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PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, U.S. INTERVENTION, AND HEGEMONY

Notes

Introduction. From East-West to North-South: US intervention in the "new world order"

1 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon, 1966), p. 523.

2 Department of State, Policy Planning Study (PPS) 23 Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS), 1948, vol. I (part 2), February 24, 1948, p. 23.

3 Carl Gershman, "Fostering Democracy Abroad: The Role of the National
Endowment for Democracy, " speech delivered to the American Political
Science Foundation Convention, August 29, 1986.

4 A summary of the book's argument may be found in William I. Robinson,
"Globalization, the World System, and 'Democracy Promotion' in U.S.
Foreign Policy, " Theory and Society 25 (1996).

5 William I. Robinson, A Faustian Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan
Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder:
Westview, 1992).

6 See, e.g., Joshua Mavavchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny
(Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1992);Ralph M. Goldman and William A.
Douglas, Promoting Democracy: Opportunities and Issues (New York: Praeger,
1988); Brad Roberts (ed.), The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy
(Cambridge, Mass./Washington D.C.: MIT Press/Washington Quarterly,
1990); Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education,
National Research Council, The Transition to Democracy: Proceedings of a
Workshop (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991).

7 See, e.g., Abraham Lowenthal (ed.), Exporting Democracy: The United States
and Latin America, Themes and Issues (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1991); Howard J. Wiarda, The Democratic Revolution in Latin America:
History, Politics and U.S. Policy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990); Tony
Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for
Democracy in the 20th Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

8 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?, " The National Interest, no. 16
(Summer 1989), 3-18.

1 From "straight power concepts" to "persuasion" in US foreign policy

1 Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 51.

2 Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of
Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral
Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975), pp. 20, 21.

3 Literature on the makings of the post-World War II order is extensive. See,
among others, Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain
Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy (New
York: Monthly Review, 1977); Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism:
American Foreign Policy, 1938-1980, 7th edn. (New York: Penguin, 1993);
Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half Century: United States Foreign Policy
in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989);William
Appleman Williams, America Confronts a Revolutionary World (New York:
Morrow, 1976).

4 National Security Council, Memorandum NSC-68 (April 7, 1950), Foreign
Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, vol. I, pp. 252, 263, 272.

5 Some of the symptoms were the Cuban revolution, the fall of the South
Vietnamese regime, mass protests against the authoritarian states in the
Philippines, South Korea, and elsewhere in Asia, the collapse of Portuguese
colonialism in Africa, a surge of mass popular movements in South
America and elsewhere, and the Iranian, Grenadian, and Nicaraguan
revolutions.

6 For example, Lars Schoultz asserts that US policy towards Latin America
seeks stability, a condition required for the satisfaction of geopolitical,
economic and military concerns (the three "national security" concerns):
"This basic causal linkage - instability in Latin America causes a threat to
United States security - is the cognitive bedrock of United States policy
toward Latin America." National Security and United States Policy toward
Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 38.

7 The "communist threat, " it could be convincingly argued, has, until the
end of the Cold War, merely been the term employed to brand those
regimes which attempted to alter existing arrangements. Many destabilization
campaigns, such as that against Panama or Jamaica, did not target
communism. And US intervention in Latin America predates the birth of
communist movements internationally.

8 Lloyd C. Gardner, "The Evolution of the Interventionist Impulse, " in Peter
J. Schraeder (ed.), Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third
World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

9 Most importantly, see Immanuel Wallerstein's The Modern World System
(New York: Academic Press, 1970) and The Capitalist World Economy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Samir Amin, Accumulation
on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment (New
York: Monthly Review, 1974), is a classic statement from this framework
as seen from the South. L. S. Stavrianos, Global Rift: The Third World Comes
of Age (New York: William Morrow, 1981), provides an encyclopedic
world historical account from the world system framework. A summary
of the literature is provided in Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of
Imperialism: A Critical Survey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).

10 Throughout this book, the term fraction is used to denote segments within
classes determined by their relation to social production and the class as a
whole, whereas I occasionally use the term faction in an entirely different
sense, to denote clusters that are drawn together in pursuit of shared
political objectives within diverse specific settings (e.g., factions within a
political party, a social movement, a cabinet, or ministry) and may involve
people from various social classes, strata, and groups.

11 Antonio Gramsci, Selections From Prison Notebooks (New York: International
Publishers, 1971), p. 12.

12 Robert W. Cox is perhaps the pathbreaker in a Gramscian model of
international relations. See his "Social Forces, States and World Orders:
Beyond International Relations Theory, " Millennium: Journal of International
Studies, 10 (1981), no. 2, 126-155; "Gramsci, Hegemony and International
Relations: An Essay in Method, " Millennium, 12 (1983), no. 2, 162-175; and
Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

An important exception to the focus on intra-core rather than coreperiphery
and/or global relations is Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy,
America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World, A Gramscian Analysis
(London: Pinter, 1988), although they, along with Cox, retain a primary
emphasis on global intra-elite relations.

See also, Ker Van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class
(London: Verso, 1984); Stephen R. Gill and David Law, "Global Hegemony
and the Structural Power of Capital, " International Studies Quarterly,
33 (1989), no. 4, 475-499; Stephen R. Gill, American Hegemony and the
Trilateral Commission (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990);
Stephen R. Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International
Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). This latter
volume launched an interdisciplinary research agenda into a Gramscian
model of international relations.

13 Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America?, 4th edn. (Englewood Cliffs,
Prentice Hall, 1986), p. 1.

14 An exhaustive review of relevant political sociology literature is to be
found in Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism,
the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985). Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1987) provides a good comparative
overview of the liberal, realist, and Marxist perspectives in international
relations. Roughly speaking, pluralism in political sociology corresponds
to liberalism in international relations, the elitist/managerial model to
realism, and the class model to Marxism.

15 In international relations, Steven Krasner's Defending the National lnterest:
Raw Materials lnvestments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978) is a basic statement in this regard. Sociologist
Theda Skocpol, in her classic States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative
Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979), also develops this view of the state, and elaborates a "statecentered"
theory which shares much with realists as regards international
relations.

16 Very briefly, the "instrumentalist" approach focuses on how the capitalist
class or other classes with capitalist interests dominate and utilize the state
directly via occupying key policy posts in government, lobbying state
managers, etc. The "structuralist" approach focuses on underlying structural
constraints on state behavior. For a discussion and critique, see, e.g.,
Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981).

17 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press,
1959); Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic
Books, 1969); G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1967; 2nd edn., 1986); G. William Domhoff, The Higher
Circles (New York: Random House, 1970); G. William Domhoff, The Powers
that Be (New York: Random House, 1978); Dye, Who's Running America?

There are important differences between these writers, particularly in
debate over whether power is deposited in institutions, in social classes, or
in elite groupings. However, all these views converge in their distinction
to the pluralist theories, according to which no one group dominates in
society and the political systems allow all groups to share in the exercise of
power. Similarly, they all thoroughly document and analyze the nexus
between economic power, hegemony in civil society, and governmental
power and policies, i.e., the symbiosis of wealth and power in the United
States. My own view is that power is embodied in wealth (the means of
production and the social product), and exercised through institutions.

18 Dye borrows the term "proximate policymaker" from Charles E. Lindblom,
The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968)
and then builds on it. See Dye, Who's Running America?, pp. 260-262.

19 See Domhoff, Who Rules America Now?, pp. 82-115.

20 Karl Marx, Preface to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy", in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edn.
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1978), p. 4.

21 The state is "the entire complex of theoretical and practical activities with
which the ruling class not only maintains its dominance, but manages to
win the consent of those over whom it rules ... [The state is] political
society plus civil society, hegemony armored by coercion." Gramsci,
Prison Notebooks, p. 262.

22 Ibid., p. 244.

23 A concrete example is the following: slavery in pre-Civil War US society
was maintained by direct coercion. Slaves did not actually believe that
they were sub-human or destined by God to slavery. When not rebelling,
they gave their consent to slavery because the lash and lynching met
rebellion. In turn, once hegemony was achieved in US society under
modem industrial capitalism, workers gave not just their consent to, but
also consensus on, the social relations of capitalist production. As US labor
history reveals, workers demanded wage increases not because surplus
value is a relation of exploitation which domination sustains, or because
higher wages would increase the relative power of the working class vis-avis
its class antagonist, but because workers are entitled to a better life
which capitalism promises or because higher wages benefit "business"
(the capitalist class) by increasing market demand.

24 For a particularly crisp analysis of Gramsci on ideology, see Augelli and
Murphy, America's Quest, ch. 1.

25 Works on the global economy are numerous. This section draws on,
among others, the following: Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy
(New York: Pantheon, 1988); J. Caporaso (ed.), Changing International
Division of Labor (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987); Richard J. Barnet and
Ronald E. Muller, Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporation
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974); Arthur MacEwan and William K.
Tabb, Instability and Change in the World Economy (New York: Monthly
Review, 1989); Tamas Szentes, The Transformation of the World Economy:
New Directions and New Interests (London: Zed, 1988); David Gordon, "The
Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?, " New Left
Review, no. 168 (Marchi April 1988), 24-64.

26 Gill, American Hegemony.

27 Barnet and Muller, Global Reach, pp. 91-92.

28 Cox, "Social Forces, " 147.

29 Osvaldo Sunkel and Edmundo F. Fuenzalida, "Transnationalization and
its National Consequences, " in Jose J. Villamil (ed.), Transnational Capitalism
and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence (Brighton:
Harvester, 1979), p. 75.

30 See works by Domhoff cited in note 17.

31 Gill, American Hegemony.

32 Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and
Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

33 James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1973). This chronic crisis of legitimacy under globalization also explains
the growing significance in the new world order of highly visible charismatic
figures who substitute concrete political projects or "social pacts" in
the legitimization process.
34 Gill and Law, "Global Hegemony, " point out that there is a complementary
and contradictory relationship between powers of state and powers
of transnational capital. The point, however, needs further theoretical
treatment.

35 See, e.g., the articles in "A Market Solution for the Americas?: The Rise of
Wealth and Hunger, " NACLA Report on tlte Americas, 26 (1993), no. 4,
which document the sharp rise in Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico of
poverty, income inequality, the concentration of productive assets, and
social polarization in direct correlation to adjustment programs. The
example of these three countries is instructive because of the high degree
of differentiation among the three and because they are touted as neoliberal
"success stories."

36 Stephen R. Gill, "Epistemology, ontology, and the 'Italian school', " in Gill,
(ed.), Gramsci, p. 48.

37 Crozier, et al., Crisis of Democracy, p. 13.

38 Cox, "Gramsci, " p. 171.

39 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957; first
published in 1944); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes
(London: New Left Books, 1975; first published in 1968).

40 Cox, "Gramsci, " pp. 170-172.
41 While space constraints prohibit a discussion, Cox, Augelli and Murphy,
and others discuss the failure of the New International Economic Order
(NIEO) but do not link this "failure" to globalization, which countered
"national logics" in the South and unified North-South elite interests by
absorbing Southern elites into the emergent global transnational elite. The
NIEO was less a "failure" than a project which became outdated by
globalization. In any event, even if it had resulted in a shift in relative
power to the Third World, the NIEO, as articulated by Third World elites,
would not have represented a global hegemony because neither elites in
the South nor those in the North with whom they negotiated proposed a
shift to consensual domination over subordinate groups in the periphery.

42 Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System: Social Change in Global Perspective
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 2.

43 Cited in Irving M. Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1990; first published in 1968), p. 312.

44 Gill and Law, "Global Hegemony, " p. 488.

45 Dye, Who's Running America?, p. 246.

46 Robert W. Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order:
Reflections on Some Recent Literature, " International Organization, 33
(1979), 257-302 at p. 260.

47 The literature on democratization that sprang up in the 1980s and early
1990s is too vast to attempt even a selected bibliography here. Two of the
most widely circulated works which my analysis focuses on are: Guillermo
O'Donnell, Philip C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1988); Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Democracy
in Developing Countries, 4 vols. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner and the National
Endowment for Democracy, 1989).

48 This blurring of power-holder and scholar is not just in the abstract. Many
people who become prominent in the scholarly community become
government officials, and many government officials become members of
the scholarly community. See, e.g., discussion by McCormick, America's
Half Century, pp. 12-16.

49 The Diamond, et al. volumes were commissioned by the NED (see Annual
Reports, 1984-1987). Diamond is co-editor of the NED's quarterly publication,
Journal of Democracy. Linz and Upset are members of the journal's
editorial board. Upset is also an Advisory Board member of the American
Initiatives Project, set up by the World Without War Council. This council
was founded as part of the White House's Office of Public Diplomacy in
the early 1980s to disseminate propaganda in the United States and
abroad in favor of US foreign policy (see chapter 2). Regarding Upset's
participation, see Sara Diamond, "The World Without War Council, "
Covert Action Information Bulletin, no. 31 (Winter 1989), p. 61. The O'Donnell,
et al. volumes were sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center, which
was established by Congress, and were funded through congressional
appropriations. The point is not that the Woodrow Wilson Center (or any
of these scholars) is fraudulent, but that it is one of many think-tanks
linked formally and informally to the US state that are crucial components
of the policy planning process. These policy planning institutes constitute
institutional gateways between academia and the state apparatus.

50 The concrete links, including funding, institutional overlaps, and so forth,
between universities, the government, and the literature, are well documented.
On the close relation between the US government and universities
in modernization and political culture/development theories, see,
e.g., Alvin So, Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency
and World-System Theories (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), pp.
17-19. As noted above, the government has funded the research, publication,
and dissemination of seminal "democratization" studies. The AID
has sponsored many workshops and conferences on "democratization"
and "democracy promotion" and brought together scholars and policymakers
into overlapping networks out of which flow numerous published
works. There are other types of linkage: for example, scholars who
publish works that become authoritative were themselves policymakers,
or later return to policymaking posts - one such scholar is Abraham
Lowenthal (former ambassador to the OAS), editor of Exporting Democracy
and other works. Other studies are published and disseminated with
funding from the government or from policy planning institutes; an
example is Goldman and Douglas's, Promoting Democracy, funded by the
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, funded in turn by the
AID. And so on.

51 Cited in Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein, Latin America: Capitalist
and Socialist Perspectives of Development and Underdevelopment (Boulder:
Westview, 1986), p. 67.

52 Works on modernization and political culture/political development
theories are vast. Some of the most prominent are: W. W. Rostow, The
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1960); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The
Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown, 1963); Lucien W. Pye and Sidney
Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1965);Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). See bibliographies in
So, Social Change and Development, and Chilcote and Edelstein, Latin
America for a fuller listing.

53 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, p. 67.

54 David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political
Science (New York: Knopf, 1953); David Easton, A Systems Analysis of
Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965).

55 For an excellent critique, see Mark Kesselman, "Order or Movement? The
Literature of Political Development as Ideology, " World Politics, October
1973, 139-154.

56 Ibid.

57 As cited in ibid., 139.

58 Alford and Friedland, Powers of Theory, pp. 394-395.

59 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2nd edn., (New
York: Harper and Row, 1947), p. 285.

60 W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts, " Aristotelian Society, no. 56
(1956), 167-198.
61 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1971). Despite its limitations and irrespective of my own
disagreement with the pluralist model and the structural-functionalist
meta-theoretical framework he employs, Dahl's is an excellent study.
Dahl, it should be noted, does not argue, normatively, that polyarchy is
"ideal" democracy but the only "realistic" democracy possible in complex
modem societies.

62 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Modest Meaning of Democracy, " in Robert
A. Pastor, Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum (New York:
Holmes and Meier, 1989), pp. 12-13.

63 See, for instance, Philip Schmitter and Terry Karl, "What Democracy Is...
And Is Not, " Journal of Democracy, 2 (1991), no. 3, 75-88. Similarly,
Diamond, et al., Democracy, state that by democracy they are referring
specifically to polyarchy (IV, p. xvi).

64 Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique (Lanham, Md.:
University of America Press, 1980), p. 17.

65 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 269.

66 Huntington, "Modest Meaning, " p. 24.

67 Cited in Alford and Friedland, Powers of Theory, p. 27.

68 Ibid., p. 29.

69 Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy, "
in O'Donnell, et al., Transitions, pp. 56-57.

70 Diamond, et al., Democracy, VI, p. xvi.

71 Huntington, "Modest Meaning, " p. 18.

72 See Diamond, et al., Democracy, IV, pp. 44-47.

73 "The Democratcy Initiative, " Agency for International Development,
Department of State, Washington, D.C., December 1990.

74 A full listing of literature referring to popular democracy is impossible
here. Moreover, this literature is highly heterogeneous and exhibits distinct
theoretical discourses. Antonio Gramsci and Rosa Luxemburg would be
the classical thinkers in the Marxist tradition on democracy. For works
discussing theoretical and historical issues of liberal capitalist and Marxist
concepts, see, among others: Alan Hunt (ed.), Marxism and Democracy
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980); George Novack, Democracy and
Revolution (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971); David Held, Political Theory
and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power, and Democracy (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1989); L. Earl Shaw (ed.), Modern Competing
Ideologies (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973). For discussion on some
contemporary attempts to elaborate a theory and model of popular
democracy (referred to as such, or as "participatory democracy, " "strong
democracy, " "direct democracy, " etc.), see, among others: David Held
and Christopher Pollitt (oos.), New Forms of Democracy (London: Sage
Publications, 1986); Daniel C. Kramer, Participatory Democracy: Developing
Ideals of the Political Left (Cambridge, ' Mass.: Schenkman, 1972); Benjamin
Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984); Carl Cohen, Democracy (New York:
The Free Press, 1971).

