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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

52
off for the testimony that now will be taken by the witness I am about
to call, Dr. Nathan Gordon. Dr. Gordon, will you please come forward
and take the stand? If you will please stand and take the oath. Would
you raise your right hand, please. Do you solemnly s"\vear that all the
testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God ~ ,
Mr. GORDON. Senator Church, I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Doctor Gordon, do you have any prepared statement
you wish to make at this time ~
Mr. GORDON. Senator Church, I do have p.n opening statement I
would like to make at this time. "
The CHAIRMAN. I have not seen your statement. Before you begin
to read it, I think that you should know of the committee rule in connection
with opening statements, which is they should be limited to 10
minutes. If your written statement is longer than that, you may submit
your written statement for the record. We would appreciate it if you
will then summarize it so that the 10-minute rule is observed.
Mr. GORDON. Thank you very much, sir. I would also request permission
to give you a concluding statement.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well; again subject to the same rule with respect
to its duration.
Mr. GORDON. I understand, sir.
TESTIMONY OF NATHAN GORDON, FORMER CHIEF, CHEMISTRY
BRANCH, TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
Mr. GORDON. Gentlemen, I am appearing before this select committee
freely and willingly. I am here, not as a mystery witness or a secret witness.
I acknowledge that I have been served technically with a subpena,;
but the record will show that I indicated to staff that I did not necessarily
need a subpena; I would be happy to appear before the closed
session and the public testimony of my own free will.
I would like to dispel the myth that has been circulating around with'
respect to a mysterious or secret witness.
The CHAIRMAN. May I say, Dr. Gordon, that a subpena was !;;sued
by the committee with the understanding that it was necessary.-
The rule that has been invoked is based upon the issuance of the>
subpena. ."
Do I understand you to say that you are here as a result of the ISSU·'
ance of the subpena, or are you here on some other basis ~ I want you t~;
know your rights under the rule, and I think I should read the rule te,t::
you.
Mr. GORDON. Please do.
The CHAIRMAN. The rule is rule 6.7. It has to do with lights an<l;
broadcasting. It reads as follows:
A witness may request on grounds ot distraction, harrassment or physical dill!'i
comfort, that during his testimony television, motion picture and other cameraBi
Ilnd lights shall not be directed at him. Such request to be ruled on in accord"
ance with Rule 2.4.
Part (b) of the rule reads:
No witness subpoenaed by the Committee shall be required, against his will,tl
ho nhntOU'l'lInbed at any hearing, or to give evidence or testimony while the broad

54
The CHAIRMAN. Can you answer the question and then tell us1
Mr. GORDON. It would be a little more logical, Senator Church, if
you will allow me to give the history of my employment with the CIA.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well, if In doing so you will answer the
questions.
Mr. GORDON. Of course.
I joined the TSD/CIA in October 1967, as the Deputy Chief of
the Biology Branch of TSD. A few months later, in February 1968,
when my 'predecessor retired from the Agency, I assumed the function
of the Ohief of tJhe Biology Branch of TSD.
In February of 1968, then, as Chief of the Biology, Branch-I continued
in that capacity through February of 1969, 1 year later: In my
judgment, and in my Division Chief's judgment, we decided that the
Biological Branch-which was a two-man operation, myself and Mr.
David Boston, a project officer, plus a technical consultant, Dr. Alex
Batlin, who would consult with us roughly once a week on all matters
pertaining to our interests in tJhe Biological and Ohemistry Branches,
because in February 1969, we merged the Biology Branch into the then
existing Chemistry Branch. And as of that particular day, February
1969, I assumed the function of Chief, Chemistry Branch.
I held that position until kpril1970. At all times I also wore another
hat; that was entitled program manager of the behavioral activities
program.
In April of 1970 I reverted to the full-time occupation of wearing a
single hat; that of program manager 'for behavioral activities. I held
that particular position within the Chemistry Branch until the date of
my retirement from the Agency, which was September 30, 19'72.
Now I hope that I have not neglected to come back to the point that
Mr. Schwarz made, and I will now be ready to answer it.
First, I would appreciate, after the few minutes of my discussion,
would you repeat your question, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. What was your job in 1970 with the CIA~
Mr. GORDON. What part of 1970 ~
Mr. SCHWARZ. Let us take February 1970.
Mr. GORDON. February 1970 I was Chief of Chemistry Branch and
prog-ram manager of behavioral activities.
Mr. SCHWARZ. At that time was the chain of command running from
yourself to a Deputy Director of the TSD, then to Dr. Gottlieb, then
to Mr. Thomas Karamessines, who was the Deputy Director for
Plans, then from him to the Director of the Agency, Mr. Richard'
Helms?
Mr. GoROON. That is correct, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Do you remember being examined under oath by;
deposition by the staff on Saturday ~
Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I am just going to read a couple of answers to yoUr,
and ask whether they are your testimony. You were asked this ques~
tion: "Were you ever told that either the Director of the Central In::".
telligence Agency, or the Deputy Director for Plans, instructed tha~
the CIA stock of biological warfare agents be destroyed ~" Answer~
"No."
Is that your testimony ~
Mr. GORDON. That is correct, sir.

56
Mr. GORDON. In 1970, sir, I did not search the laboratory. I mighti
also add that in my capacity as Chief of the Chemistry Branch, i:tI
1970, up through April of 1970, I relied upon 'Mr. Boston and tJ4
project officer to carryon with the everydaY11f you will, details of a.n.ii.,.
particular matters pertaining to that partlcular laboratory. ',I
I again repeat, I am not aware of any lethal agents, either chemi.I.•.lI..."I.
or biological, in the laboratory prior(to the time that we accepted :,
CIA Agency stockpile of 5 grams of shellfish toxin.?::
Mr. S~~~ARZ. B~ the lal:>oratory-by those answers, you mean t;~~
CIA faCIlrtIes here m Washmgton, D.C.?,~
Mr. GORDON. Yes. ,_, "~
Mr. SCHWARZ. You testified this afternoon,as you testified on S~
urday, that you did not receive an order from the Director of Centril
Intelligence, or anyone else, to search out and destroy the CI~tt
stocks of biologicalagents.t
Mr. GORDON. That iscorrect.fl
Mr. SCHWARZ. I am going to read to you now, Mr. Gordon, frmil
page 20 of the p.m. session, commencing on line 21, a question direc~
to you-of what you would have done with respect to the soutlti
laboratory if there had been an order from the Director of CentrilN
Intelligence, and the question and answer read as follows: •.•.i!!
Question: "Had there -been from the Director of the CIA an order that slilt
search out and destroy any \}Iological agents, would you, under those clrcurli
stances, have searched the south laboratory?" Answer: "Very likely, very lik~
Yes j I would have been a darned fool if I didnot.",g
And then you went on to give your explanation for the interprE:l~
tion of the order which we are going to come to. ..• ;,'
But your testimony is, Dr. Gordon, is it not, that first, there WRSij
order transmittea to you from higher authority to search outati'
destroy CIA stock of biological agents. Second, had there been so, Ji
would have searched the laboratory because you would have, as,.~
said, been a darned fool if you did not. ..;~
Mr. GORDON. To answer the first part of your question, it appe~
to me-<me moment please.c,~
rPause.] ;"~
To the best of my knowledge, I never was aware of any CIA d~
tive to search out and destroy any biological agents and/or ch~~
agents at that particular laboratory. {,.
On the second part of your question, I would repeat that if suc,,'.
order had been broug-ht to my attention by the chain of comma .
would have been-I have been too long, I feel, a devoted team pI
civil se,rvant, if you will, dedicated to my responsibilities and ~~
I would never, never have ignored such a directive. ..,:r
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Chairman and members, as you know, exhilli,
is a CIA inventory which indicates that, in fact, in the laboratory .
were several lethal substances, including some of the shellfish,
before the transfer from Fort Detrick occurred.
