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Letters PREFATORY NOTE We included all of the letters between Strauss and Kojeve that we could find. Unfortunately some letters have been lost, and at least one important letter is preserved only in part. We have corrected occasional minor misspellings of proper names: e.g. Quesneau for Queneau, and obvious slips of the pen: e.g. Sophist 361 alongside a passage from Sophist 261, without calling attention to them. In later years Strauss sometimes dictated his letters, and he did not always catch minor errors by secretaries who were unacquainted with the concepts, texts, or names he was mentioning. We silently corrected these few misspellings. But we never altered references that seemed doubtful without indicating the change. Both Strauss and Kojeve often abbreviated titles and names. We consistently spelled them out. But we let stand idiosyncratic spellings of titles or names, e.g. Phaidros, Phailebos ... ; and we saw no need to italicize titles more consistently than the writers did in their letters. Strauss's handwriting is notoriously difficult to decipher. His correspondents had to reconstruct his letters as they would assemble a puzzle: copying what they could make out, and leaving blanks to be filled in on subsequent attempts. That is also how we proceeded with most of the letters included here. We wish to record our very special gratitude to the late Professor P. H. v. Blanckenhagen for helping us with some particularly difficult passages at a time when his health was already failing. Lacunae due either to the fact that one or several words remained illegible even after repeated attempts by various competent readers, or to the fact that the original or the copy from which we were working is defective, are indicated by <...> for each missing word or portion of a word. The writers' frequent, easy shuttling back and forth between languages imparts to this exchange an added liveliness which unfortunately but inevitably gets lost in translation. The inclusion in this volume of the correspondence between Strauss and Kojeve calls for a few brief remarks about them. They were close contemporaries. Strauss was born in 1899 in Kirchhain, a small town in western Germany; Kojeve in 1902 in Moscow. They first met in Berlin in the 1920s. At the time, they both happened to be engaged in studies of religious thought. Strauss's first book is devoted to Spinoza's Criticism of Religion (1930), and his second book, Philosophy and Law (1935), brings together his early studies of medieval Jewish and Muslim thinkers.
Kojeve, for his part, wrote his doctoral dissertation under Karl Jaspers in Heidelberg on Vladimir Soloviev's philosophy of religion. In 1929 Kojeve moved to Paris. Strauss came to Paris on a Rockefeller Fellowship in 1932. They clearly saw a great deal of each other at the time. Their early letters convey something of the difficulties and uncertainties they faced in those troubled years, and the correspondence incidentally traces the main stages in their subsequent careers: Strauss moved to England in 1934, and in 1938 finally obtained a teaching position, his first, at the New School for Social Research in New York. He went on to teach at the University of Chicago from 1949 to 1968. At the time of his death, in 1973, he was the Scott Buchanan Distinguished Scholar in Residence at St. John's College in Annapolis. In 1933 Kojeve took over a seminar on "Hegel's Philosophy of Religion," which Alexandre Koyre had taught at the Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes the previous academic year. Koyre had focused on Hegel's early, so-called Jena manuscripts that had only recently been discovered and published. Kojeve focused on the Phenomenology of Mind. He continued to teach the Hegel seminar every year until 1939, the year the Second World War broke out. In the course of this series of seminars he analyzed and interpreted the text in minute detail, and then went on to discuss a number of key issues in Hegel's teaching. The material for and from these seminars was published in 1947 under the modest title Introduction a la lecture de Hegel. As Kojeve himself remarks in the letter to Strauss in which he announces the publication of the Introduction, it is not a book in the usual sense of the term at all. It combines outlines, notes, exhaustive commentaries, and the transcripts of several series of formal lectures. But this variety, and the fact that sections in which one can almost hear the rhythm of oral delivery alternate with sections that are so clearly written that they have to be seen in order to be understood, only adds to its impact. It was immediately recognized as a work of uncommon brilliance and penetration. Its pervasive and lasting influence on philosophical thought in France, in the rest of Europe, and in America, cannot be exaggerated. Kojeve did not return to academic life after the War. He entered the French Ministry of Economic Affairs as an Assistant to Robert Marjolin, who had been a participant in the Hegel seminar. He rose very rapidly to a position of eminence in the Ministry, and continued to play an influential role in French international economic policy until his death in 1968. He was the main French architect of the GATT treaty, he actively participated in the establishment of the European Economic Community, and he was widely noted for the special interest he took in what has come to be known as the North-South dialogue. The correspondence between the two men only confirms what had been perfectly evident from their public exchange on tyranny -- that for all of the profound philosophical and political differences that divided them, they had the very highest regard for one another. They valued each other's seriousness and enjoyed each other's intellectual power. Each regarded the other's position as perhaps the only significant philosophical alternative to his own, and each regarded the other as the most intransigent spokesman for that alternative. Superficially they could not have been more different. Strauss was the very embodiment of the scholar and thinker, although he was certainly not as unworldly as he sometimes liked to appear. He was utterly direct and unassuming in manner and bearing. His expression was open, intensely alert, often accompanied by a slightly quizzical, amused twinkle. When he spoke, especially when he rose to speak on formal occasions, he was a commanding presence. He had an uncommon capacity to meet others on their own terms and at their level. The young people who flocked to his courses were at least as much attracted by his ability to listen or to speak directly to their deepest concerns, and by his common sense and sobriety, as they were by his great learning. Yet I believe that even those who knew him well, even those who became his most devoted disciples, only gradually recognized the full range, penetration, and power of his thought. Kojeve, by contrast, was worldly and immediately fascinating in the many senses of that term. He, too, was utterly direct. He was a man of wide learning, and his Introduction alone gives ample proof of his capacity to combine scrupulous scholarship with bold thinking. But he was not in any way an academic. Strauss may have been right to challenge his remark that the conflict between being a man of action and a philosopher is a tragic conflict. Still, it is not a conflict of which Strauss appears to have had any direct experience, whereas Kojeve was living it. He alludes to it in several of his letters, and now and then he spoke of it, though always with irony and detachment. For the most part his conversation simply sparkled with intelligence and a certain playfulness. He could be rather disconcerting and, as he admits in his last letter in this correspondence, occasionally he rather enjoyed being outrageous. At times I experienced in his presence an intellectual power and concentration I have otherwise experienced only in the presence of great works of the mind. *** 23 rue Racine December 6, 1932 Dear Mr. Kochevnikoff, In case this card reaches you in time, would you care to come by to our place today (Tuesday), in connection with the main business, but also and above all "in general." And in case this card reaches you too late, then on Wednesday evening. We will be expecting you on Tuesday or Wednesday between 8 and 9 o'clock. Goodbye. With best regards
*** To December 13, 1932 Dear friend, As we are in the process of moving, I write just these few lines in order to give you our new address. Rue de la Glaciere runs between the Boulevard Port-Royal and the Boulevard Arago. There is a metro station "Glaciere." We look forward to seeing you on Thursday evening. Please accept, Monsieur, the expression of my most cordial sentiments. Leo Strauss *** December 17, 1932 Dear Mr. Kochevnikoff, First, regarding business: enclosed please find the second section of my article; please excuse the stains on the paper and the envelope. I had nothing else handy, and I wanted to get this matter ready for you just as soon as possible. Then, regarding personal matters: we very much look forward to seeing you and Miss Basjo at our house on Wednesday evening. If you and the records don't mind, could you bring along a few records on Wednesday? As you can imagine, this request comes more from my wife than it does from me. Still, my opposition to music received its first shock last night. Perhaps we can talk about it some day. So, until Wednesday evening. Goodbye. With best regards, also from my wife, to Miss Basjo and yourself, Yours Leo Strauss *** <undated> Address: 47 Montague Street, Russell Square, London Dear friend -- I am very thirsty in this moment and I have not the good and cheap French wine. But instead of it we have the wonderful English breakfast -- the hams taste too good as to consist of pork, and therefore they are allowed by the M<osaic> law according to atheistic interpretation -- the wonderful E<nglish> puddings and sweets; and, besides it, the English people is <much> politer than the Frenchmen. I cannot realize a greater difference than that between the Prefecture de Police and the Aliens Registration Office. We feel much better here than in Paris -- except only that we ha<ve> here no friends: we know only Herr <Hoganer> with his red <...> ; however we don't see him very often. How do you do? How is Miss Basjo? Did your beard b<ecome> greater and stronger? Do not forget to send us as often <as> possible photos showing the progresses you made in th<is> regard. Our boarding house is facing the British Museum. I hope I ob<tain> the card in the beginning of the next week so that I can begin to <use it>. Up to now I only heard two lessons about English phonetics read by two oldish spectacled Misses singing the English wo<rds> in a very funny manner. I would be very glad if you could write me what is happen<ing> with you since we did not see us. Yours sincerely, Leo Strauss *** London, January 16th, 1934 Dear friend -- Meanwhile I have acclimatized myself here. I go each day in the British Museum (half a minute's walk) in order to study the English Hobbes-literature and the Hobbes-Mss. The English cooking is much more according to my taste than the French. The most important fact: I saw Downing Street, the seat of the greatest power of the world -- much, much smaller than the Wilhelmstrasse. I had a very strong impression. The address you want is: Dr. Kl. [1] c.o. Dr. Gadamer, [2] [alias Moldauer], Marburg an d. Lahn, Ockershauser Allee 39, Germany. The quotation you want is: Heidegger, Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universitat, Breslau 1933, p. 12. [3] I am sorry -- I have not the time to write a real letter. But you want the address and the quotation at once. I hope, you will write me as soon as possible, and perhaps a little more of "details" of this memorable discussion. What was the impression you had from Herr Landsberg? [4] Yours sincerely, L. Strauss Did you hear anything from Mr. Koyre? [5] P.S. It is not necessary to be or become Aristotelian or <...> sufficient to become Platonist. *** <undated> Dear Mr. Kochevnikoff, I am deep in work and worries -- in other words in a situation similar to yours. Nothing will come of Palestine: Guttman [1] is going there. So far, prospects are the same as in France. But one must not lose courage. Be that as it may. Could you please send me Koyre's address right away. I want to write to him very soon. Saturday I am going to Oxford. Be well! With best regards to yourself and Miss Basjo, Yours Strauss My wife sends best regards New address: *** 2 Elsworthy Road, London NW3 London, April 9, 1934 Dear Mr. Kochevnikoff, Why do I never hear anything from you? I have not the least idea of how you are, what has happened to your work, your hopes and your worries. Do write me sometime, even if only a card. Regarding myself, I can only report that I am quite well. I like this country, about which one might say what Diderot said about Hobbes: dry (the pubs close at 10 p.m. sharp here, and the stuff is expensive!), austere and forceful, much more than I do France. And by contrast to the Bibliotheque Nationale, the British Museum is a place to which one enjoys going. I have become a real Hobbes philologist: Mss., etc. The Hobbes edition project (do, please, try to be discreet) is not entirely hopeless -- the Master of an Oxford College is prepared to sponsor it -- and hence also myself. In the most recent Hobbes book, by John Laird, Prof<essor> in Aberdeen, to which Gibson called my attention -- the book is better than Lubienski's, [1] but not good, not as good as that by Tonnies [2] -- I am described in connection to our joint Recherches article, as "a very competent writer," [3] in which I <mis>use Gibson's introduction. Most important: I may perhaps(!) have found Hobbes's hitherto entirely unknown first writing -- a collection of 10 essays, the first five of which deal with vanity and related phenomena. In the worst case, the ms. was written under Hobbes's influence by one of his disciples. The decision will be reached in about a week. We have a few acquaintances here -- but none with whom we enjoy spending time as much as we do with you. So write again, so that we don't lose track of one another. My wife and Thomas [4] send "Uncle" Basjo warm greetings, and I greet you no less warmly. Your Leo Strauss [5] *** May 1, 1934 Dear Mr. Strauss, Many thanks for your letter. Please excuse me for not writing all this time. But I have not written to anyone except to my wife and to Miss Basio -- not even to Koyre. That has a romantic reason. This time my July-August moods arose in April. For a change, an "Arian" girl. During the Easter vacation I did absolutely nothing. 1cancelled the first lecture. The second -- delivered entirely unprepared (it was by no means the worst). Now my life is becoming more normal, at least I prepare my lectures, and today I write to you and to Koyre. I am very pleased that you are well, and that you have made your decision. I never had any doubt about the most favorable prospects for your future. It would give me great pleasure to have more precise details (discretion assured: after all, I do -- as a human being -- have my eternal nature!). With me, nothing new, nothing good. The Ecole has not yet paid anything, and I have become very sceptical on this score. My application (the equivalence of a licence on top of the doctorate, on the basis of my German Ph.D.) was rejected. Hitler is responsible (12 similar applications!). I can therefore not announce my courses, and hence cannot request a research grant. Naturalization has now (Stavisky [1]) become very difficult. Letters of recommendation are now strictly prohibited. An old debtor has paid me 3000 Francs (such things do happen!). That is what I live off, but it, too, soon comes to an end. So that I am in a rather somber mood. As yet I work very little. Almost exclusively at my lectures. Gordin lectures on medieval philosophy at the Ecole rabbinique. [2] I have never heard anything like it! Heinemann gives lectures at the Sorbonne for Rey, [3] unpaid. Also drivel. "My" Gurevitsch has become a professor in Bordeaux. [4] I hear nothing interesting from Koyre. Please write me again soon. With best regards to yourself and your wife, Yours AK P.S. Enclosed a picture of Hitler which -- in my opinion -- explains a great deal: the man is really very congenial and "cozy." Did your wife receive Miss Basio's letter? *** Address: 26 Primrose Hill Road, London NW3 London, June 3, 1934 Dear Mr. Kochevnikoff, Many thanks for your letter. Please excuse me for not having answered it, and be so kind as to regard this writing as a letter. I write you in a similar mood as you do to me -- namely somber. Some influential English professors do, I believe, take an interest in me -- but whether and how that interest will manifest itself in terms of bread, cigarettes, and the like, is another matter entirely. And soon it is summer, that is to say a time when it is impossible to undertake anything. I don't want to detail all this for you more fully -- after all, you know about it from your own experience. If I had a modest income, I could be the happiest man in the world. I have already written you about my Hobbes-find. In the meantime I have copied the manuscript, read and studied it, and it is now absolutely certain that it is H<obbes>'s first writing. That is rather nice for all kinds of incidental reasons -- but to me it means more: namely the refutation of your own and Koyre's objection, that my Hobbes interpretation is a willful construction. No, now I can prove that I did not construct. Naturally, reality always looks somewhat different than even the most conscientious, complete texts-in-hand reconstruction. That is obvious. But it does help me to render my H<obbes> interpretation concrete in a way I would never have dared to dream possible. I should like briefly to outline this for you: In his "youth," i.e. until he was 41, that is to say before he became acquainted with Euclid and thereafter with Galileo etc., H<obbes> had been influenced by four forces: Scholasticism, Puritanism, Humanism, and the aristocratic atmosphere in which he lived. Relatively early -- let us say at the age of 22 -- he broke with Scholasticism. But the break with Scholasticism does not mean he broke with Aristotle. Aristotle, albeit not the scholastic Arist<otle>, still remains the philosopher for him. But the center of gravity has already shifted: from physics and metaphysics to ethics and rhetoric (the teaching about the passions). The place of theory is taken by "heroic virtue" (modified Aristotelian magnanimity), that is to say, virtue (beauty, strength, courage, openness of being, striving after great goals, grand way of life). That is the first point. The second is that, (under Bacon's influence), while he in principle acknowledges ancient, Aristotelian ethics and the inquiry into virtue,<his focus shifts to> the function of virtue and the inquiry into the use and life with others [1] in <...> <virtue>. Hence history, which exhibits instances of moral life, assumes greater importance than does philosophical doctrine with its exclusively abstract precepts. This provides a radical explanation of H<obbes>'s <historical> studies in his ''youth." <...> in this way H<obbes>'s later break with Aristotle <becomes radically> intelligible. For his later teaching is nothing else than the attempt to understand<...> on the basis of life with others [2], that is to say on the basis of human "nature" as it now is, that is to say of the ordinary, "average" human being <...............> The concrete way in which he did this, the passion with which he did it <...............> of this concrete criticism of that modified, distorted Aristot<elian> ethics, that is to say of aristocratic virtue, <...> a criticism that was already noticeable in the Essays. The aristocratic principle is honor, fame, pride. This criticism, the principle of which is of puritanical origin, by which honor, fame, and vanity are singled out and devalued, requires a revolution in basic moral concepts that results in the antithesis vanity-fear. The further, most important and most difficult task is then to show how the project of a mechanistic-deterministic account of nature arises from this new moral principle. The essential middle term here is the significance attached on a priori grounds to the sense of touch, which now becomes the most important sense. That is simply the as-it-were "epistemological" expression of the <the fact> that the fear of (violent) death becomes the moral principle. (That is my London discovery.) Please excuse this higher nonsense, which is intended to make up to you for the sober gloom of the beginning of this letter: if you wept then, you may now laugh. My wife received Miss Basjo's letter, and has written to her in the meantime. Thomas grows and thrives, he develops morally under my modest moral influence -- he often recalls "Uncle Basjo's" table-manners with us. It is a pity that we never meet. Perhaps it will be possible to do so in Autumn. In a fortnight my sister arrives from Egypt for a visit with us. My father would like to meet with his children outside of Germany -- perhaps in Paris. For you, the most sensational news will be that (perhaps!) Klein will join us. He, too, is "resolved" to leave Germany. Be well -- delight in the wines of France which we miss more and more -- and best regards, also in my wife's name. from Your Leo Strauss *** May 9, 1935 Dear Mr. Kochevnikoff, I was delighted with your letter -- in the first place simply because I once again had news of you, and in the second place because precisely this letter gave me great satisfaction. Most immediately that is so with respect to the Parisian "philosophes" whom you now -- finally! -- judge just as I had judged them from the first. I know only one truly intelligent man in Paris, and that is -- Kochevnikoff. I do not deny that there are cleverer "dialecticians" than you in Paris -- but since when has sterile "sharpness" (which, incidentally, invariably proves extremely dull on-closer inspection) had anything to do with understanding, with insight. Understanding is virtue (virtue = knowledge); whoever has insight into what matters, deals with the issues, is "passionately" interested in the issues and not the busyness -- and you are the only person I know in Paris who has an interest in the issues, and therefore you are the brightest of all. (But if you tell this to others, I send your letter with your judgments to Paris!) Of course some are harder-working than you -- for example Klein, who has published an absolutely first-rate analysis of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics [1] -- indeed -- which you have naturally not read -- because of your erotic adventures -- adventures that of course are more comfortable than the intellectual risks, the experimental shift in perspective to which you too will some day have to resolve yourself if you do not want to sink into a Parisian life of ease. This brings me to the second point, regarding which your letter gratified me and, I should add, my wife: I refer to your remark about Miss Basjo, that your relationship with her is not "resolved," in other words not broken off in the way we were told by some people who are ill-disposed toward Miss Basjo. I need say nothing on this point, since you know my opinion very precisely. If my wife did not have so much work, she would long ago have written Miss Basjo, and invited her to visit us. When you write to her, do please tell her that it would give my wife great pleasure to hear from her, and even greater pleasure if she came to visit her. Of course we must speak. But since I am no longer a Rockefeller Fellow, there is only one way in which that is possible, that you come here. We have a small house all to ourselves, and so have enough room even for so distinguished a guest as yourself. So come at Whitsun, for example. The trip cannot be beyond reach. I am really angry with you for loaning my book [2] to that fool Gordin who is not capable of understanding a single line of it, instead of reading it yourself. Just read the Introduction, and the first essay. The Introduction is very daring and will interest you if only because of that. And then write me your reaction. In my view it is the best thing I have written. In the meantime