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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

EPILOGUE
The Committee does not believe that the acts which it has examined
represent the real American character. They do not reflect the ideals
which have given the people of this country and of the world hope
for a better, fuller, fairer life. ,\Ve regard the assassination plots af.
aberrations.
The United States must not adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means
are as important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise
restraints that make men free. But each time we do so, each time the
means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes
us free, is lessened.
Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in
this country. The story is sad, but this country has the strength to
hear the story and to learn from it. ,\Ve must remain a people who
confront our mistakes and resolve not to repeat them. If we do not,
we will decline; but, if we do, our future will be worthy of the best
of our past.
(285)
STATEMENT OF JOINDER
I hereby join in the foregoing report.
FRANK CHURCH, Ohai'I"TIULn.
JOHN TOWER, Vice Ohai'I"TIULn.
*PHILIP A. HART,
Michigan.
WALTER F. MONDALE,
Minnesota.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON,
Kentucky.
·See Separate Views of 'Senator Ph1l1p Hart, p. 297.
(286)
287
ROBERT MORGA~orth Carolina.
GARYI!ART,
Colorado.
288
HOWARD BAKER,
Tennessee.
BARRY GOIDWATER,
Arizona.
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr.,
Maryland.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER,
Pennsylvania.
APPENDIX A
[So -'-,94th Cong., 1st sess.]
A BILL To make unlawful the entering Into a conspiracy to assassinate a foreign official
outside the United States, the assassination of a foreign official outside the United States,
or the attempted assassination of a foreign official outside the United States, and for
other purposes
Be it enacted by the Senate and House 01 Representatives 01 the United States
01 America in Oongress assembled, That title 18, United States Code, is amended
by adding immediately after Section 1117 the following new section:
"§ 1118. Conspiracy to assassinate foreign official outside the United States;
attempted assassination of foreign official outside the United States;
assassination of foreign official outside United States.
"(a) If any officer or employee of the United States or any other person while
within the United States or the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, conspires with any other such officer, employee or person to
kill any foreign official because of such official's political views, actions or statements,
while such official is outside the United States and such jurisdiction, and
one or more such officers or employees or persons does any overt act within the
United States or such jurisdiction to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
"( b) Whoever being an officer or employee of the United States, or a citizen
of the United States, while outside the United States and the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, conspires with any other such
officer or employee or with any other person or persons to kill any foreign official,
because of such official's political views, actions or statements, while such official
is outside the United States and such jurisdiction, and one or more such officers,
employees, citizens or other persons does any overt act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or life.
"(c) Whoever being an officer or employee of the United States, or a citizen
of the United States, while outside the United States and the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, attempts to kill any foreign
official, b~cause of such official's political views, actions or statements, while such
official is outside the United States and such jurisdiction, shall be punished by
imprisonment for any term of years or life.
"(d) Whoever being an oincer or employee of the United States, or a citizen
of the United States, while outside the United States and the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, kills any foreign official, be·
cause of such official's political views, actions or statements, while such official is
outside the United States and such jurisdiction, shall be punished as provided
under sections 1111 and 1112 of this title, except that any such officer or employee
or citizen who is found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for life.
" (e) As used in this section, the terLl-
"(1) 'officer or employee of the United States' means any officer or employee,
whether elected or appointed, in the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch of the Government of the United States (including the District of
Columbia) and its territories and possessions, and includes any officer or
member of the armed forces;
"(2) 'foreign official' means a Chief of State or the political equivalent,
President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Premier, Foreign Minister, Ambassador,
or other officer, employee, or agent; (a) of a foreign government
with which the United States is not at war pursuant to a declaration of war
or against which United States Armed Forces have not been introduced into
(289)
290
hostilities or situations pursuant to the provIsIons of the War Powers
Resolution; or (b) of a foreign political group, party, military force, movement
or other association with which the United States is not at war pursuant
to a declaration of war or against which United States Armed Forces
have not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions
of the War Powers Resolution; or (c) of an international
organization;
"(3) 'foreign government' means the government of a foreign country,
irrespective of recognition by the United States;
"(4) 'international organization' means a public international organization
designated as such pursuant to section 1 of the International Organizations
Immunity Act (22 U.S.C. 288) ;
"( 5) 'citizen of the United States' means, in addition to a United States
citizen, any national of the United States, and any person who has been and
is classified as an alien admitted to the United States as a permanent resident
under the laws of the United States."
SEC. 2. The analysis of chapter 51 of title 18, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following:
"U18. Conspiracy to assassinate foreign official outside United States; attempted
assassination of foreign official outside United States;
assassination of foreign official outside United States."
APPENDIX B
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
The following capsule summary sets forth in chronological sequence major
events covered in this Report. The purpose of the chronology is to remind the
J:eader that the assassination plots and related events, which are organized in
the Report around attempts against various leaders, often occurred during the
same time frame, and can only be fully understood by considering the entire
picture.
This chronology necessarily abbreviates and characterizes events, and does not
indicate when certain things should have happened but did not. It is not a substitute
for the full discussion of the events which appears in the body of the
neport at the pages indicated in brackets. The Committee's interpretation of what
occurred is fully set forth in the Findings and Conclusion of this Report.
19.59
December ll-Dulles approves "thorough consideration be given to the elimination
of Fidel Castro." (p. !}2)
1960
January 13-Special Group meeting considers Castro's overthrow. (p.92)
Spring 1900-Meetings on covert action against Cuba at levels of CIA, Special
Group, and NSC. (p.93)
Sometime in Spring 1960-Ambassador Farland establishes links with Dominican
Republic dissidents. (p. 193)
April 1960-President Eisenhower approves contingency plan for Dominican
Republic-if situation dm.eriorates, U.S. to take action to remove Trujillo when
successor regime lined up. (p. 192)
Late Spring-Early Summer-Bissell discusses H'ssassination capabilities with
Scheider. (pp. 20-21)
June 3o--Congolese independence declared. Lumumba is Premier. Kasavubu
is President.
July I-CIA memo recommending delivery of sniper rifles to Dominican dissidents
approved. (p. 194)
July ll-Tshombe declares Katanga independent.
July 13-UN Security Council calls for Belgian troop withdrawal from Congo
and sends UN peacekeeping force.
July 14-Kasavubu and Lumumba suggest Soviet aid may be requested.
July 27-Lumumba visiJtJs Washington and receives aid pledge from Secretary
Herter.
Event involving CIA request that a Cuban arrange an "accident" involving
Raul Castro. (pp. 72, 93)
August 1960-U.S. interrupts diplomatic relations with Dominican Republic.
August 196o--Bissell and Edwards have discussion concerning use of underworld
figures to aid in assassination of Castro. (p. 74)
August 18-26---NSC and Special Group discusses action against Lumumba and
Dulles cables Congo station that Lumumba's "removal must be an urgent and
prime objective ..." (p. 52)
Early September-Scheider is ordered by Bissell to make preparations for
assassination of an African leader. (p. 21)
Late September-Bissell and Edwards brief Dulles and Cabell about operation
against Castro. (p. 194)
Late September-Initial meeting between Rosselli, Maheu, and CIA support
chief. A subsequent meeting takes place in Florida. (p. 76)
September 5--Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba; power struggle ensues.
September 14-Mobutu, Chief of Staff of Congolese Army, takes over government
by coup.
September 15--Lumumba seeks protective custody of UN guard.
September 16-20--CIA cables indicate Lumumba is seen as a continued threat
(291)
61-985 0 - 75 - 20
292
while in custody-as capable of mounting a counterattack or appealing to the
public. (p. 18)
Sep~ember.17-19---Tweedy and Tweedy's Deputy tell Scheider to go 00 Congo
to del1ver pOIsons to Hedgman and instruct him to assassinate Lumumba if possible.
(p. 21)
September 19---Tweedy cables Hedgman that Scheider will come to Congo on
sensitive mission. (p. 22)
September 21-NSC meeting in which it is noted that Lumumba, although
deposed, remains a threat. (p.62)
September 26-Scheider goes to Congo. (p.24)
October 3-CIA memo sets forth plans to support Dominican dissidents.
October 5-Scheider leaves Congo. (p. 24)
October 18--Memo from Hoover to intelligence agencies detailing Giancana's
statements about an imminent Castro assassination but not mentioning CIA.
(p. 79)
October 31-Bissell asks Mulroney to go to Congo. (p. 37)
Las Vegas wiretap discovered. (p.77)
Xovember 3--Special Group discusses covert action against Castro regime.
(p. 98)
November 3-Mulroney arrives in Congo. (p.40)
Sometime after November 8--Dulles and Bissell jointly brief President-elect
Kennedy on details of planned invasion of Cuba. (p. 196)
December 1-Mobutu's troops capture Lumumba.
December 3--Lumumba imprisoned at Thysville.
December 29---Special Group approves plan of covert assistance to internal and
external Dominican dissidents. (p. "196)
1961
,January 12-Special Group meeting approved "limited supply of small arms
and other material" to Dominican dissidents. (p.196)
January 17-Lumumba transferred by Congolese government to Elizabethville
where he ill killed at hands of Katanga authorities.
January 22-President Kennedy succeeds President Eisenhower.
Sometime between Jalluar~' 22 and April 15 (sequence unknown)-Bissell and
Bundy have discussion concerning an "executive action" capability. (p. 181)
President raises with Smathers subjeet of assassination, indicating his disapprovaL
(p. 123)
Rosselli passes pills to a Cuban in Miami. (p. 80)
January 25-26-Harvey discusses Exeeutive action with CIA subordinates.
(p. 183)
February 10 and February 15-Meeting in New York City between Dominiean
dissidents and CIA officials. (p.198)
February 13-Lumumba's death announced by Katanga Interior Minister
Munungo.
February 14--Speeial Group meeting at which new members are briefed by
Dulles and Bissell on "speeific actions taken by the predeeessor group during the
past year. (p. 202)
February 15-Rusk memo to President on Dominican Republic. (p. 203)
February 17-Bissell memo to Bundy speaks of Dominican dissident "plan of
action". (p. 204)
March 13-Requests for arms and explosives made by Dominican dissidents to
CIA and passed on to Washington. (p. 198)
March 15--Request by Station to Headquarters for three pistols for Dominican
dissidents. (p. 199)
March 2o-Station raises with Headquarters the Dominican dissident request
for machine guns. (p.201)
March 24--Cable advises pistols are being pouched for the Dominican dissidents.
(p. 200)
March 31-Headquarters approves passing of carbines to Dominican Republic.
(p. 100)
April 7-Carbines passed to "action group" and eventually to one of the assassins.
(p. 200)
April lo-Bissell approves shipping machine guns to Dominican Republic by
pouch. (p. 202)
April 15-17-Bay of Pigs invasion fails.
April 17-CIA order not to pass machine guns to Dominican dissidents without
Headqu'a'rters approval. (p. 205)
293
April 18--Maheu tells FBI of CIA involvement in Las Vegas wiretap. (p. 126)
April 19-2~'!:'he quhan involved i.n the underworld assassination plot and
the Bar of Pigs IllvaSlOll attends meetlllg at which the President, other Cubans
and high Administration officials not witting of the plot are preseI1lt. (p. 124) ,
April 2o-Headquarters advises Station not to pass machine guns to Dominican
dissidents. (p. 206)
April 22-June 19-Taylor/Kennedy Board of Inquiry into Bay of Pigs invasion.
CPP. 121, 135)
April 25-Cable advises Headquarters of imminent assassination attempt
against Trujillo and possilYle use of U.S.-suppHed weapons. (p.206)
April 26--Headquarters orders Dominican Republic Station that there is no
authority to pass additional arms and tells Station to advise dissidents that U.S.
not prepared to cope w,ith aftermath of assassination. (p. 206)
May 3-Berle determines Dominican dissidents seek machine guns to assas.
dnate Trujillo and speaks against involvement in such an effort. (p.207)
Ma:\r 4--Special Group meeting at which DCI reports new anti-Trujillo plot.
(p. 208)
May 5-XSC notes President's view that the U.S. should not initiate the overthrow
of Trujillo until it knows what government will succeed him. (p.209)
~Iay 16--President approves Record of Actions of May 5, 1961, NSC meeting.
(p. 2(9)
:'Ilay 16--State Department is told that assassination attempt against Trujillo
is imminent. (p. 208)
~Iay 18--Special Group stands by decision not to pass machine guns being
sought by DominiC'an dissidents. (p.126)
~Iay 22-Hoover memo to Attorney General Kennedy noting CIA had used
Gianoana in "clandestine effurts" against OastTo. (p.l26)
:'IIay ~Presidell't advises State Department official in Dominican Republic
that L.S. "must not run risk of U.S. ah'SOC'iation with pdlitical assassination, since
U.S. as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassination". This principle
is "overriding" and "must prevail in doubtful situation." (p. 213)
May 3O-Trujillo ambushed and assassinated near San Cristobal. Dominician
Republic.
.June 1 and period shortly thereafter-State Department and CIA review of
actions taken in dealing with dissidents in Domiruican Republic. (p. 214)
Octoher 5-Xational Security Action Memorandum 100 directs assessment of
potential courses of actioll if Castro were removed from the Cuban scene. CIA
makes intelligence estimate. (p. !B6)
Xovemher 9--President tells Tad Szulc that he is under pressure from advisors
to order Dastro's assassination, but does not n'ame advisors. (p. 138)
November 15-Bissell asks Harvey to assume control of underworld operation
on stand-hy basis. (p. 83)
Novemher 16--President Kennedy gives speech mentioning opposition to assassination.
(p. 139)
November 29--John :'IIcCone succeeds Allen Dulles as Director, CIA.
November 1961------Operation MOXG{)OSE created. (p. 139)
1962
January 18--Lansd'ale assigns 32 planning tasks against Castro regime. (p.l42)
January 19--:'IfOXGOOSE meeting at which Attorney General says solution to
Cuban problelll today carries tap priority. (p. 141)
January 29--CIA ohjects to prosecution of ~Iaheu for Las Vegas wiretap.
(p. 129)
February 19--Richard Helms succeeds Richard Bissell as Deputy Directo-r,
Plans, CIA.
Early April-Harvey establiShes contact with RosseHi. (p. 83)
Late April~H'arveypasses poison pills to R~elli in Miami. (p.84)
May 7-Houston and Edwards brief Attorney General on pre-Bay of Pigs
underworld assassination plot. Thereafter decision made not to prosecute. (p.131)
August 8--Special Group (Augmented) adopts a stepped-up plan designed
to inspire internal revolt in Ouba. (p. 147)
August lO-The subject of as'Sassination is raised at a meeting of the Special
Group (Augmented). (p.161)
September 7-Rosselli tells Harvey the pills are still in Cuha. (p. 84)
October 4-Attorney General advises Special Group (Augmented) that President
wants more priority ~iven to operations against Oastro regime. (p. 147)
October 22-28----Cuban Missile Crisis.
November-Qperation MONGOOSE ends.
294
1963
Early 1963-CIA Technical Services Division explores exploding seashell and
contaminated diving suit schemes. (p. 85)
April 1963-Special Group discusses the contingency of Castro's death. (p. 170)
i\lay 8--South Vietnamese troops in Hue fire on Buddhists, triggering nationwide
Buddhist protest. (p.217)
May 18--U.S. Ambassador Xolting meets with Diem to outline steps to redress
Buddist grievances. (p. 217)
June 19--Special Group authorizes sabotage program against Cuba. (p. 173)
July 4--Vietnamese General Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem agree on necessity
of coup. (p. 218)
August 16--McCone is given memorandum detailing pre-Bay of Pigs assassination
plot against Castro. (p. 107)
August 24-DEPTEL 243 is sent to Ambassador Lodge in Saigon telling him
to press for dramatic actions to redress Buddhist grievances, including removal
of Nhu and his wife. (p. 218)
August 26--CIA officers advise Vietnamese Generals Khiem and Khanh of
DEPTEL 243. (p. 219)
August 29-A White House message authorizes Saigon to confirm that U.S.
will support a coup if it appears it will succeed. (p. 219)
August 31-Attempted generals' coup in South Vietnam fails. (p. 220)
Fall 1963-Atwood explores possible accommodation with Castro. (P. 173)
October 2-McNamara and Taylor return from fact-finding mission in Vietnam
and report that, although the war is progressing favorably, there is political
turmoil. (p. 220)
October 3-General Minh outlines to Saigon Station a course of action which
includes assassinating Diem's brothers, Nhu and Can. (p.220)
October ;}-6--CIA Headquarters directs Saigon that Minh's course of action
not acceptable. (p. 221)
November 2-Diem is assassinated following a coup. (p. 223)
November 22-President Kennedy assassinated.
Vice President Johnson becomes President.
AM/LASH given poison pen device for assassinating Castro. (PP. 89, 175)
1964
March-May-Caches of arms delivered to AM/LASH in Cuba. (pp. 89, 175)
April 7-Special Group discontinues CIA-eontrolled sabotage raids against
CUba. (p. 177)
1965
Early 1965-AM/LASH put in contact with leader of anti-Castro group and
receives weapon with silencer from him. (p.89)'
1966
1966-Helms reports to Rusk that CIA not involved with AM/LASH in Castro
assassination plot. (p. 178)
1967
May 1967-Helms briefs President on 1967 Inspector General's Report. (p.179)
1968
January 2G-President Johnson leaves office, President Nixon inaugurated.
1970
September 4--Dr. Allende wins a plurality in Chile's Presidential election.
(p.225)
September 8 and 14--40 Committee discusses Chilean situation. Question of
U.S. involvement in a military coup against Allende raised. (p.229)
September 15-President Nixon instructs CIA Director Helms to prevent Allende's
accession to office. The CIA is to play a direct role in organizing a military
coup d'etat. This involvement comes to be known as Track II. (p.227)
September 28-U.S. Military Attache in Santiago instructed to assist CIA in
promoting coup. (p. 235)
295
October 5--CIA makes first contact with Chilean military conspirators. (p.24O)
October I3-CIA Station informs Headquarters that retired General Viaux
intends to kidnap General Schneider to precipitate a coup. Viaux's plan is reported
to Headquarters as part of a coup plot that includes General Valenzuela.
