



BOOK 29

On the way to compose the laws

CHAPTER I

On the spirit of the legislator

I say it, and it seems to me that I have written this work only to prove it: the spirit of moderation should be that of the legislator; the political good, like the moral good, is always found between two limits. Here is an example.

The formalities of justice are necessary to liberty. But, their number could be so great that it would run counter to the end of the very laws establishing them: suits^a would be interminable; the ownership of goods would remain uncertain; one of the parties would be given the goods of the other without examination, or both would be ruined by the examination.

Citizens would lose their liberty and their security; accusers would no longer have the means to convict nor the accused, a means to vindicate themselves.

^a*affaires*. See note ^c, bk. 2; note ^j, bk. 28.

CHAPTER 2

Continuation of the same subject

Caecilius, according to Aulus Gellius,¹ speaking on that law of the Twelve Tables that permitted the creditor to cut the insolvent debtor to pieces, justifies the law by its very atrocity, which prevented one's borrowing beyond one's abilities.² Shall the cruellest laws, therefore,

¹ [NA] bk. 20, chap. 1 [20.1.39–52].

² Caecilius states that he had neither seen nor read of this penalty being inflicted; indeed, it

be the best? Shall the excess be the good, and all the relations between things be destroyed?

is likely that it was never established. The opinion of a number of jurists, that the Law of Twelve Tables spoke only of the division of the price paid for the debtor, is very possible.

CHAPTER 3

That laws which seem to diverge from the aims of the legislator often conform to them

The law of Solon, which declared infamous all those who took no part in a sedition, has appeared extraordinary, but one must attend to the circumstances of Greece at that time. Greece was divided into very small states; in a republic tormented by civil discord it was to be feared that the most prudent people would take cover and that things would thereby be carried to an extreme.

In the seditions that occurred in these small states, the bulk of the town entered the quarrel, or began it. In our great monarchies the parties are formed by a few, and the people want to lead a life of inaction. In this case it is natural to incorporate the seditious men into the bulk of the citizens, not the bulk of the citizens into the seditious men; in the former, the small number of wise and tranquil people must be made to go among the seditious men; thus it is that the fermentation of one liquor can be checked by a single drop of a different one.

CHAPTER 4

On laws that run counter to the aims of the legislator

There are laws that the legislator has understood so poorly that they are even contrary to the end he himself has proposed. Those who established for the French that when one of two claimants to a benefice dies, the benefice remains with the survivor, doubtless sought to quell disputes. But a contrary effect results from it: one sees ecclesiastics, like mastiffs, attack each other and fight to the death.

CHAPTER 5

Continuation of the same subject

The law I shall mention occurs in this oath that has been preserved for us by Aeschines.³ “I swear that I will never destroy a town of the Amphictyons and that I will not divert its running water; if any people dare do such a thing, I shall declare war on them, and I shall destroy their towns.” The last article of this law, which seems to confirm the first, is in reality contrary to it. The Amphictyonic league wants the Greek towns never to be destroyed, and this law opens the door to the destruction of these towns. In order for the Greeks to establish a good right of nations, they had to become accustomed to thinking it an atrocious thing to destroy a Greek town; therefore, they should not destroy even destroyers. The law of the Amphictyons was just, but it was imprudent. This is proved by the very abuse of it that occurred. Did not Philip give himself the power to destroy towns on the pretext that they had violated the laws of the Greeks? The Amphictyons could have inflicted other penalties: ordering, for example, that a certain number of magistrates in the town of the destroyers or of leaders of the violating army would be punished by death; that the destroyers would cease for a time to enjoy the privileges of Greeks; that they would pay a fine until the town was reestablished. Above all, the law should have addressed the reparation of the damage.

³[Aeschines] *De falsa legatione* [On the Embassy 115].

CHAPTER 6

That laws that appear the same do not always have the same effect

Caesar forbade men to keep more than sixty sesterces in their houses.⁴ In Rome this law was regarded as quite proper for reconciling debtors and creditors because, by obliging the wealthy to lend to the poor, it put the latter in a position to satisfy the wealthy. A similar law, made in

⁴Cass. Dio, bk. 41 [41.38]. [This should be 60,000, not 60, sesterces.]

France at the time of the System,^b was catastrophic; this is because the circumstances in which it was made were frightful. After removing all the means of investing one's silver, even the recourse of keeping it at home was taken away; this was equivalent to taking it away by violence.^c Caesar made his law so that silver would circulate among the people; the minister of France made his so that silver would be collected in a single hand. The first gave lands or mortgages on individuals for silver; the second offered for silver, bills that had no value and which could by their nature have none, because his law obliged one to take them.

