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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

IV. FINDI~GS AXD CONCLUSIONS
In evaluating the evidence and arriving at findings and conclusions,
the Committee, has been guided by the following standards. 'Ve believe
these standards to be appropriate to the constitutional duty of a Congressional
committee.
1. The Committee is not a court. Its primary role is not to determine
jndividual guilt or innocence, but rather to draw upon the experiences
of the past to better propose guidance for the future.
:2. It is necessary to be cautious in reaching conclusions because of
rhe amount of time that has passed since the events reviewed in this
report. the inability of three Presidents and many other key figures
to speak for themselves, the conflicting and ambiguous nature of much
of the evidence. and the problems in assessing the weight to be given
to particular documents and testimony.
8. The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons involved in the
events under examination, \vhile at the same time responding to a need
to understand the facts in sufficient detail to lay a basis for informed
recommendations.
'With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at the
following findings and conclusions.
A. FINDINGS CONCERNING THE PLOTS THEMSELVES
1. OFFICL\LS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INITIATED PLOTS TO
ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO AND PATRICE LUMUMBA
The Committee finds that officials of the United States Government
initiated and participated in plots to assassinate Patrice Lumumba
and Fidel Castro.
The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in the latter half of 1960 by
officials of the United States Government, and quickly advanced to the
point of sending poisons to the Congo to be used for the assassination.
The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued until
1965. The plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars, exploding
seashells, and a contaminated diving suit aid not advance beyond the
laboratory phase. The plot involving underworld figures reached the
stage of producing poison pills, establishing the contacts necessary to
send them into Cuba, procuring potential assassins within Cuba, and
, apparently delivering the pills to the island itself. One 1960 episode
involved a Cuban who initially had no intention of engaging in assassination,
but who finally agreed, at the suggestion of the CIA, to
attempt to assassinate RRul Castro if the opportunity arose. In the
AM/LASH operation, which extended from 1963 through 1965, the
CIA gave active support and encouragement to a Cuban whose intent
to assassinate Castro was known, and provided him with the means of
carrying out an assassination.
(255)
2. NO FOREIGN LEADERS WERE KILLED AS A RESULT OF ASSASSINATION PLOT&
INITIATED BY OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED STATES
The poisons intended for use against Patrice Lumumba were never
administered to him, and there is no evidence that the United States
was in any way involved in Lumumba's death at the hands of his
Congolese enemies. The efforts to assassinate Castro failed.
3. AMERICAN OFFICIALS ENCOURAGED OR WERE PRIVY TO COUP PLOTS WHICH
RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF TRUJILLO, DIEM, AND SCHNEIDER
American officials clearly desired the overthrow of Trujillo, offered
both encouragement and guns to local dissidents who sought his overthrow
and whose plans included assassination. American officials also
supplied those dissidents with pistols and rifles. .
American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese generals
who plotted Diem's overthrow, and a CIA official in Vietnam gave the
generals money after the coup had begun. However, Diem's assassination
was neither desired nor suggested by officials of the United States.
The record reveals that United States officials offered encouragement
to the Chilean dissidents who plotted the kidnapping of General Rene
Schneider, but American officials did not desire or encourage
Schneider's death. Certain high officials did know, however, that the
dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider.
As Director Colby testified before the Committee, the death of a
foreign leader is a risk foreseeable in any coup attempt. In the cases
we have considered, the risk of death was in fact known in varying
degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents in the Dominican
Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo. The contemplation of coup
leaders at one time to assassinate Nhu, President Diem's brother, was
communicated to the upper levels of the United States Government.
While the CIA and perhaps the White House knew that the coup
leaders in Chile planned to kidnap General Schneider, it was not anticipated
that he would be killed, although the possibility of his death
should have been recognized as a foreseeable risk of his kidnapping.
4. THE PLOTS OCCURRED IN A COLD WAR ATMOSPHERE PERCEIVED TO BE OF
CRISIS PROPORTIONS
The Committee fully appreciates the importance of evaluating the
assassination plots in the historical context within which they occurred.
In the preface to this report, we described the perception, generally
shared within the Fnited States during the depths of the Cold 'Val',
that our country faced a Plonolithic enemy in Communism. That attitude
helps explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed,
although it does not justify them. Those involved nevertheless appeared
to believe they were advancing the best interests of their
country.
5. AMERICAN OFFICIALS HAD EXAGGERATED NOTIONS ABOUT THEIR ABILITY
TO CONTROL THE ACTIONS OF COUP LEADERS
Running throughout the cases considered in this report was the
expectation of American officials that they could control the actions
of dissident groups which they were supporting in foreign countries.
257
Events demonstrated that the l:"nited States had no such power. This
point is graphically demonstrated by cables exchanged shortly before
the coup in Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge cabled 1Vashington on
October 00, l!Hm. that he was unable to halt a coup; a cable from
'Villiam Bundy in response stated that "we cannot accept conclusion
that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." The coup took
place three days later.
Shortly after the experience of the Bay of Pigs, CIA Headquarters
requested operatives in the Dominican Republic to tell the dissidents
to "turn off" the assassination attempt, because the United States was
not prepared to "cope with the aftermath." The dissidents replied that
the assassination was their affair and that it could not be turned off
to suit the convenience of the United States Government.
6. CIA OFFICIALS MADE USE OF KNOWN UNDERWORLD FIGURES IN
ASSASSINATION EFFORTS
Officials of the CIA made use of persons associated with the criminal
underworld in attempting to achieve the assassination of Fidel
Castro. These underworld figures were relied upon because it was believed
that they had expertise and contacts that were not available to
law-abiding citizens.
Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were also used by the
CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed. In the development of
the Executive Action capability, one foreign national with a criminal
background was used to "spot" other members of the European underworld
who mig-ht be used by the CIA for a variety of purposes, including
assassmation, if the need shou'ld arise. In the Lumum'ba case,
two men with criminal backgrounds were used as field operatives by
CIA officers in a volatile political situation in the Congo.
B. CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE PLOTS THEMSELVES
1. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT ENGAGE IN ASSASSINATION
We condemn the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy.
Aside from pragmatic arguments against the use of assassination supplied
to the Committee by witnesses with extensive experience in
covert operations, we find that assassination violates moral precepts
fundamental to our way of life.
In addition to moral considerations, there were several practical
reasons advanced for not assassinating foreign leaders. These reasons
are discussed in the section of this report recommending a statute
making assassination a crime.
(a) Distirwtion between targeted a88a88inati0n8 in.stigated by the
United States and support for dissidents seeldng to O'Vfffthr'ow looal
governments
Two of the five principal cases investigated by the Committee involved
plots to kill foreign leaders (Lumumba and Castro) that were
instigated by American officials. Three of the cases (Trujillo, Diem,
and Schneider) involved killings in the course of coup attempts by local
dissidents. These latter cases dIffered in the degree to which assassination
was contBmplared by the leaders of the coups and in the degreB
the coups were motivated by United States officials.
The Committee concludes that targeted assassinations instigared
by the United States must be prohibited.
Coups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination. The possibility
of assassination in coup atrempts is one of the issues to be considered
in determining the propriety of United States involvement in
coups, particularly in those where the assassination of a foreign leader
is a likely prospect.