75 Ibid.

76 For instance, see Schmitter and Karl, "What Democracy Is, " pp. 81, 84.

77 Miliband, State in Capitalist Society, p. 194.

78 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, p. 176. Cox, in "Gramsci, " first drew attention
to the particular passage and explored its significance as regards international
relations.

79 Max Weber, "Value Judgements in Social Science, " in W. G. Runciman
(ed.), Weber: Selections in Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978), p. 89.

80 Mosca, Ruling Class, p. 154.

81 On anti-systemic movements, see Immanuel Wallerstein, "Antisystemic
Movements: History and Dilemmas, " in Samir Amin, et al., Transforming
the Revolution: Social Movements and the World-system (New York: Monthly
Review, 1990).

82 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, p. 210.

83 These arguments are detailed in volume IV of O'Donnell, et al., Transitions,
co-authored by O'Donnell and Schmitter.

84 Ibid., IV, pp. 62-63.

85 For analysis, see William I. Robinson, "Demilitarization in Central
America: Beginning of a New Era?, " (2 parts), Central American Update
(Albuquerque: Latin American Data Base, University of New Mexico),
January 17 and 24, 1992.

86 Carl Gershman, "The United States and the World Democratic Revolution, "
Washington Quarterly, Winter 1989, 127-139.

87 Ibid.

88 James F. Petras and Morris H. Morley, 'The U.S. Imperial State, " in James
F. Petras, et al. (eds.), Class, State and Power in the Third World (Montclair,
N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun, 1981).

89 Ibid., pp. 6-7.

90 Ibid., p. 115.

91 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979),
p.654.

92 See ibid. and also Gill, American Hegemony. It should be noted that the
Trilateral Commission's report focused in particular on the "crisis in
democracy" in the developed, industrialized countries.

93 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 53, 55.

94 Gill, American Hegemony, p. 163.

95 Schmitter and Karl, "What Democracy Is, " p. 80.

96 Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political
Science Quarterly, 99 (1984), no. 2, 206. Huntington's article is basic reading
for "democratization" courses in US universities. It involves two propositions
which combine vulgar ideology with more empirically testable
propositions. The first is that democracy in the Third World declined in
the 1960s and 1970s because "Anglo-American influence" had declined,
and it should spread again in the 1980s because that influence was then
increasing. The proposition does not hold up empirically: in the post-
World War II heyday of US influence abroad, authoritarianism flourished
in the Third World because the United States ("Anglo-American influence")
actively promoted it and not democracy. Neither does the second
proposition, a direct three-way correlation between democracy, free
markets, and economic development, hold up to empirical scrutiny. In
Huntington's two "premier democracies, " the United States and Britain,
for example, polyarchy evolved side by side with active states that
intervened and regulated capital accumulation, not under free-market
conditions. And in the Third World the correlation has been between high
growth/ development and authoritarian regimes (such as the Asian Tigers,
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, etc.), not polyarchies, and these regimes all
turned to heavy state intervention, not free markets. Huntington also
distorts historical facts. Democracy, for him, is defined by near-universal
adult suffrage, and the United States is "a 200-year-old democracy." Yet at
the time of the founding of the US republic, neither women, nor blacks,
nor Indians, nor other non-white peoples could vote. Nor could propertyless
or illiterate white males vote. In 'The Rule of Capital and the Rise of
Democracy" (New Left Review, no. 103, 1977, 3-41), sociologist Goran
Therborn uses the same measurement as Huntington - near-universal
adult suffrage - to place the establishment of democracy in the United
States at c. 1970. Given such blatant inconsistencies and false propositions,
it is remarkable that Huntington's article is taken with any seriousness by
the academic community.

97 This type of "consensual" power is what Steven Lukes referred to as the
third of three dimensions of power in Power: A Radical View (London:
Macmillan, 1974). The first is the formal decision-making process, in which
there is pluralist distribution of power. The second, a hidden dimension, is
what Bachrach and Baratz refer to as "non-decision making, " or the
confining of the scope of decision-making such that alternative choices are
suppressed (Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty:
Theory and Practice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). Both these
dimensions locate power within the behavioral realm and involve manifest
conflict. The third combines the behavioral and the structural realms,
based on real interests, whether subjectively perceived or not. Power is
exercised by keeping potential manifest conflicts over real interests latent.
This third dimension of power functions under conditions of consensual,
not coercive, domination.

2 Political operations in US foreign policy

1 Howard Wiarda, The Democratic Revolution in Latin America: History,
Politics, and U.S. Policy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990), p. 270.

2 Department of State, "Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean:
The Promise and the Challenge, " Bureau of Public Affairs, Special Report
no. 158, Washington, D.C., March 1987, p. 13.

3 For the distinction between dominant groups and governing groups, see
Domhoff Who Rules America? and Poulantzas Political Power.

4 Council on Foreign Relations, 1980s Project: Albert Fishlow, Carlos F.
Diaz-Alejandro, Richard R., Fagen, and Roger D. Hansen, Rich and Poor
Nations in the World Economy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); Trilateral
Commission: Richard N. Cooper, Karl Kaiser, and Masataka Kosaka,
Towards a Renovated International System, Triangle Papers 14 (New York:
The Trilateral Commission, 1977), as cited and discussed in Cox, "Ideologies
and the New International Economic Order." See also Domhoff,
Who Rules America?, pp. 88, 112 n8; Lawrence Shoup, The Carter Presidency
and Beyond, (Palo Alto: Ramparts Press, 1980); Dye, Who Runs
America?, pp. 244-252.

5 See, e.g., Peter J. Schraeder (ed.), Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign
Policy in the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

6 The Committee of Santa Fe, A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties,
(Santa Fe: Council for Inter-American Security, 1980), p. 5.

7 Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, "Dictators and Double Standards, " Commentary no.
68 (November 1979), p. 36.

8 Augelli and Murphy, America's Quest for Supremacy.

9 Wiarda, Democratic Revolution, p. 145.

10 See Carnes Lord, "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy, " in
Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett (eds.), Political Warfare and Psychological
Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach (Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University Press, 1988), p. 18. Lord was Director of International
Communications and Information Policy on the NSC in the first Reagan
administration.

11 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., "Military Psychological Operations", in Lord and
Barnett (eds.), Political Warfare, p. 45. Paddock is the former Director of
Psychological Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

12 Angelo M. Codevilla, "Political Warfare, " in Lord and Barnett (eds.),
Political Wafare, pp. 77-79. Codevilla was a senior staff member of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

13 Lord and Barnett (eds.), Political Warfare, introduction, p. xiii.

14 See Doug Sandow, "Economic and Military Aid, " in Schraeder (ed.),
Intervention in tile 1980s, p. 63. Note that if US aid channeled through
multilateral agencies is included, the figure nearly doubles.

15 NSC-68 described economic aid as "a major instrument in the conduct of
United States foreign relations. It is an instrument which can powerfully
influence the world environment in ways favorable" to US interests.
National Security Council, NSC-68, p. 258. See Augelli and Murphy,
America's Quest for Supremacy, ch. 4, for a Gramscian focus on ideology
and foreign aid.

16 For more on low-intensity warfare and its doctrinal emergence, see
William I. Robinson and Kent Norsworthy, David and Goliath: the U.S. War
Against Nicaragua (New York: Monthly Review, 1987), particularly ch. 1;
Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (eds.), Low Intensity Warfare, Counterinsurgency,
Proinsurgency, Qnd Antiterrorism in the Eighties (New York:
Pantheon, 1988); Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar and Richard H. Shultz
(eds.), Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University Press, 1984);Lord and Barnett (eds.), Political Warfare.

17 Richard H. Shultz, Jr., "Low Intensity Conflict, Future Challenges and
Lessons From the Reagan Years, " Survival (International Institute for
Strategic Studies), 31 (1989), no. 2; Paddock, "Military Psychological
Operations, " p. 50.

18 See the report commissioned by the NSC, Discriminate Deterrence: Report of
the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (Washington, D.C.: US
Government Printing Office, 1988), which calls for a shift in primary
emphasis towards engagement in the Third World. See also four-part
series in New York Times, May 20-23, 1990.

19 Lord, "Psychological Dimension, " p. 20.

20 Princeton Lyman, "An Introduction to Title IX, " Foreign Service Journal,
March 1970, 6-48, pp. 6-8 in particular.

21 Susan George, A Fate Worse Than Debt (London: Penguin Books, 1988),
p.232.

22 Michael A. Samuels and William A. Douglas, "Promoting Democracy, "
Washington Quarterly, 4 (1981), no. 3, 52-65, at pp. 52-53.

23 American Political Foundation, "A Commitment to Democracy: A Bipartisan
Approach, " Washington, D.C., November 30, 1983. The report was
commissioned by the NSC to draft recommendations for developing
"democracy promotion" in foreign policy.

24 William A. Douglas, Developing Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Heldref,
1972). Douglas drew heavily on Huntington's Political Order in Changing
Societies and the other political development literature cited in chapter one.

25 Ibid., pp. 16-22.

26 Ibid., pp. xiii, 43.

27 Gershman, "Fostering Democracy Abroad."

28 Ralph M. Goldman, 'The Democratic Mission: A Brief History, " in
Goldman and Douglas (eds.), Promoting Democracy; Ralph M. Goldman,
"Assessing Political Aid for the Endless Campaign, " ibid., p. 253.

29 Goldman, "Democratic Mission, " p. 16.

30 The US Senate's Church Committee estimated that the CIA carried out at
least 900 covert operations between 1960 and 1975, but former CIA officer
John Stockwell estimated the total number since its founding at up to
20, 000 (interview with the authors in Managua, 1985, cited in Robinson
and Norsworthy, David and Goliath, p. 15). Another former CIA officer,
Philip Agee, pointed out that in Indonesia alone, between 500, 000and one
million people were killed in the wake of the CIA-orchestrated coup
against Sukamo. See Philip Agee, Inside the Company (London: Bantam
1976), p. ix.

31 These defectors included Philip Agee, John Stockwell, Ralph McGehee,
and David MacMichael, among others. The most well known is Agee (see
ibid.). See also Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of
Intelligence, (New York: Dell, 1974). An excellent summary is William
Blum, The CIA, A Forgotten History, (London: Zed, 1986).

32 Samuels and Douglas, "Promoting Democracy, " p. 53.

33 New York Times, June 1, 1986.

34 William E. Colby, "Political Action - In the Open, " Washington Post,
March 14, 1982, 0-8.

35 See John Pike, "Uncloaking Daggers: CIA Spending for Covert Operations, "
Covert Action Quarterly, no. 48 (Winter 1994-5), 48-55.

36 Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy:
Pattern and Process, 4th edn (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 252-
253.

37 For background on these early efforts, see Douglas, Developing Democracy,
pp.I72-177.

38 White House press release, March 29, 1967, cited in Holly Sklar and Chip
Berlet, "NED, CIA, and the Orwellian Democracy Project, " in Covert
Action Information Bulletin, no. 39 (Winter 1991-2), 10-13 at p. 11.

39 Wiarda, Democratic Revolution, p. 148.

40 General Accounting Office, Events Leading to the Establishment of the
National Endowment for Democracy, GAO/NSIAD-84-121, July 6, 1984;
Goldman, "Democratic Mission, " pp. 18-22; Wiarda, Democratic Revolution,
pp. 148-149.

41 See Lord, "Psychological Dimension, " p. 14.

42 National Security Action Memo No. 1224, January 18, 1962, as reported by
Worth Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti: The U.S. AID Democracy
Enhancement Project (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Haiti,
1994), p. 19.

43 By 1989, its budget had climbed to some one billion dollars annually.
Intelligence and national security officials continue to rotate in and out of
the USIA, the NED and other agencies. For discussion, see Council on
Hemispheric Affairs/Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center National
Endowment for Democracy (NED): A Foreign Policy Branch Gone Awry
(Washington, D.C./ Albuquerque: 1990), which provides an excellent
account of the creation and modus operandi of the NED.

44 See Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh, "Iran-Contra's Untold Story, " Foreign
Policy, no. 72 (Fall 1988), pp. 5, 9, for background on Raymond. For his
relation to North, see Report of the Congressional Committees' Investigation of
the Iran-Contra Affair (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1988), and in
particular Raymond's deposition before the Congressional Committees, in
Appendix Bof the report (vol. XXII, pp. 1-520). See John Spicer Nichols, "La
Prensa: The CIA Connection, " Columbia Journalism Review, 27 (1988), no. 2,
p. 13, for mention of Raymond's NSC role as liaison with NED.

45 Cited in Council on Hemispheric Affairs/Resource Center, National Endowmentfor
Democracy, pp. 12-13.

46 Ibid.; Parry and Kornbluh, "Iran-Contra's".

47 Goldman, "Democratic Mission ... , " p. 21, and Council on Hemispheric
Affairs/Resource Center, National Endowment for Democracy.

48 Ronald Reagan, "Promoting Democracy and Peace" ijune 8, 1982 speech
before the British parliament), Current Policy, no. 399, Department of State,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

49 New York Times, February 15, 1987.

50 This figure is mentioned by former Secretary of State George Shultz. See
"Project Democracy, " statement by Shultz before the Subcommittee on
International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, February
23, 1983, reprinted as Current Policy, no. 456, Department of State,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

51 Richard F. Staar (00.), Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR (Stanford:
Hoover Institute, 1986), pp. 297-299. Staar published the unclassified
three-page directive, but did not indicate if this version was the full text of
the original classified version. The directive contains four aspects, but two,
an International Information Committee and an International Broadcasting
Committee, would appear to overlap. See also, New York Times, February
15, 1987.

52 See Peter Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for Policy Studies, 1987).

53 New York Times, February 15, 1987.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Raymond D. Gastil, "Aspects of a U.S. Campaign for Democracy, " in
Goldman and Douglas (eds.), Promoting Democracy, p. 49.

57 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

58 This figure is arrived at by totalling the amounts of annual Congressional
appropriations for the NED, as reported in the NED Annual Reports,
1984-1992.

59 For these details, see Council on Hemispheric Affairs/Resource Center,
National Endowment for Democracy, particularly, pp. 23-39.

60 New York Times, February 15, 1987.

61 Wiarda, Democratic Revolution, pp. 277-278.

62 The boards of directors and principal officers of the NED itself, the
core groups, and numerous other pass-throughs, can best be described
as diverse groups of "proximate policymakers" and seasoned political
operatives. For a detailed breakdown of the structure of interlocking
boards of directors see, among others, Council on Hemispheric
Affairs/Resource Center, National Endowment for Democracy; Inter-
Hemispheric Education Resource Center, The Democracy Offensive (Albuquerque,
1989). Both these publications provide diagrams and flow
charts.

63 American Political Foundation, "A Commitment to Democracy."

64 John W. Sewell and Christine E. Contee, "U.S. Foreign Aid in the 1980s:
Reordering Priorities, " in Kendall W. Stiles and Tsuneo Akaha (eds.),
International Political Economy: A Reader (New York: HarperCollins, 1991),
particularly p. 318.

65 See Agency for International Development, Department of State, "The
Democracy Initiative, " Washington, D.C., December 1990.

66 For details, see "U.S. Electoral Assistance and Democratic Development, "
proceedings of a conference sponsored by the Washington Office on Latin
America, January 19, 1990, Washington, D.C.

67 Agency for International Development, Department of State, "FY 1990
Democratic Initiatives and Human Rights Program Summary, " Washington,
D.C., 1990.

68 Lord, "Psychological Dimension, " pp. 19-20.

69 See "Reagan's Global Reach, " Columbia Journalism Review, 24 (1985), no. 1,
1D-1I.

70 Phone interview with Journal of Democracy editorial assistant Susan Brown,
May 27, 1994, and letter from Brown, dated May 27, 1994, who described
the journal as "really a magazine of the NED."

71 General Accounting Office, Promoting Democracy: Foreign Affairs and
Defense Agencies Funds and Activities - 1991 to 1993 GAO/NSIAD-94-83,
January 1994, p. 3. The report specifies that these figures do not include US
contributions to the UN and its peacekeeping activities.

72 These policy outlines were scattered throughout all of Clinton's speeches
in his first few months in office. For a summary analysis, see "Clinton y
America Latina; Un Nuevo Goviemo y Antiguas Crisis, " Enlace, 2 (1993),
no. 1, pp. 1-3, 5.

73 The quote is from Resource Center, "Democratization: U.s. Governmental
Actors, " Democracy Backgrounder (1995), no. 1, 4. The $296 million figure is
from General Accounting Office, Promoting Democracy, p. 2. For the
increase to $48 million, see "Better Dead Than N.E.D., " The Nation, July 12,
1993, 6. For the administration's long-term proposals, see Larry Diamond,
"An American Foreign Policy for Democracy, " Policy Report (Progressive
Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.), no. 11 Ouly 1991), 3.