Now you did know that there was some kind of a Presidential.
did you not, Dr. Gordon ~
Mr. GORDON. May 1 be given, if the chief counsel and Senator ,
would indulge me, a 5-minute period to develop on that part~.
subject of the White House announcementR in my own way~

58
ber 25, 1969, announcement. Because if this is not done-repeat--if thfe
is not done, it is simply looking at the subject of toxins out, if yo,u Will.
in left field, without.any ~irect bearin~ or x:elationBhip to the origUhiJ
announcements on bIological or bacterIOlogICal agents and weapon&'~I<1~
Toxins are indeed a controversial subject. I am sure, in the c0..;•..1.•.
of this public testimony, you will deem fit-cI feel I do not know '.
call in an expert, certainly with far more expertise scientifically •.
the field of toxins than myself. Those of us who are chemists, a~
myself-- ,~
The CHAffiMAN. I might say, Dr. Gordon, we will have an expert 011
toxins. , . '~
Mr. GORDON. Very good, sir. I applaud you for that. .,;~
The Chemistry Branch, sir, comprised of myself-a chemist-tn,I
project officer, a chemist, and a technical consultant, also a micrO'D~
ologist/bioche~ist, all in discussions whic~ lam sure will shortr~
come out by chief counsel, looked upon specifically the shellfish toxil)
as a chemical entity, a chemical substance, not of bacterial ori~
Toxins, indeed, are chemical substances, not living organisms, andm:t!
so re~arded by the Secretary General of the World Health Organiza.i
tion. That is a statement right in the February 14, 1970 a.nnouncemerit~
This is a crucial point I make in this particular testimony. Becau~
of their consideration, we felt-myself, my project officer and technt1
cal consultant-that we were, indeed, considering l). chemicalsubstanc6i
not a biological agent, not a biological toxin, when the offer of ret8i~
ing and obtaining, and storing in a secure vault area, our own Agene1
stockpile of 5 grams of shellfish toxin was made to us during the l8lttt!~
part of February of 1970. ; '\~
Parenthetically, may I please get into .the record that everything:i
am talking about is relying on no notes, but 5% years ago, hitting ~
memory banks to the fullest extent, and it has been agonizing. I 'Will
rest. ~
The CHAmMAN. Mr. Schwarz, will you take up the questioning':';'
Mr. SCHWARZ. I am not quite sure where we are. Let us talk abo~
MKNAOMI quickly, and the decisior.. to move the stuff down to 0"
facilities. You were aware, were you not, that Fort Detrick W8.S;j
center involved in biological warfare, right ~ j~~l
Mr. GORDON. Yes,sir.';:
Mr. SCHWARZ. Not chemical' •.•...
Mr. GORDON. Its mission was not chemical~ssentiallybiOlO':
warfare. I parenthetically add, they were doing experimentation
what I personally consider, my project officer and technical consultlli
to be considered gray a.reas. These are the shellfishtoxins.,'
I mig-ht also take this opportunity to indicate that at the Ed~ewo,
Arsenal, the chemical laboratory, a substance known as polyto
was being researched, and they are still in research at this time, 1!
aware, thoug-h I am away from the field for a 3-year period. Polyt0.,
and its insidious properties were being looked at; were derived, .
from ,a bacteria or Ii virus or a fungi, but a little sea animal kno
the sea anemone, that clings to the coral rock. And it is in fact 0011
extracted, and isolated.
An 'attempt at purification is made to get out and isolate an
component, chemical component; extremely complex protein chenii'
is involved here. Again, I am sure--I will rest on that one. Yon
hear at some future time in the next 2 days, 3 days, from an expert

60
Mr. GORDON. That I proceeded to do. As I indicated to you the other
day after the closed session, working my memory banks over the
weekend, I indicated to both you and Mr. James Johnston of your
staff that a piece of the memory bank seemed to have fallen father
heavily, as I thought this thing through very carefully subsequent
to our conversation. Now it appears to me--and I may ~ wro~gbut
it really sincerely appears to ine that after Dr. Gottheb receIved
the memos now prepared for Mr. Karamessines' signature to the
Director of the CIA, then Mr. Helms, that a day later-to the best
of my recollections, now-Dr. Gottlieb indicated tha~ he, ~ould not
elect to send that memo forward for Tom Karamessmes s,lgnature.
But instead, he right then and there--probably the next day, ~ebruary
19-is making the decision.that we would not go for the optIon of
transferring those materials to a private laboratory.
But instead, we would-and I concurred at that particular pointget
out of the classified project known as MKNAOMI.Which meant,
a day or two later, I proceeded to go up to the-
Mr. SCHWARZ. Before we get to that, could we put in the record as
exhibit 1,1 the draft letter from Karamessines to Helms. This includes
the paralytic shellfish poison as an item that you were covering, and
that you knew that the Army was about to destroy. .
Mr. GORDON. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you then go there ~
Mr. GORDON. I obtained approval to go up there in a day or so-I
do not remember-but shortly thereafter, and met with the Commanding
Officer of the U.S. Anny Biological Laboratories and the chain
of command, to include the Chief of the Special Operations Division,
the project officer for MKNAOMI at the Army, and inform the people
~athered on that particular day that it was our desire to cease operating
the classified project MKNAOMI as of that particular day; which
meant that we would terminate the project that day, and all holdings
that they were holding for us as our Agency stockpile would
revert to the Special Operations Division or the Biological Warfare
Laboratories, to do with whatever they saw fit at their particular
discretion. '
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did someone from that laboratory-and if someone
did, please give his name-thereafter telephone you on the subject
of the shellfish toxin ~
Mr. GORDON. Yes. Some days later, I did receive a call-again, to
the best of my recollection-from the project officer, Mr. Charles Senseney,
who indicated that they were making the following offer before
listing our stockpile for destruction, which was now a mandatory
DOD requirement, implemented as a result of the White House announcements
to the Department of Defense, to destroy biological
stocks and biological toxms. The offer was made to us, would we want
to retain for our own potential agency use, whether it be suicide pills
or any other particular application of shellfish toxin, the 5 grams of
the agency stockpile? I indIcated at that particular time that I thanked
them for the offer, I would be consulting with my small staff, and get.
back to them. '
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you get back to them and accept the offer ~
18ee p. 189.
61
Mr. GoRDON. After the consultation with my project office and
technical consultant, we agreed that the offer was valid for a number
of factors. We knew that many years of hard, costly researc~ had
gone into the development of shellfish toxin and that thoeB particular
quantities1 5 grams or more, were realistic quantities for purposes of
experiment, research and development, because if one had to really, in
effect, study immunization methods for diseases vis-a-vis-who knows,
cancer, anything of that particular ilk, it would take a considerable
amount of t9is particular antigenic material to develop immunization.
So that we know that was a reasonable quantity for that kind of
purpose. .
It certainly was not a reasonable quantity for, as it turned out in
my tenure, any operational requirements or needs during my tenure
WIth the agency. However, I might add that that particular quantity
of 5 grams of shellfish toxin had been on a list of material held for
us at Special Operations Division in Fort Detrick for many years before
I ever entered the picture. And in retrospect, I can see clearly
now that our project officer just continued, including myself, to continue
the listin~, shellfish toxin being one of the listing of about B
dozen o~ more dIfferent materials, never questioning the quantities that
were bemg held.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you do any research after it was brought down
to the CIA laboratory ~
Mr. GORDON. No,sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you do any research before it was brought down
to t.he CIA laboratory ~
Mr. GORDON• No, sir, T never opened-lam speaking for myself now.
Let me go back a minute. I did not quite finish.
I believe the agreement was made among my small staff that, considering
that we were looking at a chemical substance or entity, and
since we did, in our considered judgment, make that judgment that
shellfish toxin was a chemical, we elected to say yes to the offer. And
subsequently, it was hand-carried down to our laboratory.
We did not feel at that particular time, we dfd not feel the necessity,
because we were thinkin~ in terms of a chemical substance, not a biological
warfare agent or bacterial toxin. We did not feel the necessity
or need to infonn our higher chain of command individual. We simply
had it placed in our secure vaulted laboratory, in a freezer, in the
original containers that were brought down to us, thinking, in all good
faith, at the particular time of delivery that we would be given our
Agency stockpile quantity of 5 grams of shellfish toxin. At that point,
I might add, we did not have any idea as to the purity of that particular
material, except comments like, "It is ~ood stuff."
Mr. SCHWARZ. You in fact not only got your material but more than
5 additional grams that belon~ed to someone else. Is that correct ~
Mr. GORDON. That is right. I learned of that in Mayor early June
of this particular year.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did they belong to the Army ~
Mr. GORDON. The additional ,gTams, by deduction, belonged to the
Special Operations Division of Fort Detrick Army Biological Laboratories.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Uid you tell any of your superiors within the Agency
that you had retained this material'
62
Mr. GORDON. No, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I have nothing further, Mr. Chainnan.