This country was created by violent revolt against a regime believed
to be tyrannous, and our founding fathers (the local dissidents of
that era) received aid from foreign countries. Given that history, we
should not today rule out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow
tyrants. But passing beyond that principle, there remam serious
questions: for example, whether the national interest of the United
Stares is genuinely involved; whether any such support should be
overt rather than covert; what tactics should be used; and how such
actions should be authorized and controlled by the coordinate branches
of government. The Committee believes that its recommendations on
the question of covert actions in support of coups must await the
Committee's final report which will be issued afrer a full review of
covert action in general.
(b) The setting in 'Which the assassination plots occu'f'r'ed explains, but
does not justify them
The Cold War setting in which the assassination plots took place
does not change our view that assassination is unacceptable in our
society. In addition to the moral and practical problems discussed elsewhere,
we find three principal defects in any contention that the tenor
of the period justified the assassination plots:
First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by imminent
danger to the United States. Among the cases studied, Castro alone
posed a physical threat to the United States, but then only during the
period of the Cuban missile crisis. Attempts to assassinate Castro had
begun long before that crisis, and assassination was not advanced by
policymakers as a possible course of action during the crisis.
Second, we reject absolutely any notion that the Unired States
should justify its actions by the standards of totalitarians. Our
standards must be higher, and this difference is what the strnggle is
all about. Of course, we must defend our democracy. But in defending
it, ,,-e must resist undermining the very virtues we are defending.
Third, such activities almost inevitably become known. The damage
to American foreign policy, to the good name and reputation of the
United States abroad, to the American people's faith and support of
our government and its foreign policy is incalculable. This last pointthe
undermining of the American public's confidence in its government-
is the most damaging consequence of all.
Two documents which have been supplied to the Committee graphcally
demonstrate attitudes which can lead to tactics that erode and
could ultimately destroy the very ideals we must defend.
The first, document was written in 1954 by a special committee
formed to advise the President on covert activities. The United States
259
may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruth'less than [those] employed
by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from hostile nations.
The report concluded that "long standing American concepts of
American fair play must be reconsldered.m
Although those proposals did not involve assassinations, the a.ttitudes
underlying them were, as Director Colby testified, indicative of
the setting within which the assassination plots were conceived.
(Colby, 6/4/15:; p. 117)
We do not think that traditional American notions of fair play need
be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries. It may well be ourselves
that we injure most if we adopt tactics "more ruthless than the
enemy."
A second document which represents an attitude which we find improper
was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when the assassination
of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The chief of CIA's Africa
Division recommended a particular agent-WI/ROGUE-because :
He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an
assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary
because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will
dutifully undertakea,ppropriate action for its ex~ution without pangs of conscience.
In a word, he can rationalize all actions.
The Committee finds this rationalization is not in keeping with the
ideals of our nation.
2. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT MAKE USE OF UNDERWORLD FIGURES
FOR THEIR CRIMINAL TALENTS
We conclude that agencies of the United States must not use underworld
figures for their criminal talents 2 in carrying out Agency
operations. In addition to the corrosive effect upon our government,3
the use of underworld figures involves the.following dangers:
a. The use of underworld figures for "dirty business" gives them
the power to blackmail the government and to avoid prosecution, for
past or future crimes. For example, the figures involved in the Castro
assassination operation used their involvement with the CIA to avoid
1 The full text of the passage Is as follows:
... • • another Important requirement Is an aggressive covert psychological, political.
and paramilitary organization far more effective. more unique, and. If necessary, more
ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand In the
way of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplishment of this mission. '
"The second consideration. it Is now clear that we are facing an Implacable enemy
whose avowed objective Is world domination by whatever means at whatever cost. There
are DO rules In such a game. Hitherto acceptable Dorms of human conduct do not apply.
If the U..s. Is to survive, long standing American concepts of American fair play must
be reconsidered."
• Pending our Investigation of the use of Informants by the FBI and, other agencies.
we reserve jUdgment on the use of known criminals as Informants. Weare concerned
here only with the use of persons known to be actively engaged In criminal pursuits for
their expertise in carrying out criminal acts.
• The corrosive effect of dealing with underworld figures Is graphically demonstrated
by the fact that Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had devoted much of his professional
life to lighting organized crime, did not issue an order against cooperating
with such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA had made use of Sam
Glancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.
In May, 1962, the Attorney General learned that the operation-which was described
to him as 'terminated-had Involved assassination. According, to a CIA witness, the
Attorney General was angered by the report and told those brlellng him that he must
be consulted before underworld ligures were used again. He did not, however, direct that
underworld figures must never again be used.
61-985 0 - 75 - 18
prosecution. The CIA also contemplated attempting to quash criminal
charges brought in a foreign tribunal against QJjWIN.
b. The USe of persons experienced in criminal techniques and prone
to criminal behavior increases the likelihood that criminal acts will
occur. Sometimes agents in the field are necessarily given broad discretion.
But the risk of improper activities is increased when persons of
criminal background are used, particularly when they are selected precisely
to take advantage of their criminal skills or contacts.
c. There is the danger that the United States Government will become
an unwitting accomplice to criminal acts and that criminal·
figures will take advantage of their association with the government to
advance their own projects and interests.
d. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting persons because
they are skilled at performing deeds which the laws of our society
forbid.
The use of underworld figures by the United States Government for
their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable to those recognized
by Justice Brandeis in a different context five decades ago:
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example. Grime is contagious. If the Government
becomes a law.lbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; -it invites every man to become
a law unto himself. To declare that in the administration of the criminal
law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of the private criminal~would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely
set its face. [Olmatcad v. U.S., 277 WS. 439, 485 (1927)]
e. The spectacle of the Government consorting with criminal elements
destroys respect for government and law and undermines the
viability of democratic institutions.
C. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO AUTHORIZATION
AND CONTROL
In the introduction to this report, we set forth in summary form our
major conclusions concerning whether the assassination plots were
authorized. The ensuing discussion elaborates and explains those
conclusions.
The Committee analyzed the question of authorization for the
assassination activities from two perspectives. First, the Committee
examined whether officials in policymaking positions authorized or
were aware of the assassination activities. Second, the Committee inquired
whether the officials responsible for the operational details of
the plots perceived that assassmation had the approval of their superiors,
or at least was the type of activity that their superiors would
not disapprove.
No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the regimes discussed
in this report were authorized at the highest levels of the government.
However, the record is unclear and serious doubt remains concerning
whether assassination was authorized by the respective Presidents.
Even if the plots were not expreSSly authorized, it does not follow that
the Agency personnel believed they were acting improperly.
261
1. THE APPAREKT LA.Cli OF ACCOUKTABILITY IK THE COMMAKD AKD COKTROL
SYSTEM WAS SUCH THAT THE ASSASSIKATION PLOTS COULD HAVE
BEEK UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT EXPRESS AUTHORIZATION
As emphasized throughout this report, we are unable to draw firm
conclusions concerning who authorized the assassination plots. Even
after our long investigation it is unclear whether the conflicting and
inconclusive state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible
denial or whether there were, in fact, serious shortcomings in the system
of authorization which made it possible for assassination efforts
to have been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government
without express authority from officials above those agencies.!
