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215 Security Agency, which came into existence September 15, 1945.169 The Allied Intelligence Bureau, composed of combined Allied forces in the Pacific command zone of General Douglas MacArthur, was established at Brisbane, Australia, on July 6, 1942, under the auspices of his intelligence staff, headed by Major General Charles A. Willoughby. According to MacArthur's records which Willoughby has cited: ... the history of the AlB is a secret, little-publicized but highly important chapter in the story of the Southwest Pacific. From the Solomons to Borneo, from Java to the Philippines, a small adventurous group of carefully trained specialists spread a network of observers and operatives behind the enemy lines well in advance of our main body.... Operating in almost total isolation and normally without hope of outside support, every expedition was carried out in the face of great personal risk. If discovered by the enemy, the small parties were doomed to almost certain capture and probable death. In that event those who died quickly were fortunate.... Jungle-wise "coastwat~hers," with tiny radio transmitter-receiver outfits, remained behind as the Japanese invasion wave swept forward.... From these few fearless men a powerful network of sea, air and ground spotters was developed until finally it became impossible for the enemy to make a single major move on the surface or in the sky without intelligence reports being flashed in advance to Allied forces.... At the conclusion of the desperate Gaudalcanal campaign, Admiral Halsey publicly stated that it was probable that the allies could not have retained their hard-won initiative on Guadalcanal Island had it not been for the consistent advance radio warnings by AlB agents of impending enemy air attacks.170 The Bureau was headed by Colonel C. G. Roberts, an Australian, with Lieutenant Allison Ind, an American, as his deputy. The principal structural units included a British Special Operations ("sabotage and silent killing") group, a British radio monitoring outfit, the Netherlands Indies Forces Intelligence Service, an Australian propaganda group, and the Australian "Coast Watchers." 171 MacArthur's records comment: ... It was found necessary to adjust the organizational structure on a "geographic" rather than a purely "functional" basis primarily to protect and reconcile political sovereignties. A very interesting figure emerged in the often delicate negotiations, one Mr. Van der Plaas, a former Governor of Eastern Java, related to native princes, and a top-flight dip- 1118 Ibid., p. 318-319. 110 Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain. MaoArtkur 1941-1951. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954, pp. 145-146. . 1tt Aillsonlnd. AJUed Intelligence Bureau. New York, David McKlly Company, pp.10:=-11. 216 lomat. His persuasive formula was the division of the vast Southwest Pacific along colonial lines, preserving the prewar status quo. Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, G-2 Deputy who had handled million dollar New York corporations before the war, was just the tough hombre to cut his way through tropical ambitions. The chiefs of the various AlB sections were placed under an Australian Comptroller who, in turn, was responsible to G-2 headquarters; an American Deputy Comptroller was inserted as the Finance Officer. Thus we retained a double check upon the Bureau and its elusive international components; a coordinating staff, consisting of liaison officers from each headquarters, was named to assIst the organization. Running true to form, though ostensibly under a single directorship, each of the sub-sections attempted to remain more or less autonomous, and continuous readjustments were necessary during the lifetime of the Bureau in order to achieve centralized control.172 The total manpower in the service of the AlB has been estimated at "several thousand individuals." 173 More concrete statistics indicate 164 Bureau operatives lost their lives during the war while the fate of 178 other agents remains a mystery; 75 Bureau members were captured.1a While a precise date for the termination of the AlB is not available, it certainly had ceased operations by V-J Day. ITI. Na'VaJ, InteUigence Published accounts on the organization and operations of the Office of Naval Intelligence and its Marine Corps counterpart duringWorId War II reveal very little about the structure and activities of these units. Generally, the Marine Corps collected and generated its own combat intelligence while ONI, which included Marines on its staff, had combat intelligence responsibilities for the Navy and strategic intelligence duties for both services. The Office of Naval Intelligence was initially organized on a geographic basis, then a functlonal scheme, and maintained units in each of the Naval Districts and principal fleet commands. It supervised naval attaches, naval observers, and liaison officers abroad. The Office apparently suffered from a fast turnover of Directors during the war years and was handicapped, as well, by a limited view on the part of the Chief of Naval OperatIons as to its role. According to one official history assessing the agency: Arguments as to the scope of Naval Intelligence responsibility were frequent. The position taken by CNO during World War II was that Op-16 [a Navy acronym identifying ONI] was in effect a post office charged with forwarding Intelligence reports and other data to the activity in the Navy Department most likely to need and make use of the information; that Op-16 had neither the time nor the qualified personnel to search for obscure leads in the reports pointinp; to U' Willoughby, Of). cit., p. 148. 1"lnd, Azued IntelUgetWe Bureau, p. vii. IT< Ibid. ; Willoughby, of). cit., p. 157. 217 enemy intentions with respect, ,for example, to new weapon developments or future operations. . . . The ptocess of evaluating and disseminating the information contained in Intelligence reports came in for investigation and some criticism by the Joint Congressional Committee that inquired into the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was brought out during the hearings that the Director of Naval Intelligence had authority to disseminate technical, statistical, and similar information received by his Office, but that he had no authority to evaluate certain aspects of military intelligence such as developing the enemy's intentions, nor to disseminate such information and its evaluation. These were responsibilities of the War Plans Division. The questions asked, the conclusions reached, and the recommendations made by the Joint Congressional Committee, indicated the belief that the Director of Naval Intelligence should have had more authority to evaluate and dissemmate information of that kind. The Naval authorities held, however, that the responsibility for developirtg enemy intentions from information gathered and analyzed by the intelligence service, and its dissemination must be left to the individual in the organization of the CNO responsible for war planning. It was in g'Emeral held by the Navy Department that even the War Plans Officer could not be the final arbiter in some cases. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy, and even the President might have to make the final decision. A measure of the pressing need for military intelli~nce in modern warfare was the increase in personnel employed on such work in CNO and in the field durirtg World War II. In June 1938, about 60 officers and some 100 enlisted personnel and civilians were employed in the Naval Intelli~nce Division-Op-16. On 1 July 1945, the numbers stood at 543 officers, 615 enlisted personnel, and 330 civilians. The increase in the field was even greater. At Pearl Harbor, the Naval Intelligence unit at the time of the attack consisted of a few officers and enlisted personnel. At the peak during the war some 4,500 people were engaged on such work at Pearl Harbor,175 Special activities developed by the Office of Naval Intelligence during the war seem to be security investigation, intelligence training, and psychological warfare. Three months before war broke out again in Europe in 1939, President Roosevelt issued an executive memorandum recognizing the Security Division as a functioning entity of ONI respon~ible for investigatirtg espionage, counterespionage and sabotage. . . _ Just as ONI's undercOver. agents werethe first American irtvestigators into Latin Mne1'1CR in search of Gerrtlan~pies .'''J1,lUu.s.Aug11stus~rer.Admitl.i8tratilm of th61Vav1lDiparl~ttn WorZ4 War 'II. WashingtOn, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1959, pp. 1190'-120. 218 before this country entered World War I, the ONI was the first to deal with Japanese espionage before the FBI took over in World War II. At that time, the Navy was the only American agency with any degree of knowledge about Japan. From the beginning of World War II, the rapidly expanding corps of investigators literally covered the waterfront. They checked on the backgrounds of naval civilian personnel in jobs involvinp; the national security, investigated suspected cases of espIOnage and subversive activities, guarded against sabotage, uncovered fraud in the buying or selling of naval materials, traced security leaks and did the Navy's detective work on crime. Security was their mission and protecting the naval establishment their goal. Not all threats to security, they found, need be related directly to enemy efforts.176 Development of the intelligence training organization and function must be credited to then (1942) Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Ellis M. Zacharias, who later wrote: Training of personnel was our primary problem, since we had only an inadequate intelligence school chiefly concerned with the preparation of officers for investigation duties, known as "gumshoe activities" among those in a belittling mood. Complaints heard in the field offices decided me to make training my number one project. Radical changes had to be made, and I took it upon myself to make them immediately. The old school was abolished and two new schools were created: one in Frederick, Md., called the Basic Intelligence School, to introduce newcomers to the elementary principles and techniques of intelligence; and another, the Advance Intelligence School in New York, to train intelligence officers on an operational level. This second school grew out of the realization that Naval Intelligence in war has somewhat different tasks from those of Army Intelligence. The elements of ground combat and the problems which it raises are largely nonexistent in naval warfare, so that what the Army calls its combat intelligence has but limited application in the Navy. What we needed was operational intelligence, an activity between strategy and tactics providing in intelligence everything a commander might need to take his ships into combat or to conduct amphibious warfare. The immense mobility of fleets and the wide expanse of our watery battlefield necessitated a broadening of intelligence work, too; and we felt that our operational intelligence would take all these factors into consideration. We planned to train hundreds of operational intelligence officers by driving them through a hard curriculum compressed into a comparatively short time. We actually trained a thousand-and as I now look back upon this proiect, and the demands which soon poured in upon us, I feel that we were not disappointed in our exnectations. Mv faith in Lieutenant (now Commander) John Mathis, USNR, 1'1$ Miriam Ottenberg. The Federal Invebtigators. Englewood CliffI', PrenticeHall, 1962, p. 64. 219 who headed this school, was well founded. His legal mind, pleasant personality, and keen investigative abilities gave me confidence. Ably assisted by an outstanding faculty of men high in the educational field, such as Lieutenant Richard W. Hatch, Lieutenant Garrett Mattingly, and others, the success of this undertaking was assured.177 It was also in 1942 that aNI embarked upon its psychological warfare effort, the first undertaking being a carefully programmed propaganda barrage designed to demoralize the German Navy. This was followed by similar campaigns against the Italian Navy and the Japanese. Always operating in extreme secrecy, the new unit made its initial broadcast on January 8, 1943. The establishment of what we called the Special Warfare Branch (we feared that calling it Psychological Warfare Branch we should engender even greater hostility by opponents of everything psychological) was greeted with extreme enthusiasm by the Office of War Information, which then found cooperation with the armed forces a very difficult task. Elmer Davis, director of OWl, became our champion, and whenever attempts were made to abolish our branch, he pleaded with our highest echelons and borrowed time for us so that we could continue our activities. We worked in the closest and most harmonious cooperation with OWl, which was the sole vehicle for the dissemination of our material. The broadcast recordings were prepared for OWl in a studio of the Interior Department then under the able direction of Shannon Allen, and manned with capable technicians. The broadcasts were put on the air by OWl seven times a day, three days a week from all outlets OWl then had in the United States, North Africa, and Great Britain. In addition we prepared for them a program called Prisoner-ofWar Mail, an arrangement by which German and Italian prisoners kept in this country could send g-reetings to their relatives and friends in their homelands. This was the first such attempt made in the United States, and it yielded splendid propaganda results. We also worked with OWl in drawing up propaganda directives insofar as naval warfare was concerned. and this close cooperation proved that a military and a civilian agency could work together smoothly on what was undoubtedly an important military operation.178 Cryptanalvsis operations were administered by the Office of Naval Communications and the information derived from these activities was shared with the Office of Naval Intelligence. Created in 1912 as the Naval Radio Service of the Bureau of Navigation, Naval Commun1ca6onR was attached to the newly created Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915 as a coequal unit with ONI and was named the Communications Division some four years later. In the twilight before American entry into the war, an effort was made, in 17'1 Ellis M. Zacharias. Secret Missions: The Story of an Intenigence OfJ',cer. NE'w York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946, pp. 296-297. 178 Ibid., pp. 301Hl06. 70-890 0 - 76 • 15 220 May of 1941, to create a special communications intelligence monitoring capacity for the Pacific region. In the middle of that month, the U.S. Navy took an important step in the radio intelligence field. It detached a 43-yearold lieutenant commander from his intelligence berth aboard U.S.S. Indianapolis and assigned him to reorganize and strengthen the radio intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor. The officer was Joseph John Rochefort, the only man in the Navy with expertise in three closely related and urgently needed fields: cryptanalysis, radio, and the Japanese language. Rochefort, who had begun his career as an enlisted man, had headed the Navy's cryptographic section from 1925 to 1927. Two years later, a married man with a child, he was sent, because of his outstanding abilities, as a language student to Japan, a hard post to which ordinarily only bachelor officers were sent. This three-year tour was followed by haH a year in naval intelligence; most of the next eight years were spent at sea. Finally, in June of 1941; Rochefort took over the command of what was then known as the Radio Unit of the 14th Naval District in Hawaii. To disguise its functions he renamed it the Combat Intelligence Unit. His mission was to find out, through communications intelligence, as much as possible about the dispositions and operations of the Japanese Navy. To this end he was to cryptanalyze all minor and one of the two major Japanese naval cryptosystems.179 Subsequently, the Director of ONI was g-iven an indirect role in the operations of this unit by simultaneously holding the position of Assistant Chief of Staff for Combat Intelligence in the Headquarters of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, in charge of the Combat Intelligence Division. As with all other intellip;ence agencies, CID began to grow after the United States entered tlie war and struggled with the challenges of 1942. By the next year, it had changed its name to Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet-FRUPAC, in the Navy's interminable list of acronvms. Rochefort had departed in October 1942. for two years of noncryptologic duties. He was replaced by Captain William B. Goggins, 44, a 1919 Annapolis graduate with long communications experience. Goggins, who had been wounded in the Battle of the Java Sea, remained as head of FRUPAC to January 1945. [Lieutenant Commander Thomas H.l Dyer continued to head cryptanalysis. Eventually FRUPAC comprised a personnel of more than 1,000. Much of the work was done in the new Joint Intelligence Center, housed in a long narrow building a{lross Midway Drive from rCommander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester W.l Nimib;' hellnauarters perched atop a cliff overlookingPearl Harbor. [Lieutenant Rudolph .T.1 Fabian. in Melbourne, directed a field unit smiliar to FRUPAC. He was on the staff of the Commander in Chief, 7th Fleet, which was 171 Kahn, Of}. oŁt., p. 8. 221 attached to MacArthur's South West Pacific Area command. FRUPAC's growth mirrored that of all American cryptanalytic agencies. This expansion compelled OP-20-G ra Navy acronym identifying the agency1to reorganize as early as February 1942. The workload had become too heavy for one man ([Commander Laurence F.] Safford). The outfit was split up into sections for its three major cryptologic functions: (1) the development, production, and distribution of naval cryptosystems, headed by Safford; (2) policing of American naval communications to correct and prevent security violations; (3) crytanalysis, headed by Commander John Redman. In September the development function was separated from the production. Safford retained control of the development work until the end of the war, devising such new devices as call-sign cipher machines, adapters for British and other cryptographic devices. and off-line equipment for automatic operation. About ,Tune, the Navy ceded .Tapanese diplomatic solutions to the Army, giving over its files as well as its PURPLE machine.180 While FRUPAC dealt with Japanese C'Odes, only WashingtonNaval communications headquarters-processed foreign diplomatic systems and naval ciphers used in the Atlantic theater, the.'le being primarily German.181 The Navy's official designation of OP-20-G indicated that the agency was the G section of the 20th division of OPNiAV, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy's headQuarters establishment. The 20th division was the Office of Naval Communications, and the G section was the Communications Security Section. This carefully chosen name masked its cryptanalytic activities, though its duties did include U.S. Navy cryptography. Its chief was Commander Laurence F. Safford, 48, a tall, blond Annapolis graduate who was the Navy's chip,f expert in cryptology. In January, 1934, he had become the officer in charge of the newly created research desk in the Navy's Code and Signal Section. Here he founded the Navy's communication- intelligence organization. After sea duty from 1926 to 1929, he returned to cryptologic activities for three mOre years, when sea duty was again made necessary by the "Manchu" laws, which required offioors of the Army and Navy to serve in the field or at sea to win promotion. He took command of OP-20-G in 193fi. One of his principal accomplishments before the outbreak of war was the establishment of the Mid-Pacific Strategic Direotion-Finder Net and of a similar net for the Atlantic where it was to playa role of immense importance in the Battle of the Atlantic against the U-boats.. Safford's organization enjoyed broad cryptologic functions. It printed new editions of codes and ciphers and dis- 1M Ibid., pp. 314-315. 181 Ilnd., p. 12. 222 tributed them, and contracted with manufacturers for cipher machines. It developed new systems for the Navy. It comprehended such subsections as GI, which wrote reports based on radio intelligence from the field units, and GL, a recordkeeping and historical-research group. But its main interest centered on cryptanalysis.182 Both Naval Intelligence and Naval Communications persisted as major agencies within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operati~ns in the aftermath of World War II. It would appear that in 1972 cryptologic duties were transferred from the Naval Communications Command to the Naval Security Group Command, an entity created in 1970 to manage certain internal physical and operational security matters. In 1973, the Naval Communications Command became known as the Naval Telecommunications Command. The old Office of Naval Intelligence is currently called the Naval Intelligence Command. VII. Oivilian Intelligence During World War II various Federal civilian departments and agencies were involved in intelligence activities. Chief among these was the Justice Department. Units principally involved in intelligence included the Criminal Division, the War Division, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Responsible for prosecuting violators of all Federal criminal statutes except those within the jurisdiction of the Antitrust and Tax Divisions, the Criminal Division exhibited intelligence capability in its General Crimes Section, where cases regarding the illegal sale, manufacture, and wearing of armed forces uniforms and insignia, the harboring of deserters, the making of threats against the President, and the interference with any plant, mine, or facility in the possession of the government were prepared; its Internal Se-, curity Section, organized as the National Defense Section in the summer of 1940, where cases regarding espionage, sabotage, sedition, foreign agents, treason, censorship, and other aspects of internal security were prepared; and its War Frauds Unit, established on February 4, 1942, under the joint jurisdiction of the Antitrust and Criminal Divisions, to locate and prosecute persons guilty of frauds in the handing of war contracts. The War Division, established on May 19, 1942, superseded the Special Defense Unit organized in the Office of the Attorney General in April, 194C.IDtimately abolished on December 28, 1945, it brought together a number of special bodies scattered among the Justice Department's regular components. Its principal substructures included the Special War Policies Unit, responsible for directing and coordinating activities of the Department of Justice relating to espionage, sabotage, sedition, subversive activities, and the registration of foreign agents. The Unit's Subversives Administration Section, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, directed investIgations of,and organized the evidence relating to, subversive activities carried on by Nazi, Communist, and Fascist elements in the 111 IMd., pp. 11-12. 223 United States, and recommended prosecutive and other actions. The Latin-American Section assembled information about and prepared reports on the control of subversive activities in the Latin-American countries. The Organizations and Propaganda Analysis Section collected, analyzed, and organized information on individuals, organizations, and publications in the United States that were considered to be seditious or potentially seditious. The Foreign Language Press Section made translations from and made reports on the foreign-language press of the United States.183 The Economic Welfare Section, which originated as the Economic Section of the Antitrust Division in 1942, was transferred to the War Division on August 28, 1943. Its chief functions were to collect industrial information, prepare reports on enemy or enemy-controlled industrial organizations, and aid in making this information available for use in the economic warfare efforts of the Allies. In the fiscal year 1944 the Bureau of the Budget designated the Section as the central agency of the Government to carry out research in the field of international cartels. The Economic Warfare Section was dissolved at the end of 1945. The objectives of the Section were: (1) To discover and analyze important intercompany connections among European and Far Eastern firms and the control of these firms by Germans and Japanese; (2) to analyze the means by which German and Japanese control could be eliminated; (3) to examine the legal problems that might arise because of the· use of intercompany connections by the German and Japanese governments as a means of espionage and economic warfare; (4) to analyze intercompany agreements between foreign and American companies in order to determine their effects on American trade and commerce; and (5) to examine the effect of cartel agreements among foreign companies upon the trade, commerce, and business structure of Latin-American and other countries. In carrying out these objectives, the Section made extensive investigations concerning bombing objectives and enemy potentials; engaged in studies of particular aspects of international cartels with emphasis on the techniques employed by the Germans to penetrate the economies of other countries, especially the United States and Latin-American countries: participated in the formulation of plans and prepared guides for the investigations of industrial combines in enemy or enemy-held countries during the period of occupation; and made studies of the efforts of enemy interests to obtain control of important assets in conquered areas and to screen their efforts in order to avoid the economic consequences of defeat. :llIl General Services Administration. National Archives and Records Service. The National Archives. Federal Recaril8 of WorM War II; OWiZia", Agencies (Vol 1). Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Oft'., 1950, p. 789. 224 The Section made analyses of the chemicals, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, electrical equipment and electronic devices, and the machinery and tools industries of Germany; the French, Swedish, Swiss, and other banking institutions that might have helped to establish and maintain German economic influence outside of Germany; the international control of certain commodities of international importance, such as tin, fats oil, and industrial diamonds; and the 1. G. Farbenindustrie.184 In the process of reviewing registration statements and analyzin~ the exhibits submitted by agents of foreign governments as required by law, the Foreign Agents Registration Section, transferred from the State Department on June 1, 1942, prepared reports of intelligence value on both individuals and organizations that had failed to comply with the registration requirement. During the war, the Immigration and Naturalization Service "continued its peacetime function of administering the laws relating to the admission, exclusion, and deportation of aliens and the naturalization of aliens lawfully resident in the United States, and it had a special wartime responsibility for the registration and fingerprinting of all aliens in the United States." 185 The Service had no investigators of its own until 1946 so it had to rely upon occasional assistance in this area from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.18G Nevertheless, its information holdings served an intelligence need. The Federal Bureau of Investigation served as the primary investigative agency of the Justice Department durinlZ the war period. Its principal components included thc Office of the Director, the Identification Division (fingerprints), the Security Division (investi~ation), t he Technical Laboratory (analysis development and application). and the Training Division. In addition to its regular field force of agents within the domestic United States, the Bureau also had a s~cial intelligence group in Latin America, South America, the Canbbean, Alaska, and Hawaii. This extension of operational jurisdiction, of course, created personnel problems. The grave security responsibilities placed on the FBI in war forced [Director J. Edgar] Hoover to relax temporarily the rule that new agents had to have a law degree or be accountants. The Bureau had 2,602 agents when the United States went to war, with a total personnel of '7,420. Hoover immediately sent out orders to the field offices to begin interviewing graduates of the FBI National Academy who could meet all qualifications except legal training. The FBI had to be built up to handle the tremendous volume of work, and its agent force was increased to 5,072. The total personnel increased to 13,317 on the active rolls two years after the outbreak of war.18T :IN Ibid, p. 791. UII Ibid., p. 795. 