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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

D. TRUJILLO
1. SUMMARY
Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominican dissidents
on May 30, 1961.
Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and Kennedy
Administrations encouraged the overthrow of his regime by
Dominican dissidents. Toward that end the highest policy levels of
both Administrations approved or condoned supplying arms to the
dissidents. Although there is no evidence that the United States instigated
any assassination activity, certain evidence tends to link United
States officials to the assassination plans.
Material support, consisting of three pistols and three carbines, was
supplied to various dissidents. While United States' officials knew that
the dissidents intended to overthrow Trujillo, probably by assassination,
there is no direct evidence that the weapons which were passed
were used in the assassination. The evidence is inconclusive as to how
high in the two Administrations information about the dissidents'
assassination :plots had boon passed prior to the spring of 19tH.
Beginning III March of 1961, the dissidents began asking United
States officials for machine guns. By the time four M-3 machine guns
were shipped to the CIA Station in the Dominican capital in April,
it was well known that the dissidents wanted them for use in connection
with the assassination. Thereafter, however, permission to
deliver the machine guns to the dissidents was denied, and the guns
were never passed. The day before the assassination a cable, personally
authorized by President Kennedy, was sent to the United States'
Consul General in the Dominican Republic stating that the United
States Government, as a matter of general policy, could not condone
political assassination, but at the same time indicating the United
States continued to support the dissidents and stood ready to recognize
them in the event they were successful in their endeavor to overthrow
Trujillo.
2. BACKGROUND
Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic in 1930.
For most of his tenure, the United States Government supported him
and he was regarded throughout much of the Caribbean and Latin
America as a protege of the United States. Trujillo's rule, always
harsh and dictatorial, became more arbitrary during the 1950's. As a
result, the United States' image was increasingly tarnished in the eyes
of many Latin Americans.
Increasing American awareness of Trujillo's brutality and fear that
it would lead to a Castro-type revolution 'caused United States' officials
to consider various plans to hasten his abdication or downfall.
(191)
192
As early as February 1960, the Eisenhmver Administration gave high
level consideration to a program of covert aid to Dominican dissidents.
(Special Group Minutes, 2/10/(0) In April 1960 President Eisenhower
approved a contingency plan for the Dominican Republic which
provided, in part, that if the situation deteriorated still further:
* * * the United States would immediately take political action to remove
Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon as a suitable successor regime
can be induced to take over with the assurance of U.S. political, economic, andif
necessary-military support. CMemo f,rom Secretary of State Herter to the
President, 4/14/60; Presidential approval indicated in Herter letter to Secretary
of Defense Gates, 4/21/60)
Simultaneously, the United States was trying to organize hemispheric
opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba. Latin American
leaders, such as President Betancourt of Venezuela, pressed the
United States to take affirmative action against Trujillo to dispel
criticism that the U.S. opposed dictatorships of the left only. A
belief that Castro's road to power ,,-as paved by the excesses of Batista
led to concern that the Dominican Republic might also eventually
fall victim to a Castro-style Communist regime. (Rusk, 7/10/75,
pp. 8, 9)
3. INITIAL CONTACT WITH DISSIDENTS AND REQUEST FOR ARMS
During the spring of 1960, the U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican
Republic, Joseph Farland, made initial contact with dissidents who
sought to free their country from Trujillo's grasp. They asked for
sniper rifles. Although documentary evidence indicates that a recommendation
to provide these rifles was approved both within the State
Department and the CIA, the rifles were never provided.
(a) Dissident contacts
Ambassador Farland established contact with a group of dissidents
regarded as moderate, pro-United States and desirous of establishing
a democratic form of government.1 (Farland affidavit, 9/7/75,
p. 1) Prior to his final departure from the Dominican Republic in May
1960, the Ambassador introduced his Deputy-Chief-of-Mission, Henry
Dearborn, to the dissident leaders, indicating that Dearborn could be
trusted. Then on June 16, 1960, CIA Headquarters 2 cabled a request
that Dearborn become the "communications link" between the dissidents
and CIA. The cable stated that Dearborn's role had the
"unofficial approval of [Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican
Affairs, Roy R] Rubottom." (Emphasis in original.)
(Cable, HQ to Station, 6/16/60)
Dearborn agreed. He requested, however, that the CIA confirm the
arrangement with the dissidents as being that the United States would
"clandestinely" assist the opposition to "develop effective force to ac-
1 This loosely-organized group, with which contact was established, was referred to
In cables, correspondence, and memoranda as "the dissidents" and is so referenced herein.
2 As uS€d herein "Headquarters" refers to Headquarters of the Central IntelLgence
Agency; "Department" indicates the Department of State.
193
complish Trujillo overthrow," but would not "undertake any overt
action itself against Trujillo government while it is in full control
of Dominican Republic." (Cable, Station to HQ, 6/17/60) CIA Headquarters
confirmed Dearborn's understanding of the arrangement.
(Cable, HQ to Station, 6/16/60)
(b) The request fol' snipeI' rifles
During the course of a cocktail party in the Dominican Republic,
a leading dissident made a specific request to Ambassador Farland for
a limited number of rifles with telescopic sights. The Ambassador
promised to pass on the request. (Farlandaffidrwit, 9/7/75, p. 1) He
apparently did so after returning to ",ashington in May 1960. (CIA
Memo for the Record, 6/7/61)
Documents indicate that consideration was given within the CIA
to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic. At a June 21, 1960,
meeting with an officer of the CIA's ",Vestern Hemisphere Division,
Ambassador Farland reportedly suggested possible sites for the drops.
(CIA memo, 6/21/60)
Documents also indicate that a meeting was held around the end
of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western
Hemisphere Division. Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant
Secretary's view regarding "[toJ what extent will the U.S. government
participate in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions
wero raised by King, among them:
Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the
removal of key Trujillo people from the scene?
King's handwritten notes indicates that Rubottom's response to that
question was "yes." (CIA memo, 6/28/60; King affidavit, 7/29/75,
pp, 1-2) 1
On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the
Acting Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel
King's signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy.
(I.G. Report, p. 26) The memorandum stated that a principal leader
of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked Ambassador Farland for a
limited number of arms to precipitate Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized
that such arms presumably "would be used against key members
of the Trujillo regime." The memorandum recommended that the
arms be provided, since the fall of the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable,
and therefore United States relations with the opposition
shoul~ be as. cl~se as possible. "Pr~viding the arms as requested would
contrIbute SIgnIficantly toward thIS end." (CIA memo, 7/1/60)
Specifically, the recommendation was to deliver to dissidents in
the Dominican Republic 12 sterile 2 rifles with telescopic sights, together
with 500 rounds of ammunition.
Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated :
Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary
of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in hands of the
opposition at the earliest possible moment. (CIA Memo, 7/1/60)
1 Neltber King nor Rubottom recalls sucb a meeting, nor does either recall any proposal
for suppl~·ing sniper rifles. (Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit, 7/29)75)
2 "Sterile" rilles are regarded as "untraceable." (Bissell, 7/22/701, p. 69)
194
The Acting Chief of the ·Western Hemisphere Division's recommendation
was concurred in by Richard Helms, as Acting DDP, and
approve~by General Cabell. (1.G. Report, p. 26)
The kmd of arms approved, sterile rifles with telescopic sights,
tog-ether with the statement that they presumably would be used
against key members of the Trujillo regime clearly indicated the
"targeted use" for which the weapons were intended. (Bissell, 7/22175,
p.77)
On July 1, 1960, a cable was sent to Dearborn by CIA Headquarters
informing him of the plan to airdrop 12 telescopically-sighted rifles
into the Dominican Republic. The cable inquired whether the dissidents
had the capability to realign the sights if thrown off by the drop. On
July 14, 1960, Dearborn replied that the dissident leaders were against
any further action in the Dominican Republic until after resolution by
the OAS of a Venezuelan complaint then pending against Trujillo.