Mr. GORDON. Because of the explanations I hope I amplified and
clarified. '
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smothers, do you have any supplementary questions
before we go to the members ~
Mr. SMOTHERS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Gordon, to the best of your
knowledge, what kinds of substances were kept in this laboratory we
have talked about, the laboratory you'worked in ~
Mr. GORDON. My predecessors-I s'ijspect, Mr. Smothers, we are
going bfCck about 10 years prior to my' joining, so roughly, we are
talking, maybe, in the middle or late fifties-I suspect had a penchant
of a person who could be considered as a collector--
Mr. SMOTHERS. When you are speaking of your predecessor, are you
speaking of Dr. Treichled ' '
Mr. GORDON. Treichler was my immediate predecessor. And to the
best of my knowledge, it could have involved others also. But to get
back to your question, Mr. Smothers, the kinds of materials were, in
my opinion, considered as interesting sam~les of candidate chemical
substances that had been experimented WIth for some years at the
U.S. Army Chemical Warfare Laboratory at Edgewood, Md., things
of an incapacitant nature or some behavioral aspects. Some of the
things that interested us in the nature of incapacitating agents would
be, in effect, under the broad category of behavioral effects.
What were the physiological reactions ~ There are certain substances
that can give you a real severe case of the "tummy's," as we know it.
This has a potential application in the field. If we want to, in effect,i
put an individual, shall we say, indisposed at a particular evening, at
a particular place, and any other scenario that you want to mention
along those lines.
Essentially, these were the kind of materials, to my recollection and
knowledge. I never called for an invento11, of the materials at the
laboratory. Frankly, I assumed that responSIbility, or laid it on, if you
will, to the project officer. This was not carried out, because this was
not a research or testing laboratory. This was a storeroom, a secure, safe
vault storeroom. All substances behind glass containers, sliding door
panels were under lock and key. We were the custodians of the key.
Mr. SMOTHERS. You never inventoried the vault ~
Mr. GORDON. That is correct, sir.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you have any reason to believe that there were
lethal substances in the vault?
Mr. GORDON. No, sir.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Was there any information in the transfer of control
to you from Dr. Treichler that should have put you on notice as to
the presence of lethal substances?
Mr. GORDON. None to my recollection, sir.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Are you saying that you would not have any reason
to tell your superiors In the Agency that this would be a likely place
for the presence of lethal substances ?
Mr. GORDON. May I have that question again, please!
Mr. SMOTHERS. Are you saying that you would have had no reason
to tell your superiors in the Agency, even after knowledge of the
63
Presidential order, that this would be a likely place to search for
lethal substances ~
Mr. GORDON. For lethal substances ~ Considering what I just indicated
to you, to the best of my knowledge that there were no lethal
substances, I would not indicate any point in searching for a lethal
substance, on the basis of my knowledge at that time.
However, if such an order came down, I would be possibly a little
bit foolish'1£ I did not ~o through at least the steps of opening that
deorl myself and my proJect officer, of taking a good hard look at what
was ill that laboratory, something that I had never done and, I suspect
in retrospect, my project officer had never done.
Mr. ~MOTHERS. DId you from time to time receive substances from
Fort Detrick ~ Were they ,transported from Fort Detrick to your
facility~
Mr. GORDON. Is that a ~eneral question ~
Mr. SMOTHERS Any substances ?
Mr. GORDON. Yes. My project officer at the time had a project which
pertained to a dart tranquilizer for animals, specifically dogs. There
were certain substances ofa temporary paralyzm~ nature, a chemical
CS 4'640, for exam,Ple, has this kind of an effect.
Prior to my joming, a very simplified, if you will, field dart disseminating
device had been developed, the purpose of which was to ~
along with such 'a physical incapacitant chemical substance. And I suspect
some tests-.Jand I am not sure of this, and I believe it did happen
before 1l}67-some tests had been conducted under controlled conditions
on do~, and, I believe, successfully.
ThIS is parallel to the kinds of military efforts that were going on at
the ChemlCal Warfare Laboratories. I mig-ht add that our own interest,
being charged with the responsibility of maintainin~ at all times a
technical interest, from the point of view of services support for any
future possible operational needs within the Agency, our interests
were parallel to what was going on at chemical warfare and biological
warfare laboratories at all times.
The liaison had been established and maintained. We were invited
in to attend classified briefing'S from time to time. In effect, Mr. Smothers,
what I am indicating to you is that we were making every sincere
attempt to stay abreast technically of the state of the art.
Mr. SMWHER8. Dr. Gordon, you knew of the existence of lethal substances,
did you not ~ You knew of the existence and the development
of lethal biological and chemical a~nts ?
Mr. GoRDON. To 'an extent, certainly. To a full extent, possibly not.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you have any knowledge of where these agents
were being kept, stockpiled or stored?
Mr. GORDON. We are talking about chemical agents and biological
agents?
Mr. SMOTHERS. Yes; we are.
Mr. GoRDON. To my knowledge, durin~ the tenure that I served with
Army Intelligence in chemical and 'biolo~cal warfare, yes, sir, I was
aware of locations. classified locations of military and biological agents
and chemical a~nts.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Were these materials being stored by the Army or
the DeDartment of Defense?
Mr. GORDON. These materials were being stored by the Army/DOD.
64
Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you have any reason to believe that stockpiles
were being stored by theCIA?
Mr. GORDON. No, sir. .
Mr. SMOTHERS. The laboratory we alluded to or elsewhere?
~r.GoRDoN.~thalagents1
Mr. SMOTHERS. Yes.
Mr. GoRDON. There were no lethala~nts going into the laboratory
until we agreed to accept our own Agency's stockpile of 5 grams or
subsequently, now, it turns out to 00\11 ~ams of shellfish toxin, in our
judgment, again, a chemical entity, a chemical substance.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Was it your belief, then, that if the Department of
Defense had complied with its own directive, that, with the exception
of the shellfish toxin you received, all other stockpiles of lethal agents,
even those belonging to the CIA, would have been destroyed? .
~r. GORDON. I think I did not get your question, could you repeat It?
Are you makin~ a statement or a question, sir?
Mr. SMOTHERS. I can do either one. It was your testimony that you
believe that all the lethal agents being held for the CIA were bein~
held by the Department of the Army or DOD, as you said. My question
then, was it your belief at the time that, with the exception of the
shellfish toxin which you received from Fort Detrick, all other stockpiles
of lethal ag-ents would be destroyed?
Mr. GORDON. Lethal biolog-ical agents.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Or a chemical?
Mr. GORDON. No, sir, lethal biological agents.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Lethal biological agents?
Mr. GORDON. There is nothing in the record indicating destruction
of chemical agents.
Mr. SMOTHERS. All lethal biological agents would be destroyed as a
result of the Executive order.
Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.
Mr. SMOTHERS. At the time that you had agreed or you proposed
the retaining of this material, did you have occasion to indicate to
anyone hi~her than your laboratory 'that there had been some discussion
with the Army regarding CIA retaining the Armv stockpiles?
Mr. GORDON. Mr. Smothe,rs, because we consider shellfish toxin as 8
chemical material and not as a biological material and/or bacterial
toxin we felt weare simply looking at a highly lethal chemical agent
which would be secured in 'a maximum security vault.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Gordon, I find vour testimony rather astounding.
You say that you and your fellow'scientists decIded to retain the
shellfish toxin and indeed to accept additional quantities of it from
the Anny.
Mr. GORDON. Unbeknownst to me, sir. That is a fact, it happened.
The CHAIRMAN. It is a fact, it happened ~
Mr. GORDON. Correct.
The CHAIRMAN. You ILnd your associates decided to retain this toxin
although you knew that it might very well have been a violation of the
President's order because by your own tesHmonv you have just told
us thlLt you asked, you discussed with Mr. Gottlieb and Mr. Gottlieb
was going to prepare for Mr. Karamessines a memorandum to the Director
in which this very question was raised and an option was given
to the Director to store it with a private finn. So it must hlLve been in
65
your mind that this toxin was highly questionable in view of the order
that the President had given.
Mr. GORDON. That is not correct in my interpretation, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. If it is not correct, why raise the question and suggest
the ~ption to the Director~. . .
Mr. GORDON. At that particular time, we had considered the optIOn
of whether we wanted to keep all of the agency's stockrile, including
the shelLfish toxin. There were a dozen or 80 biologica agents and a
few other kinds of toxins. We wanted to consider the option as to
whether or not we should retain our own materials which were not
going to be placed on a Department of Defense destruction list. They
were being held for us. If the decision was made by higher authorities,
and eventually Sid Gottlieb elected to make the decision, that he would
not go for the option if a decision had been made by higher authorities
to move that stockpile, I would have had no compunction to have done
so.
The CHAIRMAN. According to your testimony, you did not give authorities
a chan,ce to make that decision because Mr. Gottlieb and you
and your associates decided to do it on your own.
Mr. GORDON. Senator Church, I have prepared and you have a copy
of the memorandum [exhibit 1 1] with Dr. Gottlieb's approval for
that memorandum to be signed by Mr. Karamessines to the Director.