Based on the record of our investigation, the Committee finds that
the system of Executive command and control was so inherently
ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what level assassination
activity was known and authorized. This creates the disturbing prospect
that assassination activity might have been undertaken by officials
of the United States Government without its having been incontrovertibly
clear that there was explicit authorization from the President
of the United States. At the same time, this ambiguity and
imprecision leaves open the possibility that there was a successful
"plausible denial" and that a Presidential authorization was issued
but is now obscured. .
Whether or not assassination was authorized by a President of
the United States, the President as the chief exooutive officer of the
United States Government must take ultimate responsibility for major
activities during his Administration. Just as these Presidents must be
held accountable, however, their subordinates throughout the Government
had a concomitant duty to fully disdlose their plans and
activities.
As part of their responsibility, these Presidents had a duty to determine
the nature of major activities and to prevent undesired activities
from taking place. This duty was particularly compelling when the
Presidents had reason to believe that major undesired activities had
previously occurred or were being advocated and might occur again.
Whether or not the Presidents in fact knew about the assassination
plots, and even if their subordinates failed in their duty of full disclosure,
it still follows that the Presidents should have known about
the plots. This sets a demanding standard, but one the Committee supports.
The future of democracy rests upon such aceountabi'lity.
2. FINDINGS RELATING TO THE LEVEL AT WHICH THE PLOTS
WERE AUTHORIZED
(a) Diem
We find that neither the President nor any other official in the
United States Government authorized the assassination of Diem and
his brother Nhu. Both the DCI and top State Department officials
1 As noted above, there are also certain Inherent limitations In the extensive record
complied by the Committee. Many years have passed, several of the key figures are dead,
and while we have been assured by the present Administration that all the relevant
evidence has been produced, It is always possible that ather mare conclusive material
exists, but has not been found.
262
did know, however, that the death of Nhu, at least at one point, had
been contemplated by the coup leaders. But when the possibility that
the coup leaders were considering assassination was brought to the
attention of the DCL he directed that the United States would have
no part in such activ~ity, and there is some evidencB that this information
was relayed to the coup leaders.
(b) Schneider
We find that neither the President nor anv other official in the
United States Government authorized the assassination of General
Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the ·White House, did know
that coup leaders contemplated a kidnapping, which, as it turned out
resulted in Schneider's death.
(c) Trujillo
The Presidents and other senior officials in the Eisenhower and
Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow of Trujillo and
approved or condoned actions to obtain that end.
The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents viewed the removal of
Trujillo as critical to any plans to overthrow his regime and that
they intended to assassinate Trujillo if given the opportunity. It is
uncertain precisely when officials at higher levels of government with
responsibility for formulating policy learned that the dissidents
equated assassination with overthrow. Clearly by early May 1961
senior American officials, including President Kennedy, knew that
the dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo. The 'Vhite House and
State Department, as well as the CIA, knew that the United States
had provided the dissidents with rifles and pistols and that the dissidents
had requested machine guns which they intended to use in
connection with an assassination effort. .
Thereafter, on May 16, 1961 President Kennedy approved National
Security Council recommendations that the United StatBs not initiate
the overthrow of Trujillo until it was known what government would
succeed the dictator. That recommendation was consistent with earlier
attempts initiated by the CIA to discourage the planned assassination
and thereby avoid potential problems from a power vacuum which
might arise. After deciding to discourage the planned assassination,
the DCI directed that the machine guns not be passed to the Dominican
dissidents. That policy was reconfirmed by the State Department, the
Special Group, and, in a cable of May 29, 1961, by President Kennedy
himself.
The day before the assassination, President Kennedy cabled the
State Department representative in the Dominican Republic that the
United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone assassination."
However, the cable also stated that if the dissidents planning
the imminent assassination of Trujillo succeeded, and thereby established
a provisional government, the United States would recognize
and support them.
The President's cable has been construed in several ways. One reading
stresses the President's opposition to assassination "as a matter of
general policy." Another stresses those portions of the cable which
discuss pragmatic matters, including the risk that the United States'
il1\'olvement might be exposed, and suggests that the last minute telegram
was designed to avoid a charge that the United States shared
responsibility for the assassination. A third construction would be
that both of the prior readings are correct and that they are not
mntually exclusive. However the cable is construed, its ambiguity
illustrates the difficulty of seeking objectives which can only be accomplished
by force-indeed, perhaps only by the assassination of a leader-
and yet not wishing to take specific actions which seem abhorrent.
, (d) LUTnumba
The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is
stronO" enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to asE:
assiI~ate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower. Nevertheless,
there is enough countervailing testimony by Eisenhower Administration
officials and enough ambiguity and lack of clarity in the
records of high-level policy meetings to preclude the Committee from
making a finding that the President intended an assassination effort
against Lumumba.
It is clear that the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles,
authorized an assassination plot. There is, however, no evidence of
United States involvement in bringing about the death of Lumumba
at the hands of Congolese authorities.
Strong expressions of hostility toward Lumumba from the President
and his National Security Assistant, followed immediately by CIA
steps in furtherance of an assassination operation against Lumumba,
are part OT a sequence of events that, at the least, make it appear that
Dulles believed assassination was a permissible means of complying
with pres,'mre from the President to remove Lumumba from the political
scene.
Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to
have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does, as he
said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization. His testimony,
ho\"ever, should be read in light of the fact that NSC records during
this period do not make clear whether or not the President ordered
Lumumba's assassinatipn and the fact that others attending those
meetings testified that they did not recall hearing such a PresIdential
order.
Richard Bissell assumed that Presidential authorization for assassinating
Lumumba had been communicated to him by Dulles, but Bissell
had no specific recollection concerning when that communication ocCUlTed.
The impression shared by the Congo Station Officer and the
DDP's Special Assistant Joseph Scheider that the President authorized
an assassination effort against Lumumba was derived solely from
conversations Scheider had with Bissel and Bronson Tweedy. Howen~
r, the impression thus held by Scheider and the Station Officer
does not, in itself, establish Presidential authorization because neither
Scheider nor the Station Officer had first-hand knowledge of Allen
Dulles' statements about Presidential authorization, and because
Scheider may have misconstrued Bissell's reference to "highest
authority."
(c) Oastro
There was insufficient evidence from which the Committee could
con~lude that Presid~ntsEisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson, their close
adVIsors, or the SpeCIal Group authorized the assassination of Castro.
The assassination plots against Castro were clearly authorized at
least through the level of DDP. We also find that DCI Allen Dulles approved
"thorough consideration" of the "elimination" of Castro. Further,
it is also likely that Dulles knew about and authorized the actual
plots that occurred during his tenure. Bissell and Edwards testified
that they had briefed Dulles (and Cabell) on the plot involving underworld
figures "circumlocutiously," but that they were certain that he
had understood that the plot involved assassination. Their testimony
is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew about the plot to assassinate
Lllmumba which was being planned at the same time, and which also
involved Bissell. ,Ve can find no evidence that McCone was aware of
the plots ,vhich occurred during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms,
testified that he never discussed the subject with McCone and was
never expressly authorized by anyone to assassinate Castro.
The only suggestion of express Presidential authorization for the
plots against Castro was Richard Bissell's opinion that Dulles would
have informed Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy by circumlocution
only after the assassination had been planned and was underway.