my study of "Hobbes's Political Science in its Genesis" is finished. I believe that it is good. Other than the study by Klein which I have already mentioned, it is the first attempt at a radical liberation from the modern prejudice. On several occasions I refer to Hegel, and do not fail to mention your name. The study will appear in the first volume of my posthumous works, since no German publisher or English translator can be found. [i] This morning I got the definitive rejection from the English! The economic situation is serious. I have a grant until October 1, which does not exceed the minimum for bare existence. It remains an open question whether it will be renewed for another year. After that it is certainly over. Where we turn then, only the gods know. I have no luck, dear Mr. Kochevnikoff. So: write right away, and come soon. With best regards, also in my wife's name. Your Leo Strauss *** Vanves, November 2, 1936 Dear Mr. Strauss: Many, many thanks for your Hobbes book, [1] which I have already read through. To say so right away: it is one of the best history of philosophy books I have read, and it is altogether a very good book. I have learned much from it. Admittedly, I do not know Hobbes. But your interpretation is compelling: it cannot be otherwise, and one has no wish to take issue with you. I did not answer immediately because I intended to write you a very long letter, both about the Hobbes-Hegel problem, and about the progress of my own reflections. I miss our conversations more than ever. Well -- the intention remained and remains unfulfilled: I really have no time for it. In addition to which my arm gives me trouble. I have written too much, and now have a bursitis. In principle I should take two weeks' rest. But that is impossible. I must therefore at least drop all writing that is not absolutely necessary. Hence this brief and inadequate letter -- Hegel-Hobbes: Everything you write is correct. Hegel undoubtedly takes Hobbes as his point of departure. A comparison is surely worthwhile, and I would have liked to make it -- with you. Major difference: Hegel consciously wants to "return" to the Ancients ("dialectically," that is to say by way of "Hobbes.") There is a summum bonum, namely full self-understanding through philosophy. But one can only understand (and thus "satisfy") oneself fully in an ideal state (just as according to Plato). That state can only be actualized by means of history and at the end of history. For it is the "reality of the kingdom of heaven." That means, it is this-worldly, like the ancient state; but in this-world, the (Christian) other-world is actualized. That is why the state presupposes not only "knowledge" but also "action" ("volonte!"). Although its final cause is also philosophical knowledge, this knowledge is a knowledge of action, through action (man's "negative," that is to say creative, and not merely uncovering <or revealing> activity). Struggle → the dialectic of master and slave in history → synthesis of the two (master and slave) in the citizen of the ideal state. Concrete difference: Hobbes fails to see the value of work. The fear of death is not enough to lead man "to reason." The fearing slave attains knowledge (and the idea of freedom → Stoicism → Scepticism → Christianity) only if he also works (in and out of fear), and works for the master, that is to say only if he performs services. This accounts for history as a "class-struggle," that is to say as a master-slave dialectic with a final synthesis. Natural science (Galileo-Newton's, that is to say also Hobbes's) is a pseudo sci<ence> of the working slave. The ex-slave liberated by the rev<olution> (1789) gives it up; his science becomes the phil<osophy> (Hegel's) on the basis of which man can understand himself as man (but to that end, the transition through <the stage of> slave labor and its ideology is necessary!). Slave sci<ence> leads 1. to transcendentalism, 2. to subj<ective> idealism, 3. to "phrenology," that is to say to material<ist> anthropology (so, too, in Hobbes). Why? Because the slave who does not want to struggle (Hobbes's bourgeois), necessarily flees into the beyond ("belief"), and seeks his satisfaction there (without ever finding it). The purely theoretical cancellation of the beyond yields subj<ective> idealism (more generally: the intellectuals' ideology of "the thing itself," of "pure" science, etc., that is to say the flight into "absolute" values "pure insight," that is to say 17th century rationalism]). But in fact these purely intuited values are merely given givens, [2] that is to say nature. The whole process therefore ends up in materialism. The way out: recognition of values-as-duties. [3] Initially that leads to "utopia" ("insanity"). But if man is ready to struggle for them, it leads to revolution. That is the final synthesis (of master and slave): the worker's struggle leads to the struggler's work (univ<ersal> military service as the major consequence of the Fr<ench> revolution, according to Hegel!) That is the "action of each and all" = ideal state, in which everyone is a citizen, that is to say {soldier- civilian} civil servant, and thus creates and preserves the state by his own actions. In sum: Hobbes fails to appreciate the value of work and therefore underestimates the value of struggle ("vanity"). According to Hegel, the working slave realizes 1. the idea of freedom, 2. the actualization of this idea through struggle. Thus: initially "man" is always master or slave; the "full human being" -- at the "end" of history -- is master and slave (that is to say both and neither). Only this can satisfy his "vanity," in that he is recognized by those he recognizes, and understands himself as such (in [Hegel<'s >] philosophy). Nothing short of this understanding of satisfaction constitutes the summum bonum. But one can understand only satisfaction; and satisfaction presupposes work and struggle. [Fear of death alone can only lead to religion (= unhappiness)]. The master does nor kill the slave only so that he might work for him! The gen<uine> master is never afraid. In the meantime, I have re-read Plato. I continue to believe that you underestimate the Timaeus. 1. Plato wants to teach Dion geometry first (and not "virtue" itself). 2. It seems to me that Plato later found "dialectics" inadequate, and went over to the "method of division;" that method implies the primacy of physics (mathem<atical> physics). 3. The "Statesman" presupposes the "Timaeus." Thus: the "idea" = "ideal" of man cannot be seen in man himself. He has to be grasped as "a place in the cosmos." That place is his "ideal." The organization of the state presupposes the (or some) knowledge of the org<anization> of the cosmos. What do you think of that? Now, regarding personal matters. I have been promised that I would get French citizenship soon. Then I may perhaps receive a fellowship. Until then, much meaningless work in order to earn money. Library (5 hours) + the crazy Frenchman (ghostwriting) (2 hours) + 2 courses. One on Hegel (Chapter VI, B and C); and a second one on Bayle. (I am replacing Koyre, who is in Egypt), I chose Bayle because I am interested in the problem of tolerance. What for him was Prot<estantism> Cathol<icism>, is today fasc<ism> comm<unism>. I believe that in Bayle the motives and the meaning of the middle position are clearer than among modern "democrats." I regret that we write each other so seldom. It is of course due to slovenliness on my part. But do believe me that it has nothing to do with "intrinsic reasons." "Humanly" and "philosophically" I continue to value and cherish you greatly. Write me soon, and with best regards also to your wife. Yours, AK *** Paris, June 22, 1946 Dear Mr. Strauss: Many thanks for your Farabi essay. [1] I am in no way a specialist in the field. I can therefore not pass an expert judgment on your interpretation. But to a layman it seems most plausible. In any case, the essay is most amusing. But the problem interests me much more than the historical issues. I have thought much about wisdom myself, in the course of the past years. My last course was devoted to this problem. I am now bringing out a book. A compendium of my Hegel course by one of those who attended it (Queneau), [2] and transcripts of some lectures. Among others, the full text of the last course about wisdom. The book is very bad. I had no time to work it out. But it contains some interesting things. Above all, about wisdom, fulfillment, and happiness (I follow Hegel in saying: satisfaction.) I would like to know what you think of it. I will send you a copy as soon as it comes out. I would like to have the opportunity for discussions with you. As well as with Klein. Here I have almost no one. Weil [3] is very intelligent, but he lacks something, I don't quite know what. Koyre is completely dotty. Last year Klein wrote me about the possibility of being invited to St. John's College. [4] At the time I could not do it. Now I would gladly come. But Klein no longer writes anything about it. I do not want to ask him directly. Perhaps he does not want to submit my name a second time. But I would be grateful to you, if you raised this question with him. With best regards to yourself and to your wife Yours, Kojeve *** MINISTERE April 8, 1947 Dear Strauss, I received your 1943 and 1945 essays [1] almost at the same time. The essay about ancient political philosophies interests me intensely. In any case -- many thanks. I have the impression that basically we do not think as differently as it appears. What a pity that we no longer have the opportunity to talk with one another at length. Because it is not really possible by way of letters. And still less by way of essays and books. By the way -- my book has still not come out. I will send it to you as soon as it does. Koyre was very affected by your critical attitude toward his Plato book. [2] I mentioned only purely "material" criticism. But he evidently has a "bad conscience" ... Surely you can arrange a "research trip" to Europe: after all, there is a lot of money for this sort of thing in the U.S.! For it is scarcely possible for me to come to America for a mere trip. I have still not written the Lowith review. Nor have I any particular desire to do so. On May 1 I probably will go to Geneva (Conference), where I may remain 4-6 weeks. What do you hear from Klein? Will he come to Europe? It would be nice if the two of you could come together. Weil has finished his big book. [3] Very impressive. Also, very "Hegel-Marxist," and certainly influenced by my course. But it ends ala Schelling: Poetry, philosophy, and wisdom as silence. You will finally have to read it. And I regret I did not write the book myself. Perhaps I will still do it, if I drop administration ... and find a little money "to do nothing"! With very best regards to you and yours, Your A. Kojeve. *** 3202 Oxford Ave., New York 63, N.Y. 22.8.48 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff: Finally I get to write to you. Before I turn to the primary object of this letter, I should like to thank you for getting me the Malebranche (how much do I owe you?), and to ask you whether you would be prepared to review my forthcoming small book, On Tyranny: An Interpretation Of Xenopbon 's Hiero, [1] in France. I know no one besides yourself and Klein who will understand what I am after (I am one of those who refuse to go through open doors when one can enter just as well through a keyhole), and Klein is endlessly lazy. In any case, I will send you my opusculum. -- Now to the issue. Only now, during the vacation, did I find time to work through your Introduction. [2] It is an extraordinary book, by which I also mean this, that it is an uncommonly good and interesting book. With the exception of Heidegger there is probably not a single one of our contemporaries who has written as comprehensive and at the same time as intelligent a book. In other words, no one had made the case for modern thought in our time as brilliantly as you. Quite aside from this general merit, your book has the truly not negligible merit of having made the Phenomenology of Mind accessible, not only to myself, I am sure. The account as a whole leaves the impression that you regard Hegel's philosophy as absolute knowledge, and reject the philosophy of nature together with its implications as a dogmatic and dispensable residue. One is therefore all the more surprised to find you admit that the demonstrative power of the Hegelian argument (the circularity of the system) is absolutely dependent on the philosophy of nature (291 at the bottom; 400, paragraph 3; 64). Indeed, it is evident that the philosophy of nature is indispensable. How else can the uniqueness of the historical process (349 n. 2; 391) be accounted for? It can only be necessarily unique if there can be only one "earth" of finite duration in infinite time. (By the way, are there any explicit statements in Hegel about the earth's beginning and end? In Lasson's edition of the Encyclopedia I found nothing on this score, other than the rejection of evolutionary theories. How can that be reconciled with the earth's temporal finiteness?) Besides, why should the one, temporal, finite earth not be subject to cataclysms (every 100,000,000 years), with total or partial repetitions of the historical process? Only a teleological concept of nature can help out here. If nature is not structured or ordered with a view to history, then one is led to a contingency even more radical than Kant's transcendental contingency (which Hegel rejects). (Cp. 397 bottom-398 top, as well as 301 paragraph 2 and 434 middle, with 404 n. 1 and 432 paragraph 2.). But if the philosophy of nature is necessary, it follows that atheism has to be rejected (378). The deduction of the desire for recognition is convincing if one presupposes that every philosophy consists in grasping the spirit of its time in thought, that is to say if one presupposes everything that is at issue. Otherwise, that deduction is arbitrary. Why should self-consciousness and the striving for recognition not be understood as derivative from the zoon logon echon? [3] Self-consciousness presupposes desire? But is the striving for contemplation not a desire? All desire is directed at what-is not, but only the desire for desire is directed at non-being as such -- but is not recognition (for example of parents by their children, of the stronger by the weaker), always a given? What makes human beings into human beings is the striving for recognition. Hence human beings are fully satisfied when and only when they are universally recognized. I see an ambiguity here: a) they should be satisfied, dissatisfaction with universal recognition is irrational; b) they are satisfied. Regarding a) human beings are irrational; they manage to destroy the simply rational communal life (implied on p. 400, paragraph 2). Regarding b) human beings are not satisfied; they want to be happy; their happiness is not identical with their being recognized (cp. 334 with 435n). The recognition for which great men of action strive, is admiration. That recognition is not necessarily satisfied by the End-State. The fact that great deeds are impossible in the End-State, can lead precisely the best to a nihilistic denial of the End-State. There is only one way of avoiding that consequence, namely by the Platonic-Hegelian assumption that "the best" are somehow ruled by the purely rational, the philosophers. Differently stated, only if the striving for recognition is a veiled form of the striving for full self-consciousness or for full rationality, in other words only if a human being, insofar as he is not a philosopher, is not really a human being, if someone who leads a life of action is essentially subordinate to the philosopher -- that is to say if one follows Hegel even where (in my view for bad reasons) you diverge from him: cp. 398, paragraph 1, with 398-400, 275-279, 286-291. (Regarding these passages and regarding 293, I should like to remark -- and this is only another way of saying what I have just said -- that you seem to underestimate the fact that in Hegel's view the Enlightenment refuted the Christian dogma as such. Hegel would rightly reject what you call mysticism as a nonconcept inapplicable to Biblical religion.) Hence it is not recognition but only wisdom that can truly satisfy a human being (which you naturally also say). Hence the end state owes its privilege to wisdom, to the rule of wisdom, to the popularization of wisdom (414a., 385, 387), and not to its universality and homogeneity as such. But if wisdom does not become common property, the mass remains in the thrall of religion, that is to say of an essentially particular and particularizing power (Christianity, Islam, Judaism ...), which means that the decline and fall of the universal homogeneous state is unavoidable. In any case, if not all human beings become wise, then it follows that for almost all human beings the end state is identical with the loss of their humanity (490,491 and 492), and they can therefore not be rationally satisfied with it. The basic difficulty also shows itself in this, that on the one hand the End-State is referred to as the State of warrior-workers (114, 146, 560 f.), and on the other hand it is said that at this stage there are no more wars, and as little work as possible (indeed, in the strict sense of the term, there is no more work at all (145, 385 ,435 n, 560), since nature will have been definitively conquered (301 paragraph 3, et passim). Besides: the masses are only potentially satisfied (145 f.) If I had more time than I have, I could state more fully, and presumably more clearly, why I am not convinced that the End State as you describe it, can be either the rational or the merely-factual satisfaction of human beings. For the sake of simplicity I refer today to Nietzsche's "last men." [4] When do your travels again bring you this way? In any case, let me hear from you soon. With best regards from your Leo Strauss I have re-read your last two letters -- containing among other things, your judgement of Weil. I can only repeat: I have seldom seen such an empty human being. You say: he lacks something -- I say: he lacks substance, he is nothing but an idle chatterer. *** THE GRADUATE
FACULTY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE December 6, 1948 M. Alexandre
Kojeve Dear Kojeve: I am sending you under separate cover my study on Xenophon. Would it be possible for you to review it in Critique or, for that matter, in any other French periodical. I am very anxious to have a review by you because you are one of the three people who will have a full understanding of what I am driving at. Sincerely yours, Leo Strauss *** THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO May 13, 1949 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff: I was very pleased to see in an earlier issue of Critique that you plan to review my Xenophon. Now I see on the back-cover of the April issue that your name has disappeared, and that instead, M. Weil announces an article on Machiavelli. Did you abandon your plan? I would regret it very much -- among other things also because I should have liked to take your account as the occasion for an essay to which I intended to devote the month of July, and in which I would discuss our differences. Please let me know where things stand. A further request: Could you have your friends at Critique henceforth send me Critique at the above address. You probably know that at the end of January I went to the University of Chicago as "Professor of Political Philosophy." When will you come to these parts again? And how are you and your Philosophy of Right? [1] With best regards, Your Leo Strauss *** Vanves, May 26, 1949 Dear Mr. Strauss, Thank you so much for your letter of the 13th. I very much apologize for still not having answered your first, already very old letter. Really because it poses too many important questions that cannot be dealt with properly in a short answer. I have thought about the questions, and have much to say in answer to them, but I never find the time to get it all down in writing. Be that as it may -- a thousand thanks for the really very friendly judgment about a book which, as regards its form, is beneath all criticism. I have read your Xenophon very attentively, and have learned much from it. I have not abandoned the idea of reviewing the book (but the cover of Critique mentions forthcoming items only once). I have even written 22 (!) pages about it. But that is only about 2/3. Now: in the first place, I do not know when I will write the remaining 10-15 pages; in the second place, the article seems to me too long for Critique (although Bataille is ready to print everything I write). In any event, I will send you a typed copy as soon as I have one. I have another idea. A volume could be brought out (possibly by NRF) that would combine the French translation of the dialogue, a translation of your book (without the notes, or rather the "technical" notes), and my article (which deals with your book). What do you think of that idea? Naturally you have to see my article in order to be able to decide. But what do you think "in principle?" I believe that it would in any event be better to bring out the translation of your book together with the French text of the dialogue. Otherwise, I am not especially well: tired, kidneys, heart. Very much work, much personal success, but really very few results. I spent a month in Egypt: very impressive. I am very pleased that the material question is finally solved for you. And how are the students? With best regards to you and yours, Your Kojeve P.S. I will speak to Weil regarding your Critique. *** THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO June 27, 1949 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff, Thank you ever so much for your letter. I was so busy, I could not answer. Today, just before the beginning of the summer semester, in terrible heat and humidity, I find a free moment. I restrict myself to the practical problem. What matters most to me is to get to see your critique in any legible form whatsoever. I very much hope that in the meantime you have written the last third -- the rest of your 22 pages. As for the publication, I wonder whether both might not be possible: a) your review in Critique, and b) the book you suggest (translation of the Hiero, my interpretation, and your criticism). I fully agree with the idea for the book, even before having read your criticism. I would be most grateful to you for an early report about where things stand. I am very sorry to
hear that you are physically not well. That ( When will you again come to these parts? With best regards, also in my wife's name, from your Leo Strauss *** Vanves, August 15, 1949 Dear Mr. Strauss, Please excuse that I reply only today to your letter of June 27. But I wanted first to fulfill your request, and give the manuscript a legible form. That was done only yesterday: I have corrected a typed copy, and sent it to you (c/o the University, with the request to forward). I hope it is not too late, although you wanted to have it at the beginning of August. Critique is broke: the September issue is the last one. Perhaps I will publish my review in Sartre's Temps Modernes, although I do not much care to do so. As for the article, I am rather dissatisfied with it. I had to write it in bits and pieces, and the structure is therefore very defective. Regarding the book (Xenophon -- Strauss -- Kojeve), it will have to wait until the end of the vacation. That way you can let me know whether the idea appeals to you. With best regards to yourself and to your wife, Yours, Kojeve *** THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO September 4, 1949 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff, My warmest thanks
for your review essay, which, as you can imagine, I immediately read
with the most intense interest. The mere fact that you invested
as much work as you did, is the greatest compliment ever paid me. I
cannot speak to your substantive criticism in haste: I firmly intend to
discuss your position with the utmost thoroughness and decisiveness in a
public setting just as soon as your article has appeared. I am glad to
see, once again, that we agree about what the genuine problems are,
problems which are nowadays on all sides either denied or trivialized.