And Dr. Gottlieb's judgment-to the best of my recollection, he determined
that it did not need to go forward. He would make a decision
and he elected not to take that option and indeed that we would
once and for all get out of the classified project at the Special Operations
Division at Fort Detrick.
The CHAIRMAN. You would retain the poisons and tell no one ~
Mr. GORDON. Negative. That particular sequence, Senator Church,
with all respect, is a consequence which occurred after the fact. At that
particular time it was our intention simply to have Fort Detrick, as
I indicated, terminate that project and take all the materials that they
wanted. When the phone call--
The CHAIRMAN. Let us not get into a discussion of points in time
because before this proceeding was over you got a phone call from
the Army. They made suggestIons and you finally decided to keep the
stuff and not tell higher authorities about it. Is that not true ~
Mr. GORDON. Because it was not considered, in our judgment at the
branch level, any,thin2' but a chemical poison.
The CHAIRMAN. That is very curious because everybody else we
have talked to including the experts are of the opinion that it clearly
was of a kind of 'biological poison or toxin that came within the PreSIdential
order.
Mr. GORDON. Do you lmow where the material that was used for
Gary Powers' suicide weapon came from ~ It came from Edgewood
Arsenal.
The CHAIRMAN. What does that have to do with the question'
Mr. GORDON. It means that it is a chemical considered substance that
was utilized and obtained from a chemical warfare laboratory. This
is the kind of thing-excuse me Senator Church-this is the kind of
thinking that chemIsts have used. I indicated earlier in testimony that
we are getting into a gray area. Admittedly, it is a. gray area..
18841 p.189.
66
,
The CHAmxAN. Ifit is a gray area ~
Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. If you, by your own admission, say it is a gray area,
why then, in view of the Presidential order, did you take it upon yourselves
to decide to set this poison aside'
Mr. GORDON. The Presidential order, Senator Church, as I indicated
earlier, in our judgment, did not pertain to the CIA. It pertained to the
Department of Defense. ,
The CHAffiMAN. That is not the judgment of the Directors of CIA.
Mr. GORDON. I understand that, sir, but we are talking in terms of
February of 1970. ,
The CHAffiMAN. Is it not true, Dr. Gordon, that youdisagree'with
Mr. Nixon's orded
Mr. GORDON. No, sir.
The CHAffiXAN. Well-
Mr. GORDON. I was not a Department of Defense employee. I did not
feel under the obli~ation, Senator Church, to be responsible for the
DOD directive, indicating destruction of bacteriological agents or
bacteriological toxins.
The CHAmMAN. I call your attention to your testimony given under
oath on Saturday, page 50 of that testimony from the morning record,
if you would go to line 24 on page 50. Our counsel, Mr. Schwarz, asked
you the following question.
"Let us be clear what we are talkin~ about. President Nixon had
decided that the United States should destroy biological toxins.
Right~"
And you answered, "right." Then Mr. Schwarz said, "The matter
you discuss that some new President or administration official miJth,t'
come along and say, we would like to have such stuff in order to kill
people. Is that right~"
And you answered, "that is right."
"But again, this is conversation in the philosophical category, that
is all."
Mr. GORDON. I do not see anything wron~ with a group of people
like myself, my project officer and technical consultant-by the way,
Senator Church, I would appreciate if you do not already have the
testimony of my technical consultant, Dr. Alex Battin, you should get
in the record his viewpoint as to whether shellfish toxin is considered
a chemical substance. I think he considers it such. In our discussions
we are certainly--
The CHAmMAN. Senator Mondale has a point to raise on that very
question.
Senator MONDALE. I would like to point out that the whole reason for
the February 14 memo from the President was to solve the issue that
you continue to raise. I quote from the President's announcement [exhibit
51] of February 14, he said, "Moreover though toxins of this
type useful for military purposes could conceivably be produced by
chemical synthesis in· the future the end products would be the same
and their effects would be indistinguishable from toxins produced by
bacteriological or other biological substances."
It continues, "the President has further directed the destruction of
all existing toxins." Moreover, by the National Security memorandum
~ See p. 202.
67
44, the Secretary of Defense will submit recommendations concerning
the disposal of existing stocks of toxins, weapons, and agents.
No.1, "tIle United States will renounce the production, for operational
purp6ses, stockpiling, and the use in retaliation of toxins produced
either by bacteriological or biological processes or by chemical
synthesis." In other words, the whole reason for the February 14 memo
was to settle the disJ?ute which you continually raised as a defense and
that memo was directed, among others, to the CIA. That is the whole
reason.
Mr. GORDON. I have never been aware of that memo. The only thing
I alluded to--
Senator MONDALE. What a:bout the public statement ~ Were you
8IWare of that1
Mr. GORDON. No, sir. The only thing I am alluding to is what I have
indicated to you and the testimony, Doth in closed session and public,
and I have it in.fro~tof me and fur~hermoreit say's in that s~me ~~bruary
14, 1970, dU"eCtlVe thwt the Umted States Wlll confine lts mllItary
programs for toxins.
I think that really the point is being pushed in my humble opinion
to include the CIA in this particular category of a Department of
Defense responsibility.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Dr. ~rdon, if you viewed it as merely a
Department of Defense responsibility, why did you aooepit from the
Department of Defense toxins that clearly should have been destroyed?
Mr. GORDON. The toxins that we accepted at that particular time,
thinking thwt it was our own Agency stockpile, 5 grams to be held nIl
those years for us, was considered as a ohemical substance, Senator
Church, in our judgment. And that is the reason.
The CHAIRMAN. You knew the Army was going to destroy it, did
you not?
Mr. GORDON. The Army has still retained for experimental purposes,
I read, a little bit over 4grams.
The CHAIRMAN. YouKnow they gave you 'this toxin so it would not
be destroyed. If they had not ~ven it to you, they would have destroyed
it pursuant to Presidentlal order. You knew that.
Mr. GORDON. I could not speak for what they would have done or
not. They Qsked if we wanted our particul'ar stockpile, and aflter careful
deliberation 'and oonsideration among our staff and I indicated this
to you, this is the particular rationale that we opted for in taking it
and considering ilt as 'an ordinarily highly lethal chemical ·agent. And
I wish-.-
The CHAIRMAN. T~s is t~e other outsta~dingp'!'rt of your testimony.
When a second Presidentlal order was lSSUed Just to clear up any
question about the inclusion of this shellfish toxin in the directive
that none of these dirootives were passed down through the Agency
to you and th1lot you testified 'llobout your knowledge of the Presidential
directive on the basis of what you read in the newspaper. That is your
testimony, is it not ~
Mr. GORDON. Thait is my testimonv and I repent th'at I never saw-The
CHAIRMAN. I did not say that is your fault, but that is an
astounding thing'.
Mr. GoRDON. That is so.
The CHAIRMAN. That is 80. Senator Tower1
68
SeIUlitor TOWER. You received no direct order to destroy the substance.
Is that a fact or is it nOt 1
Mr. GORDON. That is a fact, sir.
Sellia.tor TOWER. In f8lCt, you asked the DCI for permission to retain
and store these substances.
Mr. GORDON. r did not seek additional guidance or consent from any
of the chain of command higher than myself as chief of the chemistry
branch to obtain and store the highly lethal shellfish toxin, which we in
our technical judgment, considered as a chemical agent, sir.
Sena-tor TOWER. What about Gottlieb W Did anyone propose to the
Del that this material be retained 1 ,
Mr. GORDON. Dr. Gottlieb was not informed, Senator Tower, that the
lethal shellfish toxin was being offered, received :and stored in a secure
vault in the laboratory, since we in the branoh, myself, project officer
and technieal consultant made the judgment that we were considering
shellfish itoxin asa chemical agent, highly lethal, but a chemical agent.
Senator TOWER. Are you saying that you never had any indication of
Helms rejecting the notion of retainin~the substance 1
Mr. GORDON. This specific substance?
Senl1tor TOWER. Yes.
Mr. GORDON. He could not in my humble opinion have made that
kind of a statement because of the fact, as I indicated, Senator Tower,
we did not, considering we were talking in terms of a lethal chemical,
~e did not in our judgment feel that we, we were in need of informmg
anyone.
Senator TOWER. You were aware that you were not to retain lethal
chemicals? .
Mr. GORDON. I am not aware of any directives indicating that' a
lethal chemical could not be retained or stored. .
Senator TOWER. Do we not normally classify a chemical and a biological
agent together?
Mr. GORDON. No, sir. That is a separate and distinct entity. There is
a chemical warfare laboratory which still today does research in chemical
agents. There is a munitions system still under development for
chemlCal agents. There is a stockpile in the military for chemical
agents, both incapacitating and lethal.
Senator TOWER. Were you not aware that the order category included
both chemical and biological agents?
