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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES-UNAUTHORIZED
STORAGE OF TOXIC AGENTS
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1975
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
W(UJhington, D.O.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 318,
R~l! Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)
preSldmg.
Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan,
Hart of Colorado, Baker, GOldwater, Mathias, and Schweiker.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O.
Schwarz.t.,.Jr.~ chief counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the minority;
and .t'aUl Michel, professional staff member.
The CHAmMAN. The committee will come'to order.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities opens its
public hearin~s today with an inquiry into a case in which direct
orders of the President of the United States were evidently disobeyed
by employees of the CIA. It is the purpose of this hearing, and those
which shall follow for the next 2 months, to illuminate the need to
make certain in the future that Federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies perform their duties in ways which do not infringe
upon the rights of American citizens.
The committee has not held public hearings prior to this time, because
of its concentration on char~es that the CIA has been involved
. in assassination plots directed against certain foreign leaders. In that
investigation, the committee has taken over 8,000 pages of testimony,
interrogated nearly 100 witnesses, examined a vast array of documents,
and. compiled a record on the assassination issue alone that compares
in size to the entire investigation of the Senate Watergate Committee.
Because of the serious damage that protracted public hearings on
such a subject could do to the United States in its relations with foreign
p:overnments, the committee chose to conduct these hearings behind
closed doors, but the committee intends to publish a full and detailed
report of its findings within the next few weeks.
It is the right of the American people to know what their Government
has done-the bad as well as t.he good~and we have every confidence
that the country will benefit by a comprehensive disclosure of
this grim chanter in our recent history.
In examining wrongdoing by such agpncies as the FBI and the
OIA, the committee in no way wishes to denip:rat~ the imnortan.ce of
t.heir legitimaf:e work. I know. first~and. the. ~artm.le wo.rth of mtelJi.
p'ence 2'athenn2' bACau~ T served m the mIlItary mtellIgence as an
Army lieutenant in World War II.
(1)
2
Today,as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I am fully
aware of the great value of good intelligence in times of peace. Without
it, an informed foreign policy could not be conducted j without
it, nuclear arms controls could not be policed j without it, the United
States would be left groping in a dangerous world.
At the same time, we must insist that these agencies operate strictly
within the law. They were established to spy on foreign governments
and to fend off foreign spies. We must know to wliat degree they
. have turned their techniques inward to spy on the American people
instead. If such unlawful and improper conduct is not exposed and
stopped, it could, in time, undermine the very foundations of freedom
in our own land. ' ,
So the committee intends to hold public hearings, not only on
domestic abuses of the CIA and the FBI, but on improper activities
of such other Government Rg-encies as the Internal Revenue Service,
the Post Office, and the National Security Agency.
Later in the fall, the committee will hold a series of hearings on
proposals for reforming our national intellig-ence system and for es·
tablishing: legislative oversi~ht of its activities. New legislation will
be needed to preserve for the United States an efficient intelligence
apparatus that remains outward reaching, and operates within the
law in the service of our legitimate national security needs.
The particular case under examination today involves the illeg-al
possession of deadly biological poisons which were retained within the
CIA for 5 vears after their destruction was ordered by the President,
and for 5 years after the United States had entered into 'R solemn international
commitment not to maintain stocks of these poisons except
for very limiited researchpurposes.'
The main questions before the committee are why the poisons were
developed in SUC~l quantities in the first plare; why Ithe Presidential
order was disobeyed; and why such a serious act of insubordination
could remain undetected for so many years.
In exploring i{;hese questions, which go to the very heart of our
work, I wish Ito acknowledge the cooperation of the White House, the
Defense Depal'ltment, 'and those officials who are presently in charge
of the CIA, including its Direotor, Mr. Colby. Upon the discovery of
the cache of forbidden toxins, the executive branch immediately came
to this committee and indicated that an investigation was underway,
the results of which were laJter reported to the committee. We then
conducted our own independent inquiry. The outcome of these two
investigations is the matter before the committee today.
Now, before we turn to our first witness~ Mr. Colby, the Director of
the CIA, I would like to recognize the ranking Republican member of
this committee, Senator Tower, of Texas, for such opening remarks as
he might ca.re to make.
Senator Tower ~
Senator TOWER. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, yOtl have alluded to, and I think it is important for
all of us to keep in mind, !the comprehensive nature of ,this committee's
task as mandated by Senate Resolution 21. Our assignment to conduct
this first full-scale examination of the Nation's intelligence activities
in more than 25 years must be viewed as a national determination to
come to grips With a wide range of deferred decisions in this vital
area.
3
.Since the end of the Second Wodd War, this Nation has haltinglyand
with no small degree of a,.mbivalence---.sought to insure its survival
by recognizing and legitimizing the role of intelligence and
clandestine a.otivity. Our ambivalence has been due, no doubt, to the
inherent confliots that 'are created when an open society fa,.ces up ito
the need for secrecy in the intelligence arena. But it has been an 'ambivalence
sanctioned by decisions of Presidents, Congresses, and our
judicial system.
In the discharge of its responsibilities, this committee has avoidedand
will oontinue to avoid-the temptations of political expediency
which would lay aside historical perspective and simply point the
finger of blame.
When the CIA Btdvised the oommittee of its discovery of the toxins
which are the subject of today's hearings, the Agency was acknowledging
its responsibility to affirmatively contribute to the solutions that
we all seek.
In ma.kinv; this matter. a. subject for public hearing, it is my hope
that we will, in an atmosphere free of sensationalism, promote a
gre3Jter public understanding of the full 'and fair nature of the committee's
process while demonstrating our concern-a concern shared by
the intelligence community-for the complexity and sensitivity of the
task of reoommending changes or refinements in this component of our
national security struoture.
In the coming weeks and months we will hear much of the problems
occasioned by such intelligence concepts as compartmentation, limited
access and need-to-know. These principles are an inherent part of the
very fabric of intelligence. They are not, and may never be, fail-safe.
Our task is to examine how well we have done, and to search for
methods of doing better within the parameters of a democratic
society.
So lit is in that spirit that we welcome your appearance here today,
Mr. Colby.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Tower.
Mr. MICHEL. Exhibit No.1 is a draft memorandum, prepared
February 16, 19'70, for Dirootor of Central Intelligence. Subject:
"Contingency Plan for Stockpile of Biologioal Warfare Agents." The
document consists of three pag-es, 'and on the third page is the indication
that it was dictated by N. Gordon.1
Exhibit No.2 is a document, "Inventory of Lethal and Incapacitating
Agents Found at a CIA Building, Excerpted From CIA
Inventory." ,
The document consists of six pages and was prepared by the Select
Committee staff, and reviewed by Dr. Sayre Stevens of the CIA.
Exhibit No.3 consists of two documents, each one page long, dated
February 18, 1910, and titled "Paralytic Shellfish Poison-Working
Fund Investigations." S
Exhibit No.4 is a press release from the White House dated November
25, 1969, consisting of two pages.·
1 See p. 189.
• See p. 192.
• See p. 198.
'See p. 200.
4
Exhihit No. 5 is a press release from the White House dated February
14, 19'70, consisting of two pages.&
Exhibit No.6 is a memorandum to Chief, TSD, Subject ;MKNAOMI ;
Funding, objectives, and accomplishments, dated October 18, 1967,
and consisting of three pages.6
Exhibit No.7 is a document consistm.g of three pa~es, dated November
25, 19692 titled "National Security Council DeciSIon Memorandum,
No. 35." It IS addressed to the various parties, including the Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.1
Exhibit No. 8 is a document consisting of one page, dated February
20, 1970, titled "National Security Council Deeision Memorandum
44," which includes among its addressees, Director, ·Central
Intelligence.8
.Exhibit No.9 is a document consisting of one page, titled "Geneva
Protocol of 1925." 9
Exhibit No. 10 is a document consisting of four pages, titled "Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction." 10
Mr. CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Colby, if you would please stand to take
the oath. Mr. Stevens, if you would stand too, in the event that you
have any testimony to offer, I will administer the oath to both of you
at the same time.
Do you both solemnly swear that all of the testimony you will give
in these proceedings, will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God 1
Mr. COLBY. I do.
Mr. STEVENS. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Colhy, I understand you have a short opening
statement, and I invite you to read it at this time.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE,
ACCOMPANIED BY SAYRE STEVENS, ASSISTANT DEPUTY
DIRECTOR, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, CIA; AND MITCHEL
ROGOVIN, SPECIAL COUNSEL, CIA
Mr. COLBY. I do, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared statement which
has been distributed. I will omit certain elements of it to save a little
time. I think I can cover the main points.
Mr. Chairman, this hearing typifies the difficulty of modernizing
our approach to intelligence in America. We are resolved that intelligence
operations be conducted in America in conformity to our laws
and constitutional procedures. This does not mean that intelligence
can have no secrets. We have many secrets in America, from grand
jury proceedings to the ballot box, where secrecy is essential or the
process will not work.
We are engaged, in these investigations, Mr. Chairman, in resolving
the dilemma between the necessary secrets of intelligence and the
equally necessary exposure of our Government's workings to our peo-
• See p. 202.
• See p. 204.
1 See p. 207.
• See p. 210.
• See p. 211. l' Rp.. no 212.
5
pIe and their representatives to insure that they respond to the p~pte's
will. I
In former times, this contradiction was resolved in favor of almost
total intelligence secrecy, which is at the base of President Kenp.edy's
remarks that intelligence failures are trumpeted, while the successes
go unheralded.
As we lift this veil to open intelligence to the kind of public review
and control we Americans want today, we have two problems. One is
how far to go, on which we must jointly develop some guidelines and
understandmgs, or we risk seriously and unnecessarily injuring our
intelligence.
The other is to insurethat our people have an accurate perception of
what modern intelligence really is. Without this, an indIvidual act is
seen as the norm, in application of Aesop's fable of each blind man
descri.bing a whole ele-phant as only an extension of the part he perceIves. .
To this committee and its staff to date, we have tried to present the
whole of intelligence today, and not just its parts. I hope this will be
the basis for the decisions we will reach as to the guidelines and supervision
we want to establish for intelligence tomorrow.
I thus ask fora suspension of final judgment until the whole picture
of intelligence can be presented in its true proportions-good and
bad-while we respond to your requirement of public exposure in this
hearing of one portion of it.
With other Government functions, like our Army or our welfare
services, the whole is perceived and the individual act and even mistake
is seen in proportion.In intelligence, we must modernize our perception
of its whole contribution to our country while we insure that it conforms
with the standards we Americans expect. I hope we can do both
Jpbs.
The specific subject today concerns CIA's involvement in the development
of bacteriological warfare materials with the Army's Biological
Laboratory at Fort Detrick, CIA's retention of an amount of shellfish
toxin, and CIA's use and investigation of various chemicals and
dr\lg'S.
The relationship between the CIA and the Army Biological Laboratory.
at Fort Detrick as an activity requiring further investigation
surfaced in late April of this year. It resulted from information provided.
by a CIA officer not directly associated with the project, in
response to my repeated directives that all past activities which might
now" be considered questionable be brought to the attention of Agency
manll:gement.
'. ,,Information provided by him, and by two other officers aware of
tl.i'~project, indicated that the project at Fort Detrick involved the
'~e:v.el~pment of bacteriological warfare agents-some lethal-and
'ated delivery systems suitable for clandestine use.
. . .. earch was made for any records or other information available
'the project. This search produced information about the basic
" ' .. "ent between the Army and the CIA relating to the J?roject and
mited records covering its activities from its beginnmg in 1952
~~rtnination in 1970. t\e ~urse of the investigation, CIA's la:boratory storage facili.6re
searched, and Bi'bout 11 grams-a little less than half an
6
ounce-of shellfish toxin, and 8 milligrams of cobra venom, were discovered
in a little-used vaulted storeroom in an Agency building.
The White House was notified as soon as the existence of the materials
became known, and was kept informed as the investigation
progressed. The ch.airmen of CIA's four oversight committees were
alerted immediately to the discovery of the toxin. Records and reports
were exchanged with the Defense DeJ?artment as it began its own investigation
of the matter. This commIttee was notified of OUF investigation
of the program in mid-June, and 'has been provided all project
files 'and reports of the investigation.
CIA associ'ation rwith Fort Detrick involved the Special Operations
Division (SOD), of that facility. This division was responsible for developing
special applications for biological warfare agents and toxins.
Its principal customer was the U.S. Army. Its concern was with the
development of both suitable agents and delivery mechanislllS for use
in paramilitary situations. Both standard biological warfare agents
and biologically derived toxins were investiga,ted by the division.
The CIA relationship with SOD was formally established in May
1952, through a memorandum of agreement with the Army chief
chemical officer for the performance of certain research and development
in the laboratory facilities of the Special Operations Division
of the Army Biological Lahoratory at Fort Detrick. The initiative for
establishing this relationship was a belief that the special capabilities
of the Fort Detrick group, and its access to biological matenals of all
sorts, provided the Agency access to research and development expertise
and capabilities whkh were a,ppropriateto its function and
not otherwise 'available. The need for such capabilities 'was tied to
earlier Office of Strategic Services WorId War II experience, which
included the development of two different types of agent suicide pills
to be used in the event of capture, and a successful operation using
biological warfare materials to incapacitate a Nazi leader temporarily.
I Through the course of years, Agency objectives in the project became
better defined. Thus, a project, approval memo of 1967 identified
four functional cate~ries of project activity: maintenance of a stockpile
of temporarily incapacitating and lethal agents in readiness for
operational use; assessment and maintenance of biological and chemical
dissemination systems for operational use; adaptation and testing
of a nondiscerntble microbioinoculator-a dart device for clandestine
and imperceptible inoculation with biological warfare or chemical
warfare agents-for use with various materials and to assure that the
micrdbioinoculator could not be easily detected by later examination
of the target; and providing- technical support and consultation on
request for offensive and defensive biolOgIcal warfare and chemical
warfare.
In the later years, the activities dwindled to the point of simply
maintaining a stockpile of agents and delivery systems for possible
Ag-ency use.
From its outset, the project was characterized by extreme compartmentation,
or 'a high degree of secrecy within CIA itself. Only two or
three Agency officers at any time were cleared for access to Fort
Detrick activities. Though some CIA-originated documents have been
found in the project files, it is clear that only a very limited documen·
tation of activities took place.
7
i)'A major Mrly requirement of the Agency was to find a replaceIJ?ent
iijr the standard. cyanide L-pill issued to agents in hazardous situatIOns
4uring World War II. This was the hasis on which eventually we
ii~vered the shellfish toxin. The only application of this toxin was
~Jl.1.the, U-2 flight over the U.S.S.R. in May 1960, during which Gary
P~'Werscarried such a device concealed in a silver dollar.
'ib the- PoweFs case, the grooves of the drill bit were filled with shelltish\~.
He obviously did not use it, and was not instructed to do
miit was offered to him to provide him with the option. The Powers
fligh.t was the only time we are aware that the toxin 'Was provided for
~perllltional use, although the L-pill was made available for earlier
~kt& .
!Xhe primary Agency interest was in the development of dissemination
devices 'to he used wi.th standard chemicals off the shelf. Various
..,dissemination devices, such as a fountain pen dart launcher and an
engine head bolt designed to release a substance when heated, appeared
ul,he peculiarly suited for dandestine use. Availwble records do not
inwcate that all specific items were developed exclusively for the CIA,
aswork on similar devices was also done for the Army.
A large 'amount of Agency attention was wven to the problem of
inCltpacltating guard dogs. Thoug-h most of the dart launchers were
a'e'l'eloped for the Army, the Agency did request the development of
StiSm&iLl hand-held dart launcher for its peculiar needs for this purpose.
\ol"kwas also done on temporary human incapacitation techniques.
'cal support elements of CIA received continuing requests for
".e,'icfi'ective, and rapidly acting- incapacitating- devices.
I" ll'fhese related to a desire to incapacitate captives before they could
.~a'erthemselves incapable of talking, or terrorists before they could
~~ta~iatory action.
~,WAS done in trying to develop the dart system for such purutsuccess
was never achieved, since a larger 'amount of an incating
agent is required to safely inactivate a human than of a
agent required to kill him.
:k was also done by or for the Agency in the development of
'·als. for sabota~e of various materials and facilities. This is
.'11 related to the A~ency's mission. Our records indicate that some
.se ,lethal materials were prepared and furnished for one opera"
It we are aware that that oDeration was not, in fact, completed.
'd these, however, no record can be found that these materials
4)l". 'e,vices were used for lethal operational purposes.
;;blJ;~helate sixties, a variety of biological warfare agents and toxins
~~. ,~8into.ined by the. SOD fo~ possible A,g'ency use. Varying
m!t~ts .().f these matenals, ran~m~ from 100 grams (about 3.5
~~},to 100 milligrams (about three thousandths of an ounce)
. .:F9I.$llintained.