The assumptions underlying this opinion are too attenuated for the
Committee to adopt it as a finding. First, this assumes that Dulles
himself knew of the plot, a matter which is not entjrely certain. Second,
it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two Presidents-a
course of action which Helms, who had far more covert action experience
than Bissell, testified was precisely wha,t the doctrine of plausible
denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third, it necessarily assumes
that the Presidents would understand from a "circumlocutious" description
that assassination was being discussed.
In view of the strained chain of assumptions and the contrary testimony
of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower
and Kennedy, the Committee makes no finding implicating
Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves.
Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under which they
served never asked them to consider assassination.
There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnson knew
about or authorized any assassination activity during his Presidency.
3. CIA OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OPERATIONS PERCEIVED
ASSASSINATION TO HAVE BEEN A PERMISSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION
The CIA officials involved in the targeted assassination attempts
testified that they had believed that their activities had been fully
authorized.1
In the case of the Lumumba assassination operation, Richard Bissell
testified that he had no direct recollection of authorization, but
after having reviewed the cables and Special Group minutes, testified
that authority must have flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate
levels in the Agency.
• 1 T!le lower le.vel operatives. such as the A:ll/LASH case officers. are not discussed
In thIS section, Slllee they had clear orders from their Immediate superiors within the CIA.
265
In the case of the assassination effort against Castro, Bissell and
Sheffield Edwards testified they believed the operation involving
underworld figures had been authorized by Dulles when they briefed
him shortly after the plot had been initiated. William Harvey testified
he believed that the plots "were completely authorized at every
appropriate level within and beyond the Agency," although he had
"no personal knowledge whatever of the individuals' identities, times,
exact words, or channels through which such authority may have
passed." Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard Bissell that
the effort against Castro had been authorized "from the highest level,"
and that Harvey had.discussed the plots with Richard Helms, his immediate
superior. Helms testified that although he had never discussed
ttssassination with his superiors, he believed:
...... that in these actions we were taking against Cuba and against Fidel
Castro's government in CUba, that they were what we had been asked to do.......
In other words we had been asked to get rid of Castro and" .... there were no
limitations put on the means, and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines
that we understood to be in play at this particular time.
The evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency officials testified
that they believed the effort to assassinate Castro to have been
within the parameters of permissible action. But Administration officials
responsible for formulating policy, including McCone, testified
that they were not aware of the effort and did not authorize it. The
explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning overthrowing
the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that were subject to
differing interpretations by those responsible for carrying out those
orders.
The various Presidents and their senior advisors strongly opposed
the regimes of Castro and Trujillo, the accession to power of Allende,
and the potential influence of Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning
action against those foreign leaders were given in vigorous language.
For example, President Nixon's orders to prevent Allende from assuming
power left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshall's baton
in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day." Similarly,
General Lansdale described the Mongoose effort against Cuba as "a
combat situation," and Attorney General Kennedy emphasized tha,t
"a solution to the Cuba problem today carries top priority." Helms
testified that the pressure to "get rid of Castro and the Castro regime"
was intense, and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to "get off
your ass about Cuba."
It is possible that there was a failure of,communication between
policymakers and the agency personnel who were experienced in secret,
and often violent, action. Although policymakers testified that assassination
was not intended by such words as "get rid of Castro." Some of
their subordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived that
assassination was desired and that they should proceed without
troubling their superiors.
The 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassinations appropriately
obseITed:
The point is that of frequent resort to synecdoche--the mention of a part when
the whole is to be understood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references
to phrases such as "disposing of Castro," which may be read i:n. the narrow,
literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the
hroader figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the coin, we
find people speaking vaguely of "doing something about Ca,stro" When it is clear
that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situation ,,-herein
those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not
have said what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral
shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended.
Differing perceptions between superiors and their subordinates
were graphically illustrated in the Castro context.t McCone, in a
memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as follows:
Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terlllH Huch aH "dbpose
of Castro," "remove Castro," "knock off Castro," etc., and this meant the
overthrow of the Communist government in Cuba and the ,replacing of it with
a democratic regime, Terms such as the abm'e appear in many working paperH,
memoranda for the record, etc., and, aH Htated, all refer to a change in the
Cuban government.'
Helms, who had considerable experience as a covert operator, gave
precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpreting them
as conveying authority for assassination.
Helms repeatedly testified that he felt that explicit authorization
was unnecessary for the assassination of Ca~tro in the early 1960's, but
he said he did not construe the intense pressure from President
Nixon in 1970 as providing authority to assassinate anyone. As Helms
testified, the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende
from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove the
Castro regime, but rather that "I had already made up my mind that
we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director."
Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected to similar
pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis that implicit authority
to assassinate Castro derived from the strong language of the
policymakers. Bissell testified that he had believed that "formal and
explicit approval" would be required for assassination, and Helms' assistant,
George McManus, testified that "it never occurred to me" that
the vigorous words of the Attorney General could be taken as authorizing
assassination. The differing perceptions may have resulted from
their different backgrounds and training. Neither Bissell (an academician
whose Agency career for the six years before he became DDP
had been in the field of technology) nor McManus (who had concentrated
on intelligence and staff work) were experienced in covert
operations.3
The perception of certain Agency officials that assassination was
within the range of permissible activity was reinforced by the continuing
approval of violent covert actions against Cuba that were sanc-
1 Senator MATHIAS. Let me draw an example from history, When Thomas Becket was
proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said, "who wlil rid me of this troublesome
priest?" He didn't say, "go out and murder him". He said "who will rid me of this man"
and let It go at that. ' .
Mr. HEurs. That Is a warming reference to the problem.
Senator MATHIAS. You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?
Mr. HELMS. I think It does, sir.
Senator MATHIAS, And .that Is typical of the kind of thing which might be said. which
might be taken by the DIrector or by anybody else as presidential authorization to go
forward?
!\Ir. HELMS. That Is right. But In answer to that, I realize that one sort of grows
up In tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found It very difficult
to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feelingthat
we were hired out to keep those things out of the oval office.
2 It should be noted, howeyer. that this memorandum was preDared se,"eral years
after the assassination plots when a newspaper article alleged CIA Involvement In
attempts on Castro's life,
3 Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far, In the Lumumba case. for example.
Johnson and Dl11on, who were Administration officials with no covert operation experience
construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while other persons who were
not in the Agency did not so Interpret them.
2fJ7
tioned at the Presidential le\'el, and by the failure of the successive
administrations to make clear that assassination was not permissible.
This point is one of the subjects considered in the next section.
4. THE :FAILURE IN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN AGENCY OFFICIALS IN
CHARGE OF THE ASSASSINATION OPERATIONS AND THEIR SUPERIORS IN
THE AGENCY AND IN THE AD~IINISTRATIONWAS DUE TO: (A) THE FAIL~
UHE OF SU"BOHDINATES TO DISCLOSE THEIR PLANS AND OPERATIONS TO
THEm SUPERIORS; AND (B) THE FAILURE OF SUPERIORS IN THE CLIMATE
OF VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSIVE COVERT ACTIONS SANCTIONED BY THE ADl\
IlNISTHATIONS TO RULE OUT ASSASSINATION AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN
POLICY; TO MAKE CLEAR TO THEIR SUBORDINATES THAT ASSASSINATION
WAS Il\IPEIUIISSIBLE; OR TO INQUIRE FURTIIEH AFTER RECEIVING INDICATIONS
THAT IT WAS BEING CONSIDERED
'While we cannot find that officials responsible for making policy
decisions knew about or authorized the assassination attempts (with
the possible exception of the Lumumba case), Agency operatives at
least through the level of DDP nevertheless perceived assassination
to have been permissible. This failure in communication was inexcusable
in light of the gravity of assassination. The Committee finds that
the failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible,
and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected to
inform their superiors are unacceptable. The Committee further finds
that Administration officials failed to be sufficiently precise in their
directions to the Agency, and that their attitude toward the possibility
of assassination was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other
activities that they did authorize.