(p.242)
October I5--Karamessines meets with Kissinger and Haig at the White House.
A decision is made to defuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily. (pp.
242,250)
October I6--Headquarters informs CIA Station of Viaux decision and instructs
it to continue to generate maximum pressure to overthrow Allende by
coup. (p. 243)
October I7-CIA informs Yiaux associate of decision. Agent told that Viaux
would proceed with coup in any case and that the abduction of Schneider is first
link in chain of events. (p. 243)
U.S. Military Attache meets with Chilean Army officer and Navy officer. They
request tear gas, grenades, and three sterile submachine guns, with ammunition.
(p. 243)
October I8-General Valenzuela informs U.S. Military Attache that he and
senior military officers prepared to sponsor a coup. (p.244)
October I8-Tear gas grenades delivered to Chilean Army officer and Navy
Captain. (p. 244)
October 19--Weapons sent from CIA Headquarters by diplomatic pouch to
Santiago. (p. 244)
First Schneider abduction attempt fails. (p. 244)
October 2o--Second Schneider abduction attempt fails. (p.244)
October 22-Three submachine guns delivered to Chilean Army officer by U.S.
Military Attache. (p. 245)
General Schneider is shot in kidnap attempt. (p. 245)
October 24---Dr. Allende confirmed by Chilean Congress. (p. 246)
October 25--General Schneider dies. (p. 246)
1972
Helms issues directive against assassination.
1973
Colby issues directive against assassination.

SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR PHILIP A. HART
Because of illness, I was unable to attend meetings of the committee
for the several months immediately preceding the issuance of this
report. Inasmuch as I did not participate in hearings on assassination
during this period, nor in much of the committee's deliberations on
the findings and the drafting of the report, it ,,,ould b~ inappropriate
and pe'rhaps misleading for me to sign the report as Olie of its authors.
However, while expressing no view on the report and its findings,
I feel that I did participate in enough committee hearings on the subject
to conclude that the United States should never engage in political
assassination in peacetime. Therefore, I support the committee's recommendation
for a statute making such activity a crime.
In addition, I endorse the Committee's decision to make the facts of
this chapter in our history known to the American people.
PHILIP A. HART.
(297)

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR ROBERT MORGAN
Our Nation needs a strong, secure, and effective intelligence community.
Our memory of Pearl Harbor and testimony taken in hearings
with regard to that catastrophe as well as testimony taken during
these hearings clearly establish the need for a central intelligence
agency to coordinate the intelligence gathered by our various agencies
of Government. If the United States had had a coordinating mtelligence
agency in 1941, the disaster at Pearl Harbor would, in my
opinion, have been averted. That we have now, and continue to have,
such an agency is essential if we are to avert any future threats to our
national security. Our national security is,after all else, of paramount
importance.
We must recognize, however, that our national security can be subverted
by overzealous governmental action as well as antagonistic
domestic or foreign agents. Our Nation cannot remain intact if we
ourselves subvert our own ideals; consequently, it is as important for
our government to abide by them. In the words of U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that governmental officials shall
be subjected to the same rules of conduct as the citizen. In a government of laws,
existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. If the government becomes
a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare in the administration of [a
democracy such as ours] the end justifies the means * * * would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine, [we] resolutely set [our] face.
It is argued, and in many cases justifiably so, that in dealing with
our national security, and especially with hostile or adversary forces
abroad, extraordinary means are necessary. So long as the Soviets
maintain KGB agents around the world, we must maintain an effective
intelligence gathering capability. However, this report deals with a
particular activity of the government, which in the absence of armed
conflict, would, if true, shock the conscience and morals of most Americans.
That this investigation was necessary was unfortunate, but it
was made so by the broadly circulated and printed reports of alleged
assassination plots, some of which were given credence by public statements
by various officials. It was my belief in the beginning, and still
is, that it would be far better to ascertain the truth as far as possible,
and clear the air,to the end that our intelligence agencies could get
back to their assigned tasks.
I have weighed in my own mind for many days and nights how much
of the information contained in this report should be made available to
the American public and thus to the world, including our potential
adversaries. That the public has a right to know is incontrovertible,
(299)
300
but whether that right extends to information which could damag-e our
image and national security is not so easily determined. Is it satisfactory
for the members of the Congress, the duly elected representatives
of the people, to hold such information in trust for the people? In
some cases of national security the answer can and must be "yes", and
in the future, such information must be held by competent and aggressive
oversight committees.
In the present situation too much water has gone over the dam for
such secrecy and to refuse to make as full and complete a disclosure
as is consistent with the safety and protection of our present intelligence
personnel would only add to the intrigue, and the issue could
not be put to rest. So though I have in some instances voted with some
of my colleagues to retain much information in executive session, I
have concurred with the issuance of this report after being assured
that the release of it would not violate any law with regard to classified
matter and after the respective agencies have had another chance
to recommend exclusion of extremely sensitive matters.
Throughout the hearings one issue has remained paramount in my
mind. If the alleged acts happened, were they the result of overanxious,
over-zealous intellig-ence agents who were acting like "a rogue
elephant on the rampage", or, were they basically the acts of responsible,
well-disciplined intelligence agents acting in response to orders
of "higher authority"? To me the conclusion is important. If the first
is true, then the agencies must be revamped or possibly dismantled
and new agencies created to replace them. If the second is true, then
clearer lines of authority must be established and stringent oversight
by the duly elected representatives of the people must take place.
During the course of these hearings, I have been impressed by the
belief held by the principals that those illegal and immoral acts engaged
in by our intelligence agencies were sanctioned by higher authority
and even by the "highest authority." I am convinced by the
large amount of circumstantial evidence that this is true. Although
illegal and immoral activities carried out by our intelligence agencies
cannot be justified by any argument, it is, I think, important to note
that these actions were carried out in the belief that they were sanctioned
by higher authority, even though this Committee has been
unable to establish whether or not presidential authority was given.
Some of the acts conducted by these agencies could have been, and
probably were, beyond the scope of the projects authorized. In addition,
the agencies may have eonducted other activities which, in spite
of this investigation. are still unknown to this Committee. Thus, they
cannot be absolved of all the blame.
Since our intelligence agencies act on both a compartmentalized and
need-to-know basis, it is difficult to establish in retrospect who was
informed and what authority was given. It is also difficult to establish
what was told to those who were informed since circumlocution was
also a standard practice within the chain of authority. The practice
was, after all, adopted to insure official deniability as well as to acquire
consent. And the effectiveness of these techniques of "need-to-know"
and "circumlocution" is attested by the fact that this Committee not
only has been unable to establish whose consent was given but has also
been unable to establish who was not involved. We have been able to
establish neither responsibility nor innocence. In this situation, the
001
presumption of innocence cannot be applied without question, since
the mere willingness to participate in circumlocutious brIefings implies
a willingness to deny responsibility at crucial times. Consequently, I
also believe that responsibility for the illegal actions of our intelligence
agencies must be shared; it should not be carried entirely by our
intelligence community.
In drafting legislation to circumscribe the activities of intelligence
gathering agencies, I would stress the need to guarantee their ability
to function effectively in our complex and dangerous world. The effectiveness
of our intelligence agencies must not be limited solely by
sound and practical applications of law drafted with clear objectives
in mind. We must know what we want our intelligence agencies to do
and what we do not want them to do. Then we can confidently allow
them to function in the knowledge that they will not only defend the
law but abide by it. Only in that way can we be certain that our
society will be preserved as an embodiment of our openly democratic
ideals. Although we must have intelligence, we also must preserve
our open society, for to destroy the latter for the sake of the former
would be a complete perversion of our goals.
While we may realize that investigations of this nature into sensitive
governmental actions in effect strengthen our country, we would
be foolhardy to think for a moment that our enemies, and perhaps even
friends, will openly acknowledge this significant accomplishment. We
can assume, for instance, that our opponents will go to great len~hsto
publicize and distribute propaganda based on this report inimical to
the best interests of the United States. That this, in fact, will be done
only serves to reinforce my belief that we need, and must have, as
strong an intelligence capability as possible. And while this Committee
is charged with the responsibility of investigating and reporting
on the misdeeds of the Central Intelligence Agency, we cannot
reveal the details of the many meaningful accomplishments of the
Agency which without a doubt have been beneficial to our country.
That we have such an agency now, that we maintain our intelligence
potential in these times of continuing international tension is essential
to our society and continued existence as a nation.
The release of this report, based on the public's right to know, does
not compromise our right to be secure. The report details only the
actions of Agency employees in the cases under investigation and does
not unnecessarily reveal confidential intelligence sources and methods.
One can, however, successfully predict the impact the report will have
in the news media. A review of previous revelations concerning assassinations
which have appeared in the press have gone a long way towards
sensationalizing this country's involvement in assassination
plots. This report confirms some prior public allegations while it disproves
others. While some may shudder upon learning that the events
related in the report actually took place, we can all take great pride
in the ability of this country to look frankly at problems within our
system of government, and accordingly, in our ability to govern ourselves.
History will undoubtedly record our ability to openly reveal
and discuss improper, unpopular governmental actions as one of the
basic elements in the continued existence of our free society and the
general ability we, as a nation, have achieved to subject ourselves and
our government to the rule of law.
ROBERT MORGAN.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR HOWARD H.
BAKER, JR.
Altogether, I think the Committee's report represents a remarkably
good treatment of the large volume of testimony and documentation
which was received by us and a fair reconciliation of the
conflicts that developed.
While it is clear from the record that assassination planning and
efforts did in fact occur during the late 1950's to the mid-1960's, it
is not equally clear from the record that they were fully authorized
by the respective Presidents serving during that time. I entirely agree
with and subscribe to the Committee's central finding that:
the system of Executive command and control was so inherently ambiguous
that it is difficult to be certain at what level assassination activity was known
and authorized. This creates the disturbing prospect that assassination activity
might have been undertaken by officials of the United States Government without
it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization
from the President of the United States. At the same time, this ambiguity and
imprecision leaves open the possibility that there was a successful "plausible
denial" and that a Presidential authorization was issued but is now obscured.
(Committee Report, Findings and Conclusions p. 261)
Or put another way, in the Inspector General's report on this subject
in 1967:
This reconstruction of agency involvement in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro
is at best an imperfect history. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the operation
being discussed or attempted, as a matter of principle no official records
were kept of planning, of approvals, or implementation. The few written records
that do exist are either largely tangential to the main events or put on paper from
memory years afterwards . . . For the most part . . . we have had to rely on
information given to us orally by people whose memories are fogged by time.
(1. G. Report, p.l)
However, it is my personal view that on balance the likelihood that
Presidents knew of the assassination plots is greater than the likelihood
that they did not. This impression stems from the record of
course, but as well from observing and hearing the witnesses testify
and by applying the usual courtroom tests for determining the worth
and value of the witnesses' testimony: the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying; the completeness or the incompleteness of their
statements; whether the testimony has the ring of truth; prior
consistent or inconsistent statements; inconsistencies in the course
of their testimony bef-ore the Committee; the probability or improbability
of their testimony; their means of knowledge; their interest in
the subject. All of these things are best judged by observing the
testimony of the witnesses.
(303)
304
It is because of this. that I had hoped for public hearings on this
subject, carefully sanitized to avoid the disclosure of properly classified
information and the identification of "sources and methods". It seems
to me that without a record clearly supporting a conclusion of Presidential
responsibility, or the absence of it, that a public examination
of the witnesses was more important than would otherwise be the
case. The Committee determined not to hold public hearings and
I abide by that decision.
Accompanying these views is an Appendix of record evidence and
documentation which relate to these conclusions and impressions.
'Vhile the Appendix in large part deals with the Castro situation, I
believe it is fairly representative of the problems we have encountered.
HOWARD H. BAKER.
APPENDIX
FOR ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR HOWARD H.
BAKER, JR.
Page
I. The Testimony and Evidence Reg,arding Authority From Those Involved
in the Operational Activities of the Plots________________ 307
II. The Testimony and Evidence Regarding Authority From Those CIA
Officials Knowledgeable of the Plots____________________________ 308
Pre-Bay of Pigs_____________________________________________ 308
Post-Bay of Pigs____________________________________________ 310
III. The Testimony and Evidence Regarding How Authority Would Have
Been Obtained-The Troubling Doctrine of Plausible DeniaL_____ 313
IV. The Concept of Assassination Was Discussed at the Highest Levels
of Government and Not Affirmatively Disavowed________________ 318
A. Executive Aetion_________________________________________ 318
B. The August 10 Meeting___________________________________ 319
1. The Testimony: Who Raised the Suggestion of the
Assassination of Castro L_________________________ 320
(a) Testimony of MCOOne______________________ 320
(b) Harvey's Testimony 321
(c) Goodwin's Testimony_______________________ 321
(d) Lansdale's Testimony ,.._____ 322
(e) Testimony of Rusk, Bundy, and Gilpatric____ 322
(f) Testimony of Robert McNamara____________ 323
(g) Testimony of Parrott______________________ 323
(h) Testimony of Walter Elder________________ 323
C. Conversations With President Kennedy About the Use of
Assassination 324
1. President Kennedy's Meeting With Tad Szulc on November
9, 196L__________________________________ 324
2. Conversation Between President Kennedy and Senator
George Snlathers_________________________________ 325
D. President Eisenhower's Discussion at the August 18, 1960,
National Security Council Meeting_________________________ 326
V. Did the Investigation of Giancana and Rosselli Reveal Their Involvement
in the Assassination Plots to the FBI, Department of Justice,
Attorney General, or the PresidentL____________________________ 327
A. The FBI MemorandR- -'-______ 328
1. The October 18, 1960, Memorandum__________________ 328
2. The M'llY 22, 1961, Memorandum____________________ 329
B. President Kennedy's Meeting With the Cuban Exile Leader__ 330
C. The Events of 1962________________________________________ 333
VI. The MONGOOSE Program-The Environment in Which the Assassination
Plots Arose___________________________________________ 333
VII. Whose Idea Was the Use of the Underworld in an Assassination Plot
Against C'llstro?_______________________________________________ 338
(305)

I. The testinwny and evidence regarding authority from those in1'
olced in the operational activities of the plots
Our investigation was unable to uncover any documentary evidence
bearing directly on the issue of authority for the assassination
plots. Testimony, however. was taken from all of those involved at
the operational level of the assassination plots. To a man, they were
convinced the assassination operations were specifically approved
by the, rnited States Government.
. The CIA Case Officer selected for the plot activities, testified about
his feelings toward the authorization of the plots. as follows:
I was in World War II. And I was told that there was an enemy, and I was
told that I was supposed to do it in the interest of national defense support. And
I felt that this was coming from a higher up and in their wisdom and judgment
this was the way to go. I was just doing as I was directed. (O.C., 5/30/75, p. 41)
Robert Maheu. the man contacted by the case officer initially in
an att~mpt to recruit underworld assistance, testified that he felt
the assassination plots were not only authorized but were an adjunct
to the Bay of Pigs invasion:
I was taking Illy instructions from [the Case Officer] and Col. Edwards. I had
no way of knowing where they were receiving their instructions * * * I personally
never discussed this matter with any higher authority than [the Case
Officer] and Col. Edwards during those days. (Maheu, 7/30/75, p. 5)
* * * * * * *
* * * The government felt it was important to dispose of Mr. Castro as part of
the overall invasion plan * * * Olaheu, 7/29/75, p. lR; 7/30/75. pp. 7-9)
:Maheu throughout his testimony reiterated his contention that he
,,"auld never have accepted the Case Officer's request for assistance
with the assassination plans had he not been cOllYinced they were
government sponsored: 1
.fohn Roselli was also firm in his testimony that he regarded the
assassination plots. as. in effect. part of tIl(' rnited States "war"
against Castro. He testified as follows:
Q. What did :\11'. Mahen discuss with you in the first meeting * * *?
A. * * * he was told that some high government official had given him word
to reeruit me, if I would be willing to help the government.
* * * * * * *
Q. "'hen you were asked to help arrange for the assassination of Mr. Castro.
what was yonI' understanding of who in the United States government wanted
you to do this?
A. Well, anybody in thp rnited States government. :\fy point "'as if I am
rpcruited in the army and I was in the Spc'ond World War. it is like heing
reeruitpd in the army and if it comps through from higher authority I don't
1 :Maheu had been Involved In a wide variety of ventures for the CIA. He was also, at the
time CIf the plots, cultivating Howard Hughes as a client (and indeed told Hughes of the
project durIng Its active stage). The Committ<:>e's 1leport discusses the full breadth of
Maheu's motivation In accepting this assignment. (Committee Report, pp. 74-75).
(307)
61-9B5 0 - 75 - 21
308
ask any questions how high it was as long as there were government people. I
was satisfied that I was doing a duty for my country.
* * * * * * *
Q. Now, you were asked to help join in an effort to kill somebody. Why did you
agree to do that?
A. It was a government project. (Roselli, 6/24/75, pp. 7, 57-58, 59)
Our evidence established that throughout his lengthy involvement
in the plots Roselli paid for almost all of his expenses.! Moreover, at
the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis both Harvey and Roselli agreed
that Roselli was active in providing pure "intelligence" on what was
occurring in Cuba. Nevertheless, the evidence adduced by the Committee
strongly suggests that the underworld was also quite interested
in getting rid of Castro because of his actions. barring their control
of the Havana gambling enterprises. Alld, Roselli did attempt to use
his CIA involvement to his advantage i1\ later years in an attempt to
deter prosecution of him for other unrelated matters. (See Committee
Report, p. 85) 2
Whatever the totality of the motivation of all those involved in the
operational end of the plots, the uncontroverted evidence is that they
all truly believed the U.S. Government was behind the project.