181 Ottenber~. Of). ott., ll. 213. m Dol' Whitehead. The FBI Story. New York, Pocket Books, 1958; originally publfshed 1956, p. 223. 225 Ways were sought to supplement the Bureau's information gathering workforce. One innovation was attempted in defense plant production security. Even before the United States entered the war, the FBI had, at the request of the Army and Navy, developed a system of cooperation with workmen in defense plants as a check against sabotage and slowdowns in plants with government war contracts. In World War I the Navy had initiated a plant protection program as a means of reducing the fires, explosions, accidents and labor frictions which affected war production, and the Navy plan had been adopted by the Army and the U.S. Shipping Board's Emergency Fleet Corporation. In 1931, the military agreed that III another emergency this work should be handled by the FBI. It was through these specially designated workmen who furnished information to the FBI that it was possible to determine in hundred of cases that accidents--not enemy sabotage- were responsible for damaged material, machinery and plant equipment. The informants were volunteers.ISS Another opportunity to garner supplementary personnel presented itself when the American Legion, in 1940, sought to orgamze an investigative force to ferret out subversives and seditionists. (These detection efforts were complicated by the fact that the United States was in a state of declared neutralIty with regard to international hostilities at that time.) When the Legionnaires laid their plan before Attorney General Robert Jackson and were dismayed at this response that such investigative activities should be. left to professionallaw enforcement agencies, Director Hoover came forth with a proposal of his own. The FBI plan suggested a liaison arrangement between Post Commanders and Special Agents in Charge of field divisions for discussions of national defense problems. Whenever a Legionnaire was in a position to furnish confidential information about a particular problem, he .would be designated to make reports to the FBI; but any investigation would be made by the FBI, not the Legionnaire. The proposal was accepted by the American Legion at its conference in Indianapolis in November, 1940, and this acceptance laid the basis for the wartime cooperation between the FBI and the Legion. The Legion's cooperation was typical of the aid given the FBI by many civic, fraternal and professional groups. The security program also included local law enforcement officers, who were drawn together for courses of instruction on such problems as convoy traffic, protection of public utilities, civil defense organization and the investigation of espionage, sabotage and subversion. The lessons taught were based largely on the British wartime experiences. These schools were attended by 73,164 law enforcement officers from 1940 to 1942. .. Ibid., pp. ~251. 226 From this security network the FBI received information not only from the military intelligence services, but also from workers in industry, the Legion, police officers and others who were mobilized for the war effort. Against this alignment, saboteurs made little headway.189 The Bureau jealously guarded its intelligence functions and prerogatives, fought a number of agencies, including the Office of Strategic Services, for jurisdiction in these matters, vigorously opposed the concept of a new centralized intelligence entity during the closing months of the war, and otherwifie emerged as a major intelligence institution in the aftermath of the international hostilities. At the Department of the Treasury, three agencies or units had significant intelligence duties. With the entry of the United States into the war, the Secret Service took on additional responsibilities regarding the forgery and counterfeiting of the increased number of government securities and cheques as well as ration stamps and coupons. Presidential protection required extensive security plans and intelligence for the Chief Executive's trips abroad that involved journeys through areas subject to enemy air attack and for conferences in places where enemy agents and sympathizers were known to be present. In addition, the Secret Service also had certain responsibilities for the protection of distinguished wartime visitors to the United States, necessitating an improved intelligence capability regarding individuals or organizations of potential danger to the safety of such visiting dignitaries. After the entry of the United States into the war, the Customs Service performed services with an intelligence potential for both the Treasury Department and other Federal agencies. These duties, which had a bearing upon intelligence matters, included assistance to "the State Department and the Foreign Economic Administration by investigating firms that applied for export licenses and by preventing the unlicensed export of any materials subject to export control," preventing "the entrance and departure of persons whose movements into or out of the country would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States," intercepting and examining "tangible communications carried by vessels, vehicles, and persons arriving from and departing to foreign countries to determine whether such documents contain matter inimical to the interests of the United States or helpful to its enemies," participation in certain measures for the protection of domestic ports and vessels therein against sabotage and espionage, and furnishing "the War Department with statistical information on the import and export of strategic war materials." 190 The Division of Monetary Research, established on March 25, 1938, supplied information and intelligence to assist the Secretary of the Treasury and other departmental officials in formulating and executing international financial policy. In addition to its analytical unitsthe Foreign Commercial Policy Section, the International Statistics Section, and the Foreign Exchan~eand Controls Section being of primary intelligence interest-the DIvision maintained representatives in ,''' Ibid., pp. 252-253. 190 General Services Administration, op. cit. (Vol. 1), pp. 754-755. 227 London, Paris, Rome, Berne, Lisbon, Stockholm, Cairo, Chungking, Nanking, Shanghai, and Manila. These offices conducted financial studies and participated in financial planning in the areas for which they had responsibilities, provided representation on combined Allied boards and committees and financial advisers to diplomatic missions, and represented the Foreign Funds Control abroad. In such places as Lisbon and Stockholm the Treasury offices served also as confidential listening posts for gathering information important for the operation of several agencies of the United States Government. All of the offices were responsible for collecting financial intelligence. The offices of Treasury attaches, which were closely associated with the offices of Treasury representatives, were concerned only with the collection and analysis of information on customs matters. Both classes of offices were administratively considered as field offices of the Division of Monetary Research. Besides staffing these offices, the Division detailed personnel to the War and Navy Departments to furnish financial advice and aid to military authorities outside the United States. The officers thus detailed were usually organized into "teams" or "missions" that were attached to the military headquarters in each theater of action or occupation.l9l Normally a Treasury Department agency, the United States Coast Guard, in accordance with the provisions of its organic act (38 Stat. 800), was transferred (E.O. 8929) to the Navy Department for wartime service in 1941 and returned (E.O. 9666) to Treasury Depaltment jurisdiction on January 1, 1946. An Intelligence Division had been established at Coast Guard Headquarters in 1936. Administration of intelligence responsibilities was conducted through fifteen district offices and special field units. Coast Guard Intelligence, now formally provided for in the Coast Guard regulations and organization manual, drew additional duties and manpower with the coming of war. It was responsible for anti-sabotage and counterespionage on the waterfront as well as security screening of merchant marine personnel and longshoremen. It became involved in the search for the Nazi saboteurs after a Coast Guardsman spotted them wading ashore with their boxes of dynamite on an isolated Long Island beach. It was charged with investigating Coast Guard military and civilian personnel for internal security and breaches of discipline. The Intelligence Division's wartime force grew to 370, of which 160 were investigators. Its wartime achievements on the home front were in the field of prevention. In World War I, Black Tom Island in New York harbor, major transfer point for supplies shipped to Europe, had been virtually destroyed by dynamite and German saboteurs were busy on a dozen fronts. But during 11ll Ibid., pp. 770-771. 228 World War II, there was not a single known instance of foreign-inspired sabotage on vessels or waterfront facilities which the Coast Guard was responsible for safeguarding. Since World War II, the Intelligence Division, reduced to a peacetime force of 70 investigators, has been mainly concerned with port security, keeping subversive elements out of the Merchant Marine and off the waterfronts, enforcing Coast Guard laws and insuring the internal security of the Coast Guard.192 While the Department of State received a variety of information with an intelligence potential from special overseas missions, roaming- diplomats, and foreign service officers during the war, its intelligence production capability was limited by the lack of personnel specifiCally responsible for intelligence collection, a decentralized organization which dispersed the intelligence function, and personal presidential intervention in foreign ~olicy mrutters which prompted the creation of special units serving mtelligence functions and reporting directly to the Chief Executive on foreign intelligence concerns. Organizational problems resulting from dispersed war programs administration began in the spring of 1941 with the implementation of the Lend-Lease Act (55 Stat. 31). This act and other acts relating to the importation of strategic commodities, the control of financial transactions, the establishment of priorities and allocations, and other "foreign economic warfare" programs not only had a profound effect on the general direction of United States foreign policy and the position of the United States in world affairs but also brought about a vast expansion in the Department's foreign activities and personnel. This expansion occurred chiefly m connection with the following activities: (1) The operation of the lend-lease program, involving the negotiation of lendlease agreements, the supplying of materials under these agreements to the Allies and other eligible countries, and the procurement of additional foodstuffs and raw materials for the manufacture of lend-lease goods; (2) the procurement abroad of additional foodstuffs and strategic materials needed by the United States for its own war program; (3) the control of exports of goods and funds in order to prevent their shipment directly or indirectly to the Axis countries an~ to conserve materials needed for the war prog-ram of the Umted States; (4) the distribution abroad of information concerning the United States, its policies, and its military activities in order to combat enemy propaganda; (5) the promotion of the cultural-relations program of the United States on a larger scale, especially in the other American Republic; and (6) the conduct of the political and diplomatic phases of the war, especially those phases related to maintaining the Allied coalition and developing the United Nations Organization. Except for the last-named activity, the Department was responsible for supervising and coordinating the programs but did not undertake to carry out their operational phases. .. Ottenberg, op. mt., pp. 137-138. 229 Instead, the following war agencies were established to plan and effectuate the programs relating to lend-lease, preclusive buying, foreign propaganda, cultural relations, and intelligence procurement: The Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Board of Economic Warfare (later the ForeiWl Economic Administration), the Office of War Information, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the Office of Strategic Services. These new agencies were required by the President to conform to the foreign policy of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State, and their field representatives, except those of the Office of Strategic Services, were responsible to the chiefs of the Foreign Service establishments in their areas. As the war progressed all foreign-relations work tended to be centered in the Department. It absorbed the long-range cultural programs of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in 1943, prepared the way for the absorption of the continuing functions of the above-named war agencies at the close of the war by creating offices to perform related activities, assisted in the planning that led to the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and provided overseas military commanders with political adVIsers to help them govern liberated areas in accordance with the foreign policy of the United States.193 Against this background, the State Department does not appear to have been a major intelligence producer during the war. It would seem that, in many regards, the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of War Information, the Office of Censorship, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the armed services intelligence organizations supplanted the Department in many areas of intelligence activity. Nevertheless, State did have an intelligence capability and those entities involved in such operations are profiled. On November 22, HI40, a semi-secret Division of Foreign Activity Correlation was established, appearing two years later as a unit within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Finance, Aviation, Canada, and Greenland. A departmental order of October 31, 1941, indicated the Division "was directed to interview all foreign political leaders promoting movements in the interests of their peoples and committees of foreign-born groups visiting the Department, and to give information on their activities and obtain all possible relevant information regarding their purpose, organization. and membership." 194 Such information, when obtained, would seemingly have intelligence value. Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (previously the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Commerce and Trade) two divisions reflected an intelligence potential in their activities. The Division of World Trade Intelligence was establishe<Iih the Department on July 21, 1941, to handle State Department responsibilities pertaining to the Pro- I,. General Services Administration, op. cit. (Vol. 1), pp. 691--692. 1" Graham H. Stuart. The Department 01 State: A Hi8torll 01 Its OrgamzatWn, Prooedure IUtd Per80nnel. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1949, p. 348. 230 claimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals. The Division was at first under the direct supervision of Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson but later became a part of the Board of Economic Operations and successor economic offices. On March 1, 1945, it was renamed the Division of Economic Security Controls and as such became a part of the OffiCe of Economic Security Policy on October 20 of that year. Its functions remained substantially the same throughout the war and included the application of the recommendations of the InterAmerican Conference on Systems of Economic and Financial Control (except with respect to the replacement or reorganization of Axi6, firms), and the collection, evaluation, and organization of biographic data.l95 The Division of Commercial Policy (previously the Division of Commercial Treaties and Agreements, when established on July 1, 1940, and then renamed the Division on Commercial Policy and Agreements on October 7, 1941) "included correspondence and contacts with American export-import interests and making arrangements with the foreign representative negotiating for supplies." 196 Information derived from these activities would seemingly have intelligence value regarding the structure of the export-import business community, its ties to the Axis powers and to the Soviet Union, and the determination of strategic materials being commercially imported by those regimes. One other intelligence unit maintained, in part, by the State Department was the Economic Warfare Division of the United States London Embassy and Consulate General. The Economic Warfare Division was established in the Embassy in London in March 1942 and remained in existence through June 1945. Its professional staff consisted of representatives of various United States military and civilian agencies, its top personnel being drawn to a large extent from the Foreign Economic Administration and the Office of Strategic Services. Although the Division was created to serve as a liaison channel between agencies of the United States Government concerned with economic warfare and the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, it soon became an important operational organization. Its principal functions during most of the war were to restrict trade benefiting the enemy by means of blockade control (working with the several sections of the AngloAmerican Blockade Committee) and neutral country trade control; to gather enemy economic intelligence; and to assist in strategic bombing activities. By March 1945 it was concerned with postwar occupation problems. It began to gather data on "Safehaven" operations (the prevention of enemy property from finding a safe haven in neutral territory) ; to develop plans to recover and restore enemy loot; to prepare studies on the German economy; and to collect and exploit 1'" General Services AdmInIstration, 011. cit. (Vol. 1), p. 118. 1110 Stuart, Zoc. cit. 231 captured enemy records through the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee and the United States Technical Industrial Intelligence Subcommittee. When the Division was abolished in the summer of 1945, its functions relating to neutral trade and "Safehaven" objectives were transferred to the United States Mission for Economic Affairs in London. Certain residual functions were assigned to the Office of the Economic Minister Counselor of the Embassy.197 The Department had its own cryptographic unit, known since .January of 1931 as the Division of Communications and Records. Located within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (previously the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State/Fiscal and Budget Officer: Administration of Department and Foreign Service), the component's cryptographic responsibilities included code construction, the development of procedures and methods for using same, the selection of code equipment, and the maintenance of the security of information transmitted by means of cryptographic systems. Although the Division had no cryptanalytic function, it was, nevertheless, an immense organization at the time of America's entry into the war. The Division of Communications and Records was now by far the largest agency in the Department: its telegraph section had a chief, an assistant chief, two supervisors, and 107 clerks; its telephone section, a chief operator, assistant chief operator, and thirteen operators; the records section, divided into seven sections-general, immigration, passport, personnel, political, mail, and wartrade board-numbered, together with its supervisor, assistants, chiefs, assistant chiefs, clerks, and messengers, 269, making a total personnel of 393. The cost of the telegraph messages alone amounted annually to almost $500,000. In the fiscal year 1940-1941, about 1,125,000 pieces of correspondence passed through the division, and in 19411942 this was almost doubled. This division, which worked twenty-four hours a day and 365 days a year, put in annually over 21,000 hours of unpaid overtime.1UB By the end of 1943, however, the Division experienced a severe breakdown in its operations. The war had almost demoralized the work of this division. Owing to the low salaries paid to its personnel and the pressure of work which constantly necessitated overtime, the Division of Communications and Records had long been very unpopular with its employees. A survey of salaries indicated that from 1936 to 1940 the Department of State personnel had received an average salary increase of 5.91 percent, while the increa!*' in the Division of Communications and Records was only 0.51 percent; in other words, the Department's average increase was eleven times greater than that of the DiviSIOn of Communications and Records. As a result of the 1111 General Services.Administration, Of). cit. (VoI.l), p. 743. 1. Stuart, Of). cit., p. 363. 232 low morale, the work of the division was unsatisfactory and under constant criticism. Incoming communications were ~elayed in distribution, papers were misplaced or lost, and madequate records made it difficult to locate them. Serious errors were made in the code room. Backlogs existed in every section. It was customary to have approximately 15,000 documents in the records branch which were neither indexed nor listed on the purport sheets. The vitally important telegraph section was on several occasions as much as two days behind in the coding and decoding of messages. The first requirement insisted upon by Mr. [Raymond H.] Geist [Division Chief] was a complete reclassification of positions so that salaries commensurate with the work might be available. This was begun immediately and resulted in a considerable improvement in speed and accuracy. The other requirement was an improvement of the procedure within the division. The huge backlog in the telegraph section required emergency action. The ",Var Department was asked to help out, and twenty enlisted men trained in cryptography were loaned temporarily, and within forty-eight hours the backlog of 200,000 words, or groups of words, was completely eliminated. Thereafter, from six to eight code clerks from the ·War Department remained to keep the work current. As soon as possible, high-speed equipment was added to eliminate the slow, cumbersome manual labor of decoding. For example, a machine will decode about 20 words, or word groups, per minute as against 2.7 to 3 words manually, and the results are more accurate. Working conditions were improved. Air conditioning made it possible to endure the heat generated by the mechanical cipher devices. Fluorescent lights reduced the percentage of error. The average time required for a massage in the code room was reduced from forty-eight to six hours. The introduction of airgrams also helped materially in reducing the strain in the code room.199 On September 22, 1944, a new Division of Cryptography was established, concentrating entirely upon cryptographic and related communications functions. At the Commerce Department, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce "provided commercial information to various Government agencies, makin~ special studies and re-ports for them; it acted as a major fact-finding orgnization in the field of foreign commerce for the Foreign Economic Administration...." 200 The Coast and Geodetic Survey provided charts, maps, tidal data, and geodetic and coastal survey services to the intelligence community. The National Bureau of Standards "abandoned many of its normal activities in order to handle research and testing projects for other Government agencies," some of which are thought to have been of intelligence interest. The War Division of the Patent Office "directed the search of applications for inventions in categories deemed of imporlance by Government war I,. Ibid., pp. 385-386. ... General Services Administration, op. cit. (Vol. 1), p. 864. 233 [including intelli~ence] agencies." 201 The Weather Bureau, of course, made its own umque contribution to intelligence activities when its assistance was requested. And at the end of the war, within the Office of Technical Services established by a departmental order on September 18, 1945, the Technical Industrial Intelligence Division continued the functions of the Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee, which was originally set up [under the Joint Intelligence Committee1by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was transferred to the Department of Commerce on December 18, 1945. It conducted intensive searches in enemy and other foreign countries to locate personnel, documents, and material from which technical and scientific industrial information that was developed especially during World War II might be obtained; it studied processes, methods, and techniques useful for obtaining- such information; and it analyzed and appraised the information obtained to determine its possible usefulness to business and industry in the United States.202 At the Department of Agriculture, the Ag-ricultural Research Administration developed infonnation reg-arding food production and war-created scarcities within both the United States and enemy held territory overseas. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics produced similar infonnation pertaining to demand and supply, consumption, prices, costs and income, marketing, transportation, labor, agricultural finance, farm management, credit, taxation, land and water utilization, and other aspects of agricultural production and distribution. In order to unify and consolidate the administration of governmental activities relating to foreign economic affairs, the Foreign Economic Administration, known also as FEA, was established by an Executive order [E.O. 9380] of September 25, 1943. The functions, personnel, and records of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations of the Department of State, and the foreign economic operations of the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination of the Department of State were transferred to the Administration. By an Executive order rE.O. 9385] of October 6, 1943, "the functions of the War Food Administration and the Commodity Credit Corporation with respect to the procurement and development of food, food machinery, and other food facilities, in foreign countries" were also transferred to the Foreign Economic Administration. And as military operations permitted, the Administration assumed "responsibility for and control of all activities of the United States Government in liberated areas with respect to supplying the requirements of and procuring materials in such areas." 101 Ibid., p. 881. ... Ibid., p. 202. 