;;. .oU,g-h.;sp,ecific Ilccountin~ for each agent on the list is not on hand,
.'f.tment of Defense recorcls indicate that the materi'als were, in
sttoyed in 1970 bv SOD personnel. excent for the 11 1!To,ms of
,ance in small medical bottles labeled shellfish toxin, plus the
igr.ams .of cobra venom, which were found on May 20 of this
~ti~e the toxin WitS found. the officer reAoonsihle for the nro;ect
;'Stated he had no recollection 'as to how it got there. On the 30th
8
of June, discussions were held with the retired Agency officer who
had provided the initial lead.
This man, who had been the G8-15 branch chief in 1970, stated that
the toxin had, in fact, been moved from Fort Detrick and stored in the
laboratory. This was done on the basis of his own decision a.fter conversations
with the responsible project officer.
He further stated that he made this decision based on the fact that
the cost and difficulty of isolatinp; the shellfish toxin were so grea.t that
it simply made no sense to destroy it, particularly when there would
be no future source of the toxin.
The current branch chief believes this explanationis correct, but still
does not recall the actual act of receivinp; the material from Fort
Detrick. Both of these middle-p;rade officers ag-ree that no one, including
their immediate superior, was told of the retention of the shellfish
toxin.
The former branch chief recalls that subsequent to the delivery of
the shellfish toxin to CIA, he was told by his chief to inform Fort
Detrick personally that destruction of CIA materials should take place.
He did so, but did not include the shellfish toxin, then in CIA hands,
in his instructions.
Discussions with Mr. Helms. Director of Central Intelli~ence, and
Mr. Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans in 1970, have established
that both were aware of the requirement that such material be
disposed of. They recall that clear instructions were given that the
CIA stockpile should be destroyed by the Army, and that, in accordance
with Presidential directives, the Agency should get out of the
bioloP,'ical warfare business. .
With the discovery of the shellfish toxin this year. a complete inventory
of the vault in which it was found was taken. The inventory consisted
of a stock of various materials and delivery systems accumulated
over the years, including other lethal materials, incapacitants,
narcotics, hallucinogenic drugs, irritants and riot control agents, herbicides,
animal control materials, and many common chemicals.
The smaIl size of the vault (about 8 by 10 feet) and the few shelves
limit the extent of this stockpile. The materials are, for the most part,
the residue of a number of different CIA programs. These involved
CIA's effort to keep a close watch on emerging technology-in this case
pharmaceutical technology-to insure that we did not encounter an
unanticipated threat from hostile intelligence services with which we
could not contend.
We also wished to capitalize on new advances which should substantially
assist us in our efforts to collect foreign intellip;ence or in a wartime
situation. The narcotics in storage related to CIA's overseas efforts
to collect intelligence on the narcotics trade, to help in counterinp: it. We
have also supplied tear gas and mace to our officers overseas for use
in defensive situations where firearms would not be appropriate.
The threat, as w~ll as the promise, posed by newer types of drugs,
particularlv the hallucinogenic drugs, made at least exploratory research
on them essential. You will recall our concern over the possible
role of drugs in the apparent brainwashin~ of American POW's iIi
Korea, and the haunted eyes of Cardinal Mindzenty as he confessed at
a Communist trial.
9
I might add that we believe that a drug was administered to one of
our officers overseas by a foreign intelligence officer within the past
year. Those responsible for providing technical support to clandestine
operations felt it necessary that they understand the ways in which
these drugs could be used, their effects and their vulnerabilities to
countermeasures.
In pursuing such concerns as these, many different materials were
obtained and stored for provision to contractors who did the actual
scientific research involved.
One of the major results of these investigations of the CIA has been
to impress upon our employees, and all of us involved in intelligence,
the fact that decisions about our pro~rams must be made in the light
of today's world. As you are aware, ill mid-1973, we tried to identIfy
all questionable activities. We did so for what I believe to be most
of them, and issued internal directives to insure that the CIA remain
within the bounds of the law.
Repeated emphasis on the importance of this did lead to the identification
of our association with Fort Detrick as an activity to be reviewed
before we were aware that one of its products had been improperly
sequestered. The controls involved in the shellfish case seem to have
existed but not to have been applied. The controls that would have
prevented or discovered this act were principally those which are the
kind of management we must have for the intelligence business.
I am confident that proper management will exist as a result of the
changes we are making in our approach to intelligence, to insure its
conformity with American values and standards. These will include
a better public al?preciation of modern intelligence, better guidelines
for its proper actlvities, and better supervision externally to stimulate
better supervision internally.
With tl\lese, I am confident that such episodes as the shellfish toxin
will not be repeated. .
,Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
{The full text of Mr. Colby's prepared statement follows:]
PJltpABED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. CoLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
Mr. Chairman: This hearing typiftesthe difftculty of modernizing our approach
to· intelligence in America. We are resolved that intelligence operations be conducted
in America in conformity to our laws and Constitutional proceduree. This
does not mean that intelligence can have no secrets-we have many secrets in
America, from grand jury proceedings to the ballot box, where secrecy is essential
or the. process will not work. .
We are engaged in these investigations, Mr. Ohairman, in resolving the dile;
mma between the necessary secrets of intelligence, and the equally necessary
~posU1'e-of our Government's workings to our people and their representatives
,{l!;·ensure- that they respond to the people's will. In former times, thi's contradictf(
Jn\'twas J:esolved in favor of almost total intelligence secrecy, which is at the
b'tjl!le\Of President Kennedy's remark that intelligence failures are trumpeted,
~J4~tlUkSUcce8sesgo unheralded.
?"""<~ we, lift this veil to open intelligence to the kind of public review and
~l:,'We Americans want today, we have two problem'S. One 1s how far to
,g,l!lillPDI!,~icbwe must jointly develop 'Some guidelines and understandings. or we
'~,fJeri()Us1y and unnecessarily injuring our intelligence. The other is to ensure
,peqple have an accurate perception of what modern intelligence really
:th'Out; this, an individual act is seen as the norm, in application of Aesop's
of ceach blind man de'SCribing a wh()le elephant as only an extension of the
~&pe~lves.
10
To this committee and its staff to date we have tried to present the whole
of intelligence today, and not just its part.6. I hope this whole will be the bam
for the decisions we will reach as to the guidelines and supervision we want
to establish for intelligence tomorrow. I thus a'sk for a suspension of final JUdgment
until the whole picture of intelligence can be presented in its true proportions,
good and bad, while we respond to your requirement of public exposure
in this hearing of one portion of it. With other government functions like our
Army or our welfare services, the Whole is perceived and the individual act and
even mistake is seen in proportion. In intelligence, we must modernize 01lr perception
of its whole contribution to our country while we ensure that it conforms
with the standards we Americans expect. I hope we can do both Jobs.
The specific subject today concerns OIA's involvement in the development of
bacteriological warfare materials with the Army's Biological Laboratory at Fort
Detrick, CIA's retention of an amount of shellfish toxin a,nd CIA's ,use and
investigation l)f various chemicals and drugs.
The relationship between the CIA and the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort
Detrick as an activity requiring further investigation surfaced in late April of
this year. It resulted from information provided by a CIA officer not directly
associated with the prl)ject in response to my repeated directives that all past
activities which might now be considered questionable be 'brought to the attention
of Agency management. Information provided by him and by two other
officers aware of the project indicated that the project at Fort Detrick involved
the development 'Of bacteriological warfare agent.6, some lethal, and associated
delivery systems suitable for clandestine use.
A search was made for any records or other information available on the
project. This search produced information about the basic agreement between
the Army and the CIA relating to the project and some limited records covering
its activities from its beginning in 1952 to its termination in 1970.
After the discovery of these project records, verification of this disposition of
a stockpile of BW agents and toxins maintained by Fort Detrick for possible
Agency use became a major concern. It was not known whether or not these
materials had been destroyed along with the Army's BW stockpiles in response
to Presidential directives of November 1969 and February 1970. The records
indicated that the question had been raised and it was the impression 'Of th~
who were familiar with the project that the material had in fact been destroyed,
although no records confirming it could be found. In the course of the investigation,
CIA's laboratory storage facllities were searched and about 11 grams (a
little less than half an 'Ounce) of shellftsh toxin and 8 milligrams of cobra venom
were discovered in a little-used vaulted storeroom in an Agency building.
The White House was notified as soon as the existence of the materials
became known and was kept informed as the investigation progressed. The
chairmen of CIA's four oversight committees were briefed immediately after
the discovery 'Of the toxin. Records and reports were exchanged with the De·
fense Department as it began its own investigation of the matter. This committee
was notified of our investigation of the program in mid-June and has been
provided all project files and reports of the investigation.
CIA association with Fort Detrick involved the Special Operations Division
(SOD) of that facility. This DiviRion was responsi'ble for developing special
applications for BW agents and toxins. Its principal customer was the US
Army. Its concern was with the development of both suitable agents and delivery
mechanisms for use in paramilitary situations. Both standard BW agents and
biologically derived toxins were investigated by the Division.
The CIA relationship with SOD was formally established in May 1952 through
a memorandum of agreement with the Army Chief Chemical Officer for the
performanee of certain research and development in the laboratory facilities of
the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laborarory at Fort
Detrick. The initiative tor establishing this relationship was a beliet that the
special capabilities of the Fort Detrick group and its access to biological materials
of all sorts providejl the Agency access to research and development expertise
and capabilities which were appropriate to its function and not otherwise
available. The need for such capa,bilities was tied to earlier Office of Strategic
Services World War II experience, which included the development ot.two different
types of a/!,ent suicide pills to be used in the event 'Of capture and a
successful operation using BW materials to incapacitate a Nazi leader
temporarily.
11
Through the course of years, Agency objectives in the project became better
defined. Thus a project approval memo of 1967 identified four functional categories
of project activity.
a. maintenance of a stockpile of temporarily incapacitating and lethal agents
in readiness for operational use ;
b. assessment and maintenance of biological and chemical disseminating systems
for operational use;
c. adaptation and testing of a non-discernible microbioinoculator (a dart
device for clandestine and imperceptible inoculation with BWJCW agents) for
use with various materials and to assure thai!: the microbioinoculator could not
be easily detected by later examination of the target, and
d. provide technl.cal support and consultation on request for o1rensive and
defensive BWjCW.
In the later years the activities dwindled to the point of simply maintaining a
stockpile of agents and delivery systems for possible Agency use.
From its outset the project was characterized by extreme compartmentatlon
or a high degree of secrecy within CIA itself. Only two or three Agency omcers
at any given time were cleared for access to Fort Detrick activities. Though
some CIA-originated documents have been found in the project files, it is clear
that only a very limited documentation of activities took place.
A major early requirement of the Agency was to find a replacement for the
standard cyanide L-Pill issue!! to agents in hazardous situations during World
War II. Work on this problem was done at Fort Detrick and ultimately centered
on the coating of a small pin-sized drlll with shellfish toxin. In the course of this
work shellfish toxin was stored in our laboratory for the purposes of conducting
stability tests. A considerable amoullit of work was done in developing concealment
schemes ,for the drill or pin to be used in the event suicide was necessary.
The only application of this e1rort was in the U-2 flight over the USSR in
May 1960, during which Gary Powers carried such a device concealed in a
silver dollar., In the Powers case the grooves of the drlll bit were filled with
shellfish toxin. He obviously did not use it,and was not instructed to do so;
it was o1rered to him to provide him with the option. The Powers flight was the
only time we are aware that the toxin was .provided for operational use, although
the Ir-Pill was made available for earlier 1iights.
The primary Agency interest was in the developmeIlit of dissemination devices,
to be used with standard chemicals 01r the shelf. Such dissemination devices
as a fountain pen dart launcher and an engine head bolt designed to release a
substance when' heated appeared to be peculiarly suited for clandestine use.
Available records do not indicate that all specific items were developed exclusively
for the CIA, as work on similar devices was also done for the Army.
A large amount of Agency attention was given to the problem of incapacitating
guard dogs. Though most of the dart launchers were developed for the Army,
the Agency did request the development of a small hand-held dart launcher for
its peculiar needs.
Work was also done on tempOrary human incapacitation techniques. Technical
support elements of CIA received continuing requests for safe, e1rective and
rapidly acting, incapacitating devices. These related to a desire to incapacitate
captives before they could render themselves incapable of talking or terrorists
before they could take retaliatory action. Work was done in trying to develop
the dart system for such purposes, but success was never achieved, since a larger
amount of an incapacitating agent is required to safetly inactivate a human than
of a lethal agent required to kill him.
Work was also done by or for the Agency in the development of materials for
sabotage of various materials and facilities. This is clearly related to the Agency's
mission. Discussions with those involved indicate that hand-launchers with
darts loaded with dog incapacitant were delivered for use in Southeast Asia.
One such operation involved the penetration of a facility abroad for intelligence
collection. The compound was guarded by watch dogs which made entry
dimcult even when it was empty. Darts were delivered for the operation but
were not used. The guard dogs ate some meat treated with dog incapacitant
which was o1rered by the entry team. Our records indicate that some of these
materials were prepared for one operation, but we are aware that that operation
was not in fact completed. Beyond these, however, no record can be found that
these materials or devices were used for lethal operational purposes.
By the late 1960's, a variety of BW agents and toxins were maintained by
BOD for possible Agency use. Varying amounts of these materials ranging from
12
100 gl'~ms (abou·t 8.5 ounces) to 100 milligrams (about S thousandths ot an
ounce) were maintained. Tho~h speci1lc accountin&' for each agent on the list
is not on hand, Department of Defense records indicate that the materials were
in fact destroyed in 1970 by SOD personnel, except for the 11 &'ra~s of a substance
in small medical bottles labelled shellfish toxin, (plus the 8 milligrams of
cobra venom) which were found on 20 May of this year.
At the time the toxin was found the olllcer responsible for the project in IM'O
stated he had no recollection a15 to how it got there. On SO June, discussions
were held with the retired Agency olllcer who had provided the initial lead.
This man, who had been the OS-15 branch chief in 1970, stated 'that the toxin
had in fact been moved from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory. This
was done on the basts of his own decision after conver_tions with the responsible
project olllcer. He further stated that he made this decision based on the fact that
the cost and dilllculty of isolating the shellfish toxin were so great that it /limply
made no sense to destroy it, particularly when there would be no future source
of the toxin. The current branch chief believes this explanation is correct but
still does not recall the actual act of receiving the material from Fort Detrick.
Both of these middle-grade olllcers agree that no one, including their immediate
superior, was told of the retention of the shell1lsh toxin.
The former branch chief recalls that subsequent to the delivery of the shellfish
toxin to CIA, he was told by his chief to inform Fort Detrick personally that
destruction of CIA materials should take place. He did 80 but did not include
the shellfish toxin, then in CIA handlt, in hiS instructions.
DisCU&Sions with Mr. Helms, Director of Central Intelligence and Mr. Thomas
Karamessines, the Deputy Director tor Plans in 1970, have established that both
were aware of the requirement that such material be disposed of. They recall
that clear instructions were given that the OIA stockpUe should be destroyed
by the Army and that, in accordance with Presidential directiveEJ, the Agency
should get out of theBWbusiness.
With the diBcovery of the shellfish toxin, a complete inventory of the vault in
which it was found was taken. The inventory consisted of a stock of various
materials and delivery systems accumulated over the yeare, including other lethal
materials, incapacitants, narcotics, hallucinogenic drugs, irritants and riot control
agents, herbicides, animal control materials, and many common chemicallj.
The small size of the vault, about 8 by 10 teet, and the few shelves limit the
extent of this stockpile. The materlals are tor the mO!Jt part the residue of a
number of different CIA programs. These involved CIA's effort to keep a close
watch on emerging technology-in this case pharmaceutical technology-to
ensure that we did not encounter an unanticipated threat from hostile intelligence
services with which we could not contend. We also wished to capitalize
on new advances which should subBtantially assist us in our efforts to collect
foreign intelligence or in a wartime situa·tion. The narcotics in storage related
to CIA's overseas etrorts to collect intelligence in the narcotics trade, to help in
countering it. We have also supplied tear gas and mace to our omcers overseas
for use in defensive situations where firearms would not be appropriate.
The threat as well as the promise posed by newer types of drugs, particularly
the hallUcinogenic drugs, made at least exploratory research on them essential.
You will recall our concern over the possible role of drugs in the apparent brainwashing
of American POW's in Korea, and the haunted eyes of Cardinal
Mindzenty as he "confessed" at a Communist trial. I might add that we believe
that a drug was administered to one of our o1Ilcel"8 overseas by a foreign intelli·
gence service within the past year. Those responsible for providing technical
support to dandestine operations telt it necessary that they understand the ways
in which these drugs could be used, their effects and their vulnerabilities to
countermeasures. In pursuing such concerns as these, many different materials
were obtained and stored for provision to contractors who did the actual 8C'ientlfic
research invol'red. This concern also led to the experiments which led to the
unfortunate death in 1M3 of Mr. Frank Olson.
In this regard, alA does very little in-house research. Our laboratories are
limited and are principally used to test developed equipment and to tailor it
for specific operational uses through concealment or special packall'ing. We do
not have, nor have we had, the facilities to produce or experiment with such
lethal materials as the sheWlsh toxin. For example, we relied upoh. Fort Detrick
to perform the actual work of coating pins or darts with toxiD. or with dOC
incapacitant. In similar fashion, we relied on other laboratories or contl1lct0r8
to 6Upport us in other fields. Most of the materials held in storage in the vault
13
were kept there tor possible issuance to contracto1"8 engaged in various kinds
of research.