^bOf John Law.

^cSee 22.10.

CHAPTER 7

Continuation of the same subject. Necessity for composing the laws well

The law of ostracism was established in Athens, Argos, and Syracuse.⁵ In Syracuse it produced a thousand ills because it was made without prudence. The principal citizens banished each other by holding a fig leaf in their hand,⁶ so that those of some merit no longer took part in public business. In Athens, where the legislator felt the extension and limits that he should give to his law, ostracism was a remarkable thing; only a single person was subjected to it; there had to be such a great number of votes that it was difficult for any one to be exiled unless his absence was necessary.

One could banish only every five years: indeed, as soon as ostracism was practiced only against a great personage who inspired fear in his fellow citizens, it should not have been an everyday business.

⁵Aristotle, *Republic* [Politics], bk. 5, chap. 3 [1302b18–19].

⁶Plutarch, *Life of Dionysius*. [Plutarch did not write a life of Dionysius of Syracuse. He wrote a life of Dion, an adviser to Dionysius, but does not describe the Syracusan form of ostracism, called petalism. A source for this information is Diodorus Siculus, 11.87.]

citizen's house is his sanctuary and that he should not be done violence in it.

CHAPTER 11

In what way two different laws can be compared

In France the penalty for false witnesses is capital; in England it is not. In order to judge which of these two laws is better, one must add that in France criminals are put to the question, in England, they are not; and one must also say that in France the accused does not produce his own witnesses, and it is very rare to admit what are called mitigating circumstances;^d that in England one receives testimony from both parties. The three French laws form a well-linked, consistent system; the three English laws form one that is no less so. The English law, which does not admit putting criminals to the question, has only slight expectations of drawing from the accused a confession of his crime; it summons outside testimonies then from every quarter, and it does not dare discourage them by the fear of a capital penalty. The French law, which has an additional recourse, does not so greatly fear intimidating the witnesses; on the contrary, reason demands that it intimidate them: the law hears the witnesses of one side only;¹⁵ they are those produced by the public party, and the fate of the accused depends on their testimony alone. But in England, one accepts witnesses from both sides, and the business is, so to speak, argued out between them. Therefore, false witnesses can be less dangerous there; the accused has a recourse against false witness, whereas French law gives none. Thus, in order to judge which of these laws is more in conformity with reason, they must not be compared one by one; they must be taken all together and compared together.

¹⁵ Under the old French jurisprudence, witnesses were heard from both parts. Thus one can see, in *Les Etablissements de Saint Louis*, bk. 1, chap. 7 [1.9], that the penalty against false witnesses, in a matter of justice, was pecuniary.

^d *les faits justificatifs*.

CHAPTER 12

That laws that seem alike are sometimes really different

Greek and Roman laws punished the receiver of stolen goods as they did the robber;¹⁶ French law does the same. The first were reasonable; the latter is not. Among the Greeks and Romans, since the robber was condemned to a pecuniary penalty, one had to punish the receiver with the same penalty, for a man who contributes in any way whatever to this damage should repair it. But as among us the penalty for robbery is capital, it has not been possible to punish the receiver like the robber without carrying things to excess. The one who receives stolen goods can on a thousand occasions receive them innocently, the one who robs is always guilty; the former prevents conviction for the crime already committed, the latter commits the crime; all is passive in the one, there is action in the other; the robber must overcome more obstacles and his soul must have been hardened against the laws for a longer time.

The jurists went further: they regarded the receiver as more odious than the robber,¹⁷ for without him, they say, the robbery could not be hidden for long. This, again, could be good so long as the penalty was pecuniary; it was a question of damage, and ordinarily the receiver was more in a position to make reparation; but when the penalty became capital, one should have been ruled by other principles.

¹⁶ Law 1 [*Corpus Juris Civilis, Digest 47.16*]; *de receptatoribus*.

¹⁷ Law 1 [*Corpus Juris Civilis, Digest 47.16*]; *de receptatoribus*.

CHAPTER 13

That laws must not be separated from the purpose for which they are made. On the Roman laws about robbery

When the robber was caught with stolen goods before he had put them where he had decided to hide them, it was called a manifest robbery among the Romans; when the robber was discovered only afterwards, it was a non-manifest robbery.

The law of the Twelve Tables ordered that the manifest robber be whipped and reduced to servitude if he were an adult, or only whipped

if he were not an adult; it condemned the non-manifest robber only to paying twice the value of the stolen thing.