Existentialism Marxism and Thomism Besides that I am glad that finally someone represents the modern position intelligently and in full knowledge -- and without Heidegger's cowardly vagueness. I therefore eagerly look forward to the moment when it will be possible to join the battle. [1] In the coming weeks I am totally taken up with the preparation of a series of public lectures on Natural Right and History -- Mr. Maritain delivered a series of lectures under the same auspices! -- which are then to be published next year. Now to the question about publication. For a variety of reasons, I would very much welcome it if the Xenophon-Strauss-Kojeve book appeared. If you have secured a publisher, let me know, so that the business side (a formality) -- copyright -- can get settled right away. Regarding the translation of the Hiero, I would like to make sure that the crucial passages are translated literally, and if necessary the translation be changed (I assume that you want to proceed on the basis of an already published French translation -- hence, too, the copyright problem would have to be resolved). Regarding my contribution, some notes really are essential. If you wish, I can put a list of them together for you. -- But all that will require a stretch of time. Therefore I wonder whether it might not be practical to have you go ahead and publish your portion in the Temps Modernes now. I would prefer that. Immediately upon its publication I would then work out my reply (and in this connection include a series of other additions to On Tyranny), and publish it. It would then be up to you to decide whether you wish to add a reply and possibly a "final word" to the French edition. In any event, let me know your intentions and plans soon. By chance I happened upon Jaspers' History (1949): [2] a well-intentioned North-German Protestant Pastor, full of unction and earnestness even in sexual relations, and who for that very reason never achieves clarity or decisiveness. Let me hear from you again soon. With warm greetings from my wife and myself, Your Leo Strauss *** Vanves, October 10, 1949 Dear Mr. Strauss, Please excuse me for answering your two letters only today. I was on holidays in Spain and came back only the day before yesterday. To the matter: I have not yet done anything about my article. But I will try to have it published as soon as possible in some journal. (Critique is now definitely dead.) At the same time I will speak with Gallimard about the "X-St-K" book. I had thought of using some old translation, in order not to have to pay any copyright. Of course some of your notes will have to be translated as well. I really thought that only the strictly technical notes, references, etc., should be omitted. Personally, I would very much welcome it if your reply to my criticism could also be reprinted. But that depends on the publisher (number of pages, etc.) Your Chicago suggestion interests me very much. I believe that regular contact with you will not only be personally extremely pleasant, but that at least as far as I am concerned it will also be philosophically extremely stimulating. (Please excuse the blemished first sheet -- I had not noticed it.) I will work out my curriculum, discuss it with Koyre, and send it to you. I know no "big shots." But I could have myself recommended by 1. Professor Wilcox (Economics), Chairman of the American Delegation in London, New York, Geneva, Havana, etc. 2. The local ECA ("Marshall Plan") people. Would that be useful? Koyre says that he does not want to intervene on his own. But if someone from the University of Chicago asks him about me, he will write favorably. The Quai d'Orsay is very interested. But Koyre tells me that any official French intervention could only hurt my prospects. Is that so? A visiting summer appointment lasts about ten weeks? What is the pay for something like that? It is not so much a question of money as of prestige. In any event -- many thanks for the suggestion, and for everything you will undertake on my behalf. Regarding the articles and the book, I will keep you informed. With best regards to yourself and your wife, Your Kojeve *** THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO October 14, 1949 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff, In the utmost haste: Regarding your article and "X-St-K," I do see that the inclusion of my Reply both increases the cost, and greatly delays it because of my terrible slowness. So: go ahead. [1] Regarding your vita, etc. -- feel free to mention Wilcox and the Paris ECA people. Provided they are not notorious communists -- every other foolishness is pardonable. -- K<oyre> is perfectly right that an unsolicited initiative on the part of the Quai d'Orsay can only hurt. But a statement about you addressed To Whom It May Concern (or, preferably, the French equivalent), written in French by one of the big shots in the "Affaires Etrangeres" would surely be useful: because it would show that you are politically not entirely inexperienced. Summer course: this should not be a matter of prestige. Everyone, including the prima donnas, prostitutes himself this way. I believe you would get the same that Koyre got. (How much that is I do not know.) I cannot undertake anything further until I have your vita. Best regards from us both, Your Leo Strauss *** Vanves, December 26, 1949 Merry Christmas, dear Mr. Strauss, After much reflection (which it would be too tedious to reproduce) I have decided to drop the Chicago project. Among other reasons, because it is a ''delicate subject." I hope that you will not hold it against me. In any event, many thanks for the suggestion. The only thing I really regret is that there is no prospect of a face-to-face discussion with you about the issues that interest us in the foreseeable future. Here I have, for all intents and purposes, no occasion for philosophical discussion. As regards our book: Queneau has read your book (+ Xenophon) and is enthusiastic. He also finds my article suitable for publication and interesting. So that he absolutely wants to publish the book, and he expects it to be a great success. However, he has spoken about the book with such enthusiasm, that Gallimard himself wants to read it, together with my article. But the article has to be corrected, because the only corrected copy is with Merleau-Ponty (for Temps Modernes). It will therefore be some time before the official contract is submitted to us. Queneau is ready to reprint the notes as well, in case you insist. However, it would considerably increase costs (because of the Greek). And he fears that the notes will scare away some readers, and so restrict the circulation of the book. On the other hand, he (and I) would very much welcome an "Afterword." A translator still has to be found for the Hiero, as well as one for your book. The translator's honorarium will probably come out of your honorarium. As for the two of us, we will divide the honorarium in proportion to the number of pages. Have you any objections to that suggestion? I would like to know what you think of my essay. I myself am quite dissatisfied. I wrote it under difficult circumstances, with massive interruptions: as a result it is wide-ranging, and at the same time unclear. But I have neither the time nor the inclination to work on it more. Or do you believe that it is really necessary that I do so? With best regards to you and yours. Kojeve *** THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO January 18, 1950 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff, I just received your letter of December 26. I very much regret
that we will not see each other for the time being. I, too, never have
the opportunity for discussions
I was very pleased by the news about our book. To begin with business-questions: My publisher owns the rights, not I. The situation is different regarding the Afterword, since I am writing it on my own. For reasons that are too tedious, I would propose that you get the honorarium for the Afterword in your name, and after subtracting taxes and so on transferred it to one of my relatives in Paris. I found your criticism clear and meaningful; stylistic revisions may be desirable, but that is something about which I have no opinion, because I do not know French well enough. The notes can for the most part be omitted, except some few that are interesting. As soon as the matter is settled and I have some leisure, I will write the Afterword in English. I assume that the publisher will have no objection to my publishing the Afterword in an American journal: after all, it would also be a bit of publicity for the book. In the meantime I have begun to prepare six public lectures on Natural Right and History. Progress is extremely slow. I am working on the first lecture, a summary criticism of historicism ( = existentialism). Have you ever read Prescott's Conquest of Mexico and Conquest of Peru? A story more fabulous than any fairy-tale. With best regards from my wife and myself, Your Leo Strauss *** THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO March 24, 1950 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff, My publisher sent me the letter that Gallimard (Mascole) wrote to him. It will be a little while before the formalities are settled (another publisher is just in the process of taking over publication of my book). But this formality should not delay the substantive procedure. I personally attach importance to only two things: (a) I should like to see the translation of my share before it is typeset; (b) translation rights are limited to the translation into French. (That is to say, no translations from the French translation into any other languages are permitted.) It would be desirable not to delay getting the translation out. The financial aspect of this business (a flat fee of $150.00) is o.k. Have you seen Heidegger's Holzwege? Most interesting, much that is outstanding, and on the whole bad: the most extreme historicism. How are you? Write soon. Your Leo Strauss *** REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE MINISTERE DES
FINANCES Paris, April 9, 1950 Dear Mr. Strauss, Please excuse me for only now answering your letter of March 24. I saw Queneau. He says that your two conditions go without saying. Koyre has a translator in view. I hope work begins soon. Could you indicate the notes that should be translated and printed? On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty does not want to publish my article in Temps Modernes. The pretext is that T<emps> M<odernes> does not publish reviews. In fact he refuses publication for substantive reasons, as is evident from his letter to Weil. I can understand that. In effect I say in the article that what Merleau-Ponty, among others, does, is politically as well as philosophically senseless. I have not yet read Holzwege. But I will do so. I assume that the legal issue between your publisher and Gallimard will be settled, and that I do not need to be concerned with it. With best regards, Your Kojeve *** THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO June 26, 1950 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff, Please excuse my long silence -- but all hell was loose. In the meantime I have signed the contract with Gallimard. I now come to you with the suggestion for a translator. Victor Gourevitch, one of my students, who will be attending the Sorbonne with a University of Chicago Fellowship this fall, and apparently knows French very well, has offered to undertake the translation -- independently of how much he gets from the publisher. I would of course regard it as absolutely proper that he receive the usual compensation from the publisher, and I would be most grateful to you if you would arrange for this -- in case a translator has not yet been found and begun work. Gourevitch would have the following great advantage: he will be in Chicago for another few weeks, and I could discuss the problems of translation with him in detail. In any event, I earnestly request that you let me know right away whether this arrangement is acceptable. Also for the following reason: in case the translation is completed soon, I would have to start work on my criticism of your criticism quite soon. I have three or four urgent commitments this summer, and therefore have to plan. How much I would
enjoy talking with you
Have you seen Lukacz, The Young Hegel? Orthodox-Stalinist in thought and writing, but useful as a corrective to Wilheiminian Hegel studies. I have looked into Lenin and Engels -- unpalatable and comical. With best regards, your Leo Strauss *** THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO July 28, 1950 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff: Thank you so much for the information regarding Stephano. As far as my Conclusion or Afterword is concerned, I intended to write it in August, because during the academic year it is too difficult to concentrate on one subject. However, since I also have to attend to a number of other things, I would like to turn to the Afterword only once it is reasonably certain that the whole thing will be completed and come out in the academic year 1950-1951. Otherwise I would postpone the writing of the Afterword until next Summer (1951). Where do things stand (a) regarding the translation of Xenophon's Hiero? Is there not one in the Collection Bude, for example? (b) When does Stephano expect to be done? (c) Is the version of your critique which you sent me, the definitive version? If it is not, I would have to wait until I have the definitive version. In any event, I very much ask you please to answer these three questions by air mail -- at my expense, so that I know how to plan my time in August. It may interest you to learn that Klein has married Husserl's daughter-in-law. I hope that you are well. Best regards as ever, Your Leo Strauss *** THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO August 5, 1950 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff, On the reverse side of this sheet, you will find the list of the notes I would like to have included in the translation. I would very much appreciate it if the translator could indicate in his Preface or elsewhere that the English original contains a great many notes that are omitted in the French translation. I plan to begin work on the Afterword tomorrow. Best regards. Your Leo Strauss
*** THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO September 14, 1950 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff, Enclosed, the Afterword. I have called it Restatement, because I regard the problem as entirely open -- "Afterword" would create the impression of an apparent finality -- and, above all, because I would very much like you to answer. You must clarify the difficulties in which the reader of your Introduction gets entangled. If my attack succeeds in getting you to clarify what is unclear, I will be very satisfied. Unfortunately, I again have a couple of requests. In the first place, I should like Gallimard's assurance that I retain the copyright of the English original of the Restatement, or more precisely, that he requires only the rights to its French translation. In the second place, for various reasons it is necessary that the dedication and the motto (from Macaulay) be retained in the French edition. I assume that Stephanopoulos will let me see the translation of the Restatement as well. I would be much obliged to you for an early reply. How are you? Best regards, Your Leo Strauss *** Vanves, September 19, 1950 SECRETARIAT D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES ECONOMIQUES Dear Mr. Strauss, Many thanks for your letter and the Restatement. (I very much like the title; only I don't know how to translate it into French!) I was in Spain for three weeks, and got your letter on the day of my return to Paris. I read your reply immediately, and with great interest. Naturally, I would have much to say, but one also has to leave something for the reader: he should go on to think on his own. I am in full agreement with the conclusion. It might be even clearer to say that the fundamental difference with respect to the question of being pertains not only to the problem of the criterion of truth but also to that of good and evil. You appeal to moral conscience in order to refute my criterion-argument. But the one is as problematic as the other. Did Torquemada or Dzerzhinski have "bad consciences"?! [1] The universal and homogeneous state is "good" only because it is the last (because neither war not revolution are conceivable in it: -- mere "dissatisfaction" is not enough, it also takes weapons!). Besides, "not human" can mean "animal" (or, better -- automaton) as well as "God." In the final state there naturally are no more" human beings" in our sense of an historical human being. The "healthy" automata are "satisfied" (sports, art, eroticism, etc.), and the "sick" ones get locked up. As for those who are not satisfied with their "purposeless activity" (art, etc.), they are the philosophers (who can attain wisdom if they "contemplate" enough). By doing so they become "gods." The tyrant becomes an administrator, a cog in the "machine" fashioned by automata for automata. All this seems to me rather "classical." With the one difference that according to Hegel all this is not right from the start, but only becomes right at the end. Now, in the meantime I have come to understand something new better than before. Human beings really act only in order to be able to speak about it (or to hear it spoken about) [conversely: one can speak only about action; about nature one can only be [mathematically, aesthetically, etc.] silent. Historical action necessarily leads to a specific result (hence: deduction), but the ways that lead to this result, are varied (all roads lead to Rome!). The choice between these ways is free, and this choice determines the content of the speeches about the action and the meaning of the result. In other words: materially <i.e., factually> history is unique, but the spoken <i.e., narrated> story can be extremely varied, depending on the free choice of how to act. For example: If the Westerners remain capitalist (that is to say, also nationalist), they will be defeated by Russia, and that is how the End-State will come about. If, however, they "integrate" their economies and policies (they are on the way to doing so), then they can defeat Russia. And that is how the End-State will be reached (the same universal and homogeneous State). But in the first case it will be spoken about in "Russian" (with Lysenko, etc.), and in the second case -- in "European." As regards myself, I came to Hegel by way of the question of criteria. I see only three possibilities: (a) Plato's -- Husserl's "intuition of essences" (which I do not believe [for one has to believe it]); (b) relativism (in which one cannot live); (c) Hegel and "circularity." If, however, one assumes circularity as the only criterion of truth (including the moral), then everything else follows automatically. For a time I believed in a fourth possibility: nature is "identical," hence the classical criterion can be retained for nature. But now I believe that one can only be silent about nature (mathematics). Hence: either one remains "classically" silent (cp. Plato's Parmenides and Seventh Epistle), or one chatters "in the modern manner" (Pierre Bayle), or one is an Hegelian. But -- as I said -- all this can be left up to the reader. In itself your Restatement seems to me very sensible and useful. There is only one passage in your text I would ask you to alter or to strike. I refer to p. 13: "Kojeve denies ... (Hiero II.11 and 11.14)." [2] The passage rests on a misunderstanding, and I am perfectly ready to improve my text in order to [3] *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO September 28, 1950 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff, Many thanks for your letter. Could "restatement" not be translated with something like "reformulation"? Or with a composite expression corresponding to "A Second Statement"? If there is no alternative, 1 would accept "Replique" or something like it. I was aware that some of your arguments are rather exoteric, and I replied to them exoterically. Quite aside from that, the question remains whether I have understood you or you me on all points. Thus, for example, I do not believe that the considerations you adduce in your letter to me were sufficient. But that would lead too far just now (beginning of the academic year). As regards p. 13 of the Restatement (Hitler), I am perfectly ready to strike the three sentences in the middle of the paragraph: "As is shown by his reference ... under his rule." But I cannot accept your suggestion to replace "good tyranny" with some other expression. I naturally knew that Stalin was comrade: you see how modern Xenophon is even in this.