(a.) Agency official8 fa.iled on 8everal occa,yio118 to reveal the plot8 to
their 8uperior8, or to do 80 with 8ufficient detail and clari-ty
Several of the cases considered in this report raise questions concerning
whether officials of the CIA sufficiently informed their superiors
in the Agency or officials outside the Agency about their
activities.
(i) Castro
The failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors of the assassination
efforts against Castro is particularly troubling.
On the basis of the testimony and documentary evidence before the
Committee, it is not, entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware
of the true nature of the underworld operation. The plot continued into
~fcCone's term, apparently without McCone's or the Administration's
knowledge or approval.
On some occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity to inform
his superiors about the assassination effort against Castro, he
either failed to inform them, failed to do so clearly, or misled them.
Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and Cabell about
268
the assassination operation using underworld figures, but that they did
so "circumlocutiously", and then only after contact had been made
with the underworld and a price had been offered for Castro's death.
Perhaps Bissell should have checked back with Dulles at an earlier
stage after having received approval to give "thorough consideration"
to Castro's "elimination" from Dulles in December 1959.
Bissell further testified that he never raised the issue of assassination
with non-CIA officials of either the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administration.
His reason was that since he was under Dulles in the
chain of command, he would normally have had no duty to discuss the
matter with these Presidents or other Administration officials, and that
he assumed that Dulles would have "circumlocutiously'.' spoken with
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy about the operation. These reasons
are insufficient. It was inexcusable to withhold such information
from those responsible for formulating policy on the unverified assumption
that they might have been "circumlocutiously" informed by
Dulles.1
The failure either to inform those officials or to make certain that
they had been informed by Dulles was particularly reprehensible in
light of the fact that there were many occasions on which Bissell
should have informed them, and his failure to do so was misleading.
In the first weeks of the Kennedy Administration, Bissell met with
Bundy and discussed the development of an assassination capability
within CIA-Executive Action. But Bissell did not mention that an
actual assassination attempt was underway. Bissell appeared before
the Taylor-Kennedy Board of Inquiry which was formed to report
to the President on the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but he
testified that he did not inform the Board of the assassination operation.
2 As chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine
operations and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials
in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban
operations, and his advice was frequently sought. He did not tell them
that the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate Castro, and did
not ask if they favored proceeding with the effort. He was present at
the meeting with Dulles and President Kennedy at which the new
President was briefed on covert action in Cuba, but neither Dulles
nor Bissell mentioned the assassination operation that was underway.
Dulles himself may not have always been candid. On December
11,1959, he approved the CIA's giving "thorough consideration to the
elimination of Fidel Castro," but told the Special Group in a meeting
the following month that "we do not have in mind the quick elimination
of Castro, but rather actions designed to enable responsible opposition
leaders to get a foothold."
The failures to make forthright disclosures to policy-makers continued
during the time that Richard Helms was DDP. Helms' failure
to inform McCone about the underworld operation (when it was reactivated
under Harvey and poison pills were sent to Cuba) was a
grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses are unpersuasive. In
May 1962 the Attorney General was told that the CIA's involve-
1 Even assuming that Bisseli correctly perceived that Dulles understood the nature of
the operation. it was also inexcusable for Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain
language. Further, even if one accepts Bissell's assumption that Dulles told the Presidents,
they would have been told too late. because Bissell "guessed" they would have
been told that the operation "had been pranned and was being attempted."
2 Dulles was also a member of the B<?ard.
ment in an as.'Jassination plot had tBrminated with the Bay of Pigs.
Not only did Edwards, who had briefed the Attorney General, know
that the operation had not been terminated, but Helms did not inform
the Attorney General that the operation was still active when he
learned that the AttDrney General had been misled. Helms did not
inform McCone of the plot until August 1963, and did so then in a
manner which indicatBd that the plot had been tBrminated before
McCone became Director. Helms' denial that AM/LASH had been
involved in an assassination effort in response to Secretary of State
Rusk's inquiries was, as Helms conceded, not factual.
When Helms briefed President Johnson on the Castro plots, he
apparently described the activities that had occurred during prior
administrations but did not describe the AM/LASH operation which
had continued until 1965. Helms also failed to inform the Warren
Commission of the Dlots because the precise question was not asked.1
Helms told the Committee that he had never raised the assassination
operation with McCone or other Kennedy Administration officials
because of the sensitivity of the matter, because he had assumed that
the project had been previously authorized, and because the aggressive
character of the Kennedy Administration's program against the
Castro regime led him to believe that assassination was permissible,
('ven though he did not receive an express instruction to that effect.
He added that he had never been convinced that the operation would
succeed. and that he would have told McCone about it if he had ever
believed that it would "go anyplace."
Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors about the assassination
effort are unacceptable; indeed, many of them were reasons why
he should have specifically raised the matter with higher authority.
As Helms himself testified, assassination was of a high order of sensitivity.
Administration policymakers, supported by intelligenceestimates
furnished by the Agency, had emphasized onseveral occasions
that successors to Castro might be worse than Castro himself. In addition,
the Special Group (Augmented) required that p1'ans for covert
actions against Cuba be submitted in detail for its approval. Although
the Administration was exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do
something about Castro and the Castro regime, it was a serious error
to have undertaken so drastic an operation without making certain
that there was full and unequivocal permission to proceed.
William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attempt using
underworld figures to assassinate Castro, testified that he never discussed
the plot with McCone or officials of the Kennedy Administration
because he believed that it had been fully authorized by the previous
Director. because he was uncertain whether it had a chance of
succeeding, and because he believed that it was not his duty to inform
higher authorities.
Nonetheless, the CDmmittee believes there were occasions on which
it was incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed the assassination operation.
As head of Task Force 'V, the branch of the CIA responsible
for covert operations in Cuba, Harvey reported directly to General
Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented). The Special Group
1 .Tohn ~IcCone was Director of the CIA and at least knew aoont the pre-Ea)" of PI~s
!llot during the Warren Commission's Inquiry. McCone failed to disclose the plot to the
Commission. Allen Dulles was on the Warren Commission. He did not Inform the other
members about the plots that had occurred during his term as DCL
21'0
(Augmen~d) had made it known that covert operations in Cuba should
be first approved by it, both by explicit inBtruction and by its practice
that particular operations be submitted in "nauseating detail". Yet
Harvey did not inform either General Lansdale 01' the Special Group
(Augmented) of the assassination operation, either when he was explicitly
requested to report to McCone, General Taylor, and the
Special Group on his activitie~ in Miami in April 1962, or when the
subject of assassination was raised in the August 1962 meeting and
McCone voiced his disapproval. Harvey testified that a matter as
sensitive as assassination would never be raised in a gathering as
large as the Special Group (Augmented).