One of the major results ot these investigations of the CIA has been to
impress upon our employees and all of us involved in intelligence the fact that
deciaions about our programs must be made in the light of today.'s world. As you
are aware in mid-1973 we tried to identify all questionable activities. We did
ElO tor what I believe to be most of them, and issued internal directives to en9Ure
that OIA remain within the bounds ot law. Repeated emphasis on the importance
ot this did lead to the identification of our association with Fort Detrick as an
activity to be reviewed before we were aware that one ot its products had been
improperly sequestered.
The controls involved in the shellfish case seem to have existed but not to have
been applied. The c;ontrols that would have prevented or discovered this act were
principally those which are the kind ot management we must have tor the intelligence
business. I am confident that this management will exist a'8 a result of
the changes we are making in our approoch to intelligence, to ensure its conformity
with Ameri~ values and standards. These will inclUde a better public
appreciation of modern intelligence, better guidelines tor its proper activities and
better superviBlon externally to stimUlate better superviBlon internally. With
these, I am confident that such eplBodes as the shellfish toxin will not be repeated.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Colby. Mr. Schwarz, our chief
counsel, will commence our questioning.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Chairman, I only have three areas of questioning
t.hat relate w· mar~ three documents.
/Mr. Colby, at the bottom of pa.ge 4 of your statement and running
over to page 5, you refer to a project approval memo of 1967, and state
that that identified the functional categories of project activity. Would
you turn to exhibit 6,1 the document dated October 18, 1967; subject,
"MKNAOMI, Flmding Objectives 'and Accomplishments."
Is that the source that you were referring to ~
Mr. COLBY. Yes, it is.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Would you read into the record, Mr. Colby, the four
items "a" through "d" under the heading "Objectives in the Exhibit,"
please~
Mr. COLBY. The objectives:
a. To provide tor a covert support base to meet clandestine operational requirements;
b. to stockpile sev-erely incapacitating and lethal materials tor the
• specific use ()t TSD; c. to maintain in operational readiness special and unique
items tor the dissemination ot biological and chemical materials j and d. to provide
tor the required surveillance, testing, upgrading and evaluation of materials
and items, in order ,flo all8U1'e absence ot detects and complete predictability ()f
results to be expected under operati1>nal conditions.
Mr. SCHWARZ. There are some differences between that and what
you had in jour statement; and in particular, Mr. Colby, there is no
mention of defensive purposes, is there ~
Mr. COLBY. No. But I think the overall purpose was both for offensive
and defensive.
Mr. SCHWARZ. In addition to the shellfish toxin. Mr. Colby, as you
identified in your statement, you found other ma.terials in the lab.
Would you turn to exhibit 2 I which is an inventory prepared from
the CIA's inventory, furnished to us, of all of the lethal and incapacitating
agents found in the building. Do you accept it as that ~
Mr. COLBY. I do.
Mr. SCHWARZ. There are items on it, are there not" in addition to the
shellfish toxin ~
Mr. COLBY. There are indeed.
18se p. 204.
I Seep. 192.
14
Mr. ScllwARZ. And there are lethal items which are in violation of
the Presidential order in addition to the shellfish toxin, are there not 1
Mr. COLBY. I think that gets into a technical question about whether
they are technically in violation or not. But they are certainly lethal,
and I think that it is certainly appropriate to say that we have no
need for this type of thing at this time.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.
Now, as the footnote on exhibit 2 1 indicates, prior to the transfer
of the material from Fort Detrick in February 1970, the CIA had in
its laboratory already half a gram of the material, did it not1
Mr. CQLBY. Yes. , '
Mr. SCHWARZ. Finally, Mr. Colby, I would like to read to you from
the President's order of February 14, 1970 [exhibit 52].
The President has further directed the destructIon of all existing toxin weapons,
and of all stocks of toxins which are not required for a research program,
for defensive purposes only.
You agree, do you not, that the retention of the shellfish toxin, and
probably certain other materials, violated that order1
Mr. COLBY. I think it was in a quantity which certainly is excessive
for research purchases.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And, in fact, no research was done on it after it was
delivered to the CIA facilities. Is that right 1
Mr. COLBY. Right.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And, in fact, it was not for defensive purposes only,
was it~
Mr. COLBY. No. I do not think you can say it, although some of it
mi~hthave been for the use of an agent for It suicide pill.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator CHURCH. Mr. Smothers, do you have any supplemental
questions?
Mr. SMOTHERS. Yes. Maybe we could clarify the point that the chief
counsel just raised. Mr. Colby, could. you be more clear on the responsibility
of the people who are involved wit,h these toxins? Do their
j oba relate to any operational needs of the Agency?
Mr. COLBY. Well, they perceived it asa potential operational need.
And the fact is that one of the toxins was used on an actual operation;
that is, the U-2 flight.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Were these persons involved in any decisionmaking
with regard to the use and implementation of these materials?
Mr. COLBY. No. This was a section of a technical support division
which did the research and development of the capability. It would
then be turned over to one of the other elements of the Agency for
the actual operation.
Mr. SMOTHERS. In the course of their duties, would these persons
have had the opportunity to employ the8(' substances in any manner
against individuals or targets, if you will, that they might have
selected ~
Mr. COLBY. I do not quite understand the question.
Mr. SMOTHERS. The scientists we are talking a;bout-would they
have had the opportunity in the normal course of their duties with
the Agency to determine how these materials might in fact be
employed~
'Seo p. 192.
I See p. 202.
15
Mr. COLBY. Oh, they would certainly conduct experiments at Fort.
Detrick in various fonns, but not on people.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Would they be responsible for any employment of ,
these m8lterials beyond experimentation in s. laboratory?
Mr. COLBY. Generally, no,' although they would probably part:icip.ate
to some degree in the detailed planning of 'an opera,tion. This wIll vary
from operation to operation. Some operations cannot be established
without a very close relationship between the technical people and the
operational people. In other cases, the technical people can merely
furnish the device, and there is sufficient explanation as to how to use
it that they llo not need to be informed of the details of the actual
operation.
Mr. SMOTHERS/Fo the best of your knowledge, either during the time
of your tenure of that of previous Directors, was there any effort made
by any of these persons who had knowledge of the toxins either to
urge employment of them or to seek in some manner to use them
against persons, or to use them in nonexperimental manner?
Mr. COLBY. There were various suggestions made over time, yes. As
a matter of fact, I had a job at one time when the idea was proposed to
me, and I turned it down.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Yes; but was it proposed by these persons who had
knowledge of the toxins~ .
Mr. COLBY. It was proposed by an expert. It was not a toxin in thaJt
case, but it was a very similar chemical. He was offering a capability,
trying to see whether we were interested in using it.
Mr. SMOTHERS. How many people work in this laboratory, Mr.
Colby~
Mr. COLBY. This particular laboratory was really a storeroom in
recent years, and it IS a very small room. The people who had access
to it were only the chief and deputy chief and the secretary of that
particular section, except that some additional people would sometimes
visit it. But it is in the neighborhood of nine, something like that,
in that particular branch.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Now, in addition to the lethal substances indicated
on the inventory of exhibit 2/ were there not, in fact, other substances
and materials kept in this storage area?
Mr. COLBY. Y88, there are a number of other materials, and I tried
to refer to that in my statement.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Were some of those other materials such benign
substances as cough syrups and batteries and various kinds of things
that scientists may indeed have inquired into from time to time for a
variety of Agency purposes?
Mr. COLBY. Well, it was a storeroom in which various kinds of things
were there. It was not restricted to the lethal business. There were lots
of differe~t things in there, and a lot of very simple, ordinary products
were In there, too.
Mr. SMOTHERS. You mentioned the capability of the A~ency with
regard to this kind of technical or toxin research. Would this storage
facility and the nine people we have talked about here represent
a capability for the conducting or the maintaining of expertise with
regard to lethal substances 1
, 8"p.192.
16
Mr. COLBY. Well, the individuals would obviously be technically
s.ua.lified to discuss a.nd advise with respect to the material in question.
l3ut normally, the process by which CIA does its work in technical
fields is by contract or by arrangement with someone else to do the
actual work. And our officers follow the contract, and receive the results
and evaluate the results, though this was not a working laboratory.
It was merely a storeroom which had some fa.cilities in it. But these
officer&-the actual experimentation, the actual research, was done in
Fort Detrick in this situation.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Finally, to the best of your knowledge, Mr. Colby,
as indicated by both your investigative effOrts and any other information
you may have, was any unauthorized use made Of these materials
at any time since their storage in the facility in question ~
Mr. COLBY. Not to our knowledge.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Thank you. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smothers. Mr. Colby, in your testimony,
you emphasized tho,t the amount of shellfish toxin, approximately
11 grams-a little more than 11 grams-translated, represents
about half an ounce. I think that since it comes in a small container,
we ought to better understand the potency of this particular toxin..
Earlier in the week, we had testimony from Carl Duckett of your
Agency, and he told us that if that amount of shellfish toxin were administered
orally-which is one of the least efficient ways for administering
it in terms of its lethality-that quantity was sufficient to kill
at least 14,000 people. If it were administered with the sophisticated
equipment that was found in the laboratory, that quantity would be
sufficient to kill a great many more. Estimates vary upward into the
hundreds ofthousands.'
Now.: my first question is, why did the A~ency prepare a shellfish
toxin tor which there is no particular a.ntldote, which attacks the
nervous system and brings on death very quickly ~ Why did the Agency
prepare toxins of this character in quantities sufficient to kill many
thousands of people-what was the need for that in the first place,
long before the Presidential order came down to destroy this
materio,l ~
Mr. COLBY. I think the first part of the answer to that question,
Mr. Chairman, is the fact that the !rpill, which was developed during
World War II, does take some time to work, and is particularly agonizing
to the subject who useS it. Some of the people who would be
natural requesters of such a capability for their own protection and
the protection of their fellow agents, really do not want to face that
kind of a fate. But if they could be given an instantaneous one, they
would accept that. And that was the thought process behind developing
the capability. I
Now, I cannot explain why that quantity was developed, except
that this was a collaboration that we were engaged in with the U.S.
Army, and we did develop this particular weapon, you might say, for
possible use. When eIA retained the amount that it did, it obviously
did it improperly.
The CHAIRMAN. This quantity, and the various devices for administering
the toxin which were found in the laboratory, certainly make
it clear £hat purely defensive uses were not what the Agency was limited
to in any way. There were definite offensive uses. In fact, there
17
were dart guns. You mentioned suicides. Well, I do not think a suicide
is usually accomplished with a dart, particularly a gun that can place
the dart in a human heart in such a way that he does not even know
that he has been hit.
Mr. COLBY. There is no question about it. It was also for offensive
reasons. No question aoout it.
The CHAmMAN. Have you brought with you some of those devices
which would have enabled the CIA to use this poison for killing
people~ \j
Mr. COLBY. We Mve, indeed.
The CHAIRMAN. Does this pistol fire the dart ~
Mr. COLBY. Yes, it does, Mr. Chairman. The round thing at the top
is obviously the sight, the rest of it is what is practically a normal .45,
although it is 'a special. However, it works by electricIty. There is a
battery in the handle, and it fires a small dart.
The CHAIRMAN. So that when it fires, it fires silently ~
Mr. COLBY. Almost silently; yes.
The CHAIRMAN. What range does it have ~
Mr. COLBY. One hundred meters, I believe; about 100 yards, 100
meters.
The CHAIRMAN. About 100 meters range ~
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And the dart itself, when it strikes the target, does
the tar~et know that he has been hit and about to die ~
Mr. COLBY. That depends, Mr. Chairman, on the particular dart
used. There are different kinds of these flechettes that were used in
various weapons systems, and a special one was developed which potentially
would be able to enter the tar~t without perception.
The CHAIRMAN. And did you find such darts in the laboratory?
Mr. COLBY. We did.
The CHAmXAN. Is it not true, too, that the effort not only involved
designing a gun that could strike at a human tar~t without knowledge
of the person who had been struck, but also the toxin itself would not
appear in the autof.sy *
Mr. COLBY. Wei, there was an attempt-The
CHAmHAN. Or the dart.
Mr. COLBY. Yes j so there was no way of perceiving that the targe~
was hit.
The CHAmHAN. As a murder instrument, that is about as efficient
as you can get, is it not ¥" '
Mr. CoLBY. It is a weapon, a very serious weapon.
The CHAmXAN. Going back to my earlier question, Mr. Colby, as to
the quantities of this toxin that had been prepared, can you conceive
of any use that the CIA could make of such quantities of shellfish
toxin¥
Mr. COLBY. I certainly can't today, Mr. Chairman, in view of our
current policies and directives.
TheCHAmxAN. Well, even at the time, certainly, the CIA was never
commissioned or empowered to conduct bacteriological warfare
ag-ainat whole communities; and quantitie..'l of poison capable of destroyilll(
up to the hundreds"of thousands of lives-it seems to me to be
entirely inappropriarte for any possible use to which the CIA might
have put such poison.
18
Mr. COLBY. I think the :fact that we were jointly doing this with
the Army" Mr. Chairman, probably led into thIS kind of a quantitative
approach to it. But we were talking about a wea.pons system, and we
developed some of the material.
The CHAffiMAN. Well, who paid for the development of this toxin ~
Mr. COLBY. There was a great deal of joint activity. This particular
thing we paid for.' .
The CHAffiMAN.And is it not true that over the years this preparation,
which is a costly and lengthy distillation process, from what I
understand, costs about $3 million ~
Mr. COLBY. Well, not just this toxin, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, development of guns of this kind.
Mr. COLBY. The total frogram, from the years 1952 to 1970, did
amount to that as a tota . But in the later years of the sixties, this
dwindled down, as I indicated, to pretty much the maintenance (jf a
stockpile, and not any more development activity.
The CHAffiMAN. In the l'ater years, it was still costing the Agency
just for the maintenance of a stockpilel about $75,000 a year.
Mr. COLBY. Yes; in collaboration WIth Fort Detrick, that was the
sum that was involved.
The CHAffiMAN. Now, there is no question in your mind that Presidential
orders were issued directing the CIA to destroy these toxins, in
accordance with the national policy and treaty obligation assumed by
the United States that such substances would not be retained except
for purely experimental laboratories and experimental purposes.
Mr. COLBY. I would like to destroy it. As you know, Mr. Chairman,
I must hold it for possible evidence 'here. I have also been approached .
by some academic centers to have it transferred to some safe handling, .
where it can be used in normal research activities, and no longer maintained
by CIA. But they asked particularly that it not be destroyed,
because of the difficulty in obtaining it for perfectly proper uses in
medical research. I would be delighted to concede with that, if the
committee agrees with it, and the other people who have a voice in it
agree with it.
The CHAmMAN. But you are not suggesting by that that the CIA
retain poisons in this quantity for experimental purposes, are you ~
Mr. COLBY. No. But I think this was a little bit the mental processes
of the people who actually did retain it.
The CHAIRMAN. During-the 5-year period, no experiments were actually
conducted?
Mr. COLBY. No, none. But I think the sense of it is it is very difficult
to make, and therefore "let us not destroy it," typified the mentality of
the people who decided to retain it against the directives given to them.
The CHAIR1\fA,N. And you are not su~gestingthat the retention of poisons
in these quantities did not, in fact, represent a violation of Presidential
directive?
Mr. COLBY. I do not contest that, no.
The CHAIRMAN. Now; the committee will follow a 10-minute rule, so
that all members have fair opportunity to question the witnesses. My
10 minutes have expired, and I will turn now to Senator Tower.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, are you certain
that these materials that have been the subject of testimony, specifically
shellfish toxin and the cobra venom, currently retain their orig19
inal potency ~ Is there a chance that over the passage of time their
potencl' has in any way deteriorated 9
Mr. COLBY. Senator Tower, I am really not enough of a technical expert
to answer that.
Mr. STEVENS. It is possible but unlikely.
Mr. COLBY. It is possible but unlikely.
Mr. STEVENS. Tnat they have lost--
Mr. COLBY. That they have lost some oftheir potency.
Senator TOWER. M~ Colby, turning to the dart gun, was it ever employed
for any pu~by the Agency 9
Mr. COLBY. I tlimk merely experiments, Senator Tower. I do not
know of any actual use. There is no record of any actual use.
Senator ToWlllR. No actual operational use of It at aU ~
Mr. CoLBY. No.
Senator TOWER. Prior to the discovery of the substances this summer,
did anyone in the Agency know of the actual quantities on hand 9
Mr. COLBY. We did not even really know that we had any quantities.
Senator TOWER. You did not even know that you had any on hand 9
Mr. COLBY. No, although the individual who kept them obviously
knew that there were some there.
Senator TOWER. Now have you in fact merely accepted the assertion
that the substances are in fact poison 1 Have you conducted any testing
to really identify these substances to make sure that they are the
substances described here'
Mr. COLBY. No, we have not tested them. We have rested upon the
labels on them and the other records indicating that that kind of a
program did exist. .