Please do not forget to remind Queneau about the copyright of the Restatement. One of my students -- Gourevitch -- will try to get in touch with you. He is very impressed by your Introduction. Have you seen the things by Lukacz? Best regards, Your Leo Strauss *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO January 19, 1951 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff, In all haste -- What has happened to the translation? And: where do things stand with my right to publish the English original of the Restatement now? I do not doubt I have that right, but would like to have it confirmed by the publisher. How are things with you? I heard about you and your political outlook from Bertrand de Jouvenel, [1] who is here just now, esteems you greatly, and also esteems your book, but did not know that you, the official, are one and the same as you, the author of the book. May I ask you for a prompt reply. Best regards, Your Leo Strauss *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO February 22, 1951 M. Alexandre Kojeve
Dear M. Kojeve: Many thanks for your letter of February 5th. It is impossible to open again in a letter the long controversy between us. We must try it again in print. I am writing to you today in connection with our publication. The NRF confirmed what you wrote in your letter. Thanks very much for that. But another problem has now arisen. I am very much pressed with my time, and I am wondering whether I could not delegate the correction of the translation to Victor Gourevitch. I have full faith in his command of the language as well as in his diligence. This procedure would have the additional value that in case of obvious blunders made by the translator, the thing would be taken care of immediately in a cafe, and one would not have to bother trans-Atlantic facilities for this problem. Gourevitch could write to me in the very few cases where he himself did not feel quite certain as to the proper translation. (His address is American Wing, Cite Universitaire, University of Paris, Paris, France). If this could be arranged, a great load would be taken off my chest. No problem of a financial nature would bother us in connection with this arrangement. Gourevitch told me that he would enjoy doing this job. I would be very grateful if you would let me know what you think of my idea. Very sincerely yours, Leo Strauss LS/mkm *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO July 17, 1952 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff: Yesterday I sent you an essay and my small book Persecution and the Art of Writing. You are acquainted with some of the contents. Would you do me the favor of calling attention to it in Critique or somewhere else. [1] How is La tyrannie et la sagesse? I was very amused by your review of Queneau. [2] I particularly liked your sensible comment about the old women or the adolescents who call themselves philosophers and savor their "tragic" condition instead of making an effort like reasonable people. Best regards, Your Leo Strauss *** REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE Paris, August 11, 1952 Dear Mr. Strauss, Thank you so much for your letter and the book which arrived the day before yesterday. I have read the review; [1] the man does not seem to have been a great philosopher; with what you say, I am in complete agreement. Regarding the Tyranny I know nothing. One of your plenipotentiaries should deal with it. The book will surely get published sooner or later. And where "eternal questions" are involved, excessive haste is out of place! I am in the process of transforming my lecture ''The Concept and Time" into a book. I have already written about 150 pages, but that is barely half of it. Up to now it has gone more or less smoothly, because I was dealing with "great unknowns": Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Hegel. But now it is Mr. Kojeve's turn, and that is a rather delicate matter. At least I have three weeks of quiet. The rest of the time I can work on it (write) only on Sundays, and make progress by setting down only 12-15 pages every Sunday. It will again be an unreadable book. If only there were something in it! With best regards, Your Kojeve *** SECRETARIAT D'ETAT
Paris, October 29, 1953 Dear Mr. Strauss. Thank you so much for your Natural Law. [1] (I have entrusted the Critique matters to Mr. Weil.) I got the book just a few days ago, and have not yet read it in its entirety. But I already see that it is excellent. One really sees in it what is at stake. I would have liked to review the book in Critique. But I am writing a book myself, and have only the weekends at my disposal. Hence.... Regarding the issue, I can only keep repeating the same thing. If there is something like "human nature," then you are surely right in everything. But to deduce from premisses is not the same as to prove these premisses. And to infer premisses from (anyway questionable) consequences is always dangerous. Your Bible quote about the land of the fathers [2] is already most problematic. From it one can of course deduce a condemnation of collectivization in the USSR and elsewhere. But with it one also justifies permanently preserving a Chinese peasant's animal-like starvation-existence (before Mao-Tse-Tung). Etc., etc. But all this is hardly philosophy. The task of philosophy is to resolve the fundamental question regarding "human nature." And in that connection the question arises whether there is not a contradiction between speaking about "ethics" and "ought" on the one hand, and about conforming to a "given" or "innate" human nature on the other. For animals, which unquestionably have such a nature, are not morally "good" or "evil," but at most healthy or sick, and wild or trained. One might therefore conclude that it is precisely ancient anthropology that would lead to mass-training and eugenics. [3] "Modern" anthropology leads to moral anarchy and tasteless "existentialism" only if one assumes, God knows why, that man can give human values. But if, with Hegel, one assumes that at some time he returns to his beginning (by deducing what he says from the mere fact that he speaks), then there indeed is an "ethics" that prescribes that one do everything that leads to this end (= wisdom), and that condemns everything that impedes it -- also in the political realm of progress toward the "universal and homogeneous State." With best greetings, Your Kojeve *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO April 28, 1954 M. Alexandre Kojeve
Dear Kojeve: I received our book. [1] I looked at the translation of my sections and it is sometimes very satisfactory and sometimes less satisfactory. Who is Helene anyway, and what became of Stephano? I suggest that you ask Queneau to send a review copy to Professor Karl Loewith, Philosophisches Seminar, Heidelberg University. Loewith would have an understanding of the issue controversial between you and me. [2] I plan to be in Paris during the second half of June. I am anxious to see you. I hope you will be there. Sincerely yours, Leo Strauss *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO June 4, 1956 Dear M. Kojeve, I heard from Tommy that you too are not well. I myself am just recovering slowly from a coronary thrombosis, so our state is similar and so I suppose many similar thoughts are passing through our minds. It is a pity that we have lost contact almost completely. The only link at the moment is Allan Bloom [1] who reminds me on proper occasions of our considerable disagreements as well as our more fundamental agreement. I deplored that I could not talk to you in June 1954, when I was in Paris. But apart from the fact that we had to rush to Switzerland, I was rather disgusted by the company in which I met you, a fellow who is really one of the most unpleasant people I have ever come across. I mean of course Weil not Koyre. At the suggestion of Pines [2] I read his book which restates in a sometimes somewhat more orderly fashion your thesis but with a complete absence of intellectual honesty: the difference between Hegel and your neo-Hegelianism is nowhere mentioned. I would call the book: Prolegomena zu einer jeden kiinftigen Chuzpa die als absolutes Wissen wird auftreten konnen. [3] You see that while possibly about to die I'm still trying to keep the flag flying. I wish you a speedy and complete recovery and I hope that it will be given to us to see each other either alone or else in good company. The possible localities of our meeting, if any, are in your opinion, if it has not changed, restricted to a certain part of the surface of the earth. I am more open-minded in this respect. If you see Koyre please give him my regards. Cordially, Leo Strauss *** Vanves, June 8, 1956 Dear Mr. Strauss, Your letter brought an unpleasant surprise: I did not know that you were -- or still are -- ill. Although I have seen Gildin [1] several times (I delivered several longish "lectures" to him), he told me nothing about it. Nor did Koyre, who may not have known anything about it himself. Anyway, I am very glad the danger is now behind you. Yes, you are right, we must surely have thought about the same things. And I am sure we fully agree that in this situation, philosophy -- if not "consoling" -- is nevertheless as reliable and satisfying as ever. In any case, I felt no desire for lectures in dead tongues, with or without musical accompaniment. Incidentally, my doctor seems to have given up the cancer hypothesis in favor (?!) of a tuberculosis. Be that as it may, I may no longer go to the Ministry (if only because of the official doctor's refusal to let me work there.) I therefore restrict myself to telephone conversations and a few official visits. That way I again have more leisure and -- in conformity with the ancient model -- I devote them to philosophy (which I never entirely abandoned anyway). I again work 4-5 hours a day at my book, or rather at its Introduction, or more precisely still, at its Third Introduction, which is intended, as a kind of general history of philosophy. I have talked philosophy only with your two American (?) students. I must say that as regards philosophical "eros" and human "decency," the two young people are OK. They must owe that to you. As regards Weil, you are right. For a long time now, I have been unable to "discuss" with him; and also have no interest in doing so. I, too, very much regret that we did not speak with one another. The atmosphere was most disagreeable indeed, and so was I ... As for when and where, it is impossible to say anything for the time being: I am tied to my room for 5-6 months (if all goes ''well.'') If you think of coming to Paris, it would naturally be very easy to get together. Bloom may have spoken to you about the Third Part of my book ("Logic," or however else it might be called). In the meantime, I make some progress. Anyway, on my part there is material for "discussion".... With best greetings, Your Kojeve *** Paris, April 11, 1957 Dear Mr. Strauss, A few days ago I read a transcript of your St. John's lecture on the Euthyphro, [1] which Mr. Hazo had loaned me. Although I had not reread the Euthyphro for a long time, I remembered the text quite well. I had the impression that your interpretation is entirely correct. But on one point in your lecture, I noted a possible difference of opinion between us. Specifically, at the point where you mention the famous portrait of the philosopher in the Thaetetus. Admittedly you do say, in connection with it, that the text is not altogether univocal. But it seems to me that you do not share my "ironic" interpretation of the entire passage. As I have already written you [by the way: did you ever get my long Plato letter; I sent it registered by surface mail, probably at the beginning of the year or at the end of '56], it seems to me that Plato sides completely with the "Thracian Maid" (who, by the way, is a pretty girl and laughs so prettily) [the ironic remark about "looking upward" is also found, setting aside the Republic, in Alcibiades I]. And that interpretation seems to me to fit very well with your interpretation of the Euthyphro. Namely, this way: "Justice without Knowledge" (in the manner of Euthyphro) is just as objectionable or unphilosophical as "Knowledge without Justice" (in the manner of "Thales," that is to say the "learned" or the "theoreticians" in general, people like Thaetetus and Eudoxus, and even Aristotle; people who do not know who their neighbor is and how he lives can naturally not practice justice; but at the end of the Thales passage Socrates says that everything depends on justice); for, philosophy is "knowing justice" or "just knowing." [That is to say: only the philosophy that accounts for the "evident" and "immediate" distinction between right and wrong, can be true; now, neither the Sophists (Heraclitus) nor Aristotle do so because of the middle terms in their diairesis [2], to which Plato's diairesis [2] opposes A with a firm non-A and thus excludes the amoral as-well-as or neither-nor]. In the meantime I have reread the Alcibiades I (indeed!) The dialogue seems to me not only to be authentic, but also very successful in literary terms. I understand the content as follows [incidentally, it contains a deliciously ironic passage about Sparta and Persia, completely in the style of the Lacedaemonian Republic [3] you so brilliantly interpreted: In Sparta two ephors are needed in order to prevent adultery on the part of the queen, and the Persian queen remains faithful only out of fear of others; etc.]: every human being (including Alcibiades) has (even as a child) an "intuition" of right and wrong, which is neither learned nor taught; it is "natural" for human beings to do what is right and avoid what is wrong (passively as well as actively); as long as one simply does not speak, one is a "naturally" decent human being (such as for example Crito or, perhaps also Cephalus in the Republic); but when one speaks or hears others speak, one can fail to hear "the voice of conscience": that is the danger of sophists and rhetoricians, and also of "theology"; indeed it looks as if (cp. Republic where it is not the father Cephalus, but his "sophisticated" son who gives impetus to the conversation about justice which the father avoids) philosophy is needed only as a (pedagogical) answer to "sophistry": it is a "dialectical" defence of "natural" justice against the "sophistic" attacks on it. However, Plato evidently does not quite mean it that way. For in the Phaedo it is (evidently seriously) said that misology is the worst thing. That would mean that one should speak about justice in spite of the danger of sophistic errors. As regards Alcibiades, responsibility has to be understood in the following way: (Heraclitus → Sophists→ Rhetoricians → Politicians → the Populace corrupted by the Politicians → Alcibiades corrupted by the people. If he had spent enough time speaking with Socrates, he would have been cured. But the conversation in Alcibiades I was insufficient because Alcibiades did not understand anything: for he believes that he does not know what is right and wrong and that that is what Socrates first has to teach him about, instead of trying (with Socrates's help) to become discursively conscious about what he already knows "intuitively," and to draw important ("logical") conclusions from it. If he had understood this, he would not have been "jealous" of Socrates (as he says at the end of the dialogue). For the rest, Socrates argues ad hominem, from the perspective of Alcibiades's "master-morality," by presenting justice and temperance as courage, and "sensuality" as slavish cowardice. Plato may wish to suggest by this that it is very dangerous to present ("aristocratic") courage as the principal virtue; that the principal virtue is, rather, ("democratic") justice. ["Anamnesis," which is implicit in Alc<ibiades> I, is a "mythical" interpretation of the psychological fact of "conscience," that is to say, of the "immediate," "innate" knowledge of good and evil.] I have also reread the Phaedrus, but not yet the Symposium. What, in your opinion, is the sequence? Sym<posium> → Ph<aedrus> → Phaedo, or Phaedrus → S<ymposium> → Ph<aedo>? Usually it is said: at the end of the Symposium the tragicomical character of philosophy is indicated, and then the philosophical comedy (Phaedrus) and tragedy (Phaedo) are exhibited. But perhaps one could also say: the Phaedrus already says that Phil<osophy> = com<edy > + trag<edy>; Socrates's first speech was a comical tragedy, his second speech a tragic comedy (in which case the interpretation of the two speeches at the end <of the dialogue> would be philosophical). The Symp<osium> would then be the philosophical comedy in which Socrates is 100% alive (at the end all but Socrates are asleep [= are dead]; in the Ph<aedo> all but Socrates are ''alive''), while he alone is dying in the Ph<aedo>. [4] And what is "better": to live solitary among the "drunk" (= dead), or to die (joking!) in the company of such ''beastly-earnest" pseudo-philosophers as Simmias-Cebes? The Ph<aedo> ends with the cock to Aesclepius! And yet Aristoph[anes] falls asleep before Agathon; does that mean the joke disappears "at the end"?? Some points in "confirmation(?)" of my earlier letter: 1. Parmenides In his Plato biography, Diogenes Laertius mentions Plato's two brothers, but appears not to know anything about his presumed "half-brother." (Antiphon [Antiphon was a Sophist, an enemy of Socrates, whose disciples he wanted to attract to himself.] = Euclides →Th<eodorus >/ Eu<clides> → Arist<otle>) According to tradition, the dialogue bears the subtitle: P<armenides> or About the Ideas. It is scarcely credible that the dialogue would have been given that subtitle if it had really contained only the purely negative-critical passages against the theory of Ideas, and not also their "refutation." In Alc<ibiades> I, '"Pythodorus" is mentioned: "ironically"; in any event not as a genuine philosopher! Even if he is a historical person, nothing stands in the way of using his name "synthetically" (for Theo-dorus). 2. Timaeus In Diogenes Laertius the chapter about Endoxus comes at the end of the book about the ... Pythagoreans! Now, Plato also presents "Timaeus" as an arch-"Pythagorean." 3. Diairesis [6] → Ordinal numbers In a neo-pythagorean fragment it is said: "He [Pythagoras] said not that everything arose from number, but that everything was fashioned in conformity to number, since essential order resides in number, and it is only in participating in that order that the very things that can be numbered are placed first, second, and so on. "Theano" in Stob<aeus > Eel. pol. I, 10,13. In Philo (for example, De origine mundi (ed. Cohen) 91-102), the ideal numbers are also interpreted as ordinal numbers. He further says (in conformity with the tradition) that a distinction has to be drawn between the (ideal) numbers of the same type within and without the decade; for example, there are "infinitely" many numbers of the type 7 (= seventh) that share the same "qualitative" character ("law of formation"), but are quantitatively differentiated from one another. One might then perhaps say that the first ten ideal numbers (the only ones which, according to Aristotle, Plato "deduced") are "categories" in the modern sense, whereas the "kinds" (to which, according to Aristotle, numbers also correspond, but which surely number more than 10) correspond to the ideal numbers > 10, and are distributed among the 10 "categories." But all this is, as I have said, most problematic. While searching in the (translated) neo-Platonists for indications about Plato's theory of numbers, I made a discovery that will amuse you in case you do not already know the relevant texts. Indeed, I discovered, one right after the other, three authentic and entirely unknown philosophers, namely the emperor Julian (Speeches), "Sallustius" (On the Gods and the World, and -- [5] last <but> not least [5] -- Damascius (Life of Isidor). These three "mystical enthusiasts" have revealed themselves as first-class Voltaires. (I vaguely recall that Burkhardt (Constantin the Great) had already said that Julian does not believe a single word of what he tells the "people.") Before reading these three, I was prejudiced, and expected to read "mystical" texts. And after a few pages I was pleasantly surprised. So, up to the 6th century there were men who preserved the philosophical tradition in all its purity, and who despised the neo-Platonic nonsense as much as they did Christian "theology." In this they were completely consciously imitating Plato's "Socratic" irony. It is a nice example of "the art of writing" which you discovered! And with that, on the one hand "highly placed" (JuIian), and on the other, literarily first class (Julian and Damascius). Julian was, in ethics, a stoicizing Cynic. In theoretical philosophy, probably a "Democritean." In any case, an atheist. Follows Aristotle in his critique of Plato's doctrine of ideas; but then also follows Xenarchus in his criticism of Aristotelian teleology and theology (against "aether" and any difference between "heavens" and the "sublunar world") (cp. Hymn to the Mother of the Gods 162a-165b). He furthermore makes particular fun of Iamblichus. And of "intellectuals" in general (most especially so in The Epistle to Themistius). "Sallustius" about the same: atheistic ''materialism" and parody of neo-Platonism. The small book (On the Gods and the World) is usually attributed to Julian's friend <Sallustius>, to whom <Julian's> Mother of the Gods is dedicated. He was certainly a "partner in thought" of Julian's. However, I do not believe that this extremely busy official wrote. Sallustius is therefore probably the one mentioned in Damascius's Life of Isidor, specifically as one of the (few) "genuine" philosophers. Now, I suspect that this "Sallustius" is nothing but an alias for Damascius himself, who probably is himself the author of the parody On the Gods and the World. Damascius: his Life is certainly written (especially against Proclus) in a way that makes Voltaire appear a mere waif by comparison! In other respects, Damascius appears to have been