74 Resource Center, "Democratization, " 4-5.

75 Morton H. Halperin, "Guaranteeing Democracy, " Foreign Policy, no. 91
(Summer 1993), 105-106.

76 For a discussion on "party-building" in intervened countries, see Ralph M.
Goldman, "Transnational Parties as Multilateral Civic Educators, " in
Goldman and Douglas (eds.), Promoting Democracy.

77 Douglas, Developing Democracy, pp. 128-129.

78 Miliband, State in Capitalist Society, p. 187.

79 Talcott Parsons, "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political
System, " in Parsons (ed.), Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New
York: Free Press, 1967), p. 244.

80 For a summary of labor's role see Roy Godson, "Labor's Role in Building
Democracy, " in Goldman and Douglas (eds.), Promoting Democracy.

81 Cited in Tom Barry and Deb Preusch, AIFLD in Central America: Agents as
Organizers (Albuquerque: Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center,
1987), p. 31.

82 For a summary of this sectoral approach to political intervention, see
Samuels and Douglas, "Promoting Democracy."

83 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, "CIA Views on the Third World Population
Issues, " June 11, 1984 (declassified January 1995), 5, reproduced in
part in Information Project for Africa, Excessive Force: Power, Politics, and
Population Control (Washington, D.C., 1995), pp. 33-34; Neil W. Chamberlain,
Beyond Malthus: Population and Power (New York: Basic Books, 1970),
pp.54-55.

84 Women in Development (WID) literature is prolific. A succinct introduction
is Annette Fuentes and Barbara Enrenreich, Women in the Global
Factory (Boston: South End, 1983).

85 Samuels and Douglas, "Promoting Democracy, " p. 56.

86 See respective chapters and sections for Nicaragua, Chile, and South
Africa. For Cuba, see William I. Robinson, "Pushing Polyarchy: The U.S.-
Cuba Case and the Third World, " Third World Quarterly: Journal of
Emerging Areas, 16 (1995), no. 4, 631-647.

87 This "multiplier effect" method of political organization developed by
U.S. foreign-policy experts in political warfare is recommended in CIA,
AID, and Department of Defense political operations manuals. See
Robinson, A Faustian Bargain, pp. 74, 210 n44.

88 Cited in Barry and Preusch, AIFLD in Central America, p. 61.

89 Shultz, "Project Democracy." The following citations are all from Shultz.

90 Gershman, "United States:'

91 Blum, The CIA, provides a concise documentation of these post-World
War II US electoral interventions.

92 For an account of these types of elections put together in Washington and
exported to the target countries as part of war policy, see Edward S.
Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections
ill the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador (Boston: South End,
1984).

93 Ralph M. Goldman, "The Donor-Recipient Relation in Political Aid
Programs, " in Goldman and Douglas (eds.), Promoting Democracy, pp. 59,
66-68.

94 See, e.g., Sharon Beaulaurier, "Profiteers Fuel War in Angola, " Covert
Action Quarterly, no. 45 (Summer 1993), 61~5.

95 Colby, "Political Action - In The Open."

96 Wiarda, Democratic Revolution, p. 207. Wiarda was for most of the 1980s a
resident scholar of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a policy
planning group that worked closely with the US government in Project
Democracy and in formulating "democracy promotion" strategies.

3 The Philippines: "Molded in the image of American democracy"

1 Cited in Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, The Philippines
Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and
Resistance (Boston: South End, 1987), p. 22. I have made extensive use of
this excellent 400-page compendium of official documents, newspaper and
magazine articles, excerpts from books on the Philippines and United
States-Philippine relations, and original essays by the editors.

2 Cited in Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization, "
in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philip C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead
(eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1988), p. 7.

3 For a definitive history of the U.S. colonial conquest of the Philippines, see
Luzviminda Francisco, "The First Vietnam: The Philippine-American War,
1899-1902, " in The Philippines: End of an Illusion (London: AREAS, 1973),
reprinted, in part, in Schirmer and Shalom, Philippines Reader, pp. 8-20.

4 Ibid., p. 11.

5 CIA, Philippines: General Survey (National Intelligence Survey, NS 99), July
1965, reprinted in Schirmer and Shalom, Philippines Reader. See p. 128 for
citation.

6 William J. Pomeroy, The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration, and Resistance
(New York: International Publishers, 1992), although an American
citizen, gives a good insider's account of the "Huk" movement.

7 "A Report to the President by the National Security Council on the
Position of the United States with Respect to the Philippines" (November
9, 1950), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: US
Government Printing Office, 1976), declassified in 1975, reprinted in part
in Schirmer and Shalom, Philippines Reader, pp. 109-110.

8 As cited in Schirmer and Shalom, Philippines Reader, p. 119.

9 For a summary of CIA activities in the Philippines, see Blum, The CIA,
pp. 37-43, and numerous entries in Schirmer and Shalom, Philippines
Reader.

10 International Labor Office, Sharing in Development: A Programme of Employment,
Equity and Growth for the Philippines (Geneva: International Labor
Organization, 1974), reprinted in ibid., citation on p. 135.

11 Richard J. Kessler, "Marcos and the Americans, " Foreign Policy, no. 63
(Summer 1986), p. 52.

12 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Korea and the Philippines:
November 1972, Committee Print, 93rd Congress, 1st session, February 18,
1973, reprinted in part in Schirmer and Shalom, Philippines Reader, citation
on p. 168.

13 As cited in ibid., p. 229.

14 For these details, see ibid., p. 226.

15 Ibid., pp. 226--227.

16 See, e.g., Pomeroy, Philippines; James Putzel, A Captive lAnd: The Politics of
Agrarian Reform in the Philippines (New York: Monthly Review, 1992); Gary
Hawes, "Theories of Peasant Revolution: A Critique and Contribution
from the Philippines, " World Politics, 42 (1990), no. 2, 215-229.

17 A detailed account of this debate and an excellent journalistic record of US
policy and US-Philippine relations is Raymond Bonner, Waltzing With a
Dictator (New York: Times Books, 1987).

18 Stephen W. Bosworth, October 25, 1984 speech before the Rotary Club of
Makati West, Manila, Philippines, reprinted as Current Policy, no. 630,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

19 The NSC directive is reprinted in Schirmer and Shalom, Philippines Reader,
pp. 322-323.

20 Paul Laxalt, "My Conversation with Ferdinand Marcos, " Policy Review,
no. 37 (Summer 1986), 2-5.

21 The $9 million figure is based on NED annual reports from 1984 to 1990,
but the actual amount is probably much higher, since millions more were
sent to the Philippines circuitously via such organizations as the AAFLI
and via the CIA and other "national security" related spending, which is
classified.

22 The Convenors' Statement is reprinted in Schirmer and Shalom, Philippines
Reader, pp. 306--308.

23 Cited in Walden Bello, "Counterinsurgency's Proving Ground: Low
Intensity Warfare in the Philippines, " in Klare and Kornbluh (eds.), Low
Intensity Warfare, p. 169.

24 Far Eastern Economic Review, March 6, 1986.

25 NED Annual Report, 1987, Washington D.C., pp. 9-10.
26 For this background, see Stephen R. Shalom, "Counterinsurgency in the
Philippines, " Journal o/Contemporary Asia, 7 (1977), no. 2, 153-172. See also
Bonner, Waltzing, pp. 40, 368, 376.

27 NED Annual Report, 1986, Washington, D.C., p. 14.

28 Schirmer and Shalom, Philippines Reader, p. 309.

29 The KABATID worked in coordination with the Asia Foundation, reportedly
a CIA front organization. See Marchetti and Marks, The CIA, pp. 150-
151.

30 "KABATID, " NED internal funding proposal for the 1990 fiscal year,
undated, obtained through the FOIA.

31 Letter from KABATID chairperson Dette Pascual to NED program officer
Marc Plattner, August 15, 1989, obtained through the FOIA.

32 For instance, KABATID's vice-ehair, Pacita Almario, was a regional chair
of NAMFREL, and owns and manages a chain of restaurants in Manila;
Secretary-General Frances Gloria runs her family's export firm and was a
Manila coordinator of NAMFREL; Assistant Secretary-General Sony Sison
is General Manager of Manila Exports, a major exporting firm; Treasurer
Rose Yenko, a former NAMFREL leader, is Executive Vice-President of Y
Engineering Cooperation and a managing partner in Development Consultants'
Network, a major consulting firm for transnational corporations.
Trustee member Carmencita Abella is also Executive Vice-President of the
Development Academy of the Philippines, a association of national and
foreign big-business interests; trustee Lourdes Baua is Services Chief of the
Human Resources Division of the government's Department of Trade and
Industry; trustee May Fernandez was Director of the Presidential Staff,
Office of the Cabinet Secretary, under President Aquino; and so on. For
this biographical data, see "One Page Summary of Proposal, " KABATID
funding proposal submitted to the NED for fiscal year 1991, dated
February 22, 1990, obtained through the FOIA.

33 See "Program Proposal, " 8, attached to letter from Tony and Tita
Dumagsa, Coordinators of Friends of NAMFREL, to Marc Plattner, NED
program officer, dated March 31, 1988, obtained through the FOIA.

34 Through a NED-organized program for "government monitoring and
public outreach, " KABATID board members set up a "speakers bureau"
and became regular featured commentators on television news and radio
talk shows, effectively utilizing in this way the mass media. All "these
activities have been made possible through grants provided by ... the US
National Endowment for Democracy, " noted the KABATID report, "One
Page Summary of Proposal, " dated February 22, 1990, obtained through
the FOIA.

35 See letter from KABATID Projects Director Gina Pascual to Friends of
NAMFREL, dated February 5, 1989, Annex I, "KABATID Foundation,
Inc., Policies and Procedures, " obtained through the FOIA, and "One Page
Summary of Proposal."

36 NED Annual Reports, 1986-88, Washington, D.C.

37 NED Annual Report, 1987, Washington, D.C.

38 Enid Eckstein, "What is the AFL-CIO Doing in the Philippines?, " Labor
Notes (Detroit), July 1986, p. 1.

39 For a detailed description of the KMU composition, program, and organizational
structure, see Kim Scipes, "Aquino's Total War and the KMU, " Z
Magazine, January 1990, 116-121. See also Beth Sims, Workers of the World
Undermined: American Labor and the Pursuit of u.s. Foreign Policy (Boston,
South End, 1993).

40 NED Annual Reports, 1984-91, Washington, D.C.

41 NED Annual Report, 1984, Washington, D.C., 19.

42 Tim Shorrock and Kathy Selvaggio, "Which Side Are You On, AAFLI?, "
The Nation, February 15, 1986, p. 170.

43 See minutes of the March 17, 1989 meeting of the Board of Directors of the
National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, D.C., obtained through
the FOIA.

44 Phil Bronstein and David Johnston, "U.S. Funding Anti-Left Fight in
Philippines, " San Francisco Examiner, July 21, 1985.

45 "Proposal from the FTUI to the NED for 1989 Programs, " December 1988,
Section B, Asia, 29, obtained through the FOIA.

46 Shorrock and Selvaggio, "Which Side Are You On, AAFLI?, " p. 171.

47 "Proposal for 1989 Programs, " Section B, Asia, 30, obtained through the
FOIA.

48 "Request to the National Endowment for Democracy for Funds for the
Free Trade Union Institute for FY 1988 Programs, " December 16, 1987,
Section B, Asia, 31-32, obtained through the FOIA.

49 Ibid., 30.

50 "Proposal for 1989 programs, " p. 29.

51 Scipes, "Aquino's Total War, " pp. 116-121; Adele Oltman and Dennis
Bernstein, "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines, " Covert Action Information
Bulletin, no. 29 (Winter 1988), 18-20.

52 See, e.g., Kay Eisenhower, "AFL-CIO Agency Offers Cash to Filipino
Union Leader for Vote on U.s. Bases Treaty, " Labor Notes, no. 152
(November 1991), 1-6.

53 For excellent analyses of the complex post-Marcos situation, see Walden
Bello and John Gershman, "Democratization and Stabilization in the
Philippines, " Critical Sociology, 17 (1990), no. 1, 35-56; James B. Goodno,
The Philippines: Land of Broken Promises (London: Zed, 1991).

54 Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares (eds.), From Marcos to Aquino:
Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1991), p. 5.

55 Cited in Bello and Gershman, "Democratization and Stabilization, " p. 37.

56 Assistance for Democracy Act of 1986, House of Representatives, 99th
Congress, 2nd session, Report 99-722, July 30, 1986, Washington, D.C. The
package provided balance-of-payments support, budget support, and
funds for the dismantling of "crony capitalism, " the introduction of neoliberal
economic reform programs, payments on Manila's foreign debt,
and other assistance.

57 Sandra Burton, "Aquino's Philippines: The Center Holds, " Foreign Affairs,
65 (1987), no. 3, 525-537 at p. 533.

58 Agency for International Development, "Philippine Assistance Strategy:
U.S. Fiscal Years 1991-1995", Washington D.C., July 1990, p. 1.

59 Bello and Gershman, "Democratization and Stabilization, " p. 45. The two
note the example of the January 1988 local elections, when "electoral
competition between the traditional elite parties was feverish, but candidates
of the leftist Partido ng Bayan, fearing for their lives, dared not run
in areas dominated by military-backed vigilante groups, " and that
"dissent is indeed possible, but within sharply circumscribed limits. Those
.who breach the limits become fair game for death squads and right-wing
vigilantes."

60 Carl H. Lande, "Manila's Malaise, " Journal of Democracy, 2 (1991), no. 1, 51.

61 For analyses of low-intensity warfare in the Philippines in the 1980s and
the US role, see Bello, "Counterinsurgency's Proving Ground"; Arnel de
Guzman and Tito Craige, "Counterinsurgency War in the Philippines and
the Role of the United States, " Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 23
(1991), no. 1, 3s-47; Oltman and Bernstein, "Counterinsurgency in the
Philippines, " pp. 18-21. Washington reportedly authorized stepped-up
clandestine CIA operations against the left in the Philippines, including a
$10 million allocation to the NAFP for enhanced intelligence-gathering
operations, and an increase in the number of CIA personnel, from 115 to
127, attached to the US embassy in Manila. See Bello, "Counterinsurgency's
Proving Ground, " p. 177; Oltman and Bernstein, "Counterinsurgency
in the Philippines, " p. 20.

62 For a discussion of these pressures on Aquino, see Bello, "Counterinsurgency's
Proving Ground, " pp. 171-174. See chapter 5 on Nicaragua for
similar pressures placed on Chamorro.

63 Cited in Bello, "Counterinsurgency's Proving Ground, " p. 174.

64 Putzel, A Captive Land.

65 For these specific statistics, see Michele Douglas, "Unfulfilled Dreams:
Philippine Land Reform, " Asia-Pacific Backgrounder (Third World Reports,
Boston), 3 (1990), no. 4, p. 1.

66 NED Annual Report, 1984, Washington, D.C., p. 20.

67 Oltman and Bernstein, "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines, " p. 19.

68 See, e.g., Rigoberta Tiglao, "Agrarian Reform Program Fails in Its Objectives:
Repeat Offenders, " Far Eastern Economic Review, September 5, 1991,
16-20.

69 See, for example, Philippines - The Killing Goes On (London/New York:
Amnesty International, 1992); Bad Blood - Militia Abuses in Mindanao (New
York: Asia Watch, 1992).

70 For instance, see David Timberman, "The Philippines at the Polls, " Journal
of Democracy, 3 (1992), no. 4, 119-124.

71 For details, see Agency for International Development, "Philippine Assistance
Strategy, " citation on p.76; Doug Cunningham, "U.S. Philippine
Relations: Taking a New Turn, " Philippine International Forum, Occasional
Article NO.5, Cebu City, Philippines, August 1992.

72 For a discussion on the dilemmas of the Filipino left in the post-Marcos
period, see Bello and Gershman, "Democratization and Stabilization, "
pp.48-50.

73 Timberman, "The Philippines at the Polls, " pp. 119, 121.

74 Agency for International Development" "Philippine Assistance Strategy, "
p.76.

75 Cited in Manila Chronicle, April 8, 1992. For more details, see Cunningham,
"U.S. Philippine Relations."

4 Chile: Ironing out "a fluke of the political system"

1 Cited in Seymour M. Hersh, "The Price of Power: Kissinger, Nixon, and
Chile, " Atlantic Monthly, December 1982, 21-58, at p. 35.

2 Ibid., 27.

3 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979),
p.654.

4 United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973
(Washington, D.C., 1975).

5 Michael T. Klare, War Without End (New York: Vintage Books, 1972),
p.280.

6 David Horowitz, "The Alliance for Progress, " in Robert I. Rhodes (ed.),
Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader (New York: Monthly Review,
1970).

7 Nelson Rockefeller, The Rockefeller Report of a United States Presidential
Missionfor the Western Hemisphere (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).

8 Crozier, et al., Crisis of Democracy.

9 Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, The Americas in a
Changing World (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973).

10 National Bipartisan Commission, The Report of the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America (New York: Macmillan, 1984). The report
was in specific reference to Central America, but was seen as a general
policy statement for Latin America.