Mr. GORDON. No, sir. We made a distinct distinction, if r may put
it that way, between the fact that in our judgment this shellfish toxin
was a lethal, highly lethal, chemical agent. And we took the proper
steps to put it in our freezer, secure it, store it. I must say, over the
years, Senator Tower, we have never had .to my knowledge, in the
period 1967 through 1972, any call for those kinds of materials.
That was in essence an example of maintaining to the best of our
technical ability, maintaining the technical capability in behavioral
materials in the event that the need should arise to use these materials
one day.
Senator TOWER. Let me ask you whether a substance is classified as
generically chemical or generically biological, can they not be applied
to achieve the same kind of results. They are both a specific means to a
common end, are they not?
69
Mr. GORDON. Senator Tower,I have to say yes; and I have to qualify
it. I must say I still feel the sharpness somehow of some of the
questidns, and properly so, of Senator Church, and, Sena.tor Tower,
may I indicate to you that technically that we always make a distinction
between chemical and biological agents. Now there are gray areas
and this toxin, this particular substance, in our judgment, falls into a
gray area, depending on who you will be talking to in the public testimony
in the next 3 daysl depending on his viewpoint, I feel certain
that you will find the testImony being given to indicate both sides of
the question.
Senator TOWER. If indeed this falls into a gray area or could be construed
as falling into a gray area, was there not a certain responsibility
on your part to inquire as to whether or not that was included within
the purvIew of the order to destroy these chemical substances ~
Mr. GORDON. Again, relying upon discussions with my project officer
and technical consultant, both technical people in the field of biological,
chemical warfare, including my own knowledge and judgment, we
made the decision at that particular level. Senator Church has asked
who made the decision. We made the decision at the particular branch
level that we were indeed considering and looking at a lethal chemical
agent. We were not aware of any particular ban on lethal chemical
agents and in all ~ood conscience, in all good conscience and judgment
we elected to retam that particular kind of material as a lethal agent
in our laboratory in a secure vault condition at all times. In the event
that one day we would be called upon to prepare supplies of suicide
pills and/or any other uses that could be considered from a higher
level of authori,ty than my own, certainly, for operational use of these
ma.terials.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mondale.
Senator MONDALE. Dr. Gordon, the National Security Decision
Memorandum No. 44 [exhibit 8 1], dated February 20,1970, says:
The President has decided that: the U.S. will renounce the production tor
operational purposes, stockpiling and use in retaliation of toxins produced either
by .bacterlological or biological processes or by chemical synthesis.
The p,ublic announcement on February 14 entitled "U.S. Policy on
Toxins' says among other things:
'!'he President has decided that the United States will confine Its milltary
programs tor toxins, whether produced by bacteriological or other biOlogical
methods or by chemical synthesis, to research tor detense purposes only, such as
to improve techniques 01' immunbatlon and medical technology. The President
has directed destruction ot all existing toxin weapons.
In light of that National Security memo---
Mr. GoRDON. Excuse me, Senator Mondale, I have a question in that
particular last paragraph, sir, where the words-Is that the same paragraph
that I am looking at, sir, if you will indulge me. Does it read the
United States will confine its military programs for toxins1
Senator MONDALE. Right.
Mr. GORDON. Military programs, sir.
Senator MONDALE. That is right. Had you ever heard of either one
of those paragraphs, either in the National Security memo or the President's
public announcements ~
1 See p. 210.
70
Mr. GORDON. I have a copy. , .
Senator MONDALE. Did you at the time~ Were you aware of the
formulation of the President's orders which srecifically settled the
issue o£ chemical or nonchemical basis for toxins
Mr. GORDON. Are you referring to the National Security Memorandum~
Senator MONDALE. Either one. Both say the same thing. The toxins
would be defined as toxins whether created biologically or chemically.
Were you aware that that policy decision settled the question that you
seem to be raising? .
Mr. GORDON. In our interpretation, we did not put the emphasis that
you have just placed on that particular paragraph, sir.
Senator MONDALE. What emphasis?
Mr. GORDON. In our judgment, we put consideration for that the
shellfish toxin was indeed to be considered in the category of a chemical
substance or a chemical entity, regardless of how it was derived.
Senator MONDALE. So you would say that because you did so, it did
not come within the meaning of either the National Security memo or
thtl President's announcement.
Mr. GORDON. I felt it did not come in the purview of the President's
announcement of February 1970 and I cannot address myself to that
National Security memo. I have never seen it.
Senator MONDALP:. Since the President had decided to repuce the
programs, both biological and chemical, how do you arrive at the position
that the shellfish toxin does not come in that definition?
Mr. GORDON. Senator Mondale, we were not in a military program-----
,
Senator MONDALP:. I understand the chemical thing. We were takinA'
your second defense, the military. I want to know whether you are still
sticking with the chemical defense, even though the Presidential directives
clearly settled that issue? If so, how?
Mr. GORDON. All I can say to respond to that particular query is
that we saw, in our own judgment this particular substance as a chemical
lethal agent.
. Senator MONDALE. Did you further decide that because you saw it in
that light, that it does come within this order, even though the order
says, toxins produced by chemical synthe.c:is. Tf so, how could you conclude
that?
Mr. GORDON. Because we tied it in with the previous statement that
the United States will confine its military program for toxins.
Senator MONDALE. All right. We will set aside our chemical arg'llment,
because really you are basing your defense on the 'grounds that
it is not a military program. Is that right?
Mr. GORDON. This was a part of our consideration.
Senator MONDALE. Can we then set the chemical argument aside?
Mr. GORDON. No, sir.
SenatorMoNDALE.~y~
Mr. GORDON. Because we felt strongly, and continue to feel, that this
was a chemical substance.
Senator MONDALE. I know that is what they said, by biological or
chemical synthesis.
Mr. GORDON. Shellfish toxin is not, in the truest sense of the term, lk
synthesis. It is a complicated process, starting with an algnt\ and clams.
71
"'Senator MONDALE. When you say it is a chemical substance--
Mr. GoRDON. A chemical substance, sir. ..'
- Senator MONDALE. The second paragraph of the Presidential publIc
.announcement says, "Toxins are chemICal substances, not living organisms
and are so re~arded by the U.N. Secretary General of the
World Health Orgamzation" Tha.t being true, is it not clear that the
President intended it to mean such things as shellfish toxins derived
from a chemical synthesis or substance 1
Mr. GORDON. I would have to say, in listening to your detailed expla.
nation, Senator Mondale, that that is true. I also have to say
that-and 'it has been some time, as you know, since we examined this
particular thing-I am trying to restructure it at some length, and
m detail. Our thinking here-we were swayed, it would appear to
me by the phrase, military programs. .'
;Senator MONDALE. Let us turn to that defense, and I w111 not go mto
this, but I think the reading of the proposed Karamessines memo
clearly reflects-and I believe that was prepared by you; was it not ~
Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.
Senator MONDALE. Clearly reflects that you understood this toxin
to be included in the Presidential order. In any event, another defense
you have for not destroying the toxin is that it was not a military
progTam; is that correct j
Mr. GORDON. That is correct, sir.
Senator MONDALE. What is it, then ~
Mr. GORDON. It was a substance which we felt being in the category
Q,fa chemical could be used ·at some future time for whatever operational
need or desire on the part of higher authorities within the
CIA, 'and we know that it had an application in the preparation of
\~:rl!wouslyprepared suicide wellpons or devices.
, Senator MONDALE. It says it can only be retained for research or
.\~ensive purposes, such as improving techniques in immunization
;;&nd medical therapy.
KrIlIMr. GORDON. Again, applied to military programs.
t,;,1d'Senator MONDALE. So it does not come within that exception. It
;tmmes within the militarY' ~xception; is that right?
i GORDON. In our OpInIOn, Senator Mondale.
n.ator MONDAJ.E. So what the CIA was involved in was not
;;:lDiit&ry j
r. GORDON. The CIA is not a military organization. It is not,
&:&;8 never been char~ed with the functions of the Department of
lei'" se. Yes; it is not a military organization.
:i~'SSenatorMONDALE. Would you say that your memorandum proposed
·'Mr. Karamessines reflects this viewpoint tha:t you are not covered ~
"/ .~~ORDON. At the particular time of that memorandum, a dis,~.
BSif)1r on this particular point hadnever taken place. That particu.
emorandum was described as an option which we had considered
n Dr. Gottlieb and myself as one for consideration. And as I
lilted earlier, that option was decided against, and at a subsequent
.in time, the offer was made to receive the shellfish toxin.
tor MONDALE. That means something', and it indicates that
,..a hot item that you did not want to destroy. The National
ymemo--
RDON. That is not my opinion, sir.