234 ' The Foreign Economic Administration was thus responsible for the wartime functions of export control, foreign procurement, lend-lease, reverse lend-lease, participation in foreign relief and rehabilitation, and economic warfare, including foreign economic intelligence. Its aotivities were required to be in conformity with the established foreign policy of the Government of the United States as determined by the Department of State.203 There were three predecessors to the Foreign Economic Administration which had responsibility for apprising the Chief Executive of developments weakenin~ or endangering the international economic status of the United States during the period of world war. In .July, 1941, the President had created (E.O. 8839) the Economic Defense Board "for the purpose of developing and coordinatinJ?,' pOlicies, plans, and programs designed to protect and strengthen the international economic relations of the United States in the interest of national defense." Within the Board's four geographic divisionsAmerican Hemisphere, British Empire, Europe and Africa, Far East-information available to existing government ag:encies and private commercial enterprises concerning the economic organiza-" tion capabilities, and requirements of the foreign countries within each unit's area of responsibility w!!,s obtained and analyzed. On December 17, 1941, the name of the agency was chan!!ed (E.O. 8982) to the Board of Economic Warfare and it was subseauently given (E.O. 9128). among other added responsibilities, the duty to "advise the State Department with respect to the terms and conditions to be included in the master a!rl'OOment with each nation receiv- . in!! lend-lease aid;" to "provide and arrange for the receipt by the UnitNl State.c; of reciprocal aid and benefits" from the p'overnmenf.s rec,eiving: lend-lease; and to "represent the United States Government in dealin!! with the economic warfare ~ncies of the United Nations for the purpose of relating the Government's e<',onomi" warfare nrog:rfl,ffi and facilities to those of such nations." All of t.his meant t.hat the Board had to develop appropriate information about those nations reoupstin!! lend-lease aid to determine if the prant was justifiNl by conditions in that country. The agency also had flome responsi~ hilitv for deciding what strategic materials would he imnorted into the United Stlltes. Such information, of course. had a !!:Teat intellip'ence notential. To assist in these mat.ters, the Board aITRnl!ed throuQ'h the State Department to send technical, engineerinQ', and. economil' representatives abroad. Bva directive (E.O. 9361) of .July 15. 1943, an Office of E"onomic Warfare was established within the Office for Emergencv Manap'ement. a wartime superstructure agency in close proximity to the PrP.<;idpnt, !lnd its director assumed the functions, PQwerR. and duties of the Roam of Economic Warfare which was terminat.Pd bv the same ordpr. L!tSting about six weeks, the Office of Economic Warfare onerRted lind wa>; orp."anized in approximately the same manner itS the old Roard. A directive (KO. 9380) of Seotember 21) consolidated the Office and certain other agencies, together with their personnel and ... Ibid., p. 636. 235 records, into the Foreign Economic Administration which was created by the same order. Foreign economic intelligence was prepared within the Foreign Economic Administration by the Bureau of Areas, consisting of an Office of the Executive Director and six branches-Pan American, British Empire and Middle East, European, U.S.S.R., Far East and Other Territories, and Enemy. All but the last were involved in assessing the economic warfare of Allied nations. The Enemy Branch was responsible for planning the economic program to be put into effect when the enemy countries should be occupied. It prepared studies and reports on the industrial disarmament of the enemy, including analyses of the entire economic structure of the Axis countries. Its staff units and divisions were functional in nature and gave their attention to problems relatin~ w the industrial disarmament, external economic secUrity, reparations and restitutions, requirements and allocations, food and agriculture, foreign trade, consumers' economy, property control, transportation and communications, and industry of the countries to be occupied. The Branch cooperated closely with the Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee, a subcommittee of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.204 With the end of hostilities in Europe and Asia, the necessity for such an agency ceased to exist. By an Executive order [E.O. 9630] of September 27, 1945, the Foreign Economic Administration was abolished and its remaining functions were divided among five other agencies. To the State Department were transferred the functions pertaining to lend-lease activities and to liberated areas and occupied territories, as well as responsibilities for economic and commercial research and analysis and for the J?articipation by the United States in the United Nations Rehef and Rehabilitation Administration. To the Reconstruction Finance Corporation were returned three corporations that had been taken over from it by the Office of Economic Warfare on July 15, 1943, and the functions relating to the procurement abroad of all commodities except food. The Export-Import Bank of Washington became again an independent agency as provided by an act of July 31, 1945 (59 Stat. 527). The Department of Agriculture received the functions pertaining to food and to food machinery and other food facillt~ es, includi!l~ those of the Office of Food Programs. The functions pertammg to the control of exports, technical industrial intelligence, and the facilitation of trade, and all other functions not assigned to the other agencies named above, were transferred to the Department of Commerce.20G Two special intelligence units were established at the Federal Comm~? 3tions Commission. The first of these, the Radio Intelligence DIVISIon, IN Ibid., P. 651. .. Ibid., p. 637. 70-690 0 - 76 - 16 236 established on July 1, 1940, as the National Defense Operations Section of the Field Division of the Engineering Department, developed in the early years of the war into the largest single part of the Commission's staff. Under its direction monitoring stations, strate˘cally located throug-hout the United States and its Territories and possessions, kept all radio communication channels under continuous surveillance. This surveillance was primarily aimed at preventing radio communication with the enemy abroad and the illegal use of radio at home. In addition to its monitoring stations the Division had radio intelligence centers at Honolulu, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C., which coordinated the reports in their respective areas concerning radio surveillance and directionfinding activities and enemy and illegal radio operations. It also had mobile coast units that supplied a comprehensive mobile radio surveillance extending throughout the coastal areas of the Western, Eastern, and Southern Defense Commands. At Washington headquarters, units of the Division prepared and distributed abstracts of the intercepted messages for the Chief Naval Censor, the Chief Signal Officer, the Weather Bureau, and the Coast Guard; plotted on maps the locations of unidentified, clandestine, and illegal stations; translated foreign lang'Uage "intercepts" into English; and provided full investigatory services. The Division picked up SOS calls and reports of submarine attacks and relayed them to naval stations; furnished "fixes" to locate lost airplanes, ships in distress, or stations causing interference to vital military circuits; intercepted enemy radiotelegraph intelligence covering economic conditions, war production, materials, supplies, morale, and other pertinent data; trained personnel of other Government agencies in direction-finding, detection and monitoring, and the evaluation of "fixes." Its function differed from that of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service in that it intercepted messages that were sent in radiotelegraph code to specific points as distinguished from broadcasts of enemy for purposes of propaganda.206 In addition, the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, established as the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service in February 1941, recorded, translated, analyzed, and reported to other agencies of the Government on broadcasts of foreign origin. It set up listening posts at Silver Hill, Md., London, San Francisco, Portland, Oreg., Kingsville, Tex., San Juan, r·R., .and other places to intercept broadcasts of foreign news, mtellIgence, or propaganda emanating from authorized stations and clandestine transmitters in belligerent, occupied, and .neutral countries. At the listening posts, translations of the mtercepted broadcasts were made and immediately teletyped or cabled to Washington headquarters. Some broadcasts ..Ibid., pp. 937-988. 237 were also recorded on disks. At Washington, incoming wires and transcriptions were edited and the more significant parts, or the full texts, were teletyped to the Government agencies that were waging war on the military, diplomatic, and propaganda fronts. Special interpretations and daily and weekly summaries were prepared at headquarters and distributed to appropriate Government agencies and officials. Through. cooperative arrangements with the Office of War InformatIOn, the British Ministry of Information, and the British Broadcasting Corporation, editors of the Service were assigned to overseas posts maintained by those agencies to select material valuable for transmission to Washington. Editors and monitors of the Service acted as part of the Arm:r Psychological Warfare Branch in North Africa when AllIed troops were landed there in 1943. On December 30, 1945, the Service was transferred to the War Department.207 The Office of War Information, established within the Office for Emergency Manag-ement by a director (E.O. 9182) of June 13, 1942, consolidated (the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office. of Government Reports, the Division of Information of the Office for Emergency Management, and the Foreign Information Service's Outpost, Publications, and Pictorial Branches of the Office of the Coordinator of Information) into one agency war information functions of the Federal government, both foreign and domestic. The unit's intelligence functions included phychological warfare, both its development and effects, and the collection of overseas media-print, film, and radio. In general, the Office consisted of two principal branches: Domestic Operations and Overseas Operations. A Policy Development Branch was established in the initial organization but lasted only until September when it was absorbed by the Domestic Operations Branch. Within the Domestic Operations Branch, in addition to the media clearance and production bureaus (Book and Magazine, Graphics, Motion Picture, News, and Radio) there were two intelligence entities : the Foreign News Bureau and the Special Services Bureau. The former was established in March 1944, taking over the functions and records of the Foreign Sources Division of the News Bureau. Its main function was to provide the American press, radio commentators, and other news outlets with war information obtained from foreign sources available only in a limited way, if ~t all, to ~ongovernmentalagencies. To this end it used momtormg serVIce:;;, excerpts from the press of occupied and en~my countries, and special reports from overseas. A special umt handled releases to the religious and educational press. The Bureau served as a receiving and distributing agent for all P?Oled .press copy from overseas war theaters. Other funct~ons mcluded the analysis of enemy propaganda technIqUes 208 lIO'l'Ibid., pp. 938-939. ... Ibid., p. 554. 238 On the other hand, the Special Services Bureau continued functions begun in the Office of Facts and Figures and the Office of Government Reports. The Bureau was responsible for providing specialized informational services to all agencies and for providing the general public with a centralized source of information concerning Government activities, organization, and personnel. Its Division of Educational Services, which provided informational material for discussion groups and helped to coordinate the educational activities of war agencies, and its Division of Surveys, which conducted public opinion and other surveys, were terminated early in 1944. The Divisions of Press Intelligence, Public Inquiries, and Research continued until August 31, 1945, when the Bureau's remaining functions and records were transferred to the Bureau of the Budget. The following year they were again transferred to the temporarily reconstItuted Office of Government Reports.209 Within the Overseas Operations Branch, in addition to its propaganda and news production, distribution, and analysis bureaus (Communications Facilities, News and Features, Overseas Motion Picture, Overseas Publications, and Radio Program), there was an administrative support unit-the Output Service Bureau-and the Bureau of Overseas Intelligence. The Bureau of Overseas Intelligence, originally known as the Bureau of Research and Analysis, maintained a central intelligence file, kept a running audit of the reliability of intelligence sources, and provided all sections of the Overseas Operations Branch with information necessary to their activities. Until late in the war it functioned through the Current Liaison Division, which maintained liaison with the Department of State, the Military Intelligence Service, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Branch's Overseas Planning Board in Washington and operational intelligence offices elsewhere, and other agencies; the Analysis Division. which classified and analyzed intelligence from the foreign press, radio broadcasts, intercepted communications, and other sources and cooperated closely with the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service; and the Field Intelligence Division, which directed the collection and distribution of intelligence from outposts. In 1944 the Bureau was recognized and thereafter functioned through the Central Intelligence Division, the Regional Analysis Division, and a special research unit known as the Foreign Morale Analysis Division....210 The Foreign Morale Analysis Division referred to above was established in the spring of 1944 under a cooperative arrangement with the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department General Staff to provide information about the morale of the Japanese and social conditions within Japan. Its - Ibid., p. 560. 210 Ibid., p. 566. 239 work was performed by two groups, one in the Office of War Information and the other in the "rar Department. The first group translated and analyzed materials available through nonmilitary sources, such as Japanese publications and transcripts of Japanese broadcasts, while the 'Val' Department group analyzed materials received from military sources, esspecially prisoner-of-war interrogation reports and captured enemy documents. By the spring of 1945 the cooperative unit was also known as the Joint Morale Survey and was divided into the Morale Research Unit (OWl) and the Propaganda Section (mainly Army), w'hich "'as concerncd primarily with the analysis of Japanese radio propaganda. The results of the research weI e presented to interested officials by means of formal reports and special memoranda and in formal and informal conferences. The reports ranged from over-all studies of military morale and the effects of Allied propaganda to special studies of subjects investigated upon request.2l1 In addition to its central Washington headquarters, the Office of War Information maintained offices in Xew York and San Francisco for the pe formance of certain of its functions. In addition to various shifting outposts overseas, a major control facility was established in London. On V-E Day the Office counted 38 outposts in 23 countries; the agency had no jurisdiction in Latin America. And with the termination of world hostilities, OWl came to an end. The Office of 'Val' Information was terminated by an Executive order [E.O. 9608J of August 31, 1945, to become effective September 15, 1945. The Overseas Operations Branch, including its executive and security Offices in New York and San Francisco, the Office of the Assistant Director for Management, and the Office of General Counsel, were transferred with their records to the Interim International Information Service of the Department of State, which was established by the same order. On January 1, 1946, these units became a part of the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State. The functions and records of the Special Services Bureau were transferred from the Domestic Operations Branch to the Bureau of the Budget, where they remained until they were transferred by an Executive order of December 12, 1946, to the reconstituted Office of Government Reports.2l2 The Office of Censorship, created by a directive (E.O. 8985) of December 19, 1941, had responsibility for censoring communications by mail, cable, radio, or other means of transmission passing between the United States and any foreign country. Deriving its basic operating authority from the First War Powers Act of 1941 (55 Stat. 840), the Office conducted its work in some 20 postal stations and 17 cable stations throughout the country in accordance with standards of censorship estabm Ibid., pp. 56lH>67. 2lJ I1nd. 548. 240 lished by the Washington office. Commissioned officers of the Navy performed cable censorship operations throughout the war, but postal censorship, which was at first carried on by commissioned officers of the Army, was transferred to civilian officials early in 1943.213 Internally, the Office was organized into seven divisions: Press, Broadcasting, Postal, Cable, Administrative, Reports, and Technical Operations. With regard to intelligence matters, the Reports Division "classified and delivered to interested Government agencies the various types of submission slips made in the process of censorship." 214 The Technical Operation unit was created in August 1943 to perform the work of the Office of Censorship in the field of counterespionage. It maintained close liaison with the intelligence agencies of the Government and supervised the work of censorship laboratories in combating the use of secret inks and developing techniques for detecting codes and ciphers. Through its efforts the Office of Censorship was able to hinder the effectiveness of the enemies' secret communications. On the basis of evidence uncovered by the Division the Federal Bureau of Investigation built up espionage cases leading to the conviction and punishment of a number of Axis agents.215 As with the other temporary wartime agencies, the Office of Censorship ceased operations with the end of world war. A Presidential directive of August 15, 1945, instructed the Director of Censorship to declare voluntary press and radio censorship at an end and to discontinue the censorship activities of the Office of Censorship. An Executive order (E.O. 9631] of September 28, 1945, provided that the Office should continue to function, for purposes of liquidation only, until November 15, 1945, at which time it should be terminated. The Treasury Department took over responsibility for completing the liquidation of the affairs of the Office.216 These were the erincipal Federal departments and agencies recognized to have exhIbited a capacity for intelligence operations during World War II. This is not a definitive collection of such intelligence entities depicted here. Undoubtedly arguments could be made for the inclusion of other units whose intelligence capacity was not immediately apparent in this research or which otherwise had secret intelligence functions. However, such exceptions, in all likelihood, will be most unusual omissions. VI II. Post-war Adjustment In the aftermath of the war, two not indistinct realizations were experienced within the Federal intelligence community: the loss of the Office of Strategic Services and the need for some type of coordinating "'" Illid.., p. 319. - Ibid., p. 324• .... lbid. lie Ibid., p. 319. 241 and/or leadership mechanism within the postwar intelligence structure. Viewing OSS as a wartime necessity, President Truman, anticipating criticism for the continuation of the agency when world peace had been restored, hastily abolished this entity in a directive (E.O. 9621) of September 20, 1945, effective ten days later. The result was that the new Chief Executive and his aides were suddenly denied the valuable intelligence produced by this unique and effective organization and experienced this loss at a time when summit conferences among the major world powers gave increased impetus for its availability. The General Staff, Joint Intelligence Committee, and Combined Intelligence Committee experiences during the war prompted interest at the highest defense policy and organization levels in an improved intelligence coordination mechanism. A centralized intelligence agency had been proposed during World War I by Treasury Secretary William McAdoo.217 OSS Director William Donovan had also proposed such an entity in 1944.218 To serve this intdligence coordination func-. tion, the President issued a directive (11 F.R.1337, 1339), dated January 22, 1946, establishing a National Intelligence Authority with a support staff called the Central Intelligence Group. Addressed to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, this instrument said: 1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. I hereby designate you, together with another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose. 2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof. 3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall: a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments. b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies IlT See Chapter 2, [165J. III See Chapter 3, pp. [224-227]. 242 and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission. c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. d. Perfonn such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct. 4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be exercised under this directive. 5. Such intellig~nce received by the intelligence agencies of your Departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence. Authority shall be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of said intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence in connection with planning functions. 6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence. 7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority. 8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential directives, other departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence infonnation relating to the national security as is in their possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence may from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the National Intelligence Authority. 9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives. 10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods. While this arrangement may have facilitated the coordination of intelligence matters, the Central Intelligence Group was incapable of ever approaching the scope of operations achieved by the OSS. Not only was the staff inadequately small in number and temporary in status, but its leadership was not stable: Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers first headed the unit but within six months he wa.c; succeeded by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg; in May. 1947, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter became director of the Group and, after the Central 243 Intelligence Agency displaced. the CIG, made the transition to lead the CIA. From 1947 (when the armed services were unified and reorg-anized under the Department of Defense superstructure, the National Security Council, the now defunct National Security Resources Board and the Central Intelligence Agency was established) to the present, there has been a steady growth in intelligence institutions and organization. The remaining portion of this study is devoted to the evolution and growth of these entities. IX. Atomic Energy Oommission Created in 1946 (60 Stat. 755) and further empowered in 1954 (68 Stat. 919) as the sole agency responsible for atomic energy management, production, and control, the Atomic Energy Commission administered nuclear power matters for almost two decades before a general reorg-anization of the Federal government's energy policy structure brought about its demi~ in 1975. The Commission was the recipient of the legacy of the Manhattan Project, operated by the Army Corps of Engineers for the development of the atomic bomb during the war. Since 1947 the agency has maintained an intelligence unit under various identifications: Director, Office of Security and Intelligence (1954-1955), Director, Division of Intelligence (19551971), and Assistant General Manager for National Security (19721975). 219 In the period between 1949, when the first Soviet nuclear test was reported, and the end of February 1958, the AEC announced some thirty-one nuclear explosions as having been detonated by the Soviet Union. Not all Soviet atomic explosions are publicly announced by the commission, nor are full details given. But information about all such tests is quickly communicated within the intelligence community. Such information is a basic requirement for officials responsible for national security plans and programs. For example, if the Soviets were known to be conducting certain types of nuclear tests, these might reveal the state of progress of hydrogen warheads for ballistic missiles or progress in developing defensive nuclear missiles.220 This type of intelligence is gathered through machinery, such as seismic devices, and atmospheric sampling procedures. The United States has maintained continuous monitoring of the earth's atmosphere to detect radioactive particles from atomic tests. Samples of atmosphere are collected in special containers by U-2 and other aircraft flying at high altitudes. AEC is able to determine from these samples and other data not only whether an atomic explosion has occurred, but also the power and type of weapon detonated. It also con- ... The periods indicated for these titles are approximate and are based upon the ·appearance of the referrent in official government organization manuals for the years specified. ... Harry Howe Ransom. The Intelligence Establishment. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 145. 244 ducts extensive research and experimentation to prevent detection of atomic explosions and methods of penetrating any. such protootive shielding as might be devised by another natlon.221 The agency also utilizes its own "state of the art" techniques in nuclear ~nergy 'productio~ to assess the status of atomie power developments III foreIgn countrIes. . The Atomic Energy Commission is therefore a consumer and producer of intelligence in the critical national security field of nuclear energy, and is accordingly represented on the U.S. Intelligence Board by its director, Division of Intelligence. The AEC is vitally interested in receiving data on foreign atomic energy or nuclear weapons developments and provides technical guidance to CIA and the intelligence agencies of the armed services in collecting these raw data. The AEC, in turn, becomes a producer of intelligence when it produces information on nuclear energy and develops estimates as to the atomic weapons capabilities of foreign powers. This processed intelligence is disseminated to the National Security Council, the armed forces, and others in the intelligence establishment. The specific functions of the AEC Intelligence Division are to keep the AEC leadership informed on matters relating to atomic energy policy; in formal terms the division "formulates intelligence policy and coordinates intelligence operations." It sets the intelligence "requirements" of the AEC, which may be supplied by the various operating arms of the intelligence community. It represents the AEC in the interagency boards and committees concerned with foreign intelligence and it provides other intelligence agencies with technical information in the hope of assuring competency in the collection and evaluation of atomic energy intelligence.222 In accordance with the provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1233), the Atomic Energy Commission was superceded by the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in January 1975. The first of these new agencies assumed the old Commission's intelligence functions, the AEC Assistant General Manager for National Security becoming the Assistant Administrator for National Security at ERDA. The new Administration is also represented on the United States Intelligence Board. X. NatiO"lUil S e<mrity Oowncil The National Security Council evolved from efforts begun in 1944 for the unification of the armed services and culminating in the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 496). Both the Council and its centralized intelligence coordinating sub-agency generally devel- 211 Monro MacCloskey. The American InteZUgence Community. New York, Richards Rosen Press, 1967, p. 141. ... Ransom, 01'. cit., p. 146. 