Senator TOWER. The. only thing you have to go by are the labels and
the records 9
Mr. COLBY. And the testimony of some of our people.
Senator ToWER. And the testimony. But there has been no test to
make sure, in fact.
Mr. CoLBY. There has not been, Senator Tower, I did not want to
risk letting the material out of our hands for a while.
Senator TOWER. In trying to locate and identify these materials that
have been described, don't you think discretion would dictate that
you should make sure that you have indeed located these materials'
Mr. COLBY. Well, I think we have enough to alert us to the need to
do something about these materials. Whatever they are, they are labeled.
The people say that they recall having sequestered them as that
kind of material. And I think that we want to make sure that we are
handling this case in the proper form and not being subject to a possible
.problem of having destroyed them by mistake or anything of
that nature.
Senator TOWER. At the time of the Presidentia1 order in 1910, did
the Agency have responsibility for custody of anything other than
laboratory samples of toxins of various types 1
Mr. COLBY. Well, we had, as I said, Senator Tower, the actual
need in some of our operations for some kinds of chemicals overseas,
and I think a legitimat.e need for a lethal substance certainly for defensive,
if not for offensive, purposes.
Senator TOWER. Were they not in fact stored at Fort Detrick1
Mr. COLBY. They were indeed stored at Fort Detrick.
20
Senator TOWER. They were not in your actual possession.
Mr. COLBY. I believe first there was a very small amount brought
down to CIA before the 197'0 move. But the main depository was
certainly at Fort Detrick.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Colby.
Mr. COLBY. Thank you, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. 'Before I turn to Senator Mondale, I want to observe
that Senator Hart of Michigan, who has been a very valued member
of this committee, cannot be with us today because he is presently
hospitalized. And I just want to express the regrets of the committee
that he cannot be here to partiCIpate in this hearing because he
has been of great service. And we hope that he will soon return to
the committee table.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, if you would yield, let me second
your remarks and associate myself with them. Senator Hart has been
a va.lued member of the committee and we hope he has a speedJ
recovery.
The CHAmMAN. Thank you. Senator Mondale.
Senator MONDALE. Mr. Colby, in your opening statement you ob.
served that the Agency which you head must operate in a secret environment.
I think most of us would accept that fundamental concession
and serious concession ill ll. society which is based upon the theory
that the American people must know what is going on. But what
troubles me is that this record seems to disclose an additional concession,
namely, the lack of accountability, so that we not only have
a secret agency, but we have an agency about which there is some
question as to its accountability to the authority of the President or
to the authority of the National Security Council. The record seems
to disclose that there is no Presidential or National Security Council
order in the first place directing the CIA to establish this program
at all.
Second, there appears to be no report by the CIA to higher authority
of the existence of these toxins or biological wea.pons.
Third, there seems to be no evidence that those in charge of the
CIA inquired of subordinates as to the existence of toxins or biolow.cal
weapons, or that following the Presidential order decreein~ destruction
of such toxins, that any formal order went forth WIthin
the CIA to require their destruction.
Moreover, the record seems to support the notion that it was only
by chance that the leadership of the CIA became aware some years
later of even the existence of these lethal toxins, which were in viola·
tion of a direct Presidential order.
In short, the record is a mess and we may never know just exactly
what happened. Does it bother you that this kind of record could be
available to us and should exist in something as serious as this?
Mr. COLBY. It certainly does, Senator Mondale. And I think we
have taken some steps to try to overcome that problem. I think that the
existence of the program did stem from the World War II experience
and the fact of the Technical Services Division having a role of support
for our intellig-ence activities was reported to various supervisory
committees of the time.
21
I do not think there is any great detail on that in line with the
st&nd&Tds of those times. But I think there is no indication that the
Agency wanted to defy a Presidential order. There is an indication that
the suggestion was made to the Agency management or to some level
o,f 'it that the material be maintained. But there is no indica.tion that
that was approved. There is an indication that the Presidential instruction
was passed down the line to the various elements of the Agen0,-,:.,
And I think that there are steps that we are taking to prevent this
kind :0'f thing happeJ:ling.
The reMon we found out about this was precisely because of the
reiterated demands and directives that I issued that we be informed of
!&nything questionable in the Agency's past, that it is precisely this
kind of detailed supervision and management that we have to have,
and! think that we now have 'and I think that we will have.
..,senator MONDALE. Why would it be that after an exhaustive study
of this matter by the committee and by your own Agency, we cannot
find a sin~le order of any kind inquirin~ as to the existence of to'xins
~r biologIca~ well;pon~, any order requirm~ their destructio~ followmg
the PresIdential dIrective at all ~ Not a smgle document eXISts. Why
would that be1
. Mr. COLBY. 'Well, the theory of the intelligence operations in the
fi£ties-and that gradually has changed-but at that time, clearly those
llmiters were not made in a great deal of record. There was some severe
>C'ompartmentation of sensitive matters, things of this nature. This,
:~~~n, reduced the amount of recordkeeping, the amount of involvement
o':f;~ther people in sensiti~ activities, and you reduced it down to a
very small group who knew anything about it.
,;;.;[ think this then explains the difficulty today of reconstructing some
o-fthese matters.
Senator MONDALE. But it also apparently created situations where
t.he Agency, or someone in the Agency, pursued a course which violated
a fUndamental order of the President of the United States and the
spirit of a solemn international convention against biological and toxic
warfare.
·~·r; 'COLBY. There is no question about it that a middle-grade officer
Itlitde-R·decision which was wrong. .
Senator MONDALE. The trouble is we have seen this same phenomenon
with respect to other matters that are not before us today, where,
it ,semething happened, people at the top did not know about it, or
I.cla.imlthey knew about it and said it shouldn't happen. Then someone
't~wer did it, claiming higher authority, not knowing who, no docum~
nta.tion. So, as we seek to reach the issue of accountability in a secret
..«&ley, we are left repeatedly with a record which is utterly beyond
Wiferstanding. And I wonder if that does not go to questions of man~
ment and control and Presidential authority in a profound way, as
.Dis-record discloses.
;~t .i\fjr.CoLBY. I think it goes to a question of the cultural pattern of
~~lIigenooactivities and the traditions, the old traditions of how they
2. conducted. And those are being changed in America and I for one
a they are.
r MONDALE. Thank you very much, Mr. Ch~irman. .
6'CHAIRHAN. Thank you, Senator Mondale. Sena-tor Baker.
22
Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, thank: you very much. Before J di·
rect a few questions to Mr. Colby, I have a brief statement I would
like to make with respect to these hearings. They will come as no surprise
to you, Mr. Chairman, nor to you, Mr. Vice Chairman, that I
think we are making a mistake. I think that we should have started
public hearings at tha very outset and gone fully into the question of
assassinations or whatever else might legitimately come before this
committea in the scope of its inquiry. I do not think, Mr. ChairI,Jlan,
Mr. Vice Chairman, that we ought to have an interim report, for in·
stance, on assassinations, because I think it tends to segregate and to
emphasize a particular area of our inquiry out of perspective- to the
totality of the inquiry. " "
Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I also want to say that I admire
you and Senator Tower for the diligence of your effort in bringing us
to this point. I do not criticize you for the decision that has been made
by a majority of the committee. I simply want to register my
disagreement.
I think that particularly on a matter of this sensitivity that has
received this much public attention, that if the country is not fully
informed, if we do not have a public forum from which they can gain
the information they require to make their judgment, that no judgment
we make for them will be adequate.
Therefore, I think, Mr. Chairman, that the committee ought to reconsider
its determination to conduct its inquiry on assassinations or
any other aspect of this matter in secret, in executive session, that we
ought to reconsider the matter of filing an interim report, and instead
we should have public hearings and forebear an interim report so we
have a full repOli and that the country would then be well served in'
accordance with rights to know. Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I do
have a few questions I would like to put to Mr. Colby.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well.
Senator BAKER. Mr. Colby, it is clear to me from the evidence at hand
that somebody authorized the formulation, the development and the
retention of these toxic materials. Can you tell me who did it ~
Mr. COLBY. The development, the research and development, I think,
was begun in the sixties, the early sixties. I cannot tell you specifically
who authorized it.
Senator BAKER. Is there a record that would tell us who did it 1
Mr. COLBY. The records are very incomplete, as you know, sir.
Senator BAKER. Why are they incomplete ~
Mr. COLBY. Some of them apparently have been destroyed.
Senator BAKER. Do you know who destroyed them 1
Mr. COLBY. I do. I have a. report that one set was destroyed by the
Chief of the Division in question before his retirement.
Senator BAKER. Do you know who that was ~
Mr. COLBY. Mr. Gottlieb.
Senator BAKER. Is that Mr. Sidney Gottlieb ~
Mr. COLBY. Yes. .
Senator BAKER. What was his title at the time ¥
Mr. COLBY. He was Chief of the Technical Services Division.
Senator BAKER. Have you interviewed Mr. Gottlieb ¥
Mr. COLBY, I have not.
23
Senator BAKER. Has anyone at the Agency interviewed Mr. Gottlieb
as to why these records were destroyed ~ . .
Mr. COLBY. There is a memorandum In the Agency between the DIrector
and Mr. Gottlieb at that time.
Senator BAKER. What does that mean ~ Does that mean yes they have
or no they haven't ~
Mr. COLBY. That they were destroyed explaining--
Senator BAKER. What I am asking you is, do you know-has anyone
at the Ag-ency interviewed GottlIeb as to why the material was
destroyed ~
Mr. COLBY. We have had one contact with Mr. Gottlieb in recent
days. We have pretty much--
Senator BAKER. Is it true that Gottlieb was at the Agency at Langley
just a few days ago, going through his records and other material
aut there~
Mr. COLBY. He was.
Senator BAKER. And did somebody at that time say, "What was it you
destroyed, Sidney~" or "how come you did it~"
Mr. COLBY. Senator, we have taken the position with this committee,
as we have with the other committees and with the Rockefeller Commission,
that we would not go outside the current employees of the
Agency to try to run down these stories. We did not want to be subjected
to a possible charge that we were somehow cooking their testimony.
And, as a result, we have restricted our connections with these
people to providing them the information that they had while they
were in the Agency.
Senator BAKER. I am not trying to press you, but the way I interpret
the totality of those remarks is that no one has interviewed Gottlieb
as to why he destroyed the material or what they contained-the
records.
Mr. COLBY. No, we have not interviewed him as to the reason.
Senator BAKER. Do you know what documents he destroyed ~
Mr. COLBY. We are very unsure as to the total. We do not have an
inventory of it.
Senator BAKER. Do you think they might have said who authorized
the formulation or the retention of this stuff ~ Do you have any reason
to think it might or might not contain that information 1
Mr. COLBY. In this case, I doubt it would have very much, because
this case, from the evidence we have at hand--
Senator BAKER. Does it say anything or have any reason to indicate
that it might say how, if at all, this material was used in an aggressive
way against someone to kill someone ~
Mr. COLBY. Well, there may well be some of that in the material.
Senator BAKER. When was the documentation destroyed 1
Mr. COLBY. In 1973.
Senator BAKER. It did not happen to be destroyed at the same time
as those tapes that the CIA destroyed ~
Mr. COLBY. In 1972.
Senator BAKER. In 1972. When in 19721
Mr. COLBY. November, I believe it was.
Senator BAKER. In November of 1972. Do you have any idea what
volume of records were destroyed 9
Mr. CoLBY. I do not know.
24
Senator BAKER. Do you know who authorized the destruction, if
anyone 1
Mr. CoLBY. As I said, there was a memorandum of agreement between
the Director and Mr. Gottlieb at that time.
Senator BAKER. And the Director at that time was 1
Mr. COLBY. Mr. Helms.
Senator BAKER. Mr. Helms is here in this room, I believe, Mr. Chairman,
and I take it we will have an opportunity to hearfroII1 him ~
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Helms will be our witneSs at tomorrow morning's
hearings. I believe he is the leadoff witness.
Senator BAKER. I will npt prolong my opportunity to examine
the witness much longer, Mr. Chairman. I understand we are going
to try to operate under the lO-minute rule..
May I ask you only this further question, then, in general, Mr.
Colby?' You have heard of the doctrine of plausible deniability?
Mr. COLBY. Yes, and I have rejected it now, Senator. I say we cannot
depend upon that any more. '
Senator BAKER. The question I was going to put to you-is that
a phrase of art in the intelligence communityWDoes it have a separate
significance that you understand W
Mr. COLBY. It was a rationale used in earlier years.
Senator BAKER. What does it mean?
Mr. COLBY. If the United States could deny something and not be
clearly demonstrated as having said something falsely, then the United
States could do so.
Senator BAKER. In the case of assassinations, in the case of lUl;Y
other-of domestic surveillance, in the case of the formulation of pOIsons,
under that previous rationale, would the doctrine of plausible d'eniwbility
have led the Agency to destroy records to conceal evidence or
to compartmentalize to the point that it would be-that a committee
such as this later would have been unable to establish what really
happened?
Mr. COLBY. I think the plausible denial concept was used in the sense
of international diplomatic relationships, that our country-Senator
BAKER. Are you saying by that it would not have applied
to the formulation of toxic materIals?
Mr. COLBY. I would not say it did not have anything to do with it
at all, but I think that the baSIC rationale for the doctrine of plausible
denial w,as so our Nation could deny something and not be tagged with
it.
Senator BAKER. Senator Mondale pointed out that in another area
which is not being covered here-I take it he meant assassinationsand
an area that I think should be covered here-that we run up
against a stone wall, that we get so far and leads get fuzzy. You know
what we are driving at. You are familiar with our record so far.
Mr. COLBY. I have the same problem. .
Senator BAKER. Without goin~ into that, is that an application of
the doctrine of plausible deniabibty ?
Mr. COLBY. No; I do not think so. I do not think that would apply
to internal records. Plausible denial would be to one's posture vis-a-vis
some foreign nation. That is the basic rationale behind it. It does not
have anything to do with the keeping or nonkeeping of internal
records.
25
Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I am a little beyond the scope of this
inquiry here, but not much and not for that primary purpose. You
are familiar, I take it, with the Inspector General's report on the
assassination situation ~
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
Senator BAKER. As I recall, the first few sentences in that report dealt
with the difficulty of reconstructing, finding records, and dealt generally
with the question of plausible deniability. Are you familiar with
the lan,guage I am referring to ~
Mr. CoLBY. I believe so.
Senator BAKER. Is that the sort of thing that would prevent us from
finding records of responsibility and causal connection to this matter
of the formulation and retention or the failure to destroy toxic materials
~
Mr. COLBY. The effect of it would, but the purpose of the doctrine was
certainly not to deprive our Government of any knowledge about our
Government's own activities.
Senator BAKER. But it had that effect 1
Mr. COLBY. It could have that effect.
Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAmMAN. Thank you, Senator Baker. Senator Huddleston.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, first,
I would like to commend you for the forthright way that you have
dealt with this committee. In my judgment, you have made every
effort to provide us with the information we needed and have adopted
the policy on your own that certainly would tend to eliminate many
of the alleged abuses and apparent abuses that occurred in recent years.
I would also reiterate what you said in your own statement, that these
particular hearings, this series on biological warfare and toxins, should
not be considered as typical of the operation of the CIA, nor should it
?e considered as uniqu~ or unusual. It is sim~ly o~e piece of ~ giant
JIgsaw puzzle thllit, untIl we see more of the entire pIcture, we Will have
II hard time assessing the total operation.
Mr. COLBY. Thank you, Senator.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I would like to refer you to a memorandum
[exhibit 1 1], that was purported to have been prepared by Thomas H.
Karamessines, who at the time was Deputy Director for Plans of the
Central Intelligence Agency, directed to the Director of CIA at that
time. I understand that this memorandum was not signed by Mr.
Karamessines, that the person to whom it was directed indicated that
he did not, in fact, see it.
However, it sets out very specifically the situation at that time, in
1970, following the President's order to eliminate our activity in bacteriological
and toxin warfare. As a matter of fact-let us go' through
it very briefly.
In the first parag:mph it calls attention to the President's order in
November 1969, which was to eliminate this .program. In the second
p'aragraph, it points out the President's clarIfication in January of
1970, to state very specifically that this order did, in fact, apply to the
CIA. Then, in the third paragraph, it goes on to say, to point out, that
the CIA did have at Fort Detrick certain su.pplies. It then says that
this stockpile did not appear on the inventory lIst.
J Bee p.189.
26
Now, does that not indica.te to you a. specific knowledge on the pa.~t
of this individual, at least, that the CIA was in violation of the PresIdent's
order W
Mr. COLBY. Well, it certainlY indicates that the material held by CIA
did not appear on the Fort Detrick list. That is certainly so. In that
respect, it certainly indicates awareness of President Nixon's directive.
Senator HUDDLESTON. And that this inventory should have been included
so that the Army could proceed with its plan of destruction, as
it had been ordered to do V
Mr. COLBY. I think there is that implication, .that it should have
appeared. .