72
Senator MONDALE. I recognize. thllit. It was directed to the'CIA, as
well. As far as I'm concerned, hased upon you~ testimony, the only
conceivable way that the President could have hIS order executed was
to have you over for dinner and plead with you. .
Mr. GORDON. If there was a CIA directive that did not eXIst at that
particular time, implementing the ~ite House direc~ive for. the Department
of Defense, I have no doubt, at that partIcular Instance,
the proper steps would have been taken, and this day, there would
not be a discussion of the subject of shellfish toxins, Senator Mondale.
Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. In effect, you say it was a faHure of h~gher authority
within the CIA to properly direct you that led you to the
decision ~
Mr. GORDON. I cannot place the blame on Mr. Helms' shoulder..
The CHAIRMAN. "Where does the blame lie ~ You say it does not lie
with you ~ If you say it does not lie with Mr. Helms, where does the
blame lie~
Mr. GORDON. You asked the question, who in the CIA made the
decision. Now you know that it was the Chemistry Branch Chief, the
project director, and his technical consultant.
The CHAIRMAN. The blame lies with you ~
Mr. GORDON. The blame lies with the ,gTOUp I have just specified.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Senator Mathias.
Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Gordon, I think you testified that you had been to Fort Detrick~
Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. Did you p;o there frequently ~ .
Mr. GoRDON. I would say, Senator Mathias, during the course of a
year-and this is somewhat tenuous-certainly less than a dozen times
a year.
Senator MATHIAS. Did you know Dr. Housewright, for example ~
Mr. GORDON. Yes; I did, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. Did you have occasion to talk with the Detrick
staff by telephone on occasion, in addition to your visits?
Mr. GORDON. At times, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. In other words, you had a working relationship
with the Detrick organization?
Mr. GORDON. My project officer more than I, sir. at that particular
point in time. I am sorry to overuse that particular phrase.
Senator MATHIAS. Were you aware that, following President Nixon's
decision of November 25,1969, an interagency group was assembled to
consider the very question of the definition of toxins ?
Mr. GORDON. No; I was not, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. That this Valentine's Day memorandum did not
issue just out of the goodness of President Nixon's heart on Valentine's
Day, but it was the considered judgment of a number of scientists
in the Federal establishment?
Mr. GORDON. I WIll agree to that, sir. Yes, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. You did not know that at the time 1
Mr. GoRDON. I did not know that at the time.
Senator MATHIAS. Even with your relationship with the people at
Fort Detrick, this never came to your attention1
73
Mr. GORDON. No, sir. Again] Senator Mathias, I would like to repeat,
hopefully not ad nauseum,. tnat in our judgment we considered this
particular announcement directed only at the Department of Defense.
Senator MATHIAS. Again, I do not think either of us gain anything
by repeating arguments already made. As Senator Mondale pointed
out, this was a decision that was lifted from your shoulders. This was
a decision that had been made Government-wide, after an interagency
st'!<!Y by Presidential order.
4Mr. GORDON. May I point out something, Senator Mathias? I think
;-i7hat.it is somewhat unfair to take this February 14 announcement in
artlit"by itself without always looking back to the November 25, 1969,
;&nnouncement, because the February 14 announcement, as you put it,
~n-",the Valentine's Day announ?em~nti is a natural extension of the
.November 25 announcement, whICh me udee the sentence "I have or,
dered the Defense Department to make recommendations about the
:«iis.posal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons."
This; I think, is, again to our judgment, a clear mandate, and again,
the,other version of the November 25 announcement-that the DOD has
been. asked to make recommendations as to the disJ;losal of existing
:stbcksof bacteriological weapons. The toxins, again, In our judgment,
despite Senator Mondale's explicit pointing out to me the statement
1about the chemical synthesis, and so on-I think these have to be put
into a package for any discussion and consideration, because, again,
'this, is the only way we make a judgment, by putting these papers
fJegether, examining them carefully, agonizing over them, disagreeing,
,agreeing, and finally, making the conclusion that, indeed, we were
looking at a lethal chemical agent, no different than any of the other
highly toxics, but certainly, to be respected as a V agent, or a G agent.
Senator MATHIAS. You see, Dr. Gordon, this is exactly what I think
lisl,ooncerning the members of the committee. We do put the Valentine's
Day announcement in context with the November 25 announcement.
'''W<etake into consideration the fact that there is an interagency study,
cmated by order of the President of the United States. We take into
consideration the high office that you held, as one of the princiJ;lal officers
of the CIA, charged with knowledge and responsibility In this
area, and you come to us, and you tell us that you have not even heard
pfthe existence of the interagency group.
,Just let me finish. You will have plenty of time. I want to make this
point, because this may not reflect on you, giving the thing the best
gloss you can give it. I have spent a good many years in the Navy, and I
know there is always somebody who does not get the word, and ap'
parently you were that guy in this instance. That is the best gloss we
can put on it. That is enormously concerning to us.
'Let us leave Dr. Gordon out of it as an individual. Let us talk about
poople. When somebody does not get the word, serious problems can
arise, in the course of any operation, and one of the objects of this
committee is to try to find out where these short circuits were, why
they occurred, how we can prevent them occurring again. Because
obviously, when they occur at the high level of responsibility that you
occupy at this time, they can have serious national consequences.
Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Senator Mathias. I would like to state, with
all Que respect to the description that you have placed upon my particular
function, at that particular time that I was a chief of a branch,
74
a chemist, who, had the .technical responsib~lity of p~rform~n~.asupport
and serVIce functIon for the Techm.cal ServI~es DlvlSl~m, In
response to any possible future use, operatIonal ~eqUlre~ents, l~ you
will, of the DDP. Certainly, I agree, I, w~. not In a polIcy poSItIOn.
Certainly I would agree-and I do not think that you would expect
me to be privy to a National Security memo~andum, or any other
possible hi~hly placed documents of thl~t partIcular sort.
Senator MATHIAS. Just to refresh your recollection, the Valentine's
Day press release from the White House, which was issued at 6 p.m.
that day from the press office at Key Biscayne said in part" "the
President has further directed the destruction of all existing toxin
weapons." .
Mr. GORDON. Within the DOD-yes,sir, that is correct. Asa-Senator
MATHIAS. It was not so lImited. We have been over that.
Mr. GORDON. Right, sir. Exactly.
Senator MATHIAS. Let me 'ask you this question-Mr.
GORDON. Yes, sir.
S-enator MATHIAS. Was the transfer an idea that originated with
you, or did the Army suggest it to you ~
Mr. GORDON. The Special Operations Division of the Biological
Laboratories, Fort Detrick, Md., suggested it, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. What did they actually say to you, to the best of
your recollection?
Mr. GORDON. Would we consider taking, in effect, in the repository
of our own, the CIA stockpile of, 'as I understood it, 5 grams from our
old listings, of the shellfish toxin,and the reason being because-and
I think it was generally agreed-we all had a keen appreciation of
the extreme cost, resources, material, personnel that had gone in over
a lO-year period for these materials.
I would like to add that since this has become publicized, I have
read in the newspapers Dr. Ritchie's comment from Yale University.
I suspect that it was in the nature of a plea to this committee in considerm~
the final disposition of these materials whether or not it could
be considered-and that is a considerable quantity, now, 11 grams, to
go back into the medical science research.
Senator MATHIAS. I am aware of that.
One further question, Dr. Gordon. I want to be fair to you. I want
you to understand that I am trying to put myself into your shoes and
into your mind and try to understand the motivations which caused
you to take the acts that you did. But I did say earlier, and I meant it,
that this is a problem that could have arisen because we used to say,
someone did not get the word.
The other possibility which is not as happy a one was suggested by
a statement that you made earlier this afternoon, when you described
your reaction to learning of the November 25, 1969, decision of President
Nix~n, when you, as I recall your words, you said, you turned to
Mr. Gottheband vou said, you realize that this is the beginning of the
demise of the military biological warfare system.
Mr. GORDON. From the point of view of any parallel interests, sir,
that we might have in the field, there was nowhere to go to, to stay
abrea:>t of a BW capability. Fort Detrick, as you know, Senator
MathIas, subsequently was closed down and converted to the National
75
Dancer Institute. This, I believe, if my memory serves me correctly,
was 1971-72, or thereabouts.
Senator MATHIAS. It took that long to get done. That is something
else.
Mr. GORDON. Again, as I recall, it was over a :year from the time
that they said it would be done, and then, finally, 1t did get done. Let
me rest there.