11 For such arguments, see, e.g., Karen Remmer, Military Rule in LAtin
America (Boulder: Westview, 1989); Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

12 There is abundant literature on dependency and on the specific 151model.
See, among others, Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and
Development in Latin America (Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1979); Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).A good overview is
Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein, Latin America: Capitalist and
Socialist Perspectives of Development and Underdevelopment (Boulder: Westview,
1986).

13 The debt crisis dates back to the 1970s' "global shocks" triggered by the
OPEC oil crisis. Behind this crisis was the unprecedented transfer of
resources and economic power to international finance capital. OPEC
governments and oil company deposits in Western banks led to huge
investible bank surpluses that were "recycled" as loans to Latin America.
Beneath the surface, the transnationalized fraction of capital, and particularly
finance capital, became hegemonic, c:s money capital became the
regulator of the international circuit of production rather than investment
capital. On the relation between the 1970sshocks and global restructuring,
see Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy. On the debt crisis, among
others, see Arthur MacEwan, Debt and Disorder: InternatiOllal Economic
Instability and U.S. Imperial Decline (New York: Monthly Review, 1990);
Jackie Roddick (ed.), The Dance of the Millions: Latin America and the Debt
Crisis (London: Latin America Bureau, 1988).

14 There was a definite element of intentionality on the part of transnational
capital concerning the accumulation of debt and its consequences. Jerome
I. Levinson, a former IDB official explained: "The debt crisis afforded an
unparalleled opportunity to achieve, in the debtor countries, structural
reforms ... The core of these reforms was a commitment on the part of the
debtor countries to reduce the role of the public sector as a vehicle for
economic and social development and rely more on market forces and
private enterprise, domestic and foreign." World Bank official Sir William
Ryrie described the debt crisis as "a blessing in disguise." Citations in
Doug Henwood, "Impeccable Logic: Trade, Development and Free
Markets in the Clinton Era, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 26 (1993),
no. 5, p. 25.

15 Rolando Munck, Latin America: The Transition to Democracy (London: Zed,
1989), pp. 49-52.

16 Eduardo Silva, "Capitalist Coalitions, the State, and Neo-Liberal Economic
Restructuring, " World Politics, 45 (1993), no. 4, 526-559; Alex E. Fernandez
Jjlberto, "Chile: The Laboratory Experiment in International Neo-Liberalism, "
in Henk Overbeek, Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political
Economy (Routledge: London and New York, 1993).

17 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, p. 208. In Dependent Development, Evans shows
how states legitimize themselves when they serve the needs of general
accumulation and lose legitimacy when they begin to act as "states-forthemselves, "
whether military or civilian. Thus in Brazil, new elite
fractions closely tied to multinational capital began to push in the 1970s
for "democratization and de-statization, " meaning polyarchy and neoliberalism.
Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational,
State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979), pp. 266, 269, 272, 279.

18 See, e.g., Maurice Zeitlin and Richard Earl Ratcliff, Landlords and Capitalists:

The Dominant Class of Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
19 For these franchise details see William F. Sater, Chile and the United States:
Empires in Conflict (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), pp.
129-130, 139. The strength of the polyarchic system led to a relatively nonpolitical
military - another factor often mentioned by these observers. But
its "constitutional character" should not be confused with its repressive
capacity. The Chilean armed forces, like their Latin American counterparts,
have a long tradition of repressing popular sectors, including
massacres in 1907, 1921, 1925, 1953, and 1967.

20 Cited in Wiarda, Democratic Revolution, p. 98.

21 Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America, 2nd edn.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 112.

22 US Senate, Covert Action, p. 8.

23 Sater, Chile and the United States, p. 131.

24 US Senate, Covert Action, p. 16

25 Ibid., 14, 18.

26 Sater, Chile and the United States, p. 140.

27 Hersh, "The Price of Power," p. 32.

28 Cited in Alonso Aguilar, Pan-Americanism from Monroe to the Present: A
View from the Other Side (New York, Monthly Review, 1986), p. 119.

29 These are AID figures, cited in Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S.
Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1910-1985 (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburg Press, 1985), pp. 263-264.

30 US Senate, Covert Action, p. 9.

31 Sater, Chile and the United States, p. 132.

32 James Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism
and the Overthrow of the Allende Government (New York, Monthly Review,
1975), pp. 8-9.

33 Hersh, "The Price of Power, " p. 32.

34 The best source for the UP program is the published official program itself,
Programa de la Unidad Popular (Santiago, 1969), reproduced in English as
The Popular Unity Program (New York: North American Congress on Latin
America, 1972).

35 Documentation is voluminous. For US government reports, see US Senate,
Covert Action, and US Congress, Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to lntel1igence Activities, Interim Report: Alleged
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 94th Congress, 1st Session,
November 10, 1975, hereafter referred to as Assassination Report. For an
extensively footnoted summary, see Blum, The CIA, particularly pp. 232-
243. See also: Petras and Morley, United States and Chile; Hersh, "The Price
of Power." Poul Jensen, The Garotte: The United States and Chile, 1970-1973,
2 vols. (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1988), is probably the
single most comprehensive source of information and analysis of US
intervention in the Allende period, and includes a critical review of
existing literature.

36 US Congress, Assassination Report, p. 23.

37 Hersh, "The Price of Power"; Petras and Morley, United States and Chile,
pp.40-41.

38 Hersh, "The Price of Power, " p. 57.

39 US Senate, Covert Action, p. 33.

40 For details on Aylwin's "white coup d'etat" strategy, see Sobel, Chile and
Allende, pp. 135, 138; Gabriel Smimow, The Revolution Disarmed: Chile
1970-1973 (New York: Monthly Review, 1979), pp. 111-113, 127-128, 152.

41 US Congress, Assassination Report, p. 140.

42 Petras and Morley, United States and Chile, p. 82.

43 AID figures cited in Blasier, Hovering Giant, p. 264.

44 US Senate, Covert Action, p. 38.

45 Petras and Morley, United States and Chile, p. 6.

46 This estimate was officially accepted by the US State Department in
February 1974. See Sobel, Chile and Allende, p. 168.

47 New York Times, September 17, 1974, as reproduced in Sobel, Chile and
Allende, p. 170.

48 US Senate, Covert Action, p. 47; Blum, The CIA, p. 242.

49 US Congress, Assassination Report, p. 229.

50 Petras and Morley, United States and Chile, p. 14.

51 Ibid., p. 76.

52 A critical analysis of how three distinct variables came together in the
Chilean counterrevolution is Smimow, Revolution Disarmed.

53 Smimow, Revolution Disarmed, p. 68. A day after the coup, Frei released a
POC communique welcoming the coup in unambiguous terms. For a
summary of the POC post-coup positions, see John Dinges, "The Rise of
the Opposition, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 17 (1983), no. 5, 16, 26.
Even before the coup, key POC leaders, including Frei and Aylwin, had
made discreet contact with the military to lobby for a coup. Pamela
Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), pp. 281, 352 n. 28.

54 See, for instance, Sobel, Chile and Allende, p. 170. Constable and Valenzuela,
Nation of Enemies, pp. 281, 352 n. 28; Dinges, "Rise of the Opposition, "
p. 26.

55 Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). In contrast to Mexico, the UP
government never controlled the state per se, only the executive branch
within the state (the presidency). The UP coalition was unable to capture a
controlling proportion of the legislature, which remained an instrument of
the dominant classes, and was never able to control the judicial system,
which also operated as a potent weapon of the elite - particularly since the
UP government was committed to abiding by the constitutional framework
which authorized the judicial system to rule on what it could and
could not do "constitutionally."

56 The Le Monde report is reproduced in Sobel, Chile and Allende, p. 169.

57 Lance Compa, "Laboring for Unity, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 22
(1988), no. 2.

58 For details of the recruitment by the AID of the "Chicago Boys, " see
Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of Enemies, pp. 166-168.

59 Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a
Democratic Regime, " in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour
Martin Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries, 4 vols. (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1989), IV, p. 200.

60 Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of Enemies, pp. 166-168.

61 For these statistics, see Sobel, Chile and Allende, p. 190. Regarding CIA
technical assistance to DINA, see Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of
Enemies, p. 91.

62 Petras and Morley, United States and Chile, p. ix.

63 Sater, Chile and the United States, p. 191; Constable and Valenzuela, Nation
of Enemies, p. 172.

64 Sater, Chile and the United States, pp. 191, 195.

65 Ibid., p. 194.

66 Congressional Record, Senate, 99th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 131, no. 141,
October 25, 1985, p. 13763.

67 An excellent summary of the 1985-1988 shift is Martha Lyn Doggett,
"Washington's Not-So-Quiet Diplomacy, " NACLA Report on the Americas,
22 (1988), no. 2, 29-38.

68 For details, see ibid.; Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of Enemies, p. 290.
They point out that Barnes, in addition, visibly kept at arm's length from
the leftist and popular opposition.

69 Sater, Chile and the United States, p. 201.

70 Elliot Abrams, "Latin America and the Caribbean: The Paths to Democracy, "
June 30, 1987 address before the Washington World Affairs
Council, Washington, D.C., reprinted by the Department of State, Bureau
of Public Affairs, Current Policy, no. 982 Guly 1987).

71 Sater, Chile and the United States, p. 200.

72 This strategy is outlined, among other places, in a slew of "working
papers" and policy proposals funded by the NED (see below for details on
this NED involvement), among them: Genaro Arriagada, Negociacion
politica y movilizacion social: la critica de las protestas (Santiago: Centro del
Estudios de Desarrollo, 1987); Ignacio Balbontin, Movilizacion social, control
social de los conflictos y negociacion politica (Santiago: Centro del Estudios de
Desarrollo, 1987); Heman Pozo, Partidos politicos y organizaciones poblacionales:
una relacion problematica (Santiago: FLACSO, 1986); Philip Oxhorn,
Democracia y participacion popular: organizaciones poblacionales en la futura
democratica chilena (Santiago: FLACSO, 1986). The strategy is also discussed
by one of its architects and activists, Genaro Arriagada, Pinochet:
The Politics of Power (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), esp. pp. 70-78.
Arriagada was a top POC leader.

73 New York Times, December 2, 1984.

74 Sater, Chile and the United States, p. 200.

75 Ibid., p. 201.

76 Ibid., p. 203.

77 For these details, see Fernando Villagran, "Me or Chaos, " NACLA Report
on the Americas, 22 (1988), no. 2, 14-20; Arriagada, Pinochet, pp. 69-70.

78 A useful review of the origins, strategies, leadership and thinking of
twenty-two of the Chilean political parties is the compendium edited by
Patricio Tupper, 88/89: Opciones politicas en Chile: La voz de los partidos
politicos, movimientos y corrientes de opinion. Lideres, ideas y programs
(Santiago: Ediciones Colchagua, 1987).

79 Washington condemned the FPMR's "terrorism" and assisted in counterinsurgency
efforts by providing the junta with intelligence information.
See Arriagada, Pinochet, p. 77.

80 See, e.g., Department of State, Office of Democratic Initiatives, Latin
American Caribbean Bureau, "Evaluation of Voter Education Program in
Chile Inter-American Institute of Human Rights - CIVITAS, " final report,
LAC grant number 0591-G-S5-8005-00, Agency for International Development,
Washington, D.C., February 1989, p. iii.

81 Doggett, "Washington's Not-So-Quiet Diplomacy, " p. 36.

82 Arriagada, Pinochet, p. 69; Dinges, "Rise of the Opposition, " pp. 18-20;
Congressional Record, Senate, 99th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 131, no. 141,
October 22, 1985, p. 13763.

83 Arriagada, Pinochet, pp. 75-78. The specific citation is on p. 78.

84 See Villagran, "Me or Chaos, " for details on the polls. See NED Annual
Report, 1988, for details on the NRI funding.

85 Arriagada, Pinochet, p. 68.

86 For these NED spending figures, see Annual Reports, 1984-1991. For 001
funding, see Doggett, "Washington's Not-So-Quiet Diplomacy, " pp. 34-35.

87 Sobel, Chile and Allende, pp. 43, 47-48. Boeninger was rector of the
University of Chile during the Allende years.

88 Regarding this strategy, and POC leaders' roles, see Paul H. Ooeker, Lost
llusions: Latin America's Struggle for Democracy, as Recounted 1Jy its Leaders
(La Jolla/New York: Institute of the Americas/Markus Wiener Publishers,
1990), pp. 21-23, 35-36, 39, 44; Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of
Enemies, p. 284.

89 NED Annual Reports, 1986-1991. Two of the studies to come out of the
FLAC50-NED programs were: Heraldo Munoz and Carlos Portales, Una
amistad esquiva: Las relaciones de Estados Unidos y Chile (Santiago: FLACSO/
PROSPEL-CERC, 1987); Eduardo Boeninger, et al., Estados Unidos y Chile
hacia 1987 (Santiago: FLACSO, 1987). Munoz, Portales, Boeninger, and
other contributors to these studies were all closely associated with the
POC, with one or another NED, or AID-funded programs and/or with the
elite transition strategy in general. Portales went on to become Deputy
Minister of Foreign Relations in the Aylwin government. Boeninger went
on to become Aylwin's chief advisor.

90 The study group published a subsequent report, by Mark Falcoff, Arturo
Valenzuela, and Susan Kaufman Purcell, Chile: Prospects for Democracy
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988). See p. 79 for a list of the
study group members. Domhoff, Who Rules America Now?, pp. 85-88,
notes that Council "study groups" are central components of the US
foreign policymaking process, the creation of a study group signals that
some new policy initiative is underway, and the results of these study
groups generally guide policymakers.

91 NED Summary, "Development of Democracy Project, " dated February 19,
1985, obtained through the FOIA.

92 NED Annual Report, 1986, pp. 31-32. Constable and Valenzuela noted
that "the emerging opposition parties and press were relying on them [the
US-funded think-tanks] for expertise. Under Edgardo Boeninger, the
Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo (CEO) became a meeting ground"
and clearing-house for the opposition. Nation of Enemies, p. 253.

93 Sobel, Chile and Allende, pp. 47-48; Smirnow, Revolution Disarmed, p. 142;
Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of Enemies, p. 255.

94 NED Annual Report, 1986, 31.

95 For summaries on Freedom House, see Council on Hemispheric Affairs/
Resource Center, National Endowment for Democracy, pp. 67-69; Freedom
House, Groupwatch series (Albuquerque: The Resource Center, 1989).

96 NED Annual Reports, 1986-1991. For the specific citations, see 1987
report, p. 50.

97 The five parties were the right-wing National Unity Movement and the
centrist Christian Democratic, Social Democrat, Christian Humanist, and
Radical parties. See NED Summary, "Editorial Fund for the Dissemination
of Democratic Thought in Chile, " one-page project summary (undated),
obtained through the FOIA.

98 See, e.g., NED Annual Reports, 1988 and 1989.

99 Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown, " particularly
pp.186-187.

100 See, e.g., Heman Larrain F., Governabilidad en Chile luego del regimen militar
(Santiago: Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, August 1987); Manuel
Antonio Garreton M., En busca de la democracia perdida (Santiago: Centro de
Estudios del Desarrollo, August 1985); Arriagada, Negociacion politica;
Balbontin, Movilizacion social; Pozo, Partidos politicos; Oxhorn, Democracia y
participacion.

101 NED Annual Reports, 1989, p. 31; 1990, p. 38. See also Edgardo Boeninger,
"Lessons from the Past: Hopes for the Future, " Journal of Democracy, 1
(1990), no. 2, 13-17.

102 "Delphi International Services, National Endowment for Democracy,
Grant with Delphi for the Implementation of the Project with Participa, "
final activities report, grant number 89-50.1, April-December, 1989, dated
February 28, 1990, obtained through the FOIA.

103 NED Annual Reports, 1984-1990.

104 For details on the CIA Institute and its revival by the NED, see Wiarda,
Democratic Revolution, p. 106. For the founding of the School in Venezuela,
see NED Annual Report, 1984, p. 32.

105 See National Democratic Institute, Chile's Democratic Transition (Washington
D.C., 1988); NED Annual Report, 1985, pp. 5, 16.

106 New York Times, January 27, 1986; Doggett, "Washington's Not-So-Quiet
Diplomacy."

107 Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of Enemies, p. 289.

108 See, for example, Mark Falcoff, "Chile: A Cognitive Map, " in Falcoff, et al.,
Chile: Prospects for Democracy.

109 NED Annual Report, 1984, p. 34.

110 NED Annual Report, 1986, p. 33.

111 NED Annual Report, 1986, p. 32.

112 See, e.g., NED Annual Report, 1989, p. 30.

113 See, e.g., NED Annual Report, 1987, pp. 50-51.

114 NOl, Chile's Transition, pp. 5-6.

115 NED Annual Report, 1987, p. 50; NDI, Chile's Transition, p. 6.

116 Ibid., p. 7.

117 NED Summary, "Committee for Free Elections (Chile), " undated, obtained
through the FOIA.

118 NED Annual Reports, 1987-1989.

119 NED Summary, "Committee for Free Elections: FY 1987 Evaluation, "
obtained through the FOIA.

120 New York Times, November 18, 1988. Frank Hartwig was the NOlcontracted
polling analyst.

121 For these details, see the following NED Summaries: "Supplement for
Participa (Chile), " undated; "Candidate Forums in Chile: A Nonpartisan
Voter Education Service"; "Delphi International Services, National Endowment
for Democracy, Grant with Delphi for the Implementation of the
Project with Participa, final activities report, grant number 89-50.1, April-
December, 1989, " dated February 28, 1990, all obtained through the FOIA.