The dissidents reportedly believed that sufficiently strong action by the
OAS could bring Trujillo's downfall without further effort on their
part. (Cable, Station to HQ, 7/14/(0) The 12 sniper rifles were never
furnished to the dissidents.
On August 26, 1960, Dearborn cabled Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Lester Mallory reporting on a meeting between a dissident
leader and a Consulate political officer. The dissident leader was reportBd
to have lost enthusiasm for an assassination attempt and was
then speaking of an invasion from Venezuela. However, by September
1, 1960, dissidents were again speaking about the possible provision
to them of arms. This time the request was for 200 rifles. For the
next several months, consideration centered on providing 200 to 300
guns.
4. SUMMER AND FALL OF 1960
In August 1960, the United States interrupted diplomatic relations
with the Dominican Republic and recalled most of its personnel. Dearborn
was left as Consul General and de facto CIA Chief of Station.!
Consideration was given both to providing arms and explosive devices
and to the use of high level emissaries to persuade Trujillo to abdicate.
By the end of the year, a broad plan of general support to antiTrujillo
forces, both within and without the country, was approved.
(a) Diplomatic develo'fYrnent-withdrawal of United States
personnel
Events occurring during the Summer of 1960 further intensified
hemispheric opposition to the Trujillo regime. In .Tune, agents of Trujillo
tried to assassinate Venezuelan President Betancourt. As a result,
the OAS censured the Trujillo government. At the same time, in Augnst
1960, the Fnited States interrupted diplomatic relations with the
Dominican Republic and imposed economic sanctions.
'Vith the interruption of diplomatic relations, the United States
closed its Embassy. Most American personnel, including the CIA Chief
1 Dearborn's role as communication's I1nk and de fact" Station Chief was, according
to the evidence before the Committee. quite unusual. This open Involvement. by the
senior State Department representative. In clandestine activities was a subsequent concern
within both the State Department and the CIA.
195
or Station, left the Dominican Republic. 'With the departure or the
CIA Chief of Station, Dearborn became de facto CIA Chief or Station
and was recognized as such by both CIA and the State Department.
Although in January 1961, a new CIA Chier or Station came to the
Dominican Republic, Dearborn continued to serve as a link to the
dissidents.
(b) Dearborn reports a:ssGssination may be only way to overthrow
Tru;jillo regime
Dearborn came to believe that no effort to overthrow the Trujillo
go\-ernment could be successrul unless it im-olved Trujillo's assassination.
He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and
the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom that
the dissidents were
,. ,. ,. in no way ready to carryon any type of revolutionary activity in the
foreseeable future except the assassination of their principal enemy. (Letter,
Dearborn to RUbottom, 7/14/60)
It is uncertain what portion or the inrormation provided by Dearborn
to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary level. Through
August or 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom, his Deputy, Lester
Mallory, and his Staff Assistant, were. within the Latin American
Division of the Department, a"are of Dearborn's "current projects."
(Letter. Staff Assistant to Dearborn, 8/15/60) 1
By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom as
Assistant Secretary lor Inter-American Affairs, and the Staff Assistant
had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While serving as
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, the Special Assistant reportedly
spent ninety percent or his time coordinating State Department-
CLL\. activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that the
Special Assistant maintained almost daily communication with
officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. (Special Assistant)
7/9/75, p. 7) 2
Mann solicited Dearborn's comments concerning plans under discussion
for forcing Trujillo from power. Dearborn replied in a detailed
letter which concluded:
One further point which I should probably not even make. From a purely
practical standpoint, it will be best for us, for the OAS, and for the Dominican
Republic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillo before he leaves this island.
If he has his millions and is a free agent, he will devote his life from exile to
preventing stable government in the D.R., to overturning democratic governments
and establishing dictatorships in the Caribbean, and to assassinating his enemies.
If I were a Dominican, which thank heaven I am not, I would favor destroying
Trujillo as being the first necessary step in the salvation of my country and I
would regard this, in fact, as my Christian duty. If you recall Dracula, you will
remember it was necessary to drive a stake through his heart to prevent a continuation
of his crimes. I believe sudden death would be more humane than the
solution of the Xuncio who once told me he thought he should pray that Trujillo
would have a long and lingering illness. (Letter, Dearborn to Mann, 10/27/60)
1 Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960 raised concern within
the Department and he was advised that certain specific information should more
appropriately come through "the other channeL" (presumably, CIA communications)
Dearborn was advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19 different
recipient offices. (Id.)
2 The Special Assistant to the Assistant for Inter-American Affairs i~ currently servin~,
in another capacity, in the State Department. He is referred to hereinafter as the "Special
Assistant."
61-985 0 - 75 - 14
196
(c) Efforts to conmnce TmjiUo to abdicate
Throughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both the diplom~
tic. and economic !ronts aime~ at pressu~ing Trujillo into relinqUIshmg'
control, and IdeallY, leavmg the Dommican Republic. The use
of high level emissaries, both from within and without the ranks of
government, was considered. (Special Group Minutes, 9/8/60; letter,
Mann to Dearborn, 10/10/60) None of the efforts proved successful,
and at the end of 1960, Trujillo was still in absolute control.
(d) OIA plans of October 1960
A CIA internal memorandum dated October 3, 1960 entitled "Plans
of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican Desk for Overthrow
of the Trujillo Government" set forth plans which "have been
developed ona tentative basis which appear feasible and which might
be carried out * * * covertly by CIA with a minimal risk of exposure."
These plans provided, in part, for the following:
a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols, together with ammunition
and a supply of grenades, to secure cache on the South shore of the island, about
14 miles East of Ciudad Trujillo.
b. Delivery to the same cache described above, of an electronic detonating
device with remote control features, which could be planted by the dissidents in
such manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillo henchmen. This might necessitate
training and introducing into the country by illegal entry, a trained
technican to set the bomb and detonator. (Emphasis added.) (CIA Memo,
10/3/(0)
(e) De<Jember HJ60 Special Oro-up plan of covert actio'fIJJ
On December 29, 1960, the Special Group considered and approved a
broad plan of covert support to anti-Trujillo forces. The plan, presented
by Bissell, envisioned support to both Dominican exile groups
and internal dissidents. The exile groups were to be furnished money
to organize 'and undertake anti-Trujillo propaganda efforts and to
refurbish a yacht for use in paramilitary actiVIties. Bissell emphasized
to the Special Group that "the proposed actions would not, of themselves,
bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some
decisive stroke against Trujillo himself." (Special Group Mmutes,
12/29/60)
5. JANUARY 12, 1961 SPECIAL GROUP APPROVAL OF "LIMITED SUPPLIES OF
SMALL ARMS AND OTHER MATERIAL"
On January 12, 1961, with all members present,1 the Special Group
met and, according to its Minutes, took the following action with
,respect to the Dominican Republic:
., Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State tha,t limited
'lilupplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents
'Wide the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe thi8 can be
,managed securely by CIA, and that ,the plan would call for final tran8portation
;,into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved
. tbeproject. (Special Group Minutes, 1/12/61)
1 The memben of the Special Gl"OUp were at the time: LivIngston Merchant, Under
Seereta1'7 of State for Political Alfalrs; Gordon Gray. AdvIsor to the PresIdent for
National Security Alfalrs; John N. IrwIn, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Allen Dulles.