245 oped from the National Intelligence Authority-Central Intelligence ~roup experience and a principal study of post-war defense organizatIon matters prepared at the suggestion of Senator David I. Walsh (D.-Mass.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, for Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal by New York investment broker Ferdinand Eberstadt.m While numerous other reorganization ideas would follow, the Eberstadt report recommended the maintenance of three departments, War, Air and Navy, with each having a civilian secretary, a civilian under secretary, and a commanding officer. A National Security Council, composed of the Secretaries of vVar, Navy and Air, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a permanent secretariat would be established to facilitate interagency clearances. In the absence of the President, the Vice President or the Secretary of State would preside as Chairman. The duties of the Council would be to exercise critical policyforming and advisory functions in the setting up of foreign and military policy. A Central Intelligence Agency was to be made a constituent part of the Council's organization with the Joint Chiefs of Staff serving as the principal coordinating unit. The latter would be given statutory authority permitting it to advise the Council on strategy, budgetary problems, and logistics.224 As initially establishecl in 1947, the Council was an independent agency with a membership including the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Air, Navy, and the Chairman of the (now defunct) National Security Resources Board with the option that the Chief Executive might also include the heads of two other sredal defense units (now expired). Two years later the membershIp of the Council was overhauled (63 Stat. 579) to include the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and certain other defense officials which the Chief Executive might specify as members, subject to Senate confirmation. Also, in accordance with Reorganization Plan No.4 of 1949 (63 Stat. 1067), the Council was formally located within the Executive Office of the President. Two aspects of NSC organization and operation are of interest to this study: staff growth and activities and coordination mechanisms developed under the auspices of of the Council. The general staffing pattern of the NSC would appear to be a movement from a small secretariat to a large professionalized body competing with the bureaucracies of the defense and foreign policy agencies ... See u.s. Congress. Senate. Committee on Naval Affairs. Unijloation of the War and Navy Departments and PostuJar Organization for National Security. Committee Print, 79th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1945. - Edward H. Hobbs. Behind the President: A Study of El1!ecutive 08f,oe Agencies. Washington, Public Mairs Press, 1954. p.I29. 246 an~ departme.nts for access to the President.225 The availability of the ChIef Exe~~tlVe to t~e NSC staff has been enhanced by the decline of ~he C.ouncII. s ExecutIve ~ecretary l.lnd virtual replacement by a presIdentI. al a~sIstant for natIOnal securIty matters; the creation of various coordmatIOn mechanisms reporting to the Council, where the Chief Executive presides, or directly to the President has also increased the influence of this staff with the man in the White House. Under President Truman, who did not make extensive use of the panel, the NSC staff, a small body of permanent Council employees and officers detailed temporarily from the :participating agencies, was headed by a nonpolitical civilIan executive secretary appointed by the President. An "anonymous servant of the Council," in the words of the first executive secretary [Sidney W. Souers], "a broker of ideas in criss-crossing proposals among a team of responsible officials," he carried NSC recommendations to the President, briefed the chief executive daily on NSC and intelligence matters and maintained his NSC files, and served, in effect, as his administrative assistant for national security affairs. The organization of the NSC staff was flexible and, as the Council developed, changed to meet new needs. In general, during the pre-Korean period, it consisted of three groups. First was the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Secretariat, composed of permanent NSC employees, which performed the necessary basic functions of preparing agenda, circulating papers, and recording actions. Next was the Staff, consisting almost entirely of officials detailed on a full-time basis by departments and agencies represented on the Council, and headed by coordinator detailed from the State Department who was supported, in turn, by a permanent assistant. This body developed studies and policy recommendations for NSC consideration. The third group consisted of consultants to the executive secretary, the chief policy and operational planners for each Council a~ncy. Thus, the head of the Policy Planning Staff represented the State Department, the Director, Joint Staff, represented the Department of Defense, and so forth.226 Late in July, 1950, President Truman ordered a reorganization and strengthening of the Council. Attendance at NSC sessions was lim- ... See: Paul W. Blackstock. The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration. Armed Forces and &>ciety, v. 1, February, 1975: 231-250; I. M. Destler. Can One Man Do? Foreign PoUcy, no. 5, Winter, 1971-72: 28-40; Stanley L. Falk. The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. PoUtical Science Quarterly, v. 79, September, 1964: 403-435; Paul Y. Hammond. The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and Appraisal. American Political Saience Review, v. 54, December, 1960: 899-911; Edward A. Kolodziej. The National Security Council: Innovations and Implications. Public Administratioo Review, v. 29, November/December, 1969: 573-585; John P. Leacacos. Kissinger's Apparat. Foreign Policy, no. 5, Winter, 1971-72: 3-28; Alfred D. Sander. Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947. The Journal of American History, v. 59, September, 1972: 369-389; Frederick C. Thayer. Presidential Polley Processes and "New Administration:" A Search for Revised Paradigms. Public AdministratiOn Review, V. 31, September/October, 1971: 552-561. ... Falk, op. cit., pp. 408-409. 247 i~ed to statutory members and five other specifically designated offiCIals (the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,. the Director of Central Intelligence, a Special Assistant to the Pres!dent ['Y. Averell Harriman], and a Special Consultant to the PresIdent [SIdney W. Souers]) together w'ith the Executive Secretary (James S. Lay, Jr.).227 The President also directed a reshuffiing of the NSC staff. The permanent Secretariat rema:ined, but the Staff and consultants were replaced by a Senior Staff and Staff Assistants. The Senior Staff was composed of representatives or State, Defense, NSRB, Treasury, JCS, and CIA, and shortly thereafter of Harriman's office, and headed by the Executive Secretary, an official without departmental ties. Members were generally of Assistant Secretary level or higher and in turn designated their Staff Assistants. The Senior Staff participated closely and actively in the work of the Council. Not only did it continue the functions of the Staff, but it also took over responsibility for projects formerly assigned to ad hoc NSC committees. It thus provided the Council with continuous support by a high-level interdepartmenta1 staff group. The Staff Assistants, who did most of the basic work for the Senior Staff, spent a large part of their time in their respective agencies, where they could better absorb agency views and bring them to the fore during the developmental phase of NSC papers. The position of the executive secretary, moreover, as chairman of the Senior Staff and also head of the permanent NSC staff in the White House, gave that official an intimate view of the President's opinions and desires that he 'Could brings to bear quite early in the planning process. And finally, JCS and Treasury representation on the NBC staff filled needs that had been long felt.228 With the arrival of the Eisenhower Administration, the Council was transformed into a highly organized and enlarged forum for the formulation or both national defense and foreign policy. Auxiliary coordination units were added to the NSC structure and the panel's factual research and policy paper production was supervised by the first officially designated presidential assistant for national security matters, Robert Cutler (James S. Lay, Jr., continued as the Council's Executive Secretary) .229 Most of this machinery disappeared in 1961, = By this time the Council's statutory membership had been altered by a statutory amendment (63 Stat. 579) to the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 496) and the panel had been officially located (63 Stat. 1067) within the Executive Office of the President. = Falk, op. cit., p.415. 229 Cutler's official title, first appearing in the government organization manual for 1954, was 'Special Assistant to the Presideut for National Security Affairs and was listed in both the White House Office staff and National Security Council staff. Stress must be placed upon this being an official title for certainly other presidential aides had been regarded as assistants for national security matters. Thus one finds, for example. President Truman writing that when Admiral William D. Leahy retired as White House Chief of Staff in March, 1941, "... I brought Admiral Souers to the White House in the new capacity of Special Assistant to the President for Intelligence." Officially, ,Souers was Executive Secretary of the NSC. Truman, op cit., p. 58. 248 however, with the arrival of the Kennedy Administration and the NSC became but one of several means by which foreign policy and defense problems might be scrutinized. Normally the President assigned the preparation of a study or recommendation to a Cabinet official or one of his top subordinates. This official, in turn, was responsible for obtaining other departmental views and checking and coordinating with other responsible individuals. Sometimes he did this within small, interdepartmental groups, specially created to study the problem, sometimes by arranging for subordinates in each interested agency to develop the matter. 'Where appropriate, this included close consultation with the Budget Bureau. Fiscal matters were considered during- the development of a study and in drawing up recommendations and proposals; papers no longer had separate financial appendices. The completed report included not only the responsible officials own analysis and recommendations for action, but also a full statement of any differing views held by other agencies or individuals. This was true whether the report was prepared by one person or by a special task force. The final version, presented to President Kennedy at a formal meeting of the NSC or within smaller or larger panel or subcommittee meetings, was then discussed and, if necessary, debated further before the President made his decision. Once the chief executive approved a specific recommendation, the respunsible agency or department made a written record of the decision and the head of that agency, or a high-level action officer, was charged with overseeing its implementation.230 President Kennedy did not, however, discard the special assistant's role in Council operations and national security matters. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, also played an important role in the national security process. Not only was he a. top presidential adviser, but as overall director of the NSC staff he participated in all Council-related activities. He and his assistants had a va.riety of responsibilities in addition to their normal secretariat functions. They suggested areas for consideration and the mechanisms for handling these and other problems; followed studies through the planning stage and saw that they were properly coordinated, staffed, and responsive to the needs and desires of the President; ensured that a written record was made of all de~isions, whether they were reached at formal NSC meetings or at other top conferences; and kept tabs on the implementation of whatever policy had been adopted. In this work, Bundl and the NSC staff coordinated closely with other parts 0 the presidential staff and the Bud~t Bureau, performed whatever liaison was necessary, and met frequently with the President at regular White House staff meetings. 230 Falk, 011. cit., p. 430. 249 For,mal NSC meetings were held often but irregularly, sometImes as frequently as three times a week and usually at least once every two weeks. In the first half year of the Kennedy administration, for example, the Council met sixteen times. Many matters that had been considered at regular sse meetings under Eisenhower were now handled in separate meetings of the President with Secretaries Rusk and McXamara or with a single Cabinet officer, or in committees of the NSe that included only some of the statutory members but also several of their top deputies or other government officials, or at meetings below the presidentiallevel.231 While President Johnson largely continued to operate in much the same manner as his predecessor with regard to national security matters, President Nixon significantly altered these arrangements by vesting a great deal of autonomy in his assistant for national security affairs, granting that agent a large staff responsible to his personal supervision (the XSC Executive Secretary position remained vacant during the Nixon tenure). When Kissinger came to Washington he told a number of people of his determination to concentrate on matters of general strategy and leave "operations" to the departments. Some dismissed this as the typical disclaimer of a new White House staff man. Yet much in Kissinger's writings su?,gests that his intention to devote himself to broad "policy' was real. He had repeatedly criticized our government's tendency to treat problems as "isolated cases," and "to identify foreign policy with the solution of immediate issues" rather than developing an interconnected strategy for coping with the world over a period of years. And his emphasis was primarily on problems of decision-making. He defined the problem basically in terms of how to get the government to settle on its major policy priorities and strategy, and had been slow to recognize the difficulty of getting the bureaucracy to implement such a strategy once set. Kissinger found a kindred spirit in a President whose campaing had denounced the Kennedy-Johnson de-emphasis on formal national security planning in favor of "catch-ascatch- can talkfests." And the system he put together for Nixon is designed above all to facilitate and illuminate major Presidential foreign policy choices. Well over 100 "NSSM's" (National Security Study Memoranda) have been issued by the White House to the various foreign affairs government agencies, calling for analysis of major issues and development of realistic alternative policy "options" on them. These studies are cleared through a network of general interdepartmental committees responsible to Kissinger, and the most important issues they raise are argued out before the President in the National Security Council. Nixon then makes a 231 Ibid., p. 432-433. 250 decision. from. among the options, usually "after further private delIberatIOn." 20" W?ile the .NSC itself. may not ~ave met any more frequently under PresIdent .Nlxon than It dId durmg the Kennedy-Johnson regimes, the CouncIl served as an important coordinating mechanism for Dr. Kissinger in centralizing and affirming his control over national security and intelligence matters. As in the Eisenhower period, a variety of auxiliary panels were created for special aspects of security policy; these were chaired by Kissinger and provided staff support by his NSC personnel. The principal auxiliary units (not all, for some, undoubtedly, were never publicly acknowledged and a definitive list is not otherwise known to exist) associated with the Council since its creation are discussed below. On May 10, 1949, President Truman announced the creation of two panels which would flank the NSC structure. The first of these, the Interdepartmentai Committee on Internal Security, was chaired initially by the Special Assistant to the Attorney General with representatives from the Department of State, Defense, and Treasury as well as the NSC (the last in an adviser-observer capacity). Largely a paper structure, this body has been almost totally inactive during the past decade; nevertheless, responsibility for its operations currently lies with the head of the internal security section of the Criminal Division, Department of .rustice. The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, the other unit established by President Truman, was initially headed by J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and counted among its members the heads of Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence agencies and an NSC representative (the last, again, in an adviserobserver capacity). Slightly more active than the counterpart internal security panel, the Conference has, since the death of Director Hoover, been maintained by a secretariat within the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Both of these entities, one predominantly military and the other largely civilian in scope, are responsible for coordinating certain investigations of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and related internal security matters. Because the differentiation between their jurisdiction is not altogether clear, fundamental disagreements between them over such matters are settled by the NSC ; however, in view of the inactivity of these units, it would seem that few disputes over jurisdiction have been taken to the Council recently by these panels.233 In June, 1951, a Psychological Strategy Board was established by presidential directive.234 Supplanting an earlier board created in the Department of State under Assistant Secretary Edward W. Barrett, the new panel attempted to determine the psychological objectives of the United States and coordinated and evaluated the work of operating psychological warfare agencies. Under the terms of its charter, ... Destler, op. mt., pp. 28-29. ... Hobbs, op. cit, p. 150. • 8< See Public Papers of the Presidrnts of the United States: Harry B. Truman, 1951. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965, pp. 341-342. 251 the Board was obligated to "report to the National Security Council on ... [its] ... activities and on its evaluation of the national psychological operations, including implementation of approved obJectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned." Composed of ,the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence (or their designees), and such other representatives as determined by them, the unit was ultimately abolished (E.O. 10483) on September 2,1953, when Reorganization Plan No.8 of that year (67 Stat. 1642) established the United States Information Agency which assumed the functions of the Board. Finding a need for improving the manner in which NSC policies were carried out, President Eisenhower created (E.O. 10483) the Operations Coordinating Board in September, 1953, which, after the Chief Executive approved a policy submitted by the Council, was to consult with the agencies involved as to: (a) their detailed operational planning responsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the coordination of the interdepartmental aspects of the detailed operational plans developed by the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) the timely and coordinated execution of such policy and plans, and (d) the execution of each security actIon or project so that it shall make its full contribution to the 'attainment of national security objectives and to the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world, and (e) initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation. In addition to the Under Secretary of State, who acted as chairman, the panel consisted of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Foreign Operations, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs might attend any session of the Board on his own volition and the Director of the United States Information Agency was to advise the body upon request. In his efforts at streamlining the national security structure, President Kennedy terminated (E.O. 10920) the Board in February 1961. The Forty Committee (also known as the Special Group, the 54/12 Group, and the 303 Committee) was established by a secret NSC order # 54/12 and derived from an informal Operations Coordinating Board luncheon group. Created sometime in 1955, the panel has had a varying membership but has reportedly included the Director of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and, during the past decade, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the presidential assistant for national security affairs. During the past three administrations the President's national security assistant is thought to have chaired the group's sessions. According to one authority, it is this unit which makes "policies which walk the tightrope between peace and war;" 235 another source credits the committee with - David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. The InvillibZe Government. New York, Vintage Books, 1974; originally published 1964, p. 263. 70-890 0- 76 - 17 252 holding authority on the execution of CIA clandestine operations!36 In this latter regard, the group functions as a shield against claims that the Chief Executive directly approved some morally questionable clandestine activity; this function of the panel would not, however, seem to excuse the President from his constitutional obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." 237 With the arrival of the Nixon Administration in 1969, Dr. Kissinger instituted three new NSC coordinating mechanisms. The Under Secretaries Committee, initially headed by Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin, was "originally designed as the chief implementing body to carry out many (but not all) Presidential NSC directives" but, according to a 1971 evaluation, the panel's "actual importance (never very great) continues to lapse." 238 "Another is the Senior Review Group, now [1971] at an Under Secretary level and chaired by Kissinger, which usually gives final lJ,pproval to the NSC study memoranda after making sure that 'all realistic alternatives are presented'." 239 The third entity, the Washington Special Actions Group, included as members, as of late 1971, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. It functions as "top-level operations center for sudden crises and emergencies." 240 On November 5, 1971, the White House announced additional reorganization efforts with regard to the intelligence community, the net outcome of which was the establishment of three more NSC panels: ... a National Security Oouncil Intelligence Oommittee, chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Its members ... include the Attorney General, the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence], the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Committee will give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence user. . . . a Net Assessment Group within the National Security Council staff. The group [is] ... headed by a senior staff member and ... [is] responsible for reviewing "'Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult of IntelUgence. New York, Alfred A. Knop, 1974, pp. 325-327; this currently controversial account of Cen':ral Intelligence Agency and foreign intelligence community operations contains the most recent and detailed publicly available statistical estimates regarding Federal Intelligence resources. :m See U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera· tions With ResJ)f'ct To Intelligenf'e Af'tivitics. AlIef/ed As·.as8ination P7,ots Involvinq Foreign Leader!!. Committee print, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, pp. 9-13. [Also, published as S. Rept. 94-465 with identical pagination.] .... Leacacos, Of}. cit., p. 7. IS Ibid. ..., Ibid., pp. 7-8. 253 and eva.luating all intelligence products and for producing net assessments. . . . an Intelligence Re8ource8 Advi80ry Oommittee, chaired by the DCI, including as members a senior representative from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of Manag-ement and Budget, and the Central Intelligence Agency. This Committee ... advisers] the DCI on the preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget.241 These units, together with the above named groups and the Verification Panel, which is responsible for monitoring the intelligence related to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and is chaired by Dr. Kissinger, constitute the major NSC affiliates of interest to this study. Unless otherwise noted, all of these entities are officially operative though, in some instances, they exhibit little functional activity. Xl. Oentral Intelligence Agency Viewed by some as a revitalized model of the Office of Strategic Services, the Central Intelligence Agency was established as a subunit of the National Security Council by the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 496) with responsibilities (1) to advise the NSC on intelligence matters related to national security, (2) to make recommendations to the Council regarding the coordination of intelligence activities of the Federal Executive departments and agencies, (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide for its appropriate dissemination, (4) to perfonn such additional services for the benefit of existing intelligence entities as the NSC determines can be effectively accomplished by a central organization, and (5) to perform such additional functions and duties relating to national security intelligence as the Council may direct. The Agency's organic statute was amended in 1949 by the Central Intelligence Agency Act (63 Stat. 208) which sought to improve CIA administration hy strenfftheninl! the powers of the director. Among- other authorities granted, this law exempts the Agency from any statutory provisions requiring the publication or disclosure of the "org-anization, functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed" and. further, directs the Office of Management and Budg-et (then identified as the Bureau of the Budget) to make no reports on these matters to Cong-ress. Nevertheless, in spite of this restrictive lan!!Uage, some gleanings are available on the organization of the CIA.242 This scenario necessarily includes not only the evolution and current status of the Agency's internal structure, but extends as well to entities apart from the Ag-ency which are headed by the Director of Central Intelligence and unofficial affiliates in the service of the CIA. The head of the Old Central Intelligence Group. Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, served as the first director of the Central Intelligence tU See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, v. 7, November 8, 1971 : 14~2. ' ... 'l'hl're al'e. of roUl'lll'. VllrlOllll al'COllnts of eTA operntions and exnloits bnt these are generally unenUl!'htenin~ with regArd to orlranizational considerations and are, therefore, outside of the scope of this study. 