an Aristotelian, but in the manner of Theophantus (whom he praisingly quotes as Asclepiodotos, [where this "Ascl<epiodotos"> may also just be a pseudonym for Dam<ascius >]. In case you have not yet done so, I very much urge you to read all three authors (The Epistle to Them<istius>, the two Speeches Against the Cynics, The Hymn to Helios and [above all!] the Hymn to the Mother of the Gods. In the first place because it is a great intellectual pleasure. In the second place because I would like to know your opinion of them. Because if you agree, I would write an essay about Julian (or Damascius?) for the "Strauss Festschrift"; since I was recently asked to contribute something to it, which I naturally will do with pleasure. In conclusion I would like to give you some samples of my authors' "art of writing." Sall<ustius> After having summarized (an incidentally ''tempered") neo-Platonism in the first 12 chapters, he begins chapter XIII with the following words: "Regarding the gods, the universe, and human things, what we have said suffices for those who are incapable of delving more deeply into the study of philosophy, and whose souls are not incurable. [So, too, in Julian and Damascius: the neo-Platonic "myths" are worthwhile insofar as they challenge reasonable people to think about them and to oppose something reasonable to this nonsense.] It remains to explain how all things never had a beginning...." That is done in chapter XVII. In between there are 4 chapters (XIII-XVI) in which Sallustius makes fun of sacrifices, etc. Chapter XVII begins as follows: "We have said that the gods do not destroy the universe; it remains to show that it is also by nature incorruptible." There follow 4 pages of "Democritean" theory [where, among other things, one reads: "If what is vanishes into what is not, what is to prevent this from happening even to God?"] And the concluding sentence of the chapter reads: "Having spoken thus for those who require more solid proofs, we pray the world (sic!) itself to be propitious to us." The concluding chapter (XXI)-(XVIII-XX: ethics) -- reads as follows: "As for the souls that have lived in accordance with virtue, they are in all respects happy, and they will be especially so when, separated from their irrational principles and purified of all bodily component, they will join the gods and share the government of the entire universe with them. Even if none of this happened to them, virtue itself and the honor and happiness they will derive from it, the life free of pains and of all servitude, would suffice to render happy the life of those who have chosen to live in accordance with virtue and have proven themselves capable living in accordance with it." -- Period -- and one has the impression of hearing the resurrected Socrates having once again told the "Cebeses" his Phaedo myth, while he himself, like a philosopher, thinks about dying. Dam<acius> The entire book is so delightful, I am unable to pick out some one ironic passage. I therefore cite some (few!) "serious" passages [Das Leben des Philosophen Isodorus, wiederhergestellt von Asmus, Leipzig, Meiner, 1911] [6] 79,30 "... it is not meet for a philosopher to declare divination as his profession or to practice it, any more than any other branch of the hieratic sciences. For the boundaries between the philosophers' and the priests' realms are as specific as the proverbial boundaries between the Magerians and the Phrygians." [Strabo cites this proverb in order to emphasize the difficulty (!!) of determining boundaries!]. 129,9 "And [yet] he [an unknown "Diomedes" who was "corrupted" by the neo-Platonist] was a man suited for philosophy; for the <kind of> philosophy that cannot be injured or corrupted by a foreign evil, but only, as Socrates says, by its own. That is precisely why philosophy is also injured by this offence [namely neo-Platonism] which arises from its own midst. 130,21 "However if, as you [Hegesias] maintain, the activity of the clergy ... is more divine, then so do I maintain that it is, but first of all those who are to become gods have to become human beings. That is also why Plato said that men can be granted no greater [sic!] happiness than philosophy. But now philosophy stands on the razor's edge; she has truly reached the most advanced old age: she has reached this far. ... But ... as for myself I am of the opinion that those who want to be men and do not want to pant like animals [sic!] after boundless pastures [namely after the clergy] need only this "divination" [namely genuine philosophy]...." It is scarcely possible to express oneself more clearly and incisively. And yet ... everyone from Zeller etc. to the learned translator (Asmus), see Damascius as nothing but a "mystical enthusiast" who abandons himself to the "most extravagant superstition"!!! Yet Damascius very explicitly says at the end of the Life how this <"mystical enthusiasm"> is to be understood. Indeed, he says: 132,27 "But what even sounds contradictory is that for all his noble and solid dignity he [the ideal <"Dia...">, a symbol of Plato, who never existed] made a cheerful impression on everyone around him, because although he generally spoke seriously to the best of his interlocutors, he also sometimes substituted wit for seriousness, and with innate skill made fun of those who were not there, so that he gave his rebukes a jocular cast." Julian. I urge you read: the Letter to Themistius, the two Speeches against the ''Cynics" ( =Christians), Hymn to Helios, Hymn to the Mother of the Gods. Everything is first-class "Voltaire," and at the same time genuinely philosophical. It is interesting that in them Julian literally expounds your theory about the "art of writing": Cynic Heraclios: 207 a/b "Now if an orator [like Jul<ian> himself) fearing the hatred of his audience, hesitates to speak his mind openly, he must hide his exhortations and doctrines in some disguise. That is what manifestly Hesiod also does. After him, Archilochus not infrequently used myths in order as it were to sweeten his poems...." ib.; 224a: "Furthermore, what is the value of your [presumably the Cynics, in fact, of course, the Christian monks] traveling everywhere, molesting mules and also [?!], I hear, muleteers, who are more afraid of you than they are of soldiers? For I hear that you put your sticks [presumably: Cynics' sticks, but in fact bishops' crooks] to more cruel use than they do their swords. No wonder, then, that you frighten them more." ib.; 239b: "For one just may not say everything, and even of what may be said, some things must, in my view, be kept from the many." In other words: all "myths" serve either to camouflage or to "sweeten," Including the Platonic myths. Now: what are "myths"? ib; 205, c " ... untrue stories in credible form." In other words, in deliberate contrast to Stoicism: " ... true stories in incredible form." For Julian the Christian as well as the pagan (including the neo-Platonic) myths are simply nonsense. But the content of the Platonic "myths" is also false. [The form may be "believable precisely because they are in fact believed]: in any case, the "soul" is not immortal [according to Plato, as Jul<ian> understands him]: ib.; 223, a "However, anyone who composes his stories for the purpose of improving morals, and in the process invokes myths, should address them not to men but to such as are still children in years [?!] or in understanding, and are still in need of such stories." It is important that in their "ironic" way of writing, Jul<ian> (as well as Damascius) consciously imitate the Platonic Socrates. (So that the good tradition maintained itself well into the 6th century!) The following passage is therefore particularly important to me (for my Timaeus interpretation): ib.; 237a-c "... I would then tell you [presumably the "Cynic Heraclios," in fact a Bishop (earlier: Heracles = Christ)] things in this connection [about Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle], that may be unknown to you, but are for the most part well-known and clear to the others. But now just listen to what Plato writes [ironically]: "My fear of the gods, dear Protarchos, is no longer human [?!], but exceeds all measure [?!]. And although I know Aphrodite as she likes to be known, regarding pleasure, I know that it has many shapes." --This passage occurs in the Philebus [12,c], and another of the same kind [!] in the Tim<aeus> [40,d]. What he requires is that one should simply grant credence to everything [?!] the poets [?!] say about the gods without requiring any proofs [?!] for it. <"> But I have referred to this passage here only so [!] that you not invoke Socrates's irony as many Platonists do in order to refute Plato's opinion [double irony!]. For after all, these words are spoken not by Socrates but by Timaeus, who is not in the least given to irony [!!!] Is it not also entirely reasonable that instead of testing what has been said, we ask who has said it, and to whom his words are addressed?!" No comment! [7] Julian: Speeches against the "uneducated Cynics" (= Christians) 186,c <.. > ... it would also not be as noticeable if the wise [here: Diogenes] made fun in them [namely in his supposed tragedies (which, according to J<ulian>, he never wrote) , since many philosophers are known also to have devoted themselves to them. Democritus [I], it is said used to laugh at his fellows' solemn demeanor. We therefore do not want to attend to the products of their jesting muse, ... ... Hence, in order to avoid having the same thing happen to us [namely: as to the person who, on approaching a holy city, sees brothels on its outskirts, and believes that that is the holy place!], by taking seriously everything he [Plato] wrote just for fun -- and which also contains some not altogether worthless wheat ... we will therefore take our bearings in what follows by his [i.e. Diogenes qua wise man] deeds, as dogs hunting wild animals begin by sniffing out the spoor." And that is by far not the only place! K *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO April 22, 1957 M. Alexandre Kojeve
Dear M. Kojeve: Many thanks for your second long letter. I received your first long letter, but since I was too busy to study it at the time at which I received it, I sent it on to Klein, who had promised to read it right away and let you know his opinion. Needless to say that I have not heard anything from him since. My handwriting has become so illegible that I have to dictate my letters, and this means that I have to write to you in English. Now to the subject. As regards the excursus of the Theaetetus, the ironical character of the description of the philosopher is obvious; it flagrantly contradicts Socrates' own familiarity with all Athenian gossip; the philosopher combines the understanding of the pure theoretician ("sophist") and of the statesman. I agree: philosophy is just, but I hesitate on the basis of Plato to identify "just" with "moral". As for your remark on Alc<ibiades> I, (of course it is genuine, everything which has come down as genuine is genuine), that' "if one does not speak, one is naturally a decent man -- e.g., Crito", I do not agree; there is no "conscience" in Plato; anamnesis is not conscience (see Natural Right and History, p. 150n. re Polemarchus). Indeed, misology is the worst, as you say; therefore, there is ultimately no superiority of the merely honorable man to the sophist (contrary to Kant) or for that matter to Alc<ibiades> (cf. N. R. & H, p. 151). I do not believe in the possibility of a conversation of Socrates with the people (it is not clear to me what you think about this); the relation of the philosopher to the people is mediated by a certain kind of rhetoricians who arouse fear of punishment after death; the philosopher can guide these rhetoricians but cannot do their work (this is the meaning of the Gorgias). As for the relation between manliness and justice (to which you refer with regard to Alc<ibiades> I), I believe that you underestimate the positive side of manliness; in the Republic everyone is just and moderate, but only the elite is manly (and wise); manliness and wisdom belong together, for philosophy does not wish to be edifying as your hero says. I am not aware of a ''sequence of the Symposium-Phaedo-Phaedros"; considering the low position of Phaedros compared with the others there in the Symp<osium>,one could say that the Symp<osium> is "higher" than the Phaedrus. Your suggestion that at the end of the Symp<osium> all are dead except Socrates, and at the end of the Phaedo all are alive except Socrates, is very appealing. But this does not yet justify your assertion that the Symp<osium> is a comedy and the Phaedo a tragedy. All the Dialogues are tragicomedies. (The tragedian is awake while the comedian is sleeping at the end of the Symp<osium>.) The dramatic hypothesis of the Symp<osium> is that Plato reveals what happened prior to the Sicilian expedition: not Alc<ibiades>,but Socrates divulges the mystery. I am also attracted by the alternative regarding the Symp<osium>-Phaedo as stated by you: whether it is better to live among the dead or to die in the society of the dull. Regarding "ideal
numbers" I trust you have read Klein's detailed analysis in his book on
logistics and algebra. I was extremely interested and gratified but not
altogether surprised to learn of your discoveries regarding Julian &c. Mysticism is one form in which philosophy can appear (cf.
beginning of the Sophist). Your discovery makes the possibility of Farabi more intelligible. As regards Sallustius, if the division into
chapters is authentic, 17 is of course the right place: 17 is the number
designating
What you say about the volume to be written in my honor was news to me. Needless to say that I shall feel greatly honored by anything you would write. I expect to send you on one of the next days a copy of an essay of mine on Machiavelli's Prince. I hope to have finished my book on Machiavelli by the end of this year. Therefore I must concentrate absolutely on this work and cannot even look up the neo-Platonists whom you made so interesting to me. Bloom will do it for me. Are you well? As ever yours, Leo Strauss LS: mfg *** May 28, 1957 M. Alexandre Kojeve
Dear Mr. Kojeve: I have now found the time to read your long letter on Plato. I was unable to look up the texts. I simply tried to follow your argument and to see whether it agrees with what I believe to have been the understanding of Plato. I am sending your letter today to Klein, who promised to read it at the end of the semester, i.e., after June 15th. It is not impossible that you will hear from him then. The combination "Parmenides ... Phailebus" makes sense. But so do other combinations, i.e., the combination is arbitrary. One cannot separate as you do Timaeus-Critias from the Republic e.g., the Cephalus in the Parmenides alone suffices to establish the connection with the Republic, which also begins with Cephalus. I disagree with your procedure. The interpretation of Plato always grows out of the thorough interpretation of each individual Dialogue, with as little reliance on extraneous information (even to begin with that supplied by other Platonic Dialogues) as possible. Certainly one cannot treat information supplied by Diogenes Laertius, &c. on the same level as what appears from the Dialogues themselves. This applies also and especially to the Protreptichos -- an exoteric writing of which only fragments survive -- I would tremble to base any inferences on that. What you say about Plato's presumed reaction to the Protreptichos in the Parmenides, amounts to this, that Plato maliciously treats Aristotle's criticism of the ideas as old hat with which Socrates was already thoroughly familiar in his earliest youth. While this attracts me as every ingenious malice would, I regard it as perfectly possible that these criticisms of the ideas were Platonic and perhaps even Socratic commonplaces, prior to Aristotle's birth. One cannot read the Republic without becoming aware of the criticism of the idea of the good as stated in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics; given the paradoxical character of the doctrine of ideas its criticism is implied in doxa [1] itself (therefore no need for Aristotle's genius). To understand Aristotle's criticism of Plato, the criticism of which criticism is according to you the thread of your heptalogy, I myself would start from that part of Aristotle's criticism of Plato with which I am most familiar, the critique of the Republic in Politics II. Aristotle's criticism is absolutely reasonable, he understands perfectly what Plato is doing, but he refuses to treat as ironical what is meant ironically, because he believes that it is possible and necessary to write treatises and not merely Dialogues; therefore, he treats the dialogic thesis of the Republic as a treatise thesis; undoubtedly because he believes that wisdom and not merely philosophy is available. This seems to me to be the difference between Plato and Aristotle, a difference which presupposes the acceptance by both of the doctrine of ideas, Le., of the doctrine that the whole is characterized neither by noetic homogeneity (the exoteric Parmenides, and all "mathematical" philosophy) nor by sensible heterogeneity (four elements, &c.) but by noetic heterogeneity. Before I turn to this main point, some details. Contrary to what you say, I think that Theatetus is superior to Theodorus. Theodorus is a typical mathematician: nice, unreflective, tactless, lacking instinct, and therefore falls victim to a philosopher (Protagoras) who denies the truth of mathematics itself. (Hence his pupil, Theatetus, does not even think of mathematics when trying to answer the question of what knowledge or science is.) Theatetus is superior: he can converse with Socr<ates>, he is not "stupid and vain," he is indeed not a philosopher; but if the "moderate" Theatetus (he accepts God's making the whole in deference to the Eleatic Stranger) and the "bold" younger Socrates could be combined, they would make a philosopher. (The relation of Theat<etus> and the younger Socrates is the same as that of Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Republic.) The boldness of the younger Socr<ates>: he is the addressee of the myth of the Statesman, the most massive meaning of which is denial of Providence -- it is the ugly myth. (Generally the Statesman is ugly.) Constant dissatisfaction, always something is begun and then dropped unfinished, imitation of Sisyphean human life, of the life of even the philosopher, how it would be without Eros; the Eleatic Stranger advises Socrates to commit suicide, i.e., not to resist the condemnation; the Eleatic Stranger had caught the Sophist (Socrates) and could hand him over to the king, in the Sophist, but in the Statesman he catches the king, so that the sophist could be freed, (but it is not worthwhile in your age, Socrates.) In a word, the Eleatic Stranger is far from being "a parrot". -- As for the depreciation of Astronomy in Republic VII, this must be understood in the line of the basic hypothesis of the Republic (unreasonable depreciation of ''body"); the status of the visible heaven is restored at the end of Republic IX. -- The Aristotelian "mean" is not "relativistic". Plato's notion of the Metrion, Prepon, and Hikanon [2] is fundamentally the same. -- Regarding the irrelevance and stupidity of Antisthenes, I entirely concur (on the basis of Xenophon's Symposium). Cephalus at the beginning of Parm<enides> reminds of Cephalus at the beginning of the Republic. The latter sacrifices to the gods instead of philosophizing. I assume that the same is true of Cephalus of Clazomeneae -- in a way. Claz<omenae> reminds of Anaxagoras' Nous: Anax<agoras>, intelligently understood, would lead to theo-teleology, i.e. perfectly rational account of everything, [3] including the [3] irrational or meaningless or accidental. But this is not philosophy, but rather piety or sacrificing to the gods. Philosophy consists in the escape into Logoi, ideas. In the Parm<enides>, the ideas are represented as separate from the sensible; this thesis has no difficulty for Socr<ates> . As far as opposites are concerned and especially the moral opposites: the latter, as "ideal" ends, necessarily transcend what men achieve. He is doubtful regarding the idea of "man" (cf. the finger, in the Republ<ic>,) and especially low things (let me say, worms). But as Par<menides> warns him, this is due to Socrates' youthful contempt for the low and humble, and this contempt means to remain under the spell of popular prejudice. The primary correction, therefore, is this: if philosophy's quest is for the knowledge of the whole, and if the whole must be understood in the light of ideas, there must be ideas of "everything." One must therefore turn to the primary meaning of Idea, or Eidos, as class, as a whole, which is a whole by virtue of a specific character, and this character is in the case of living beings at the same time the end for the individual belonging to the class, and in this sense transcends the individuals (the animal's dominating desire for procreation or for perpetuation of the class.) In the case of man, the end is complex because man is both simply a part of the whole (like the lion or the worm) and that unique part of the whole which is open to the whole. (Only the souls of men have seen the ideas prior to birth.) Therefore, man's form and end is articulated in such a way that justice can come to sight provisionally as simply transcendent, and in no way "the perfection of man." There is a realm of ideas; hence there must be a hierarchy, an organizing principle: the idea of the good. But as the highest principle it must be the ground not only of the ideas, but of the sensible as well. Hence the idea of the good is "the Good". The problem of diaeresis is the problem of the organization of the realm of ideas, and in particular the problem of the knowability of that organization. If wisdom is not available but only philosophy, the diaeresis as descent from One to all ideas is not available. We live and think in the derivative and ascend to some extent, but not to the origin of