II. The Testimony a.nd Evidence Rega.rding Au.thority From Those
OIA Of!icials Knowledgeable of the Plots
The Committee's Report discusseS the evidence relating to whether
the assassination plots were authorized by higher authority outside
the CIA. That is, of course, the ultimate issue of our inquiry. To properly
address that issue, I feel it is important to note that each of the
supervisory officials of the Agency testified that they fully believed
that the plots were authorized by the "highest authority." 3 During
the Pre-Bay of Pigs phase Bissell and Edwards ",-ere the CIA officials
admittedly knowledgeable of the plots. Both felt that the plots were
fully authorized. During the Post-Bay of Pigs phase Bissell turned
the project over to 'William Harvey and his immediate superior
Richard Helms. Both confirmed Bissell's earlier testimony that the
plots were authorized both within and without the CIA.
PRE-BAY OF PIGS
Bissell testified that the plots were authorized by "highest authority"
which he felt meant knowledge and approval by the Presidellt. He
testified that it wOllldnot han been "consonant with the operations of
the CTA" to conduct such highly sensitive activities without the President's
permission or knowledge. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 37-38) Bissell
elaborated:
lThis was corroborated by the testimony of the 'Case officer, Maheu. and Harvey.
'At least Harvey (and P<'rhaps others) recognized that the use of the underworld
could lead to demands In later years. When he was first apprised of the details of the
Roselli project he observed that:
... • • It was a very. or It appeared to be. and In my opinion was, at that time. a very
real possibility of this government being blackmailed either by Cubans for political
purposes or by figures In organized crime for their own self-protection or aggrandizement.
which. as It turned out. did not happen. but at that time was a ven' pregnant
posslbllitv." (Harvey, 6/2:)/75. pp. 67-68)
3 Our investigation established that "highest authority" was a euphemism. used both
at the CIA and cabinet level. for the President of the United States.
Q. * * * (I) n the ordinary course of the operations of the CIA as you know it
under their traditions, their rules and regulations, their policies as you knew
them, what is your opinion-(w)as the President, President-elect briefed or
was he not in the light of all these circumstances?
Bissell: I believe at some stage the President and the President-elect both
were advised that such an operation had been planned and was being attempted.
Q. By whom?
Bissell: I would guess through some channel by Allen Dulles.
* * * * * * *
Senator ~Iorgan: Mr. Bissell, it's a serious matter to attribute knOWledge of
this sort to the President of the United States, especially one who cannot speak
for himself. Is it fair to assume that out of an abundance of caution you are
simply telling us that you have no knowledge unless you are absolutely certain?
* * * I gather that you think * * * it (assassination plot information)
came out but because of the seriousness of the accusation you are just being
extremely cautious * * * Is that a fair assumption to make?
Bissell: That is very close to a fair assumption, sir. It's just that I have no
direct knowledge, firsthand knowledge of his (the President) being advised
but my belief is that he knew of it (assassination plans). (Bissell, 6/9/75,
pp.55--56)
Bissell emphasized that because of the Agency's structure, in which
he was only DDP and not DCI, Allen Dulles would be the "only person"
who could have informed the President of the assassination plots.
(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 60). And, he summed up why he felt certain that
such authorization was obtained from the President by Dulles:
I had no direct evidence that (the President) was advised. I do agree with
you that given the practices of the Agency, its relation to the Presidency and to
the White House and given also everything I know of :Mr. Dulles' character and
integrity, I would expect he had perhaps obliquely advised hoth of the Presidents
of this auxiliary operation, the assassination attempt. (Bissell, 6/9/75,
p.47) 1
Bissell testified that it waS not at all unusual that he, Bissell, did not
personally discuss authorization for the project with either the President
or one of his aides in the White House.2 He stated that h(>, believed
that, since his position was that of DDP reporting directly to
the DCr. the DCr. ann not Bissell, "in a matter of this sensitivity * * *
would handle hig-her-level clearances." (BisselL 6/9/75, p. 26)
On matters of this sort I left the question of advising senior officers of the
government and obtaining clearances in Allen Dulles' hands. (Bissell, 6/9/75,
p.29)
Bissell concluded his testimony by describing the tight control which
was applied to snch a project:
Assuming for the moment that I am correct (that the President approved the
plots), since the effort would have been to minimize the possibility of embarrassment
to the President, it is. I ,think, understandable that neither I nor anyone
else in the Agency would have discussed this operation on our own initiative
with. for instance. members of the White House staff. The effort would have
been to hold to the absolute minimum the number of people who knew tbat
the President had been consulted. had been notified and had given, perhaps only
tacitly. his authorization. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6)
1 How Rlssell felt the President would have been addsed. throuA'h the method of
plausible denial, Is treated in Part III of these views. infra.
2 Bissell did discuss assassinatinn canabllitv with a senior White House official and
the record is patently clear that at a minimum he received no discouragement and at "
maximum was "ordered" to develop an assassination cnpabillty. As I discuss In Part IV
of these views. these conversations may have contributed to bls strong subjective notion
that assassination was authorized.
310
The onlv other supervisory official who testified about authorization
during thIs Pre-Bay of Pigs period was Col. Sheffield Edwards.1
Col. Edwards was quite ill at the time of his appearance before
the Committee (and has since died) and was unable to undergo a
lengthy inquiry. He was, however, certain in his belief that the
assassination plans were approved by the top echelon of the CIA.
He testified before the Committee as follows:
* * * (T) his possible project was approved by Allen W. DUlles, Director of
CIA, and by General Cabell, the Deputy Director. They are both dead.
The Chairman: How do you know, Colonel, that the project had been
approved by these two gentlemen?
Edwards: I personally briefed Allen Dulles * * • and Cabell. (Edwards,
5/30/75, pp. 5-6) .
Edwards was also interviewed by the Rockefel1er Commission (Edwards
interview, 4/9/75, p. 5) :
Q. NoW, who inSide the Agency besides Bissell did you have any contact
with on the top echelon?
A. Very important. The plan was approved by Allen ·W. Dulles and General
Cabell.
As Director of Security of the CIA, Edwards appeared to have little
direct contact with the 'White House and therefore was unable to enlighten
the Committee on the issue of authorization to the plots outside
the CIA.2 His testimony, however, corroborates the feelings of the
others involved in the plots that at no time did they view their actions
as beyond the bounds of appropriate authority.
POST-BAY OF PIGS
The assassination project or activities continued into a second or
post-Bay of Pigs phase. As the Committee's Report discusses, William
Harvey was selected by Bissell to take over the project. Harvey
testified that he had no doubt, throughout his involvement in the
assassination plots, that the project was authorized by the "highest
authority," 3 which to him meant the President of the United States.
He testified that:
I ean conceive of it [assassination] being perfectly within the province of an
intelligence service, • • • on proper orders from the highest • • • authority
(and)
* * * * * • *
the approval [for assassination] • • * must come from the Chief Executive,
the President. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 22, 24, 31-32)
Harvey emphasized at the outset of his testimony that he as a subordinate
officer of the CIA did not have direct knowledge concerning the
source of such authority. He described the authorization process as necessarily
being conducted on a higher level:
[T]he fact that I say that authority for an assassination must • • • come
from the President does not mean that I as an officer in CIA am entitled to know
or to inquire exactly as to the where, why, what, When and in what words this
authority may ha,e been transmitted. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 32)
1 See discussion regllrdlng knowledge or lack thereof of J.C. Kin!':, then Chief of the
CIA's Western HemIsphere DivisIon, infra, Part VII.
2 He did participate In the;\Iay 7, 1962. brlefin!,: of Attorney General Kennedy, which
I treat In Part V, infra, and which Is described In depth In the Committee's Report, pp. 1311'
34.
3 See ft. 3. pg. 308, supra.
311
Harvey continually asserted and re-asserted throughout his testimony
at several appearances before the Committee, that '
I was completely convinced during this entire period, that this operation had
the full authority of every pertinent echelon of CIA and had full authority of
the ·White House, either from the President or from someone authorized and
known to be authorized to speak for the President. But I won't answer, so this
does not get out of context, that I have no personal knowledge whatever of the
individual's identities, times, exact words or channels through which such authority
may have been passed. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 31)
Harvey "'as then questioned about (1) whether he had any doubts
that the plots were authorized and (2) why he did not personally
confirm the authorizatjon by specifically asking high government
officials about it. Harvey answered that, "[I]t was my conviction at
the time * * * that [the plots] were completely authorized at every
appropriate level within and beyond the Agency." (Harvey, 6/25/
75, p. 69) He explained that he felt he was always operating under
appropriate orders from the top and that it simply was not hIS place
(or purpose, particularly within the framework of plausible denial)
in the bureaucracy to go "topside to question the orders of his superiors."
(Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 73) In response to a question by Senator
Goldwater, he described his feelings this way:
I did not feel that it was up to me, after being requested, instructed, ordered,
whichever you want to put it, to assume (control of this operation), and after
being told, if you will, by a responsible officer at a senior level who was my
immediate superior, that this did have the necessary and requisite approval that
you referred to, Senator Goldwater, that it was up to me to go to the Director
and say, now what about this? (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 84)
At his final appearance before the Committee, Harvey explained:
• • • if I had not been firmly convinced that this had full authority right
straight down the chain of command, • • • I (WOUld) have said to Bissell, all
right, If I'm going to undertake this, which at best is a damned dicey operation
or undertaking, I want to know who authorized it and under what circumstances.
But I had every right to believe organizationally, humanly, whatever way you
want to put it, that nothing that was being told to me by Bissell had not in fact
come to him from the Director of Central Intelligence, or with the knowledge
of the Director of Central Intelligence. (Harvey 7/11/75, pp. 73-74)
Harvey specifically rejected the idea that he would have entertained
the thought of embarking on an assassination project on his own:
I think what you are saying is had I not had reason to believe and been
firmly convinced that this was an authorized, direct and fully approved and
ordered, both operational and policy decision, would I, William Harvey, have
gone out on my own and planned anybody's assassination, and the answer to that
is a fiat no. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 72)
Harvey best summarized his involvement in the plots as follows:
At no time during this entire period we are talking about did I ever personally
believe or have any feeling that I was either free-wheeling or end-running or
engaging in any activity that was not in response to a considered, decided U.S.
policy, properly approved, admittedly; perhaps through channels and at levels I
personally had no involvement in, or firsthand acquaintance with, and did not
consider it at that point my province to, if you will, cross examine either the
Deputy Director or the Director concerning it. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 83)
The only other supervisory official of the CIA who admittedly was
knowledgeable of the plots during the Post-Bay of Pigs phase was
Richard Helms. presently n.s. Ambassador to Iran. Helms was at that
time DDP (taking over from Bissell in February, 1962) and John
312
McCone was DCI (taking over from Dulles in November, 1961.1
Helms had not be~n involved in the planning for the abortive Bay of
Pigs invasion and had no knowledge of the Pre-Bay of Pigs assassination
plots (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 17-18). Harvey testified that he had
"briefed" Helms some time in early 1961 regarding Bissell's directive
to Harvey to begin working on an assassina;tion capability." (Harv~y,
6/251i5, pp. 42-44) 2 Thereafter, Helms saId he was not "brought mto
Cuban operations" until after McCone had become Director in "late
1961 or early 1962." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 18) .
Our evidence established, however, that Helms was not brought mto
the picture affirmatively until April, 1962, when Harvey discussed with
him the contacting of Roselli. Helms explained that:
Harvey * * * says he came to me and said he wanted to recruit this man * * *
(Roselli) which I didn't like at the time * * * But I decided to go along with it,
since (Roselli) had been used in a previous operation, which hadn't worked. He
was, therefore, in that sense, around our neck as a possible embarrassment. if he
(Roselli) did have some connections and we didn't have very many in those days
into Cuba someplace, maybe he would turn out to be a useful fellow. (Helms,
7/17/75, p. 8)
Helms testified that he was never convinced that this operation
would be snccessful but since it had already been approved, he felt that
"we haven't got very much, why don't we try". Helms, 7/17/,,5,
pp.23-24)
Helms, as our Report demonstrates, was much less involved in the
plots than either Bissell or Harvey and perhaps because of this testified
that:
* * * [t]here is something about the whole chain of episode in connection with
this Roselli business that I am simply not able to bring back in a coherent fashion.
And there was something about the ineffectuality of all this, or the lack of
conviction that anything ever happened, that I believe in the end made this
thing simply collapse, disappear. And I don't recall what I was briefed on at the
time. You saw the IG Report [which] says that I was kept currently informed.
Maybe I was and maybe I wasn't, and today I don't remember it. * * * But I
do not'recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was really made on
Castro's life. (Helms, 7/12/75, p. 38)
Nevertheless, Helms did recall being advised of the plots by Harvey
and indicating his approval. He testified that he felt the assassination
attempts, w~ile he was skepti~al as to how far they actually progressed,
were authorIzed by the 1VhIte House. Helms, however, lIke Harvey
and Bissell, did not have any personal knowledge as to how or through
whom such authorization passed.3
1 McCone denied any knowledge of or authorization for the assassination plots which
went on during his tenure as DCI. McCone testified that he learned of the plots for the
first time in August 1963 when Helms briefed him. This discussion and the failure of
McCone to isslle any directive thereafter affirmatively banning such actions (which continued
into 1964 and 19f15) is discussed In the Committee's Report. pp. 99-108.
• Harvey testified he told Helms exactly what Bissell told him. i.e., that the White
House had twice urged Bissell to set up an 'Executive Action capablIlty. (Harvey, 6/25/i5,
pp.42-44)
3 Helms. in effect, stepped into the middle of a project run orllOnalIy by Bissell and
passed on In November, 1961, to Harvey. Dulles remained as DCI until November, 1961well
long enough to have briefed the Incoming Kennedy Administration on whether to
continne the assassination actions. Helms did not know whether Dulles obtained such
anthorizatlon or for that matter whether McCone did so. As developed hereinafter, everythin/;
which was transpiring around him led him to believe such authorization was
obtained. See Helms, 6/25/75, pp. 67-69,34. 90, 101-103. 'Part VI infra, of these views
provides a look at just what kind of environment surrounded Helms and the CIA In
1962. Helms. however, never asked anyone in higher positions If the plots were in fact
authorized even when he had the opportunity to do so-exhibiting, at a minimum, very
bad judgment.
313
Helms testified that while no one in the Administration gave him a
direct order to assassinate Castro, neither did he expect one.! It was,
however, made abundantly clear to him by the Kennedy Administration
that the CIA's mission was to "get rid of Castro" ;
The desire (of the Administration) was "can't you fellows [CIA] find some
way to get rid of Castro and the Castro regime?" (Helms, 7/17/75, p. 17)
Helms testified that he had no doubts but that the assassination
attempts were within the authorized U.S. policy toward Castro:
I believe it was the policy at the time to get rid of Castro and if killing him
was one of the things that was to be done in this connection, that was within
what was expected. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 137)
Thus, Helms told the Committee that the plot ac;tivities were both presented
to him in 1962 as an ongoing project previously authorized and
that such actions appeared to be clearly within the ambit of authority
which he felt existed at the time. The latter concept, stressed by Helms
in his testimony, was that assassination plots were consistent with the
environment of the time. Helms' view that assassination was within
the approved policy during the atmosphere of the time is corroborated
by the authors of the CIA's 1967 Inspector General's Report who took
pains to point out:
We cannot overemphasize the extent to which responsible Agency officers felt
themselves subject to the Kennedy Administration's severe pressure to do something
about Castro and his regime. The fruitless and, in retrospect, often unrealistic
plotting should be viewed in that light. (IG Report, p. 4)
Helms testified that during this 1961-1962 period
The highest authorities of government were anxious that the Castro government
fall and that in some fashion Castro go away (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 62)
* * * * * * *
and if he (Castro) had disappeared from the scene they would not have been
unhappy. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 72-73)
Helms summed up his testimony, in effect, by stating in colloquy with
Senator Mathias that, though no direct order was given to him, "some
spark had been transmitted that (assassination) was within the permissible
limits." (Helms, 6/25/75, p. 72) Helms' and Harvey's total
understanding of the authorization of assassination plotting together
with the ingrained system of deniability present in intelligence operations,
I feel, explains, but does not excuse their actions in not directly
confronting a superior or a While House official and saying: "By the
way, are these assassination plots really authorized." I think it blinks
reality to suggest that such a thing would have occurred. True, the
system must be changed, but these assassination activities must be
viewed in light of the modus operandi which existed at the time.
Ill. The Testimony and Evidence Regarding How Autlwrity Would
Have Been Obtained-the Troubling Doctrine of Plausible Denial
The Committee received considerable evidence on the manner or
modus operandi which would have been employed to advise the President
of matters of great sensitivity, such as the assassination plots. The
1 How Bissell, Harvey, and Helms felt the plots would have been authorized Is treaterl
In part III of these views.
314
Committk'e Report defines and discuSSk's the mode or method of operating
which has come to be known as plausible denial. (Committee
Report, pp. 11-12) Members of the CommittBe have given its lapplication
to the assassination plots differing degrees of weight. In these
views I assign it substantial "'eight becauSB of the freAluency with
which it wove its way through the evidence concerning the critical
issue of authorization.
Simply stated. plausible denial is the system which dictates that any
acts that are perpetrated shall be done in such a way so as to ensure
that the U.S. Government cannot be blamed. In its most common
llH'aning in the intelligence community, plausible denial dictates the
use of "cut-outs." or. various levels of knowledge with the lowest level
not being told that the work that is being done is on behalf of the U.S.
Gonrnment. The system is designed to insulate the President from the
responsibility for projects ,vhich may go awry. .
lYe know that efforts were made to employ this system In the Castro
plots through the use of "Maheu to initiate the contact with Rosselli
and Giancana. the CIA Case Officer assuming the falSB identity of an
employee of "Maheu. and the use of the "cover story" of the U.S. business
interests in explaining the plots to the Cubans. The agent (in
this case the Cubans) may assume or guess that the person he was
doing the work for was a government representative, but, an admission
of government ill\"olvement was avoided.