DIrector of the C"entral Intelligence Agency.
197
(a) Memorandum underlying the Special (}r01J,p action
On .Tanuary 12, 1961, Thomas Mann sent a memorandum to Under
Se{\retary Livingston Merchant. The memorandum, sent through
.Joseph Scott, Merchant's Special Assistant, reported the disillusionment
of Dominican dissidents with the United States for its failure
to furnish them with any tangible or concrete assistance. Further, it
reported:
Opposition elements have consistently asked us to supply them with "hardware"
of various types. This has included quantities of conventional arms and
also, rather persistently, they have asked for some of the more exotic items
and devices which they associate with revolutionary etrort. (Memo, Mann to
Merchant,l/12/61)
Mann suggested for Merchant's consideration and, if he approved,
for discussion by the Special Group, the provision of token quantities
of selected items desired by the dissidents. Mann specifically mentioned
small explosive devices which would place some "sabotage
potential" in the hands of dissident elements, but stated that there
"would be no thought of toppling the GODR [Government of Dominican
Republic] by any such minor measure." (Memo, Mann to Merchant,
1/12/61) This memorandum was drafted on January 11 by
Mann's Special Assistant for CIA liaison.
A covering memorandum from Scott to Merchant, forwarding
Mann's memo, was apparently taken by Merchant to the Special Group
meeting. Merchant's handwritten notations indicate that the Special
Group "agreed in terms of Tom Mann's memo" and that the Secretary
of State was informed of that decision by late afternoon on J anuary
12, 1961. (Memo, Scott to Merchant, 1/12/61)
There is no evidence that any member of the Special Group, other
than Allen Dulles, knew that the dissidents had clearly and repeatedly
expressed a desire for arms and explosives to be used by them in assassination
efforts.1 While it is, of course, possible that such information
was passed orally to some or all of the members of the Special Group,
and perhaps even discussed by them on January 12, 1961, there is no
documentary evidence of which the Committee is aware which would
establish this to be the case.
On .Tanuary 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower Administration,
Consul General Dearborn was advised that approval had been given
for supplying arms and other material to the Dominican dissidents.
(Cable, HQ. to Station, 1/19/61) Shortly thereafter, Dearborn in~
formed the Special Assistant that the dissidents were "delighted"
about the decision to deliver "exotic equipment." (Cable, Dearborn t(>
Spedal Assistant, 1/31/61)
6. JANt'"ARY 20, 1961-APRIL 17, 1961 (THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
THROUGH THE BAY OF PIGS)
On .Tanuary 20,1961, the Kennedy Administration took office. Three
of the four members of the Special Group (all except Allen Dulles)
retired.
1 Various CIA cables. Includlnll' those dealing with the sniper rifles. indicate that
copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulles.
198
Prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961,
a number of significant events occurred. These events included meetings
with Dominican dissidents in which specific assassination plans
were discussed, requests by dissidents for explosive devices, the passage
by United States officials of pistols and carbines to dissidents inside
the Dominican Republic and the pouching to the Dominican Republic
of machine guns which had been requested by the dissidents for
use in connection with an assassination attempt.1 These events are discussed
below under subheading (a).
Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of these events possessed
by senior American officials is treated thereafter. As used herein,
"senior American officials" means individuals in the White House or
serving as members of the Special Group.
(a) Specific events indirectly linking United States to dissidents'
assassination plans
(i) Assassination Di~cus8ion8 and Requests for Emplosi~'es
At meetings held with dissident leaders in New York City on February
10 and 15, 1961, CIA officials were told repeatedly by dissident
leaders that "the key to the success of the plot [to overthrow the
Trujillo regime] would be the assassination of Trujillo." (CIA Memo
for the Record, 2/13/61) Among the requests made of the CIA by
dissident leaders were the following:
(a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan and execute the death of
Trujillo.
(b) Cameras and other items that could be used to fire projectiles.
(c) A slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on the palm
of one's hand and transferred to Trujillo in a handshake, causing
delayed lethal results.
(d) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a distance of several
miles. (/d.)
Other methods of assassinating Trujillo proposed by dissidents at the
February 10 or February 15 meetings included poisoning Trujillo's
food or medicines, ambushing his automobile, and attacking him
with firearms and grenades. (CIA Memos for the Record, 2/13/61,
2/16/61) 2
The dissidents' "latest plot," as described in the February CIA
memoranda, was said to lllvolve the planting of a powerful bomb,
which could be detonated from a nearby electric device, along the
route of Trujillo's evening walk. (Id.)
On March 13, 1961, a dissident in the Dominican Republic asked
for fragmentation grenades "for use during the next week or so."
This request was communicated to CIA Headquarters on March 14,
1961, and was followed the next day by an additional request for
50 fragmentaition grenades, 5 rapid-fire weapons, and 10 64-mm. anti-
1 As indicated In the post-Bay of Pigs section, intra, permission to pass these machine
guns was denied and the guns were never passed.
• There Is no record that the CIA responded affirmatiyely to any of these requests and
the CIA officer who drafted the Fehruary 13 memorandum stated the view that some of
the questions raised by the dissidents did not require an answer.
199
tank rockets. This further request was also passed on to CIA Headquarters.
(Cable, Station to HQ, 3/15/61) There is no evidence that
any of these arms were supplied to the dissidents.
The documentary record makes clear that the Special Assistant at
the State Department was also advised of related developments in a
March 16, 1961, "picnic" letter from Dearborn who complained that
his spirits were in the doldrums because:
• • • the members of our club are now prepared in their minds to have a
picnic but do not have the ingredients for the salad. Lately they have developed
a plan for the picnic, which just might work if they could find the proper
food. They have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly more. and we are not
prepared to make them available. Last week we were asked to furnish three
or four pineapples for a party in the near future, but I could remember nothing
in my instructions that would have allowed me to contribute this ingredient.
Don't think I wasn't tempted. I have rather specific guidelines to the effect that
salad ingredients will be delivered outside the picnic grounds and will be brought
to the area by another club. (Letter, Dearborn to Special Assistant, 3/16/16)
After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requests in
the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn concluded during
his testimony before the Committee that the "pineapples" were
probably the requested fragmentation grenades and the restriction
on delivering salad ingredients outside of the picnic grounds was, almost
certainly, meant to refer to the requirement, of the January 12
Special Group decision that arms be delivered outside the Dominican
Republic. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, pp. 25-27)
(ii) The Passage of Pistols
(1) Pouching to the Dominican Republic
In a March 15, 1961 cable, a Station officer reported that Dearborn
had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue to several dissidents.
In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret no authorization exists to
suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms," and indicated
that their reply had been coordinated with State. (Cable, HQ to Station,
3/17/61) The Station officer then asked Headquarters to seek
the necessary authorization and noted that at his last two posts he
had received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and, therefore,
he knew it could be done. (Cable, Station to HQ, 3/21/61) Two
days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols and ammunition were
being pouched. However, the Station was instructed 1Wt to advise
Dearborn. (Cable, HQ to Station, 3/24/61).1
(2) Reason for the OIA instrU<Jtion 1Wt to tell Dearborn
A Station officer testified that he believed the "don't tell Dearborn
the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that the sending
of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not something to be
unnecessarily discussed. (Didier, 7/8/75, pp. 78, 79) Dearborn said
he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew the Station had
no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn, 7/20/75, p. 33)
1 The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with a review of these events.
conclUdes that;
"There is nO indication in the EM/DEED operational files that the pistols were actuallY
pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsequent request
for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 60)
This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the )farch 24, 1961, Headquarters
to Station cable, which provides;
"Pouching revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462 (in 20040) on 28 March. Do
not advise (name Dearborn deleted) this material being pouched. Explanation follows."