122 See Fred Landis, "C.I.A. Psychological Warfare Operations: Case Studies
in Chile, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, " Science for the People, January-February
1982, 6-37.

123 See NED Annual Reports, 1988-1990; NED Summary "LA Epoca Newspaper, "
undated, apparently 1989, obtained through the FOrA.

124 For an overview, see Peter Wino, "U.S. Electoral Aid in Chile: Reflections
on a Success Story, " paper presented at the Washington Office on Latin
America (WOLA) conference, U.S. Electoral Assistance and Democratic
Development, Washington, D.C., January 19, 1990. The precise figures are
$2.7 million provided by the NED (NED Annual Report, 1988), and $1.2
million provided by the AID through the Democratic Initiatives Office. See
Agency for International Development, FY 1990 Democratic Initiatives and
Human Rights Program Summary (Washington, D.C, 1989), p. 12.

125 For background on CAPEL, see Robinson, Faustian Bargain, pp. 98-99.

126 For these details, see NED Annual Reports, 1987-1990; NED Summary,
"Candidate Forums in Chile: A Nonpartisan Voter Education Service, "
1989, obtained through the FOIA.

127 This was said by Frank Greer, "Media Consultant" for NDI, in testimony
before the Bipartisan Commission for Free and Fair Elections in Nicaragua, "
May 9, 1989, Washington, D.C I attended the Commission's
hearings.

128 Ooeker, Lost Illusions, p. 48.

129 For documentation and analysis of the electoral results see Cesar N.
Caviedes, Elections in Chile: The Road Toward Redemocratization (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 1991).

130 For self-congratulatory discussion on the success of the elite strategy see
Joseph S. Tulchin and Augusto Varas (eds.), From Dictatorship to Democracy:
Rebuilding Political Consensus in Chile (Washington, D.C/Boulder:
Woodrow Wilson Center /Lynne Rienner, 1991).

131 New York Times, October 16, 1973, reprinted in Sobel, Chile and Allende,
p.153.

132 NED Summary, "Democratic Action in Slum Areas ('Poblaciones')", May
1985, obtained through the FOIA.

133 "Center for Youth Development (FY 1987) Evaluation, " NED summary
document on its youth program in Chile, September 9, 1988, obtained
through the FOIA.

134 For Quintero's background, see Robinson, Faustian Bargain, p. 51.

135 Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of Enemies, p. 226.

136 "National Endowment for Democracy: Grant with Delphi For the Implementation
of the Project with Accion Vecinal y Comunitaria, " final report,
grant number 88-513-E-Q39-22.0, March 1988-February 1989, dated
August 31, 1989, obtained through the FOIA.

137 "Proyecto de Apoyo, Formacion y Asistencia Tecnica a Dirigentes y
Organizaciones Poblacionales de Inspiracion Democratica (Renovacion), "
document submitted on AVEC letterhead to the NED along with a cover
letter from Sergio Wilson Petit to NED official Katty Kauffman, dated
February 8, 1988, obtained through the FOIA.

138 "National Endowment for Democracy: Grant with Delphi, " 31 August
1989.

139 Ibid.

140 "The Delphi International Group, National Endowment for Democracy,
Grant with Delphi for Accion Vecinal Y Comunitaria (AVEC), " quarterly
report, grant no. 88-513-E-039-22.0, October 1988-December 1988, dated
March 15, 1989, obtained through the FOIA.

141 The FI1J1 received some $1 million between 1984 and 1990 for its Chile
programs. NED Annual Reports, 1984-1990. To this must be added
several million dollars more in regional Latin American FI1J1 programs in
which Chilean trade unions were involved, as well as millions of dollars
more which the Chilean unions received, not through the FI1J1, but
through other AFL-CIO channels.

142 Villagran, "Me or Chaos, " p. 17.

143 See, e.g., Compa, "Laboring for Unity, " pp. 21-28; Smimow, Revolution
Disarmed, pp. 28-29, 82-85.

144 See, e.g., Compa, "Laboring for Unity, " pp. 24, 25; Smimow, Revolution
Disarmed, pp. 82-85.

145 See, e.g., Compa, "Laboring for Unity, " p. 27. Constable and Valenzuela,
Nation of Enemies, pp. 228-229, report that the AFL-ClO's AIFLD sent a
delegation to Chile in 1978 to meet with Pinochet. The delegation told
Pinochet that radical unionism would get the upper hand if the regime did
not allow the Group of Ten to operate freely. Pinochet obliged.

146 See, e.g., Dinges, "Rise of the Opposition, " pp. 21-23.

147 NED Annual Report, 1984, p. 16.

148 NED Annual Report, 1984, p. 16; 1985, p. 14.

149 Compa, "Laboring for Unity, " p. 27.

150 For these NED-FI1J1 funding cycles, see NED Annual Reports, 1984-1992.

151 See, e.g., "Quarterly Report to the National Endowment for Democracy
from the Free Trade Union Institute, AFL-ClO, " 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
quarters, 1988 and 1989; NED Summary "Democratic Labor and the
Chilean Transition to Democracy, " undated (contents indicate it was
drafted after the October 1988 plebiscite and before the December 1989
national elections), obtained through the FOIA.

152 Free Trade Union Institute, "Request to the National Endowment for
Democracy for Funds for the Free Trade Union Institute, FY 1990, " March
5, 1990, obtained through the FOIA.

153 "Quarterly Report to the National Endowment for Democracy from the
Free Trade Union Institute, AFL-ClO, Regarding Activities and Expenditures
Undertaken Pursuant to Grants Made in FY '88, FY '89 and FY '90,
First Quarter 1990 Oanuary 1, 1990 through March 31, 1990), " dated April
30, 1990, p. 26, obtained through the FOIA.

154 "Center for Youth Development (FY 1987) Evaluation," September 9, 1988.

155 NED Summary, "Formation of Youth Leaders for Democracy, " July 12,
1984, obtained through the FOIA.

156 NED Summary, "Center for Youth Development, " undated (contents
indicate it was drafted in early 1988), obtained through the FOIA.

157 Letter from Miguel Salazar to Katty Kauffman of the National Endowment
for Democracy, on CDJ letterhead, March 29, 1988, obtained through the
FOIA.

158 NED Annual Report, 1986, p. 33.

159 Ibid., p. 33.

160 "Funcionamiento de la Nueva Institucionalidad Democratica, Proyecto
'CEL', " summary document by Sergio Molina on CEL activities and future
plans, submitted to the NED with a cover letter on Delphi letterhead,
November 30, 1989, obtained through the FOIA.

161 See, e.g., NED Annual Reports, 1990-1992.

162 Cathy Schneider, "The Underside of the Miracle, " NACLA Report on the
Americas, 26 (1993), no. 4, 18-19.

163 See, e.g., Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

164 Boeninger, "Lessons from the Past, " p. 13. Boeninger asserts that, in the
seventeen years of dictatorship, "The Chilean Left learned the hard way -
through exile, torture, and proscription - to appreciate political freedoms
... Never again will democracy be threatened from the left of our
political spectrum" (p. 14). Given Boeninger's apparent historical amnesia,
it should be recalled that it was not the Chilean left that departed from the
"democratic" rules, but the Chilean center, including his own POC, the
right and the United States.

165 Cited in James Petras and Steve Vieux, "The Chilean 'Economic Miracle':
An Empirical Critique, " Critical Sociology, 17 (1990), no. 2, 56-72, quote
from p. 70. I draw on this excellent article in the following section. For
succinct critique of the "miracle, " see also Duncan Green, "Chile: The First
Latin American Tiger?, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 28 (1994), no. 1,
12-16.

166 See, e.g., Thomas Klubock, "And Justice When?, " NACLA Report on the
Americas, 24 (1991), no. 5, 6-7.

167 Petras and Vieux, "Chilean 'Economic Miracle', " p. 66.

168 Ibid.

169 ECLAC report released in Santiago, Chile, on October 23, 1990,
reported in Agence France Presse news dispatch from Santiago, October
13, 1990.

170 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 138.

171 Petras and Vieux, "Chilean 'Economic Miracle', " p. 64.

172 Ibid., pp. 58-59.

173 Ibid.

174 Pedro Vuskovic Bravo, "Chile: Mito y Realidad de un Milagro, " Pensamiento
Propio, no. 85 (October 1991), 7-11.

175 Petras and Vieux, "Chilean 'Economic Miracle', " pp. 60-61.

176 Ibid., pp. 62-63.

177 Green, "Chile: The First Latin American Tiger?"

178 Arturo Valenzuela and Pamela Constable, "Chile after Pinochet: Democracy
Restored, " Journal of Democracy, 1 (1990), no. 2, p. 6.

179 Petras and Vieux, "Chilean 'Economic Miracle', " p. 59.

180 See Vuskovic Bravo, "Chile: Mito y Realidad, " p. 9.

181 Boeninger, "Lessons from the Past, " p. 15.

182 Petras and Vieux, "Chilean 'Economic Miracle', " p. 70.

5 Nicaragua: From low-intensity warfare to low-intensity democracy

1 Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, "Bipartisan Objectives for American
Foreign Policy, " Foreign Affairs, 66 (1988), no. 5, p. 919.

2 Cited in Penny Lernoux, "The Struggle for Nicaragua's Soul: A Church in
Revolution and War, " Sojourners, May 14, 1989, p. 23. Neuhaus was a
founding member of the conservative Institute on Religion and Democracy
(IRD), which helped promote US policy toward Nicaragua in the 1980s.

3 Peter Rodman, Special Assistant to the President on National Security
Affairs. Cited in Robinson, A Faustian Bargain, p. 25. This work will be
referred to simply as AFB in subsequent notes for this chapter.

4 Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 16.

5 A penetrating overview of this period is Bradford E. Burns, Patriarch and
Folk: The Emergence of Nicaragua, 1798-1858 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1991).

6 Karl Bermann, Under the Big Stick: Nicaragua and the United States since 1848
(Boston: South End, 1986), p. 16. This is an excellent analysis of USNicaragua
relations in historical perspective.

7 For an in-depth study of the Zelaya period, see Oscar Rene Vargas, La
Revolucion que Inicio el Progreso: Nicaragua 1893-1909 (Managua: Ecotextura/
Consa, 1990).

8 Bermann, Big Stick, p. 141.

9 For an account of this spate of elections, see Oscar Rene Vargas, Elecciones
en Nicaragua, 1912-1932: (Analisis socio-politico) (Managua: Fundacion
Manolo Morales, 1989).

10 The definitive biography of Sandino and his movement is Gregorio SeIser,
Sandino (New York: Monthly Review, 1981).

11 Cited in Bermann, Big Stick, p. 213.

12 Richard Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty (New York: Maryknoll, 1977), is
the classic work on the National Guard.

13 There is no direct evidence of such involvement. However, the circumstantial
evidence suggests the historical record is still undetermined. For
discussions on the possible US role, see Bermann, Big Stick, pp. 221-222,
and Seiser, Sandino, pp. 174-179.

14 There are many works on the Somoza dynasty. See, e.g., Bernard
Diederich, Somoza and the Legacy of u.s. Involvement in Central America
(New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981).

15 Cited in Bermann, Big Stick, p. 219.

16 Ibid., p. 247. See also Thomas Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino
(Boulder: Westview, 1981), p. 89.

17 For these details, see Millett, Guardians, pp. 200, 252; Tom Barry, Debrah
Preusch, and Beth Wood, Dollars and Dictators (New York: Grove, 1983),
pp. 66--73; George Black, Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in
Nicaragua (London: Zed, 1981), pp. 47-48.

18 See, e.g., Victor Blumer Thomas, The Political Economy of Central America
since 1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Jaime
Wheelock, Imperialismo y Dictadura (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1975).

19 See Kent Norsworthy, Nicaragua: A Country Guide (Albuquerque: The
Resource Center, 1990), pp. 78, 193 n. 18; See also Black, Triumph,
pp. 28-41, 68-70; Thomas, Political Economy, pp. 150-225.

20 Cited in Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, p. 162.

21 For discussion, see William I. Robinson and Kent Norsworthy, David and
Goliath: The US War Against Nicaragua (New York: Monthly Review, 1987),
ch.7.

22 Jaime Wheelock, EI Gran Desafio (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua,
1983), p. 26.

23 A detailed chronicle of events leading to the 1979 Sandinista revolution is
Black, Triumph. For an insider's account of the elite opposition, see Pedro
Joaquin Chamorro, Diario Politico (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua,
1990), posthumous.

24 Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, pp. 79, 86.

25 For details, see Bermann, Big Stick, pp. 261-272.

26 Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, pp. 93, 107.

27 See ibid., pp. 151-159, for these details.

28 Cited in Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs, Latin America Data
Base, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque,
March 24, 1994.

29 Literature on the revolution's economic and social programs is vast. On
agrarian reform, see, e.g., Joseph Collins, et al., Nicaragua: What Difference
Could a Revolution Make: Food and Farming in the New Nicaragua (San
Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1985); La reforma
agraria en Nicaragua 1979-1989: cifras y referencias documentales (Managua:
CIERA, 1989). On the world-recognized Sandinista literacy crusade, see
Valerie Miller, Between Struggle and Hope: The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade
(Boulder: Westview, 1985). For an account of the revolution's health
programs, see Richard Garfield and Glen Williams, Health and Revolution:
The Nicaraguan Experience (London: Oxfam, 1989). For general description
of post-1979 economic democratization, and social and cultural achievements,
see Norsworthy, Nicaragua; Thomas Walker (ed.), Nicaragua: The
First Five Years (New York: Praeger, 1985).

30 For discussion on democracy in Nicaragua between 1979 and 1990, see,
e.g., Jose Luis Coraggio, Nicaragua: Revolucion y Democracia (Mexico:
Editorial Linea, 1985); Gary Ruchwarger, People in Power: Forging a Grassroots
Democracy in Nicaragua (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey,
1987); Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost, Democracy and Socialism in
Sandinista Nicaragua (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

31 On the 1984 elections and US strategy toward them, see, among others,
William I. Robinson and Kent Norsworthy, "Elections and U.S. Intervention
in Nicaragua, " Latin American Perspectives, 12 (1985), no. 2, 22-24;
John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson (eds.), Elections and Democracy in
Central America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989);
Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988),
pp. 232-257.

32 Vanden and Prevost, Democracy and Socialism, p. 19.

33 [bid. See also Dennis Gilbert, Sandinistas, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988;
Ruchwarger, People in Power.

34 For this type of critique, see Carlos Vilas, La Revolucion Sandinista: Liberacion
nacional y transjormaciones sociales en Centroamerica (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Legasa, 1984). Vilas's is a brilliant study; I differ with him on the
"scope conditions" under which the revolutionary project should be
assessed.

35 Works on the US war against Nicaragua are numerous. See, e.g., Robinson
and Norsworthy, David and Goliath; Thomas Walker (ed.), Reagan Versus
the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua (Boulder: Westview, 1987);
Holly Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Boston: South End, 1988);
Kornbluh, Nicaragua.

36 The $447.69 million figure is from US congressional reports reproduced in
Norsworthy, Nicaragua, p. 176. For breakdown on the $2 billion figure, see
Robinson and Norsworthy, David and Goliath, pp. 86-94.

37 For these details, see ibid., pp. 1OG-102, 123-124, 161-163.

38 AFB, p. 36.

39 For more details, see AFB and Robinson and Norsworthy, David and
Goliath, ch. 7.

40 This section draws heavily from AFB. Readers interested in original
sources are referred to that volume, which contains a hundred pages of
notes and reproduced US government documentation.

41 Ibid., p. 28.

42 Ibid., pp. 28, 195 n. 6.

43 Ibid., pp. 29-30/ 196, nn. 11-15.

44 These figures are drawn from the National Endowment for Democracy/s
Annual Reports, 1984 through 1992. The 1984-1991 spending is described
and analyzed, item by item, in AFB.

45 For these citations, see ibid, p. 48.

46 Ibid., p. 49.

47 For the detailed account of the formation by US officials of the UNO
coalition, see ibid., pp. 47-65.

48 Ibid., pp. 50-51.

49 Ibid.

50 For these citations and more details, see ibid., pp. 52-53.

51 Ibid., p. 52

52 For these details, see ibid., p. 53.

53 See ibid., pp. 58-60.

54 For summaries of Obando y Bravo's US ties, and on his role in the anti-
Sandinista campaign, see Irene SeIser, Cardenal Obando (Managua: Centro
de Estudios Ecumenicos, 1989); Robinson and Norsworthy, David and
Goliath, pp. 208-219, 241-248.

55 Status Report on the Task Force on Humanitarian Assistance in Central
America, Report on Phase 1lI, May I-August 31, 1989, Agency for international
Development, September 17, 1989, Washington, D.C. This money
was used for establishing a national logistical network of communications
and transportation for his archdiocese.