Senator HUDDLESTON. Further, then, in paragraph 5, this memorandum
suggested that if. the Director wishes to continue this special
capability-now, does that not also indicate that the Director might
want to violate outright the President's order ~
Mr. COLBY. It certainly gave an option that that particular order
would not be followed. Now, that does not indicate that the Director
would necessarily do that without consultation with the President.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I recognize that..But someone in the Department,
either Mr. Karamessines or his deputy or someone, was suggesting
this as an option.
Mr. COLBY. I think the originator of the p~rticular draft memorandum
is one of your witnesses, and there is no indication of the level
to which the memorandum got beyond him, although it is clear that
Mr. Karamessines did not sign it.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Except that what he suggested did, in fact,
take place. .
Mr. COLBY. Yes;thait is right. It in foot took pl'ace, accordin~ to his
a?count, by his own decision, in violation of the directives he was
gIVen.
Senator HUUDLEBTON. One more sentence in paragraph 5, "Arrangements
have been made for this contingency." Does that indicate
that someone in the Agency had already taken action or had made
arrangements to specifically violate the order of the President of the
United States ~
Mr. COLBY. They had a.rranged for the possible transfer of the
materials to a research center, a private research center, in Baltimore.
That was what that"Arrangements have been made" referred to.
Senater HUDDLESTON. But the memorandum had already indicated
that they recognized that is in violation of the President's order.
Mr. COLBY. A contingency that, if the Director approved, it would
be done. And it of course was not. The material was kept in the Agency
itself.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, that memorandum also lists an inventory,
I presume at that time, which differs somewhat from the inventory
that you have submitted from the material that has recently
been located. Is that correct ~
Mr. COLBY. Yes, there are some differences in it. I think a number
of those items were actually included. in the destruction by Fort
Detrick.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do youknow who made the decision and why
he selected certain items to retain illegally and allowed certain items
to be destroyed 9
27
Mr. COLBY. Th~ only one was the ~el~, whi~h was retai~ed in
violation of the dIrectIve. Of the rema.mmg matenal, some of It was
not included within the directive and some was and was destroyed. So
the story, as we can reconstruct it today, is that this certain officer
wanted to save this material because it was very valuable.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Colby, it has already been.establis~edthat
the cost of this research work and development was m the neIghborhood
of $3 million.
Mr. COLBY. I would not apply that only to the shellfish but to the
total activity. .
Senator HUDDLESTON. You indicated that, as far as you know, there
has been only one application, and that was Francis Gary Powers, the
U-2 pilot.
Mr. COLBY. Well, of course, that wasn't an application either. There
wel'e certain other situations in which clearly some consideration was
given to analogous material, if not this materIal.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Are you saying, for $3 million we supplied
one U-2 pilot with a device with which he might do away with hIS own
life, which he decided not to use, a decision I would say was very wise
on his part, personally. Is that correct?
Mr. COLBY. No. I think that is not quite correct, Senator Huddleston.
The $3 million refers to the whole activity and includes the research
and the stockpiling, not only of this particular material, but of other
materials. Ana I indicated some of the other materials have been used
on other operations, the guard dogs and things of that nature.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, most of the material there, the toxic
material, was applied by some sort of injection. Consequently, you
developed the dart guns and drill bits that you put in silver dollars
and whatever. Was there also material there that would be administered
in some other way ~
Mr. COLBY. Oh, yes; there were various ways you could administer
various of these materials, no question about it, both orally and under
some kind of a guise and so forth.
Senator HUDDLESTON. And what devices were prepared for that kind
of administration ~
Mr. COLBY. It was really rather the development-to see what the
effect of putting the particular material into another substance, what
chemical reactions and stabilities were.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, the inventory for the first set of materials
that were held at Fort Detrick included an agent that, I presume,
WAS designed to induce tuberculOBis. .
'Is that correct 9
'Mr. COLBY. Yes. There is that capability.
'Senator HUDDLESTON. What application would be made of that partficular
agent ¥
.·;Mr. COLBY. It is obviously to induce tuberculosis in a subject that
you want to induce it in.
c t~enator HUDDLESTON. For what purpose ¥
. Mr. COLBY. We know of no application ever being done with it, but
the idea of giving someone this particular disease is obviously the
thought process behind this.
28
Senator HUDDLESTON. You mentioned earlier in your testimony that
the primary purpose for collecting this material was to induce a
temporary situation to prevent harm ~
Mr. COLBY. That certainly does not apply to the lethal agents.
Senator HUQQLESTON. I would not think it did.
Mr. CoLBY. No.
Senator HUDDLESTON. What about brucellosis, which we are trying
to eradicate in Kentucky. It affects cattle. That was also on the inventory.
What was the purpose of that ~
Mr. COLBY. I think we were talking about an experiment. We were
talking about what its capabilitiea-.were, what its properties were, what
the reactions were, and so forth. I do not think anybne had gone down
the trail to a particular use, a pa.rticular purpose there. They were
dealing as scientists with the different materials 'available to them.
Senator HUJ)QLESTON. Was this at the direction Qf, the CIA to de- .
velop this or for scientists just looking around trying to find out ~
Mr. COLBY. These were CIA officers who were responsible for keeping
up with the state of the art in various kinds of technical and
pharmaceutical areas to see what applications might be appropriate
for intelligence-related purposes. . '
Senator HUJ)QLE8TON. Thank you. I believe my time has expired,
Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Huddleston. Senator Goldwater.
Senator GOWWATER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I only' have one
question, Mr. Colby, but I have a short statement I would lIke to make
to you.
Criticism and analysis are important ingredients in making "our
democracy work. However, we are now approaching the point where
both are being abused to the point of self-destruction. I submit we
must get out of the morass of doubt and pessimism into which we have
sunk. We must not let the quarrels of the past interfere with buildin~
for the future. A tidal wave of criticism has swept over the intelligence
community of our countrl' much of which is mistaken or unwarranted.
The damage is severe. I continued, its survival is uncertain.
Before this committee have appeared men of the CIA, both on active
duty and retired. All have been impressive because of their dedication
and loyalty. Nothing we have heard detracts from the reputation of
the CIA as a highly competent organization. The men and women of
the CIA are doing a great job under very trying conditions.
And I say to them, as our Nation 'gets back on course, I believe there
will be change for the better. I ask you to hold on until that happens.
You were never more needed by this country than right now. And, as
one American, I am proud of you.
To those young people who may be looking for careers and who have
a desire for public service, I can think of no better way to serve your
Nation than as an intelligence officer. Many skills are required to keep
the CIA a useful and productive organization, and contmuity is vital
to America.
Now, Mr. Colby--
Mr. COLBY. Senator Goldwater, if I may, on behalf of our employees,
thank you for that statement. They are under a lot of pressure
these days, and they will appreciate that.
29
Senator GOLDWATER. The question I have to ask you, have other
countries developed bacteriological warfare ability ~
Mr. COLBY. Certainly, Senator; that is one aspec,t of bacteriological
warfare that the PresIdent's directive in 1969 and 1970 tells CIA t(l
continue, and that is to follow the activities of other nations. We will
see the capabilities and activities of other nations in this field and we
have some officers who do follow these activities abroad. And they
are quite general. There are some very, very dubious areas where we
are just not sure what the actual capabilities are in some respects, but
we do follow it indeed and there is extensive effort done by other
nations in this line.
Senator GOLDWATER. But you are now prevented from--
Mr. COLBY. No; we can follow the foreign ones, that's no problem.
Senator GOLDWATER. You can follow them, but can you do anything
to offset them?
Mr. COLBY. I think tho.t the defensive against those possible things
is a matter for the Department of Defense.
Senator GOLDWATER. You feel you are safe in that field?
Mr. COLBY. I think in cooperation with the Department of Defense,
and advising the Department of Defense of foreign developments in
this area, we are giving them the basis for developing such defense
efforts as we need them. .
Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you, that is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Goldwater. Senator Morgan?
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Chainnan, Mr. Colby, since this is the first
public hearing of this· committee, I think we should note that we
feel and I certainly feel that the role played by the CIA is a very
vital one, and a very important one. I think the fact that you quoted
from President Kennedy. who said that quite often our failures are
trumpeted and our successes go unheralded is appropriate here.
This committee has been told by witnesses that had the CIA existed
prior to World War II, Pearl Harbor might never have happened or
if it had 4appened, the loss in deaths and property might have been
much less. So I want you to know that we do recognize the role of
the CIA. We lElcognize the fact that we in this country must be able
to know in aavance what our potential adversaries and potential
enemies may be planning so that we can cope with them. So I do
think it is important.
Mr. CoLBY. Thank you, Senator.
Senator MORGAN. I believe, Mr. Colby, that most of the questions
have been asked except that earlier the reference was made to the
Presidential order and we alluded to what was in fact, I think, the
press release concerning the Presidential order. But as I read the
Presidential order, I found this statement. The U.S. bacteriological
and the biological programs will be confined to research and development
for defensive purposes, immunization, safety measures, et cetera.
This does not J;>reclude research into those offensive aspects of bacteriological,
biologIcal agents necessary to detennine what defensive meaSures
are required.
Now earlier you stated you thought it might have been the mentality
of those who made the decision to keep these toxins that they might
be needed in order to develop defensive weapons. Do you think if
30
that was their thinking that it would be in keeping with the Presi·
dential order as I just read it to you ~
Mr. COLBY. Well, we looked at that. I think that you might be able
to make a case for that, Senator, if you were actively involved -and
had responsibilities for these defensive measures. But, as I think the
chairman pointed out, the quantities maintained by CIA are difficult
to defend under that directive.
Senator MORGAN. What was your position with the. CIA at that
time?
Mr. CoLBY. In 1970 I was on detached service. I was assigned to
the Department of State in Vietnam. ),
Senator MORGAN. You had nothing to do with retaining these
~~, .
Mr. COLBY. No; I M;d nothing.
Senator MORGAN. And you knew nothing about them until you
made the discovery ~ , .
Mr. COLBY. Until we had discovered this in May. .
Senator MORGAN. I would commend you, Mr: Qolby,.again for taking
these steps to determine what has happened. ~ think'most men in the
CIA, as well as those in the IRS ,and the FBI, are dedicated public
officials that want to do what"is right. I think your method of asking
for any lmown violations ha'Sbeen helpfUl to this committee. I would
comme~d it, Mr. Chai,rman, to the IRS, to the ,end .that .they. might
ask theIr field agents If they know of known Violations III thIS area
and I would commend it al50,to the Director of the FBI..
Senator Goldwater mentioned, and I believe the Presidential order
directed the CIA to continue to maintain 'Surveillance on the ba~·
teriological and biological warfare capabilities of other states. You
say you have done that1 .
Mr. CoLBY. Wedoso; yes,sir.
Senator MORGAN. Are' you in a position to tell this committee
whether or not other states and especially ,potential adversaries,'
enemies, now have stockpiles'of such toxins ~
Mr. COLBY. I do not think I can say much a.bout stockpiles but I do
know that there are installations which appear to ue to he experi.
mental stations of some sort.
Senator MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Colby. ,
Mr. COLBY. In the chemical field, certainly there are stockpiles. We
are aware of that also.
Senator MORGAN. I have no further questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Senator Mathias ~
Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, some of America's greatest victories and some of America's
~reatest defeats have represented failures of intelligence. Trenton,
Antietam, Pearl Harbor, I think all illustrate the vital necessity
of intelligence. A year ago, almost exactly a year ago, when Senator
Mansfield and I intrj)duced the legislation which has resulted in this
investigation, we had that very much in mind. We wanted to be sure
that we had the best intelligence system that was available. But I
think we also had in mind John Adams' warning that a frequent recurrence
to the principles of the Constitution is absolutely necessary to
preserve the advantages of liberty and to maintain a free government.
I think: the discovery of this toxin raises some interesting questions
31
which are within the purview of this investigation and which, I think,
have to be answered before this committee completes its work and
makes its recommendations to the Congress. For example, I accept
your statement that this toxin was never used except in the one instance
that you described. But I then have to ask you this: If you had
used the toxin, what provision in the Constitution would have afforded
authority to do so ~
Mr. COLBY. I think CIA's operations are certainly overseas operations.
They fall under the National Security Act of 1941 and they fall,
consequently, under the provisions of the Constitution that call for
the national defense and the foreign relations of the United States.
Senator MATHIAS. The use of a toxin of this sort is, of course, the
use of foree.
Mr. COLBY. It is a weaJ?on; yes.
'Senator MATffiAB. It IS a weapon, it is a use of force and normally
if a force is to be employed against another nation, congressional
approval is required, is that not true 1
Mr. COLBY. Well, I think we are now in the midst of the War Powers
Act, and this activity of course preceded that.
Senator MATHIAS. Yes, it did precede it, but what occurs to me here
is that we have an illustration of the use of force in the relations of
the United States to other powers in the world, or at least the J?otential
use of force. As you say, it has never been used in this mstance,
which differs only in degree from covert operations in Laos or other
examples that we could think of. And so it seems to me that the discovery
of this toxin raises very fundamental questions about the relat.
ionship to covert activities of any intelligence agencies, be it the CIA,
the FBI, or others, with the constitutional process on which this
Government is conducted.
Now I would think, Mr. Chairman, that there is no responsibility
~reater upon us than to define that relationship as accurately as possible
before the close of these hearings. Thank you.
<,Mr. COLBY. It is, of course, contained within the amendment to the
BOrei:~ Assistance Act, passed last December, which now requires
that any activity of CIA, other than intelligence gathering abroad,
,shaH be found to be important to the national security by the Presi(
lent and shall be reported to the appropriate committees, and that
mcludes six committees of the CongTess at this time. This is a statu~
tol1lprovisionwhich we are in compliance with.
.Benator MATHIAS. Let me say, Mr. Colby, that I agree with you.
,I'ietme say this imposes responsibilities on the Congress that I do not
~'havealways been discharged very well. I can recall members of
, ss who recoiled from the responsibility of knowing what was
·ng. members of Con~ress who said, "Don't tell me, I do not
iQ, know." I think that is an indictment of the Congress, iust as
an indictment as those labeled against any of the intelligence
'~es;
€!$LJnr. I would not call it an indictment of the Cong-ress, Sena",:
nk it r~ther,reflected the general atm~sphere, political atmos';\
t;pw:8rrd lnteillgence that was the tradItIOnal approach and I
. Americans are changing that. This act is an example of that
:,sis this committee.
32
Senator MATHIAS. I think you are more generous than I am inclined
to be. I cannot be that permissive. I do not think climate will excuse
what is really a dereliction of duty and if there had not been that
dereliction of duty, perhaps we would not be here today.
The CHAIRMAN. I must say, Senator Mathias, I agree fully. We
have been victimized by excessive secrecy, not only with respect to
failure of Congress in the past to exercise proper surveillance over
intelligence actIvities, but also excessive secrecy has created this kind
of mischief within the executive branch. Here we have a case where
the very methods of secrecy concealed for 5 years an act of insubordinatlon
within the CIA that came to light only by tpe happenstance
that Mr. Colby, the present Director, asked the Agency if they please
would tell him what. has been going on that is wrong. And as a
result, somebody knowing something about this gave him a tip, as a
result of which he then conducted investigations that led to this disclosure.
So I beli~:ve that the internal workings within the Agency
itself are a matter that we tri'ust look at very closely to be sure that
this, kind of thing does not h~ppe~ again,and can be prevented. ExceSSIve
secrecy may have VIctlmIzed thIS Agenl:ly as well as the
Congress.
Our next Senator in line IS ~enatorHart.
Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, can you be absolutely sure that there are not in other
vaults any poisons in this town or in this country or in our possession
in some part of the world ~
Mr. COLBY. I cannot be absolutely sure, no, Senator. We obviously
are conducting such investigations and releasing such orders as possible,
but I cannot be absolutely sure that some officer somewhere has
not sequestered something.
Senator HART of Colorado. Could you concisely as possible
state for the committee your understanding of the practice of
compartmentation?
Mr. COLBY. Well, the compartmentation process is merely the strict
application of the "need-to-know" principle. If an employee in the intelligence
business needs to know something in order to do his job, then
he has a right to the information. But if he does not need to know that
particular information, he does not have a right to the information.
And if the information is one which is required for large numbers of
employees, then large numbers of employees will be allowed to know it.
If the particular activity is a very sensitive matter and only a very
few employees need to know it, then it will be known to only a very
few employees. We make a particular effort to keep the identities of
our sources and some of our more complicated technical systems restricted
very sharply to the people who actually need to work. on
them. And many of the rest of the people in the Agency know nothmg
about them.
Senator HART of Colorado. Does that need-to-know principle apply
in cases of sensitivity to the Director of Central Intelli~ence~
Mr. COLBY. Certainly not. It does not with one exception. I do not
believe I need to know the name of an agent in some foreign country
who is serving us at the risk of his life. I know he is there, I know
what kind of a person he is, but 1 do not need to know his actual name. r have kept that out of my knowled~ because r travel and r do not
---~ ~- 1 ~\,-~ 1"":_.:1 "I- ..l..;..... ll ..+ H,d ;cz thll nnlv A,l'AA. t.ha.t I
33
would apply it to. I am responsible for everything that happens in
the Agency, I need to know everything that happens in the Agency.