200
(3) Were the pistols related to MSMsinatimd
Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol for purposes
completely unrelated to any assassination activIty. (Dearborn, 7/29/
75, pp. 29-31) He said he had been approached by a Dominican
contact who lIved in a remote area and who was concerned for the
safety of his family in the event of political reprisals. Dearborn testified
that he had believed the man's fears were well-founded and had
promised to seek a pistol.l
Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these pistols
to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA memorandum,
unsigned and with no attribution as to source, states that two of the
three pistols were passed by a Station officer to a United States citizen
who was in direct contact with the action element of the dissident
group. It should also be noted that the assassination was apparently
conducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether
one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols eventually
came into the hands of the assassins and, if so, whether they were used
in connection with the assassination, remain open questions.
Both Dearborn and the Station officer testified that they regarded
the pistols as weapons for self-defense purposes and that they never
considered them to be connected, in any way, with the then-current
assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 70; Didier, 7/8/75, pp. 38,
73) However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the
purpose for which the handguns were sought and the Station's cable
stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents.
(Cable, Station to HQ, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24,1961, cable advising
that the pistols were being pouched was sent in response to a
request by the dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination
effort. As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that
little, if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing
these weapons to would-be assassins.
(iii) PMsing of the Oarbines
(1) Request by the Station and by Dearborn and approval by 01A
Ina March 26, 1961, cable to CIA Headquarters, the Station asked
for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber M1 carbines.
The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by Navy personnel
after the United States interrupted formal diplomatic relations in
August 1960. Dearborn t~tified that he knew of and concurred in the
proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents. (Dearborn, 7/29/75.
pp. 42, 43) On March 31, 1961, CIA Headquarters cabled approval of
the request to pass the carbines. (Cable, HQ to Station, 3/31/61)
(2) Were the carbines related to MSa8sination.'f
The carbines were passed to the action group contact on April 7,
1961. (Cable, HQ to Station. 4/8/61) Eventually, they found their
way into the hands of one of the assassins. Antonio de la Maza. (Cable,
Station to HQ, 4/26/61; I.G. Reports, pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn
1 Dearborn Is clear In his ftCollection that he asked the station officer to request only
one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29'/75, pp. 30, 31) The sfatlon officer on the other hand, testified
that It his cables requested three pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for
three pistols. (Didier 7/8/75, p. 72)
The pistols were, however, apparentl.v sent In one package. (Cables, HQ to Station,
3/21/1>1, 3/24/~1) and Dearborn testified that, what he believed to be tbe one gun,
came "wrapped up" and that he passed It. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, p. 30)
201
and a Station officer testified that the carbines were at all times viewed
as strictly a token show of support, indicating United States support
of the dissidents' efforts to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn, 7/29/75,
pp. 46-48; Didier, 7/8/75, p. 39)
(3) Failure to Disclose to State Department Officials in Washington
There is no indication that the request or the passage of the carbines
was disclosed to State Department officials in Washington until
several weeks after the passage. In fact, on April 5, Headquarters requested
its Station to ask Dearborn not to comment in correspondence
with State that the carbines and ammunition were being passed to the
dissidents. This cable was sent while a Station officer was in Washington,
and it indicated that upon his return to the Dominican Republic,
he would explain the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had
not commented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence
with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Cable, Station
to HQ, 4/6/61)
Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the time of his
April 6 cable, that someone in the State Department had been consulted
in advance and had approved the passage of the carbines.
(Dearborn, 7/29/75, p.44)
(iv) Requests for and P()U{Jhing of the Machine Guns
(1) Requests for Machine Guns
The Station suggested that Headquarters consider pouching an
M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961. (Didier, 7/8/75, pp. 63, 64;
cable, Station to HQ, 3/15/61) The request was raised again in
March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, the Station cabled
a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns specifying
their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic pouch or similar
means. The dissidents were said to feel that delivery by air drop or
transfer at sea would overly-tax their resources. (Cable, Station to
HQ, 3/20/61)
The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly identified,
in the Station cable, as being sought for use in connectIOn with an
attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to kill Trujillo in the
apartment of his mistress and, according to the Station cable:
To do they need five M3 or comparable machine guns, and 1500 rounds ammo
for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job.
(ld.)
In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an assassination
was wrong. The Station was told that precipitous or uncoordinated
action could lead to the emergence of a leftist, Castro-type regime and
the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create more problems than solutions."
It was Headquarters' position that:
• • • we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents
until opposition group and HQS are better prepared to support [assassination] 1
effect a change in the regime, and cope with the aftermath. (Cable, HQ, to
Station, 3/24/61)
The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared to deliver
machine gun!, and ammunition to the dissidents when they developed
1 Word supplied by CIA previously sanitized cable.
202
a cupability to receive them, but that security considerations precluded
use of United States facilities as a carrier.! Soon thereafter, on
April 6, 1961, while a station officer was in Washington for consultation
with Headquarters, he reported on events in the Dominican
Republic and:
• • • especially on the insistence of the EMOTH rdissident1leaders that they
be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (specifically,
five M3 .45 SMG's) (CIA Memo for the Record, 4/11/61)
(2) Pouching of Machine Guns Approved by Bissell
On April 7, 1961 a Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification
was submitted seeking permission to pouch "four M3 machine
guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for
issuance to a small action group to be used for self prote~tion." (Pouch
Restriction Waiver Request, 4/7/61)
The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief, 1Vestern Hemisphere
Division, further provided:
A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the
action group is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important
group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determination
to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took
the form of advising the group in January 1961 that we would provide limited
arms and assistance to them provided they develop the capability to receive it.
Operational circumstances have prevented this group from developing the assets
capable of receiving the above equipment through normal clandestine channels
such as air drops or sea infiltration. (Id.)
The 'Waiver Request was approved by Richard Bissell, as DDP, on
Ap,rj110, 1961. (Id.)
Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, issued a memorandum,
also on April 10, which stated:
Mr. Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets or arms in the Dominican Republic
taken without his approval. (Elder Memo, 4/10/61 2)
The Elder memorandum suggests that Dulles did not then know
that an air drop of arms was regarded as unfeasible and that consequently
pouching of the arms had been approved.
The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and
were received by the Station on April 19, 1961,3 (I.G. Report, p. 42;
Cable, Station to HQ, 4/19/61) .
(b) Krwwledge of senior American officials (pre-Bay of Pigs)
On February 14,1961, prior to the passage of weapons, but a month
after the generalized approval of the passage of arms by the prior
Administration, a meeting of the Special Group was held with Messrs.
McNamara, Gilpatric, Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Bissell and General
Cabell in attendance.
The minutes state that:
1 This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised that the revolvers and
ammunition were being pOUChed.
2 Elder testified that this note, sent the weekend before the Bay of Pigs invasion of
Cuba, was Intended to make sure that there were "no unu.ual planes shot down or
any unnecessary noise In the Dominican Republic" prior to the Cuba invasion. (Elder,
8/13/75, p. 51)
3 Permission to pass the machine guns was never obtained and the guns never passed
Into the hands of the dissidents.
Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the
new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor
group during the past year, and also a list of significant projects which
antedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue. (Special
Group Minutes, 2/14/61) -
In the course of the discussion, the following point, among others,
was made:
Dominican Republic--Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for
higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government
to Trujillo. (Id.)
The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Dominican Republic
had been one of the matters on which Dulles and Bissell briefed
the new members.
What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just ,as it is unclear
from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to which the Special
Group was informed concerning the means by which the dissidents
planned to -accomplish the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Specifically,
it is not known if the new members of the Special Group
were told that the dissident group had expressed the desire to assassinate
Trujillo. Nor is it known if the Special Group was advised
that the State Department representative in the Dominican Republic
had made the assessment that the Dominican government could not
be overthrown without the assassination of Trujillo.
Bissell testified that he had no clear recollection of the details of
the February 14 briefing and he was unable to say whether or not
the method of overthrow to be attempted by the dissidents was discussed.
(Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 101, 102) Robe~t McNamara, one of
the new m~mbers of the Special Group in attendance for the briefing,
had no recollection as to the specificity in which the Dominican Republic
was discussed at the Febmary 14 meeting. He did not recall
any mention by either Dulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassinate
Trujillo. (McNamara affidavit, 7/11/75)
February memoranda
The Secretary of State sent the President a memorandum on February
15, 1961, in response to a request concerning progress to assure
an orderly takeover "should Trujillo fall." The memorandum advised
that:
Our representatives in the Dominican Republic have, at considerable risk
to those involved, established contacts with numerous leaders of the underground
opposition * * * [and] * * * the CIA has recently been authorized to
arrange for delivery to them outside the Dominican Republic of small arms
and sabotage equipment. (Memo, Rusk to President Kennedy, 5/15/61)
This reference to recent authori~ation for delivery of arms indicates
that Secretary Rusk had received some briefing concerning events
in the Dominican Republic and the January 1961 Special Group decision
to provide arms to anti-Trujillo elements. Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary
William Coorr; and the Special Assistant continued in their respective
positions throughout the transition period. The Committee has
been furnished no documents indicating that Secretary Rusk or
Under Secretary Bowles were specifically advised as to the intentions
of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentions of which
the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainly had knowledge. Indeed,
Secretary Rusk testified that he was not personally so advised.
(Rusk,7/10/75,pp.41,42)
On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a br:iefing paper on the
Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's
National Security Advisor. The paper, requested by Bundy for "higher
authority," made note of the outstanding Special Group approval for
the provision of arms and equipment to Dominican dissidents and
stated that the dissidents had been informed that the United States
was prepared to provide such arms and equipment as soon as they
developed the capability to receive them. .
The briefing paper also indicated that dissideI1t leaders had informed
CIA of "their plan of action which they ifelt could be implemented
if they were provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and
remote control detonation devices." Various witnesses have testified,
however, that supplying arms for 300 men would, standing alone,
indicate a "non-targeted" use for the arms (i.e., a paramilitary or
revolutionary implementation as opposed to a specifically targeted
assassination use). (Bissell, 7/29/75, p. 80) .
Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that:
* * * it is perfectly clear that I was aware at the time of the memorandum to
Mr. Bundy that these dissident groups were, and had for a long time, been
hoping they could accomplish the assassination of Trujillo. As a matter of fact,
the request, since some seven or eight months earlier, was a perfectly clear indication
of that, so that fact was not new knowledge. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 102)
When asked why the memorandum did not include the fact that
the dissidents intended the assassination of Trujillo, Bissell replied:
I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do not remember what considerations moved
me. I don't know whether it was because this was common knowledge and it
seemed to me unnecessary to include it, or as you are implying, there was
an element of concealment here. I would be very surprised if it were the latter,
in this case. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 101)
In response to questions concerning the lack of information in the
February 17, 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses to which the requested
arms might likely be put by the dissidents, Bissell stated:
* * * I would say that the Agency's failure, if there be a failure here was [not]
to state in writing that the plans of the dissidents would include assassination
attempts. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 99)
Bissell's briefing paper for Bundy concluded with the assessment
that a violent clash might soon occur between Trujillo and the internal
opposition, "which will end either with the liquidation of Trujillo
and his cohorts or with a complete roll up of the internal opposition."
In this regard, the fear was expressed that existing schedules for the
delivery of weapons to the internal opposition might not be sufficiently
timely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration be given
to caching the requested arms and other materials. (Memo, Bissell to
Bundy, 2/17/61)
Thus, by the middle of February 1961, the senior members of the
new Administration (and in view of the "for higher authority" nature
of Bundy's request, presumably President Kennedy himself) were
aware of the outstanding Special Group approval for the passage of
arms and other materials to opposition elements within the Domini205
can Republic. There was no modification or recision of the "inherited"
Special Group approval and it would seem fair, therefore, to regard
the approval as having been at least acquiesced in by the new
Administration.
During March and early April 1961, operational levels within both
the CIA and the State Department learned of increasingly detailed
plans by the dissidents to assassinate Trujillo. There is no evidence
that this information was passed to the White House or to any
member of the Special Group, except Allen Dulles.! Similarly, there
is no evidence that the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the
pouching of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was disclosed
to anyone outside of the CIA during this period.2
7. APRIL 17, 1961-MAY 31, 1961 (BAY OF PIGS THROUGH TRUJILLO
ASSASSINATION)
Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, attempts were
made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican Republic to
dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassination attempt. These
efforts to halt the assassination of Trujillo were the result of instructions
from CIA Headquarters and were prompted by concern over
filling the power vacuum which would result from Trujillo's death.
The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic but permission
to pas.'> them to the dissidents was never given and the guns never
left the Consulate.
Dearborn returned to 'Washington for consultation and a contingency
plan for the Dominican Republic was drafted.
The day before Trujillo's assassination, Dearborn received a cable
of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy. The cable advised
that the United States must not run the risk of association with
political assassination, since the United States, as a matter of general
policy, could not condone assassination. The cable further advised
Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of material assistance to the
dissidents and to advise them of United States support for them if
they were successful in overthrowing the Trujillo government. The
cable also reconfirmed the decision not to pass the machine guns.
(a) Decision not to p(J,88 the machine guns and unsu.ocessful United
State8 attempt to stop (J,8sa.'f8ination eff07't
By April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion had failed. As a result,
there developed a general realization that precipitous action should
be avoided in the Dominican Republic until Washington was able
to give further consideration to the consequenc,eB of a Trujillo overthrow
and the power vacuum which would be created. (Bissell, 6/11/75,
p. 113) A cable from Headquarters to the Station, on April 17, 1961,
advised that it was most important that the machine guns not be
passed without additional Headquarters approval.
1 Copies of CIA cables, includlnl'( the March 20, 1961 cable describing the plan to
assassinate Trujillo In the apartment of his mistress, were apparently sent to the office
of the Director of Central Intelllgence.
2 Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols were being pouched was
sent to the Director's office, Dulles apparently did not receive copies of the cables
approving passage of the carbines or pouching of the machine guns.
206
The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic On April 19,
1961, and Headquarters was so advised. The earlier admonition that
the machine guns should be held in Station custody until further notice
was repeated in a second cable from Headquarters, sent April 20,
1961. This decision was said to have been "based on judgment that
filling a vacuum created by assassination now bigger question than
ever view unsettled conditions in Caribbean area." (Cable, HQ to
Station, 4/20/61)
The dissidents continued to press for the release of the machine
guns and their requests were passed on to Headquarters in cables from
Dearborn and from the Station. (Cables, Station to HQ, 4/25/61) On
April 25, 1961, the Station advised Headquarters that an American
living in the Dominican Republic and acting as a cut-out to the dissidents
had informed the Station that Antonio de la Maza was going to
attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2. The Station
also reported that this attempt would use the three carbines passed
from the American Consulate, together with whatever else was available.