56 For these details, see AFB, pp. 59-60.

57 For details and analysis, see ibid., pp. 60-65, 67-89.

58 Ibid, pp. 114-115.

59 Ibid, p. 62.

60 According to Peter Montgomery, "1980-1990: The Reagan Years, "
Common Cause Magazine, November 1990, p. 12, Bush spent a total of $70
million in public and private funds.

61 For these details, see AFB, pp. 63-65.

62 Ibid., pp. 67-68.

63 For details, see ibid., pp. 69-70.

64 Ibid., p. 70.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 See ibid., p. 71.

68 For example, see Orlando Nunez, "La ideologia como Fuerza Material, y
La Juventud como Fuerza Ideologica, " in Estado y Clases Sociales en
Nicaragua (Managua: CIERA, 1982).

69 AFB, p. 72.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., p. 74.

72 Ibid.

73 "Political and Social Action Project, Nicaragua, " Delphi International
Group, undated document obtained through the FOIA.

74 AFB, p. 75

75 Ibid.

76 See Holly Sklar, "US Wants to Buy Nicaragua's Elections - Again, " Zeta,
November 1989, 39-40.

77 AFB, p. 76.

78 Ibid.

79 For discussion on propaganda and the communications media in US
policy towards Nicaragua, see sources listed in ibid., p. 211, n. 61.

80 Ibid, p. 78.

81 See ibid., p. 78, and discussion and sources listed in pp. 211-212, n. 61,
63-65.

82 For details, see sources in ibid., p. 212, n. 65.

83 Ibid., p. 79.

84 For details, see ibid.

85 For documentation on the CIA connection, see sources listed in ibid.,
p. 212, n. 70.

86 Ibid., pp. 81-82.

87 Ibid., p. 87.

88 The most exhaustive analysis of pre-electoral polls is William A. Barnes,
"Rereading the Nicaraguan Pre-Election Polls, " in Vanessa Castro and
Gary Prevost (eds.), The 1990 Elections in Nicaragua and Their Aftermath
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992). See also AFB, pp. 87-89.

89 See, e.g., ibid., p. 104.

90 Ibid., p. 105.

91 For details on this aid package, and Contra activity during the electoral
process, see ibid., pp. 134-140.

92 Ibid., p. 137.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 For these statistics, and for an overall analysis of the rural aspects of the
electoral process, see Vanessa Castro, Resultados Electorales en el Sector
Rural (Managua: Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Democracia, 1990).

97 Alvin H. Bernstein, "Political Strategies in Coercive Diplomacy and
Limited War, " in Lord and Barnett (eds.), Political Warfare, p. 146.

98 Norsworthy, Nicaragua, p. 67.

99 Cited in AFB, p. 141.

100 See White House statement, November 8, 1989, released by the Office of
the Press Secretary.

101 AFB, pp. 143-144.

102 For details, see ibid., p. 144.

103 See Vanden and Prevost, Democracy and Socialism, pp. 142-143.

104 Paul Oquist, "The Sociopolitical Dynamics of the 1990 Elections" in Castro
and Prevost (eds.), 1990 Elections, p. 29.

105 "Recibi al Pais en un Profundo Abismo, " La Jornada (Mexico), June 25,
1993, 1.

106 On post-revolutionary Nicaragua and US activities therein, see, among
others, Oscar Rene Vargas, A donde va Nicaragua: perspectivas de una
revolucion latinoamericana (Managua: Ediciones Nicarao, 1991); William I.
Robinson and Kent Norsworthy, "The Nicaraguan Revolution Since the
Elections, " CrossRoads, no. 6 Oanuary 1991), 21-27; Midge Quandt, "U.S.
Aid to Nicaragua: Funding the Right, " Z Magazine, November 1991, 47-
51; George R. Vickers and Jack Spence, "Two Years After the Fall, " World
Policy Journal, Summer 1992, 533-562.

107 For discussion on the FSLN and the popular organizations after the
elections, see Midge Quandt, Unbinding the Ties: The Popular Organizations
and the FSLN in Nicaragua (Washington, D.C.: Nicaragua Network Education
Fund, 1992).

108 Remark made during an AprilS, 1990 press conference, cited in "Family
Frictions, " Ba"icada Internacional, no. 320 (April 12, 1990), p. 3.

109 Agency for International Development, "Country Development Strategy
Statement: U.S.AID/Nicaragua 1991-1996, " Washington, D.C. June 14,
1991, pp. 62-63.

110 For the $541 million figure, see AID, "Strategy Statement, " resource table,
appearing on an unnumbered page following the last numbered page (63).
See also: AID, "Nicaragua: A Commitment to Democracy, Reconciliation,
and Reconstruction" ("Fact Sheet" prepared for reporters and the public,
March 1990); AID, "Economic Assistance Strategy for Central America,
1991-2000, " Washington, D.C. January 1991. For detailed analysis, see the
excellent studies by two Nicaraguan economists: Angel Saldomando, El
retorno de la AID, caso de Nicaragua: condicionalidad y reestructuracion
conservadora (Managua, Ediciones CRIES, 1992); Adolfo Acevedo Vogl,
Nicaragua y el FMI: el pozo sin fondo del ajuste (Managua: Ediciones CRIES,
1993). Also see interview with Saldomando, "U.S.AID's Strategy in
Nicaragua, " Envio, no. 142 (May 1993), 23-31.

111 AFB, p. 164.

112 For details, see ibid., pp. 164, 23700.7-10.

113 Vargas, A donde va Nicaragua.

114 AFB, p. 163.

115 AID, "Strategy Statement, " pp. 47-48.

116 AID, "Strategy Statement, " pp. 15-16, 45.

117 For details on the AID textbooks, see Quandt, "U.S. Aid to Nicaragua."

118 AFB, pp. 165-166.

119 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 46.

120 AFB, p. 166.

121 See NED Annual Reports, 1990-1992. For the television program, see 1992
Report, 75.

122 AFB, p. 166.

123 Quandt, "U.S. Aid to Nicaragua."

124 Ibid.

125 Saldomando interview, "U.S.AID's Strategy in Nicaragua, " pp. 26-27.

126 William 1. Robinson, "AID to Nicaragua: Some Things Aren't What They
Seem, " In These Times, October 24-30, 1990.

127 See Roberto Larios, "Bowing Before Financial Organizations, " Ba"icada
Internacional, nos. 367-8 (Nov.-Dec. 1993), pp. 8-9.

128 Anne Larson, "Foreign Debt: Where Have All the Dollars Gone?, " Envio,
no. 143 Oune 1993), 4-10.

129 For these details and statistics, see Larson, "Foreign Debt."

130 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 39.

131 See ibid., resource table; Saldomando, El retorno, p. 97, and pp. 88-89 for a
listing of the new private banks and their principal board members.

132 Ibid., p. 92.

133 Larios, "Bowing Before Financial Organizations."

134 "Why Social Conflict, " Envio, no. 138 Uan.-Mar. 1993), p. 18.

135 Larios, "Bowing Before Financial Organizations."

136 See, e.g., AID, "Strategy Statement"; AID, "Economic Assistance
Strategy." For further discussion of this general model for the Caribbean
Basin, see, e.g., H. Rodrigo Jauberth Rojas et al., La triangulacion Centroamerica-
Mexico-EUA: una oportunidad para el desarrollo y la paz? (Managua:
Ediciones CRIES, 1991).

137 See "Welcome to the Free Trade Zone, " Envio, no. 150, 27-33.

138 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 25.

139 Saldomando, EI retorno, pp. 74-78.

140 See, e.g., ibid., p. 80.

141 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 20.

142 See, e.g., Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary Spokesman,
"Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, " press release, April 2, 1993,
which outlines strict conditions imposed by the Clinton administration for
the release of frozen US funds, including a purging of Sandinistas from the
government, the dismissal of army chief Humberto Ortega (a Sandinista)
and other high-level EPS officials.

143 For an explanation of this doctrine, as described by Humberto Ortega, see
interview with Ortega in Barricada [Managua j, December 29, 1992, 1.

144 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 63.

145 There is considerable literature on these measures and debate on whether
they were necessary or in the popular interests. See, e.g., Richard Stahler-
Sholk, "Stabilization, Destabilization., and the Popular Classes in Nicaragua,
1979-1988, " Latin American Research Review, 25 (1990), no. 3, 55-88.
For a summary, see AFB, pp. 141-144.

146 "Why Social Conflict, " 18.

147 Ibid.

148 Susanne Andersson, "New National Health Care Policy: Undercover
Privatization, " Barricada Internacional, no. 367-8, (Nov.-Dec. 1993), 12-13.

149 For discussion on the debate in the FSLN and in the left in Latin America,
see, e.g., Gary Prevost, "The FSLN in Opposition, " in Castro and Prevost
(eds.), 1990 Elections; Vargas, A donde va Nicaragua; William I. Robinson,
"The Sao Paulo Forum: Is There a New Latin American Left?, " Monthly
Review (1992), no. 7, 1-12.

150 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 8.

6 Haiti: The "practically insolvable problem" of establishing consensual domination

1 Cited in Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1971), pp. 62-63.

2 Steve Meacham, "Popular Power in Haiti, " Forward Motion (1991), no. 3,
p.23.

3 General works in English on which I draw include: Elizabeth Abbott,
Haiti: The Duvaliers and their Legacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988);
Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel (Boulder: Westview,
1989); Paul Fanner, The Uses of Haiti (Monroe, Me.: Common Courage,
1994); James Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers (New
York: Blackwell, 1987); Mats Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty: A Study of
Haiti (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Rod Prince, Haiti: Family Business
(London: Latin American Bureau, 1985); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti,
State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism (New York:
Monthly Review, 1990); Amy Wilentz, The Rainy Season: Haiti since
Duvalier (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).

4 See, e.g., the classic study in English on the Haitian revolution, C. L. R.
James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo
Revolution (New York: Random House, 1963), p. ix.

5 Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. and Nancy Gordon Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story
of the Haitian People, 1492-1971 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 33.
The Heinls' exhaustive historical account, like earlier colonial historical
logs, is steeped in racism and ethnocentric assumptions. The Haitians are
not only "primitive" and exhibit some mystical "psyche, " but are a people
inexplicably incapable of resolving their own problems since they do not
fit the Eurocentric logic of the observers.

6 For analysis, see James, Black Jacobins.

7 Cited in Prince, Family Business, p. 32.

8 Prince, Family Business, pp. 13-14.

9 Although space constraints preclude discussion, in reality a "pure" peasant
economy never existed in Haiti, and has rarely existed in human history.
The peasant economy was highly stratified, an amalgamation of subsistence
production and semi-feudal rural production relations, in which
large holders were in turn "articulated" to capitalist production relations
via marketing in the world economy through a commercial bourgeoisie
and a state bureaucracy. See, e.g., Trouillot, State against Nation.

10 See, e.g., Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, pp. 17, 21.

11 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 18; Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel, pp. 48-55.

12 Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America:
Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review, 1967).

13 These statistics are summarized in Prince, Family Business, pp. 1-4, 43,
53-55.

14 For details, see Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 172.

15 Cited in Schmidt, United States Occupation, p. 48.

16 Fritz Longchamp and Worth Cooley-Prost, "Breaking with Dependency
and Dictatorship: Hope for Haiti, " Covert Action Information Bulletin, no. 36
(Spring 1991), 54-58, at p. 55.

17 Schmidt, The United States Occupation, p. 31.

18 Ibid., p. 103, Emily Greene Balch, Occupied Haiti (New York: The Writers
Publishing Co., 1927).

19 As cited in Paul W. Drake, "From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912-
1932, " in Lowenthal (ed.) Exporting Democracy, p. 25.

20 Schmidt, United States Occupation, p. 145.

21 Ibid., pp. 108-112.

22 For these details, see ibid., pp. 37-40, 48-52; Paul H. Douglas, "Political
History of the Occupation, " in Balch, Occupied Haiti, pp. 18-21 and
Douglas, "Economic and Financial Aspects, " in ibid., pp. 44-46, 54-56.

23 E. G. Balch, "Public Order, " in ibid., p. 130.

24 E. G. Balch, "Charges of Abuses in Haiti, " in ibid., p. 125.

25 Ibid., pp. 123-127; Schmidt, United States Occupation, pp. 86-91, 100-102.

26 Ibid., pp. 86-91; Trouillot, State against Nation, pp. 104-108.

27 Noirism was in turn a Haitian version of Negritude, an anti-colonial
ideology of the disenfranchised African middle class in French colonies
who took over the reins of direct government from departing white
administrators in new neo-colonial states.

28 On US support for Duvalier's electoral bid, see Bellegarde-Smith, Breached
Citadel, pp. 94-95.

29 Wilentz, Rainy Season, p. 42.

30 See Abbott, The Duvaliers, f~ graphic descriptions of Duvalierist terror,
and pp. 184 and 234, respectively, for the specific statistics.

31 Note that vodoun is alternatively spelled vodun, voudou, and voodoo.
Vodoun, a blend of African animist religions and Catholicism, developed
during the colonial period as a means of uniting people and organizing
resistance, both spiritual and worldly. The US occupation force, mulatto
governments, and the conservative Catholic Church hierarchy had long
tried forcibly to suppress it. The Machiavellian Duvalier, on the other
hand, won support by encouraging voudoun as a source of black pride and
practiced the religion himself, and was able to incorporate many houngans
into the Macoute network. For discussion, see Bellegarde-Smith, Breached
Citadel, pp. 9-22.

32 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 87.

33 Ibid., pp.108-111.

34 Ibid., pp. 93, 105, 114; Prince, Family Business, pp. 26-27, 36, 38; Ferguson,
Papa Doc, Baby Doc, pp. 62, 78.

35 Ibid., p. 42.

36 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 163; Prince, Family Business, p. 31; Ferguson, Papa
Doc, Baby Doc, pp. 55, 57.

37 See ibid., pp. 68-69. Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel, p. 100, estimates
that total U.S. economic aid to the Duvalier regime between 1957 and 1986
was about $900 million.

38 See, e.g., Prince, Family Business, pp. 43-46; Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty,
various chapters; Tom Barry, Beth Woods, and Deb Preusch, The Other
Side of Paradise: Foreign Control in the Caribbean (New York: Grove Press,
1984), pp. 330-341.

39 For analyses of the CBI and the arrival of the global economy in the
Caribbean, see Kathy McAfee, Storm Signals: Structural Adjustment and
Development Alternatives in the Caribbean (Boston: South End 1991);Barry, et
al., Other Side of Paradise.

40 Prince, Family Business, pp. 47-51.

41 Cited in Barry, et at., Other Side of Paradise, p. 336.

42 See Prince, Family Business, pp. 48, 72. Prince notes that Haitian workers in
the free-trade zone showed to be just as productive as those working in
core countries, which belies the argument that lower wages in the Third
World are a result of lower productivity.

43 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 176.

44 The World Bank report is cited in Noam Chomsky, Year 501 (Boston,
South End, 1993), pp. 206-207; the AID report in Bellegarde-Smith,
Breached Citadel, p. 127.

45 For instance, Duvalier official Clemard Joseph Charles, who had established
the local Commercial Bank and also served as Jean-Claude's "bagman, "
in charge of managing the Duvaliers' Swiss bank accounts, was also
on the boards of fourteen major transnational corporations operating in
Haiti, among them General Electric, Siemens, Schuckerwerke, and Toyota
Motors. See Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 182.

46 Longchamp and Cooley-Prost, "Breaking with Dependency, " pp. 56-57.

47 Truillot, State against Nation, pp. 218-219.

48 While the old-style dictatorships of the Philippines, Nicaragua, and Haiti
demonstrate both these flaws of authoritarianism, Chile, with its "bureaucratic-
authoritarian regime" under Pinochet, provided technical and administrative
efficiency but demonstrated the second failing, generating
mass resistance to dictatorship that threatens the social order.

49 Prince, Family Business, p. 71.

50 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 305; Wilentz, Rainy Season, p. 39. The US
Embassy-Namphy conspiracy to remove Duvalier is detailed in Abbott,
The Duvaliers, pp. 285-293, 302-314, 321-333.

51 Ibid., pp. 287, 292-293.

52 Ibid., pp. 299-300.

53 Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 112.

54 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 306.

55 Ibid., p. 308; Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 119.

56 Ibid., p. 121.

57 Ibid., p. 176.

58 Americas Watch/National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Silencing a
People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti (New York/Washington,
February 1993), pp. 3-4.

59 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 305.

60 Ibid., p. 335; Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, pp. 123, 128, 140-142.

61 See Thomas Carothers, "The Reagan Years: The 1980s, " in Lowenthal,
Exporting Democracy, p. 113.

62 Longchamp and Cooley-Prost, "Breaking With Dependency, " p. 57.

63 "Assistance for Democracy Act of 1986, " Report 99-722, House of Representatives,
99th Congress, 2nd Session, July 30, 1986, p. 21. Of the $4
million, $2.8 million was disbursed before a November 1987 suspension of
military aid, according to Trouillot, State against Nation, p. 222.

64 ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 161; Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel,
p.123.