254 Agency. But, while this leadership continuity assured an easy transition from one unit to its successor, the Agency was struggling with internal organization difficulties and liaison relationships .during its first years of operation. These problems diminished with the arrival of Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, former Secretary of the General Staff under General George C. Marshall and Chief of Staff to General Dwight D. Eisenhower in Europe, as Director of Central Intelligence in 1950. Former CIA official Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., offers this view of Smith's impact on the Agency. Under the persistent prodding of General Smith, the intelligence community moved toward coordination and centralization. He was impatient with jurisdictional arguments, whether within the CIA or among the services. His attitude was that there was more than enough work for eV9l'ybody. He had the authority and used it. Within the CIA he reorganized the operational arm, established new guidelines for interagency cooperation, and established a support arm to provide the personnel, training, communication, logistics, and security so necessary in intelngence activities. He separated research from the estimating process and proposed a division of research responsibilities among the intelligence agencies. The Intelligence Advisory Committee gamed stature as the governing body of the communIty. Perhaps no action more typified the style and personality of General Smith than the organization of the operational offices of the CIA. The agency had inherited its foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence offices from the OSS, and in the five years since the Second World War these had been consolidated, reorganized, and reoriented to peacetime conditions. By 1948 another office had been added to engage in covert operations or political warfare. The new office was in, but not of, the CIA. It took its directives from a StateDefense committee, not the DCI. One of Smith's first actions on becoming director in October 1950 was to announce that he would issue the orders to this office. He later directed that the two offices (foreign intelligence and covert operations) be merged and that the deputy director concerned and the two assistant directors in charge of those offices work out the details. As one of the assistant directors, I participated in what were extended and exhaustive negotiations. In the summer of 1952 Smith finally accepted our proposals and called a meeting of all of the division and staff chiefs of the to-be-merged offices to announce the new organization. Although everyone present knew that the director was impatient to have the merger implemented, there were a couple who wanted to argue it. Smith gave them short shrift; his quick temper flared and he srathingl;y stopped the discllssion. announced what was to take place, and stalked out. One of my colleaQ:ues leaned over and whispered, "My God, if he is that terrifying now, imagine what he must have been at full weight I" During the Second \Vorld War, when he was Eisen255 hower's Chief of Staff, Smith had weighed about 185, but an operation for stomach ulcers had reduced his size by fifty pOunds.243 When Smith departed from the CIA directorship in 1952, he was succeeded by a man who was not only his equal in organizational abilities, but an individual virtually without equal in intelligence operations: Allen Welsh Dulles, the ass master spy in Switzerland during World War II, lately head of the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination which carried out political subversion missions, and brother of the new Secretary of State. While Dulles, himself, has written very little about his organization and manner of administering the Central Intelligence Agency, one close observer of his operating techniques has written: ... one of the first things we did when he became the Director was to abolish the office of the Deputy Director of Administration [DD/A]. In a city renowned for its bureaucratic administration and its penchant for proving how right C. Northcote Parkinson was, Mr. Dulles' first act was more heretical to most Washingtonians than one of Walter Bedell Smith's first actions-the one in which he told the McCarthy [Senate investigation of Communist activity] hearings that he thought there might well be Communists in the Agency. Washington was not as upset about the Communists as it was to learn that a major agency of the Government had abolished A.dministration. Mr. Dulles took the view of the intelligence professional, that it was much more dan~rous and therefore undesirable to have all kinds of adIriinistrators acquiring more information than they should have, than it was to find some way to get along without the administrators. While the public was mulling over that tidbit from the CIA, the real moves were being made inside the organization, where no one could see what was going on. The Deputy of Intelligence fDD/I] , strengthened by the addition of the Current Intelligence organization [which prepares the daily intelligence report submitted to the President] and other such tasks, was to be responsible for everything to do with intelligence, and more importantly, was to be encumbered by nothing that had to do with logistics and administration. That was the theory. In practice, the DD/I has a lot of administrative and support matters to contend with, as does any other large office. However, as much of the routine and continuing loads as could be was set upon the Deputy Director of Support [DD/S]. A.t the same time, the new and growing DDIP [Plans] (the special operations shop) was similarly stripped of all encumbrances and freed to do the operational work that Dulles saw developing as his task. This left the DD/S (Support) with a major task. He was responsible for the entire support ..a Lyman B. Ki"knatrickJ Jr. The F.B. TlIteTUgenee Otm/.munit1JR Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities. New York, Hill and Wang, 1973, pp. 32-33. 256 of the Agency, support of all kinds, at all times, and in all places.244 As an "intelligence professional," Dulles held strong views as to the type of individuals who should lead the Agency and serve it. During the hearings on the proposed National Security Act of 1947, he sent a memorandum on the CIA provisions to Senator Chan Gurney (R.S. D.), Chairman of the Committ~eon Armed Services, indicating his view that the new intelligence entity ... should be directed by a relatively small but elite corps of men with a passion for anonymity and a willingness to stick at that particular job. They must find their reward in the work itself, and in the service they render their Government, rather than in public acclaim. Elsewhere in his statement he opined that the Agency "must have a corps of the most competent men which this country can produce to evaluate and correlate the intelligence obtained, and to present it, in proper form, to the interested Government departments, in most cases to the State Department, and in many cases to the Department of National Defense, or to both." 245 Dulles continued to express this view after he left the directorship, offering perhaps his most developed account on this point in a 1963 writing. From the day of its founding, the CIA has operated on the assumption that the majority of its employees are interested in a career and need and deserve the same guarantees and benefits which they would receive if in the Foreign Service or in the military. In turn, the CIA expects most of its career employees to enter its service with the intention of durable association. No more than other large public or private institutions can it afford to invest its resources of time and money in the training and apprenticeship of persons who separate before they have begun to make a contribution to the work at hand. It can, in fact, afford this even less than most organizations for one very special reason peculiar to the intelligence world-the maintenance of its security. A sizable turnover of short-term employees is dangerous because it means that working methods, identities of key personnel and certain projects in progress will have been exposed in some measure to persons not yet sufficiently indoctrinated in the habits of security to judge when they are talking out of turn and when they are not. The very nature of a professional intelligence org-anization requires, then, that it recruit its personnel for the long pull, that it carefully screen candidates for jobs in order to determine ahead of time whether they are the kind of people who will be competent, suitable and satisfied, and that once ... L. Fletcher Pronty. The Secret Team. Englewood C1i1'ls, Prentice-HaIl, 1978, pp. 245-246. ... SPe U.S. Con~ress. Senate. Committee on Armed Sprvices. National Defense EaatalJUshment: Unification of the Armed Services. Hearings, BOth Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Oft'., 1947, pp. 525-528. 257 such people are within the fold their careers can be developed to the mutual advantage of the government and the officer.246 Yet, regardless of these expressions of personnel policy, the overriding factor in CIA recruitment during Dulles' tenure would seem to be security, a condition brought to bear not by the Director's own choosing but, rather, by the tirades of the junior Senator frum Wisconsin, Joseph R. McCarthy. The CIA Director told the President he would resign unless McCarthy's vituperation was silenced. Eisenhower had been reluctant to stand up to the politically powerful (and politically useful) senator. But he accepted Dulles' contention that McCarthy's attacks on the Agency were damaging to the national security. Vice-President Nixon was dispatched to pressure McCarthy into dropping his plans for a public investigation. The senator suddenly became "convinced" that "it would not be in the public interest to hold public hearings on the CIA, that that perhaps could be taken care of administratively." The "admmistrative" remedy McCarthy demanded as the price of his silence was a vast internal purge of the Agency. The senator privately brought his charges against CIA "security risks" to Dulles' office. He had lists of alleged "homosexuals" and "rich men" in CIA employ and provided Dulles with voluminous "allegations and denunciations, but no facts." To insure, however, that his charges were taken seriousl; r by CIA, McCarthy continued to threaten a public investigation. At his infamous hearings on alleged subversion in the Army, the senator frequently spoke of "Communist infiltration and corruption and dishonesty" in CIA. He called this a "very, very dangerous situation" which disturbs me "beyond words." The pressure took its toll. Security standards for Agency employment were tightened, often to the point of absurdity, and many able young men were kept from pursuing intelligence careers.247 The author of the above passage suggests that the effect of the new security standards were profound for the development of the Central Intelligence Agency: III brief, individuals who had been involved in any type of leftist ideological cause would find it difficult to obtain employment with the CIA. Because of the situation, the flow of diverse viewpoints through new personnel was restricted and a likeminded manner of thinking began to evolve within the agency. As a consequence of this state of affairs, and for other reasons, some CIA employees abandoned their intelligence careers and sought more rewarding positions in the diplomatic and foreign policy establishment. These shifts also had an interestin~ effect in terms of the CIA's image and impact. .... Allen W. Dulles. The Oroft of InteUigence. New York, Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 171-172. 'n Smith, OJ}. cit., pp. 370-371. 258 State Department officials have learned the power of their clandestine opposite numbers. In March 1954, a Texas attorney with long business experience in South America was named Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. At one of his first briefings, the Texan learned that the CIA had set aside $20 million to overthrow a leftist regime in q-uatemala. The Assistant.Secretary. raised vigo~ous objections to the whole plan until he was SIlenced by hIS superior, th~ Undersecretary of State-who happened to be ex-CIA DIrector Walter Bedell Smith. On several other occasions during the 1950s, John Foster Dulles felt that his own ambassadors could not be "trusted" and should not be informed of CIA operations in their countries. And those operations, as often as not, were undertaken by arrogant adventurers who had developed operational independence from a relatively enlightened staff at CIA's Washington headquarters.u8 At present the Central Intelligence Agency is thought to be organi1: ed into five entities-the Office of ilie Director and its satellites and four functional directorates.249 At the head of the agency are the Director and Deputy Director, both of whom serve at the pleasure of the President and are appointed subject to confirmation by the United States Senate. Either of these officials may be selected from among the commissioned officers of the armed services, whether active or retired, but one position must always be held by a civilian. There is also a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community (prior to 1973 this official was known as the Deputy Director for Community Relations) who assists the Director of Central Intelligence in his administrative responsibilities outside of managing the Agency. One satellite entity attached to the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence is a small group of senior analysts, drawn from the CIA and other agencies, who prepare the National Intelligence Estimates which are position papers assessing potentiality or capability for the benefit of U.S. policy makers-e.g., Soviet strategic defense capability, grain production in Communist China, or the political stability of Argentina, Chile, Angola, or Jordan. Founded in 1950 as the Board of National Estimates and initially headed by OSS veteran Dr. William Langer, the unit was reorganized in October, 1973, when its name was changed to National Intelligence Officers (NIO). Each NIO is either a geographic or functional expert and is allotted one staff assistant. "Flexibility" is a frequently used word in the CIA under [Director William E.] Colby, who has recruited an NIO for economic problems from RAND corporation, another for arms control ("Mr. Salt Talks") and others for key geographic areas such as Russia, China, and the Middle East. Reportedly, the NIOs are to be recruited from all agencies within the intelligence community (with a ... Thid.. p. 376. - This general description is taken from Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. The OIA and the Oult of IntPlUgence. New York. Alfred A. Knopf, 1974, pp. 6779; corroborating information has been compared from other public descrilltionR of the Agency. 259 sprinkling of functional experts from the outside), and the military NIOs are to have general officer rank in order to add prestige to the position. If so, this provision is suspect, since the promotion system within the armed forces does not assure that good intelligence estimators will be advanced to general officer rank. On the contrary, as experience in Vietnam has repeatedly demonstrated, high rank is often associated with poor estimating ability and loss of touch with reality. If NIO positions are stafted with general officers, the latter will have to depend on their staff assistants for credible estimates. However, the system as envisaged will enable the NIO to go outside CIA for expertise and advice, thus playing specialists from one government agency (or industry) against each other in an adversary process of arriving at balanced estimates. It will also enable the NIO to let contracts for the study of certain problems to academia.250 The other satellite attached to the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence is the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, successor to the National Intelligence Resources Board created in 1968 by CIA Director Richard Helms. Both units were designed to assist in the coordination and management of the intelligence community's budget. While the old Board consisted of the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Sta.te Depa.rtment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research with the Deputy Director of CIA as chairman, the new Committee, established during President Nixon's 1971 intelligence reorganization to a.dvise "the DCI on the preparation of a. consolidated intelligence program budget," added a senior representative from the Office of Management and Budget to the group and designated the CIA Director, acting in his capacity as coordinator of national intelligence, as chainnan. Another panel which might be mentioned a.t this juncture is the United States Intelligence Board. Esta.blished in 1960 by a. classified Na.tional Security Council Intelligence Directive, the Board is the successor to the Intelligence Advisory Committee created in 1950 as an interdepartmental coordinating forum chaired by the CIA Director and counting representatives from the armed services intelligence units, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence a.nd Resea.rch, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a.nd the Atomic Energy Commission as members. The Committee and its successor function (ed) as a "board of directors" for the intelligence community. At present, USIB reportedly a.ssists a.nd a.dvises the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to the issua.nce of Na.tional Intellip;ence Estimates; setting intelligence collection requirements, priorities, and objectives; coordinating intelligence community estimates of future events and of enemy strengths; controlling the classification and security systems for most of the Federa.l Government and protecting intelligence sources and methods; directing resea.rch in various fields of technical intelligence; and deciding what infonnation is to be sha.red with the intelligence services of allied or friendly nations.251 The Board consists of a. representative from the State .. Rla~kst()ck. Of). cit.• p. 239. m Marchetti and Marks. O'[J. oit., pp. 81-84. 260 Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Research and Development Administration (successor to the Atomic Energy Commission on nuclear intelligence matters), and the Deputy Director of CIA. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency was included in 1961 and three years later the status of the armed services representatives-the Army, Navy, and Air Force having been represented on the original Board-was downgraded from member to observer, on the grounds that the Defense Intelligence Agency member represented all of them. In the 1971 intelligence community reorganization announced by President Nixon, a Treasury Department representative was added to USIB. Meeting approximately once a week, the Board's agenda and minutes are classified; when the panel goes into executive session, all staff members are excluded from the proceedings. USIB is supported by an interdepartmental committee structure which "encompasses every aspect of the nation's foreign intelligence requirements, ranging from the methods of collection to all areas of research." 252 While these standing committees have numbered as many as 15,253 a recent disclosure indicates a reduction to 11 units in mid-1975.254 The other components of the Office of the Director include those traditionally found in governmental bureaucracies: press officers, congressional liaison, legal counsel, and so on. Only two merit special note: the Cable Secretariat and the Historical Staff. '1'he former was established in 1950 at the insistence of the Director, General Walter Bedell Smith. When Smith, an experienced military staff officer, learned that agency communications, especially those between headquarters and the covert field stations and bases, were controlled by the Clandestine Services, he immediately demanded a change in the system. "The operators are not going to decide what secret information I will see or not see," he is reported to have said. Thus, the Cable Secretariat, or message center, was put under the Director's immediate authority. Since then, however, the operators have found other ways, when it is thought necessary, of keeping their most sensitive communications from going outside the Clandestine Services. The Historical Staff represents one of the CIA's more clever attempts to maintain the secrecy on which the organization thrives. Several years ago the agency began to invite retiring officers to spend an additional year or two with the agency-on contract. at regnlar pay-writing their official memoirs. The product of their effort is, of course,highly classified and tight~y restricted. In the agency's eyes, this is far better than havmg former officers openly publish what really happened during their careers with the CIA.255 .... Kirkpatri('k, op. cit., p. 39. ... Mllrf'hetti and Marks, 01J. cit., p. 81. ... U.S. Commis<>ion on CIA Activities Within the United States. RepfYrl to the Pre.~dent.WIlf'hington. V.R. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, p. 70. ... Marchetti and Marks, op. cit., p. 70. 261 Outside of the Office of the Director, the Agency is organized into four functional directorates: Operations, Management and Services Science and Technology, and Intelligence. The first of these-th~ Directorate of Operation&-is the clandestine services unit, reportedly consisting of about 6,000 professionals and clerks in a rough two to one ratio with approximately 45 percent of this workforce stationed overseas (the "vast majority" in cover positions).256 Composed of some fifteen components, the Directorate has most of its personnel ("about 4,800 people") within the so-called area divisions which correspond to the State Department's geographic bureau arrangement. The largest area division is the Far East (with about 1,500 people) followed in order of descending size by Europe (Western Europe only), Western Hemisphere (Latin America plus Canada), Near East, Soviet Bloc (Eastern Europe), and Africa (with only 300 staff). The chain of command goes from the head of the Clandestine Services to the chiefs of the area divisions, then overseas to the chiefs of stations (COS) and their chiefs of bases (COB).257 There is also a Domestic Operations Division which "is, in essence, an area division, but it conducts its mysterious clandestine activities in the United States, not overseas." 258 Grouped with the area divisions, the Special Operations Division's "main function is to provide the assets for paramilitary operations, largely the contracted manpower (mercenaries or military men on loan), the materiel, and the expertise to get the job done." 259 Apart from the area divisions are three staffs within the Directorate of Operations: "Foreign Intelligence (espionage), Counterintelligence (counterespionage), and Covert Action, which oversee operational policy in their respective specialties and provide assistance to the area divisions and the field elements." 260 The remaining three components of the Clandestine Services provide technical assistance to the operational components. These three are: the Missions and Programs Staff, which does much of the bureaucratic planning and budgeting for the Clandestine Services which writes up the justification for covert operations submitted for approval to the 40 Committee; the Operational Services Division, which among other things sets up cover arrangements for clandestine officers; and the Technical Services Division, which produces in its own laboratories the gimmicks of the spy trade-the disguises, miniature cameras, tape recorders, secret writing kits, and the like.261 The Directorate of Management and Services, formerly the Directorate of Support, is the Agency's administrative and housekeeping 2l5I IbU• ..., I1Iid., p. 71. .. Ibid., p. 72; certain of these "mysterious clandestine activities" have been revealed in U.S. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, 0fJ. oU., pp. 20R-22i'i. .. Marchetti and Marks, Zoe. cit. 110 Ibid. ... IbM., p. 73. 262 component but, according to one former insider, "most of its budget and personnel is devoted to assistin~ the Clandestine Services in carrying out covert operations," contributing "in such areas as communications, logistics, and training." 262 Within the Directorate: The Office of Security provides physical protection for clandestine installations at home and abroad and conducts polygraph (lie detector) tests for all CIA employees and contract personnel and most foreign agents. The 'Office of Medical Services heals the sicknesses and illnesses (both mental and physical) of CIA personnel by providing "cleared" psychiatrists and physicians to treat agency officers; analyzes prospective and already recruited agents; and prepares "psychological profiles" of foreign leaders (and once, in 1971, at the request of the Watergate "plumbers," did a "profile" of Daniel Ellsberg). The Office of Logistics operates the agency's weapons and other warehouses in the United States and overseas, supplies normal office equipment and household furniture, as well as the more esoteric clandestine materiel to foreign stations and bases, and performs other housekeeping chores. The Office of Communications, employing over 40 percent of the Directorate of Management and Services' more than 5,000 career employees, maintains facilities for secret communications between CIA headquarters and the hundreds of stations and bases overseas. It also provides the same services, on a reimbursable basis, for the State Department and most of its embassies and consulates. The Office of Training operates the agency's training facilities at many locations around the United States, and a few overseas.... The Office of Personnel handles the recruitment and recordkeeping for the CIA's career personne1.263 The Directorate of Intelligence, counting some 3,500 employees, is concerned with the generation of finished intelligence products and the provision of certain services of common concern for the benefit of the entire intelligence community.264 The Directorate's principal units include an Operations Center (management and coordination), a secretariat for the United States Intelligence Board which the CIA Director chairs, an Intelligence Requirements Service (collection and needs), a Central Reference Service, a Foreign Broadcast Information Service (a world-wide radio television monitoring system), an Office of Operations, an Office of Current Intelligence (daily developments), an Office of Strategic Research (long-range planning), an Office of Economic Research, an Office of Basic and Geographical Research, an Imagery Analysis Service (photographic analysis), and a National Photographic Interpretation Center (run in cooperation with the Defense Department for analyzing photographs taken from satellites and high altitude spy planes). The fourth and newest of the Agency's directorates, Science and Technology, employs about 1,300 people in carrying out basic research 1IU Ibid. ... Ibid., pp. 73-74. w. Ibid., p. 75. 263 and development functions, the operation of spy satellites, and intelligence analysis in highly technical fields. Composed of an Office of Scientific Intelligence, an Office of Special Activities, an Office of Research and Development, an Office of Electronics, an Office of Special Projects, an Office of Computer Services, and a Foreign Missiles and Space Activities Center, the Directorate has been credited with a leadership role in the development of the U-2 and SR-71 spy planes and "several brilliant breakthroughs in the intelligence-satellite field." 265 In the areas of behavior-influencing drug and communications intercept systems development, the Directorate experienced a certain amount of controversy with regard to testing these entities within the domestic United States.266 Beyond this structuring of the Central Intelligence Agency there have been a variety of unofficial affiliates in the service of the CIAfront groups, proprietary organizations, and well established social, economic, and political institutions which received Agency funds for assistance they provided or secretly transmitted such money to a third party for services rendered, at least until these practices were made public. The CIA's best-known proprietaries were Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, both established in the early 1950s. The corporate structures of these two stations served as something of a prototype for other agency proprietaries. Each functioned under the cover provided by a board of directors made up of prominent Americans, who in the case of RFE incorporated as the National Committee for a Free Europe and in the case of RL as the American Committee for Liberation. But CIA officers in the key management positions at the stations made all the important decisions regarding the programming and operations of the stations.267 Other CIA "businesses" which became apparent in the 19608 were the Agency's airlines-Air America, Air Asia, Civil Air Transport, Intermountain Aviation, and Southern Air Transport-and certain holding companies involved with these airlines or the Bay of Pigs effort, such as the Pacific Corporation and the Double-Chek Corporation. 