The Committee finds the reasons advanced for not having informed
those responsible for formulating policy about the assassination operation
inadequate, misleading, and inconSistent. Some officials viewed
assassination as too important and sensitive to discuss with superiors,
while others considered it not sufficiently important. Harvey testified
that it was premature to tell McCone about the underworld operation
in April 1962, because it was not sufficiently advanced; but too late
to tell him about it in August 1962, since by that time Harvey had
decided to terminate it. On other occasions, officials thought disclosure
was someone else's responsibility; Bissell said he thought it was up
to Dulles, and Harvey believed it was up to Helms.
The Committee concludes that the failure to clearly inform policymakers
of the assassination effort against Castro was grossly improper.
The Committee believes that it should be incumbent on the DDP
to report such a sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter
how grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of the operation.
It follows that the DCI has the same duty to accurately inform
his superiors.
(ii) Trujillo
In the Trujillo case there were several instances in which it appears
that policymakers were not given sufficient information, or were not
informed in a timely fashion.
At a meeting on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a plan to the
Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups and local dissidents,
and sta~d that the plan would not bring down the regime without
"some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself." At a meeting on
January 12, 1961, the Special Group authorized the passage of "limited
supplies of small arms and other ma~rials" to Dominican dissidents
under certain conditions.
At this time, the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating the
assassination of Trujillo had boon known in the State Department at
least through the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican
Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA, including the
DCI. Yet the internal State Department memorandum which was
furnished to Undersecretary Livingston Merchant, and which was said
to have been the basis for the Special Group's agreeing to the limited
supply of small arms and other material (i.e., eXJ>losive devices), .did
not mention assassination. Instead, it spoke of 'sabotage potential"
and stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the [government]
by any such minor measure [as the supplying of small arms and
explosives]."
At a meeting of the Special Group on February 14, 1961, represe~tatives
of the CIA briefed the Ilew members of the Group on outstandmg
271
CIA projects. The Dominican Republic was one of the briefing topics.
The minutes of that meeting indicate that Mr. Bundy requested a
memorandum for "higher authority" on the subject of what plans
could be made for a successor government to Trujillo. Bissell had no
clear recollection as to the details of the February 14 briefing and was
unable to recall whether or not the method of overthrow to be attempted
by the dissidents was discussed. It is not known, therefore,
whether the new members of the Special Group learned, at that time, of
Bissell's assessment that overthrow of the regime required a decisive
stroke against Trujillo himself. Robert McNamara recalled no mention
at that meeting of any dissident plans to assassinate Trujillo.
On February 15 and 17, 1961, memoranda were prepared for the
President by Secretary of State Rusk and by Richard Bisse'll respectively.
Although both the Department of State and the OIA then had
information concerning the dissidents' intent to assassinate Trujillo
if possible, neither memorandum referred to such a contingency. Rusk
disclaimed any knowledge of the dissidents intent to assassinate
Trujillo until shortly 'before the event occurred, but Bissell admitted
personal afwareness of the assassination plans.
Bissell's February 17 memorandum indicated that dissident leaders
had informed the CIA of "their plan of action which they felt could
be implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men, explosives,
and remote control detonation devices." Various witnesses testified
that supplying arms for 300 men would, standing alone, indicate a
"non-targeted" use for the arms. One possible method of assassinating
Trujillo which had long been discussed by the dissidents and which
was the favored approach at the time of Bissell's memorandum envisioned
assassination by means of a bomb detonated by remote control.
But the memorandum made no reference to the use to which the
explosive devices might be put. (There is no record of any query from
recipients of the briefing paper as to the nature of the dissidents' "plan
of action" or the uses for which the arms and explosives were intended.)
The passage of the carbines was approved by CIA Headquarters on
March 31, 1961. Although the State Department's representative in
the Dominican Republic concurred in the decision to pass the carbines,
he was requested by the CIA not to communicate this information
to State Department officials in Washington, and he complied
with that request. Accordingly, neither the State Department nor the
'White House was aware of the passage for several weeks. Similarly,
there was no contemporaneous disclosure outside the CIA, other than
to the State Department representative in the Dominican Republic,
that machine guns had been sent to the Dominican Republic via the
diplomatic pouch.
A memorandum prepared by Adolph Berle, the State Department
official from whom the CIA sought permission to pass the machine
guns, states that "on cross-examination it developed that the real plan
was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose."
(Berle, Memorandum of Conversation, 5/3/61) Berle's memorandum
states that he informed the CIA officials that "we did not wish to
have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any
time." The CIA official reportedly said he felt the same way, even
though on the previous day he had been one of the signers of a draft
CIA cable which would have permitted passage of the machine guns
Z72
to the dissidents for "* * * their additional protection on their proposed
endeavor." (Draft HQs to Station Cable, 5/2/61)
Although the report of a new anti-Trujillo plot was discussed at a
meeting of the Special Group on May 4, 1961, there is no indication
that BerIe, who was the Chairman of the Inter-Agency Task Force
having responsibility for contingency planning for Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, and Haiti. disclosed to higher authority the assassination
information which he discovered by "cross-examination." The
National Security Council met the next day and noted the President's
view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of
Trujillo before it was known what government would succeed him.
That Xational Security Council Record of Action was approved by
the President on May 16, 1961. There is no record indicating whether
BerIe communicated to the President, or to members of the National
Security Council, his knowledge as to the lethal intent of the dissidents
who would be carrying out the overthrow of Trujillo.
(iii) Schrwider
The issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were contrary
to those of the Administration. It is clear that President Nixon
desired to prevent Allende from assuming' office, even if that required
fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile. Nor did ·White House
officials suggest that tactics employed (including as a first step kidnapping
General Schneider) would have been unacceptable as a matter
of principle. Rather, the issue posed is whether 'Vhite House officials
were consulted, and thus given an opportunity to weigh such matters
as risk and likelihood of success, and to apply policy-making judgments
to particular tactics. The record indicates that up to October 15 they
were; after October 15 there is some doubt.
The documentary record with respect to the disputed post-October 15
period gives rise to conflicting inferences. On the one hand, Karamessines'
calendar shows at least one White House contact in the critical
period prior to the kidnapping of General Schneider on Octdber 22,
However, the absence of any substantive memoranda in CIA fileswhen
contrasted with several such memoranda describing contacts
with the White House between September 15 and October 15-may
suggest a lack of significant communication on the part of the CIA
as weB as a lack of careful supervision on the part of the White House,
The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a view that
action which the Committee believes called for top-level policy discussion
and decision ,vas thought of as permissible, without any further
consultation, on the basis of the initial instruction to prevent Allende
from assuming power. Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered
to military figures there on the authority of middle level CIA officers
without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of the program.
We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action of the middle
level officers. but their failure to consult necessarily establishes
that there was no advance permission from outside the CIA for the
passage of machine guns, And it also suggests an unduly lax attitude
within the CIA toward consultation with superiors. Further, this case
demonstrates the problems inherent in giving an agency a "blank
check" to engage in covert operations without specifying which actions
are permissible and which are not, and without adequately supervising
and monitoring these activities.