things. The actual diaeresis reflects this in the arbitrariness of its beginning. (The divisions of the Sophist and the Statesman are caricatures; the principle of the caricature is mathematical simplification like division of even numbers by two). The adequate division would presuppose that one could deduce all ideas, especially also the ideas of living; it would presuppose a "rational biology"; this is impossible (see Timaeus); hence what is available is a dualism of a hypothetical mathematical physics and a non-hypothetical understanding of the human soul. The difference between Plato and Aristotle is that Aristotle believes that biology, as a mediation between knowledge of the inanimate and knowledge of man is available, or Aristotle believes in the availability of universal teleology, if not of the simplistic kind sketched in Phaedo 96. The main point: you have not used your assumption or admission that according to Plato wisdom is not available. If one takes this as seriously as one must, the vision of the One-Good which is mediated by division, and hence the division itself, is not available. As for the choice between Plato and Hegel, I agree with you that Suez and Hungary are more interesting and more real than the Sorbonne; but what has the Sorbonne to do with Philosophy? The analogon with the Sorbonne is not Suez and Hungary, but the more inept kind of deputies and sous-prefets. In conclusion, I am sure that the community of ideas is absolutely essential, but I simply do not have the time at the moment to develop this. Hoping to hear from you soon again, As ever yours, Leo Strauss LS:mfg *** Paris, July 1, 1957 Dear Mr. Strauss, Many thanks for your letter of May 28, 1957. It is, of course, difficult to discuss our theses in writing. But I have no one nearby with whom discussion would be meaningful [as regards Weil, I must, belatedly, admit that you were entirely right: he is not a "philosopher"; and Koyre is a little "dotty": and besides, rather too "sceptical;" anything else is simply not worth even considering!] To anticipate: Your letter has ... confirmed me in my conviction (which, naturally, is entirely "natural"). I tell myself: if one of the two Plato experts has no more massive objections than that, then my interpretation is surely possible and perhaps even correct. Your letter disappointed me greatly in only one, admittedly decisive, point. I refer to the koinonia ton genon. [1] For with regard to it, the "systematic" state of affairs is absolutely unequivocal (although I have known this for only about a year). If the concept (and hence knowledge) is to be eternal, that is to say "spatial" and not "temporal," then koinonia [2] is sheer nonsense and can therefore only be used as a reductio ad absurdum (either as a mere consequence of empiricism, or as a claim by Eudoxus; which is likely, in view of the well-known passage in the Metaph<ysics>). If koinonia [2] is taken seriously, it would follow that the concept is not eternal. One is then faced with choosing between Heraclitean "relativism" (= historicism in the fashion of Max Weber) according to which: concept = temporal; and Hegelian "absolutism," according to which: concept = time ("time" = completed history; knowledge = re-called [completed] history). [3] Now, to make an Hegelian (let alone an Heraclitean) of Plato; is simply not possible. Be that as it may: if the koinonia [2] is true, then your entire interpretation of Plato is false; that is to say, Plato is then not an "Ancient." However I believe that your interpretation of the Ancients is entirely correct, and that that is why koinonia [2] cannot be seriously maintained by an ancient philosopher (Eudoxus was, after all, only a philosopher in the sense that, say, Einstein is one!) Klein also admits as much -- implicitly -- in his Algebra Essay (which is otherwise first rate!). For he says that the logos (he of course means the ancient, that is to say, eternal Logos) is transcended by the koinonia. Certainly! But if for Plato it were a matter of maintaining silence, then the theos-agathon [4] would be entirely sufficient (cp. the "first hyp<othesis >" of the Parm<enides>). After all, the entire doctrine of ideas was invented in order to make discursive knowledge possible. Hence, if the doctrine of ideas is reduced to silence by koinonia, then that is a reductio ad absurdum of koinonia, at least as Plato understands it. [The Ancients proceed on the basis of two axioms: 1. Knowledge = eternal, that is to say, infinitely repeatable speech that does not change in meaning over time; (this axiom is "evident" and is naturally retained by Hegel); 2. Knowledge = a (discursive) sense [5] that "corresponds" to an "essence" subsisting outside speech and its sense; [this is naturally "senseless"; necessarily leads to skepticism; is not recognized by Hegel; according to Hegel, the "eternal" in speech is guaranteed by its completeness (its circularity shows or "proves" completeness): whoever has said everything can only repeat himself, and no one can contradict him]. 3. From the Ancients' axioms it follows that: there can be knowledge only of eternal beings; regarding the temporal (always understood as in-complete) there can only be opinion which can, however, be right if it agrees with its object; but since that object is temporal, "right" knowledge of it is also temporal, and that is precisely not genuine knowledge but a (by definition changeable) opinion. 4. The eternal, on the other hand, is un-changeable, and hence koinonia is there either impossible or it is a mere mixture: the night of the absolute, in which all cows are black.] Besides, Plato says so himself in the Soph<ist> (although "ironically"). The Stranger says that everything can be mixed except motion and rest. Now, everyone knows that there are different speeds and mixing motion and rest is a perfectly obvious thing to do! Much more so than, for example, to mix being and not-being. The fact that the Stranger regards it as "self-evident" that the mixture of motion and rest has to be rejected strikes one as comical. However what it means is: rest = idea, motion = phenomenon, these two should, then, not be mixed. So that the point is only to establish the chorismos [6] of the ideas (in the name of Eudoxus who in fact denies the separateness of the ideas!). Koinonia, on the other hand, is motion. Hence there is no koinonia ton genon [7] [which is to say, no koinonia ton ideon; [8] for the genos [9] is Aristotelian-Eudoxian, and among kinds or species there indeed is koinonia; which is why there can be no knowledge of these gene, that is to say of sensible kinds or species]. There is also an ad hominem argument in the Soph<ist>. The Stranger says two or three times that without koinonia, it is impossible to understand the "essence" of the Sophist. So that the world of ideas has to be set in motion in order to understand the Sophist?! That is a typically Homeric-Heraclitean-"Protagorean" attitude: a goddess is supposed to tell of a man's anger! De facto there simply is no knowledge of the Sophist because he has no [eternal] essence (is, after all, but a Proteus!): one can only have an opinion (right or wrong) about the Sophist. That is indicated by the following, among other things, that (at the end of the Statesman) Socrates thanks the Stranger not for the "pathbreaking discovery" of the koinonia, but solely for the good ( = correct = resembling) portraits ( = images) of the Sophist and of the Statesman (who themselves are only "images"). That an unwitting half-Hegelian like N. Hartmann waxes enthusiastic for koinonia (Platos Logik des Seins) [10] -- is only "natural." But how can you in the same breath fight Hegel and regard koinonia as true -- that I really do not understand. But I believe that a re-reading of the Soph<ist> / States<man> would persuade you. If only by the way the Stranger is introduced in them by Plato. 1. The Stranger, like "Pythodorus," is a disciple of Parmenides and of Zeno ("Zeno" = betrayer = Sophist) (216a). 2. He is introduced as a "Philosopher." But ... by Theodorus. Now, in the Theatetus Theodorus did not understand irony, and he accepted at face value the caricature Socrates sketched (in connection with "Thales"); what is more, he recognized himself in that "portrait"! But in fact it was the portrait of a <"learned man" or> "scholar" = a Sophist. Thus, if for Theod<orus> the Stranger is a "Philosopher," then for us (and "in himself") he is a Sophist. More precisely: "a man of theoretical learning." (In fact: Eudoxus.) 3. Socrates's reaction to Theodorus's introduction of the Stranger is typically ironic (216a/b), and reproduces Socrates's usual ironic exaggeration when he deals with famous Sophists. Moreover, Socrates defines the Stranger as an "adversary": "to survey and refute, he, the divine refuter, the poor reasoners we are" (216, b). The irony is here manifest. Whereupon the Stranger is introduced (by Theodorus) as a kind of parrot: "he admits having heard as many lectures as he could, and not to have forgotten them" (217b, in fine). De facto this means: Eudoxus has not invented anything new; he only repeats the basic doctrines of "Zeno" = "Heracliteanism" = Megera; yet he is so unphilosophical as to carry this doctrine ad absurdum, without even noticing that he does so; in the Sophist Plato does nothing else than to spell out these absurd consequences implicit in the Eudoxian theory: namely, the koinonia doctrine. Finally, the Stranger's [11] behavior [11] (= Method) is shown as typically sophistic: "with a docile and accommodating partner (such as, for example, Thaetetus, and "learned" people in general), the easiest [!] way is with an interlocutor. Failing which, it is better to argue by oneself alone." (217c/d) But as I said, the koinonia problem is too fundamental to admit of being settled by correspondence. To be sure, the diairesis problem is just as fundamental (and corresponds to the first), but here your answer seems to me to rest on a misunderstanding. I expressed myself badly. Admittedly Plato denies the possibility of wisdom = absolute [discursive!] knowledge, whereas Aristotle allows this possibility. But the question I had in view is a different one. Since Kant we know that the "categories" (= divisions of being) may be valid for the "things-in-themselves" ( = ideas, in Platonic terminology), but cannot be applied to the things-in-themselves (by men). In other words, what is at issue is the ontological structure as such. That is what Plato and Aristotle quarrel about (i.e. in the Soph<ist>-States<man>. In formal logical terms, the quarrel can be defined in the following way, that Aristotle speaks about contraries (with mesotes [12]), whereas Plato has contradictories (without mesotes) in view (cp. especially 257b in fine). The Aristotelian theory (contraries + mesotes), effectively denies the radical difference between good and evil (= not-good) (cp. 258a: "hence the non-just must also be placed on the same level as the just"). That is the real reason for rejecting this "Aristotelian" method of division (which is illustrated ironically by means of concrete examples in the Sophist-Statesman in order to show that it leads to a mixing of the kinds, namely not of the next (proximate) kind [the only ones about which Aristotle, quite sensibly, speaks], but of the "higher" kinds, as far as good-evil). Thus: there are two differences between Plato and Aristotle. Namely: 1. Both agree in saying that for us (pros hemos) all that is possible (or at least discursively possible), is an "induction" (from "below" to "above"), whereas "in itself" (physei [13]) the order is "deductive" (from "above" to "below"). But according to Plato there is a break in the induction pros hemos [14] (because of the aoristos dyas [15]): the One (= agathon [16]) reveals itself (if at all) not in the logos [17] (discursively) but in ecstasy (silently); but from silence, anything, that is to say nothing, can be "deduced." According to Aristotle (who replaces the dyad by the ether, that is to say who interprets the kosmos noetos [18] as Uranus) there is no break, and it is possible for us to return to the sensory "manifold" "deductively" after we have inductively ascended to the One (= Nous [19]), Thus: discursive wisdom or system as absolute knowledge (to speak with Hegel). [Only with this difference, that "reality" [20] is not, as it is in Hegel, completed [21] (human) history, but eternal revolution of the heavenly bodies ("the logos become flesh" = planetary sphere and not an "earthly phenomenon," for example, man)]. 2. Independently of knowledge for us, there is a difference in their conception of the in itself (and in my letter I spoke exclusively about that difference. According to Plato, there is
The number of these "intermediates" is determined in a purely empirical fashion since they are natural kinds (cp. Parts of Animals I -- the polemic against the Plat<onic> diairesis [23]). [I believe that Nic<omachean > Eth<ics> 1094b 25; I095a 32; l098a 27 is not only directed against Plato in general, but specifically against his diaeresis, which admittedly distinguishes very precisely between A and non-A, but leaves the classification of the mesotes [24] more or less "indeterminate."] I also do not put much stock in the historical tradition. Still, it seems to me incredible that, as you assume, Plato should not have taken diairesis seriously, but should have been serious about koinonia, [25] whereas [26] Aristotle never so much as mentions koinonia but frequently speaks about Plat<onic > diairesis and criticizes it, and when he does so, he manifestly has my scheme in view. I guess that that is the most essential. However, I do want briefly to speak to the other points in your letter. 1. You reprove me for separating the Tim<aeus>-Crit<ias> from the Rep<ublic> and in that connection you say that Cephalus" represents a mixture between the Republic and ... the Parm<enides>. I don't understand what you mean by that. For me, the Rep<ublic > -- Summa Theologica, and the Parmenides ---> Philebus -S<umma > contra Gentiles (in 7 Books). To be sure, "Cephalus" is a link between the two: in the Rep<ublic >, Ceph<alus> = head of a "Civil" (not a philosophical) family; in the Parm<enides>, Ceph<alus> (= Plato) = head of a philosophical "family" (= Academy). In both cases, the "sons" (in the Parm<enides >: Aristotle) are "corrupted" by the Sophists. The Tim<aeus> -Crit<ias> are not related to the Rep<ublic > directly but indirectly, through the Parm<enides> + Th<eatetus> ---> Soph<ist> ---> States<man> . In fact, the summary at the beginning of the Tim<aeus> is a summary of the States<man>, and not of the Rep<ublic >. (This last point has long been known, and it has led to the absurd hypothesis of a proto-Republic, as if a Plat<onic> dialogue could be assembled from disparate pieces!) 2. My interpretation proceeded on your own method: I was looking for a way to distinguish the positive from the negative (either evil = not good, or good = not-evil) and reread the Sophist; whereupon I noticed the ironical character of the divisions; this led me to the States<man>; then back to the Th<eatetus> ; then to the Parm<enides>; and only then to the Tim<aeus> / Crit<ias> because of the summary at the beginning. Then the Phil<ebus> proved to be the "crown" of the whole: beatitude as neither-nor, and the "mixture" (= as well as = koinonia) as "sophistry." The Protepticus, Diogenes Laertius, etc., came much later (when I read Jager's Aristotle, and I do not even regard them as confirmations; now, I do not want to be in the position of saying: "Arist<otle> misunderstood Plato!" [Although he sometimes consciously falsified him, but always in such a way that the letter of the Aristot<elian> text is correct: "In the Tim<aeus>, Plato," can also mean: the "Timaeus" Plato made up (for polemical purposes); but a reader can also take the Tim<aeus> at face value. 3. I never said that Aristotle invented the criticism of the theory of ideas. But Arist<otle>'s presence shows that he made this criticism his own (and it is certain that he did, since it reappears in the Met<aphysics>.) Now Pl<ato> could ignore the Megeran criticism of the theory of ideas; he had to respond to its being taken up by his own disciples, by Aristotle among others (the "gentiles" are not "pagans" but "heretics"!); and also to the presumed ''correction" of the theory of ideas by Eudoxus (which is philosophical nonsense: ideas without chorismos [27] simply are not ideas in the Plat<onic> sense). 4. I agree with your interpretation of the basic difference between Pl<ato> and Arist<otle> (in the sense of what I have said above on this subject). Certainly, both assume noetic heterogeneity. But they conceive of the structure of this "multiplicity" entirely differently (diairesis ≠ definition by prox<imate> genus). For Plato the ground of the multiplicity of the ideas is not spatial, but the dyad as such; hence the ideas are immovable (for Plato: motion = not-rest, i.e., rest = positive, mot<tion> = privation. In Arist<otle> this ground is aether, hence spatio-temporal, which is why the ideas = planets move (albeit in an circle). Aristotle is thus a philosophically not absurd theorist of Eudoxism (for in heaven there is no koinonia of the planets; the planets are "atomic," like the ideas; they form a "hierarchy," as a series of ordinal numbers, namely the ''lengths" of the radii; and nevertheless ... the planets move and are causes of the sub-lunar world, which is just what the unmoving ideas are not). 5. I never denied that Theat<etus> is intellectually "superior" to Theodorus. And the Stranger = Eudoxus is even more "superior" (intellectually). But none of them is a philosopher, and the Eudoxian "theory of ideas" is not a philo<sophical> theory. But morally the order is reversed: Theod<orus> is quite "decent"; Th<eatetus> -- so-so; the "second Socr<ates>" (= Arist<otle>) -- a "tyrant"; and the Stranger (= Eudoxus) a murderer! "Not worthwhile in your age, Socrates" etc. means: Eudoxus can "save" Platonism by bringing the doctrine of ideas in line with "the results of modern science." But Plato is too old to understand it (besides being too religious-poetic). This theme of age ( = anachronism) recurs time and again in the septet. [Be that as it may, Theatetus is nevertheless depicted as philosophically "dumb" and a "chatter-box" ("amateur-philosopher" in the manner of Einstein). For example: <Sophist> 262a in fine: "The Str<anger>: Hence names alone, said one after the other, no more make up speech, than do verbs unaccompanied by names. Theat<etus>: I didn't know that." [28] [!!!] <[> In other words: he is incapable of distinguishing between sensible (philo<sophical> discourse and pseudo-scientific chattering in the manner of Eudoxus.] If the Aristotelian mesotos
[29] is not a <form of> moral relativism, then
I don't know what the word (relativism) means. After all, it is nothing
else than the biological optimum. Admittedly there are only two
contraries; however the point is that both are "bad" (≠ optimum, and
instead,
either ex<cess> or defect); but the "good" mesotos is an "indeterminate
many," depending on the ... mode of life:
6. I, too, believe that Klazomenae is intended to bring Anaxagoras to mind. But approximately as follows: Aristotle (in the Met<aphysics>) criticizes Anax<agoras> for not having made use of Nous [30] as (final) cause; he directs the same criticism at Plato (the ideas are not causes); in the Phaedo Plato says the same thing, through clearly ironically (by making fun of teleology [say of Diogenes of Ap<ollonia>'s]; "The earth is the center of the cosmos only because it is better for it to be there!" etc.); "our Klazom<enae> "in the Parm<enides> would then mean: "we" (= Acad<emy>) by no means want to lower the ideas to the level of (efficient) causes of phenomena, as do those [for instance Eudoxus] who place the ideas in things; hence Xenophanes → Parmenides → Anaxagoras → Socrates → Plato, and not (Homer →) Heraclitus → Diogenes → Eudoxus → Aristotle. Parm<enides>'s "warning" to Socr<ates> not to disdain worms and dust is, in my opinion, ironic: that is the criticism directed at Plato by the "learned" (besides, Socrates is by no means "persuaded" by Parmenides's remark). It seems to me altogether impossible to assume (Platonic!) ideas of worms and dust: there are no ideas of the negative (the idea is A, and non-A is no idea; more precisely: as non-A it "participates" in the idea of A, but as non-A it is only a function of the aoristosdyas [31]; worm and dust are "privations" of the "complete" animal and the "complete" mineral. That seems to me to be a basic principle of Platonism, in contrast to Aristotelianism, for which worm and dust are "between" A and non-A (mesotes!). As regards the soul, I understand it approximately as follows: soul = A (idea); body = non-A (matter ← dyad); non (non-A) = A [solely on the basis of diairesis, without koinonia!]; that is to say: only when the body is "negated" does the soul become "pure" idea, and only man can "negate" his body (on the basis of diairesis without koinonia, which precisely allows the body to be understood as non-A, where the Non, which appears as space-time, is derived from the non-existing dyad.) In practical terms that means: one should abandon the polis, practice dialectic in the Academy, live accordingly, and one may then perhaps as a (for an instant) "pure idea" coincide (for an instant) with the One-Good. In short, Plotinus is a genuine Platonist, and the "astrolatry" of the Tim<aeus>, Laws X, Epinomis is either purely ironical, or forged (by the Eudoxian Speusippus), or ... preached to the "people" for reasons of state. 7. Yes; diairesis is intended to show the hierarchy of the ideas which, inasmuch as they form a hierarchy, can be represented by (ordinal) numbers. But it is very difficult to do so, perhaps it is impossible to do so de facto (as long as one remains in the Non-). However, the divisions of the Soph<ist>-States<man> are Aristotelian, and have nothing in common with Platonic diairesis, precisely because they do not lead to hierarchy, but assume a juxtaposition of the species <or kinds>.