268 Then, in early 1967, the disclosure was made that the CIA had, for fifteen years, subsidized the nation's largest student organization, the National Student Association.2il9 This revelation heightened press interest in CIA fronts and conduits. Eventually it became known that the Agency channeled money directly or indirectly into a panoply of business, labor, and church groups, the universities, charitable organizations, and educational and cultural groups, including: 270 African American Institute .. Ibid., pp. 76-77. - See U.S. Commission or CIA Activities Within the United States, oJ}. cit., pp. 225-232. 2fI1 Ibid., pp. 134-135. 11II Ibid., pp. 135, 137. .. See Sol Stern. A Short Account of International Student Politics & the Gold War with Particnlar Reference to the NSA, CIA, Etc. Ramparts, v. 5, March, 1967: 29-38. "'. This list is drawn from Wise and Ross, OJ}. cit., pp. 247n-248n. 264 American Council for International Commission of Jurists American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees American Friends of the Middle East American Newspaper Guild American Society of African Culture Asia Foundation Association of Hungarian Students in North America Committee for Self-Determination Committee of Correspondence Committee on International Relations Fund for International Social and Economic Education Independent Research Service Institute of International Labor Research International Development Foundation International Marketing Institute National Council of Churches National Education Association National Student Association Paderewski Foundation Pan American Foundation (University of Miami) Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Synod of Bishops of the Russian Church Outside Russia United States Youth Council Andrew Hamilton Fund Beacon Fund Benjamin Rosenthal Foundation Borden Trust Broad-High Foundation Catherwood Foundation Chesapeake Foundation David, Joseph and Winfield Baird Foundation Dodge Foundation Edsel Fund Florence Foundation Gotham Fund Heights Fund Independence Foundation J. Frederick Brown Foundation J. M. Kaplan Foundation Jones-O'Donnell, Kentfield Fund Littauer Foundation Marshall Foundation McGregor Fund Michigan Fund Monroe Fund Norman Fund Pappas Charitable Trust Price Fund Robert E. Smith Fund 265 San Miguel Fund Sidney and Esther Rabb Charitable Foundation Tower Fund Vernon Fund Warden Trust Williford-Telford Fund In addition to these domestically based entities, a number of foreign beneficiaries of CIA funds were revealed as well. Probably others have been disclosed which are not recorded here. Undoubtedly persistent research and investigation will unearth additional entries for this roster. However, to the extent that details regarding the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency remain cloaked in secrecy, the identity of the unofficial affiliates of the CIA will continue to be elusive. XII. Defen-'Je Intelligence Since World War II, the intelligence organization of the Department of Defense and the armed services has been subject to a variety of changes which have sought to reduce the independence of the nation's fighting forces by unifying their administration with a view toward promoting a more effective use of resources. This effort began in a grand manner with the creation of the National Military Establishment and the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1947 (61 Stat. 495) and the institution of the Department of Defense two years later (63 Stat. 578). Intelligence was but one common defense function which was greeted by the unification trend. At the end of World War II the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to continue the Joint Intelligence Committee created in 1942 as a coordinating mechanism. With the demise of the Office of Strategic Services in 1945, the Joint Chiefs created the Joint Intelligence Group (sometimes referred to as J-2) within its Joint Staff authorized by the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 505). In 1961 the Joint Intelligence Group was supplanted by the newly created Defense Intelligence Agency which assumed the role of principal coordinator for intelligence matters among the armed services. Until 1961, coordination with the civilian side of the Department of Defense was maintained through the Defense Secretary's Assistant for Special Operations, who served as principal aide to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary on all matters pertaining to the national intelligence effort. The office of Assistant for Special Operations rather suddenly disappeared in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961. Another arrangement, never publicized, was made for a special assistant to the Defense Secretary to supervise these activities. He represented the Secretary on special interdepartmental intelligence boards and committees.21l Intelligence coordination matters were given a significant impetus in 1972 when an Assistant Secretaryship was created to supervise "Defense intelligence programs through the entire management cycle, from initial research and development through programming, budgetm Ransom, op. cit., p. 102. 268 it later hired separately, and housed itself in their buildings. 274 The success of the unified approach to cryptolog-y evidenced by the operations of the Armed Forces Security Agency warranted an expansion of that institution to include cryptosystems outside of the Defense Department, such as those maintained by State. Accordingly, President Truman promulgated a classified directive creating the National Security Agency on November 4,1952, abolishing the Armed Forces Security Agency, and transferring its assets and personnel to the new successor. Such an aura of official secrecy surrounded NSA that no acknowledgement of its existence appeared in the government organization manuals until 1957 when a brief, but vague, description was offered. In brief, according to one expert, NSA "creates and supervises the cryptography of all U.S. Government agencies" and "it interprets, traffic-analyzes, and cryptanalyzes the messages of all other nations, friend as well as foe." 275 It is the American Black Chamber reincarnated with the most highly sophisticated technology available, an estimated staff of 20,000 employees at its home ba~ (Fort Meade, Maryland) with between 50,000 to 100,000 persons III its service overseas, and an annual budget thought to range between $1 and $1.2 billion.276 According to best estimates, the National Security Agency is organized into three operating divisions-the Office of Production (code and cipher breaking), the Office of Communications Security (code and cipher production), and the Office of Research and Development (digital computing and radio propagation research, cryptanalysis, and development of communications equipment)-and supporting units for recruiting and hiring, training, and the maintenance of both physical and personnel security.277 In November. 1971, President Nixon directed certain changes in the organization of the intelligence community, among them the creation of a "National Cryptologic Command" under the Director of the National Security Agency.278 The result of this announcement was the organization of the Central Security Service, comprised of the Army Security Agency, the Naval Security Group, and the U.S. Air Force Security Service with the NSA Director concurrently serving as the Chief/CSS. Apparently established to consolidate the crvptanalytic activities of the armed services, the official purpOSe of CSS, as stated in the FY 1973 Annual Defense Department Report to Congress, is to provide a unified, more economical, and more effective structure for executing cryptologic and related electronic operations Previously conducted under the Military Departments. The Military Departments will retain administrative and 10- .." KRhn, op. cit., pp. 379--880. ..,. Ibid., pp. 380-381. .... Dou~lfls Watson. NSA: America's Vacuum Cleaner of Intelligence. Washington Post, March 2, 1975 : AI. m Kahn, op. cit., pp. 385-388; Ransom, op cit., pp. 130-132; Wise and Ross, op. cit. p. 2]0. m See Weekly Oompilation of Presidential Documents, v. 7, November 8, 1971: 1482. 267 also commander of the Defense attache system and chairman of the weekly meetings of the Military Intelligence Board, composed of the chiefs of the four armed services. In addition to a General Counsel office, an Inspector General unit, and a Scientific Advisory Committee, the Defense Intelligence Agency presently consists of the following components which respond directly to the Director/Deputy Director leadership: Chief of Staff/Deputy for Management and Plans (policy development and coordination, plans, operations management and formulation of requirements for functional management systems), Deputy Director for Intelligence (including responsibility for allsource finished military intelligence but not scientific and technical intelligence, maintenance of target systems and physical vulnerability research, military capabilities, and current intelligence assessments, reporting, and warning), Deputy Director for Collection, Deputy Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Deputy Director for Estimates, Deputy Director for Attache and Human Resources, Deputy Director for Support (support activities and administrative services), Deputy Director for Information Systems (intelligence information and telecommunications systems), Deputy Director for Personnel, Comptroller, and the Defense Intelligence School created in 1962 and supervised by a commandant.273 The National Security Agency, an independently organized entity within the Department of Defense, is the product of efforts at unifying and coordinating defense cryptologic and communications security functions. In the first postwar years, the cryptologic duties of the American armed forces reposed in the separate agencies of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. The Army, at least, charged its agency with maintaining "liaison with the Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, and other appropriate agencies, for the purpose of coordinating communication security and communication intelligence equipment and procedures." Presumably the Navy and the Air Force units were similarly charged. This arrangement, which relied on internal desire instead of external direction, prolonged the abuses [once] hinted at by [General Douglas MacArthur's World War II intelligence chief, Major General Charles A.] Willoughby. To rectify them and achieve the benefits of centralized control, the ~fense Department in 1949 established the Armed Forces Security Agency. The A.F.S.A. took over the strategic communications-intelligence functions and the coordination responsibilities of the individual agencies. It left them with tactical communications intelligence, which can best be performed near the point of combat and not at a central location (except for basic system solutions), and with low-echelon communications security, which differs radically in ground, sea, and air forces. Even in these areas, A.F.S.A. backed them up. A.F.S.A. drew its personnel from the separate departmental agencies, though ... Earlier organization models for the Defense Intelligence Agency may be found in MacCloskey (1967), op. cit.. pp. 92-93; Ransom (1970), op. cit., p. 105; Kirkpatrick (1973), op. cit., pp. 40-41. 70-890 a - 76 - 18 266 i~g, and the .fin~l proc~ss of follow-up evaluation ... [and to provI~ e] the I?rmcIpal pomt for management and policy coordination wIth the DIrector of Central Intelligence, the CIA and other intelligence officials and agencies outside the Department ~f Defense." 272 The new Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) also has malfagement overview responsibilities with regard to the Defense IntellIgence Agency and the National Security Administration in terms of coordinating their programs with those of the other Defense Department intelligence functionaries. Established by a departmental directive (DoD 5105.21) dated August 1, 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency is responsible for: (1) the organization, direction, management, and control of all Department of Defense intelligence resources assigned to or included within the DIA; (2) review and coordination of those Department of Defense intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the military departments. Over-all guidance for the conduct and management of such functions will be developed by the Director, DIA, for review, approval, and promulgation by the Secretary of Defense; (3) supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs policies, and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA; (4) obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of Department of Defense intelligence resources. This includes analysis of those DOD intelligence activities and facilities which can be fully integrated or collected with non-DOD intelligence organizations; (5) responding directly to priority requests levied upon the Defense Intelligence Agency by USIB [United States Intelligence Board] ; (6) satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of the Department of Defense. The Agency was a by-product of the post-Sputnik "missile gap" controversy of the late 1950s. Faced with disparate estimates of Soviet missile strength from each of the armed services which translated into what have been called self-serving bud~et requests for weapons for defense, the United States Intelligence Board created a Joint Study Group in 1959 to study the intelligence producing agencies. In 1960 this panel returned various recommendations, among which were proposals for the consignment of the defense departments to observer, rather than member, status on the Intelligence Board and the creation of a coordinating Defense Intelligence Agency which would represent the armed services as a member of USIB. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara adopted these proposals. The Director of DIA functions as the principal intelligence staff officer to both the Secretary of Defense and. the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reporting to the Secretary through the Joint Chiefs. The Director is ... u.s. Department of Defense. National Security Strategy 01 Reali8tic Deterrence: Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's Annual Defense Department Report FY 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, pp. 134---135. 269 gistic support responsibilities for the military units involved, but these units will be managed and controlled by the CSS.279 The 1971 intelligence community reorganization also called for the consolidation of all Defense Department personnel security investigations into a single Office of Defense Investigations. From this mandate a departmental directive (DoD 5105.42) dated April 18, 1972, was issued chartering the Defense Investigative Service. Operational as of October 1 of that year, the Service consists of a Director, a headquarters establishment, fourteen district offices and various subordinate field offices and resident agencies throughout the United States and Puerto Rico. The Service examines allegations of criminal and/or subversive behavior attributed to potential and actual Defense Department employees holding sensitive positions. The 1971 reorganization "also directed that a Defense Map Agency be created by combining the now separate mapping, charting, and geodetic organizations of the military services in order to achieve maximum efficiency and economy in production." The result of this mandate was the establishment of the Defense Mapping Agency on January 1, 1972, under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, with a Director responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the aftermath of these unification efforts within the defense establishment, each of the armed services continues to maintain an intelligence organization and their departments control their own intelligence production activities, particularly tactical or combat intelligence affecting their operations (cryptological, mapping, and pertinent personnel security investigation functions having been consolidated for administration as discussed above). An Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) has continued with the Army General Staff since World War II. This officer supervised the Army Intelligence Corps, which included both collection and analysis functions, and the Army Security Agency, established September 15, 1945 to execute cryptologic duties. In June, 1962, a major reorganization of Army intelligence operations brought about the merger of these two units into the Army Intelligence and Secmity Branch. Prior to January 1, 1965, the Military District of Washington and each of the six Armies within the United States were res.l?0nsible for counterintelligence activities throughout theIr geographic areas, and controlled an Intelligence Corps Group which carried on these activities. On January 1, 1965, the seven Intelligence Corps Groups were consolidated into a new major command-U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command. About two months later it was redesignated the U.S. Army Intelligence Command.280 This Command, located at Fort Holabird, Maryland, continues to funct~on as a primary Army intelligence entity under G-2. The Army SecurIty Agency appears to have less direct intelligence production !119 u.s. Department of Defense. National Security Of Realistic Deterence. ... , op. cit., p. 135. ... MacOloskey, op. cit., p. 100. 270 significance for G-2 in the aftermath of the 1971 reor1ranization when it was placed under the control of the Chief of the Central Security Service. Other Army agencies, such as the Army Transportation Corps, are capable of contributing an intelligence product should G-2 consult them regarding some aspect of their expertise. During the Army~ most recent major commitment of forces in Southeast Asia, a combined intelligence organization was maintained in Vietnam. This structure was headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Assistance Command/Vietnam (J-2) who was responsible for exercising general staff supervision over all Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps intelligence activities as well as serving as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) to General William Westmoreland, Commanding General, U.S. Army/Vietnam.281 The Office of Naval Intelligence is currently called the Naval Intelligence Command and continues to report to the Chief of Naval Operations through the Command Support Programs Office. The field organization for carrying out ONI's missions has three major components: (1) Naval District Intelligence officers, under the management control of ONI and operating in the United States and certain outlying areas; (2) intelligence organizations with the forces afloat, which are directly under unit commanders with over-all ONI supervision; and (3) naval attache's functioning under ONI direction as well as State Department and Defense Intelligence Agency supervisions. District intelligence officers operate primarily in counterintelligence and security fields. The District Intelligence Office (DIO) is directly responsible to the Naval District Commandant, with additional duty in Some areas on the staff of the commander of the sea frontier of his district. Civilian agents usually are assigned to the district intelligence officers along with naval intelligence officers, and the former conduct security and major criminal investigations involving naval personnel or material. With the forces afloat or in overseas bases, flag officers in command of each area, fleet, or task force have staff intelligence sections functioning primarily in the operational or tactical intelligence field. The intelligence officer who heads this staff section works not only for the unit commander, but also performs some collection missions for ONI. Naval attaches, trained by ONI in intelligence and languages, collect naval intelligence for ONI as well as serve the diplomatic chief at the post to which they are assigned.282 While ONI serves certain of its intelligence needs, the Marine Corps "maintains a small intelligence staff in its headquarters, and intelligence officers are billeted throughout the corps" and these personnel I8l See U.S. Department of the Army. Vietnam Studies: The Role Of Military Intelligence, 1965-1967 by Major General Joseph A McChristian. Washington U.S. Govt'. Print. Off., 1974, PP. 4--6, 8, 11, 13--20, 24, 27-28, 41-42, 47-57, 71-78, 14R, and 157. lI8!I Ransom, op. cit., pp. 119-120. 271 "are concerned primarily with tactical, or operational, rather than national intelligence." 283 Transferred to the Navy Department for wartime service in 1941 (E.O. 8929), the Coast Guard was returned to the Treasury Department in 1946 (E.O. 9666) and has maintained a very small intelligence unit "mainly concerned with port security, keeping subversive elements out of the Merchant Marine and off the waterfronts, enforcing Coast Guard laws and insuring the internal security of the Coast Guard." 284 When the United States Air Force became a separate service apart from the Army in 1947, a general staff directorate--ealled the Air Staff-was instituted with an Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACS/I and sometimes still unofficially referred to as A-2). This officer supervises an immediate office organized into a Special Advisory Group (a "brains trust" designed to keep the ASCII abreast of scientific, technical, and strategic matters of prime concern to the air arm), a data-handling systems group, a policy and programs unit, a resources management component, a collection directorate, and a strategic estimates directorate. The ASCII has also held staff supervision authority of the USAF Security Service (personnel and physical security) and the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (aeronautical charts, graphic air target materials, flight information publications and documents, terrain models, maps, evaluated intelligence on air facilities, geodetic and geophysical data, and related cartographic services). Overseas attaches are administered through the collection directorate which at one time included a Reconnaissance Division, acknowledged to be "charged with overseeing the development of the latest 'spy-in-the-sky' equipment, some of it exotic." 285 This entity may have been displaced by the National Reconnaissance Office, an Air Force intelligence agency only recently disclosed to exist, which reportedly operates satellite intelligence programs for the entire intelligence community on a budget estimated at more than $1.5 billion a year.286 X I II. State Department The formal intelligence organization of the Department of State began with the liquidation of the Office of Strategic Services. By an Executive order [E.O. 9621] of September 20,1945, President Truman terminatkld the Office of Strategic Services and transferred its research and analysis branch and presentation branch to an Interim Research and Intelligence Service in the Department of State. At the same time there was established the position of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence. Acting Secretary [Dean] Acheson announced on September 27 the appointment of Colonel Alfred McCormack, Director of Military Intelligence in the War Department, as Special Assistant to set up the new agency. ... Ibid., p. 119. ... Ottenberg, op. cit., p. 138. ... Ransom, op cit., pp. 123-125; also See MacCloskey, op. cit., pp. 102-103. ... Marchetti and Marks, op. cit., p. 90. 272 Colonel McCormack explained the work of the Department's agency as mainly a research program. "The intelligence needed by the State Department" he declared, "is primarily information on the political and economic factors operating in other countries of the world, and on the potential effect of those factors in relations with this Government." He estimated that approximately 1,600 OSS personnel were transferred to State, a number soon reduced by about 50 percent. Two offices were created, an Office of Research and Intelligence under Dr. Sherman Kent, with five geographical intelligence divisions corresponding roughly to the Department's geographic organization, and the Office of Intelli~ ence Collection and Dissemination under Colonel George R. Fearing, who had served with distinction as an intelligence officer with the army. Colonel McCormack indicated that most of the work would be done in Washington, but that from fifty to seventy-five representatives with special training would be attached to embassies overseas to do particular types of work. As examples of the work done, Colonel McCormack cited the report made on the transportation system of North Africa, which was invaluable to the American forces of invasion, and a study of the industrial organization and capacity of Germany. Once created, the intelligence program underwent a series of revisions and modifications. For example, established as a self-sufficient intelligence unit on a geographic basis, the service was changed in April, 1946, in aC<lordance with the socalled Russell Plan, so that the geographic intelligence functklns were transferred to the political offices, thereby limiting the functions of the Office of Intelligence and Research to matters which cut across geographic lines. At the same time an Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison was established to formulate, in consultation with the geographic and economic offices, a Departmental pro~ram for basic research. The day after the Departmental regulations making this radical chan~e were issued, Colonel McCormack resigned on the ground that he regarded the new organization as unworkable and unsound and felt that it would make impossible the establishment of a real intelligence unit within the Department. On February 6, 1947, the ori~inal type of organization was reinstituted when the Office of Intelligence and Liaison was changed to the Office of Intelligence Research and the geographical divisions were restored to its jurisdiction.281 While a variety of reorganizations have shaped the unit during the succeeding years, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which the component has been designated since 1957, is the principal intelligence agency of the State Department. This status, however. should be qualified: the Stat{l Department does not engage in intelligence collection other than the normal reporting from diplomatic posts in foreign countries, though it has provided cover for CIA staff attached to U.S. diplo- IJ8'1 Stuart, op. cit., pp. 429-430. 