Senator HART of Colorado. Based upon this case and other matters
that we have under consideration and past practices in the Agency,
h0W can you, as the Director of Central Intelligence, be absolutely
sure that activities of this kind are not going on within the Agency,
shielded from your knowledge by the practice of compartmentation 1
,Mr. COLBY. I think I have an adequate system today, both in our
program review of what the activities of the Agency are, the decisions
made about resource levels, personnel levels, things of this nature,
devoted to different kinds of projects. I look at results from those
commitments to see whether they are compatible with the kind of funds
eXJileRded on them. I also have an independent Inspector General and
we have most recently increased the size of his staff in response to
t~requirementof the Rockefeller Commission.
We have made certain organizational changes in the Agency to
try to break down the former high degree of compartmentation
which in some cases was not really based upon a need-to-know principle,
but became a little bit identified with the normal bureaucratic
precesses of developing a small wall between different organizations.
This particular office, for instance, was transferred from our operational
directorate to the science and technology directorate.
Senator HART of Colorado. But in the final analysis, there is no
absolutely certain guarantee that incidents of this type might not
oceur in the future.
"'"Mr. COIJBY. There is a guarantee in the sense that the employees are
shown a statement each year and sign it, a set of standards for their
activities, and included in those is our requirement that if they know
of any questionable activities or activities beyond OIA's charter, that
they're instructed to bring it to either me or the Inspector General.
This is a process I have insisted on to my subordinate deputies, that
I be subjected to no surprises; and it is the latest one of these particuI'lliI'
diredives that actually instil!:ated this exposure here, that my subol'dinates
are responsible for bringing to me anything tha.t they find
that is sensitive in any fashion and to keep me advised of any such
matters going on.
As you say, Senator, it is certainly possible that some person somep'l'a,
ce in the world can do an improper thing without my knowledge of
it'beforehand.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Colby, I think your exposure to this
et')mmittee is sufficient to know that none of us wishes to question the
loyalty or patriotism of any of your employees. What we are trying
to ,do, as tlie chairman and Senator Mathias and others have stated,
is to work with you and your colleagues in preventing the kind of
a:bnses and misconduct that has gone on in the past. In that connection,
clln you sugtrest any further guidelines in addition to the statement
t1ioat you made which would gua.rantee that this compa.rtmentation
'0es not prevent the knowledge of the command and control officers in
f:Ere-,Agency of key aotivities ~
'li~Mr. COLBY. Well, I think, as I did say in mv statement, Senator, I
"eli~:ve that intensive external supervision will generate intensive
~rna.l supervision. That is a nonn.al worki~ of bureaucracies and I
fIiriJi that that kind of supervision I welcome from 'both the Executive
34
and the Congress because I think it will keep our intelligence people
absolutely oonfident that they do not do things that they should not.
Senator HART of Colorado. So you do not find the work of this
committee unwelcome?
. Mr. COLBY. No j I do not. As I have said to the chairman~I welcome
the chance to try to describe to the American people what intelligence
is really about today. And it is an opportunity to show how we Americans
have modernized the whole concept of intelligence and I hope
we can do that.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Colby~ one brief line of inquiry in
connection with the case under study. Are you famiUar with a reported
series of so-called vulnerability studies that were conducted probably
sometime in the sixties in connection with this program of toxic
weapons and so forth ~ _.
Mr. COLBY. I think this was a Defe~SeDepartment activity of determining
what possible vulnerabilities our country might have to these
kinds of weaJ>Ons. ...
Senator HART of Colorado. To your kriowledge, were CIA personnel
involved in this ~
Mr. COLBY. CIA was aware of some of them because they were conducted
with Fort Detrick and sometimes there are lessons to be learned
from it that were picked up. .
Senator HART of Colorado. But to your knowledge, your employees
did not participate ~
Mr. COLBY. They reported on the activities to us, but it was my
impression that they did not actually participate in the experiment
itself.
Senator HART of Colorado. And you are familiar with the fact that
one of these experiments was conducted in the Food and Drug Administration
here in Washington ~
Mr. COLBY. I'm aware of a report to that effect j yas~ sir.
Senator HART of Colorado. And you are also--
Mr. COLBY. There were other installations around the country that
we looked at to determine what possible vulnerabilities large mstal·
lations would have.
Senator HART of Colorado. Major urban subway systems and so
forth ~
Mr. COLBY. Yas.
Senator HART of Colorado. Did any of these studies in any way
jeopardize human life and safety ~
Mr. COLBY. Accordin~ to my records, they were not conducted with
hazardous substances. They were simulated rather than real.
Senator HART of Colorado. So~ to your knowledge, no actual jeopardy
occurred to any individual during any of these tests ~
Mr. COLBY. I do not know of any that were in these studies, I do not
know of any. Obviously we did have the J>roblem of the testing of
LSD on unwitting subjects. That would fall within the category of
your question. -
Senator HART of Colorado. I am talking more about the mass-Mr.
COLBY. No, the mass ones, it is my inipression thllit they did
not risk the lives and health of the people involved.
Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you, and as far as you know,
that one study on the subway system was oonducted in New York
City'
35
Mr. COLBY. I have seen a. report to tha.t effect. That is all I know
about tha:t particular program.
Senator HART of Colorado. There was further indica.tion that some
of these toxic elements might have had something to do wi,th th~
destruction of crops in parts of the world. Do you know if that was
ever i~plementedW
Mr. COLBY. I believe it was not. I know it was oonsidered but it was
decided not to do it.
Sena-tor HART of Colorado. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hart. And the Chair now
recognizes Senator Schweiker.
Sena:tor SCHWElKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, you testified in your opening statement tha-t there were
basically 11 grams on the shelf of this toxin, discovered by the CIA
in the storage l'ab in Washin~on. I take note of the fact tha't the
documents the committee has In front of it also indicate that when
the committee, or when ,the CIA took its own inventory in thwt
unsigned memo [exhibit 11] that we were discussing a moment ago,
which was dated February 16, it only refers to 5.2 milligrams, so
there is obvious discrepancy of almost 100 and some percent between
the amount that an internal CIA memo said existed and ,their inventory
from the 'amount that was finally discovered at the CIA' lab,
a discrepancy of a very substantial nft/ture. I wonder if you could
account for that ~
Mr. COLBY. The difference is the amount the CIA had earlier, which
was the 5 milligrams, and then the 11 grams which it collected from
Fort Detrick. That material was moved from Fort Detrick to OIA,
the additional 11 milli~rams, or 11 grams, excuse me.
Senator SCHWElKER. I believe Fort Detrick's inventory only shows
S€lme 5 millig-rams for CIA, and I also believe-I have 'an inventory
list here [exhibit 1], unclassified from ,the Arm.r., when they took
inventory at the same time that the CIA letter [exhIbit 1] was written,
~ebruary 17, 1970, the Army listed on its inventory 2.8 milligrams.
h,the logical question is, did in faot the Army also disobey ,the Presi:
I'lential order, and did it end up at the same lab 1 And I think you can take the question one step further, since 5.2 and 2.8 only account
ftJr ,8 milligrams, did some other person generously cooperate in
s»pplying 'an inventory of 3 milligrams, or 3 grams, as opposed to
nw.'1liB'rams 1 How do we explain this rather obvious discrepancy,
llart;lcularly when there was 2.8 grams-I should have said 2,800 milli~
Ilims, 2.8 grams, in this regard ~
:,l,~r. COLBY. If I may, Senator, consulH
'Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes, sure. You are entitled to that.
J,~. COLBY. Senator, we do not know where those other 5 grams
~e~ from.
:,1, Jenator SCHWEIKER. I think it is important for the record to show
Mr. Colby, and I appreciate your frank answer that the CIA
tory at Fort Detrick showed very clearly there were only 5.2
. The Army inventory Bit Fort Detrick, In the same period of
showed that Army had 2.8 grams. There isa pretty obvious
'cation here that somebody at the Army decided they were going
p their supply up to CIA.
~eep.18B.
36
What concerns me more is, we are still unaccountable for 3 grams,
and do we, in faot, have three agencies deciding to circumvent·a
Presidenti'al order: The CIA, the Army, and some unknown supplier.
I think tha·t iaa very serious question, and I would hope that we
would pursue it.
Do we know who authorized the Fort Detrick, CIA to take away
that supply ~ Certainly someone from the Army would,Jmve had to
authorize the removal of that supply.
Mr. COLBY. We have no record of it, Sen8ltor.
Senator SCHWEIKER. We do not know that, so we could not possibly
know, then, if the 2.8 grams was also shipped out at that time.
Also, do I understand correctly, Mr. Colby, that in' order to'locate
this-and I want to make clear that it was a CIA discovery, I think
that is a significant point, and a fair point to make-but do I understand
that in discovering this materIal, that they had a code name
for this material that was not presently available to you as Direotod
Mr. COLBY. There was a code name fOl'this particular activity, and
the code name wa.<; recorded, but I did not know it. It came to the
memory of one of our officers. One of the problems we have is that
frequently, on sensitive ,aotivities, we do not use the real names of the
activ1ties. We use these oode names, land the code names become a
form of second language. I'm sure the code name was available to me,
if I had asked specifically about this particular code name.
Sen8lt.or SCHWEIKER. Does not the Director have, really, somewhere
in his command, a roster or a master index of what the ongoing code
names mean, and how relevant they are? How could you exercise any
cOIIUnand and control ~
Mr. COLBY. This is an old code name. We obviously do have a lisring
from which the code names are chosen for particular activities,
and I oould have found out about this if I 'had 'had the tip. All I
needed here was the tip, and we had the tip, and then that led us to
the whole story, to the extent that we have records.
SenaJtor SCHWEIKER. Does this not also suggest the possibility that
the code name information was in those destroyed records? It seems
to me that is a pretty relevant question about why the Director, even
though he didn't know the code name, did not have access to the code
name immediately. It seems to me that it would very likely be that
that access or informational sheet might well have been destroyed too.
Do we know ·that?
Mr. CoLBY. The code names are obviously kept in different centers
within the Agoency, and it is a matter of going througoh the different
centers and selecting which ones to ask for for the particular information,
and what the code names are.
Now, there is a procedure by which we can find out what one of
these code names refers to, or alternatively, to find the code name
applied to a certain activity.
Senator SCHWFJIKF1R. A project that would kill many thousands of
people-I would think it would be somewhere immediately at hand,
in the Director's drawer, to know what had or had not happened.
Mr. COLBY. WeH, this was a project t1l.at had been closed out () years
ago, and the matter had been terminated, and the records were in om
reoords center.
37
Senator SCHWEIltER. Now, on this same inventory list, again, that
the CIA discovered, is another toxin, a fish toxin, and we inventoried
t.hat at 3 cubic centimeters, and only 1 milligram of this material
ap~arentlv is a lethal dose, indicating It is almost as lethal, at least
weIght-wiSe, as the shellfish toxin. Why was this also overlooked, and
why wasn't the fish toxin destroyed ~
Mr. COLBY. Well, the fact here was that the various materials here
were nat destroyed. I believe there is a technical argument about
whether the shellfish toxin is the only one that is directly covered
by the President's order. But obviously, we do not have a need for
the other kinds of toxins, beyond the research into the possibly
defensive uses."
Senator SCHWEIltER. Well, the President's order, Mr. Colby, is very
clear and specific. It said'l'esearch for defensive purposes only. To
y<1Ur knowledge, has any"research for defensive purposes been going
on with the fish toxin at CIA, or at any other laboratory ~
Mr. COLBY. No, Sena.tor. This was put on this shelf, 'and just left
there. It became an old storeroom, and the material was up there and
forgotten.
Senaltor SCHWElKER. Mr. Colby, you said earlier, if I recall your
testimony, that at one point in your career, coming from the covert
side, that you had been approached by n technical person about possible
use of this substance, and you had turned it down 1
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
Senator SCHwEmER. Whv did you turn it down?
Mr. COLBY. Because I did not think it was a good idea. I do not
believe in that kind of activity.
Senator SCH\VEIKER. I gather, then, from that statement that there
was no policy, or no dirootive, or no written document indicating that
whoever approached you was operating out of the framework of a
policy of the Agency. Is that not a fair assumption?
Mr. COLBY. I just never got to tha.t question. As far as I was concerned
the thought was put, and I turned it. down.
Sen8ltor SCHWEmER. And I think the obvious question is, what if
the same Technical Service person approached somebody who did not
have your judgement, cODSClence, and standards, and decided that he
would accept it? What would have happened then?
Mr. CO~Y. Well, today, he would run into very specific directives
on that pomt.
Sena.ror SCHWEIKER. Yes; and I commend you for that.
Finally, I would like to ask a question as far as this memorandum
[exhibit 1 1
] is concerned. The memorandum that said they wanted to
transfer this poison, or toxin-poisons--to a location in Baltimore is
unsigned. Is this the original or the carbon that the CIA found?
Mr. COLBY. It is apparently the carbon.
Senator SCHWEIKER. So, as a matter of speculation, one could speculate
that the original memorandum, which has never been found, could
well have been signed and could have been destroyed.
Mr. COLBY. Normally not. I think the evidence here-there is no
typed date on it, and there is no mark that the original had been
signed. This is a normal procedure in our machinery that this would
be so indicated.
1 See p. 189.
38
SenatorSCHWEIKER. Is it not abnormal that the carbon turns up,
and not the original? It seems to me if Agency records were not
destroyed and kept, the first thing would be the original draft or the
memo, and not the carbon.
Mr. COLBY. Well, I think the fact that there is an indication that it
was not signed made it a bit of a nondocument. Someone may have
destroyed the original, since it had,,1lot been signed, and was not really
a document in that sense.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Of course all we know is the carbon was not
signed.
Mr. COLBY. Yes; that's right, but as I say, the indications-Senator
SCHWEIKER. We do not know the original was not signed.
Mr. COLBY. The indications are that the original was not signed. I
think the originator is going to be one of your witnesses, and I think:
you could perhaps get better clarificat.ion of thatdeto,il there.
Senator SCHWEIKER, That is all the questions I hQ.;ve, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Schweiker.
Mr. Colby, going back to the document [exhibit I'] that Senator
Schweiker has been questioning you about. It purports to be a document
that carries the name, though not the signature, of Thomas H.
Karamessines, who was Deputy Director for Plans in the CIA, and
it purports to have been prepared for the Director himself.
Now, calling your attention to paragraph 5, where the Director is
given, in effect, an 'Option not to comply with the President's order,
it reads, "If the Director wishes to continue this special capability"
which the President had ordered destroyed, "it is recommended that
if the above DOD decision is made, the existing Agency stockpile at
SO Division, Fort Detrick be transferred to the Huntingdoh Research
Center, Beeton-Dickinson> Co., Baltimore, Md. Arrangements
have been made for this contingency and assurances have been given
by the potential contractor to store and maintain the Agency's stock,
pile at a cost no greater than $75,000 per annum." Well, that is a pretty
hefty storage cost, but what- is really being suggest$d there is that the
President's order be circumvented by taking the ma.terial out of the
CIA laboratories and storing it with a private firm. Is that not correct?
Mr. COLBY. Out of Fort Detrick?
The CHAffiMAN.-Out of Fort Detrick.
Mr. COLBY. And stored at a private firm, which is capable of maintaining
it according to the proper standards that you would expect
to handle this. But I do not thmk there is a concealment from CIA
involved in that process. The contracting for the storage of the material
in a private firm would not necessarily conceal it from CIA,
because some records--
The CHAffiMAN. No; but the option was being suggested to the Director
of the CIA that the President's order be circumven.ted by storing
these forbidden toxins at a private firm. Is that not correct?
Mr. COLBY. That somehow the President's directive not be complied
with, as respect' to these toxins, for whatever reason the originator
might have thoug-ht may be possible. Obviously one of them is a violation
of the President's order, but also possible is that some permission--
The CHAIRMAN. It is obvious that the shellfish toxin represents a
violation of the President's order 1 What about the cobra venom W
J See p, 189.
39
Mr. COLBY. Some of their others are also included, and I believe
there is a technical argument about which one8 are and which ones
are not. In effect, they are.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am informed that 11 grams of shellfish
toxin-on the surface, it seems to be a small quantity-actually represents
about a third of the total amount ever produced in the world.
We have already covered the number of peoIlle that could be killed
through the application of such quantities. What I would like to get
at is this: The President declares it to be the national policy of the
United States not to engage in the development of toxins of this kind.
The President ~ouncesto the world, as a unilateral initiative, which
was widely publicized as an indicator of our peaceful intentions,
that we would, indeed, destroy such substances, and that we would
become part of an international convention to this end. Now, that is
rather a major statement of policy, broadcast to the world, and the
good faith of the President of the United States and of the Government
of the United States is thus on the line. Would you not agree 1
Mr. COLBY. I agree.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, we find out 5 years later that the Presidential
orders were not, in fact, carried out. Why in a matter of this kind was
no written order given to destroy these toxins, in compliance with
the President's directive 1
Mr. COLBY. I do not know, Mr. Chairman. I think that it is quite
obvious that the suggestion was made that they not be destroyed.