Additionallv. we found the system used in the records of the Special
Group ,,"hich avoid direct attrIbution to the President and refer to the
President as "higher authority," or "his associate." This was t.rue in
almost all the cases we examinecU Moreover, the testimony revealed
that the prevailing practice on all SBnsitive matters was to brief the
President without obtaining his express approval. Maxwell Taylor
testified that the President would simply listen to what the person
briefing him had to say without responding affirmatively so that
"the record (did not) say that the President personally approved (the
proieet). (Taylor. 7/9/75, p. 25)
Thus. whenever we attempted to climb the authority ladder to determine
the highest level of knowledge and approval of assassination
plots we encountered the USB of plausible denial. Indeed, Bissell testified
that he and Edwards used the system to "circumlocutiously" adl"
ise Dulles of the assassination plans because "the Director (Dulles)
preferred the use of * * * (that) sort of (circumlocutious) language
* * *." (Bissell. 6/9/75, p. 25) Bissell testified that it would
be through the use of plausible denial that he felt approval for the
assassination plots would have been obtained from the President by
Dulles.
Bissell testifie(l that Dulles would have adviSBd the President of the
assassination plots by obliquely describing the operation but contirming
"until the President got the word." (Bissell. 6/11/75, pp. 12-14)
He <lescribed how Dulles could have preserved deniability yet obtained
approval from the President:
I have expreRRed the opinion and am making it clear, it is not baRed on hard
evidence that probably the President knew something of this * * * I very much
1 See "Guidelines for Operation MONC',.oOSE" (Draft), March :i. 1962; Memorandum for
tlw Record, Special Group Aug-mented, "Discussion of Operation MOXGOOSE with th"
Preslrlent" of March 16. 1962 and accompanyinlr footnote of ::\!arch 22, 1962; Memorandum
for the Record, Special Group ::\Ieetlng, August 25, 1960.
315
doubt if he at any time was told any of the details. My guess is that indeed whoever
informed him, that is Dulles directly or Dulles through a staff member,
would have had the same desire that you referred to to shield the President and
to shield him in the sense of intimating or making clear that something of the
sort was going forward, but giving the President as little information about it
as possible, and the purpose of it would have been to give the President an opportunity,
if he so elected, to cancel it, to order it cancelled, or to allow it to
continue but without, in effect, extracting from him an explicit endorsement of
the detailed specific plan.
Senator MATHIAS. What you're saying is this is a highly subjective kind of
operation in which an intimation can be given in which the President can
clearly be told what is happening, but be told in, I think the words you used,
a circumlocutious way, that he might not even blink unless he wanted to. Is that
right?
Mr. BISSELL. That is correct, sir. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 60-61)
Bissell made it clear that his perception of what happened at levels
of authority above him spanned more than one administration. Indeed,
he continually spoke of President Eisenhower and Kennedy together:
In the case of an operation of high sensitivity of the sort that we are discussing,
there was a further objective that would have been pursued at various levels,
and that was specifically with respect to the President to protect the President.
And therefore the way in which I believe that Allen Dulles would have attempted
to do that was to have indicated to the two successive Presidents the general
objective of the operation that was contemplated, to make it sufficiently clear
so that the President-either President Eisenhower or President Kennedyeould
have ordered the termination of the operation. but to give the President
just as little information about. it as possible beyond an understanding of its
general purpose. Such an approach to the President would have had as its
purpose to leave him in the position to deny knOWledge of the operation if it
should surface.
My belief-a belief based, as I have said, only to my knowledge of command
relationship, of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his mode of operationsis
that authorization was obtained by him in the manner that I have indicated.
I used the word on Monday "circumlocutious," and it was to this approach that
I referred. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6)
William Harvey and Richard Helms also felt that they doubted that
there would ever be a direct written 01' even oral order communicated
to the DCI on a matter such as the assassination plots. Helms elaboraterl
on why he felt the plots were authorized even though he was unable
to point to a direct written or oral order to carry them out:
[Assassination plots would not be] authorized in any formal way * *'* These
schemes * * * would have taken place in the context of doing what you could
to get rid of Castro, and the difficulty with this kind of thing, as you gentlemen
are all painfully aware, is that nobody wants to embarrass a President
of the United States discussing the assassination of foreign leaders in his
presence. This is something that has got to be dealt with in some other fashion.
Even though you use euphemisms you've still got a problem * * *
Now, when President Eisenhower took responsibility for the U-2 flights that
was on his own * * * [hIe wasn't obliged to do that * * * he had his mechanism
to blame it on, if he wanted to. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 29)
Helms added that apprising the President of such a matter was
no easy or simple task:
Senator :\1ATHIAS. When Mr. Bissell was here I thinl. I asked him whether
the job of communicating with superior authority was one of proteeting superior
authority, and specifically the President, protecting him from knowledge and at
the same time informing him, whieh is a difficult and delicate job, and he agreed
that that was really the difficult~·.
And you this morning have said that in advising a President or very high
authority of any particular delicate subject, that you resorted to euphemism.
:\11'. HELMS. Yes, sir. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 65-66)
* * * * * * *
316
RI'DatOT :\L\THTAS. Did Prl'shIl'nts in(Iullrl' in l'unhpmisms ns wpIl as Dirpctors?
Mr. REDrs. I oon't know. I founo in my f'xpf'ripnrf' that Prf'siopnts uspd the
entire rangp of the Bnlrlish language from euphemisms on the one extreme to
very explicit talk on the other.
i'pnlltor MATHIAS. Lpt me draw an pxamplp from history. Whpn Thomas A.
Beckett was proving to he an annoyance, as Castro, the King said who will rid
me of this man. He didn't say to somehody go out and murder him. He said who
will rid me of this man, and let it go at that'" ......
Mr. HELMS. That is a warming refprence to the prohlem.
RpnRtor MATHIAS. You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?
Mr. HELMS. I think it does, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be
said, whif'h might he taken by the Director or hy anybody else as Presidential
authorization to goo forward?
Mr. HELMS. That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that one sort of
grows up in tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found
it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the United States. I
just think WI" IIll had the feeling that we were hired out to keep those things out
of the Oval Office.
Senator MATHIAS. And yet at the same time you felt that some spark had
been transmitted, that that was within the pprmissible limits?
Mr. HELMS. Yes; and if he had disappeared from the scene they would not
have heen unhappy. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 71-73)
The Executive Assistant to Harvev, described what he thought
the approval process might be in the following exchange with Senator
Schweiker:
Senator SCHWEIKER. We keep coming back to this confusing status where
we see the assassination plans and plots falling out very prolifically, and we see
that higher authority as in your case has authorized them, but somewhere along
there we lost track. And I guess my question is, would a logicai explanation of
this very confusing situation be that some of the powers that be just decided
not to discuss them in the formal sessions, and just verbally passed on instructions
through the chain of command, but not in the formal committee special
group apparatus?
Might that be a logical explanation of why we are continually confused by the
kind of testimony that you have given, and let me say that others have given,
too?
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT: I wouldn't expect any President to sign Ii piece of paper
directing an assassination for any reason. I don't think that is done in any
government.
Spnator SCHWEIKER. So that kind of an explanation would make sense from
your experipnce in governmpnt?
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT: Yes, sir.
Senator ~CHWEIKER. And exnlain the discrepancy that we keep running into
in terms of different situations analogous to yourself?
EXFCUTIVE ASSISTANT: Sure. I don't think yl(m are going to find III piece of paper
for pverything that this Agency or any other Agency has done. Thpre are lots of
thinlrs that get done hy word of mouth.
The CHAIRMAN: Hut d'Oes this le-aye us in a situation where the direct connection
hetween the President or the Special Group Angmented, the high policy
makinl!' anthority. with rpspect to knowlpdge of and direction to assassination
of 1fr. Castro mnst he hased upon llJSsumption or speculation?
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT: I think it is hased upon the integrity of ,the people who
passpd Ofl the orders. And it is all oral. (Executive Assistant to Han-ey, 6/18/75,
pp. ;)4-55)
HnrYeY. re-nnrtinO' dire-ctly to first Bissen and then Helms, also
rxhibited in his testimony ~n in,qrained reluctance to even discuss
assnssination in front of liis snperiors unless specifically asked about
it. He ,vas snre that the way the system of deniability operaterl
... * ... no one would want 1'0 charge the Preflident pernonally with the complete,
dirty-handed details of [the assassination plans]. <Haryey, 6/25/75, p. 82)
317
Moreover, when he was first advised by Bissell that the ·White House
was urging the CIA to set up an assasslllation capability,' Harvey was
asked during his testimony why he had not inquired of Bissell as to
who in the White House had communicated with him. Harvey
answered that:
I did not ask him, and he did not volunteer and I would have considered it
·some,vhat improper to ask and grossly improper if he had volunteered on his
part. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37)
Again. when queried by the Committee as to why he never raised the
subject of assassination at any of the Special Group Meetings he
attended, Harvey responded that he:
* * * felt that if ,the Whilte House (tasked) this (operation to the CIA) and
wanted the Special Group to know about it, it was up to the White House to
brief the Special Group and not up to me to brief them, and I would have considered
that I would have been very far out of line and would have been subject
to severe censure. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 77)
It seems to me that Harvey's failure to specifically raise the subject
of assassination in meetings with high level Government officials is
attributable to more to his attempt to effectuate the system of plausible
denial than to any sinister motive to conceal the plots from his superiors.
Helms very frankly, and in my view honestly, confirmed
Harvey's understanding of deniability and the "protection" of one's
higher authority as follows:
:\Ir. HEL~{s. I don't know whether it was in training experience tradition or
exactly what one points to, but I think to go up to a Cabinet officer and say,
am I right in assuming that you want me to assassinate Castro or to try to
assassinate Castro, is a question it wouldn't have occurred to me to ask. (Helms,
7/17/75, p. ;)1)
"\Vhether that protection ext~mded to a duty to lie to protect higher
authority is a matter we were not able to resolve. Bissell, while
emphasizing that he had been tmthful in his testimony before the
Committee, said:
"* * * There are occasions when I would go a long way to protect the President
of the United States from certain kinds of embarrassment." (Bissell, 6/
11/75, pp. 62-63)
• • • • • • •
"( Senator Goldwater) Q. * • • Would you tell a falsehood to protect a President
of the United States?
A. "-ell, under certain circumstances, I would indeed, Senator. I would tell a
falsehood, for instance, to the Press or in public announcements * * * and that
j:;; perhaps a little different thing, hut I would certainly he at ease to do so if
the revelation of an operation would be directly embarrassing to the President."
(Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 50--51)
The testimony set out above provides us with the best look at what
most likely occurred in t~rms of how authorization was obtained by
the CIA for the assassination plots. "\Vhether such conversations did
in fact occur is something 'we will never be able to prove conclusively.
vVhat remains are impressioll3 of what probaMy occurred. This testimony
in large part forms the basis of my impressions.
1 Assassination capability of "Execution Action." as it callle to be known Is described
In Part IV of these views, infra.
318
IV. Tile concept of a8sassinationwas disC1NiSNZ at tile lIigliest levels of
GOI'ernment and not atfinnath'ely disavrYwed
The Committee's investigation revealed that the "concept" of assassination
was actually discussed on seH~ral occasions at the highest
le\'els of GOYeI'llment. ,Vhile I find it disturbing that something as
drastic as assassination was apparently calmly talked about within
our GOYermnent. it is even more troublesome that assassination was
neYer clearly and unequivocally disavowed in a manner which left
no doubt. at any lp\'el of government, that such a course of action
"'ould not be tolerated under anv circumstances. Some of the discussions
of assassination were plainly that. Other times the "capability"
for assassination 01' language whieh may have been interpreted by
some as a euphemism for assassination were the topics of debate
within the Executive Eraneh. The fine distinction between approval
of a "capability" for assassination and approval of planning and plotting
for actual assassination may be a distinction without difference.
If not, it is clearly a dangerous and foolish distinction to make. So too
was the eYer so common use of loose language and euphemisms. As the
Committee's Report notes, the frequent usage of terms such as "get
rid ot" "eliminate," "removal of Cuban leaders." "disappear simultaneously,"
"straightforward action." "direct positive action" together
with continual discussion of contingency plans to take effect upon the
(lemise of Castro within an intelligence community operating under
an ingrained system of deniability combined to create a mosaic of confusion
and misunderstanding.
A. EXECUTIVE ACTION
Executive Action is treated in the Committee's Report, pp. 181-190.
The impact of Executive Action, at least upon me, is one of more substantial
\wight than that accorder] in the Report. In my view, the
gravity and seriousness of Executive Action is bvofold. First, in some
\vays I find an untargeted capability to perform assassinations
even more sinister than the owrt planning against a specific antagonistic
target. ,Vhile the plotting against Castro can never be justified.
at least the argument can be made that we were battling what was at
that time perceived to be a hostile communist force 90 miles from our
shores. A standby assassination ability that is capable of being employed
anY"'here for any reason addresses no particular threat, perceived
or real. It is highly a dangerous "capability" to maintain.
Second. the approyal. whether actual or apparent, of the maintenance
of an assassination capability surely contributed to the CIA's
view that the assassination plots were fully authorized. It strains my
imagination to argue that assassination capability (Executive Action)
on the one hand and assassination "plotting" on the other hand fit
neatly into separate little compartments. For example, while Bundy
was either affirmatively ordering the CIA to set up an assassination
capability or at least implicity approving it, did the CIA officers
knowledgeable of such White House approval find it consistent with
and supportive of their feeling that the assassination plots were
authorized? ·Were Bissell, Helms and Harvey, aware that the White
319
House had approved or urged assassination "capabilitv," far off base
in their beliefs that the Castro plotting also bore the White House
imprimatur? To me, these questions provide obvious answers.
Third, Bissell testified that when he and Bundy were discussing
Executive Action he "might have" spoken of "Castro as a possible victim"
(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 50) and:
I might very well have spoken of others [besides Castro], I might well have
spoken of Lumumba. I might possibly have spoken of Trujillo. They were some
of the cases where this kind of thing was considered.
• • • • • • •
I might well have used the three names that I just gave, because they were
the sorts of individuals [Castro, Lumumba, Trujillo] at that moment in history
against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed. (Bissell,
6/11/75,pv.50-51)
Thus, we have yet another example of the CIA's planning in Trujillo,
Lumumba and Castro blended together, along with Executive
Action, in a common web of perceived authority.
The fact that Executive Action and actual plots were at times
blended together is best illustrated by Harvey's testimony of his discussion
with Bissell about the creation of an Executive Action
capability. He recalled that Bissell advised him at that time of a
then going operation involving "the names of Maheu and possibly
Roselli and Giancana," "which was a part of the Agency's effort to
develop * * * a capability for Executive Action." (Harvey, 7/11/75,
pp. 55,61) Harvey said that he was told that "in connection with * * *
our charge to create such a ca:eability [Executive Action], [t]here is
one operation already going." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 53)
These are some of the questions and concerns which I have about
the "Executive Action" testimony and evidence the Committee has received.
What I consider to be the most important parts of our documentary
evidence and testimony concerning Executive Action are set
out comprehensively in the Committee's Report, pp. 181-190.
B. THE AUGUST 10 MEETING
The Special Group Augmented met on August 10, 1962. Sixteen
persons, an high Government officials, attended the meeting. I treat
this meeting separately because I accord it more importance than does
the Committee's report. It is one of the few times where the Committee
has established, upon convincing evidence, that assassination was
raised and overtly discussed as a possible course of action. While, as
the Committee Report concludes, the August 10 meeting was not directly
related to the Castro attempts, I feel it is instructive for several
reasons. First,it is about the only concrete example of what occurred
when we know the subject of assassination was raised publicly and the
discussion was written up. Second, it contributed to the hostile atmosphere
in which these various assassination plots grew. Third, it
demonstrates that despite the clear record that assassiI'lation was discussed,
not everyone present can "recall" the discussion and no one
will admit that he raised assassination as a possible course of action.
Fourth, the written record of the meeting (the minutes) contains no
61~985 0 - 75 - 22
320
reference to it.1 In short, the August 10 meeting serves as a microcosm
for the whole system of deniability.
The Committee Report, pp. 161-169, describes this meeting in detail.
I will not recount the facts again, but will focus instead on the testimony
regarding who suggested it. .
1.-THE TESTIMONy-WHO RAISED THE SUGGESTION OF THE
ASSASSINATION OF CASTRO?
(a) TESTIMONY OF MCCONE
McCone testified that the question of a "liquidation" or removal
of Castro and other Cuban leaders arose at the August 10 meeting in
the context of "exploring the alternatives that were available" for the
next phase of MONGOOSE. (McCone, 6/6/7!?, p. 33) He noted that:
• • • during those days it was almost common for one person or another to
say, we ought to dispose of Castro ... But at no time did anyone come to me.
or come to other authorities to my knowledge, with a plan for the actual undertaking
of an assassination. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 3.)
McCone testified that he did not recall who made this sugg-estion,
but that he and Mr. Murrow took "strong exception" to assassination
he said:
Q. ... • • I take it then, that according to your best recollection the subject of
liquidating Castro and possibly other top Cuban ll'aders did coml' Ull at this
meeting, and you did take strong exception to it?"
A. "Yes. I was not alone in that. Mr. Murrow took exception. I remember that
very clearly." (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 33)
Despite remembering very clearly his response, McCone testified he
couldn't "recal'l" who it was that made the suggestion, (Ibid.)
McCone then testified that although he had no independent recollection
of who raised the subject of ,assassination, he was able to
reconstruct from the documentary record that was Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara who made the suggestion. McCone relied
upon his own memorandum, which was WI'ltten in 1967, and the
August 13 Harvey Memorandum. McCone's memorandum was prepared
April 14, 1967, after McCone left the CIA. He dictated the
memorandum as his recollection of the August 10, 1962 meeting.
The memorandum was prompted by a telephone call from the
newspaper columnist .Tack Anderson, who at that time was preparing
a column on Castro assassination attempts. After talking
with Anderson on the telephone, at Robert Kennedy's request.