65 See, e.g., Tim Weiner, "Key Haitian Leaders Said to Have Been in CIA's
Pay, " New York Times, November 1, 1993, A-I; Tim Weiner, "CIA Formed
Haitian Unit Later Tied to Narcotics Trade, " New York Times, November
14, 1993, A-I.

66 Ibid.

67 See, e.g., eyewitness accounts by Abbott in The Duvaliers, esp. p. 320. See
also Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 125.

68 For a discussion of these parties, see Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel,
pp. 154-157.

69 See Weiner, "CIA Formed Haitian Unit."

70 Longchamp and Cooley-Prost, "Breaking with Dependency, " p. 57. For
details and eyewitness descriptions of the repression under the National
Government Council, see Wilentz, Rainy Season, and Abbott, The Duvaliers,
esp. pp. 331-367.

71 Wilentz, Rainy Season, p. 358.

72 For details on Adams and his activities, see Longchamp and Cooley-Prost,
"Breaking with Dependency, " p. 54.

73 Ibid.

74 On the formation of these and other broad democratic coalitions, see
Michael S. Hooper, "The Monkey's Tail Still Strong, " NACLA Report on the
Americas, 21 (1987), no. 3, 24-31; Wilentz, Rainy Season, esp. pp. 209-211,
233; Mark V. Aristide and Laurie Richardson, "Profiles of the Popular
Currents, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 27 (1994), no. 4, 32-33; Mark V.
Aristide and Laurie Richardson, "Haiti's Popular Resistance, " NACLA
Report on the Americas, 27 (1994), no. 4, 30-36.

75 For descriptions of these peasant federations, see Silencing a People,
pp. 9-26. See also Robert E. Maguire, "The Peasantry and Political Change
in Haiti, " Caribbean Affairs, 4 (1991), no. 2, 1-18.

76 Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and
Row, 1969).

77 In The Rainy Season, Wilentz, who as a reporter in Port-au-Prince held
numerous interviews with U.S. Embassy officials, amply documents this
distrust and hostility. See, e.g., pp. 11, 114-115, 120, 128, 129, 220-221, 390.

78 For summaries, see NED Annual Reports, 1985-1990; Resource Center,
"Populism, Conservatism, and Civil Society in Haiti, " The NED Backgrounder,
1 (1992), no. 2; Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti. This
booklet contains summaries and reprints of sections of several AID
documents released to the Washington Office on Haiti through the FOIA.

79 AID, "Democracy Enhancement Project (521-0236) Project Paper, " Wa-
shington, D.C., June 20, 1991, reproduced in part in Cooley-Prost, Democracy
Intervention in Haiti, p. 7.

80 See, e.g., letter from Berlanger to NED officer Marc F. Plattner, December
2, 1985, obtained through the FOIA.

81 See "Haitian International Institute for Research and Development
-(IHRED), Proposal to Conduct Forums for the Promotion and Development
of Democracy in Haiti, " January 1989, released through the FOIA.

82 See NED Annual Reports, 1987-1990.

83 NED Annual Report, 1987, p. 57.

84 Memo from US Embassy in Port-au-Prince to NDI regarding partybuilding
workshops, August 1986, obtained through the FOIA.

85 See, e.g., Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 139.

86 "The 1990 Elections in Haiti, " report of the electoral observation mission
sponsored by the National Republican Institute for International Affairs,
undated, p. 30.

87 See the following four documents obtained through the FOIA: "NRIIA
Final Program Report: NED Grant #90-132.0 Haiti, AID Funds, Project
Title: Democratic Institution Development and Election Observation, "
undated; "Grant Agreement Between the National Endowment for Democracy,
Incorporated, and the National Republican Institute for International
Affairs, NED Grant No. 90-132.0, " undated; "National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs, Quarterly Report to the National Endowment
for Democracy (July 1 - September 30, 1991}, " October 31, 1991;
"Haiti Aid, Grant Number: 90-132.0, Program Title: Political Party Development."
Regarding the 1990 electoral results, see Washington Office on
Haiti, "Report on the Elections of December 16, 1990, " Washington, D.C.
March 1991; "The 1990 Elections in Haiti."

88 See Abbott, The Duvaliers, pp. 254-255; Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc,
p.127.

89 Ibid.

90 The businessman was Vernon Gentry, cited in a commentary he published,
"State Department Rebuffed in Haiti, " Times of the Americas
(Washington, D.C.), December 26, 1990, 25.

91 Cited in Americas Watch, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, and
Physicians for Human Rights, Return to the Darkest Days: Human Rights in
Haiti Since the Coup (New York: Americas Watch, December, 1991),
pp.16-17.

92 See "Toward a New Future: Emerging Democracy in Haiti, " Haiti Backgrounder
(1991), no. 1 (published by Third World Reports, Cambridge,
Mass.)

93 Resource Center, "Populism"; Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in
Haiti, p. 7.

94 See Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti, p. 7, and the following
documents obtained through the FOIA: America's Development Foundation
(ADF) summary of proposal to NED, February 13, 1991; "National
Endowment for Democracy/Haiti Election, America's Development Foundation
Civic Education Proposals, " undated; "Quarterly Program Report,
National Endowment for Democracy Haiti Elections, Grants # 90-121.0,
90-122.0, 90-123.0, 90-124.0, 90-129.1, October 1, 1990 - December 31,
1990."

95 See Resource Center, "Populism, "; Allan Ebert, "Haiti and the AIFLD: A
Burden Removed ... A Burden Renewed, " National Reporter, Summer 1986,
19-21. Ebert documents how, in the wake of Duvalier's departure, the
AIFLD dispatched a delegation to Haiti to set up a full-time office and
work closely with the FOS.

96 Weiner, "Key Haitian Leaders."

97 See "FY 1990 Democratic Initiatives and Human Rights Program
Summary, " Agency for International Development, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

98 Meacham, "Popular Power in Haiti, " p. 24.

99 See Washington Office on Haiti, "Report on the Elections"; "The 1990
Elections in Haiti."

100 See, e.g., Xavier Gorostiaga, "La avalancha haitiana, " Pensamiento Propio,
March 1991, 1-3.

101 Cited in William I. Robinson, "The Tragic History of the Haitian Republic, "
Notisur, Latin America Data Base, Latin America Institute, University
of New Mexico, Albuquerque, vol. 2, no. 2 ijanuary 22, 1992).

102 See Washington Office on Haiti, "Update on Haiti, " Washington, D.C.,
April 18, 1991.

103 Ibid.; Barbara Briggs and Charles Kernaghan, "The U.S. Economic Agenda:
A Sweatshop Model of Development, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 27
(1994), no. 4, 37-40.

104 Amy Wilentz, "Haiti: The September Coup, " Reconstruction (1992), no. 4,
p.103.

105 See Kim Ives, "The Unmaking of a President, " NACLA Report on the
Americas, 27 (1994), no. 4, p. 17.

106 The list is cited and discussed in Niki Joseph, "Haiti: The Long March to
Popular Democracy, " CrossRoads, no. 15 (November 1991); Also, the New
York Times, October 13, 1991, A-I reported that individual enlisted soldiers
and policemen were paid as much as $5, 000 each to support the coup.

107 Prince, Family Business, pp. 51, 57.

108 However, there might well have been covert involvement which has not -
and may never - become public knowledge.

109 See, e.g., Allan Nairn, "Our Man in FRAPH: Behind Haiti's Paramilitaries, "
The Nation, 259 (1994), 458-461.

110 E.g., U.S. ambassador Alvin Adams, in the days prior to the coup, had
presented a number of Haitian army demands to Aristide officials in a
coercive diplomacy tactic to place pressure on Aristide to cede a greater
quota of power to adversaries in and out of the armed forces and to take
measures that would strengthen the state's coercive apparatus. See
Notimex news dispatch, datelined Mexico City, February 3, 1992, "Aristide
Adviser Charges U.S. Involved in Coup, " reproduced in FBI5-LAT-
92-023, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1992.

111 See "Mobilizing Resources for Development, " International Policy Report
(Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C.), May 1992; Briggs and
Kernaghan, "The U.S. Economic Agenda."

112 See Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 146; Bellegarde-Smith, Breached
Citadel, p. 135;Trouillot, State against Nation.

113 AID, "Democracy Enhancement Project (521-0236), Project Paper, Project
Summary, " 1-8, reprinted in Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti,
appendix.

114 For these citations and details, see Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in
Haiti, pp. 8-9.

115 Ibid., p. 12.

116 On US policy between 1991 and 1994, see, among others, John Canham-
Clyne, "U.S. Policy on Haiti: Selling Out Democracy, " Covert Action
Quarterly, no. 48 (Spring 1994), 4-9, 52-56; Ives, "Unmaking of a President";
Farmer, Uses of Haiti; James Ridgewood (ed.), The Haiti Files:
Decoding the Crisis (Washington D.C.: Essential Books/Azul Editions,
1994).

117 New York Times, October 7, 1991, A-I.

118 See, among others, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Haiti: A Human
Rights Nightmare (Washington, D.C./New York, 1992); Amnesty International,
Haiti - The Human Rights Tragedy: Human Rights Violations since the
Coup (New York, January 1992).The Washington Office on Haiti ("Human
Rights in Haiti, " Washington, D.C., January 1992) documented that the
military committed an average of twenty-four rights violations per month
under Aristide. Under the regime of Gen. Prosper Avril (September 1988-
March 1990), the average was seventy-three per month, and under former
provisional president Ertha Pascal Truillot (March 1990-February 1991),
fifty-nine per month. Independent reports, while praising his government's
record, also criticized Aristide for failing to condemn, and for
speeches which seemed to encourage, mass mobilizations and sometimes
direct violent attacks against former Duvalierists, Macoutes, and representatives
of the wealthy elite. Although space constraints preclude discussion,
at play was the contradiction between the formal structures of
representative democracy (dysfunctional as they were) - Le., a government
structure that could constitutionally block basic social change in Haiti -
and popular democracy. Whether unarmed "intimidation, " via mass
mobilization, of a privileged minority, such as took place under Aristide,
or the blocking by that historically privileged minority of social change to
the benefit of an historically oppressed and exploited majority, is the
greater "human rights violation, " is a matter of dispute. Besides, the
documentation indicates that Aristide's "inflammatory speeches" were
themselves taken out of context and distorted by US officials for the
purpose of discrediting him and justifying US policy. See, e.g., Wilentz,
'The September Coup, " p. 102; Anne-Christine D'Adesky, "Haiti, Pere
Lebrun in Context, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 2S ( 1991), no. 3, 7-9.

119 "CIA Report on Aristide False, Newspaper Says, " Washington Post,
December 2, 1993, A-18; James Carroll, "The CIA Can be a Poor Judge of
Character, " Boston Globe, October 26, 1993, A-I.

120 Ives, "'Unmaking of a President, " p. 38.

121 The document, titled "Memo from Consultant to the U.S. Embassy in Portau-
Prince, " was reproduced in Ridgewood (ed.), Haiti Files, pp. 104-107.

122 See Howard French, "U.s. Presses Ousted Haitian Chief to Negotiate a
Return from Exile, " New York Times, June 27, 1992, A-I.

123 Ives, '''Unmaking of a President, " p. 29. Also see, e.g., Haitian Information
Bureau, "Subverting Democracy, " Multinational Monitor, March 1994,
13-15.

124 See, e.g., Lawyers Committee, Human Rights Nightmare, Amnesty International,
Human Rights Tragedy; Human Rights Watch/Americas, National
Coalition of Haitian Refugees, Terror Prevails in Haiti, reproduced in
Ridgewood (ed.), Haiti Files.

125 Americas Watch, et al., Return to the Darkest Days, as cited in Chomsky,
Year 501, p. 212.

126 See, e.g., Paul Quinn-Judge, "Haitians Trained After Coup, " Boston Globe,
December 6, 1993, A-I.

127 New York Times, September 27, 1992, A-I.

128 See, e.g., Americas Watch/National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Half
the Story: The Skewed U.S. Monitoring of Repatriated Haitian Refugees (New
York: Americas Watch, June 1992); Emma D. Navajas, "Haitian Interdiction:
An Overview of U.s. Policy and Practice, " Migration World, 20 (1991/
2), no. 1, 38-41; Bill Frelick, "Haitians at Sea: Asylum Denied, " NACLA
Report on the Americas, 26 (1992), no. 1, 34-39.

129 Nairn, "Our Man in FRAPH, " p. 458.

130 See, e.g., ibid.

131 General Accounting Office, "Summary of Shipments to Haiti After November
20, 1991, Compliance with the OAS Recommended Embargo, "
report no. B-248828, 1994; Charles Kernaghan, "Skirting the Embargo, "
Multinational Monitor, March 1994, pp. 16-17.

132 These figures are cited in "Haiti: U.S. Trade With Haiti Increases, Despite
Embargo, " Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs, Latin America Data
Base, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, March 10, 1994,
and also in Kernaghan, "Skirting the Embargo, " pp. 16-17. U.S. officials
justified these exemptions by arguing that the embargo had brought great
suffering to the poor. These same officials rejected similar arguments that
poor, innocent civilians were the victims of embargoes against Cuba, Iraq,
and other countries.

133 "U.S. AID/Haiti Democracy Factsheet, " September 2, 1993, reprinted in
Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti, pp. 14-15. For analysis of
post-eoup political aid programs, see also Haitian Information Bureau,
"Subverting Democracy, " Multinational Monitor, March 1994, pp. 13-15;
Canham-Clyne, "U.s. Policy on Haiti."

134 See, e.g., Haitian Information Bureau, "Subverting Democracy:'
pp. 13-15; Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti, pp. 14-15;
Canham-Clyne, "US Policy on Haiti."

135 For analysis of the invasion and its relation to "democracy promotion"
intervention, see, among others, William I. Robinson, "Haiti: Behind the
Occupation is Washington's Elusive Goal of Stabilizing Elite Rule:'
Notisur, Latin America Data Base, Latin American Institute, University of
New Mexico, vol. 4, no. 37 (October 7, 1994); Jane Regan, "AI.D.ing U.S.
Interests in Haiti, " Covert Action Quarterly, no. 51 (Winter 1994-95); Kim
Ives, "The Second U.s. Occupation, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 28
(1995), no. 4, 6-10.

136 Ernest H. Preeg, "The Haitian Challenge in Perspective, " in Georges
Fauriol (ed.), The Haitian Challenge: U.S. Policy Considerations (Washington
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), p. 2. Preeg was
U.S. ambassador to Haiti from 1981 to 1983, and was then transferred to
Manila, where he partook in the "transition" in that country.

137 The company official was Charles McKay, as quoted in "Massive Foreign
Assistance Expected to Pour Into Haiti, " Chronicle of Latin American
Economic Affairs, Latin America Data Base, Latin American Institute,
University of New Mexico vol. 9, no. 39 (October 20, 1994).

138 Cited in Allan Nairn, "Occupation Haiti: The Eagle is Landing, " The
Nation, 259 (1994), no. 7, 344.

139 Ibid.

140 Cited in ibid.

141 AID, "U.S.AID/Haiti Briefing Book, " Washington, D.C., November 1994.

142 See, e.g., "Massive Foreign Assistance Expected to Pour into Haiti";
"Haiti: U.s. Plan for Economic Recovery Depends Heavily on Private
Sector Reactivation, " Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs, Latin
America Data Base, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico
vol. 10, no. 18 (May 4, 1995); Douglas Farah, "$1.2 billion to Build Haiti
from Scratch, " Washington Post, October 21, 1994, A-I. On the details of the
neo-liberal program, see "Republique d'Haiti Strategy for Social and
Economic Reconstruction, " and "Statement by Hon. Mark Schneider,
World Bank Informal Donors Meeting, August 26, 1994, " reproduced as
Annexes Band A, respectively, in AID, "U.s.AID/Haiti Briefing Book."

143 Regan, " AI.D.ing U.s. Interests, " p. 12.

144 Cited in Ives, 'Second U.s. Occupation, " p. 10.

145 Regan, " AI.D.ing U.S. Interests, " p. 13.

146 See, e.g., "Haiti: New Prime Minister Names Cabinet as First Step in
Socioeconomic Reconstruction:' Chronicle of Latin American Economic
Affairs, Latin America Data Base, Latin American Institute, University of
New Mexico, vol. 9, no. 42 (November 10, 1994).

147 Catherine S. Manegold, "Aristide Picks a Prime Minister with Free-Market
Ideas, " New York Times, October 25, 1994, A-I.

148 For details, see Regan, "Al.D.ing U.s. Interests, " p. 11; Nairn, "Occupation
Haiti."

149 Establishing precise figures for these programs is difficult because they
were so extensive, overlapping and handled by numerous public and
quasi-private agencies, and budgets were constantly being redrawn. The
$85 million figure is cited in "Statement by Hon. Mark Schneider, " p. 4.
See also AID, "U.S.AID/Haiti Elections Factsheet, March 10, 1995"; Voices
for Haiti, "A Report on U.S. Elections Assistance to Haiti, " Washington,
D.C., June 1995; AID, Bureau of Legislative and Public Affairs, "Fact
Sheet: Haiti Recovery Program, " Washington D.C, undated, distributed to
journalists in mid-October 1994. Apart from overt but nearly-impossibleto-
track political aid, the Clinton administration approved a $5 million
CIA covert program for unspecified "political activities." See Elaine
Sciolino, "C.I.A Reportedly Taking a Role in Haiti, " New York Times,
September 28, 1994, A-7.