(Id.)
In response to the April 25 cable, Headquarters restated that there
was no approval to pass any additional arms to the dissidents and requested
the Station to advise the dissidents that the United States was
simply not prepared at that time to cope with the aftermath of the
assassination. (See CIS comments. Cable, Station to HQ, 4/27/61)
The following day, April 27, 1961, the Station replied that, based upon
further discussions with the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S.
government not now prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade
them from attempt." (Cable, Station to HQ, 4/27/61)
Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that an effort be made to turn
off the assassination attempt and testified that efforts to carry out the
instructions were unsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him
that this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit the convenience
of the United States government. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, p. 52)
On April 30, 1961, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the dissidents
had reported to him the assassination attempt was going to take
place during the first week of May. The action group was reported to
have in its possession three carbines, four to six 12-guage shotguns and
other small arms. Although they reportedly still wanted the machine
guns, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the group was going to go
ahead with what they had, whether the United States wanted them to
or not. (Cable, Station to HQ, 4/30/61)
Dearborn's cable set forth the argument of the action group that,
since the United States had already assisted the group to some extent
and was therefore implicated, the additional assistance of releasing the
machine guns would not change the basic relationship. The cable concluded:
Owing to far-reaching political implications involved in release or non-release
of requested items, Headquarters may wish discuss foregoing with State Department.
(ld.)
Beginning with Dearborn's April 30 cable, there was a fairly
constant stream of cables and reports predicting Trujillo's imminent
assassination. Certain of these reports predicted the specific date or
dates on which the assassination would be attempted, while others
spoke of the attempt bein~made at the first propitious opportunity. In
addition to cables sent dIrectly to CIA Headquarters, the substance
of these assassination forecasts was circulated throughout the intelligence
community and the higher echelons of the government in the
form of intelligence bulletins. These bulletins did not, however, contain
references to any United States involvement in the assassination
planning.
As a result of these reports, Robert Kennedy had a discussion with
Allen Dulles, apparently sometime in the early part of May, and
thereafter "looked into the matter." (June 1, 1961, dictated notes of
Robert F. Kennedy.) 1 Robert Kennedy reportedly called the President
and it was "decided at that time that we'd put a task force on
the problem and try to work out some kind of alternative course of
action in case this event did occur." Robert Kennedy's notes state
that at the time he called the President, "He [the President] had
known nothing about it [the reports of Trujillo's imminent assassition]."
(ld.)
There is no record as to the specificity with which Allen Dulles
discussed the matter of Trujillo's predicted assassination with Robert
Kennedy. Dulles was, of course, fully informed at this time both
as to the relationship between State Department and CIA representatives
in the Dominican Re{>ublic and the dissidents planning Trujillo's
removal, and, also, of the weapons which had Deen furnished
to the dissidents and those which they were then requesting for use
in connection with the assassination effort.
(b) Further consideration of passing machine gwns
In response to Dearborn's cable, a cable was drafted at CIA Headquarters
authorizing passage of the machine guns. The cable which
was sent to Allen Dulles, with Bissell's recommendation for its dispatch,
provided :
Since it appears that opposition group has committed itself to action with
or without additional support, coupled witb fact ref. C items [tbe carbines]
already made available to them for personal defense; station authorized pass
ref. A items [the machine guns] to opposition memher for their additional protection
on their proposed endeavor." (Draft Cable, HQ to Station, 5/2/61)
The cable was never sent.
In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characterized his
reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns as
• • • baving made already a considerable investment in this dissident group
and its plans that we might as well make the additional investment. (Bissell,
7/22/75,p.127)
The following day, May 3, 1961, the Deputy Chief of the Western
Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted as liaison with the
State Department in matters concerning covert operations in the
Dominican Republic, met with Adolph Berle, Chairman of the Interagency
Task Force on Latin America. .
A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that the CIA officer
informed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Republic wished
1 These notes were dictated by Robert Kennedy on June 1, 1961, after he learned of
Trujillo's assassination.
to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose. The memorandum
continued:
On cross examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo
and they wanted guns for that purpose. [The CIA officer] wanted to know
what the policy should be.
I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the general
sentiment. But we did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination
plots anywhere, any time. [The CIA officer] said he felt the same way. (Berle,
Memo of Conversation., 5/3/61)
Copies of Bede's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr, the
Acting Assistant Secretary for I nter-American Affairs, and to the
Special Assistant.
Both the CIA officer and the Special Assistant~ who had been in
almost daily contact with each other since August of 1960, had been
advised of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact, the
CIA officer, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed cable
of May 2, releasing the machine g-tms for passage.
(0) Special group meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961
On the day following the Berle-CIA officer meeting, the Special
Group met and, according to the Minutes:
The DCI referred to recent reports of a new anti-Trujillo plot. He said we
never know if one of these is going to work or not, and asked what is the status
of contingency planning should the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point
is covered in the Cuba PIlper which will be discussed at a high level in the very
near future. (Special Group Minutes, 5/4/61)
Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes makes
subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed speculative.
It is not known to what extent and in what detail Allen Dulles referred
to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo plot. Certainly, the
most recent report of such a plot was Dearborn's April 30 cable-disclosing
an imminent assassination attempt potentially utilizing United
States-supplied weapons.
On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the situation
in the Dominican Republic and, according to the Minutes:
Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the
release to them of certain small arms now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic.
He inquired whether fhe feeling of the Group remained that these arms
should not be PIlssed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary
position at this time. (Special Group Minutes, 5/18/61) 1
(d) Final reque8ts by dissidents for rruwhine gWfUJ
On May 16, 1961, Dearborn cabled the State Department (attention
Acting Assistant Secretary Coorr) with an urgent request from the
dissidents for the machine guns. The cable advised that the assassination
attempt was scheduled for the night of May 16 and that, while the
chances of success were 80 percent, provision of the machine guns
would reduce the possibility of failure. The dissidents reportedly
1 Thel'l! was no meeting of the Soeclill Group at which thE' Dominican Republic was
dlllCussed between May 4 and May IH. The language attrlbnted to General Cnbell as to
wbetber tbe feeling ot the Group remalnl'd not to pass the arms. tends to 8Ue:gl'st
, that the question of passing these arms must have been raised prior to the May 18 Group
meeting, perhaps at the May 4,1961 meeting.