McCone dictated the April 14. 1967 memorandum, which stated
that at one of several MONGOOSE meetings on August Fl, 9
or 10, 1962. "I recall a suggestion being- made to liquidate top people
in the Castro regime, including Castro." (McCone, Ex. 4, p. 1) While
1 I find it disturbing, but not surprising', that our eXhausth'e inquiry did not satisfaetorlly
establish either why the minutes show no reference to assassination nor who suggested
assassination. No one was candid enough to say, yes, I raised It but not In a serious
vein or in a moment of frustration. Rather. we are left either to question the credibility
of the witnesses or eonclude that assassination was so commonplace or Insignificant that
it did not make an Impression on anyone. In any case. It Is not a pleasant picture.
321
this 1967 memorandum does not state that McNamara raised the concept
of assassination, it does state that:
Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara personally
and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed. I did this because
Operation MONGOOSE---'lln interdepartmenta~ affair-was under the operational
control of (the Defense Department) * * * (ld.)
McCone continued in his testimony that "At no time did the suggestion
receive serious consideration by the Special Group (Augmented)
nor by any individual responsible for policy." (McCone,
Ex. 4). He emphasized that after he spoke with Harvey about the
Lansdale memorandum he:
[i]rusisted that that Memorandum be withdrawn because no decision was made
on this subject, and since no decision was made, then Lansdale was quite out
of order in tasking the Central Intelligence Agency to consider the matter.
(McCone, 6/6, pp. 38-3~)
McCone concluded his testimony about the August 10 meeting and its
aftermath by saying that "The subject was just dropped" after his
objection. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 37) 1
(b) HARVEY's TESTIMONY
Harvey testified that Robert McNamara raised the subject of assassination
by stating at the August 10 meeting "shouldn't we consider
the elimination or assassination of Fidel?" (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp.
29---'30) When asked whether he was certain or merely guessing
that it was McNamara and not someone else who made the suggestion,
Harvey responded:
No, I am not guessing ... [t]o the best of my recollection, it was surfaced by
Robert McNamara. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 86)
Harvey also testified that his independent recollection of McNamara
raising the subject was in accord with his memorandum of August
14 (written shortly after the meeting) which also referred to
MeNamara bringing up the assassination suggestion.
( c) 'filsTIMONY OF GOODWIN
The testimony of Goodwin was, like Lansdale's appearance before
the Committee. not a model of clarity. Goodwin was interviewed by
the staff on May 27, 1975. (Goodwin Exhibit 2, 7/18/75) At that
time he told the staff that McNamara had suggested assassinating
Castro or "getting rid of Castro" at the August 10 meeting'. Indeed,
he told the staff that "etched on his memory" was the following
exchange:
McNamara got up to leave during a discussion of how to get rid of Oastro and
said, "The only way to get rid of Castro was to kill him."
Goodwin then said that McNamara followed this comment up by
saying, "I really mean it." At that point, Goodwin told the Committee
1 This conclusion was not in accord with Harvey's recollection that after the August 10
meeting Lansdale tried to raise the subject of assassination with him on several occasions.
See I.G. Report, p. 115; Harvey 7/11/75, pp. 3~5.
322
staff that Bissell said, "Oh, you mean Executive Action." Goodwin
said he didn't think the comments were followed up on by McNamara
(although Lansdale and Harvey were both at the meeting) and that
"it was pretty foolish for McNamara to talk about that kind of a subjcct
in front of 15 other people." (Goodwin interview, 5/25/75, p. 1)
'When Goodwin appeared before the Committee, about six weeks
later, his testimony was significantly different. He testified with respect
to who raised the suggestion of assassination at the August 10
meeting that: "I am unable to say with any certainty who it wa."."
(Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 8)
Goodwin was latcr questioned about statements he was quoted as
having made to authors Taylor Branch and George Crile, III.1 He was
quoted in thc article as having said that at one of the Cuban task force -;
meetings, McNamara said that "Castro's assassination was the only
productive way of dealing with Cuba" and that he, Goodwin, was
"surprised and appalled" at such statements. In his te.stimony, Goodwin
said he was misquoted and that he did not tell the authors "it was
definitely McNamara." (Good\vin, 7/18/75, p. 33). Goodwin concluded
by testifying- that, some 15 yE'ars after the August 10 meeting,
he could not testify about who raised the assassination suggestion
with "substantial certainty" (Id. at p. ~5).
(d) LANSDALE'S TESTIMONY
Lansdale testified that he simply had a poor recollection of. the
August 10 meeting. He was not sure what occurred at the meetmg,
other than that assassination was raised and that "one or two people
sitting in there (at the mE'eting) said it was something that shouldn't
be considered," (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 12~) and that "others * * *
might have" joined McNamara in proposing or urging it. (Lansdale.
7/8/75, p. 127) Moreover, Lansdale could not explain why he ordered
the CIA to draw up an assassination plan if the consensus of the
Special Group was negative.2 He said he didn't "remember the reason
why" he sent out such a memorandum. (Lansdale. 7/8/75, pp. 122-23,
20-21) Lansdale summarized his recollection as follows:
I believe that the subject of assassination was brought up at a meeting • • •
by Robert McNamara • • • and (McNamara) was usually very brief and terse in
his remarks, and it might have been something like, well, look into that • • •
(Lansdale, 7/8/75, pp. 116, 126).
Lansdale could not offer any explanation for why the minutes of the
meeting- were silent on the matter except that it was decided not to
make it "a matter of official record." (Lansdale exhibit 16, p. 1)
(e) TESTIMONY OF RUSK, BUNDY, AND Gn,PATRIC
Rusk, Bundy. and Gilpatric all testified that they had "no recollection"
of assassination being discussed at the August 10 meetin~. (Rusk.
7/10/75, p. 63; Bundy, 7/11/75, pp. 27, 89; Gilpatric, 7/8/75, p. 48) 3
1 They co"authored the article entitled "The Kennedy Vendetta," which appeared In
Harner's Magazine. July, 1975.
3 Lansdale. llke Goodwin, denied the accuracy of two news stories ouoting him as saying
he was ordered to develop such a pl,lO. See Committee Report. po. 167-169.
• Indeed, Gllpatri'e testified that "1 didn't think 1 was present for that meeting." (Gi/patrie.
7/17/75, p. 48)
323
(f) TESTD[()XY OF )ICX.DL\IU
McNalllam testified conceming the Augllst 10 meeting that he did
not even recall that particular meeting. (McNamara. 7/11/76. p. 11)
He said that he had "no rr('ollrction of raising [the assassination
suggestion] at any time." C~IcXamara. 7/11/75, p. 12) McXamara.
throughout his testimony. stated that he doubted that he proposer]
,uch a tactic. He said at one point:
I have talked with :.\Iessrs. Taylor. Bundy. Gilpatric and Rusk [and they
also] have no recollection of me raising it. It is entirely out of character with
what I beliew I thought at the time and I do not read into those words (Harvey's
memorandum) a Htatement that I did propose it. (:.\kXamara, 7/11/7:1. p. IS)
Parrott. the author of the August 10 )Iinutes, testified that he did
not recall a discussion of assassination at that meeting, but the fact
that the minute~ do not reflect such 11 discussion is not an indication
that the mattpr <lid not come np. Parrott pointpd out that his minutps
",,'ere not intended to be a vprbatim transcript of everything that was
said." (Parrott. 7/10/75. p. M) Parrott further stated that the purpose
of his minutes was "to interpret what the decisions ,wre and to
record those and to use them as a useful action document.'~ (Parrott,
7/10/75, p. :-35) Parrott testified:
"We had 15 or 16 people (at the August 10, 1962, meeting) * * * all of them
well informed. all of them highly articulate.
This meeting. as I recall, went on for several hours • * * Now I'm sure that
particularly in a group like this that there were a great many proposals made
that were just shot down immediately. (Parrott. 7/10/75, pp. 34-35)
Parrott further testified that he did not record proposals "that were
<[uicklv rejected at the Augnst 10 meeting. (Parrott. 7/10175, p. 35)
He st~ted that. although he had no recollection of a discussion of
Castro's assassination at the August 10 meeting, he would infer from
the related documents (the Lansdale and Harvey memoranda of August
13 and 14) that the subject was raised but "it never got off the
ground * * * [a]nd therefore. I did not record it:' (Parrott. 7/10175.
p. ~;) Parrott said it was not his practice to intentionally not record
such discussions in the minutes.
(h) TESTIMONY OF ELDER
'VaIt!'r Elder testified that although he was not present at the
Augnst 10 meeting, he was present when McCone returned to the
Agency and "called )fc~amara on the phone and * * * took exception
to the discussion of assassination as improper:' (Elder. 8/13/75,
pp. 22-2~) Elder described the conversation (which he heard in
McCone's office on a sp!'akPI' phone) as follows:
A. * * * (McCone) said. "Boh, the subject you just bronght np. I think it is
highly improper. I do not think it should he discussed. It is not an action that
should eyer he condoned. It is not proper for us to discuss. and I intend to haye it
expunged from the record."
Q. Did MeXamara Ra~· he did not hring it. up?
A. No. he did not.
Q. Is that the total conYersation as you remember it'!
A. This was back in 1962. That was the gist of it.
324
C. CONVERSATIONS 'VITH PRESIDEXT KENNEDY ABOUT THE USE OF
ASSASSINATION
The only evidence the Committee heard of the discussion of assassinations
with a President were two conversations with President Kennedy.!
Both occurred during the active phase of the Castro plots, during
the year 1961. Neither oonversation aided us in our effort to determine
,,,hether President Kennedy or any other President specifically
or implicitly authorized the CIA's assassination plots and plans. They
established that President Kennedy said he was being- urged to authorize
Castro's assassination. Yet, none of the Presidential advisors were
aware of any such urgings and testified that they thought they would
have been if the President had been so urged.
1. PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MEETING WITH. TAD SZULC ON
NOVEMBER 9, 1961
In early November 1961, Szulc was asked by Richard Goodwin.
then Special Assistant to President Kennedy, to meet with Attorney
General Robert Kennedy on November 8, 196'1, to discuss the situation
in Cuba. The meeting was an "off-the-record" one which Szulc
attended as a friend of Goodwin's and not as a reporter. ('Szulc,
6/10/75, p. 24) During the meeting- with Robert Kennedy. the discussion
centered on "the situation in Cuba foUowing the [Bay of Pigs]
invasion [and] the pros and cons of some different possible actions
by the U.S. Governmentin that context." (Szulc, 6/1O/7il. p. 25) The
word assassination did not come up during this meeting. (Szulc.
6/10/75, p. 31)
At the close .of the meeting, Robert Kennedy asked Szulc to meet
with President Kennedy. (Szulc. 6/1O/7fj, p. 25) On November 9,
1961, Szulc, accompanied by Goodwin. met with President Kennedy
for over an hour in the Oval Office. (Szulc, 6/10/75. p. 25) Szulc recalled
that the President discussed "a number of his views on Cuba
in the wake of the Bay of Pigs. asked me a number of 'luestions concerning
my conversations with Premier Castro. and * * * what the
United States could [or] might do in * * * either a hostile way or
in establishing some kind of dialogue * * *" (Szulc, 6/10/75. pp.
25-26)
Szulc testified that after this general discussion, the President then
asked, '''what would you think if I ordered Oastro to be assassinatrd?"
(Szulc. 6/10/75, p. 26; Szulc Notes of Conversation ,,,ith President
Kennedy, November 9. 1961 (Emphasis Added.) Szulc testified that
he replied that an assassination would not necessarily cause a change
in the Cuban system, and that it ,ms Szulc's personal view that the
United States should not be party to murders and political assassinations.
(Szu1c. 6/10/75. p. 26) Szulc testified that thereupon the
President said, "I agree with you completely." Szulc stated further:
He [President Kennedy] then went on for a few minutes to make the point
how strongly he and his brother felt that the {'.S. for moral reasons should
never be in a situation of havin~ recourse to assassination in foreign policy.
(Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 27)
1 The te~tjrnony regardinll: the AUll:u~t 18. 1960 "'....tinll: of tlw Xational Spcurlty Council
at which Pre~ident Eisenhower said something which one Robert John~on thollA'ht was as
an assassination suggestion is discus;;ed infra; 8ee 0180 Committee Report. pp. 55-60.
325
Szulc~s notes of the meeting with the President state:
JFK then said he was testing nIP, that he felt the same way-he added "rill
glad you feel the same way-because indeed r.s. morally must not be part [sic]
to assassinations."
Szulc~s notes of the com'ersation further state:
JFK said he raised question because he was under terrific pressure frolU
advisers (think he said intelligence people, but not positive) to okay a Castro
murder, said [sic] he was resisting pressures. (Szllic Xote of Conversation with
President Kennedy, Xovember 9,10(1)
Szulc stated, relying on his memory, that it is "possible" and he
"believerl" that President Kennerlv used such ,vords as "someone in
the intelligence business," as the source of the pressure for a Castro
assassination. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 29) The President did not identify
the person or persons. (Szulc, 6/10/7:'), p. 27)
Goodwin also testified before the Committee about the Szulc/Kennedy
conversation. He said that, after asking Szulc for his reaction
to a suggestion that Castro be assassinated, President Kennedy said
only, "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be targets."
(Goodwin, 7/18/75, pp. 4, 11)
This conversation, if accurately related to the Committee, and if
tIm President was accurate in his remarks to SzuIc, is particularly
troublesome to me. It raises a number of questions on the issue of
authority. The central question, of course, is who, in November 1961,
,vas putting pressure on the President to authorize Castro's assassination?
On Nonmber 29, 1961. .Tohn McCone replaced Allen Dulles as
DCI; 1 thus, on November 9, Dulles was still DCI. Bissell was then
still DDP. Helms and Harvey were both within the DDP. Yet, everyone
has uniformly denied ever even mentioning assassination to Presi<
lent Kennedy. let alone "pressuring" him to approve it.2 Moreover,
the CIA itself, in a paper drafted and submitted to the President only
one month earlier, had concluded that Castro's death would not be
"fatal to the regime" and recommended against any such action. See
Committee Report) pp. 136-137.
Thus, this piece of evidence, like many others, does not fit neatly
into the puzzle. Whether Allen Dulles ever spoke to President Kennedy
about approval is a matter which cannot be conclusively resolved.
2. CON\'ERS.\TION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND SENATOR GEORGE
SMATHERS
George Smathers. former l"nitecl States Senator representing the
State of Florida, testified that in a conversation he had with President
Kennedy as they walked together on the 1Vhite House lawn:
• • • [President Kennedy] asked me what reaction I thought there would be
throughout South America were Fidel Castro to be assassinated • • • I told
the Presidpnt that Hen as much as I dislikpd Fidpl Castro that I did not think
it would be a good idea for there to be even considered an assassination of Fidpl
Castro, and the President of the United States completely agreed with me, that
it would be a wry unwisp thing to do, the reason obviously being that no mattpr
1 McCone's appointment was announced on September 27, 19f11. but he Rpent some time
"getting up to speed" on Agency oneratlonR. tJhroug-h brleting-R with Dulles, and took office
on November 29. ('See Elder. 8/13/75, pp. 8-9. 12-14)
2 McCone, Helms, BiRsell. Harvey. and all members of the Snecial Group and Special
Group AUl?mented have testified that at no time did they ever discuss assassination with
President Kennedy. Allen Dulles is deceased.
who did it and ne, mattE'r how it was donE' and no mattl'r what, that tlll' Cnitl'll
States would rE'cE'ive full erE'dit for it, and it would work to his gTE'at disadvantage
with all of the othE'r eountriE's in Cl'ntral and South America * * * I disapproved
of it, and he eompletE'ly disapvrovro of the idea. (8mathE'rs, 7/2.3!7[),
pp.6,7)
Smathers testified that he had the "impression" thilt the 'President
raised the subject of assassination with him because someone "had
apparently discussed this and other possibilities with respect to Cuba"
with the President. (Smathers. 7/23/75. pp. Hi. 25) Smathers had no
direct knowledge of any such discussion. nor did he know who might
have been involved. (Smathers. 7/23/75, pp. 16. 2iJ) Moreover, the
Presidpnt did not indicatp directly that assassination hac] hCCII ])1'0posed
to him. (Smathers. 7/23/75: p. 18)
According to Smathers. the President "asked me what reaction I
thought there would be through South America were Fidel Castro to
be assassinated." (Smathers, 7/23/75. p. 6) Smathers responded that
he thought it would wor'k to "!~Teat disaclvanta're" with the nations of
Central and South America bl'cause tlwv would blame thr r.s. for
any assassination of Castro. .
Thereafter. Smathrrs said he trirc] to raise thr subject of Cnha with
Prrsident Kennrdv and the Presiclent told him in no nncrl'tain trl'nlS
that hr should not raise the subject with him a'!ain, Smathl'rs ra1'ticu1arly
recalled one incident. which occurred after thl' abow-f1uotecl
converSation, which stuck in his memory, He recalled that one evening
he was at the President's home and during conversation:
I just havpenro to mention, * * * somE'thing ahout Cuba, and the PresidE'nt
took his fork and cracked the plate * * * and says, for Gods sakes, quit talking
about Cuba * * * (Smathers, 7/23/75, p. 22)
Senator Smathers concluded his testimony by indicating that in
general he felt he was "taking the tougher stance" on Cuba than
was President Kennedy (SmatI1ers. 7/23/75. p. 24) but that he disapproved
even thinking of assassinating Castro and that in his opinion
President Kennedv was definitelv "not interested in the assassination
of Fidel Castro." '(Smathers. 7/23/7f>. p. 16)
This second time that President Kennedv talked about assassination
he again expressed· the opinion that assassination should not be
used by the lTnited States, The subject was one. however, which appeared
to be on his mind and. again. we are unable to establish who. if
anyone. raised assassination with the President.