(also no difference between left/right, straight/crooked, or ideas/world). 8. The entire difference between Plato and Aristotle rests on the
discovery
of de facto biological cycles ( I am afraid that this letter will not clarify the issue, but only confuse it further. It would naturally be so much better to be able to talk about all this. But when? And where? Incidentally, I have read our Jerusalem lecture. [34] Surely the best thing I have read of yours: extremely clear, dense, and brilliant. But to speak about "the Moderns" without mentioning Hegel and Marx?! Up to Rousseau everything moves along very well, but then there is a gap, and we come to ... Max Weber and Oppenheimer! That is to say to endless, that is to say senseless so-called "history" (without "Napoleon"). It is naturally not difficult to show the absurdity of such a "philosophy." But what about a certain Hegel, who spoke of the end-state and absolute knowledge, and the people called Marx, etc., who actualize it? Is the silence about these people intended to be "pedagogic" (or dema-gogic? since you are addressing an audience of grown-ups)? Or is the sacred soil responsible for that? Otherwise, I am much better, and I am glad to hear that you, too, are better. Well -- I hope we will still be able to see and speak with one another. With warmest greetings your Kojeve P.S. Enclosed a copy of a Note for my "book" that will not be published! [35] *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO Sept. 11, 1957 M. Alexandre Kojeve
Dear Mr. Kojeve: It was only last week that I could read your typewritten statement and your letter. I had had a minor illness, no real vacation and I'm feeling very tired. My general reaction to your statements is that we are poles apart. The root of the question is I suppose the same as it always was, that you are convinced of the truth of Hegel (Marx) and I am not. You have never given me an answer to my questions: a) was Nietzsche not right in describing the Hegelian-Marxian end as "the last man"? and b) what would you put into the place of Hegel's philosophy of nature? I am under the impression that you read Plato from your Hegelian point of view without sufficiently waiting for what would reveal itself as Plato's view by simply listening to Plato and strictly adhering to his suggestions. You take for granted that the "ideas" are "concepts" and that Plato is exclusively concerned with the "ideas" and not with the "soul". Hence you are certain that there cannot be ideas of the "sensible species". Without a previous solution of the question ''of which things are there ideas and of which things are there no ideas" there cannot be a fruitful discussion of the community of ideas. Your whole interpretation appears to me schematic and arbitrary. Apart from the dialogues you use the Aristotelian reports. The Aristotelian reports are of course most competent but they do not answer the question of how definitely or how seriously Plato asserted the things Aristotle says he asserted. (Incidentally, precisely Aristotle's report should induce one to ascribe to Plato the assertion that there are "ideas of the sensible species".) I am not satisfied that there are Platonic dialogues devoted to criticism of Aristotle and that the dialogues devoted to the criticism of Aristotle are the seven mentioned by you. In particular I regard it as impossible to divorce the Timaeus and the Critias from the Republic as you do. I see only two points in your exposition regarding which we can at least begin to have a conversation. The two points are the Eleatic Stranger and the Critias. I am absolutely certain that the stranger is not a parrot and that you misinterpret completely his introduction by Theodorus and Socrates' welcoming speech. On the other hand I believe that you are right in saying that there is something wrong about his assertion concerning the community of rest (ideas) and motion (non-ideas). This does not prove however that he lacks comprehension, for every Platonic dialogue is based on the deliberate disregard of something crucially important, and what is right for the Platonic Socrates is right also for the Platonic Eleatic Stranger. Briefly, the separateness of the ideas makes it impossible to understand the whole which consists of onta and gignomena; [1] it makes it impossible to understand the soul (and therefore the philosopher who can only be understood in contradistinction to the non-philosopher). In order to overcome the separateness the stranger assimilates onta and gignomena (motion and rest) and he expresses this thought most radically by defining being as acting and suffering which (acting and suffering) as far as I understand Plato cannot be said of the ideas; the stranger wrongly but not ignorantly abstracts from the radical difference between onta and gignomena. Instead of assimilating onta and gignomena one must seek for the bond between them, but the thesis of the stranger is superior to the mere chorismos-thesis <separateness-thesis> because it is based on an awareness of the fundamental inadequacy of the bare separateness thesis. I suspect that the Timaeus in its doctrine of the soul brings out the "bond" solution to the problem -- at the price of abstracting from something else of utmost importance. (What that something else is I do not yet know.) The mere fact that the Stranger is the murderer of Parmenides shows that he is not a parrot. Cf. also the Beauty of the non-corrected Eleatic thesis: "there is only the One" and the philosopher-sophist states man are three, whereas I believe the Eleatic thesis as corrected by the stranger is to the effect "the one consists of many" and "philosopher sophist-statesman" is One. Regarding the Critias I make this suggestion: The Republic deals with the "city in speech", the Timaeus with the "cosmos in deed" and the Critias with the "city in deed": the cosmos in speech is missing ("the fourth is missing"): the promise of Hermocrates' speech conceals the not promised but required speech by Plato himself. The city in deed is necessarily inferior to the city in speech -- it is necessarily "diluted", the good is identified with the ancestral (therefore the best city in speech is necessarily Athenian; the Critias shows that the best city abounds not only in virtue but in gold as well). The city in deed must be the city in motion and motion means war. The biggest war of historical Athens was the Sicilian expedition and this was an unjust war and it ended in a defeat. The ideal war of "old Athens" must therefore be a just war (a war of defence) with a super Sicily (the biggest island in the farthest West) ending in an Athenian victory. The description of the most glorious Athenian deed cannot be given by an Athenian for reasons of propriety (see the much more limited praise of Athens given by the stranger Aspasia in the Menexenus). Now, the victory of Athens over "Sicily" has of course also a transpolitical meaning as you will be the first to admit (Hermocrates was the chief man responsible for Athens' defeat in the Sicilian expedition; Timaeus comes from southern Italy which is almost Sicily; Elea is in southern Italy; and last but not least the Cephalus of the Republic and his family stem from the same region). One must also not forget the invasion of Athens by Parmenides in the Parmenides. In brief Sicily, "the West", tries to conquer Athens but is defeated by Athens. This, if I understand you correctly, is exactly what you say, but this victory of Athens over Sicily is asserted by Critias, a somewhat dubious figure, and Plato prevents him from telling his story. It seems to me that the incomplete character of the Critias means exactly this: the victory of Athens over Sicily is a half victory and therefore also a half-defeat. You will disagree with my final conclusion but it is obvious that you can use all my other statements regarding the Critias very well for your purposes. Yet this statement could not have been arrived at except by adhering to the unambiguous Platonic suggestion that the Timaeus and Critias belong with the Republic and this proves that one must stick much more closely than you do to the obvious donnees platoniques. (Critias is a competitor of Alcibiades and Alcibiades is the instigator of the Sicilian expedition.) I hope that you continue to be in good health. I expect to have finished my study on Machiavelli by the end of this year. Yours LS *** Geneva, 10.24.57. My dear friends, Truth to tell, I have absolutely nothing to tell you. Which is to say that regarding A<...> and myself everything is going well. I am in Geneva, where I expect to spend 5-6 weeks: Common Market meetings. At the margins of "great politics," [1] I granted myself a most restful [2] working party, which allows me to read and write while meetings are in session: specifically this letter. Enclosed a slip with three books. I would be most grateful if you could have them sent to me (in Vanves). I have read the Rosan book about Proclus recommended by Hering. Not very "profound," but very clear and apparently accurate. A useful book. But it also contains the "biography" of Pr<oclus> by "Marinus"! Without commentary and taken 100% seriously. Now, in fact, and as I had assumed after reading the vita Isidori, this "Marinus" is clearly nothing but a pseudonym of my friend Damascius, and the so- called "biography" nothing but a shameless mockery of its hero. It is written in the style of the vita. If you want to be amused, I greatly recommend that you read this "Marinus" in Rosan, Proclus (N.Y. 49). It takes up only 22 pages. But as I suspect that you will not choose to read them, I will copy a few particularly tasty passages. III. ... Everyone of these [physical virtues] was naturally present in our blessed philosopher from birth, and their traces could be seen clearly even in that external oyster-like shell of his ... He was so beautiful that, although all his pictures are excellent, none of the painters was able completely to capture his likeness, that all remained far behind in the imitation of his true form ... [In this connection Rosin points out in a note: A portrait-bust has been found ... It is one-third broken and has a peculiarly hooked nose"]. IV. ... It is astonishing that those basic qualities of the soul, which he had spontaneously. and innately, were the same parts of virtue that Plato considered to be the elements of a philosophical character ... IX.... He learned Aristotelian philosophy under Olympiodorus . Now Olympiodorus was known as an able speaker, but because of the ease and rapidity with which he spoke, only a few of his hearers could understand him ... ... The logical writings of Arist., which are difficult to understand for those who read them, he [Proclus] nevertheless easily learned by heart, and at a single reading ... XIII. Within less than two years, Syrianus [one of the <...> of the Vita Isidori] read with him all the writings of Arist<otle> in logic, ethics, politics, physics and even theology. And after going through these sufficiently as if they were preparatory rites or lesser mysteries, he led him, systematically and not, as the [Chaldean] Oracle says "by enormous steps", up to the greater mysteries of Plato, and revealed their truly divine visions to the untainted eyes of his soul and the pure gaze of his mind. And Proclus, on his own part, by constant practice and attention, both day and night, and by writing down everything that was said in the form of a summary with his own opinions produced in a short time so much that by the age of 28 he has written his Comm<mentary> on the Timaeus as well as many other commentaries, all finely done and full of learning. Such an occupation improved his character even more, because he added knowledge to his moral virtues. XIV. He also acquired the political virtues from the writings of Ar<istotle's> Polit<ics> and from the Laws and the Rep<ublic> of Plato. So that even in this no one might say he was concerned with words alone and not with deeds; since his preoccupation with higher things prevented him from taking part in political affairs himself, he persuaded the pious Archiadas to do this, by teaching him the political virtues ... XV. Proclus showed that he possessed a Herculean courage even in politics And when his enemies, like a horde of giant vultures, tried to put him on trial [or perhaps: annoyed him excessively], he left Athens in obedience to the Revolution of the Whole, [3] and travelled to Asia. Actually this was all for the best, for his guardian Spirit really provided him with this pretext for the journey so that he might be initiated into the ancient rites that were still preserved there ... Acting and living in this fashion, he passed even more unnoticed than the Pythagoreans [Epicureans??], who firmly obeyed that command of their master to "live unnoticed" [lathe biosas]. But he spent only one [4] year in Lydia and returned to Athens by the Providence of the Goddess of philosophy. This was the manner in which Proclus gradually obtained his courage ... XVI. ... He was an excellent judge in every field. And whenever he found someone who was not taking his own work seriously, he severely censured him. It was this that made him appear very quick-tempered and quite emulous [cf. IV...: he appeared to us as to be by nature modest ...], because he wanted and was able to judge everything correctly. He was indeed emulous, but emulous only in respect to virtue and goodness; perhaps nothing great among human beings could be done without this kind of motivation. I also admit that he was quick-tempered. Nevertheless [5] he was mild at the same time, for he calmed down easily and quickly, becoming as soft as wax within a moment; -- one minute he would be scolding someone and the next minute because of his sympathetic nature he would be helping him ... XVII. I am glad that this sympathetic nature of his has come to my mind, for I believe that no other person can be said have been as sympathetic as he. Because he never desired a wife or children, although he had received many offers of marriage from noble and wealthy families, he was free of experience of having his own family, ... XVIII. ... We now come to his purifying virtues which are quite different from social virtues..... But the purifying virtues are superior to these..... The philosopher Proclus practiced these purifying virtues throughout his philosophical career, ..... He always did that which was conducive to separating the soul, and whether in the night-time or daytime, he would pray against evil demons, bathe himself, and use other methods of purification, both Orphic and Chaldean, such as immersing himself in the sea resolutely every month, or even twice or three times a month. And he did all this not only in the prime of his life, but even in his later years he religiously performed these customary actions. XX.... He was indifferent in this way not only to physical pain, but even more so to external evils, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Whenever these occurred he would always say; "that's [6] the way things are; that's the way they usually are". Which seemed to me to be a maxim that deserved to be memorized and which sufficiently proved the greatness of the philosopher's soul. As to anger, he tried to repress it as much as he could [cf. above XVI, in fine]. XXII. he arrived at higher [7] virtues ... which could no longer be called phronesis in the human sense but rather sophia or even some more reverent name. While he was absorbed with this, Proclus learned with ease all of Greek and non-Greek theology and also that truth that [8] had been hidden in the form of myths; he explained all these in a very enthusiastic manner ... He went through all the writings of previous authors and whatever he found that was fruitful he would select and combine ... In his lectures he was able to discuss each doctrine sensibly and he mentioned all of them in his writings. He had an unbounded love of work: sometimes he would teach five or more classes a day, write on the average about 700 lines of prose [Chrysippus, who was notoriously prolific, was said to write 300 lines], visit with other philosophers and then in the evening give lectures that were not based on any text; in addition to all this he would sleeplessly worship the gods every night and bow in prayer to the sun when it arose, at midday and when it set. XXIII. Proclus himself was the originator of many previously unknown doctrines in natural, intellectual and even more divine subjects. He was the first to claim that there was a genus of souls who were able to perceive many Ideas at one time and who occupied a middle position between the Nous which knows everything at once ... and those souls who can concentrate upon only one Idea at a time. Anyone who wishes to, may learn of his many other innovations by going through his works, which I cannot do now, since it would prolong this biography too greatly to mention all of them. But whoever does read his works will agree that what I have just said is true ... XXVI. ..... it was by means of these divine oracles that Proclus reached those highest virtues of the human soul which the inspired Iamblichus has excellently called "theurgic". For gathering the interpretations of previous philosophers together with proper judgment by a great deal of labour for five whole years [contra: "less than two years" for "all the writings of Arist<otle>." (cp. XIII above)], he brought together all the rest of the Chaldean literature and the most important commentaries on these divinely-given Oracles. In regard to this he had the following wonderful dream: the great Plutarch [Syriannus's teacher] appeared to him and foretold that he would live for as many years as there were four-page sheets in his works on the oracles; afterwards he counted these and found that there were 70. That the dream had been divine was proved by the close of his life. For [9] although he really lived, as was said before, for 75 years, during the last five years he was no longer strong. . . To be sure, he still prayed, even in this condition, composed hymns ... but he did everything in accordance with this weakened condition so that he marvelled whenever he thought of the dream and constantly said: "I have really lived for only 70 years [?!] [10] [compare with III: ... Fourthly he had health ... And he was gifted with this virtue from infancy so highly, that he was able to say that his body had been ill only two or three times in a long life of altogether 75 (sic!) years. The final proof of this, to which I myself can testify, was that he did not even recognize in his last illness what kind of suffering had befallen him, so rarely had he experienced pain. -- compare XXXII: [11] ... He had been afraid when he was in the prime of his life that the arthritis of his father might attack him also ... And it was not without reason that he feared this, because, as I should have said before, he was indeed suffering pain of this kind.]. XXVIII.... Proclus proceeded step by step; first he was cleansed by the Chaldean purification; then he held converse, as he himself mentions in one of his works, with the luminous [!] apparitions of Hecate which he conjured up himself; then he caused rain-falls by correctly moving the wry-neckbird wheel, [12] by this means he saved Athens from a severe drought. He proposed means to prevent earthquakes; he tested the divinatory power of the tripod; and even wrote verses about his own destiny ... XXXIII. But if I wanted to tell everything about him, such as his friendship with Pan, the son of Hermes, and the great kindness and aid which he received from this god in Athens, or if I related the good fortune that he obtained from the Mother of the Gods to whom he always prayed and in whom he greatly rejoiced, I would probably seem to some readers simply to be prattling and to others to be saying the incredible. For the many great things which this Goddess did for him and said to him almost daily were so numerous and so unusual to be written about, that I no longer remember them very clearly. But if anyone wishes to know more about his affinity with the Goddess, let him read his book on the Mother of the Gods [otherwise unknown!], for it will be seen how he reveals the whole theology of this Goddess [13] with divine inspiration and explains philosophically what is symbolically done or mythically said of her and Attis, so that no one need any longer be disturbed by hearing the seemingly absurd wails [14] and other things that are secretly said at her ceremonies. [Compare with Julian's equally ironic speech about the Mother of the Gods]. [These citations might suffice to elucidate the somewhat enigmatic meaning of the following passage from the Preface of the "Biography":] I. ... I was afraid lest, in the words of Ibycus, I might win the esteem of men by sinning, not against the gods, as he said, but against a wise man [sc. Proclus], especially since it would not have been right that I alone of all his friends should keep silent and should not, on the contrary, make every effort to tell the truth about him, in spite of the fact that of all men I was under the greatest obligation to speak out openly. Perhaps, in fact, I might not have even won men's esteem, because they would not have attributed to modesty my refusal to undertake this task but to mental laziness or even a worse fault of soul. For all these reasons, therefore, I felt myself compelled to set forth at least some of the countless superior accomplishments of the philosopher Proclus and some of the things that have been truly reported about him. [All in all: amicus Plato ...] But isn't the irony unmistakable? After you have read this letter, could you send it to Strauss in my name. I have spoken to him about Julian, Damascius, and "Sallustius." This "Marius" will complete the picture! As ever yours, K. *** Geneva, 11.5.57 Dear Mr. Strauss, Please excuse that I only now answer your letter of 9.11. But various things have interfered. I am here in Geneva (GATT meeting) and will probably stay here until the end of the month. To the issue: I fully agree with you that a "general" discussion of Plato does not make much sense. The only really sensible thing to do would be to read the 7 dialogues together. But for my part, the whole thing did not in any way arise from preconceived "general" views. On the contrary, rather by accident, I came across some passages from the Sophist that seemed to me "senseless" or sounded "ironic." Thereupon I read the other 6 dialogues, in which I found many similar passages. All this then led to a comprehensive interpretation that in itself made sense and, in my opinion, is also historically possible (but very much astonished me!). In my first (long) letter in this connection I cited many of these passages (without copying them), and briefly interpreted the whole thing. What I really expected from you was that you would take a specific stand on everyone of the passages in question. Well, time did not allow you (as you yourself have told me) to look up the passages themselves. Thus you answer only with "general" considerations about Plato, and the entire discussion gets sidetracked. I can only hope that when you are done with your Machiavelli you will have the time and the inclination to answer my first letter concretely (assuming that Klein has not lost it in the meantime [which would be a great pity, as it is my only writing dealing with the issue]). I attach particular importance to the first part of the Parmenides (up to the so-called "dialectic"). So far I am acquainted with only one concrete stand on your part: that regarding the Eleatic Stranger. Now, here I can really not understand why you refuse to see the ironical element in the depiction of the Stranger. Socrates's reaction is, after all, exactly the same as his reaction to Protagoras, Euthydemus, etc.: ironically exaggerating admiration of the "divine wisdom" of a sophist. Finally and in conclusion, the following may surely not be ignored: 1 ͦ The depiction of the "philosopher" in the Thaet<etus> is manifestly ironic; 2 ͦ Theodorus does not see the irony, takes the depiction seriously and recognizes himself in it [in which he is again right]; 3 ͦ The Stranger is introduced [in the Soph<ist>] by this Theodorus, as a philosopher. 