209
stressed to Dearborn that if the effort failed, due to United States refusal
to supply the machine guns, the United States would be held
responsible and would never be forgiven. Dearborn reported that he
had informed the dissidents that, based on his recent conversations in
1Vashington, he wa.s reasonably certain that authorization could not
be obtained for handing over machine gun. (Cable, Dearborn to Depa.
rtment, 5/16/61)
A return cable from the State Department to Dearborn, sent the
same day, confirmed Dearborn's judgment. It instructed him to continue
to take the same line until he received contrary instructions
which clearly indicated they had been cleared in advance by the State
Department itself. This cable from State was approved by Under
Secretary Bowles. (Cable, Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)
An officer in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division referred to
Dearborn's May 16 request in a memorandum he sent to the Special
Assistant on the same date and asked to be advised as to the Department's
policy concerning- passag-e of the machine guns. The CIA
officer noted that when this request was last taken to the Department,
Berle made the decision that the weapons not be passed. (Memo to
ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)
Devine responded to the CIA officer's memorandum on the same day,
advising him that the Department's policy continued to be negative
on the matter of passing the machine ~ns.l The CIA officer's attention
was directed to the .Tanuary 12, 1961 Special Group limitation concerning
the passage of arms outside of the Dominican Republic. A
copy of the Special Assistant's memorandum to the CIA officer was
forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of Stat{l, to the attention
of his ~rsonal assistant, .Toseph Scott. (Memo, Special Assistant
to [CIA officer], 5/16/61)
(e) Dearborn in Washinqton for consultatio'Tlr----drafting of
contingency plans
At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961, the
question of United States policy toward the Dominican Republic was
considered and it was: .
Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency
and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in
Haiti or the Dominican Republican. Noted the President's view that the Un,ited
States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government
would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multi"
lateral. (Record of Actions by National Security Council, 5/5/61) (Approved by
the President, 5/16/61)"
Although the precise dates are uncertain, Dearborn was recalled M
Washington to participate in drafting of these contingency plans and
recommendations. Dearborn was in Washington at least from May 10
through May 13, 1961. .
'By May 27, 1961, Dearborn was advising the State Department that the group was
no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the fact that It must make do with whll.t
it had. (cable, Dearborn to State, 5/27/61)
"As noted 8upra, p. 207, the President. prior to his May 16 approval of the NRC Record
of Actions, had been informed by Robert Kennedy of the reports that Trujillo might
be assassinated. Richard GoodWin of the White House staff had also received, prior to
May 16. a CIA memorandum which disclosed that Dominican dissidents. intending to
"neutrallze" TMljillo. had been supplled by the U.S. with certaih weapons and had
sought further weapons.
210
While in Washington, Dearborn met with State Department personnel
and with Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger of the
White House staff. When testifying before the Committee, he was
unable to recall the substance of his discussions with Goodwin and
Schlesinger, aside from his general assumption that the current situation
in the Dominican Republic was discussed. He did not recall any
discussion with Goodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms, either those
which had been passed to the dissidents or those which were being
sought. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, pp. 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at
the White House, however, with the firm impression that Goodwin
had been reviewing cable traffic between Washington and the Dominican
Republic and was very familiar with events as they then stood.
(Dearborn,7/29/75,p.62)
On May 11, 1961, Dearborn prepared a two-page draft document
which set forlih ways in which the U.S. could overtly aid and encourage
the opposition to Trujillo. The draft noted that means of stepping
up the covert program were considered in sepamte papers. ('Dearborn
draft document of May 11, 1961) This Dearborn draft of May 11,
1961, was ,apparently used as a basis Tor portions of the "Dominican
Republic-Contingency PaRer" discussed oelow.
Two documents entitled, 'Program of Covert Action for the Dominican
Republic" were provided to the Committee staff from State Department
files. Each appears to be ,a draft of the covert activities
paper described in Dearborn's May il, 1961 memorandum. One draft
recommended an expanded U.s. offer to deliver small explosive devices
and arms. (Document indicating it was attached to "Dominican Republic-
Contingency," dated 5/12/61 and bearing Nos. 306-308) The
other draft is very similar except that it concludes that delivery of
arms within the Dominican Republic to members of the underground
is not recommended. (Document from State Department ,files bearing
No. 310)
Attached to the second draft was a one-page document which the
Special Assistant 'believes he wrote. It listed eight numbered. points including
the following:
1. The USG should not lend itself to direct political assassination.
2. U.S. moral posture can ill atIord further tarnishing in the eyes of the world.
3. We would be encouraging the action, supplying the weapons, effecting the
delivery, and then turning over only the final execution to (unskilled) local
triggermen.
4. So far we have seen no real evidence of action capa'bi1ity. ShOUld we entrust
ourselves and our reputation to this eX\tent in the absence thereof?
7. Can we atIord a precedent which may convince the world that our diplomatic
pounches are used to deliver assassination weapon? (Document from the State
Department files bearing No. 313)
The other points raised in document No. 313 related to the likelihood
that any such involvement by the United States would ultimately be
revealed.
On May 15, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sent to Under
Secretary Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Programs Authorized
With Respect to the Dominican Republic." That document
outlined the existing Special Group approvals for covert assistance to
Dominican dissidents and, while making no recommendation as to
211
further policy, suggested that the Special Group review the outstanding
approvals and communicate to interested 'agencies the status of
such authorizations. (State Dept. document from CoerI' to Bowles,
5/15/61)
During this period a document dated May 13, 1961, was prepared at
the request of Richard Goodwin and was thereafter circulated within
the State Department.! This document, entitled "Program of Covert
Action for the Dominican Republic" reported:
CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo, a very
limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent requests from
the internal opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their
projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three (3) 38 Cal revolvers and three
(3) carbines with accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure means
to the opposition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed
support.
This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure to anyone
on the 'White House staff of the fact that arms had been passed to dissidents
in the Dominican Republic.
The original ribbon copy of the memorandum has the above quoted
material circled in pencil and the word "neutralize" is underscored.
Goodwin testified before the Committee that he circled the above paragraph
when first reading the memorandum because the information
concerning passage of the arms was new to him and struck him as
significant. (Goodwin, 7/18/75, pp. 48, 49)
Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which Require
Additional Authorization," the memorandum to Goodwin indicated
that the CIA had a supply of four .45 caliber machine guns and a small
number of grenades currently in the direct custody of the Station in
Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passing these weapons to
the internal opposition "for their use in personal defense attendant to
their projected efforts to remove Trujillo" could be developed by the
Station. The memorandum made no recommendation to approve or
disapprove passage of these weapons. (ld.)
On May 15,1961, Bundy forwarded to Goodwin another memorandum.
This one, entitled "The Current Situation in and Contingency
Plans for the Dominican Republic," had been received by Bundy from
the State Department. Attached was an underlying document which
began:
Recent reports indicate that the internal Dominican dissidents are becoming
increasingly determined to oust Trujillo by any means, and their plans in this
regard are well advanced.
The May 15 memorandum stressed that it was highly desirable for
the United States to be identified with and to support the elements
seeking to overthrow Trujillo. The attachment recommended that Consul
General Dearborn inform the dissidents that if they succeed "at
their own initiative and on their own responsibility in forming an
acceptable provisional government they can be assured that any reasonable
request for assistance from the U.S. will be promptly and
favorably answered." (Documents from State Dept. files bearing Nos.
279-286)
t See Scott to Bowles memorandum of :\Iay 19, 1961, enclosing copy of Goodwin
memorandum.
G1- r, il.') () - '1,1 - 1,~)
212
(I) Cable of May ~9, 1961
A copy of Dearborn's cable of May 16, 1961, requesting urgent State
Dep~rtment guidance, was forwarded to Richard Goodwin. At the
specIfic request of Goodwin, the State Department replied to Dearborn
on May 17, and advised him to keep in mind the President's view,
as expressed at the May 5 National Security Council Meeting, that the
United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before
knowing what government would succeed him. (Cable, Department to
Dearborn, 5/17/61)
Dearborn responded on May 21, 1961, pointing out that for over a
year State Department representatives III the Dominican Republic
had been nurturing the effort to overthrow Trujillo and had assisted
the dissidents in numerous ways, all of which were known to the Department.