D. PRESIDEXT EISENHOWER'S DIscrSSION AT TIlE ArGrST 18. 1960
NATIOXAL SECVRITY COVXCIL MEETIXG
A discussion of United States policy towards the Congo occurred at
the National Security Council on August 18. 19GO. Robert H.•Johnson.
an NSC staff member from .July 1951 to .January 1962, attended
that meeting as he had others and took the minutes. He testified that:
I attended one such NSC meeting in the summer of 1960. I should note varenthetically
that I have refreshro my memory as to the probable time of the meeting
by checking the historical record of international developments. At that
meeting, there was a discussion of developments of what was then the Congo,
now Zaire. I do not remember the context of the discussion. It is my guess that
it was preciVitated hy the intelligence briE'fillg hy the Director of Central Intelli~
ence on world developments with which every NSC meeting at that time hegan.
327
At some time during that discussion President l<Jisenhower said something-I
ean no longer remember his words-that came across to me as an order for the
assassination of Lumumba who was then at the center of political conflict and
contron>rsy in the Congo. There was no discussion; the meeting simply moYe<1
on. I rememuer my sense of that moment quite clearly because the President's
statement came as a great sllOek to me. I eannot, however, reeonstruct the moment
more speeifically. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 6)
Senator ~Inthias then asked:
But what comes across is that you do have a memory, if not of exact words,
IJUt of your own reaction to a Presidential order which you consider to be an
order for an assassination.
Mr..JOHNSON. That is correct.
Senator MATHIAS. And that although precise words have escaped you in the
passage of 15 years, that sense of shock remains?
~Ir. ,JOHNSON. Right, Yes, Sir. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 8)
.Johnson, however, qualified his remarks as follows:
• • • I must confess that in thinking about the incident more recently I have
had some doubts. As is well known, it was quite uncharacteristic of President
Eisenhower to make or announce policy decisions in NSC meetings. Certainly
it was strange if he departed from that normal pattern on a subjeet so sensitive
as this. Moreover, it was not long after this, I believe, that Lumumba was dismissed
as premier by Kasavubu in an action that was a quasi-coup. I have
come to wonder whether what I really had [heard] was only an order for some
such political action. All I can tell you with any certainty at the present moment
is my sense of that moment in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Robert
H. Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 5-7)
The minutes do not. hmyever. reflect the exchange to which Johnson
alluded," Xor, does any other participant of the same meeting remembPl'
any such statement. Douglas Dillon. who was also present.
suggests that the sentiment of the time was to get rid of Lumumba
and that perhaps that is what was said. See Committee Report, pp.
;>7-60.
A fine line appears to exist between getting rid of someone and taking
steps toward their assassination. Again, we find conversations
which mean different things to different people. This is one more
example of why I fully agree with the Committee's central finding
that we cannot conclusively establish whether the assassination plots
were authorized, yet come away with the impression that the CIA's
actions were not far afield from what the policymakers desired.
V. Did the Inve8tigation of Giancana and R08elli RMleal Their Invollvement
in the A88a88ination Plots to the FBI, Department of
JU8tice. Atto'f'ney General or the President?
On October 31, 1960, at the very early stages of the Castro plotting
in Florida, the wiretap installed through Maheu at the request of
Giancana was discovered in another person's Las Vegas apartment.
,""ee Committee's Report, pp. 77-79. The FBI commenced an investigation
which soon led to both Maheu and Giancana. During the course
of the investigation information regarding the CIA's involvement
\vith underworld figures was disclosed to the FBI, .Justice Department
1 Johnson. following the meeting. "checked with a superior as to whether I should Inelude
the President's statement In my de-briefing of the Planning Board and as to how I
should handle it In m~' memorandum of the discussion. I suspeet-but no longer have an
exact recollection-that I omitted It from the de-briefing. It was not unusual to occaslonall~'
omit some partlcularl~' sensitive subject from the de-briefing." (Johnson, 6/1R/7".
p.7 ; 9/13/75, PP. 11-13)
328
officials, and Attorney General Kennedy. In addition, our investigation
revealed that during the Florida assassination plottin~ the FBI
actually had Roselli and Giancana under surveillance and had a bug
in their various abodes.1 This section will describe what evidence the
Committee gathered concerning what information was transmitted to
the Executive Branch during the period of the Las Vegas wiretap
investigation and what action was taken because of it.
A. THE FBI MEMORANDA
1. THE OCTOBER 18, 1960 MEMORANDUM
The first relevant memorandum discovered by the Committee's investigation
was a memorandum sent by Director Hoover to Allen W.
Dulles, DCI, marked "Attention: Deputy Director, Plans." 2 The m~morandum
reported that an FBI "source" had obtained the followmg
information:
According to the source, during recent conversation with several friends,
Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with very shortly. When
doubt was expressed regarding this statement Giancana reportedly assured those
present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he
allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three
occasions, the last meeting taking place on a boat docked at the Fontainbleau
Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida. Reportedly, Giancana claimed that everythinghas
been perfected for the killing of Castro and that the "assassin" had arranged
with a girl, not further described, to drop a "pill" in some drink or food of
Castro's.
Bissell, however, was the CIA's DDP (to whose attention the memo
was directed) at the time and testified that he did not recall seein~
the memorandum. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 40) He said that under CIA
proc~dures a copy would also have been given to the DCI Dulles.
(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 40)
The FBI copy of the Hoover/Dulles memorandum contained the
following additional information:
By separate airtel [night cable] we have instructed the field to be most alert
for any additional information concerning alleged plots against Castro and to
submit recommendations for close surveillance of Giancana in the event he
makes trip to the Miami area or other trips which may be for the purpose of
contacting people implicated in this plot.
I find the October 18, 1960, memorandum particularly significant since
it reveals intimate knowledge of the Castro plots including the method
to be used (poison pills) and the place of most meetings. (Fontainbleau
Hotel). I have a hard time believing this memorandum was dismissed
as idle chatter, particularly as the FBI's investigation proceeded
forward and yet additional information was obtained. Our investigation,
however, has not determined exactly who was advised, orally
or otherwise. of this October 18 memorandum or what was done about
it.
1 See FBI documents; Meheu 7/29/75. pp. 66-67, 9/23/75. pp. 13-16; Roselli 9/22/75.
pp. 13. 19.20-21.47. 55.
2 Copies of this memorandum were sent to Assistant Chief of Staft' for Inte11ll!ence, De·
psrtment of the Army. Attention: Chief, Security DIvision: Office of Special Investlll'atlons.
Air Force. Attention: Chief, Connterlntelligence DIvision; Director of Naval Intellll!
ence: Assistant ~ttorney General J. Walter Yeagley: Office of Security. Department
of State.
329
Courtney Evans was then the FBI's liaison with Attorney General
Kennedy and the President. He had ,vorked closely with the then Senator
John Kennelh and Robert Kennedv on the ~IcClellan Committee,
,,'hich hal] inYPstigated the relationship between organized labor
and organized crime. After becoming Attorney General, Robert Kennedy
singled out Giancana a(S one of the underworld leaders to be given
the most intense investigation. Evans was questioned by the Committee
about the Odober 18 memorandum. He testified that he did not recall
eVeI' having seen it. that he had never heard from any source of an
assassination plot involying the Central Intelligence Agency and members
of the underworld during his tenure with the Bureau, and that he
never discussed assassination with the Attorney General. (Evans,
8/27/75, pp. 55-57) He testified that while he did not recall the memomndum,
if it had been sent to him. it would have been sent by Thomas
McAndrews, "'ho was Chief of the Organized Crime Section of the
Special Investigative Diyision of the Bureau.
McAndrews, who was responsible for distributing information to
the pntire intplligence community from the FBI, could not recall ewr
haying given the October 18 memorandum to his superior, Evans.
'When asked if he believed the information contained in that memorandum
had ever been brought to the attention of Attorney General
K('nnedy, ~IcAndr('ws testifi('d:
I think he was hriefed specifically on it, either in writing or orally * * * I
think it was done. But I can't say for sure. (McAndrews, 9/17/75, p. 27)
Ralph HilL who was the Special Agent in charge of the investigation
of Giancana, stated t!>at he lwall('d the information in th(' October
18 memorandum. hut that he did not recall the memorandum itself.
He stated that b('cause of tIl(' Attorney G('neraFs interest in organized
crime figures, it was tl:e practice for fi('ld reports concerning Giancana
to bp given to CourtJwy Eyans, who would th('n forward them to the
.\ttorney General.
As the FBI investigation of the Las Vegas wirptap proceeded forward,
Sheffield Edwards, the CIA's Diredor of Secnrity, was in continual
contact with tlw Bureau about the case. Edwards was unable to
be questioned about pither the October 18 memorandum or his contacts
with the FBI due to his infirm condition. Bissell, however. testified
that he knew during the spring of 1961 that Edwards was seeking to
persuade the .TustiC(> Dppartment not to prosecute the parties involved
in the tap. ineluding Mal,('u. Ros('JJi and Giancana. 'While he believed
that Edwards had told the Burpau the truth. }w did not expect that
Edwards would have rev('aled that the CIA operation invoh'ed assassination.
(Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 63-65)
2. THE :MAY 22, l!l61 MEl\IORANDUl\1
The information which Edwards was providing the FBI in response
to inquiry about the Las Vegas tap was eventua]]y forwarded by
Director Hoowr dirpctly to Attorney General Kennedy by memorandum
of May 22. 1961. The memorandum, while not directly mentioning
tlw word "assassination." reported that the CIA had relied on
Giancana b('calls(' of J is contacts "'ith gambling figur('s who might
have sources for use "in connection ,,'ith CIA's clandestine efforts
330
against the Castro government." The memorandum continued that
"none of Giancana's efforts have materialized to date and that several
of the plans still are working and lllay eventually 'payoff'." It described
the a,ctivities as "dirtv business" and said the CIA could not
afford having knowledge of tIl£> actions of Maheu and Giancana in
pursuit of any mission for the CIA. The ~Iay 22 memorandum stated:
Colonel Edwards advised that in connection with CIA's operation against
Castro he personally contacted Robert 11aheu during the Fall of 1960 for the
purpose of using Maheu 'as a "cnt-out"' in contacts with Sam Giancana, a known
hoodlum in the Chicago area. Colonel }<,dwards said that since the underworld
controlled gambling activities in CUba under the Bati~ta government, it was
assumed that this element would still continue to han' sourcps and contacts
in Cuba which perhaps could be utilized succpssfully in connection with CIA's
clandestine efforts against the Castro government. As a result, 1laheu's services
were solicited as a "cut-out" hecause of his possible entree into underworld
circles. Maheu obtained Sam Giancana's assistance in this regard and
according to Edwards, Giancana gave ewry indication of cooperating through
11aheu in attempting to accomplish several clandestine efforts in Cuba. Edwards
added that none of Giancana's efforts have materialized to date and that several
of the plans still are working and may evt'ntually "payoff."
Colont'l Edwards related that he had no direct contact with Giancana; that
Giancana's activitit's wert' complett'ly "back stopped" by Maht'u and that Maheu
would frequently report Giancana's action and information to Edwards. No
details or methods used by Maheu or Giancana in accomplishing their missions
were ever reported to Edwards. Colonel Edwards said that since this is "dirty
business" he could not afford to haw knowledge of the actions of11aheu and
Giancana in pursuit of any mission for CIA. Colonel Edwards added that he
has neither givt'n Maht'u any instruction to use technical installations of any
type nor has the subject of technical installations ever come up hetween Edwards
and Maheu in connection with Giancana's activity.
• • • • • • •
Mr. Bissell, in his recent briefings of Gent'ral Taylor and the Attorney General
and in connection with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situation
told the Attorney Gent'ral that some of the associated planning included the
use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro.
The memorandum thus provided a graphic though elusive description
of the assassination plots in terms which I think would lead one
receiving the memorandum to ask: ",Vhat dirty business? Wnat exactly
are the "clandestine efforts" of the CIA against Castro? Wllat
"plans" are still working and may eventually "payoff?" PerhapR,
though, the Rystem of plausible denial dictated that such questions
would not be asked. In any event. our investigation did not reveal
whether such questions were asked and if so what answers were
• 1 gIven.
B. PRESIDENT KEN1IiEDY'S MEETING ",VITH THE CUBAX EXILE LEADER
Before reviewing what our investigation revealed as to what happened
to the May 22 memorandum, I feel it important to review the
time period in which it was written. First, the portion of the memorandum
which reads "none of Giancana's efforts haw materialized to
date" seems to refer to the recent passage of poison pills in April
Hl61 to the Cuban exile leader who was active in the plots around this
1 All officials still living- who the record established saw th.. m..moranda t ..stlfi",l tlwy
never learned that the memorandum was describing assassination efforts,
331
period of time.! Secom1. the memorandum \vas recei \'ed by Attorney
Grneral KellllP(l" in aftermath of the Bay of Pigs and at the height
of the Taylor/Kennedy Bay of Pigs inquiry which met from April
thl'Ough .Tllllr of HHl1. (See COInmittre's Report at pp. 121-2:)) ~foreover.
"\llen Dulles was one of tIl(> members of the Taylor/Kennedy
Board and ob\-iousl" available to answer inquiries about the May 22
memorandulll. Thir·d. am' investigation determined President Kennedy
Illet in person with the Cuban exile leader on April 19-20. HHl1.
apparently to discuss the failure of the Bay of Pi~s.2.Ther~after.on
"ray IS. 1961. the Taylor/Kennedy Board of Tnqmry mtervJCwed the
Cuban exile leader, and other members of Cuban groups. The record
l'(\\'eals that the subject matter of this interview was the Bay of Pigs
operation and that Attorney General Kennedy was present.
Those still li\-ing who participated in the Taylor/Kennedy inquiry
have testifie(l they never heard of t.he assassination plots from any of
the \vitnesses. The ~[a" 22 memorandum. howenT. references Bissell's
hricfin(r Attol'llev Geileral KennedY about the fact that the CIA's
"assso(;ated plallning included the lise of Giancana against Castro."
BisselFs testimony about \vhat I}(' told Kennedy at that time is treated
at length in the Committee's Report. pp. 121-22. Suffice it to say he
again had a n'ry bad memory as to what. if anything. he toM Attorney
General Kl'nnedy about till' plots. 3
The ~ra.v 22 memorandum was accompanied by a short cover memorandum
stating that Edwards had acknowledged the "attempted" use
of )[aheu find "hoodlum eh>ments" by the CIA in "anti-Castro activities,"
but that the "pnrpose for placing the ,viretap * * * [had] not
been determined * * *." (FBI memo to Attorney General, 5/22/61)
The ~[ay 22 memorandum to Attornev General Kennedy was
stamped "l:('cei,-ed." and contained It notation in the margin. iIi Kenne(
h-'s ham1. as follows: "Courtney I hope this will be followed un
vigorously." "Courtnpy" was Cou~tney Evans. Evans. as indicated
earlier. testified that he neither knew anything about any assassination
plots nor (liscuf:sNl tIlE' subject with Attorney General Kennedy. Howpwr.
Evans did write It memorandum to Allen Belmont. Assistant
Director of the FBr. daten .Tune 6, H161, which staten:
'VP chpckpd with CTA and ascprtainpd that. CIA has uspd Mahpu ns an intprnlPdiary
in contacting Snm Giancana, thp not.orious Chicago hoodum. This was
in connl"Ction with anti-<'astro actiyitips. CIA, howpypr, did not give any instruetions
to :\Iahpu to usp any tp<'hnical installations. In connpct.ion with this information
receiyPd from CIA concerning thpir attpmpted utilization of thp hood-
1 Accordln!! to J<'BI nwmoranrla dat~d D~('~mb~r 21, 1960. ami Jannary 18. 1961. tlw
Cnban ~xll~ l~ad~r was a~soelat~d with anti-Castro actlyltl~s financl'd bv nnlt~d Stat~"
rackateers. includln!! SantOR Traffi('ant~. who honed to S~cnr~ Ill~gal monopoll~s In th~ ~y~nt
of Castro's ov~rthrow. Cnban pxj]~ l~ad~r was also us~d by Ros~lJi in th~ sPeond passa!!" of
pllJs to Cuba in Anrll 1962.
2 Whll~ ther~ Is no r~cord of this IIw~t1ng. oth~r memh~rs of Cuban !!rouns an,l
S~cr~tary of D~f~llRe ~fcXamara and Gen~ral Lemnitzer wPf~ pr~s~nt. IIIcXamara has
t~stlfi~d that he nev~r h~ard the assassination plots discussed with the rr~sldent or anJ'-
on~ ~18~. 0lcNamara, 7/11/75. p. 7.1) .
a Rlss~ll at on~ point answer~d :
Q. • • ~ you're sayln!! that In brl~fin!! th~ Attorn~J- Gen~ral you ar~ tellIn!! him
yon ar~ USlll!! the underworld a!!alnst Castro. and you Int~nded to mean, Mr. AttornH
G~n~ra1, we are tr:vln!! to kill him. .
A. I thought it si!!nal~d just exactly that to the Attorney General, I'm sure.
(BIRS~ll. 7/22/75. n. ;'4)
Rnt, IlP liltpr poniyocated "bont what hp s"i,]. the net rpsult heln!! that wp ju~t cannot be
Rure what h~ may have said to Attorn~y Gen~ral Kenn~dy.
332
lum element. CIA requested tbis information be bandIed on a "need-to-know"
basis.
We are conducting a full investigation in this wiretap case requested by the
Department and tbe field bas been instructed to press tbis investigation vigorously.
Accordingly, tbe Attorney General will be orally assured tbat we are
following up vigorously and tbe results of our investigation will be furnisbed to
the Department promptly.
At the time Director Hoover sent the May 22, 1961 memorandum
to the Justice Department, indicating that there was a CIA/Giancana
link, the Bureau and Justice files contained the October 18, 1960
memorandum revealing that Giancana had earlier talked about an
assassination attempt. This memorandum of October 18, 1960 did
not reveal any Giancana/CIA connections. It did, however, mention
assassination. Anyone reading the memorandum of October 18, 1960
and knowing that the CIA was associated with Giancana in a project
"against Castro" should have realized the connection. There is no evidence,
however, that the Attorney General ever saw the October 18
memorandum. Nor is there any evidence that anyone put the two
memorandums together or, for that matter, asked enough questions
of the right people to determine that the project or activities or plans
"against Castro" were in fact assassination plots.