When the Porcian law had abolished the usage of whipping citizens and reducing them to servitude, the manifest robber was condemned to a payment of quadruple the value,¹⁸ and the non-manifest robber continued to be punished with a payment of double.

It seems odd that the laws put such a difference in the status of these two crimes and in the penalty they inflicted for them; indeed, whether the robber was caught before or after carrying the stolen goods to the place of destination was a circumstance which did not change the nature of the crime. I cannot doubt that the whole theory of the Roman laws on robbery was drawn from Lacedaemonian institutions. Lycurgus, with a view to endowing his citizens with cunning, trickery, and quickness, wanted the children to be trained in petty theft and be severely whipped if they were caught; among the Greeks and later among the Romans, this established a great difference between manifest robbery and non-manifest robbery.¹⁹

Among the Romans the slave who had robbed was thrown off the Tarpeian rock. Here it was not a question of the Lacedaemonian institutions; the laws of Lycurgus on robbery had not been made for slaves; deviating from them on this point was to follow them.

In Rome, when someone who was not of age was caught in a robbery, the praetor had him whipped at his will, as was done in Lacedaemonia. All this came from a more distant past. The Lacedaemonians had drawn these usages from the Cretans, and Plato,²⁰ who wants to prove that the Cretan institutions were made for war, cites this one: "The faculty of bearing pain in individual combats and in petty thefts that have to be concealed."

As civil laws depend on political laws because they are made for one society, it would be well if, when one wants to transfer a civil law from one nation to another, one examines beforehand whether they both have the same institutions and the same political right.

Thus, when the laws on robbery passed from the Cretans to the Lacedaemonians, as they passed to them along with the government

¹⁸See what is said by Favorinus according to Aulus Gellius [*NA*], bk. 20, chap. 1 [20.1.9–19].

¹⁹Compare what Plutarch says in *Vit. Lycurgus* [17–18.3] with the laws in the *Digest* [*Corpus Juris Civilis, Digest* 47, 2 (2, 3)]; *de furtis* and the *Institutes*, bk. 4, tit. 1, paras. 1–3 [*Corpus Juris Civilis, Institutes* 4.1.1–3; *de obligationibus quae ex delicto nascuntur*].

²⁰[Plato] *Laws*, bk. 1 [633b].

and even the constitution, these laws were as sensible for one of these peoples as they were for the other. But when they were carried from Lacedaemonia to Rome, as they did not find the same constitution, they were always foreign to it and had no link with the other civil laws of the Romans.

CHAPTER 14

That laws must not be separated from the circumstances in which they were made

An Athenian law wanted all the useless people to be put to death when the town was besieged.²¹ This was an abominable political law which was a consequence of an abominable right of nations. Among the Greeks, the inhabitants of a captured town lost their civil liberty and were sold as slaves; the capture of a town brought about its entire destruction. And this is the origin not only of these unyielding defenses and unnatural actions, but also of the atrocious laws that were sometimes made.

The Roman laws wanted doctors to be punishable for their negligence or incompetence.²² In this case, they condemned a doctor to deportation when his rank was somewhat elevated and condemned him to death when his rank was lower. It is otherwise with our laws. The Roman laws were not made in the same circumstances as ours; in Rome, those who wanted to meddle in medicine did; but, among us, doctors are obliged to study and to take certain degrees, so they are deemed to know their art.

²¹"Those useless on account of age are to be killed" [L.]. Syrianus, *Scholia ad Hermogenis* [*Commentarium in librum "Peri staseon"*]; p. 167, #16–25].

²²[*Corpus Juris Civilis, Digest* 48.8 (3.5)] *ad legem Corneliam de sicariis et veneficis*; *Institutes*, bk. 4, tit. 3, para. 7 [*Corpus Juris Civilis, Institutes* 4.3.7]; *de lege Aquilia*.

CHAPTER 19

On legislators

Aristotle sometimes wanted to satisfy his jealousy of Plato, sometimes his passion for Alexander. Plato was indignant at the tyranny of the people of Athens. Machiavelli was full of his idol, Duke Valentino. Thomas More, who spoke rather of what he had read than of what he had thought, wanted to govern all states with the simplicity of a Greek town.⁴⁷ Harrington saw only the republic of England, while a crowd of writers found disorder wherever they did not see a crown. The laws always meet the passions and prejudices of the legislator. Sometimes they pass through and are colored; sometimes they remain there and are incorporated.

⁴⁷In his *Utopia* [Thomas More, *Utopia*, bk. 2, pp. 39–40; 1975 edn].