273 matic posts. As One authority has commented: "The Department of State since 'Vorld 'Val' II serves as a minor producer and major consumer within the new intelligence community."288 Holding status equivalent to that of an Assistant Secretary, the Director of the Bureau functions as senior intelligence adviser to the Secretary of State, departmental representative on the U.S. Intelligence Board, and chief of the intelligence staff at State. Recently reorganized in 1975, the Bureau is composed of two directorates and three supportin~ offices. These are: The Directorate for Research, organized into five regional units (Africa, American Republics, East Asia and Pacific, Europe and the Soviet Union, Near East and South Asia), three functional components (Economic Research and Analysis, Strategic Affairs, Political/Military and Theater Forces), and the Office of the Geographer. The Directorate is responsible for finished intelligence products; The Directorate for Coordination, consistin~ of an Office of Intelligence Liaison, Office of Operations Pohcy, and Office of Resources Policy, conducts liaison and clearances with other agencies of the Federal government on matters of departmental intelligence interest, activity, policy impact, and resource allocation; The Office of the Executive Director, a support unit responsible for administrative functions. The Office of External Research another support entity which encourages and contracts for non-governmental research in the behavioral and social agencies; and The Office of Communications and Information handling which, in its support role, manages sensitive intelligence documents (security) and operates the Department's watch center for monitoring international crisis developments.289 XIV. President'8 Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Established as an impartial group of distinguished citizens who would meet periodically to review the activities and operations of the intelligence community, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is officially mandated to : (1) advise the President concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the various activities making up the overall national intelligence effort; (2) conduct a continuin~ review and assessment of foreign intelligence and related activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies are enga~d; . (3) receive, consider and take appropriate action with respect to matters identified to the Board, by the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies of the intelligence community, in which the support ... Ransom, op. cit., p. 135. ... See U.S. Department of State. INR: Intelligence and ReseMch in the Department of State. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973, PP. 13--19. 274 of the Roard will further the effectiveness of the national intelligence effort; and (4) report to the President concerning the Board's findings and appraisals, and make appropriate recommendations for actions to achieve increased effectiveness of the Government's foreign intelligence effort in meeting national intelligence needs.290 The current PFIAB is the successor to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities created (E.O. 10656) in early 1956 out of a mixed motivation which sought to respond to a recommendation of the (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government calling for "a committee of experienced private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine and report to [the President] periodically on the work of Government foreign intelligence activities." 291 The PBCFIA was also established out of concern over congressional efforts then underway to institute a joint committee on the CIA to carry out oversight duties with regard .to the intelligence community.292 Composed of eight members, the Board of Consultants met a total of nineteen times during its tenure under President Eisenhower, five sessions being held with Chief Executive, and submitted over fortytwo major recommendations regarding the functioning of the intelligence community. As a matter of formality, the panel submitted resignations on January 7, 1961, in anticipation of the new Kennedy Administration. Inactive during the next four months, the unit was revitalized (E.O. 10938) in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and given its present designation, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Provision was also made for the payment of compensation to the PFIAB members, in addition to expenses incurred in connection with the work of the panel. While President Johnson maintained the Board under its 1961 mandate, President Nixon prescribed (E.O. 11460) specific functions for the group during his first year in office. President Ford has continued the operations of the PFIAB under this directive. The unit currently meets on the first Thursday and Friday of every other month, is assisted by a small staff, and utilizes occasional ad hoc committees or work groups to organize some aspects of its work. XV. Loyalty-Semtrity While domestic loyalty and security matters with regard to potential and actual Federal employees had been treated with concern during World War II, investigations in pursuit of these ends became more virorous with the onset of the Cold War and the "Communist menace' perceived in the late 1940s and 1950s.293 The signal for this ..., E.O.11460, March 20,1969 (34 F.R. 5;;35). 2Il1 See U.S. Commission on Organization of the ExeC'Utive Branch of Government. Intelligrnce Activities: A Report to the Oongress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Oft'., 1955, pp. 1, 59-65, 71. [References also include the recommendations of the Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities which are included in the cited document.] ... Kirkpatrick, op. cit., pp. 34, 61 . ... See Eleanor Bontecou. The FederaK LoyaUy-8ecurity Program. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1953, pp. 1-30. 275 heightened probing of public employee political sentiments, generally conducted by the Civil Service Commission's Bureau of Personnel Investigations and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (some agencies, such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the armed service departments, had their own personnel investigative services), was probably President Truman's March 21, 1947 directive (E.O. 9835) establishing a government-wide loyalty-security program and an organizational framework for its administration. When President Truman issued his 1947 executive order initiating the loyalty-security program for federal employees, he struck a new note in the expanded concept of executive powers. In all previous peacetime loyalty-testing experience, Congress rather than President had taken the lead. Controversy greeted the order. Some critics condemned it as totally unnecessary, others as needful but excessively rigorous, and still others as too mild. Truman may well have headed off more stringent congressional action in this arena, but [Former Interior Secretary Harold] Ickes insisted that the order resulted from cabinet hysteria engendered by Attorney General Tom C. Clark's pressures upon the PresIdent. The listing of alleged subversive organizations, association with which equated "disloyalty" for a federal official, by the Attorney General has been one of the most fertile sources of disagreement. Never before in American history, even during war crises, had the government officially established public black lists for security purposes. The vast literature supporting and condemning the executive loyalty order has searched deeply into complex and contradictory aspects of contemporary American life. American liberals had long crusaded for the kind of executive initiative that Truman exhibited, but exempted the field of civil rights from governmental interference even in the cause of security. Conservatives, who decried extensions of federal functions, demanded that the security program increase in rigor, scope, and effectiveness. Disagreement centers upon the means the program used rather than the ends it sought. The nation's servants, it seemed, could not have their positions and at the same time enjoy traditional privileges of citizenship.294 In brief, the president's order required a loyalty investigation of nvery individual entering Federal employment; this inquiry was to be conducted by the Civil Service Commission in most cases; sources to be consulted in such a probe included FBI, Civil Service, armed forces intelligence, and House Committee on Un-American Activities Committees files as well as those of "any other appropriate government investigative or intelligence agency," pertinent local law-enforcement holdings, the applicant's school, college, and prior employment records, and references given by the prospective employee. Department and agency heads were responsible for removing disloyal employees and appointed loyalty boards composed of not less than three representatives from their unit to hear loyalty cases. A Loyalty Re- /1M Harold M. Hyman. To Try Men's Souls: LoyaUy Tests in American History. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959, p. 334. 276 view Board within the Civil Service Commission examined cases where an employee was being dismissed from the Federal government for reason of disloyalty. Activ.ities an.d associati.ons o~ an applicant or employee which might be consIdered III connectIOn wIth the determination of disloyalty include one or more of the following: a. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations therefor, or knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs; b. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof; c. Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter the constitutional form of government of the United States; d. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of documents or information of a confidential or non-public character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employment bv the Government of the United States; . e. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting so as to serve the interests of another govment in preference to the interests of the United States; f. Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.295 While the program raised a variety of questions regarding the civil rights of Federal employees, it also generated a cache of information of intelligence interest (but of questionable quality). The loyalty-testing problem remained to face Republican President Dwight Eisenhower. Soon after he assumed office, Eisenhower modified the loyalty-testing program. His 1953 directive [E.O. 10450] decentralized the security apparatus to the agency level and altered the criteria for dismissal to include categories of security risks-homosexuals, alcoholics, persons undergoing psychiatric treatment-without reference to subversion. But security risk and disloyalty had already become a fixed duo in the public mind. The Eisenhower modification [which eliminated the Loyalty Review Board] did not basically alter the loyalty-testing structure. Other executive orders and legislative requirements have extended loyalty-security processes to passport applicants, port employees, industrial workers, American officials in the United Nations, recipients of government research grants, and scientists engaged in official research and development programs. The military services and the Atomic Energy Commission [recently dissolved to form the Energy Research .. See 12 F.R. 1935. 277 and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission] conduct their own clearance procedures. The American national government, in short. has been involved in an unending, [almost two] dozen-year-Iong search for subversives. How effective this drive has been no one has yet satisfactorily proved.29G The Civil Service Commission continues to conduct most of these investigations for the majority of Federal agencies; the Defense Investigative Service performs the personnel clearance function for Defense Department employees and may provide assistance to other entities in these matters at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. XVI. Watergate In the early morning hours of June 17, 1972, vVashington, D.C., Metropolitan Police, responding to a request for assistance from a security guard, apprehended and arrested five men who had illegally entered the headquarters suite of the Democratic National Committee located in the Watergate Hotel complex. Approximately three months later these individuals, and two others who had escaped detection at the arrest scene, were indicted. These were, as is now known, burglars with an intelligence mission, authorized by some of the most powerful officials in the Federal government. Inquiries into this incident by law enforcement and congressional investigators subsequently revealed a most unusual and legally questionable intelligence organization.297 ... Hyman, op. aU., pp. 335-356. ll97 The major congressional investigators of Watergate matters were the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities and the House Judiciary Committee. The most useful materials produced by these panels regarding organizational considerations were: U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. The Final Report of the Select Oommittee on Pre8idential Campaign Activitie8. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. (93rd Congress, 2d Session. Senate. Report No. 93-981) ; ---. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Statement ot'Information: White Hou8e Surveillance Activities (Book VII). Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. ---. ---. ---. Statement Of Information: Internal Revenue Service (Book VIII). Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. ---. ---. ---. Te8timony of Witne88es. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. Other relevant published congressional materials generated by other committees include the following: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Investigation of the Special Service Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. Committee print, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. ---. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. OIA Foreign and Domestic Activities. Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. ---. ---. ---. Dr. Ki88inger's Role in Wiretapping. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. ---. ---. ---. Report on the Inquiry Concerning Dr. Kissinger's RoZe in Wiretapping, 1969-1971. Committee print, 93rd Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. ---. ---. Committee on the Judiciary. Electronic Surveillance for National Security Purposes. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off, 1974. (Continued ) 278 Sometime in 1970, the White House, concerned, in part, about increasing domestic protests and acts of violence as well as recent leakages of national security information embarrassing to the Administration, produced a top secret study entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection." Authored by Tom Charles Huston, assistant counsel to the President and White House project officer on security programs, this paper (commonly referred to as the "Huston Plan") suggested techniques formaking domestic intelligence opera- . tions, morc effective, perhaps to curtail violent protests or to identify those responsible for or otherwise trafficking in leaked national security materials. Among the recommendations offered in the document were increased use of electronic surveillances and penetrations ("existing coverage is grossly inadequate"), mail coverage, and surreptitious entries (break-ins). Huston was quite candid about the implications of these undertakings, saying: Covert [mail] coverage is illegal and there are serious risks involved. However, the advantages to be derived from its use outweigh the risks. This technique is particularly valuable in identifying espionage agents and other contacts of foreign intelligence services. And with regard to break-ins: Use of this technique is clearly illegal: it amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion. 298 When his report was completed, Huston, apparently forwarded it for scrutiny by the President. On July 14, 1970, [White House Chief of Staff H. R.] Haldeman sent a top secret memorandum to Huston, notifying him of the President's approval of the use of burglaries, (Continued) --. --. --. Political Intelligence in the Internal Reven-ue Service: The Speoial Service StafJ. Committee print, 93rd Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. --. --. --. and the Committee on Foreign Relations. Warrantless Wiretapping and El~ctronic Surveillance-197l,. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. --. --. --. Warrwntless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillwnce: Report. Committee print, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. OII., 1975. --. House. Committee on Armed Services. Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Oentral InteUigence Agency in the Watergate and EUsberg Matters. Hearings, 94th Congress, 1i't session. Washin/{ton, U.S. Govt. Print. OII., 1974. --. --. --. Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the OentraJ IntelUgence Agency in the Watergate and EUsberg Matters: Report. Committee print, 93rd Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. --. --. Committee on the JUdiciary. Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance. Hearings, HSrd Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. . ... The Huston Plan continues to be a highly classified document; quotations utilized here are extracted from sanitized segments of the paper appearing in U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Presidential Camooim Artivitil's. Pre.~idential Oampaign Activities of 1972: Watergate wnd, Related Activities (Book 3). Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Ofl'., 1973, pp. 1319-1324. 279 illegal wiretaps and illegal mail covers for domestic intelligence. In the memorandum, Haldeman stated: The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the review, have been approved by the President. He does not, however, want to follow the procedure you outlined on page 4 of your memorandum regarding implementation. He would prefer that the thing 8imply be put into motion on the basis of this approval. The formal official memorandum should, of course, be prepared and that should be the device by which to carry it out. . . . [emphasis added] It appears that the next day, July 15, 1970, Huston prepared a decision memorandum, based on the President's approval, for distribution to the Federal intelligence agencies involved in the plan-the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. In his May 22, 1973, public statement, the President reported that the decision memorandum was circulated to the agencies involved on July 23,1970. However, the decision memorandum is dated July 15, 1970, indicating that it was forwarded to the agencies on that day or shortly thereafter. Huston's recommendations were opposed by J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI. Hoover had served as the chairman of a group comprised of the heads of the Federal intelligence agencies formed to study the problems of intelligencegathering and cooperation among the various intellIgence agencies. In his public statement of May 22, 1973, President Nixon stated: After reconsideration, however, prompted by the opposition of Director Hoover, the agencies were notified 5 days later, on July 28, that the approval had been rescinded. Haldeman's testimony [before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities] is to the same effect. [White House Counsel John] Dean, however, testified that he was not aware of any recision of approval for the plan and there apparently is no written record of a recision on July 28 or any other date. There is, however, clear evidence that, after receipt of the decision memorandum of July 15, 1970, Mr. Hoover did present strong objections concerning the plan to Attorney General Mitchell.299 Huston attempted to counter Hoover's arguments in a memorandum to Haldeman dated August 5, eight days after the President allegedly ordered the recision, in which he indicated "that the NSA, DIA, CIA and the military services basically supported the Huston recommendations." 300 Later, on September 18, 1970 (almost 2 months after the President claims the plan was rescinded), Dean sent a top ... U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activity. The Final Report ... , op. oit., p. 4. 300 Ibid, p. 5. 280 secret memorandum to the Attorney General suggesting certain procedures to "commence our domestic intelligence operation as quickly as possible." [emphasis added] This memorandum specifically called for the creation of an Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligence Unit which had been an integral part 0:Ł the Huston plan. Dean's memorandum to the Attorney General observed that Hoover was strongly opposed to the creation of such a unit and that it was important "to bring the FBI fully on board." Far from indicating that the President's approval of Huston's recommendation to remove restraints on illegal intelligence-gathering had been withdrawn, Dean, in his memorandum, suggested to the Attorney General: I believe we agreed that it would be inappropriate to have any blanket removal of restrictions; rather, the most appropriate procedure would be to decide on the type of intelligence we need, based on an assessment of the recommendations of this unit, and then proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence. [emphasis added] 301 The Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligence Unit was never realized and it is difficult to determine if any other recommendation from the Huston Plan was directly implemented. Nevertheless, the document may have functioned as an intellectual stimulant to those high officials subsequently involved in the Watergate scandals. Huston left the WhiteHouse sometimes in 1971 and returned to private law practice in Indianapolis. FBI Director .r. Edgar Hoover, the principal critic and opponent of the Huston Plan, died on May 2, 1972. Out of this background, a number of intelligence organizational developments began to occur in and around the White House. In June ]971, the leak of the Pentagon Papers prompted the President to create a special investigations unit (later known as the Plumbers) inside the White House under the direction of Egil Krogh. Krogh, in turn, was directly supervised by [Assistant to the President] John Ehrlichman. Krogh was soon joined by David Young and in July the unit, staffing up for a broader role, added G. Gordon Liddy and E. Howard Hunt, both known to the White House as persons with investigative experience. Liddy was a former FBI agent; Hunt, a former CIA agent.302 Probably the first such White House intelligence component in history, the special investigations unit planned and executed the burglary of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psvchiatrist, Dr. Lewis J. Fielding. Liddy, Hunt, and two of their Cuban-American recruits later broke into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate Hotel complex.303 The COTllmittee to Re-Elect the President [heaned bv former Attorney General John Mitchell and, together with the Finance Committee for the Re-Election of the President, 301 Ihid., pp. 5-6. 302 Ibid., p. 12. llll3 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 281 counting some 35 former White House aides among its personnel] was gearing up for its own political intelligencegathering program around the same time as the Ellsberg break-in. In September 1971, John Dean asked [former Special Assistant to the President] Jeb Stuart Magruder to join him for lunch with Jack Caulfield. Caulfield, a White House investigator who had conducted numerous political investigations, some with [former New York City policeman] Anthony Ulasewicz [who had conducted investigations for Ehrlichman], wanted to sell Magruder his political intelligence plan, "Project Sandwedge," for use by CRP. Magruder had been organizing the campaign effort since May 1971, having received this assignment from Mitchell and Haldeman. In essence, the Sandwedge plan proposed a private corporation operating like a Republican "Intertel" [a private international detective agency] to serve the President's campaign. In addition to normal investigative activities, the Sandwedge plan also included the use of bagmen and other covert intelligence gathering operations.30 ' While Caulfield had proposed Sandwedge to the White House in the spring of 1971 and later had proposed its adoption by the Committee to Re-Elect the President, the plan was rejected in both instances. With Sandwedge rebuffed, Magruder and Gordon Strachan of Haldeman's staff asked Dean to find a lawyer to serve as CRP general counsel who could also direct an intelligencegathering program. Magruder stated [before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activity] that he and Dean had, on previous occasions, discussed the need for such a program with Attorney General Mitchell. The man Dean recruited was G. Gordon Liddy, who moved from the special investigations unit in the White House to CRP. Magruder testified that, when Dean sent Liddy to the Committee To Re-Elect the President in 1971, he (Magruder) was unaware of Liddy's activities for the Plumbers, particularly his participation in the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office.305 Once in place at CRP headquarters, Liddy's principal efforts were devoted to developing-, arlvocating- and implementing- a comprehensive political intelligence-gathering program for CRP under the code name "Gemstone." 306 Ultimlltely a version of this plan-ealling for surreptitious entry and bugging of Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington and later, if sufficient funds were available, penetration of the headquarters of Democratic presidential contenders and the Democratic convention facilities in Miami-was executed with the 'Vatergate break-in on May 28. 1972.307 Other intelligence activities were directly undertaken by members of the White House staff during' the period of the first Nixon Administration. These operations included electronic surveillance matters, moni- ""'Ibid., p. 17. llO5 /bid., p. 18. ... Ibid.. p. 20. OM See Ibid., pp. 21-25, 27-29. 282 toring and investigating the behavior of Senator Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass.) and Dr. Daniel Ellsberg with a view to causing them public discredit, burglarizing and possibly damaging the Brookings Institution, and probing individuals both within and outside of the government in a clandestine manner to determine their involvement in the disclosure of a memorandum written by ITT lobbyist Dita Beard (columnist Jack Anderson had alleged that a $400:000 contribution to the Nixon campaign was linked by the document to a favorable ruling by the Justice Department on ITT's antitrust difficulties).308 In addition, White House staff, in pursuit of political intelligence, enlisted the assistance of certain government agencies. These actions resulted in what has been described as "attempts to abuse governmental process." 309 Agencies utilized in this manner by White House personnel included the Internal Revenue Service (harassment of political enemies, identification of sensitive cases, and supplying privileged information from taxpayer returns), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (supplying derogatory information about individuals from raw investigative files), the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department (supplying sensitive or derogatory information about individuals or groups), the Secret Service (wiretaps, surveillance information, and sensitive political information). and the Federal Communication Commission (media harassment). 310 This, in general. was an important part of the organization of the White House intellilrence forces durin~ the Nixon tenure in the presidency. A portion of it was lost with the arrest of the Watergate burglars; the remaining portion slowly crumbled with investigations into its existence and operations by Congress and Federal prosecutors. XVII. Justice Department The Justice Department is presently organized into eight offices (legislative affairs, management and finance, legal counsel, policy and planning, public information, the community relations service, the pardon attorney, and the executive office for the U.S. attorneys), two boards (parole and immigration appeals), six prosecutorial divisions (civil, criminal, antitrust, tax, land and natural resources, and civil rights), and six bureaus (FBI, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United States Marshals Service, and the Bureau of Prisons/Federal Prison Industries). Certain of these units have the potential for intelligence production, perhaps in the course of developing materials (in the caSe of the divisions) or by virtue of their particular information holdings (such as the files of" the Immiwation and Naturalization Service). The principal intelligence (and investigative) component within the Justice Department, however, is the FBI.311 Both the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI have responsibilities for the coordination of intelligence activities within the De- ... See Ibid.. pp. 111-113, 117-129. ... Ibid., p. 130. m Ibid., pp. 130--150. 111 It should also be noted that the mandate of the Drug Enforcement Administration provides that a~ency with a specified intelligence function (Reorganization Plan No.2 of 1973 [87 Stat.l09l] and E.O.11727). 