273
(b) Adlninistmtion officials failed to rule out assassination as a tool of
foreign policy, to make clear to their subordinates thai assa8siJnation
10(18 impe1'1ni8sible 01' to inquire further after receiving indications
that assassination 1MS being considered
\Vhile we do not find that high Administration officials expressly
approved of the assassination attempts, we have noted that certain
agency officials nevertheless perceived assassination to have been authorized.
Although those officials were remiss in not seeking express
authorization for their activities, their superiors were also at fault for
giving vague instructions and for not explicitly ruling out assassination.
No written order prohibiting assassination was issued until 1972,
and that order was an internal CIA directive issued by Director Helms.
(i) Trujillo
Immediately following the assassination of Trujillo, there were a
number of high-level meetings about the Dominican Republic attended
by the policymakers of the Kennedy Administration. All relevant
fact.<; concerning CIA and State Department support of the Dominican
dissidents were fully known. No directive was issued by the President
or the Special Group criticizing any aspect of United States involvement
in the Dominican affair. Similarly, there is no record of any
action having been taken prohibiting future support or encouragement
of groups or individuals known to be planning the assassination of a
foreign leader. The meetings and discussions fol'lowing the Trujillo
assassination represent another missed opportunity to esta'blish an
administration policy against assassination and may partially account
for the CIA's assessment of the Dominican operation as a success a few
years later. They may also have encouraged Agency personnel, involved
in both the Trujillo and the Castro plots, in their belief that
the Administration would not be unhappy if the Agency were able
to make Castro disappear. No such claim, however, was made in testimony
by any agency official.
(ii) Schneider
As explained above, there is no evidence that assassination was
ever proposed as a method of carrying out the Presidential order to
prevent Allende from assuming office. The Committee believes, however,
that the granting of carte blanche authority to the CIA 'by the
Executive in this case may have contributed to the tragic and unintended
death of General Schneider. This was also partially due to
assigning an impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably
short time. Apart from the question of whether any intervention
in Chile was justified under the circumstances of this case, the Committee
believes that the Executive in any event should have defined
the limits of permissible action.
(iii) Lumumba
We are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally
authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba due to
the lack ofllibsolute certainty in the evidence. However, it appears
that the strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and
NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings, led Dulles to believe
that assassination was desired. The minutes contain language
274
concerning the need to "dispose of" Lumumba, an "extremely strong
feeling; about the necessity for straightforward action," and a refusal
to rule out any activity that might contribute to "getting rid of"
Lumumba.
(iv) Oastro
The efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in an atmosphere of
extreme pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration officials
to discredit and overthrow the Castro regime. Shortly after Castro's
ascendancy to power, Anen Dulles directed that "thorough consideration"
be given to the "elimination" of Castro. Richard Helms recalled
that:
I remember vividly [that the pressure] was very intense. And therefore, when
you go into the record, you find a lot of nutty schemes there and those nutty
schemes were borne of the intensit~· of the pressure. And we were quite
frustrated.
Bissen recalled that:
During that entire period, the Administration was extremely sensitive about
the defeat that had been intlicted, as they felt, on the U.S. at the Ba~' of Pigs,
and were pursuing every possible means of getting rid of Castro.
Another CIA official stated that sometime in the Fall of 1961
Bissell was:
* * * chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by both the President
and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything
about getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime.
General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation
MONGOOSE that "you're in a combat situation where we have been
given full command." Secretary of Defense McNamara confirmed
that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs
and thereafter."
Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved contemplated
violent action against Cuba. The operation which resulted in the
Bay of Pigs was a major paramilitary onslaught that had the approval
of the highest government officials, including the two Presidents.
Thereafter, Attorney General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special
Group (Augmented) that "a solution to the Cuban problem today
carried top priority * * * no time, money, effort-{)r manpower is
to be spared." 1 Subsequently, Operation MONGOOSE involved
propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward spurring a revolt
of the Cuban people against Castro. Measures which were considered
by the top policymakers included incapacitating sugar workers
during harvest season by the use of chemicals; blowing up bridges
and production plants; sabotaging merchandise in third countrieseven
those allied with the United States-prior to its delivery to Cuba;
and arming insurgents on the island. Programs undertaken at the urging
of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruit and arm
dissidents within Cuba, and raids on plants, mines, and harbors. Consideration
and approval of these measures may understandably have
led the CIA to conclude that violent actions were an acceptable means
of accomplishing important objectives.
1 The Attorney General himself took a personal interest in the recruitment and development
of assets within CUba, on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible
recruits and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban exiles active in the covert
war against the Castro Government.
27\5
Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings might well have
contributed to the perception of some CIA officials that assassination
was a permissible tool in the effort to overthrow the Castro Regime.
At a Special Group meeting in November 1960, Undersecretary Merchant
inquired whether any planning had been undertaken for "direct,
positive action" against Che Guevara, Raul Castro, and Fidel Castro.
Cabell replied that such a capability did not exist, but he might well
have left the meeting with the impression that assassination was not
out of bounds. Lansdale's plan, which was submitted to the Special
Group in January 1962, aimed at inducing "open revolt and overthrow
of the Communist regime." Included in its final phase an "attack
on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders." The proposal
stated that "this should be a 'Special Target' operation * * *. Gangster
elements might provide the best recruitment potential against
police * * *." Although Lansdale's proposal was shelved, the type of
aggressive action contemplated was not formally ruled out. Minutes
from several Special Group meetings contain language such as "possible
removal of Castro from the Cuban scene."
On several occasions, the subject of assassination was discussed in
the presence of senior Administration officials. Those officials never
consented to actual assassination efforts, but they failed to indicate
that assassination was impermissible as a matter of principle.
In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA project
described as the development of a capability to assassinate. Bundy
raised no objection and, according to Bissell, may have been more affirmative.
' Bissell stated that he did not construe Bundy's remarks as
authorization for the underworld plot against Castro that was then
underway. But the fact that he believed that the development of an
assassination capability had, as he subsequently told Harvey,been
approved by the White House, may well have contributed to the general
perception that assassination was not prohibited.2
Documents received by the Committee indicate that in May 1961,
Attorney General Kennedy and the Director of the FBI received information
that the CIA was engaged in clandestine efforts against
Castro which included the use of Sam Giancanaand other underworld
figures. The various documents referred to "dirty business," "clandestine
efforts," and "plans" which were still "working" and might eventually
"payoff." The Committee is unable to determine whether
Hoover and the Attorney General ever inquired into the nature of the
CIA operation, although there is no evidence that they did so inquire.
The Committee believes that they should have inquired, and that their
failure to do so was a dereliction of their duties.
Documents indicate that in May 1962, Attorney General Kennedy
was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate Castro prior to the
B~y of Pigs. According to the CIA officials who were present at the
brIefing, the Attorney General indicated his displeasure about the
lack of consultation rather than about the impropriety of the attempt
1 The Inspector General's Report states that Harvey's notes (which no longer exist)
quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey: "The White House has twice urged me to create
such as capability."
2 Bundy, as the National Security AdvisOT to the PresMent. had an obligation to telI the
President of such a grave matter, Hen though It was only a discussion of a capability to
assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error.
61-985 0 - 75 - 19
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itself. There is no evidence that the Attorney General told the CIA
that it must not engage in assassination plots in the future.