There is an indication that it was not accepted. The President's directive
was obviously passed down and made known to the people who
had this facility, and the degree to which a specific order IS required,
Ido not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Why, in a matter of this importance, if no writ~
ten order were used, why did not the Agency follow up in some way to
determine whether or not the President's order had been obeyed ~
Mr. COLBY. I think the assumption was that the material was at
Detrick1 and that it would be destroyed up there. The request was sent
to DetrIck to destroy the material there. The individual left out the
material--.
The CHAIRMAN. But no effort was made to obtain a count, no check
'Was made to see whether or not the material had, in fact, been
destroyed W
Mr. COLBY. Apparently not, sir.
The CHAIBMAN. Do you not think that is an exceedingly loose way
tQ"run an agency, particularly the CIA W
.",Mr. COLBY. Well, we are going to try to run it tighter.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you have said that in your opinion the manufl\.
Pture of these poisons and delivery devices, as you call them, was
Qriginally authorized by the law. I would like to ask a question or two
It'~out that. The statute in the National Security Act that gives the
CIA its basic power sets out the various duties of the Agency and
iJ;i..a well-known catchall provision, which is subsection 5 of sectiop n .of the act-that catchall provision reads, "to perform such other
functions and duties related tl> intelligenceaffectmg the national se(\
u,rit~, as the National Security Council may, from time to time,
~." .
:,.<~o~" .fir~t of al.l, ,Poisons do n~t normally fall. under the category
g,l'mtelhgence, as It IS generally understood. That IS to say, the gatheraur
of infOl·mll.t,;on. WOllIn VOll 1l.P'J'P.P. wit.h tha.t W
40
Mr. COLBY. Yes. Except to the degree-the tradition of the L-pill,
and things of that nature.
The CHAIRMAN. Except as they might be used purely defensively ¥
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And so that the offensive use of poisons would fall
within the category that we generally refer to as covert operations?
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And based upon &11 of the testimony and documents
that this committee has received thus far, the CIA bases its authority
to conduct covert operations on this provision of the law *
Mr. COLBY. Correct.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. I will reread this provision of the law:
"to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security, as the National Security Council may,
from time to time, direct." My question is, did the National Security
Council direct the CIA to develop these quantities of poison ~
Mr. COLBY. No; but the N'ational Security Council certainly expects
the CIA to be prepared to conduct paramilitary operntions traditionally
associated with the covert action area, and in the process of
preparing for those kinds of operations, the CIA has developed different
weapons, has maintained different stocks of weapons, and I
think that this incident came from the thoug-ht process that is represented
by the development of that capability for the possibility of such
covert operations.
The CHAIRMAN. But Mr. Colby, you have already testified that
poisons in this quantity exceeded any use that the CIA might conte-
mplaJ..e or properly pursue in connection with its covert operations.
Mr. COLBY. In this quantity, yes, Mr. Chairman. But th~ idea of
developing it-
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and my question is, since these poisons were
developed in such quantities, and since the National Security Council
gave you no directive to do so, is it not questionable that the CIA
was really authorized to develop such quantities of poisons1
Mr. COLBY. I think, Mr. Chainnan, we have to get back to what this
related to. It w'as a joint effort between the Army and ourselves about
a weapons system, biological and chemical warfare, that were acceptable
and accepted up until the time of the President's directives.
Therefore, these were weapons which were in the national arsenal, if
you will.
Now, I think the ide<a of the CIA being interested in these weapons
for possible intelligence related activities is appropriate under that
provision. However, I agree with you that the quantities were exces·
sive.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senllt,.br Tower has some further questions.
I
Senator TOWER. We have spoken rather extensively here about
appa,rent lac]t of clear lines of contr I and authority running downward
and of clear lines of responsibi ity and accountability running
upward.
To the best of your knowled~e, has here been any pervasive noncompliance
in the" matter of orders, dir tives from the President, or
orders from the DCI on the part of subo inates ~ In other words, has
this reached a grea.ter proportion tha.n mi ht even hd.ve been revealed
41
here, as a result of our discovery of a very significant instance of in·
subordination ~
If, indeed, it has boon pervasive, is there not a need for much tighter
controls at the top ~ .
Mr. COLBY. Senator Tower, I believe that we are really-we have
in CIA a very tight discipline. I'm not saying it is total, obviously.
It did not work in this case. I think with people scattered around the
world doing very sensitive work and highly compartmented work,
there has been, indeed, a very high sense of discipline in the organization
and a high sense of compliance to the regulations and the rules
and the directives of the organization. And I think that the leadership
of the organization hali,oalways felt very much subject to direct Presidential
control and responsive to it.
Senator TOWER. So you would say, actually, that this instance is an
exception to the rule? Ordinarily, the discipline has b€en good, that
the control has worked, and the accountability has worked in the way
it should, according to the proper tenets of good administration?
Mr. COLBY. In the business which we are in, intelligence and covert
operations, I think there have been very few cases in which the Agency
or its employees has done something they should not have. And in
many of the cases which we now question, we find that those activities
were approved by the appropriate authorities at that time. The sense
of diSCIpline within the organization seems to be quite tight.
Senator TOWER. In the absence of a written order, would a subordinate
regard a verbal order as less serious or less emphatic than a
written order, or would he regard it just as seriously?
Is it the custom in the Agency to give verbal orders on extremely
sensitive matters, where you perhaps may not want something reduced
to writing~
Mr. COLBY. Well, I think the effectiveness of an oral order is exactly
what a written order is, that the individual is supposed to comply with
it. It is clear that in the past there was a time in which various subjects
were not written down. The committee has been into one of these, and
we now have another one, where very little was actually written down
be'Cause of the belief of high sensitivity of the activity.
Senator TOWER. Now, isn't the Agency expected to maintain the
competence to perform any operation mandated by the President or the
NatIonal Security Council ~
Mr. COLBY. Any operation within the law.
Senator TOWER. Any operation within the law. So in this connee.,
tion, would specific NSC approval or knowledge be required from the
standpoint of experimentation on weapons?
Mr. COLBY. On the experimentation, I would say no.. I would say
that, if there is an accepted national weapons system, that the intelligence
agency can look at it to see if it has intelligence applications,
possible applications.
As to the use of such a weapon, either this or another weapons systf;
m, then I think it falls clearly within the provision of the memo\
I:&ndum which covers covert operations, which says that I am required
t~}rMeive the approval for anything major or politically sensitive-and
Pit~~k certainly this would fall into the category of politically
senSItive.
Senator ToWER. Thank you, Mr. Colby. No further questions.
42
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senlt'tor Tower. Sena.tor Mondale'
Senator MONDALll. Thank you very much.
I was wondering if I might ask a few questions of Mr. Stevens.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stevens, would you come to the witness table,
please' Just pull your chair up.
Senator MONDALE. Mr. Stevens, as I understand it, you were ordered
by the Director to conduct a study of the matter before the committee
today, namely, the treatment and destruction of toxic ma.terials.
Mr. STEVENS. That is correct.
Senator MONDALE. How long did that study take 1
Mr. STEVENS. Well, it has continued from late April until, essentially,
the present time.
Senator MONDALE. You were charged to make a thorough study, and
that is what you believe you did 1
Mr. STEVENS. A thorough study, within some very important limitations.
We investigated the matter to the extent that we wanted to
really establish that it was an area that deserved further review, that
it was an area apt to be questioned, and so on. But it was not a thorough
investigation in the sense that the committee, for example, would
conduct.
Mr. COLBY. One thing, for instance, is this rule against interviewing
extensively former employees, although in this case we did make contact
with one to find something about it.
Senator MONDALE. In other words, one way in which it was inadequate
is that former employees were not interv'iewed ~
Mr. STEVENS. Several former employees were interviewed, but only
at their volition, and they were under no compulsion to go into
anything.
Senator MONDALE. Did you interview Gottlieb, Gordon,
Karamessines 1
Mr. STEVENS. I interviewed Dr. Gordon.
Senator MONDALE. Karamessines 1
Mr. STEVENS. No, sir.
Senator MONDALE. Is there any doubt in your mind that the top
leadership in the CIA was aware of the President's order to destroy
these tOXInS 1
Mr. 'STEVENS. No; I think there is clear evidence tl1a,t they were
aware.
Senator MONDALE. That they understood that. Is there any doubt
that the persons in the department dealing with these toxins, Mr. Gordon,
Dr. Gottlieb, and so on, also were aware of the Presidential order
directing the destruction of these toxins 1
Mr. STEVENS. They were aware of them.
Senator MONDALE. So there is no question of knowledge here' Then,
if they knew the President had ordered the destruction of these toxins.
yet the toxins were not destroyed, what happened 1
Mr. STEVENS. Well, I think that the question as to what must be done
with the Agency stockpile, how it was to be destroyed and so on, was
addressed. And I think that the memorandum that you have referred
to earlier is the representation of that question being raised. Quite
apart from that, the shellfish toxin was brought back on the part of an
individual decision.
43
Senator MONDALE. Yes. But there was no question, as I gather from
your response, that anybody in command, from the top to the bottom,
was in doubt about the Presidential order directing the destruction of
toxin. Your answer to that was, yes, there was no doubt. Yet they were
not destroyed.
What happened? Let me ask you about the three options I can think
of: (1), somebody deliberately disregarded an order of the President;
(2), negligence or inadvertence;' (3), a back-channel order that does
not show up anywhere, in which higher: authority said something else
privately to these officials, which was different from the official public
order.
Which of these possibilities, or another if you can think of it, is the
likely explanation for what was obviously a policy which was different
from that recommended or ordered by the President?
Mr. STEVENS. I think, really, ,none of those. I think what happened
was, the instructions were given that the material that was held for the
Agency at Fort Detrick, that that be destroyed. Before that was done,
some of the shellfish toxin was returned or brought to the CIA and
stored there. That was done, I think, by people who were completely
enmeshed with the technical aspects of the problem, and were so impressed
with the value, the difficulty of extracting that stuff, and so on,
they simply could not bear to have it destroyed.
Senator MONDALE. So what you are saying is that, though the President
ordered its destruction, people lower in the Agency felt it was of
such value that they did not do it?
Mr. STEVENS. That is apparently the ca8e.
Senator MONDALE. So that they deliberately disobeyed a Presidential
order?
Mr. STEVENS. And apparently disobeyed orders within the Agency.
Senator MONDALE. So that, in your judgment, based upon your
study, there was a decision at a low level to disobey higher orders?
Mr. STEVENS. So far as I could see, that was about it.
Senator MONDALE. Was there any evidence of back-channel orders
that was different from the public order?
Mr. STEVENS. I have no evidence whatsoever that that was the case.
Senator MONDALE. Maybe the Director would like to respond to these
questions, too.
Mr. COLBY. No. I accept fully Dr. Stevens' answers, and I think that
it is quite clear that there was a decision not to destroy it, and various
people knew it.
Senator MONDALE. We are not arguing that the President has the
duty to find out who had this, and call him personally and plead with
'him, or anything like that. This was an order that was known, and
someone decided to disregard it.
M'r.CoLBY. No doubt about its application, I think, or the order. I
do not think that not only that there is no indication of any back chan"
nel advice not to do it, and don't say anything about it. I think there is
~:Dindication in our interviews that no such thinp: occurred, because I
'SfJ.:spect we would have heard about it in the interviews with Dr.
Gordon, for example.
ISenator MONDALE. Would you say that the proposed memorandum
P}J'M'OO by Dr. Gordon clearly shows that he understood the seriousSl'eSSi'of
this matter9
44
Mr. COLBY. I think it clearly indicates that some decision had to be
made as to whether to destroy the material in compliance with the
President's orders, or not to destroy it, either in violation of the Presi·
dent's order or under some other justification not expressed.
Senator MONDALE. But it is clear in that memo he understood that
the President ordered its destruction, and these toxins were included.
Mr. STEVENS. Yes; I think so.
Senator MONDALE. And he went on further to suggest that they therefore
be transferred to another private warehouse, but at public expense.
So I think it is quite clear-.from that memo that he knew the
seriousness of what he was doing.-
This, in my opinion, is the pomt, Mr. Chairman. I very much believe
we need a strong CIA, and we need a strong intelligence capability.
There is no doubt about it.- I think it has to operate in secret. But
.what bothers me, based on this evidence-the evidence we have had in
other hearings-is this whole issue, not of secrecy, I grant that,
but of accountability, this difficulty of finding out what happened,
and this gnawing fear that I have that thmgs are occurring in
deliberate contravention and disregard of official orders.
That is what bothers me,and I know it bothers you, Mr. Director.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, in that connection, would you inquireif
you do not, I will-would you inquire whether any of those who
failed to obey the President's order are still with the Agency ~ The
Agency has made a careful investigation on its own.
All right, I will put the question. Are any of them still with the
Agency~
Mr. COLBY. Apparently, yes. At least one still is.
The CHAIRMAN. What disciplinary action has been taken ~
Mr. COLBY. I have not yet taken any. I have that under advisement
right now, and I am coming to a decision.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you be sure to report to the committee what
action the Agency takes ~
Mr. COLBY. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. If it is determined that this individual willfully
disobeyed the President's order.
Mr. COLBY. Whatever action I take, I will report.
The CHAIRMAN. Sometimes such people get promoted in our
bureaucracy, and we will be interested in knowing what action is taken
in this case.
Mr. CoLBY. Certainly.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator Mathias.
Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, in response to Senator Mondale just a minute ag?, you
said that your investigation had indicated that there was no eVIdence
of any back-channel order in violation of the Presidential command;
is that not right ~
Mr. COLBY. Right. .
Senator MATHIAS. Is it not more than that; did you not find e.Vlde~ce
that the official order had been to comply WIth the PreSIdentIal
directive ~
Mr. COLBY. Yes. There is indication that the instruction was to
have material destroyed at Fort Detrick. There was a gap there as
to what was to be destroyed at Fort Detrick, and as to what was
45
physically in the CIA, and that gap was not covered by a specific
directive. But also, there is no indication that that gap was covered
by any back-channel arrangements.
Senator MATHIAS. I think it is important that the record show that
you answer affirmatively if t.hat is the case, that there was a good
faith attempt to comply with the Presidential order, if that was your
understandmg.
Mr. COLBY. I think there was by the Agency itself; yes.
Senator MATHIAS. No.w, the chairman has raised the question about
the volume, the aPlount and quo.lity of shellfish toxin. As I understand
it, this was D..pt--it seems a prosaic phrase to use for it but it
was not an operational supply.
Mr. COLBY. I think it was beyond that quantity, it appears, from
what you can see.
Senator MATHIA~. Well, let us establish this in the first place. Fort
Detrick was the national biological warfare center ~
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
Senator MATHIAS. And CIA had a continuing- relationship at Fort
Detrick which, in fact, supported the SOD division at Detrick. Is
that not true ~
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
Senator MATHIAS. And that this was the facility in which experiments
were carried out, in which research was done ~
Mr. COLBY. Yes. It was not solely supported by CIA. It was also
supported by the Army.
Senator MATHIAS. ButCIA was one of the principal customers ?
._ Mr. COLBY. Principal participants, yes. It wasn't the principal,
l)utit was a substantial customer.
Senator MATHIAS. It was a principal customed All right.
Now, when the idea of the shellfish toxin arose, you just do not
go to the Boston Cookbook and look up how to make it; is that not
true~
Mr. COLBY. No j you do not.
Senator MATHIAS. You have to find out, and that was the job of the
SOD division.
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
~8enator MATHIAS. And it was a costly, time-consuming process.
,Mr. COLBY. Yes, and a very difficult one, I guess. . .
Senator MATHIAS. And one that prdbably no one could predIct the
v.olumes which would be produced by a given mass of shellfish.
Mr. COLBY. Well, I'm not sure of that. I think that after we found
ol:}tenough about it, we could probably predict at some point where
nut-quantities would result from a certain quantity of shellfish.
Mr. STEVENS. Production capability, as I understand it, was develoJlM
by Fort Detrick. It was produced.
(Mr. COLBY. Some of this was of course produced by other Government
agencies as well.
..... Senator MATHIAS. Fort Detrick was not normally a production
fp;.c.ili-'ty, though, was it?
Mr. COLBY. No. I think this particular materio.l-it is indicated it
!4ioO)me from elsewhere. It was actually produced somewhere else.
"~nator MATHIAS; Which was a normal procedure.
~E. COLBY. Which was, in other words46
Senator MATHIAS. After the techniques were developed at Fort
Detrick~
Mr. COLBY. Fort Detrick contracted for the production of this
quantity.
Senator MATHIAS. Well, could '"that explain the discrepancy raised
by Senator Schweiker, the fact that Detrick had a ~ertain amount of
toxin on hand as a result of experimenta.tion, and that production was
then implemented, as in the case of other biological agents ~
Mr. COLBY. Well, I think here the inventories indicate that Fort
Detrick had a certain quantity available, but we ended up with considerably
more. It may have been that there was more derived from elsewhere
to make up the total that we finally found. .
Senator MATHIAS. Thank you.
The CHAmMAN. Senator Huddleston 1
Senator HUDDLESTON. I just have one question. It has been suggested
that one of the reasons for retaining this quantity of toxin was because
of its value and its potential research value. During the 5-year period
it was stored, is there any evidence that any request from any source,
either outside of the Agency or within the Agency, that it be used in
any way for experimentation?