Given the information transmittRd in the memorandum of 1960 and
1961 that developed from the FBI investigation of the Las Vegas tap
together with bugs in the listening devices in various buildings of the
underworld figures and the physical surveillance in Florida adds up
to one of three possibilities; (1) the plots became known to those who
wanted to know and were allowed to continue; (2) no one learned of
them because they "didn't want to know;" or (3) the information was
never sufficiently put together enough to reveal the plots. The evidence,
however, will not permit me to even guess which of the three possibilities
actually occurred. We will never know for certain whether in
May of 1961, almost a year before the second passage of poison pills
in April 1962. anyone realized that there were ongoing assassination
plans and yet did nothing about them.
C. THE EVENTS OF 1962
Both the Castro plots and the Giancana wiretap investigation
did not exhibit much activity between the May 22, 1961 memorandum
and the advent of 1962. The events surrounding the May 7,
1962 briefing are dealt with at length in the Committee's Report. I
mention them briefly here so that they may be viewed together with
the events preceding them in 1960 and 1961. In this manner I believe
a fuller picture of the problems of who knew what when is presented.
The ambiguity reflected in the Committee's Report over what occurred
in the May 7 briefing is heightened by the May 14, 1962, memorandum
which purports to describe the May 7 briefing. The May 14
memorandum was prepared at the Attorney General's request by Edwards,
with Houston's assistance.
The May 14 memorandum described the assassination plots as a
"sensitive operation against Fidel Castro," and said that" (a) fter the
failure of the invasion of Cuba word was sent through Maheu to
Roselli to call off the operation," and that "neither this Agency (CIA)
nor (Edwards) knew of" the proposed Las Vegas wiretap. Thus, the
memorandum did not fully or accurately describe the assassination
operation and actually falsely stated other facts, e.g., that the plots
were concluded in May of 1961 when they were continuing and that
333
the CIA was not involved in authorizing the Giancana tap when it
apparently did. Moreover, the Attorney General had already seen the
May 22, 1961 memorandum (discussed mpra) which said that in late
May of 1961 "[plans were] still working" and might "eventually pay
off." And, the Attorney General was presumably also aware that the
CIA had been involved in the proposed tap (from reading the May 22,
1961 memorandum). Therefore, the May 14, 1962, memorandum contained
several statements which seem to be known inaceurances.
The answer to all these ambiguities may be that the May 14 memorandum
was intended to be false to serve as a "cover" for the real facts.
Alternatively, the memorandum may just have resulted from the apparent
confusion between Houston and Edwards and a general reluctance
to detail in writing something like an assassination operation.
It is clear, however, that at the May 7 briefing the "operation"
against Castro was described as an assassination attempt because of
the meeting between Attorney General Kennedy and Hoover two days
later. Hoover's May 10 memorandum describing the May 9 meeting,
noted that Kennedy described the operation as involving the CIA's
hiring "Robert A. Maheu, a private detective in Washington, D.C., to
approach Giancana with a proposition of paying $150,000 to hire some
gunmen to go into Cuba to kill Castro."
Whatever occurred at the May 7 meeting and whatever the reasons
for the May 14 memorandum, the major concern which arises for me
is that no affirmative action was taken. Despite the fact that the Attorney
General, the Director of the FBI, the General Counsel and the
Director of Security of the CIA, all discussed assassination plots
against Castro, no written order was levied upon all CIA employees
banning any such actions.1
Indeed, John McCone, the Director of the CIA in May of 1962, testified
that he was not even told of the plots until August of 1963, and
then only because of a newspaper article (Committee Report, pp. 99108)
2. And, all the advisors to President Kennedy testified that they
also never heard anything about it. For example, Herbert J. Miller, Jr.
testified that he had never heard about assassination efforts and that if
the Attorney General had, "he would have told me." (Miller, 8/11/75,
pp. 17-22) Of course, we know that the Attorney General did know,
at least as of May 7, 1962. Whether he informed President Kennedy
we do not know. The confusion over who did or did not know, and if
so when, again demonstrates the glaring need for better command
and control within both the intelligence community and the Executive
Branch.
VI. The MONGOOSE Program-The EnvironmRlnt in Which the
A88as8ination Plot8 Aro8e
The Committee Report discusses in some detail the occurrences during
the so-called "MONGOOSE Program" against Cuba by the Ken-
1 In another aspect of the Committee's Investigation the command and control structure
also failed to provIde a spec.lfic wrItten order whIch, accordIng to one CIA emplOyee, would
have ensured the destruction of certaIn toxIns. (Gordon, 9/16/75, PP. 166-67)
• ThIs Is so even though oUr record indicates that McCone and Attorney General
Kennedy were personal frIends and, In the words of McCone's former Executive Assistant
Walt Elder "quIte close." (Elder 8/13/75, pp. 52) Usee also Helms, 6/13/75, P. 69)
334
nedy Administration from November 1961 through October 1962, and,
for the most part, I find little to differ with in the presentation. I
thought that, because of the length of the Committee's Report, it
would be useful to succinctly set out some examples of how and why
the pressure on the CIA and other agencies was so great during this
period. Even a brief look at these events demonstrates what the environment
was. This is not to excuse what occurred but to describe the
quite unique atmosphere which existed during these various assassination
plots. While MONGOOSE was a program directed only against
Cuba, it in some ways set the tone for actions taken in other countries.
These examples, along with other eYidence of that period, will. I hope,
shed some additional light on why assassination plots may not have
struck those involved at the CIA level as immediately,·erboten.
Richard Helms has testified that during the time he was DDP the
prevailing mood in the Administration regarding Castro was, in essence,
"anything goes." He stated that (1) the injunction laid down by
the Administration was to "get rid of" the Castro regime, and (2) no
limitations were placed on the means.
Helms testified that in October or Kovember of 1961 :
* * * the Agency was instructed-to get going on plans to get rid of Castro by
some device which obviously would have to be covert because nobody had any
stomach anymore for any invasions or any military fiascos of that kind. (Helms,
6/13/75, pp. 16-17)
He characterized the atmosphere of the 1961-62 MONGOOSE period
as
pretty intense, and I remember vividly it WllS very intense * * * [X] utty schemes
were born of the intensity of the pressure. And we were quite frustrated. (Helms.
6/13/75, p. 26)
And by the time of the missile crisis the pressure was described as "no
doubt about it, it was white heat." (frl. p. 27)
Helms was not the only witness who testified that the pressure to
remove Castro by any means was real. The Executive Assistant to
Harvey in the DDP testified that in the early fall of 1961 Bissell told
him that he was called to the White House where he ,vas:
chewed out in the Cabinet Room of the White House by both the President and
the Attorney General for, as he puts it, sitting on his ass and not doing anythin~
about getting' rid of Castro and the Castro regime. (Executive Assistant,
6/18/75, pp. 8, 37-38)
The Executive Assistant added that he understood that the CIA had
been ordered during the MONGOOSE period to remove the Castro
regime and that "no holds were barred * * * we had no limitation."
(Executive Assistant, 6/18/75, p. :37)
Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara noted that
we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter.
And there was pressure from JFK and RFK to do something abont Castro. (McNamara,
7/11/75, p. 93)
The Inspector General's Report described tlll' pressurized environs
in which the assassination plots were spawned as follows: '
We cannot overemphasize the extent to which responsible Agency officers felt
themselves subject to the Kennedy Administration's severe pressure to do something
about Castro and his regime. The fruitless and, in retrospect, often un·
realistic plotting should be viewed in that light. (IG Report. p. 4)
333
The eYcnti'i. meetings and proposals concerning the "Cuba problem"
which occlllTed after tIll' defeat at the Bay of Pigs largely cxp!
ain why those involved felt engulfed by the "pressure" to get rid of
Castro. After the Taylor/Kennedy Report (Colllmittee Report, pp.
1~5-3{i) was completed in .Tune 196'1, President Kennedy set up a
completely new COVHt structnre for dealing with the Cuban situatIOn.
In November 1961 a new program was mounte'd against Cuba which
came tD be known as "Operation MONGOOSE." And, before it was
concluded in October 1962 a wide variety of actions were debated, considered
and employed against Cuba. While not all proposals were
l~pproved their mere consideration contributed to the dimate at the
time.
President Kennedy's November 30, 1961, memorandum formally
established the MONGOOSE program and named Edward G. Lansdale
as its Chief of Operations. On December 1, 1961, the Attorney
General informed the Special Group that "higher authority" had decided
that higher priority should be given to Cuba.
The parameters of what was or was not considered authorized under
the MONGOOSE program was graphically demonstrated in Roswell
Gilpatric's 'testimony:
Q. Going haek. then, to the general MO~GOOSE Special Group (Augmented)
atmosphere here, could you give the Committee your best recollection of your
perce<ption at that 'time of the li:miJts of the authority of the 'Speiciail Group with
respect to what could and could not be done about Castro?
Mr. GILPATRIC. Well, the only limit that I felt the Special Group was nnder, was
Senator Goldwater said, we had no power. We were an advisory group, we were
staffing the President of the United States and the Attorney General. but within
OUr charter, so to speak, the one thing that was off limits was military invasion.
That, as I understood it, was something that the group was not to go into. The
.Toint Chiefs had contingency plans for the invasion of Cuba. They always have
had, probably, they've probably got new ones today, hut that kind of overt military
action was out of bounds as I understood it as far as the Special Group was
concerned.
We were talking about covert, clandestine operations to he conducted through
the CIA using, perhaps, paramilitary measures, hut not the armed forces of the
United States in a support role.
Q. Would the killing of Castro by a paramilitary group have been within
hounds?
Mr. GILPATRIC. I know of no restriction that would have barred it. (Gilpatric.
7/17/7r;, pp. 44--4;"')
Early in the MONGOOSE Program, on December 7, 1961, Gen.
Lansdale sent a memorandum concerning the Cuba Project to Maxwell
Taylor, U. A.•Tohnson, Roswell Gilpatric. and .Tohn McCone, then
DCI. Lansdale noted that the President's November 30 memorandum
would be implpmented and that MONGOOSE would accomplish an
overthrow of Castro by means of a popular movement of Cubans from
,,-ithin Cuba. He recommended exploiting the potential of the under',"
orld in Cuban eities to harass and bleed the Communist control apparatus.
The Lansdale memorandum read in part:
This effort may, on a very sensitive basis, enlist the assistance of American
links to the Cuhan underworld. (Memorandum, Decemher 7, 1961)
The Lansdale program assigned some ;~2 planning tasks for the
agencies participating in MONGOOSE (including the CIA). These
tasks ranged frojll intelligence collection to the use of military force.
The next day an additional 33rd task was added to a plan to utilize biological
and chemical warfare against the Cuban sugar crop workers.
61-885 0 - 75 - 23
336
Although the proposal was eventually rejected as unfeasible, the consideration
of such a drastic tactic was no doubt borne out of the frustration
and concern of the times.
On ,January 19, 1962, the Attorney General once again addressed the
Special Group and emphasized that the President felt that immediate
action against Cuba was necessary. The Attorney General emphasized
that the solution of the Cuban problem \ns:
The top priority in the U.S. government-all else is secondary-no time, money,
effort, or manpower is to be spared * * * Yesterday * * * the President had
indicated (to the Attorney General) that the final chapter had not been writtenits
got to be done and will he done. (McManus Memorandum, ,January 19, 1962)
After the Attorney General addressed the group on that occasion,
Lansdale sent a memorandum to the members of the "Caribbean Survey
Group" (another euphemism for the Cuba Project) dated the next
day which stated:
As he (the Attorney General) so adequately tasked us, there will be no acceptable
alibi. If the capability must be developed, then We must acquire it on
a priority basis. It seems clear that the matter of funds and authority offers
absolutely no defense for losing time or for doing less than the very best possible
effort in your tasks.
* * * * * * *
It is our job to put the American genius to work on this project, quickly and
effectively. This demands a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing of
the fact that we are in a combat situatiotlr-where we have been given full command.
(Memorandum, January 20,1962, p. 1) (Emphasis supplied.)
On ,January 24,1962, the CIA submitted its plan for developing the
assets needed for the Cuba Project. The plan included the USe of Cuban
"crime syndicate" members as intermediaries who would make appeals
inside of Cuba, but it noted that controlling indigenous nationals was
difficult.
General Lansdale's Program Review for the Cuba Project of February
20, 1002, included his "Basic Action Plan." Phase IV of that
plan had as one of its components:
Attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders * * * This should
be a "Special Target" operation. CIA defector operations are vital here. Gangster
elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against
police G-2 officials. Bloc technicians should be added to the list of targets. CW
(Chemical Warfare) agents should be fully considered.
Lansdale testified that the "actions" and "attack" referred to in
this component meant killing. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 106) And, he also
testified that he had suggested to various agency representatives involved
in the MONGOOSE program that they contact "criminal elements"
for possible use in the program against Cuba. (Lansdale.
7/8/75, p. 107)
On January 30, 1962, a Defense Department proposal was sent to
Lansdale entitled "Operation Bounty." The proposal involved a:
system of fiJ;lancial rewards, commensurate with position and stature, for killing
or delivering alive known Communists. (Lansdale ex #1, Memorandum of .January
30, 1962, p. 1)
Under Operation Bounty leaflets were to be dropped into Cuba listing
rewards for the death of various individuals. The rewards ranged
from $5,000 for an "informer" to $100.000 for "government officials."
337
A reward of "2¢" was listed for Castro himself. (Id., p. 3)1 While
the Bounty proposal never got off the ground operationally, yet it is
another indicia of the climate of the time.
As the MONGOOSE program advanced, the Special Group recognized
that the Cuban program, considering what was being proposed.
created a potenti.ally volatile situation. The March 5, 1962 SGA
Minutes acknowledged that:
Ap;entR infiltrated into Cuha would be trained in paramilitary as well as intellip;
ence l;killR and * * * once the agents are within the country, they cannot be
pffl'('tiYel~' controlled from the U.S.
XeveTthe]p:-;s. undrl' the program, agent teams '\"ere dispatched into
Cuba. A Lansdale memorandum of March 13, 1962, to the Special
Group Augll1entf'd advised that:
(1) Two tl'alllR of agentR dispatched April 1 through 15, W62; (2) Two teams
of agents dispatl'hed April 16 through 30, 1962; (3) Two teams dispatched to
Cuha )lay 1 through Ii), 1962; (4) Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba
)laJ' 16 through 31; (iI) Ten to fift('pn teams of agents dispatched to Cuba June 1
throug-h :n, ll)r,2.
In addition to the agent infiltrations, the MONGOOSE program
also continued to include stepped up sabotage proposals. The unsuccessful
attempt to blow up the Matahambre mine was approved on August
30. 1\Hi2 , and an August 31, 1962 memorandum from Lansdale to the
SGA selectpd sabotage targets as "the Matahambre Mine and various
refineries. nickel plants * * *" The same memorandum suggested:
pncolll'aging destruction of crops hy fire, chemicals, and weeds, hampering of
harvest hJ' worl;: Slowdown, destruction of bags, cartons, and other shipping
l'ontainers.
While the MONGOOSE program ended around the time of the
Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, sabotage continued. For example,
t he Special G-roup minutes of .June 19, 196;~, show that the following
proposed sabotage program was approved:
.\ meeting wal; held this morning with higher authority, on the above subject.
Present were :\11'. )IcXamara and General )lcKee; ~1:r. Harriman; Mr. McCone
and )11'. l<'itzgerald; and )11'. Bundy.
* * * * *
)11'_ Fit%geraltl then glHe tll{; outlines of the proposed program. It will be
(lireeted at four major l;('gments of the Cuban economy: (a) electric power;
(II) petroleulIl refineries and storage facilities; (c) railroad and highway transjlortatioll:
and (,1) productil'n nnd manufaeturing. (He pointed out that many
1argi'tl; ill the la~t category ,-",mId he put out of operation by successful sabotage
of l)o,,"pr faeilities.) The first operation is planned for mid-July. Raids will be
e(;ndueted from outside Cuba, using Cuban agents nnder CIA control. ;\lissions
will be staged from a U.S. key. .
* * * * * * *
A question was asked as to wl1ether the Cubans would retaliate in kind, The
answer wal; that theJ- would certainly have this capability but that they have
not retaliated to date, in spite of a number of publicized exile raids.
I set out tIll' above e,"pIlts as examples of the atmosphere and environment
which I ean easily :-;('(' mig-ht lead one to conclude that an assassination
effort, presumably approved by higher authority, fit within
the realm of approved action against Castro and Cuba.
1 The rpward for Castro W<lS supposed to "dpnlgrate • * * Castro in thl' eJoes of thp
Cuban population." (Lansdale. 7/8/75, p. 26) The logic of the effort, however, escapes m,.'_
338
VII. Whose Idea Was the Use of the Underworld in an Assassination
Plot Against Castro
A fi~al matter I would like to treat briefly is a question which the
CommIttee Report does not specifically address, i.e., the origin of the
Castro plots. I describe the testimony here not beeause it matters much
where within the CIA the proposal originated, but because it sheds
additional light on why it is so difficult to pin down responsibility
for assassination.
The Inspector General's investigation did not focus on anyone
particular individual as the originator of the plots, noting that the
"first seriously-pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro had its inception
in August 1960." Concerning the plots' origin, the Inspector Gen('
ral's Report stated:
Riehard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, asked Sheffield Edwards, Director
of Security, if Edwards could establish contact with the 1'.S. gambling syndicate
that was active in Cuba. The objeetive clearly was the assassination of Castro
although Edwards claims that there was a studied avoidance of the term in his
eonversation with Bissell. Bissell reealls that the idea originated with J. C. King,
then Chief of WH Division, although King now recalls having only limited
knowledge of such a plan and at a much later date-mid 1962. (I.G. Report,
p.14)
However, when King was interviewed by the Committee, he denied
that the Castro underworld plots originated with him. He said that he
remembered nothing about the plots hut could not dispute Bissell and
Edwards. (King Interview, p. 1.)