At a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in August 1962,
well after the assassination efforts were underway, Robert McNamara
is said to have raised the question of whether the assassination of
Cuban leaders should be explored, and General Lansdale issued an
action memorandum assigning the CIA the task of preparing contingency
plans for the assassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone
testified that he had immediately made it clear that assassination
was not to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testimony and documents
which he wrote after the event indicate that Harvey may have
been confused over whether McCone had objected to the use of assassination,
or whether he was only concerned that the subject not be
put in writing. In any event, McCone went no further. He issued no
general order banning consideration of assassination within the
Agency.
One of the programs forwarded to General Lansdale by the Defense
Department in the MONGOOSE program was entitled "Operation
Bounty" and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cuba offering rewards
for the assassination of Government leaders. Although the plan
was vetoed by Lansdale, it indicates that persons in agencies other than
the CIA perceived that assassination might be permissible.
While the ambivalence of Administration officials does not excuse
the misleading conduct by Agency officials or justify their failure to
seek explicit permission, this attitude displayed an insufficient concern
about assassination which may have contributed to the perception
that assassination was an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government's
general objectives. .
Moreover, with the exception of the tight guidelines issued by the
Special Group (Augmented) concerning Operation MONGOOSE,
precise limitations were never imposed on the CIA requiring prior
permission for the details of other proposed covert operaJtions against
Cuba.
No g-eneral policy banning assassination was promulgated until
Helms' intra-agency order in 1972. Considering the number of times
the subject of assassination had arisen, Administration officials were
remiss in not explicitly forbidding such activity.
The committee notes that many of the oce.asions on which CIA
officials should have informed their superiors of the assassination
efforts but failed to do so, or did so in a misleading manner, were also
occasions on which Administration officials paradoxically may have
reinforced the perception that assassination was permissible.
For example, when Bissell spoke with Bundy about an Executive
Action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that an actual assassination
operation was underway, but Bundy failed to rule out assassination
as a tactic.
In May 1962, the Attorney General was misleadingly told about
the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs, but not about
the operation that was then going on. The Attorney General, however,
did not state that assassination was improper.
When a senior administration official raised the question of whether
assassination should be explored at a Special Group meeting, the
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assassination operation should have been revealed. A firm written
order against engaging in assassination should also have been issued
by McCone if, as he testified, he had exhibited strong aversion to
assassination.
5. PRACTICES CURRENT AT THE TIME IN WHICH THE ASSASSINATION PLOTS
OCCURRED WERE REVEALED BY THE RECORD TO CREATE THE RISK OF CONFUSION,
RASHXESS AND IRRESPONSIBILITY IN THE VERY AREAS WHERE
CLARITY AND SOBER JUDGMENT WERE MOST NEOESSARY
Various witnesses described elements of the system within which
the assassination plots were conceived. The Committee is disturbed
by the custom that permitted the most sensitive matters to be presented
to the highest levels of Government with the least clarity. We
view the following points as particularly dangerous:
(1) The expansion of the doctrine of "plausible denial" beyond its
intended purpose of hiding the involvement of the United States from
other countries into an effort to shield higher officials from knowledge,
and hence responsibility, for certain operations.
(2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe serious
matters-such as assassination-when precise meanings ought to be
made clear.
(3) The theory that general approval of broad covert action programs
is sufficient to justify specific actions such as assassination or
the passage of weapons.
(4) The theory that authority granted, or assumed to be ~ranted,
by one DCI or one Administration could be presumed to continue
without the necessity for reaffirming the authority with successor
officials.
(5) The creation of covert capabilities without careful review and
authorization by policymakers, and the further risk that such capabilities,
once created, might be used without specific authorization.
(a) The daJnger inherent in overextending the doctrine of "plausihle
denial"
The original concept of "plausible denial" envisioned implementing
covert actIOns in a manner calculated to conceal American involvement
if the actions were exposed. The doctrine was at times a delusion and
at times a snare. It was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship
of actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed.
The Committee's investigation of assassination and the public disclosures
which preceded the inquiry demonstrate that when the United
States resorted to cloak-and-dagger tactics, its hand was ultimately
exposed. We were particularly disturbed to find little evidence that the
risks and consequences of disclosure were considered.
We find that the likelihood of reckless action is substantially increased
when policymakers believe that their decisions will never be
revealed. Whatever can be said in defense of the ori~inal purpose of
plausible denial-a purpose which intends to conceal Umted States
involvement from the outside world-the extension of the doctrine to
the internal decision-making process of the Government is absurd.
Any theory which, as a matter of doctrine, places elected officials on
the periphery of the decision-making process is an invitation to error,
278
an abdication of res'ponsibility, and a perversion of democratic government.
The doctrine IS the antithesis of accountability.
(b) The danger of using "Oirmtmlomttion" mn.d "EuphemUlm"
According to Richard Bissell, the extension of "plausible denial" to
internal decision-making required the use of circumlocution and
euphemism in speaking with Presidents and other senior officials.
Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity. On the one
hand, it assumes that senior officials should be shielded from the truth
to enable them to deny knowledge if the truth comes out. On the other
hand, the concept assumes that senior officials must be told enough, by
way of double talk, to grasp the subject. As a consequence, the theory
fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the risk of misunderstanding.
Subordinate officials should describe their proposals in
clear, precise, and brutally frank language; superiors are entitled to,
and should demand, no less.
Euphemism may actually have been preferred-not because of
"plausible denial"-but because the persons involved could not bring
themselves to state in plain language what they intended to do. In some
instances, moreover, subordinates may have assumed, rightly or
wrongly, that the listening superiors did not want the issue squarely
placed before them. "Assassinate," "murder" and "kill" are words
many people do not want to speak or hear. They describe acts which
should not even be proposed, let alone plotted. Failing to call dirty
business by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty
business being done.
(c) The danger of generalized inst1"lUJtiuna
Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis of general approvals
of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende from assuming office,
get rid of the Castro regime) blurs responsibility and accountability.
Worse still, it increases the danger that subordinates may take steps
which would have been disapproved if the policymakers had been
informed. A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally
use loose general instructions to evade responsibility for embarrassing
activities.
In either event, we find that the gap between the general policy
objectives and the specific actions undertaken to achieve them was
far too wide.
n is important that policymakers review the manner in which their
directives are implemented, particularly when the activities are sensitive,
secret, and immune from public scrutiny.
(d) The dam,ger of "Floating AutluYrization"
One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William Harvey
for not informing John McCone about the use of underworld figures
to attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion that the project
had already been approved by McCone's predecessor, Allen DUlles,
and that further authorization was unnecessary, at least until the
operation had reached a more advanced stage.
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,Ve find that the idea that authority might continue or "float" from
one administration or director to the next and that there is no duty to
reaffirm authority inhibits responsible decision-making. Circumstances
may change or judgments differ. New officials should be given the
opportunity to review significant programs.
(e) The problems connected with creating new covert capabilities
The development of a new capability raises numerous problems.
Having a capability to engage in certain covert activity increases the
probability that the activity will occur, since the capability represents
a tool available for use. There is the further danger that authorization
for the mere creation of a capability may be misunderstood as
permitting its use without requiring further authorization.
Finally, an assassination capability should never have been created.

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