Senator MATHIAS. Having recalled to you your words, the only
question that I raise is whether or not you had, in fact, a visceral
r~ion which perhaps clouded your judgment in order to :preserve
.from disruption at least one small corner of this area of enterpr1se 1
Mr. GORDON. Senator Mathias, I appreciate the way you put that.
J really do. I want to use this opportunity for my response, to repeat
once again-please bear with me, Senator Church-that our judgment
'Was collectively made, and we considered it as a lethal chemical
lfgent. If that was not the decision at that particular time, we
never would have gone back to accept and say yes to the offer of our
own stockpile of 5 grams, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. My time is up, and I will only say that I cannot
understand why your decision which was so agonizingly made-and
I accept that it was agonizingly made, as you descr1bed it, why a
decision so agonizingly made, and in the full consciousness of the difficulties
under which you were operating was not referred to higher
authority within the Agency for some confirmation, before you went
through with it.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Senator Mathias.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddleston.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do not wish to belabor the point, but I do think it is quite important,
as to what your understanding was at the time, back in February of
19-70 on why this decision was made. I find it very difficult to reconcile
what you are saying now about the concern that you had at that time
as to the true nature of shellfish toxin.
Shellfish toxin is a toxin, is it not ~ There is no question about
thatW
Mr. GORDON. That is correct, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. It is also a weapon. You mentioned a moment
ago it could be used as a weapon, against oneself as a suicide
weapon, or against somebody else.
Mr. GORDON. We would consider it, I think, certainly, as a weapon,
but the tactical description for that, Senator Huddleston, would be
as an agent in a weapons system, our weapons system being any
means.
Senator HUDDLESTON. It is a potential weapon or a part of a weapon.
Mr. GORDON. Exactly.
Senator HUDDLESTON. In the first paragraph of the memorandum
which you prepared for Mr. Karamessines, you point out that in the
November 26 memorandum of the President or the order of the President
and then you put in parentheses that on February 14, 1970, the
Valentine's order, he included all toxic weapon~. There seems to ~e
no doubt that at that time you understood preclSely what the Pres1dent
said.
76
Mr. GORDON. As it applied to the Department of Defense that is
correct, Senator.
Senator HUDDLESTON. If you felt at this time that this just applied
to the Department of Defense, I am wonderillg why you felt it necessa.
ry that Mr. Karamessines make a d~termination as to whether ~r
not the CIA should move to protect Its supply. It seems to me It
would be perfectly clear that he would not have to take any action
if it were perfectly clear that this would apply only to Department
of Defense.
Mr. GORDON. This was tied in with the relationship that we had
with the Special Operations Division and, for that m~tter, the rest
of the Army Biological Warfare Laboratory with respect to staying
abreast of the state of the art.
Ag-ain, intuition indicated to us at that particular time that before
too long, as Senator Mathias said, if it took too long the Biological
Warfare Research Laboratories would no longer exist. There would
be no sense in continuing to support a project, and I might add-and
this has not been brought out by me-I have never had a question
with that respect. We were, in effect, piggybacking or giving- some
additional dollar technical support to Special Operations Division,
who were being funded by the Army component, namely, the Special
Forces, for purposes which interested us and we wanted to stay with
the developments as time proceeded.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I do not see that there is anything that would
have clouded your perception based on your own words and recommendations
here that this toxin was, indeed, part of the order that the
President had issued. Let me make one other point, again relying on
your own memorandum dated February 1970, when you list for the
Director those items that would be in jeopardy if some action were
not taken by the President's order. You do, in fact, list paralytic
shellfish poison.
Mr. GORDON. Which was part of the inventory being held, yes, sir.
At that particular time, the other option, which is what we exercised
a day or two later, February 19 or 20, was to, as I indicated, let the
Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratories
know that we no longe~ would support them and terminate the project
and for them to do WIth what they saw fit with all the stocks.
It was subsequent, and only subsequent, that we rethought the matte:
of the shellfish toxin. When the telephone call came down to us
WIth respect to the offer of ~etaining and consid~ring for retaining
th.e shellfish. stocks! at that tune after careful delIberation we determmed
that In our Ju~gment, knowing we were in a 1{l'ay area going
through the same testimony, and deciding it was a chemical agent.
Sen~tor :a.uODLESTON. You have changed your perception then from
w~at It orIgIn~lly had been, which seems to be crystal clear here, to
raIse the qu~tlOn as t? whether or not there might be a slight loophole
through WhICh you mIght--
Mr. GORDON. We rethoug-ht the question of shellfish toxin.
~enator H~DLESTON. That was subsequent to this memora.ndum
wInch, at that tIme, seemed very clear and precise 9 '
Mr. GORDON. Right, that is correct, Senator.
Sen~tor HUDDLES:roN. As. to what the problem was and how it mi ht
be aVOIded by the DIrector, If he wanted to take this action 1 g
77
,
Mr. GORDON. That is correct. .
,SenlLtor HUDDLESTON. Just one other question. As I mentioned this
morning to Mr. Colby, included in that inventory, were agents thlLt
'Were designed to induce tuberculosis in an individual. Were you involved
in that experimentation W
Mr. GORDON. No, sir.
SenlLtor HUDDLESTON. WhlLt about the one for brucellosis?
Mr. GORDON. We were not involved in any experimentation.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you have any knowledge of these agents
tnd what they were used fod
Mr. GORDON. From the nomenclature of those particular ones you
described, they would be the causative agents to produce that kind of
l\disease. Those are biological agents.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Did you ever have instructions from your
superiors to develop this kind of capability 7
Mr. GORDON. No, sir; not during my tenure.
Senator HUDDLESTON. How do you propose they were included in the
CIA inventory 9
Mr. GORDON. I surmise that my predecessor or predecessors, that
over the years in their wisdom and judgment and with the expertise
of the people at the laboratories that determined in the event of some
need or USe of these kinds of materials it would be technically feasible
to· be considered and used. Hence, certain quantities were attributed
as grams or whatever they may be in their listing to those particular
. orgronisms and toxins. That is the way the list, I suspect, was de~
e1oped and simply transferred from year to year to year.
. Senator HUDDLESTON. From your personal knowledge and experience,
you had no contact with these agents.
Thank vou, Mr. Chairman.
; The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Huddleston. Senator
'Schweiker. '
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Gordon, can
you shed any light on the designation of P600 that appeared on the
cans he received in the lab 9
..Mr. GORDON. No; I cannot, sir. As of this moment, I do not recollect
~,'lliny of the information that appeared on the cans. Are you referring,
,Senator Schweiker, to the cans of the shellfish-containers of shellfish
~,itll;)xin ?
Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes. The ones in this picture, I assume.
Mr. GORDON. No, sir, I cannot. What does P600 mean?
Senator SCHWEIXER. That is what I am trying to find out.
Mr. GORDON. I think I could suggest who might give you the
answer, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I thought you would be in a good position to
tell us. It SlLyS, "Do not use unless directed by P600." How clLn you
store a quantity of poison in your lab in IL vault 'ILnd lock it up, when
it says do not open unless you have permission of so and so, and you
do not even know so and so ¥
Mr. GORDON. Is "P600" a person ¥
Senator SCHWEIKER. It is your code.
Mr. GORDON. That plLrticular label-we are on the subject of labeling,
Senator Schweiker, was prepared ILt the Special Operations Division,
Biologioal Labora.tories.
78
Senator SCHWEIKER. At Fort Detrick W
Mr. GORDON. They would be in a position to give you that answer.
I'd like to know itmyself.-
Senator SCHWEIKER. The second part of my question is, you keep'~
mentioning 5 grams in your testimony here with the other Senators.
Yet it is clear from Director Colby's testimony that, in fact, there
were 11 ~rams. The picture shows 11 grams. Can you account for the
G-p-am discrepancy 1
Mr. GORDON. When I received, or we received, the containers of the
shellfish toxin, it was our best understanding that we received what
was the Agency stockpile of shellfish toxin in th~ amount of 5 grams,
and we put it away in the freezer, and never, at least during my tenure,
had occasion to ever open those containers, did not want to open those'
containers unless there was a need, and that is the way it sat and got
forg-otten about over the years, because no queries--obviously, no
applications-- .
If I may continue, in Mayor June-of this year-and I am told this
by my project officer at that time, Mr. David Boston-he was asked
by the present Director, Mr. Colbv of the CIA, as part of an 'agencywide
query, to look into particular matters or things that he, Mr.
Colby, should know about. This is secondhand information. My understanding
is, as a result of that particular memo, directive-call it what
you will-Mr. Boston then proceeded to then very carefully look into
that particular freezer, and he called me, and asked, did I remember
that there was shellfish toxin and I most certainly remembered that
there was shellfish toxin containers. Then he proceeded to open it, the
cont'ainers, laid the vials out, as I understand, added up the figures,
and then informed me that there was not 5 grams, but close to it. I do
not know the exact figures. It is 3 in decimal points, but 11 g-rams.