Moreover, Bissell and Edwards each had differing recollections concerning
who proposed the idea of utilizing the underworld in an assassination
effort against Castro. Each testified that the other came to him
with the idea. Edwards testified that:
Q. Now, did you in the fall of 1960 receive some instructions from Mr. Bissell
in connection with :\Ir. Castro?
A. Yes.
Q. And did he tell you to find somebody who could accomplish the assassination
of Mr. Castro?
A. No, he told me if I had access, to see if I had access to any source that I
feel might accomplish th'at end, yes.
* * * * * * *
Q. And this refreshes your recollection that you were approached in August
1960 by Mr. Bissell.
A. I was approached by Mr. Bissell. Now, I'm not sure that it shows here that
it was approved, this possible project was approved by Allen W. Dulles, Direct<>r
of CIA, and by General Cabell, the Deputy Director. They are both dead.
* * * * * * * I mean, I told him that Mr. Bissell, the Deputy for Plans, had asked me if I
had any sourees and Bissell was there as I recall. I'm pretty sure he was there.
And it was a brief conversation, it Wll8 a sensitive conversation. (Edwards,
5/30/75, pp. 3, ~ 7)
On the other hand, Bissell described the origin as follows:
My own recollection was that Shef Edwards himself brought up the possibility
of using this channel. * * * I am sure that I did encourage Shef Edwards
to see what could be done through this channel.
* * * I think he [Edwards] either sa,id in as many word'S or strongly inferred
that the plan would be put into effect lIDless at that time or subsequently he was
told by Mil". Dulles that it should not he.
* * * * * * *
339
Yuu have hit on an important point which is that this operation, the planningfor
this operation and the support of this operation was conducted in a manner
completely different from that of any other operation I ever knew of in the
Ag-ency was conducted. The main difference was that an operation directed
against a foreig-n g-overnment was handled through the Director of Security's
chain of command by his people and with his contacts, and as you are aware, he
did not report to me, he was not in my chain of command. This was done, as I
made clear, with my foreknowledge, but operationa'lly, this matter was in his
hands.
* * * * * * *
I received reports quite infrequently from S'hef Edwards. I felt a high confidence
in his competence to pursue this matter and none in my own. • • • I
knew II plan had been drawn up and I knew that Edwards had been authorized
to pursue it, and I knew in a general way what the plan involved. (Bissell,
G/ll/7ii, pp. 2'2, 23, 32, 72)
* * * * • * *
I think the question it undoubtedly did raise in my mind at the time was
whether the specific operation that had been initiated by Mr. Edwards with my
knowledge and encouragement, whether the operation was threatened with being
blown. (Bissell, 7/22/7ii, p. 59, emphasis added)
The testimony set out above demonstrates that none of the witnesses
were rushing forward to take credit for initiating the Castro schemes.
And, plots to use the underworld to attempt to assassinate Castro are
l'vents which should stick in one's memory. Nevertheless, this aspect of
our investigation, as in many other areas of our inquiry on assassination,
has not provided concise, clear evidence nor easy answers.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR BARRY
GOLDWATER
My signature appended to the Majority Report of this Committee
indicates I am greatly appreciative of the dedicated work done by
the Senate members of the Committee and the complete staff.
I am in disagreement with the general idea of an interim report. In
fact, as I will indicate, I was opposed to getting into the subject of
assassinations at all. Although my signature appears on the Majority
Report, I have additional views concerning this whole subject which I
am compelled to make part of this report.
A majority of the Select Committee voted in favor of an interim
assassination report, because they believed it was necessary to lay the
matter at rest so that the Committee could get on with other work.
While I respect the decision of the Committee, I disagree for the following
reasons:
(1) An interim report is tentative in nature. If the Select Committee
is unable to pass on the subject matter of assassinations with
finality, I submit it should wait until it can do so. Further, it is questionable
that there is any public need requiring an interim report.
(2) A lengthy report with numerous names and replete with quotes
can pose security and diplomatic problems in the absence of time to
carefully scrutinize the document. Americans and our friends abroad
may suffer embarrassment or notoriety.
(3) The interim report deals with such subjects as "plausible deniability",
"command and control", and covert operation methods. The
Select Committee is placing itself in the position of generalizing on
these subjects based on four case studies presented to the full Committee.
Although the document does contain disclaimers as to final
conclusions on these matters, nevertheless conclusions in those areas
are implied.
(4) It is possible that the Select Committee may uncover new
material bearing on assassinations as it proceeds into other areas of
investigation leading to the further possibility that its findings might
have to be altered in the final report.
In view of the foregoing, I believe the reader of the interim report
might want to ask himself these questions:
Does it serve any national interest ~
Does it enhance the legislative process ~
Does it raise more questions than it answers ~
1. for one, oppose the interim assassination report because I feel the
Committee should have all the evidence at hand before publishing a
report. Problems raised by the conduct of covert operations have an
important bearing on the work of the Select Committee. Important
also are the lines of authority established by various administrations.
However, the Committee has received scant information on covert
operations and command and control as of this writing.
(341)
342
What have been the results of the assassination investigation!
The full Committee has considered four case studies involving
Hafael Trujillo, President of the Dominican Republic; Kgo Dinb
Diem, President of South Vietnam; and General Rene Schneider.
Chief of Staff of the Chilean Armed Forces; and attempts on the life
of Fidel Castro during the early 1960's. In the first three cases, evidence
presented to the full Committee failed to establish any clirect
U.S. involvement in the deaths. .
One case not examined in detail by the full Committee, requires
comment. The Committee has r~eived evidence that "higher authority"
than the CIA ordered the removal by whatever means necessary
of the late African leader Patrice Lumumba. On .Tanuary 17.
1961, Lumumba was killed in Katanga. and a subsequent United
Nations report found no U.S. involvement. The findings of the United
Nations are supported by evidence received by the Select Committee.
This case tends to reinforce findings given further on concerning the
CIA's responsiveness to Presidential orders and dirpctives.
The attempts upon the life of Fidel Castro fall into a differpnt
category. During the early 1960's the United States was in a state of
near war with Cuba. Fidel Castro and Che Guevara were promoting
and abetting the export of revolution to other countries of the 1Vestern
Hemisphere. Russian ballistic missiles were installed on Cuban soil
altering the balance of power beLveen the United States and the Soviet
Union and creating a serious threat to America's survival.
The ill-conducted Bay of Pigs invasion was mounted because Fidel
Castro was clearly thought to be a threat to the United States and
friendly nations in Latin America. Castro's removal seemed necessary,
if not vital, in those days and was supported by nearly all
responsible officials in ·Washington. Congress generally supported
President Kennedy in his Cuban policy.
The Select Committee has received circumstantial evidence that
Attorney General Robert Kennedy was aware of the attempts on
Fidel Castro's life before, during, and after they occurred. There can
be no doubt of the unusual circumstances where the President has
his brother as Attorney General, and there can be no doubt of the
close relationship existing between these two.
When the Select Committee decided to conduct an investigation
into assassinations. I warned the Committee that Presidential involvement
or authority was a certainty. Moreover, I was very concerned
that harm would come to the office of the Presidency giving comfort
to our Nation's detractors and enemies.
Nothing has happened in the intervening weeks to change my views.
Unfortunately, the word assassination has been thrown around to the
extent that the office of the Presidency and the CIA appear to the
untutored as Murder, Inc.
The mere fact that key officials are called with respect to so-called
assassination hearings tend to reinforce this image. For example, the
Select Committee has been taking testimony on the Allende election
in Chile in 1970 and the circumstances surrounding the death of General
Rene Schneider. In the early hours of October 22, General
Schneider was shot while some Chileans were trying to abduct him.
Their purpose Was to remove General Schneider from the office of
Commander-in-Chief so that a military coup to oust Allende could
proceed,
The conspirators planned to remove General Schneider to Argentina
for safekeeping. The last thing in the world they wanted was his death,
because they knew this would be severely criticized in Chile. Unfortunately,
General Schneider pulled his pistol in an attempt to resist
his abductors. In the ensuing melee, General Schneider was shot and
ultimately died.
Two things have been confirmed by the record: First, the Schneider
death can in no way be characterized as an 1tssassination. Second, there
was no direct American involvement in his abduction or death.
Xevertheless, the words "assassination", "Chile", and "Allende"
have become linked with those who testify regardless of the actual
facts of the case. While this is true of any Congressional investigation,
in this instance it becomes more burdensome to the witnesses because
murder is involved.
'Vith the understanding that new information may be received in
the coming months by the Select Committee, I offer these conclusions:
I. Since World War II, Presidents have directly or indirectly
approved of all actions taken by the CIA which have been the subject
of the SpIed Committee investigation. If any Presidents were unaware
of CIA activities, it was a result of their failure to insist on
detailed briefings or reports. The intelligence community is, and must
be, responsive to Presidential requests and orders.
II. Since 'Vorld 'Val' II, no President or his agents ordered an
assassination that was actu.ally committed. Moreover, there is no
evidence that any agency of the U.S. Government committed an
assassination. There is no doubt that it was the policy of the U.S.
Government, for example, to seek the ouster of Presidents Ng'O Dinh
Diem and Rafael Trujillo, but their removal and death cannot be
directly attributed to the U.S. Government.
III. 'The CIA at all times was acting within the law, or had every
reason to believe it was acting legally. in taking action on the behalf
of Presidents Eisenhower. Kennedy, .Johnson, and Nixon.
IY. If there have been failures, abuses, mistakes, or bad judgment
they are the result of individual actions and are deviations from the
normal high standimls established by the U.S. intelligence services.
V. The rnited States has been served by men and women in our
intelligence services who have exhibited great courage, loyalty and
dedication.
The Select Committee may be faced with a dilemma that cannot
be resolved: tyrannicide. The appalling atrocities committed by Hitler
and Stalin raise a question which may be unanswerable but which needs
to be carefully examined because the human carnage they created
cries out for it. Stated another way, should a President of the United
States han the right to aid the destruction of either a Josef Stalin
or Adolf Hitler in peacetime? Assassination during wartime does
not seem to be at issue. Here we have a fundamental question which
may have confronted Presidents in the past, and which could confront
a future President.
Since the Select Committee came into being in late .January. it
has been my belief that the investigation should be held in executive
session with one final and complete report to the Senate and ultimately
to the American people. The difficulty of distinguishing between those
matters that are part of the public record from those that must remain
classified are difficult to keep in mind. Accordingly, ~lembers of
the Select Committee and its staff are now faced with an increased
possibility of inadvertent disclosure of information that could be
damaging to America's foreign policy.
Finally, Congressional investigatIOns into the intelligence services
are failing to turn up any categories of abuses not already known.
More open hearings in the abuse area can lead us into lines of inquiry
that may well do serious harm to the Nation's intelligence services.
Congress now possesses sufficient information. in the abuse area to start
the le.gislative wheels turning. We may have passed the point where
public investigation into the intelligence services has produced irretrievable
harm. I hope not. It is not too late to put on the brakes.
BARRY GOLDWATER•
•
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CHARLES MeC.
MA'l'HIAS, .Tn.
As much as I regret the necessity for this report, I concur in the findings
reported.
Painful political problems are seldom soln·d by silence. As crude
as the story unfolded here may seem, it can be the sonrce of important
lessons for the future.
The farts are necessary in order to frame, with authority, a new,
comprehensi \'e statutory chartel' for the intelligence agencies of the
Fnited States. The proposal of that charter is the most useful work
that thE' Seled Committee can accomplish and the basic justification
for its existence. The main tasks of the Select Committee remain to be
done in the next three months.
It will be asked why it is necessary to publish the report outside thE'
Seled Committee. 01' at most beyond tllP Capitol. One of the tenets of
American political philosophy holds that "Knowledge will forever
go\'('rn ignorance an(l a people who mean to be their own Governors
Illust arm tlH'lllsehes with the power which knowledge gives." The
dutv \vhi('h .Tames Madison defines in tlH'se words is of the eSSE'nce of
dE'n1ocracy and it can be positive and stimulating. This report portrays
a darker side. hut life (lacs present us with responsibilities that must
be discharged if stench is to be {>rcventpd from causing rot and disease.
)fu('h of \vhat is reportl'd hl'rein is in('onelusive. There should be no
illusions that e\'en the work done so far' bv the Seled Committee on
this alwrrant ('hapter in United States policy has produced anything
more than an oblique insight into the destructive effect of excessive
secrecy upon the prarti('es of governments. It is a glimpse of the exer('
ise of great power without many of the ('he('ks and balances that serve
to guar(] our liberties and protect our values.
Nearly ?,O years have passed since Congress created the Central
Intelligence .\gency in 1947. Tn that time the thousands of men and
women who haw \vorked in our intelligence services have rendered a
vital contrilmtion to the American people.
In the aftermath of 'V"atel'!!ate and its lessons about the abuse of
power. it is clear that Congress faces a most serious task-to determine
the proper role of our intelligence agencies within our constitutional
system of gon~rnment.
The assassination plots (]iscussed in the report are profoundly distllrbing.
not lwcause they are unique. hut because they represent steps
backward. History has often witnessed the practice of assassination
as an instrument to transfer or to terminate political power. History
also shows that men and governments have come to recognize the compelling
force of ethical· princinles. The torturer who was once an
ad;unC't of the courts themsehes is today an international outlaw. Rv
rrcognizing the sacredness of human life. mankind has sought to shed
snch harbarisms. harbarisms that have usually led to further violence
(345)
and often to the destruction of the leaders and nations who resorted
to them.
1Vhen practiced against a domestic leader, assassination is common
murder. vVhen practiced against a foreign leader, assu&sination is an
act of war without that sorry sanction that war gives to the taking- of
human life. There can be no place in a world striving toward civilization
for either practicing or condoning assassination.
Principles are impersonal. If they are right for the weak, they are
right for the strong. Moral strength is more enduring than mere
power. It is these concepts that should guide nations and history
teaches that a contrary course brings tragedy not only to the victim
but to the assassin as well. Nothing found in these pages will contradict
the lessons mankind has read and ought to have learned.
Our purpose in studying the evidence of assassination plots was
not to damage our intelligence services or to injure the reputations of
past Administrations. Rather, we sought to stop the erosion of society's
values caused by excessive secrecy and unchecked Executive power
by making the factual record as accurate and clear as possible.
",Ve talk candidly with our fellow Americans, but we speak also to
our friends around the world. They should be advised of our efforts at
self-correction and our adherence to our traditional values and beliefs.
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, .Jr.
Abbreviations of eitations
Example
Bundy, 7/1/75, p. 34 _
Hoodpaster, 7/17/71;. n, pp. 13-14 _
Helms, Rockefeller Commission, 3/5/75,
p.61.
:'.Iemo, Bissell to Smith, 10/1/54 _
Cable, Bissell to Smith, 10/1/54 _
Cahle HQ to Sta., 10/5/70 _
Callie, Smith, .Jones to Hedgman, 10/5/
57.
Cahle, Smith to .Tones, Hedgtnan, 10/5/
57.
)lemo to Smith, 6/5/60 _
Memo from Hedgman, 6/5/60 _
NSDM 97, 8/18/70 _
Smith affidavit, 6/5/63, p. L _
Special Group Minutes, 10/6/6L _
SGA Minutes, 10/6/6L _
I. G. Report, p. 98 _
1. G. Report, B, p. 22 _
I. G. Report, C, p. 22 _
Pentagon Papers, p. 422 _
Mecklin, p. 158 _
Source
Bundy testimony to the Senate Selpct
Committee, .July 1, 1975, p. 34.
Gootlpaster testimony to the Senate
Select Committee, July 17, 1975,
afternoon session, PP. 13-14.
Helm.,; testimony to the Commission
on CIA Activities Within the United
States, Mar. 5, 1975, p. 61.
)[emorandum from Bissell to Smith
Oct. 1, 1954.
Cable from Bissell to Smith, Oct. 1.
19;>4.
Cable from Headquarters to Station,
Oct. 5, 1970.
Cable from Smith and Jones to Hedgman,
Oct. 5, 1957.
Cable from Smith to Jones and Hedgman,
Oct. 5, 1957.
Unsigned memorandum to Smith, June
5, 1960.
Unaddressed memorandum from Hedgman,
June 5, 1960.
National Security Decision Memorandum
No. 97, Aug. IS, 1970.
Smith affidavit given to the Senate
Select Committee, June 5, 1963, p. 1.
Minutes of a meeting of the Special
Group, Oct. 6, 1961.
~nnutes of a meeting of the Special
Group (Augmented), Oct. 6, 1961.
Apr. 4, 1967, Report on Plots to Assassinate
Castro prepared by the Inspector
General of CIA for the
Director, p. 98.
Undated [c. March-May 1967] Report
on the Assassination of Trujillo prepared
by the CIA. 1. G. for the Director,
p. 22.
May 31, 1967, Report on the Assassination
of Diem prepared by the CIA.
r.G. for the Director, p. 22.
Senator Gravel Edition, "The Pentagon
Papers," the Defense Department
History of U.S. Decisionmaking on
Vietnam, Beacon Press, Boston,
p.422.
Mecklin, John, "Mission in Torment,"
an Intimate Account of the U.S. Role
in Vietnam, DQubleday & Co., 1965,
p.158.
(347)

This report is the result of an impressive effort by the entire Committee
staff. The Committee wishes to express its appreciation to the
members of the support, research,and professional staffs, and, in
particular, to the following professional staff members who made a
substantial contribution to this report:
Frederick D. Baron Edward F. Greissing
David W. Bushong Karl F. Indedurth
M. Elizabeth Culbreth Robert K. Kelley
Rhett B. Dawson Lawrence Kieves
Thomas C. Dawson Charles B. Kirbow
Joseph F. Dennin Michael J. Madigan
Dorothy C. Dillon Andrew W. Postal
Daniel E. Dwyer, Jr. Gordon C. Rhea
Joseph E. diGenova Gregory F. Treverton
Burton V. Wides
(349)

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