Mr. COLBY. No. No, there was none. It was just put away on the shelf,
or in the freezer, and eventually was found. There was no indication
of any consideration for any purposes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Whoever was so interested in it as a potential
research tool promptly forgot it, or made no suggestion it be used for
that purpose ~
Mr. COLBY. Yes, although I did say I have a request now from a
quite proper research interest not to destroy it, but to make it availa15le
to medical research.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But that has come since the public revelation
of its existence?
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you.
The CHAffiMAN. Senator Schweiker?
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, there was a news account, when Gary Powers was shot
down, the silver dollar that contained this drill wit.h the shellfish toxin
on it was opened by the Russians immediately, and was tested on a dog,
and the dog died in 10 seconds. Is that correct; ?
Mr. COLBY. I have heard that account. I cannot testify to that
specifically. I just do not know. Gary Powers might know. It is my
impression that he separated the pin from the silver dollar and threw
the silver dollar away on his way down, hoping to keep the pin as a less
obvious device, and then was captured with the pin on his person.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I understand one of your people did verify
that account. I realize you may not know.
Mr. COLBY. Then I accept that. The shellfish toxin is very'
quick-acting. -
Senator SCHWEIKER. That would not be inconsistent with the lethal
effect of the shellfish toxin?
Mr. COLBY. It's certainlv possible, yes.
Senator SCHWEIKER. The second is that the materials that were in
the vault in the storage facility in Washington, I believe some 15
47
people had access to that vault during this period of time. Is that
correct 9 .
Mr. COLBY. Over the years, with the changes in personnel, I think
that is a fair total.
Senator SOHWEIKER. Would that not strike you, being as compartmentalized
as you are, and limiting things to two and three peopleand
sometimes one, as we have seen in the case of that unsigned memorandum-
would that not be an excassively large number to have access
to those deadly toxins 9
Mr. COLBY. I do not think it was 15 at anyone time. These reflected
replacements and so forth, as I recall, and It is just adding up everybody
who had access to)tover that time, including the secretary, who
had the combination to the vault and things like that. No, it is not an
excessive number for a highly compartmented thing, because you
qo need that many people to be involved in a particular activity. Sometimes,
you have to have thousands involved in a highly compartmented
activity.
Senator SCHWElKER. Would you have some kind of fail-safe mechanism
to make sure that one person could not just go on his own and do
it ~ It seems to me you would have to have some check and balance.here.
Mr. COLBY. Well, in this case.--
Senator SCHWEIKER. Just like the person that came 'to you and offered
the opportunity for you to use it.
Mr. COLBY. Well, I think in this case, the material was in a locked
vault, a safe with a combination lock, three-numbered combination
lock. The combination was known to only specific people. It was controlled,
in a guarded building. It was quite a safe situation, except
from those people who had access to it. Now there, you depend then
on the discipline of the people involved, and as you know in this case,
it did break down at one point.
Senator SOHWEIKER. Mr. Chairman, I just had a point. I do not
know if this is the time to raise it, but I think we should at some point
inquire from the Army as to whether they can account for the 6 grams
of unknown toxin.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree, Senator, and we will do that. And I think,
in connection with your question, it ought to be observed that after
Mr. Colby and the present mana~ement of the CIA discovered these
poisons in the laboratory, that a 24-hour special guard was placed on
them, which would indicate that previous security arrangements were
not thought to be sufficient. And I think th8,t speaks for itself.
Senator Morgan ~ .
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Colby, we have referred to Presidents' orders
to destroy these stockpiles. The only two orders that I have before me
simply renounce the use of the toxins, a,nd also direct the Secretary of
Defense to make recommendations about the disposal of existing stocks.
Did the Secretary of Defense ever make· such recommendations ~
Mr. COLBY. I do not know the answer to that. I believe the point that
the directive refers to is that the United States will renounce the production
or the stockpiling-and we are 8, part of the United States, as
fai' as I am concerned.
Senator MORGAN. And the next paragTaph says, the Secretary of
Delanse will submit recommendations. And my question is that this
48
would break down the claim of authority, it seems. Did he ever make
any recommendations ~
Mr. COLBY. Well, obviously, Fort Dietrick was under instructions to
destroy the toxins it had.
Senator MORGAN. Have you seen any recommendations from the
Secretary of Defense 1 .
Mr. COLBY. I have not seen them.
Senator MORGAN. Do you have any in your files' .
Mr. COLBY. We may, and I will certainly make a search for them
and see if I can find them.
Senator MORGAN. Thankyou.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart ~
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Colby, you stated in your opening
statement that your awareness of the existence of these materials came
after I think what you referred to as repeated directives. Would y~u
describe for the committee what kind of difficulty you encountered III
finding out about these toxins yourself ~
Mr. COLBY. Well, after we had the suggestion that there was an area
that needed to be looked at that was a questionable area, then Dr.
Stevens began to look for it. And eventually it was discovered. He did
not run into any attempt to conceal or hIde at that point, after he
began to ask the right questions. The difficulty was that, for a couple
of years, starting WIth Dr. Schlesinger's instruction, and then repeated
additional ones, to inform the management of anything questionahle,
and individual items would keep coming to someone's mind. Then we
could follow them up and find the details.
Senator HART of Colorado. What if you did not ask the right questions?
Mr. COLBY. If you do not ask the right questions, you have to depend
upon a rec?rd search. And sometimes, this then gets into the diffic';llty
of the avaIlable records and the ctyptonyms, and that sort of thmg.
That has been a problem. It is a problem we are going to have to
resolve.
Senator HART of Colorado. Dr. Stevens, it is my understanding.,
based upon Mr. Duckett's testimony, that in your efforts to piece all
of this together, you inquired of people in the Agency who should have
known about this who discounted in 1963 the Inspector General's report
about the existence of this capability, and said that it was not
really as serious as that report might have indicated. Is that, in fact,
wha't happened the first ~o-round~
Mr. STEVENS. Generally, yes. I think they were not being untruthful,
but they put emphasis on aspects of the program that were not really
pertinent, and I think that's really the reason why I failed to follow
up on that with more vigor at that time.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Director, you are satisfied that as
you pursued the other questions that I asked, that you found out all
of the so-called questionable activities ~ That is, you.have asked all of
the right questions?
Mr. COLBY. No, I cannot say for absolutely certain. We are still asking
the same questions to all of our people, and will continue to do so
frequently. And of course, an incident like this then reiterates the
~ecess~ty of getting our peopl~ to come forward. We are dealing sometimes
ll1 an area where there IS nobody currently in the Agency who
49
knows anything about it, and we are dealing with people who left the
Agency, and we do not have access to them.
Senator HART of Colorado. One final question ill regard to vulnerability
studies that we discussed earlier. I believe you testified that
these experiments or studies were conducted purely for defensive purposes.
To your knowledg-e, was there any indication or any thoug1lt in
the,minds of those conducting the studies that we would make them
~p~rationalor offensive at some time ~
.1>;.•• CeLBY. I think th.8,vulnerability studies conducted by the De.
ment of Defense were oasically defensive in their thought process.
'k the intelligence people were observing -them and watching
•lam not sure that they had a totally defensive approach toward
. ossibility of clandestine implementation of some such idea some
Mnder some circumstances which might warrant it.
ator HART of Colorado. I think in the memorandum of Octo,1967
[exhibit 6 1], identified as MKNAOMI, clearly states that
ipated future use of some of these capabilities were certainly
dad to be offensive.
• COLBY. We are talking about a weapons system that the United
€IS was developing, and potential applications for it, and through
a1' military force or through secret methods and during times
f,and some such thing.
ator HART of Colorado. So it was not purely defensive 1
• COLBY. No, I do not think it was purely defensive. I think parrly
the intelligence people who were observing it were thinking
ssible positive applications when appropriate.
ator HART of Colorado. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
he CHAffiMAN. Senator Mondale has one final question, and Senator
~hias has a final question.
..Gator MONDALE. Mr. Colby, we have a photogra-ph, which I think
;have seen. of the containers in which the shellfish toxin was found.
t'he top of each of these gallon cans iSIl la:bel which says, "Dry
scla Poisons"; 'and it says, "Do not use unless direct.ed by P600."
the second can, in large handwritten fiber pen letters, it says
(.}O."
you tell me who or what P600 is ~
r. COLBY. I am afraid I cannot 'a,t the moment, Senator. Really,
rEI trying to find out, but we do not know.
nator MONDALE. Mr. Stevens, you conducted a study for several
ths 'as to what the chain of command 'and other responsibilities
Did you look into this question ahout who P600 is1
. STEVENS. Yes, sir,and we have been unable to find out what
refers to.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not know 1
Senator MONDALE. You cannot find out who P600 was 1
'r. STEVENS. My impression is that it is a designation used at Fort
rick. No one at the Agency is aware of what that refers to, no one
whom I have talked.
~:Senator MONDALE. Did you check with Fort Detrick to see what
~600 meant~
~_<•• ·Mr. STEVENS. NO,sir,rwe didn't.
11.!"lL,The CHAIRMAN. I think this committee should follow up on that
,!!{:ueetion and see if we can get some information.
I Seep. 2Of.
50
Senator MONDALE. Oan you find out who or what P600 is for us ~
Mr. STEVENS. We will endeavor to do it, but the Defense Department
is in a much better position to talk to fonner Fort Detrick people
than we are.
The CHAIRMAN. We can talk to the Defense Department, I think,
and these photographs, of course, will 'be made public as part of the
public hearing today, and now Senator Mathias has the final question.
Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, your last st;atement just suggests
one other very brief question. So we do not mislead anybody, could
you tell us in terms of some simple measure, how much of this toxic
subst'ance was involved in teaspoons or tablespoon,s, for eXjtffiple.
Mr. COLBY. Well, 'a:bouta half an ounce is what the total is of the
11 grams. "I
Senator MATHIAS. It would be 'a couple of ,tli:blespoons ~
Mr. COLBY. A couple of teaspoons, prohatbly,a couple of teaspoons.
Mr. STEVENS. A couple of teaspoons of sugar would constitute about
the same.
Senator MATHIAS. About 2 teaspoons of sugar because these pictures
would indicate something much more, because of the bulk of the
containers.
Mr. COLBY. Well, each of those bottles is about 4 inches high and,
of course, the substance is at the bottom. There's a very small amount
of the substance at the bottom of each of these bottles.
Senator MATHIAS. We are dealing with such a highly lethal substance
that 2 tablespoons is really what is involved here.
Mr. CoLBY. Yes; but it is highly potent.
Senator MATHIAS. Now, what I really began to ask, Mr. Chairman,
is this. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense established
very, very elaborate procedures for destruction of roxie materialsat
Fort D~trick,so elaborate, in fact, that they were considered
redundant by many scientists. Having destroyed 'all of the ragents
once, they went back and did it three or four more times, and much of
thi~ was done publicly. to impress both the 4'merican people and other
natIOns that we had, m fact, renounced thIS form of 'Warfare.
Did you have any such procedures within CIA or, first of :all, were
you aware of the Department of Defense procedures ?
Mr. COLBY. Well, most of our material is at Fort Detrick, so all the
material except for what was pulled away from it, was destroyed up
there.
Senator MATHIAS. Now, you were -aware of those procedures at
that time?
Mr. COLBY. The procedures up there, I oannot say that for sure. I
just do not know.
Mr. STEVENS. We have no capability to destroy that kind of material.
Mr. COLBY. Wecannot destrov it ourselves.
Senator MATHIAS. Were you aware of tile DOD procedures that
were estlliblished ?_
Mr. STEVENS. I am sure that the people working in this area were;
yes.
Senator MATHIAS. At that time 1
Mr. COLBY. At that time.
Senator MATHIAS. But yon did not attempt to establish any parallel
procedures?
51
Mr. COLBY. No.
Mr. STEVENS. We would never have destroyed it ourselves, but would
have relied on Fort Detrick.
. Mr. COLBY. We would have gone to somebody who could destroy
It.
Senator MATHIAS. Just as you contracted with Detrick to produce it,
you would have contracted with Detrick to destroy it.
Mr. STEVENS. That, in fact, is what happened with most of it.
The CHAIRMAN. ,;You must have been aware because the whole world
was made aware by the most elaborate television programs that were
intended to inform the world that these substances were, in fact,
being destroyed. .
Senator MONDALE. I was just going to suggest that if Mr. Stevens
could be around this afternoon, I would like to explore some things
with him.
. The CHAIRMAN. We have a problem I would like to explain at this
time which will affect the schedule. Tomorrow morning we will meet
again here in this room to cont,inue the public hearings,and our first
witness will be Mr. Richard Helms, who was the Director of the CIA
during the time in question, and other witnesses whose names have
already been made available will then be called as time permits.
The public hearings will be held as they were today between the
'hQurs of 10 in the morning and approximately 12 :30. We are staying
:pretty close to schedule, but this afternoon, owing to the fact that one
afom scheduled witnesses has invoked a committee rule which I would
·tlke n0:-V to read, it will be ne,cessary' to hold a Pl;lblic hea::ing, but one
that WIll not be coyered by. hve radIO or teleVISIOn, by VIrtue of rule
6~7(b) of the committee, whIch reads as follows:
, 'No witness subpenaed by the Committee shall be required against his will to
:be photographed at any hearing or to give evidence or testimony while the
Ilroadcasting of that hearing by radio or television is being conducted. At the
i\.;~anest of any witness who does not wish to be subjected to radio, television,
i6t'l'stlll photography coverage, all lens shall be cO,vered and all microphones used
;~l>r coverage turned off. So far as practicable, a witness deBiring to make sucb
iJl!'i:,~.!llluest shall so inform the Chiet Counsel ot the Committee at least 24 hours
.,~or to the time that that witness Is scheduled to testify. '
~ow, Dr. Nathan Gordon has so advised the chief counsel yesterday
i\8ilia has invoked this rule. The committee, of course,respects the rule
, , for that reason, Dr. Gordon will be the witness this afternoon,
for purposes of this afternoon's session only live television, ra.dio,
photographic coverage will be prohibited. For that reason, I
we should wait to bring back Mr. Stevens, if you wish to bring
. laack, until tomorrow, but the first witness tomorrow will be
!hard Helms, and the committee will now stand adjourned until
is afternoon.
":b,~Whereupon, at 12 :45 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
!It,ro. the same day.] ,
AFTERNOON SESSION
he CHAIRMAN. The hour of 2 o'clock has arrived. The hearing
come to order.
"Pursuant to rule 6.7' (b) the lights will be turned off; let there be no
:.ht.The live microphones and the television cameras will be turned
52
off for the testimony that now will be taken by the witness I am about
to call, Dr. Nathan Gordon. Dr. Gordon, will you please come forward
and take the stand? If you will please stand and take the oath. Would
you raise your right hand, please. Do you solemnly s"\vear that all the
testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God ~ ,
Mr. GORDON. Senator Church, I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Doctor Gordon, do you have any prepared statement
you wish to make at this time ~
Mr. GORDON. Senator Church, I do have p.n opening statement I
would like to make at this time. "
The CHAIRMAN. I have not seen your statement. Before you begin
to read it, I think that you should know of the committee rule in connection
with opening statements, which is they should be limited to 10
minutes. If your written statement is longer than that, you may submit
your written statement for the record. We would appreciate it if you
will then summarize it so that the 10-minute rule is observed.
Mr. GORDON. Thank you very much, sir. I would also request permission
to give you a concluding statement.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well; again subject to the same rule with respect
to its duration.
Mr. GORDON. I understand, sir.
TESTIMONY OF NATHAN GORDON, FORMER CHIEF, CHEMISTRY
BRANCH, TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
Mr. GORDON. Gentlemen, I am appearing before this select committee
freely and willingly. I am here, not as a mystery witness or a secret witness.
I acknowledge that I have been served technically with a subpena,;
but the record will show that I indicated to staff that I did not necessarily
need a subpena; I would be happy to appear before the closed
session and the public testimony of my own free will.
I would like to dispel the myth that has been circulating around with'
respect to a mysterious or secret witness.
The CHAIRMAN. May I say, Dr. Gordon, that a subpena was !;;sued
by the committee with the understanding that it was necessary.-
The rule that has been invoked is based upon the issuance of the>
subpena. ."
Do I understand you to say that you are here as a result of the ISSU·'
ance of the subpena, or are you here on some other basis ~ I want you t~;
know your rights under the rule, and I think I should read the rule te,t::
you.
Mr. GORDON. Please do.
The CHAIRMAN. The rule is rule 6.7. It has to do with lights an<l;
broadcasting. It reads as follows:
A witness may request on grounds ot distraction, harrassment or physical dill!'i
comfort, that during his testimony television, motion picture and other cameraBi
Ilnd lights shall not be directed at him. Such request to be ruled on in accord"
ance with Rule 2.4.
Part (b) of the rule reads:
No witness subpoenaed by the Committee shall be required, against his will,tl
ho nhntOU'l'lInbed at any hearing, or to give evidence or testimony while the broad

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