It was, Dearborn stated, "too late to consider whether
United States will initiate overthrow of Trujillo." Dearborn invited
further guidance from State.
In response to Dearborn's request for guidance, the State Department
drafted a reply on May 24. The draft discussed a conflict between
two objectives:
(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit among
DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;
(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic
and even more so from any political assassination which might occur.
It was said to be the Department's considered opinion that "former
objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter." (Draft Cable,
Department to Dearborn, 5/24/61-not sent)
This State Department draft was forwarded to Under Secretary
Bowles with the comment that Goodwin considered it "too negative"
and that he would try his hand on a draft "for Bundy to present tomorrow
morning." (Memo from Achilles to Bowles, 5/24/61)
A May 26, 1961, memorandum from Bowles to Bundy begins:
Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's meeting
of the Special Group. I am forwarding you a draft telegram which we would
like to send to Henry Dearborn. our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo. supplementing
the guidance he will be receiving on the recently approved contingency
plans.
The minutes of the Specia:l Group meeting on May 25, 1961, do not,
however, reflect any discussion of the Dominican Republic. Ii, as
Bowles' memorandum suggests, a discussion concerning the Dominican
Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting, it is not known what the
discussion involved Or what decisions, if any, were made.
Richard Goodwin personally prepared alternate drafts to the proposed
State Department cable to Dearborn. Goodwin testified that it
was his intent in revising the cable to communicate to Dearborn, President
Kennedy's personal belief that the United States "* * * didn't
want to do anything that would involve us further, the United States
further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo." (Goodwin, 7/10/75,
p.32)
At the same time, Goodwin's draft raised the issue of further covert
action and transfer of arms to the dissidents and advised Dearborn to
hold out the arms as being available to the dissidents pending their
ability to receive them.
213
It was the twofold intent of the cable as revised by Goodwin, (1) to
express the desire to remain in the good graces of the dissidents who, it
was believed, would constitute the new government following Trujillo's
assassination, and (2) to avoid any action which might further involve
the United States in the anticipated assassination. This dual purpose
is clearly evident in the cable which advised:
* * * we must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since
U.S. a.~ 1nutter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principal
is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. (Emphasis added)
• • • • • • •
Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position.
According to Goodwin, the italicized material was inserted in the
cable at the specific direction of President Kennedy. (Goodwin,
7/10/75,pp.22,23)
With respect to the four machine guns which were in the Consulate
and which had been repeatedly requested by the dissidents, the cable
advised Dearborn that the United States was unable to transfer these
arms to the dissidents. Dearborn was instructed
Tell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be
unsafe. In actual fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little
purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination
attempt.
The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Kennedy,
was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (Cahle, Department to
Dearborn, 5/29/61)
8. MAY 30, 1961 AND IMMEDIATELY THEREAFI'ER
(a) Trujillo assassinated
Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and
assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassination
closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the action group to
American representatives in the Dominican Republic and passed on
to officials in Washington at both the CIA and the State Department.
(Cable, Dearborn to Department, 4/30/61) The assassination was conducted
by members of the action group, to whom the American carbines
had been passed, and such sketchy information as is available
indicates that one or more of the carbines was in the possession of the
assassination group when Trujillo was killed. (I.G. Report, pp. 60-61)
This evidence indicates, however, that the actual assassination was
accomplished by handguns and shotguns. (I.G. Report, p. 61)
(b) Oables to Washington
After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul
General Dearborn and the CIA Station sent replies. According to
Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable as a change
in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations. (Dearborn,
7/29/75, p. 74)
He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:
* • • we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate Trujillo, that is all right.
But we don't want anything to pin this on us, because we aren't doing it, it is
the Dominicans Who are doing it. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, p. 104)
214
Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had always
been his personal belief: that the U.S. should not be involved in an
assassination and that if an assassination occurred it would be strictly
a Dominican affair. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, pp. 100-101)
In contrast, the CIA Station officer did regard the cable as manifesting
a change in U.S. policy, particularly on the question of supplying
arms. (Didier, 7/8/75, p. 120) He be'lieved the May 29 cahle was
the final word in United States policy on this matter and consequently
felt that the government had retreated from its prior position, of
offering material support to the dissidents, and had adopted a new
position of withholding such support. His responsive cable to Headquarters
stated:
HQ aware extent to which U.S. government already associated with assaSS'ination.
If we are to at least cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in
assassination preparation must be withdrawn. (Cable, Station to HQ, 5/30/61)
Immediately following the assassination, all CIA personnel in the
Dominican Republic were removed from the country and within a few
days Consul General Dearborn was back in Washin~ton.The State Department
cabled the CIA station in the Dominican Republic to destroy
all records concerning contacts with dissidents and any related matters,
eX'C€pt not to destroy the contingency plans or the May 29, 1961 cable
to Dearborn. (Cable, HQ to Station, 5/31/61)
«(J) I mmedi4te post-assassination period
The United States Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quick
to dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated, and
the United States communications network transmitted the report to
President Kennedy in Paris. The President's Press Secretary, Pierre
Salinger, made the first public announcement of the assassination, preceeding
by several hours release of the news in the Dominican Republic.
Secretary of State Rusk testified that when he learned of Salmger's
announcement he was most concerned. Rusk said that Trujillo's son
Ramfis was also in Paris and he was afraid that Ramfis, upon first
learning of his father's death from the press secretary to the President
of the United States, might reason that the United States had been in
some way involved and he might therefore try to retaliate against
President Kennedy. (Rusk, 7/10/75, pp. 32-33)
Following the assassination, there were several high-level meetings
in Washington attended by President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson,
Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, At~
torney General Kennedy, and many lower-level officials who had been
involved in the Dominican Republic operation. The meetings considered
the crisis in the Dominican Republic, caused by Trujillo's assassination,
and attempted to ascertain the facts concerning the degree of
United States involvement in the assassination. The passage of carbines
to the dissidents was discussed at one such meeting. (State Department
Memorandum for the files, 6/1/61)
On June 1, 1961, Robert Kennedy dictated four pages of personal
notes reflecting his contemparaneous thoughts on the situation in the
Dominican Republic. A review of these notes evidences considerable
concern regarding the lack of information available in Washington
2115
as to events in the Dominican Republic.l The notes end with the
following statement:
The great problem now is that we don't know what to do because we don't (sic)
what the situation is and this shouldn't be true, particularly when we have knawn
that this situation was pending fur some period of time.
There is no indication or suggestion contained in the record of
those post-assassination meetings, or in the Robert Kennedy notes, of
concern as to the propriety of the known United States involvement
in the assassination. Nor is there any record that anyone took steps
following Trujillo's assassination to reprimand or censure any of the
American officials involved either on the scene or in 'Washington, or
to otherwise make known any objections or displeasure as to the
degree of United States involvement in the events which had transpired.
Whether this was due to the press of other matters, including
concern over Trujillo's successor and the future government of the
Dominican Republic, or whether it represented a condonation or ratification
of the known United States involvement, is uncertain.
In any event, when, some years later, the project covering American
involvement in changing the government of the Dominican Republic
was terminated by the Agency, the project was described in Agency
documents as a "success" in that it assisted in moving the Dominican
Republic from a totalitarian dictatorship to a Western-style
democracy.
1 Robert Kennedy's concern, Immediately following the assassination, with the Agency's
Inability to provide first-hand Information from the Dominican Republic as to popular
support for the antl-Truj1ll0 group. the extent of fighting, If any, In the country, and
the likelihood of the dissidents seizing control of the country, was also discussed In a
1962 CIA report.

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