150 Cited in Regan, "AI.D.ing U.S. Interests, " p. 12.

151 Cited in "A Democracy Made of Cardboard, " Briefing (Haiti Support
Group), no. 12 (April 1995), p. 1, reprinted in Haitian News and Resource
Service, Washington Office on Haiti, Washington, D.C., April-June 1995.

152 Cited in Nairn, "Occupation Haiti, " p. 348.

153 [ves, "'Unmaking of a President, " pp. 17, 23.

154 Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea (New York, Monthly Review, 1969).

155 Jean Casimir (interview), "Haiti After the Coup, " World Policy Journal, 9
(1992), 354, 357.

156 J. P. Slavin, "Haiti: The Elite's Revenge, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 25
(1991), no. 3, 4.

157 Casimir, "Haiti After the Coup, " p. 354.

158 Ibid., p. 352.

159 Further discussion is not possible here, but note that this fact poses a
challenge to both the transnational elite project and to popular leaders and
leftist intellectuals who have argued that formal state power in the new
world order is no longer necessary.

7 Conclusions: The future of polyarchy and global society

1 Barnet and Muller, Global Reach, p. 190.

2 Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1982), p. 3.

3 Carl Bernstein, "The Holy Alliance, " Time, February 24, 1992, 28-35, at
p.30.

4 For a review of the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 and their
aftermath, see John Feffer, Shock Waves: Eastern Europe After the Revolutions
(Boston: South End, 1992). Feffer interviewed hundreds of grassroots
leaders, politicians, and intellectuals who led the revolutions. The predo-
minant vision among them was not an emulation of Western capitalism
but the construction of an authentically democratic socialism.

5 Among other sources, the following section is based on: "Support for
Eastern European Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy: Proposal
for Program to Support East European Democracy, " January 1990,
obtained through the FOIA; NED Annual Bulletins, 1984-1992; Covert
Action Information Bulletin, no. 35 (Fall 1990), special issue, "Friendly
Enemies: The CIA in Eastern Europe"; Sean Gervasi, "Western Intervention
in the Soviet Union, " Covert Action Information Bulletin, no. 39 (Winter
1991-2), 4-9; Kevin Coogan and Katrina Vanden Huevel, "U.S. Funds for
Soviet Dissidents, " The Nation, March 19, 1988, 377-381; Council on Hemispheric
Affairs/Resource Center, National Endowment for Democracy.

6 Bernstein, "The Holy Alliance, " pp. 28-29.

7 Ibid., 34. For a detailed analysis of the destabilization strategy, see Gervasi,
"Western Intervention."

8 NED Annual Reports, 1984-1992.

9 Gershman, "United States, " pp. 131-132.

10 David Ignatius, "Spyless Coups, " Washington Post, September 22, 1991,
C-1.

11 The "strategy paper" is cited and discussed in Gervasi, "Western Intervention, "
pp. 5-6.

12 For CFD programs, see NED Annual Reports, 1984-1992. For the specific
citations, see 1988 Report, p. 27.

13 For NED funding to the IRG, see NED Annual Reports, 1989-1991. For
general discussion, see Russ Bellant and Louis Wolf, "The Free Congress
Foundation Goes East, " Covert Action Information Bulletin, no. 35 (Fall
1990), 29-32; Sara Diamond, "Contra Funders Aid Soviet Right, " Guardian,
September 26, 1990, 16. For analyses (among many) of different factions
that emerged following the demise of the USSR and the inklings of
transnationalized fractions, see: Fred Weir, "An Interview with Roy
Medvedev, " Monthly Review 44 (1993), no. 9, 1-10; Roger Burbach,
"Russia's Upheaval, " ibid., 11-24.

14 Yeltsin sent a fax from Moscow to CFD president Allen Weinstein four
days after the failure of the attempted coup d'etat on August 19, 1991: "I
thank you for the sincere congratulations you sent me in connection with
the victory of the democratic forces and the failure of the attempted
August 19, 1991 coup. We know and appreciate the fact that you
contributed to this victory." Translation from the Russian of the fax from
"B. Yeltsin" to "Allen Weinstein, President, National Endowment for
Democracy, Washington, D.C., U.s.A., " August 23, 1991, as reported in
Gervasi, "Western Intervention, " p. 4.

15 See NED Annual Reports and Bellant and Wolf, "Free Congress Foundation, "
pp. 30-31.

16 For strategic discussion from within the extended policymaking community
on how to proceed with the transnational project, see Charles Wolf, Jr.
(ed.), Promoting Democracy and Free Markets in Eastern Europe: A Sequoia
Seminar (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1992); Shafiqul
Islam and Michael Mandelbaum (eds.), Making Markets: Economic Transformation
in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 1993).

17 NED Annual Report, 1987, p. 15.

18 Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen (eds.), National Security Study
Memorandum 39: The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa (Westport: Lawrence
Hi1l, 1976).

19 Works on US policy toward South Africa are voluminous. See, e.g., Kevin
Danaher, The Political Economy of u.s. Policy Towards South Africa (Boulder:
Westview, 1985). On the relation between transnational capital, South
Africa, and the southern and central African political economy, see Ann
Seidman and Neva Seidman Makgetla, Outposts of Monopoly Capitalism:
Southern Africa in the Changing Global Economy (Westport: Lawrence Hill,
1980). The strategic thinking in the extended policymaking community
and the transnational elite on South Africa is summarized in a series of
studies commissioned by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), funded
by the Ford Foundation, and published by the CFR-affiliated Foreign
Policy Association (New York) in the late 19805 and early 19905 under the
heading "South Africa Update Series." Among others, volumes included
Pauline Baker, The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years (1989);
Robert Schrire, Adapt or Die: The End of White Politics in South Africa (1991);
Tom Lodge, et al., All, Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the
1980s (1991).

20 See Study Commission on US Policy Toward South Africa, South Africa:
Time Running Out (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

21 The Act was passed in the House by a 317-83 margin, and in the Senate by
a 78-21 margin. For a summary discussion, see R. Hunt Davis and Peter J.
Schraeder, "South Africa, " in Schraeder (ed.) Intervention In the 1980s.

22 Ibid., p. 265.

23 Ibid., p. 266.

24 Ibid. The "Inkathagate" scandal of 1991 revealed that Buthelezi and
Inkatha had been built up by the South African government as a rival to
the ANC and led to a loss of Inkatha credibility as an alternative to the
ANC.

25 NED Annual Report, 1985, p. 26.

26 See NED Annual Bulletins, 1985-1992.

27 AID, as cited in Davis and Schraeder, "South Africa, " p. 265.

28 For a breakdown of these programs, see NED Annual Reports, 1986-1992.
For discussions, see Council on Hemispheric Affairs/Resource Center,
National Endowment for Democracy, pp. 52, 63, 65-67; Beth Sims, Workers of
the World Undermined: American Labor and the Pursuit of u.s. Foreign Policy
(Albuquerque: Resource Center, 1991), pp. 15-16, 45, 58, 64, 69; Davis and
Schraeder, "South Africa, " pp. 264-266.

29 These figures are obtained from the NED Annual Reports for 1984-1992.
Regarding the European category, five of the countries were not specifically
Eastern or Central Europe. They were Northern Ireland, Portugal,
Spain, Greece, and France.

30 NED, Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Board of Directors of the
National Endowment for Democracy Washongton. D.C., January 22, 1993
3, obtained through the FOIA.

31 There are hundreds of concrete examples as documented in the NED
Annual Reports. For instance, the 1991 Report includes a program "for
international participants representing organizations engaged in educational
reform to review civic education and methodologies and materials
that promote an understanding of democracy in the formal and informal
educational system" (p. 68). A program such as this, which links the
curricula of educational systems of different countries - and injects into
those curricula the ideology and outlook of the transnational elite
agenda - should be seen as movement towards organic linkage of the
institutions of the Gramscian extended state across nations (in this case
educational systems), indicating transnationalization of the extended
state.

32 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development
Report 1992(New York: UNDP/Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 35-36.

33 Ibid., p. 34.

34 For data and analysis on income polarization, see Denny Braun, The Rich
Get Richer: The Rise of Income Inequality in the United States and the World
(Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1991).See also Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations,
2nd edn. (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), although Reich's solution is
utopian: a call for that 20 percent of the population advancing under the
global economy to resolve the crisis of polarization by being more sharing
and concerned about the plight of the other 80 percent.

35 US Bureau of the Census, as cited in Jerry S. Kloby, "lncreasing Class
Polarization in the United States, " in Berch Berberoglu (ed.), Critical
Perspectives in Sociology, 2nd edn. (Dubuque, Ia.: Kendal/Hunt, 1993)
pp. 27-43. The following data are from the Bureau, as cited by Kloby,
unless otherwise indicated.

36 See, e.g., William I. Robinson, ''The Global Economy and Latino Populations
in the United States: A World Systems Approach, " Critical Sociology,
19 (1993), no. 2, 29-59.

37 Edward A. Muller, "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income
Inequality, " American Sociological Review, 53 (1988), 50-68, at p. 56. Muller
also published an earlier study indicating a direct correlation between
socioeconomic inequalities and political instability: "lncome Inequality,
Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence, " American Sociological
Review, 50 (1985), 47-61.

38 Agency for International Development, Department of State, "The Democracy
Initiative, " Washington, D.C., December 1990, p. 3.

39 Quoted in V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1978 [1917)), p. 75.

40 The 1900 figure is cited in Barnet and Muller, Global Reach, p. 190; the 1960
figure is from the UNDP report.

41 Mosca, Ruling Class, p. 62.

42 Ibid., p. 71.

43 Literature on the philosophical and ideological roots and evolution of
classical "democratic" thought is vast. See, e.g., C. B. MacPherson, The
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University
Press, 1962), and "Politics: Post-Liberal-Democracy?, " in Robin Blackburn
(ed.), Ideology in Social Science: Readings in Critical Social Theory (London:
Fontana/Collins, 1972); George Novack, Democracy and Revolution (New
York: Pathfinder, 1971); Herbert Aptheker, The Nature of Democracy,
Freedom and Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1967); David
Held, Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power, and
Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).

44 Cited in Novack, Democracy and Revolution, p. 181.

45 Cited in Aptheker, Nature of Democracy, p. 27.

46 Novack, Democracy and Revolution, p. 144.

47 Polanyi, Great Transformation.

48 Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes.

49 Alan Wolfe, The Seamy Side of Democracy: Repression in America (New York:
David McKay, 1973).

50 Therborn, "Rule of Capital", p. 3. More explicitly, the "Marxist paradox"
is how a tiny minority rules through democratic means, and the "bourgeois
paradox" is how to assure private property and minority rule under
democracy.

51 Novack, Democracy and Revolution.

52 Moore, Social Origins.

53 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens,
Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1992).

54 This point is important, since it often escapes the process-oriented
approaches, such as that advanced by Reinhard Bendix in Nation-Building
and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order (New York: Wiley,
1964), as well as much of the more recent "transitions" and "democratization"
literature which stresses "democratization" as a strictly intra-elite
affair.

55 Therborn, "Rule of Capital."

56 Huntington, "Modest Meaning, " p. 19.

57 That promoting polyarchy would increasingly be accompanied by other
types of transnational intervention, such as military action, was suggested
by Morton Halperin, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and
Peacekeeping: "The United States, the United Nations, and regional
organizations should insist on a guarantee clause by which they ensure
the maintenance of constitutional democracy. An international guarantee
clause will be credible only if key countries, including the United States,
commit to using force if necessary to restore or establish constitutional
democracy" ("Guaranteeing Democracy, " in Foreign Policy, no. 91
[Summer 1993], 121). If US marines intervened unilaterally in the past to
shore up pro-US authoritarian regimes, now US and other international
forces would intervene, through multilateral umbrellas under the pretext
of "peacekeeping, " "humanitarian missions, " and "defense of democracy, "
to install, defend from threats (particularly from popular sectors
transgressing the "legitimate" rules of polyarchy) and/or bolster elites
around the world organized politically in polyarchic regimes.

58 See, among other sources, NED Annual Report, 1992, p. 9.

59 See Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Board of Directors of the
National Endowment of Democracy, Washington, D.C., January 22, 1993,
p. 3, obtained through the FOIA.

60 NED Annual Report, 1992, p. 9.

61 These developments are discussed in a special issue of the Journal of
Democracy (4 (1993), no. 3), "International Organizations and Democracy."

62 These are discussed in various articles in ibid.

63 For discussion, see Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, Encouraging
Democracy: What Role for Conditional Aid? (Washington, D.C.: Overseas
Development Council, 1993).

64 Sunkel and Fuenzalida, "Transnationalization, " p. 82.

65 See Gilpin, Political Economy; Gill, American Hegemony.

66 Sklair, Sociology, of the Global System, p. 5.

67 Gilpin, Political Economy, p. 254.

68 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, World
Bank Annual Report, 1992 (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1992), p. 33, as
cited in Doug Henwood, "Impeccable Logic: Trade, Development and
Free Markets in the Clinton Era, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 26 (1993),
no. 5, p. 26.

69 United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, World Investment
Report 1991 (New York: United Nations, 1991). In 1992, the Centre
changed its name to the Transnational Corporations and Management
Division, but its report retained the same title (World Investment Report
1992).

70 This was the case, e.g., regarding the Pentagon's classified "Defense
Planning Guidance - 1994-99, " leaked to the New York Times, March 8,
1992 ("U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop, A-I),
which called for a military policy to ward off "competitor" nation-states
and preserve US state domination. The point is that the emergence of a
transnationalized elite is an exceedingly complex process that should be
seen in longer historical terms than just from one US administration to the
next, and states remain highly complex institutions involving intricate,
multifarious processes, fractions, pulls and tugs at play, and so forth. The
social scientist must be able to extract from day-to-day and year-to-year
events, and from policymakers' own perceptions and statements on those
events.

71 For instance, the Uruguay round of the GATT gave the World Trade
Organization powers to oversee compliance with the agreement over any
one nation-state.

72 Gilpin, Political Economy, p. 153.

73 See, e.g., John M. Goshko, "'Super State Department' May Absorb Other
Agencies, " Washington Post, January II, 1995, A-I.

74 Cited in Henwood, "Impeccable Logic, " p. 28.

75 Space constraints preclude discussion. This distinction between "hegemony
based on fraud" and "ethical hegemony" was brought to my
attention in personal correspondence with Craig Murphy, and is discussed
in Augelli and Murphy, America's Quest for Supremacy.

76 See, for instance, Dean E. Murphy, "Amnesty International Blasts U.s. on
Refugee Treatment, " LosAngeles Times, June 27, 1992.

77 The 1960-1980 doubling figure is cited in Reich, Work of Nations, p. 269.
The 1980-1990 figure is from a US Department of Justice report released in
June 1994 and reported by an Associated Press dispatch, datelined
Washington, June I, 1994.

78 Ibid., p. 269.

79 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, as reported
in Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs, Latin America Data Base,
Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, December 3, 1992.

80 See, for instance, Leslie Wirpsa, "'Social Cleansing' Haunts Bogota's
Indigent, " Latinamerica Press, 26 (1994), no. 1, 4. The article reported at
least 505 such documented killings in Bogota alone in 1993. The systematic
rounding up and mass killing of "street children" in Guatemala, Brazil,
and other countries became major scandals in the early 1990s. The 90, 000
figure was reported by the Latin American Human Rights Association. See
"Human rights suffer in 1993" (unsigned), in ibid., 4.

81 For chilling analysis of such new forms of social control, see Mike Davis's
two-part article in New Left Review: "Who Killed Los Angeles: A Political
Autopsy, " no. 198 (March/April 1993), 3-28; "Who Killed Los Angeles?
Part II: The Verdict is Given, " no. 199 (May /June 1993), 29-54; Mike Davis,
City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Verso, 1990).

82 Sklair, Sociology of the Global System, p. 41.

83 Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: New Left
Books, 1975), p. 18.

84 Karl Marx referred to a "class-in-itself" as the objective status of a class
defined by its relation to the production process, and a "class-for-itself" as
a class as class protagonist, dependent on the extent to which a class (or
classes) becomes conscious of itself. Only a "class-for-itself" becomes a
political actor. Wallerstein has argued that there is an antinomy in the
capitalist world system between "class-in-itself" defined by relations to a
world economy, and "class-for-itself" defined by classes as political actors
located in particular nation-states - an antinomy between "class-in-itself"
in the world system and "class-for-itself" in the nation-state. Wallerstein,
The Capitalist World Economy, p. 196. However, it seems fairly logical that
globalization is dissolving this antinomy.

85 See, for instance, discussion of this process in Latin America in Robinson,
"The Sio Paulo Forum."

86 Robert Barros, "The Left and Democracy: Recent Debates in Latin
America, " Telos, no. 68 (Summer 1986), 49-70, at pp. 64-65.

87 Cited in Vanden and Prevost, Democracy and Socialism, p. 17.

88 Andrew Webster, Introduction to the Sociology of Development, 2nd edn.
(London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 5.

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