4 ͦ That is to say: in the eyes of Theodorus, the Stranger corresponds to the depiction of the" philosopher" in the Thaet<etus>; hence in Plato's eyes, the Stranger is a "sophist"; more precisely, a "modern [= post-socratic] sophist, that is to say, a scholar [natural- scientific with "philosophical" pretensions; ! say, Plato has the "Pythodorus" of the Parm<enides> in mind [for me "Pythod<orus>" = Theodor<us> + Thaetetus + Eudoxus; that is to say, in the Sophist: Stranger = Eudoxus]. Here, then, is a concrete difference in our interpretations of Plato. But here, too, the question can probably be resolved only by a comprehensive interpretation of all relevant passages in the [7] dialogues. In the meantime I have read [Apud Rosan, Proclus, N.Y.] the supposed "biography" of Proclus by the so-called "Marianus." When I read the vita Isidori, I suspected that this "Marianus" was nothing but an alias for Damascius and that the "biography" might in fact be an "ironic" parody. Reading this "biogr<aphy>" has fully confirmed it [here I did indeed have a preconceived opinion!] The ''biogra<phy>" is a duplicate of the vita Isidori. I have copied some passages from it and sent them to Koyre with the request that he forward the letter to you. All this is interesting because Damascius emigrated to Persia and could have begun an oral tradition there that extends up to Farabi. I have tried in vain to get Bloom to read the vita Isidori [Isi-dar or Pytho-dor]. But he is busy with an Othello interpretation where he appears as Yahwe and Iago as Christ ... [1] I have not yet begun my Julian-essay (for your Festschrift), but I hope to be able to write it in Geneva. Perhaps with a short footnote about "Sallustius" -- Damascius -- "Marinus." But I would have liked first to know what you think about these texts. But that will hardly be possible. With heartiest cordial greetings. Your Kojeve *** Paris 5.15.58 Dear Mr. Strauss, Many thanks for sending me your Farabi. I have just read it. It is "first-class." [1] As you know, I am now more or less of the same opinion as Farabi. Only, for me F<arabi>'s "Socrates" is the historical Plato himself. Either the Laws are intended by Plato as Farabi understands them, or they are forgeries (by Philippos of Opus and Speusippus) (or: Books I-IX [in particular IX) forged, and X-XII re-written). Plato's real opinion is found in the Rep<ublic > + Statesman + (Tim<aeus> + Kritias) + Philebus. They deal exclusively with the "Academy," that is to say, with life together [2] in view of wisdom, [2] or philo-sophizing. This "Academy" ought to be a "monastery," that is to say, "separated" (chorismo) from the "world." The "lawgiver" is the Kephalos, the Head of the Academy [3]: he ought to be "sole ruler" and not bound by any "laws" (= prejudices). Etc. However: the "common" reader knows nothing of the Academy and thinks exclusively of the polis. Read that way, the Republic and the States<man> are deliberately "absurd": in the Republic the cynic-sophistic "communism" (including the ridiculous "community of women"), and in the States<man> ---- sophistic "tyranny." The entirely serious polemic (against Euclid-Eudoxus-Aristotle) revolves around the "politeia" inside the Academy; that is to say: 1) either dialectics (= genuine diairesis without "koinonia" [atomos eidos), or "logic" + "science"; 2) either "the good life" through the living model (paradigma) of the "leader," or -- "study." This genuinely platonic conception was tried ("monks") for a thousand years (by both Christians and Muslims), and degenerated into Bayle's Republic of Letters which remains "alive" to this day. Betrayal of the Intellectuals). [4] Genuine politicians (statesmen) were always opposed to this (as Julian already was): namely, what Plato may really have meant was of no concern to them, and what they (mis)understood of Plato was naturally "utopian" (because it could only be carried out by a "superhuman" tyranny). That is how it stood until Hegel-Marx: for they did not want either to destroy the Academy (= "monasteries") or to render them inactive and ineffectual, but wanted on the contrary to transform them into a "polis." For Hegel/Marx (but by no means for Plato), the philosophers ought indeed (and hence can) become "Kings" (Napoleon-mine) [naturally not the other way around, which would be "utopian"; whereas the phil<osopher's> becoming king is not at all utopian -- insofar as this "becoming" is a revolution]. [Something like this is perhaps also what Machiavelli had in view.] As for "the art of writing," it is possible that Farabi goes back to a tradition (oral?), namely to Damascius's teaching in Persia. He stayed there for only two years, but that might have been enough. Damascius himself goes back to Julianus. [In the Vita Procli, "Marianus" quotes almost literally from Julian's Speeches, and in the vita Isidori echoes of Julian can also be found.] And Julian was not alone (even disregarding his friend Sallustius). The entire so-called "Vespasian School" thought as he did, It is not a "school," and certainly not "mystical" or "neo-platonic," but rather "epicurean" or democritian. So was Julian, but as Emperor or "civil servant" he deliberately opposed the "epicureanism" ("gardens") of those "intellectuals" (cp. his speech to [ = against] Themistius). That is perfectly evident in Eunapius's Vita Soph. [6] (although Eunapius himself did not understand it): especially clearly in connection with Julian's greeting of Maximus (a typical "adventurer"). If you have the time, you must read Eunapius! With best greetings, Your Kojeve P.S. By the way, Julian was of the opinion (as were Dam<ascius> and Farabi) that Plato thought exactly as they did, and only never said so openly. *** Paris 2.17.59. Dear Mr. Strauss, Many thanks for the new book. [1] Although I know the lectures, the book seems to have come out very differently. I will certainly read it. Please excuse me for thanking you only now. But I was travelling: India, Siam, then Geneva. As a civil servant, naturally. I would like to hear what you think of my Julianus, [2] in which I publicly appear as a faithful Strauss-disciple. If you now have more time we might perhaps also resume our Plato dialogue. Klein naturally did not react at all. And you yourself did not have the time to check the passages I cited. In any event I would like it if I could have my first (long) Plato letter back. It must at present be with Klein. It is the only piece I have written on the question. I keep hoping I can go to the U.S. But I am now so "European" that it is not altogether easy. It appears that Gallimard (NRF) intends to have my posthumous works typed up: in exchange for the right to publish some parts post mortem. The latter is a matter of indifference to me. But as soon as I have a typescript, I will send it to you, for your judgment. Besides, Bloom has probably spoken to you about it. With best greetings, Your Kojeve *** Paris, 4.6.61 Dear Mr. Strauss, We have not written to each other for an eternity. I don't even know who first did not answer. The last thing I had from you was your Machiavelli. [1] I am not sure I wrote you about it. It seems to me that I did. In any event, the book is first class. I am naturally not in agreement with the conclusion suggested at the end. But that is not important. According to Hegel (Ph<enomenology> of M<ind>, propaganda in the modern sense was not discovered until the Enlightenment. According to you, it was discovered by Machiavelli. You appear to be right. But Hegel is also right, in the sense that mass- propaganda in the modern sense developed only in the 18th century. However, Machiavelli is also right (at least according to your interpretation), when he says that the "modern" system of propaganda is specifically Christian. In the meantime I have completed my Ancient Philosophy. Over 1000 pages. Taubes [2] has had them photocopied. In my view it is by no means "ready for publication." But if Queneau insists, I will not refuse. (To refuse would, in this case, also amount to taking oneself seriously!) Bloom is hard at work on his translation [3] and I hardly see him. On the other hand, I frequently talk with Rosen, [4] whom I rather like. He seems to me to be more serious than Bloom. In terms of health, I am quite well. My official work is very interesting and productive. I would enjoy hearing from you. With most cordial greetings, Your Kojeve *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO January 30, 1962 M. Alexandre Kojeve
Dear M. Kojeve: I write to you today at the request of Gadamer. He is very anxious that you should come to the opening meeting of the International Hegel Association which will take place at the end of July in Heidelberg and that you should give there a lecture. I suppose he wants you to present your overall interpretation of Hegel. I am sure it would be for the common good if you would give that lecture. Be so good as to let me know at your earliest convenience what you plan to do, so that I can inform Gadamer. The only reason why he did not write to you directly was that he thought that a letter from me to you might be more effective. How far advanced is your work? I am preparing a small book to be called "The City and Man," three lectures, one on the Politics, one on the Republic and one on Thucydides. My German book on Spinoza is in the process of being translated into English; I plan to write a very long preface to it containing my autobiography. Hoping to hear from you soon. As ever yours, Leo Strauss LS:ef *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO March 27, 1962 M. Alexandre Kojeve
Dear M. Kojeve: On January 30 I wrote to you as follows: "I write to you today at the request of Gadamer. He is very anxious that you should come to the opening meeting of the International Hegel Association which will take place at the end of July in Heidelberg and that you should give there a lecture. I suppose he wants you to present your overall interpretation of Hegel. I am sure it would be for the common good if you would give that lecture. Be so good as to let me know at your earliest convenience what you plan to do, so that I can inform Gadamer. The only reason why he did not write to you directly was that he thought that a letter from me to you might be more effective. How far advanced is your work? I am preparing a small book to be called "The City and Man," three lectures, one on the Politics, one on the Republic and one on Thucydides. My German book on Spinoza is in the process of being translated into English; I plan to write a very long preface to it containing my autobiography. Hoping to hear from you soon." Inasmuch as I have not received a reply would you please give this your earliest attention. As ever yours, Leo Strauss LS:ef *** 3.29.62 Dear Mr. Strauss, Please excuse me for not yet having answered your first letter. Oddly enough, I was planning to do so today, before I received the second letter. Well, the reason is that I could not decide to say no, although I had no desire to accept the invitation. The older I get, the less interested I am in so-called philosophical discussions. Except for yourself and Klein I have not yet found anybody from whom I could learn something. If you or Klein or both of you were to go to Heidelberg, I would naturally also come. But otherwise.... It is really a matter of utter indifference to me what the philosophical gentlemen think or say about Hegel. A few days ago I gave a lecture on dialectics at the College Philosophique of Jean Wahl [1] who had been asking me to do so for over five years. It was terrible. More than 300 very young people came, the room had to be changed, and nevertheless people sat on the floor. When one thinks that this happens only for lectures by Sartre! And that when I first spoke at the Ecole barely a dozen people were in attendance! But the worst was that all these youths set down everything I said. I tried to be as paradoxical and shocking as possible. But no one became indignant, no one thought of protesting. Everything was quietly written down. I had the impression of having become a kind of Heinrich Rickert. [2] In other words, an "old gent." The public, on the other hand, was typically Saint Germain and Cafe Flore (I spoke at a short -- at most 100 meters -- distance from it). So that at times I felt like some famous twist-teacher.... All this in order to tell you that I am becoming more and more "platonic." One should address the few, not the many. One should speak and write as little as possible. Unfortunately my Essay at a Reasoned History of Pagan Philosophy is to be published, and it comprises more than 1000 (sic) pages! With very best greetings, Your Kojeve P.S. Why do you never come to Europe? *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO May 29, 1962 M. Alexandre Kojeve
Dear M. Kojeve: I thank you for your letter of March 29. I informed Gadamer immediately. I understand your judgment on this kind of meetings and I am in the habit of acting on the same judgment. Your experience with the philosophic seminar of Wahl does not surprise me. If one wants to see young people who are not mentally in their seventies, one has to come to Chicago. Would it be at all possible for you to spend some time with us, assuming that the money could be raised? I am looking forward with the utmost interest to your history of pagan philosophy. I am glad to see that, as is indicated by the adjective, you have returned to the faith of your fathers. I myself have written a fairly long chapter on Plato (but only on his political philosophy) for a history of political philosophy which I am editing. My present preoccupation is with my old book on Spinoza which has been translated into English and for which I am writing a new preface, [1] intended to bridge the gulf between 1930 Germany and 1962 U.S.A. It comes as close to an autobiography as is possible within the bounds of propriety. In addition I am preparing for publication three lectures on the city and man, dealing with the Politics, the Republic and Thucydides. Only after these things have been finished will I be able to begin with my real work, an interpretation of Aristophanes. Klein claims to have finished his book on the Meno -- only three more months for checking on the footnotes -- but since he has said more or less the same three years ago I believe I shall have to wait another lustrum for its appearance. Hoping to hear from you soon. As ever yours, Leo Strauss *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO October 4, 1962 M. Alexandre Kojeve
Dear Mr. Kojeve: I am very sorry that it took me so long to reply to your letter of July 17. I was very glad to hear that you might be willing to pay us a visit here in Chicago. It is not impossible that we can arrange it financially in 1963, perhaps in the early months of that year. But in order to convince the authorities, I would have to know for how long a period you would be able to come; for a week, a month, a quarter (i.e., two months) or any other period. I must know this very soon, a brief postcard would be sufficient. I am very anxious to see the second edition of your book especially the supplement on Japan. With kindest regards. As ever yours, Leo Strauss LS:ef *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO November 16, 1962 M. Alexandre Kojeve
Dear M. Kojeve: I believe that a month's stay here would be perfectly agreeable to the authorities here. Unfortunately, the months June-September would be the worst from our point of view. What about April, or say April 10-May 10? Be so good as to let me know as soon as possible. What you say about my preface to my book on Spinoza is not entirely new to me. I think I have taken into consideration your objection, whereas you have not taken into consideration the point which I make. Perhaps we can clear up this difficulty when you come here. With kindest regards. As ever yours, Leo Strauss *** THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO January 25, 1963 M. Alexandre Kojeve
Dear M. Kojeve: I am sorry that it took me such a long time to reply to your letter. There are all kinds of administrative difficulties, to say nothing of my own work. I eventually succeeded in talking to the individual who is in charge of the lectures such as those which I hope you will give. They are having a meeting next week; for one reason or the other he insists on corresponding directly with you. So I expect that you will hear from him within the next two weeks. I am now writing the third and last chapter of a short book to be entitled The City and Man (Aristotle's politics; Plato's Republic; Thucydides). Around Easter Pines' new translation of Maimonides' Guide with a rather long introduction by me [1] as well as <a> History of Political Philosophy [2] written by my former students, and, last but not least, the English version of Gallimard's On Tyranny will be out. You may have heard that Bloom has succeeded in becoming a member of the Political Science profession. With kindest regards. As ever yours Leo Strauss Ls:ef *** June 3, 1965 Dear Mr. Kojevnikoff, Thank you so much for your letter. I have told Cropsey that you did not get a copy of the Festschrift. He is certain that the publisher sent you one. Perhaps you can check once more at home. I very much regretted that you could not make a side-trip to Chicago. As for myself, I hardly travel any more. I experience considerable discomfort ever since my circulation has stopped functioning properly. In any case, Gildin, who has evidently sat at your feet with open ears and open mouth, has given a detailed report on your political views. I was pleased to see that you are just as critical of D.S. liberals as I am. It did not surprise me, because I know there is reason, and that you are reasonable. I almost came to Europe this Spring: I had accepted an invitation from Hamburg for the 1965 S<ummer> S<emester>,but then had to cancel it for reasons of health. I should have liked to see with my own eyes how things are developing in Germany. From intelligent young Germans I got the impression that the development exhibits a certain parallelism to 1830 and ff: a turning away from German speculation (in the twentieth century, away from Heidegger) toward Western positivism (that is to say, American social science). I did not get your Koyre essay. Please do send it to me. Or do you mean your contribution to the Melanges Koyre. [1] That one I did indeed get; it arrived together with your letter. I was unable to write to Mrs. Koyre. That is very bad. I trust that she will forgive me. As for your contribution to my Festschrift, I had been acquainted with it for a long time, since you had sent me the manuscript. I was very gratified, since it shows that persecution and the art of writing are not some fancy. (Incidentally, a young American -- Hathaway -- is currently working on the pseudo-Dyonisius from your point of view. [2] I have referred him to your observations regarding the neo-Platonists.) I have just finished dictating a book, Socrates and Aristophanes. [3] I believe that it will elicit an occasional smile from you, and not only because of Aristophanes' jokes and of my Victorian paraphrases of them. If all goes well, I will then turn to Lucretius. Did you get my The City and Man? [4] And what do you say about Klein's Meno? [5] Cordially as ever, Your Leo Strauss
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