283 partment and with other Federal agencies. Organizational efforts in service to this duty exhibited themselves in 1967 when Attorney General Ramsey Clark created the Interdivision Information Unit for "reviewing and reducing to quickly retrievable form all information that may come to this Department relating to organizations and individuals throughout the country who may play a role, whether purposefully or not, either in instigating or spreading civil disorders or in preventing or checking them." 312 'While this entity received and indexed information from a variety of sources (Federal poverty programs, the Labor and Post Office Departments, the Internal Revenue Service, and the neighborhood legal services offices), an Intelligence Evaluation Committee, composed of representatives from Justice, Defense, and the Service, was supposed to coordinate and evaluate the information but proved to be a rather inactive entity.313 In July of 1969, Attorney General John Mitchell established the Civil Disturbance Group to coordinate intelligence, policy, and operations within the Justice Department with regard to domestic civil disturbances. Both the Interdivision Information Unit and the Intelligence Evaluation Committee were placed under the new panel's jurisdiction and Mitchell asked the CIA to "investigate the adequacy of the FBI's collection efforts in dissident matters and to persuade the FBI to turn over its material to the CDG." 314 In 1970 the moribund Intelligence Evaluation Committee was reconstituted with representatives from Justice, FBI, CIA, Defense, Secret Service, NSA, and late in its activities, a Treasury member. Technically, Robert Mardian, Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, was chairman of the reconstituted panel but White House Counsel John Dean also played. a leadership role with the group and meetings were held at his office on various occasions. The IEC was not established bv Executive Order. In fact, according to minutes of the lEe meeting on February 1, 1971, Dean said he favored avoiding any written directive concerning the IEC because a directive "might create problems of Congressional oversight and disclosure." Several attempts were nevertheless made to draft a charter for the Committee, although none appears to have been accepted by all of the IEC members. The last draft which could be located, dated February 10, 1971, specified the "authority" for the IEC as "the Interdepartmental Actional Plan for Civil Disturbances," something which had been issued in April 1969 as the result of an agreement between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense. Dean thought it was sufficient just to say that the IEC existed "by authority of the President." 315 By the end of January, 1971, a staff had been organized for the Committee and did "the work of coordination, evaluation and preparation of estimates for issuance by the Committee." 316 For cover purau n.~. CommiSSion on CIA Activities Within the United States, 0'fJ. olt., p. 118. m Ibid. p. 119. ... Ibid., p. 121. m Ibid., p. 126. m Ibid., p. 127. 284 poses, the IES was attached to the Interdivision Information Unit, even though the Unit was not actually involved in the operations of the Staff. The Intelligence Evaluation Committee met on only seven occasions; the last occasion was in July 1971. The Intelligence Evaluation Staff, on the other hand, met a total of one hundred and seventeen times between January 29, 1971, and May 4,1973. The IES prepared an aggregate of approximately thirty studies or evaluations for dissemination. It also published a total of fifty-five summaries called intelligence calendars of significant events. The preparation of these studies, estimates or calendars was directed by John Dean from the White House or by Robert Mardian as Chairman of the IEC.317 Both the lEO and the IES were terminated in July, 1973, by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen.318 The Department's principal intelligence (and investigative) agency, the FBI, currently employs over 8,400 special agents. All operations of the FBI are directed and coordinated through 13 headquarters divisions. Each of the headquarters divisions reports to either the Assistant to the DirectorDeputy Associate Director (Administration) or the Assistant to the Director-Deputy Associate Director (Investigation) except for the Inspection Division and the Office of Planning and Evaluation which report directly to the Associate Director. The field operations are carried out,by 59 field offices located throughout the United States and Puerto Rico.319 Other special unit facilities of the Bureau include the FBI Laboratory, established in 1932, the FBI Academy for training new agents, created in 1935, and the National Crime Information Center, a computerized criminal information system operated by the FBI since December, 1970. Although the FBI relinquished overseas operations. in 1946, the bureau still maintains overseas liaison agents with other security and intelligence agencies to insure a link between cases or leads which develop overseas but which come to rest in the continental United States. In the aftermath of the American intervention in the Dominican Republic crisis in 1965, there were reports that President Johnson had assigned FBI agents to certain missions on that island. If S(}and the reports were never confirmed-such a mission was limited and temporary.320 At present the Bureau maintains liaison posts in sixteen foreign countries.321 There has also been a recent disclosure that the FBI 81. Ibid. m Ibid., p. 128. ... U.S. Conjtress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Departments of State, Ju~tice. and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1976: Department of ,Tu~tice. Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Oft'., 1975. p. 190. lIOO Ransom, op. cit., p. 145. 811 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations, op. cit., p. 192. 285 periodically dispatches private citizens on intelligence-gathering mil'>sions outside of the United States.322 In January, 1973, the Bureau re-established its Liaison Section which keeps In constant communication with other agencies of the intelligence community, Director Hoover had abolished the unit in September, 1970, reportedly due to a dispute with the Central Intelligence Agency over a refusal to disclose an intelligence source.323 Responsible for criminal, civil, and internal security investigations, the FBI conducted 745,840 such probes in FY 1974 and 774,579 such inquiries the previous fiscal year.324 Until his death on May 2, 1972, the Bureau was headed by J. Edgar Hoover. L. Patrick Gray III was named Acting Director the following day and ultimately nominated for the permanent position on February 17, 1973. Controversy over Gray's involvement in Watergaterelated matters caused him to request the withdrawal of his nomination on April 5 and he resigned as Acting Director on April 27. He was succeeded by William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, who served as Acting pirector until Kansas City (Mo.) Police Chief Clarence M. Kelley, nominated June 7, was confirmed to head the FBI on June 27,1973. One other Justice Department unit which has exhibited increasing intelligence importance is the Drug Enforcement Administration. Created by reorganization plan (87 Stat. 1091) in 1973, the agency is only beginning its intelligence operations and re.cently provided the following account regarding this aspect of its activities. Our objectives with respect to the intelligence program have been to begin the routine production of strategic intelligence reports, to design and implement regional intelligence units, to build an intelligence oriented data base through the production of finisheu tactical intelli~ence reports, and to support our operations on the Southwest Border with a 24 hour-a-day intelligence center covering several regions and including several agencies. Results in these areas are indicated by the following facts: DEA has taken the lead in developing a set of national narcotic indicators which can be used by DEA, NIDA [National Institute on Drug Abuse] and SAODAP [Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention] to monitor drug abuse trends. These national narcotics indicators include data from STRIDE (System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence) on the price, availability and sources of heroin; data from DAWN (Drug Abuse Warning Network) on emergency room visits of drug users; and data on serum hepatitis throughout the United States. When these systems are forged together with the NIDA systems, and general survey~, they become a very powerful set of indicators on the drug abuse situation. - See John M. Crewdson. U.S. Citizens Used By F.B.I. Abroad. New York TimeR, Febmary 16, 1975: Iff. III See Jeremiah O'Leary. Gray Re-establishes Intelligence LiQk to Units. Washington Star-News, January 10, 1973; also appears in New Yor/c'l'imes, January 11. 1973. ... U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations, of). cit., p. 233. 286 Regional intelligence units have been established in every DEA regional office. These units have responsibilities not only for collecting intelligence information, but also for producing tactical intelligence 'Products to be used at the regional level. Personnel in these ~mits are being trained in the collection and analysis of intelligence information by DEA's training program. Through the first 6 months of fiscal year 1'975, 160 analyses of drug networks, 1,877 profiles of specific traffickers and 9,386 enforrempnt tarO'pts haVf~ hpen pro-luced. These analvses represent the foundation of the national narcotics intelligence system. In the development of a National Narcotics Intelligence System it is mandatory on DEA that a high level of liaison with other enforcement agencies, Federal, State and local be maintained: and interchange of information with these agencies be developed. In t~rms of this requirement I am particularly encouraged with the operation we call the Unified Intelligence Division of the New York Joint Task Force. This is a true interagency operation utilizing DEA agents, New York City and State Police and funded in part by an LEAA grant. The program surcepds in brinqing combined drug information to bear on the traffickers in our most populous city and greatest area of drug abuse.325 XVIII. Trerusury Department The Treasury Department has long contained components with an intelligence potential. Treasury attaches serving with American embassies provide vaInable foreign economic intelligence for departmental units within the jurisdiction of the Under Secretary for Monetary Policy as well as for other units. such as the State Department and other agencies represented on the United States Intelligence Board and the National Security Council. The Treasury Department is also developing and expanding its Federal Law Enforcement Training Center which will be utilized by a variety of agencies for training investigative personnel as well as State Department security agents, Internal Revenue Service intelligence special agents and internal security inspectors, Secret Service agents, and Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau special agents.326 Among the intelligence units within the Treasury Department, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms has primary responsibilities for monitoring and pursuing illegal trafficking in and/or sale of distilled spirits, tobacco, and firearms (including explosives). The Bureau utilizes some 1,600 special agents, conducts electronic surveillance operations, and has both undercover personnel and paid informers in its service. In addition to maintaining intelligence activities in support of its regular duties, the Bureau undoubtedly has an intelli- .... From the statement of DEA Administrator John R. Bartels, Jr., in Ibid., pp. 847-848. .. See U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Treasury, Postal Service. and General Government Appropriations: Fiscal Year 1976. Hearin~s, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington. U.S. Govt. Print. Oft., 1975, pp. 23092324. 287 gence capacity regarding political candidate and foreign dignitary protection obligations which must be met on occasion.327 The u:.S. Secret .S~r:v~ce engages in .intelligence ?perations in support .of Its responsIbIlItIes for protectmg the PresIdent, presidential candIdates, and certain foreign dignitaries, pursuing counterfeiters, and, in cooperation with its police auxilIaries (Executive Protective Se~vice, White House Police, and Treasury Security Force), the mamtenance of security at certain Federal and diplomatic facilities. The Secret Service presently consists of slightly more than 1,200 special agents plus administrative personnel. During FY 1974 some segment of this workforce completed 15,403 protective intelligence cases and anticipated completing 16,000 such cases during the next fiscal year.328 The U.S. Customs Service, while largely a law enforcement agency, has an intelligence potential in such matters as narcotics and munitions control, prevention and detection of terrorism in international transportation facilities, and enforcement of Federal regulations affecting articles in international trade.329 The Internal Revenue Service, responsible for administering and enforcing the internal revenue laws other than those relating to alcohol, tobacco, firearms, explosives, and wagering, consists of 3. national office and a decentralized field staff organized into seven regions containing 5'8 districts. The Intelligence Division, staff with over 2,600 special agents, is the principal IRS intelligence component and is responsible for identifying willful noncompliance with the tax laws as well as devious and complex methods utilized to avoid tax obligations. In addition to the use of informants, undercover operatives, and electronic surveillance, the Intelligence Division, until recently, maintained an Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System. Inaugurated in May, 1969, this computerized data bank of personal information was suspended in January, 1975, after criticism was made that the system contained information of non-germane interest to a tax-collection and enforcement agency and that holdings constituted an invasion of privacy.33o This matter, certain surveillance activities involving the IRS office in Miami (Operation Leprechaun), and related spying operations have recently brought the agency's intelligence program under congressional scrutiny.33l Another controversia1aspect of IRS intelligence operations involves the now defunct SJ?ecial Service Staff established within the Compliance Division. InitIally created in July, 1969, as the Activist Organizations Committee, the unit came into existence. . . . apparently in response to pressures emanating from the White House and from Congress to insure that dissident groups were complying with the tax laws. lSI Ibid., pp. 157-160, 165-166. ... See Ibid, pp. 704, 707; also see U.S. Con~ress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Review 01 Secret Service Protective Measures. Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Oft'., 1975. ... See U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Treasury, Postal Service, and GeneraZ Government Appropriations . .., op. vit., pp. 613-617. aao See Ibid., Jlp. 457--464. 3ll1'See u,s. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. ,Subcommittee on Oversight. Internal RevPnue Service Intelligence Operations. Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, ms. Govt. Print. Oft'., 1975. 288 Several weeks before, at hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations on June 18, 1969, a former member of the Black Panthers had testified that it was his belief that the organization had never filed tax returns and had never been audited by IRS. Similarly, an IRS official had raised the question of whether certain politically-active groups, then tax-exempt, should continue to qualify for this status.332 In the aftermath of these events. Dr. Arthur Burns. Counselor to the President, and Tom Charles Huston, a White Hou'se staffer concerned with security programs, began urging IRS to establish a special political intelligence component to deal with these tax matters.333 The SSS wa~ established in several organizational meetings held in the IRS during July, 1969. During this time, the initial SSS personnel were chosen and the functions of the SSS were set out. The SSS was to "coordinate activities in all Compliance Divisions involving ideological, militant, subversive, radical, and similar type orgamzations; to collect basic intelligence data; and to insure that the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code concerning such organizations have been complied with." Also, some people associated with the SSS indicated that they believed the SSS was to play a role in controlling "an insidious threat to the internal security of this country." The people involved with the SSS had a difficult time determining precisely what organizations and individuals to focus on. It appears from the staff's examination that the day-to-day focus of the SSS was largely determined by information it received from other agenCIes, as the FBI and the Inter-Divisional Information Unit of the Justice Department. The SSS generally operated by receiving information from other investigative agencies and congressional committees, establishing files on organizations and individuals of interest, checking IRS records on file subjects, and referring cases to the field for audit or collection action. Also the SSS provided information to the Exempt Organization Branch (Technical) with respect to organizations whose exempt status was in question. This method of operation was established by late 1969.334 With a staff which apparently never exceeded eight individuals, the Special Service unit "began with the names of 77 organizations and by the time it was disbanded in 1973 there was a total of 11,458 SSS files on 8,585 individuals and 2,873 organizations ... with ... u.s. 'Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Political Intelligence in the Internal Revenue Service: The Speaial Service Staff. Committee print, OOrd CongTess, 2d ses~ion. Washinl\'ton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974, p. 9. ... U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. Investigation of the Special Ren'fce Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. Committee print, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, p. 5. ... Ibid., pp. 6-7. 289 widely varying points of view, from all parts of tlw country and from many vocational and economic groups." .35 In addition to identifying subjects for IRS scrutiny, the SSS also functioned as a reference source for White House intelligence actors.336 Assessing the experience of such special intelligence entities, one congressional scrutinizer of the Special Service Staff observed: The Constitution guarantees every American the right to think and speak as he pleases without having to fear that the Government is listening. There can be little doubt that political surveillance and mtelligence-gathering, aimed at the beliefs, views, opinions and political associations of Americans only inhibits the free expression which the First Amendment seeks to protect. Yet the formation of governmental surveillance units is not a new occurrence. Throughout our Nation's history such programs have been instituted to protect "national security' interests which were perceived to be threatened. It is apparent, however, that the extraordinary political unrest of the late sixties had a powerful effect on those at the governmental helm. Using this as justification, they undertook to use the powers at their disposal to stifle and control the growing political dissidence and protest they were witnessing. The plain words of the Constitution were ignored. There is no evidence to indicate that the creation of so many "secret" intelligence units as well as the expansion of existing units throughout the government at roughly the same time was the result of any conscious conspiracy. But the fact remains that the contemporaneous creation of these units permitted an incipient arrangement whereby the special talents of investigation, prosecution arrangement whereby the special talents of investigation, prosecution, and administrative penalties (tax actions)-most of the powers at the government's disposal-were levelled against those who chose to dissent, whether lawfully or otherwise. Although each agency may not have known specifically of another's intelligence program, the fruits of such units were freely exchanged so that each agency knew that another was also "doing something." 837 IDtimately, the Special Service Staff operation came under question at the highest level of the Internal Revenue Service. In May 1973 (one day after he was sworn in), Commissioner' Donald C. Alexander met with top IRS personnel with respect to the SSS and directed that the SSS actions Were to relate only to tax resisters. This was reemphasized in a second meeting held at the end of J nne 1973. In early August 1973, the Commissioner learned of National Office responsibility for an IRS memorandum relating to the SSS published in Time magazine. The Commissioner felt that this memo- - Ibid.; p. 7. ... Ibid., p. 9. - U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Politiool Intelligence in the Internal Revenue Service ..., op. cU., pp. 49-;;0. 290 randum described activities that were "antithetical to the proper conduct of ... tax administration" and he announced (on August 9, 1973) that the SSS would be disbanded.aas XIX. Overview This is the organizational status of the Federal intelligence function on the eve of America's bi-centennial.aa9 Institutional permanence did not appear within this sphere of government operations until almost a decade and a half before the turn of the present century. For a variety of reasons-inexperience, scarce resources, lack of useful methodology, failure to apply available technology, and a leadership void-a functionally effective intelligence structure probably did not exist within the Federal government until the United States was plunged into World War II. And what observations might be offered regarding the current intelligence community organization ~ An outstanding characteristic of the contemporary intelligence structure is its pervasiveness. There are a panoply of Federal agencies with clearly prescribed intelligence duties or a reasonable potential for such functioning. One authority recently estimated that ten major intelligence entities maintain a staff of 153,250 individuals on an annual budget of $6,228,000,000.340 Such statistics provide some indication of the size of the immediate intelligence community within the Federal government but, of course, ignores the commitment of reo 3M u.s. Congress. Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, op cit., p. 7. "'" This study does not purport to present an exhaustive scenario of intelligence agencies but has sought to include the principal entities which have been or continue to be involved in intelligence operations. Agencies not discussed here but which do conceivably contribute information relevant to the intelligence matters include the United States Information Agency, which maintains numerous overseas offices, the Agency for International Development, with missions in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, and the Department of Agriculture. which has attache's in United States embassies. For an overview of the chronological development of the principal Federal inte'ligence entities. see Appendix I. ... The following estimate is taken from Marchetti and Marks, op. oiL, p. 80: certain comparative data is supplied from Federal bUd~et and U.S. Civil Service Commission sources. The statistics appear to be for FY 72 or FY 73. SIZE AND COST OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Organization Personnel Budget $750,000, O:J() 1,200,000,000 200,000,000 700,000,000 2, 700, 000, 000 8,000,000 40,000.000 20,000,000 10,000,000 6,228,000,000 16,500 24,000 5,000 35,000 56,000 350 800 300 300 153,250 Central Intelligence Agency • National Security Agency .. _ Defens~ Intelligence Agency .. .. _ Army Intelligence. _ Air Force Intelligence (including National Reconaissance Office) • State Department (Bureau of Intelligence and ResearchL __ Federal Bureau of Investigation (Internal Security Division) _ Atomic Energy CommiSSion (Intelligence Division) __ Treasury Department._. • _ TotaL • _-------- COMPARE Item Fiscal year 1972 Fiscal year 1973 Budget outlay, sctual (billions)_____________________________________ $231.9 Federal employees (civilian) •__ ._____ 2,811,779 $246.5 2,824,242 291 sOl~rces to inte~li~nce efforts, on one hand, by front groups, proprIetary orgamzatlOns, and informers, and, On the other hand, by sub-natIOnal government agencies, and other Federal ent:ties (such as Department of Agriculture overseas attaches, National Aeronautics and Space Administration satellite launching systems, and the products of the National 'Weather Service). 'With these additional components identified, the pervasive nature of the intelligence organization begins to become more apparent. It might also be argued that the intelligence community exhibits an organizational tendency toward clusters of centralized leadership. Overseas intelligence operations leadership has been concentrated in the Director ()f Central Intelligence; armed forces intelligence leadership has been concentrated in the chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency; armed forces crypto~ogicalleadership has been concentrated in the head of the National Security Agency;'Central Security Service. A propensity for further unifying these leadership capacities may be seen in the example of Dr. Henry Kissinger (when serving as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs/chief of staff, National Security Council) and, to some degree, in the case of the White House intelligence functionaries during the Nixon Administration. While the coordination of intelligence activities is a desirable goal in government efficiency, the centralization of intelligence leadership can pose threats to civil liberties. Finally, as the Federal intelligence organization has grown, there appears to be a tendency toward the confusion of the purposes of intelligence operations. Many intelligence institutions, past and present, function (ed) without an explicit statutory mandate for their activities. More consideration might be given to the relationship between domestic intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities: intelligence units have been organized to spy on citizens (and sometimes harass them) seemingly without any regard as to whether or not illegal behavior might be detected. Also, entities established to enforce the laws domestically have become enamored on occasion with intelligence pursuits which bear little significance to their primary law enforcement duty. . The Constitution of the United States continues to guarantee "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searchers and seizures...." The Federal intelligence organization has the capacity to significantly enhance and support that right or to manifest itself as one of the crue1est detractors of that tenet of American government. Vigilance on the part of the citizenry as to encroachments upon its rights and liberties is an utmost necessity for the preservation of a meaningful democracy. Yet, public confidence in the state tolerates a condition of official secrecy WIth regard to almost every aspect of intelligence activity. Institut'ional reliance upon the fullest commitment of the intelligence community to the preservation and realization of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the people is the necessary consequence. Endowed with its special privilege of operational secrecy, the Federal intelligence organization, in any violation of its pledge of service to the citizenry, can expect to elicit a prohibitive punishment from the polity, for it has, of course, a unique potential to execute the ultimate breach of trust, the demise of the demos itself. JANUARY 1, 1976. Washington, D.O.
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