The inference, the only inference in my mind is that the Special
Operations Division, in their wisdom, or lack of it, decided to send
along the 6 grams that were in their particular repository.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Dr. Gordon, the Part I have trouble comprehending,
in view of your testimony is that labels on these cans are
stuck on the top of the cans. You could not possibly pick 'a can up
and put it in a file, without reading the label. One label says very
clearly 5 grams of stockpile, manufactured in Ohio, which is probably
very directly the 5 grams we have been talkin~ about. The interesting
label on the other can-this may clear up the 6 gram mystery-it says
paralvtic shellfish toxin. working fund investigation Northeast Shell.
fish Sanitation Center. Then it says, USPH~you do not have to be
James Bond to figure out that means U.S. Public Health Service,
Narragansett, R.I. And my question is why the U.S. Public Health
Service is producing a deadly poison for this country, 'and who is
paying for it, and you could see that by just reading the label on the
can, so why all the mystery about where these 6 grams came from ¥
Mr. GORDON. Senator Schweiker, I do not recollect-and I saw what
you are referring to in closed testimony as two exhibits-and I was
asked in closed testimony, closed session, that, did I recall seeing those
particular exhibits that you are referring to. I honestly do not remem.
bel' seeing those.
Insofar as the Public Health Service or-as being a source of the
shellfish toxin ma~rial, this reflects a program that had been going
79
ltQr some years. This is part of the cost in resources and value
"sic in the ~uantity of sliellfish toxin that was expended by those
rticular Government agencies for many years for the pur-
,,af developing possibly-again, I am summarizing this, an imation
therapy or technique against this very deadly shellfish
stor SCHWEIKER. If it was developed for that 'purpose, why did
otkeep it for that purpose, instead of giving It to you ~
GoRDON. They gave it to the Special Operations Division at
trick Biological Laboratories. How that was obtained, the
, msm, the purchase, 'acquisition, I have no knowledge about. I
rd,'~ reflect that they were holding for us year after year, from
me that I entered the' TSDi I) grams of paralytic shellfish toxin.
as on the Agency's stockpile ist.
ena.tor SCHWEIKER. Your testimony is that we have, in fact, been
iving deadly poison manufactured by the U.S. Public Health
.ce and delIvered, indirectly at least, to Fort Detrick. It came to
hands, but first of all to Fort Detrick. And I am wondering
\"f!ther our House subcommittee that appropriates money for health
march is really aware that that is exactly where our health funds
li!J..ve been going.
. ,)~Ir. GORDON. I understand your question, Senator. I do not have a
~nsetoit.
:.t;,:Senator SCHWEIKER. I have a great deal of difficulty understanding
2~hy you could not size up the two cans, one being the stockpile from
~tl),~,dIA and Fort Detrick and the other coming from Narragansett,
;~I. There's a discrepancy. Does this not ring any bell, or do you not
;):ecollect a thing~
'T. GORDON. I honestly ha.ve to say no, sir. I do not understand. In
'g to reconstruct events, I just do not remember seeing those par'
h,Y-War listings. All I can indicate to you, the materials-by the way,
~ilt\ire.you sa.ying those listings were attached to the labels ~
"Senator SCHWEIKER. They were not only attached; they were on top
Qf the can. You could not possibly pick a can up without seeing the
~,that is, 5 grams and 6 grams, and the manufacturer, U.S. Public
,Ilealth Service.
,',Mr. GORDON. I admit, Senator, I do not have any recollection of that
,po.rticular photograph or object.
,senator SCHWEIKER. You testified earlier, Dr. Gordon, that somegna
called from fort Detrick asking if you would receive or accept
!tteae toxins; is that correct, in essence ~
'Mr. GoRDON. Shellfish toxin'
Senator SCHWEIKER. Shellfish toxin.
Mr. GORDON. Yes.
Senator SCHWEIKER. What was the rationale or reason by which he
sa.id you should accept it' Why was he not reporting' Because he did
report, Fort Detrick did report some 3 grams, as was testifie.d to that
they inventoried and got approval from the National S~unty CounQU.
I am sure you are well a.ware of that procedure, yet you elect not
to go the accountability route. You elected to follow his suggestion to
ge the other route ~
Mr. GORDON. The Agency's stockpile of all those materials was not
on a reported destruction list at Fort Detrick. They were being held
80·
sepa.rate and apart, to the best of my understanding. They were being
held separate and apart from their own military or Army holdings.
Senator SCHWEIKER. The memo we have from the Army indicates
tha.t they reported through official channels, and apparently received
National Security Council approval to keep the 3 grams for research
PTa-oRDON. May I make a surmise, sir~ I do not believe-I may
be wrong, but I do not believe, that that was the Special Operations
Division, or the Biological Laboratories that made that request. I
believe that it was another oomponent, research component, separate
and apart from the Special Operations Division of the Biological
Laborat<>ries that made that request to retain the quantities-that is
what I read myself in the newspapers the other day-and apparently
received the approval for experimental and R&D purposes, a very
legitimate request, in my opinion.
Senator SCHWEIKER. There are two.things that I think this oommit·
tee has to ascertain. First, after the orc;ler was issued, did sotneone
make a decision at Fort Detrick to send back your 5 grams. Also, did
someone make a decision to include the U.S. Public Health Service
quantity that probably momentarily. was up in Narragansett, R.I.,
and throw that in.
Mr. Chairman, I have here a number of requests. As well as the
Army, we are going to have to call the Public Health Service to find
out why they were producing deadly poison, why they were a part of
this whole thing.
Mr. GORDON. I believe, sir, Senator Schweiker, if I could have a
moment--
Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes.
Mr. GORDON. I can surmise, sir, for what it is worth. I believe the
U.S. Public Health Service-I cannot address myself to the mechanism
of how it arrived from the Public Health Service to Fort Detrick,
specifically the Special Operations Division.
Senator SCHWEIKER. That is what we want to know, and that is our
job to find out, Dr. Gordon.
Mr. GORDON. I believe the Public Health Service-and I say this
sincerely-I think, it is injustice, if I may say this, that the Public
Health Service was raising or cultivating or making shellfish toxin
for the purpose of a poison, per Be; in my humble opinion, they were
making these auantities to study defensively immunization techniques
against the shellfish toxin.
Senator SCHWEIKER. If they had kept it there, Dr. Gordon, and used
it for that purpose, I would not be questioning that either. It looked
like they were producing a supply of far more than they needed at
somebody's expense.
Mr. GORDON. I follow your rationale.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRM;AN. I ~ollow your view that there is a sug~estion here.·
that the comJ.!uttee WIll have to fully inquire into whether other de~
artments of the G.over~ment in addition to t he CIA undertook to
c~rcumvent the PresIden.bal order by depositing this toxin in this partIcular
cache. And we wIll look into that because we want to really get
to the root of the whole question present~d here. Senator Morgan.
81
Senator MORGAN. Dr. Gordon, as I understand your testimony, you
take responsibility, along with the two of your colleagues for retainin~
;tAe-toxins that we are talking about.
,Mr. GORDON. Because of tne rationale tha,t I indicated earlier.
Senator MORGAN. That rationa.le was first, that the National SelWrity
Decision Memorandum of February 20 [exhibit 8 1J-and I be'
Ueve you refer to also the 1969 order--
i!Mr. GORDON. The press releases of November 25, 1969, and February
t,t4,1970.
>,>;S'enator MORGAN. You referred to military prop-ams, wherein since
:th&February 20 order, which is actually the NatIOnal Security Councihrder--
'
,Mr. GORDON. Which I have not seen.
Senator MORGAN. The memorandum that you have been referring
~,or the document that you have been referring to is February 14,
;was actually the press release-that the memomndum itself was dated
~bnlary 20.
Mr. GORDON. I understand that.
..senator MORGAN. That reads, following the review of the United
"tates military programs for toxins, the President has decided-so
f~t, part of your rat~onale was, it applied to military programs ~
il:~hMr. GORDON. That IS correct.
P;.Senator MORGAN. And you contended that shellfish toxin was not a
hjQlogical weapon ~
~.~Mr. GORDON. In a true sense of the definition, sir-and again, par(
antbetically, we recognized and admit to a gray area here. Also parenthetically,
that both chemical warfare laboratories and biological
~arfare laboratories, both groups worked on this particular substance,
'r.1 would like to throw in that there is a chemical, or was a chemical
. ent program, polytoxin, at, and only at the chemical warfare
ratories.
Senator MORGAN. Dr. Gordon, I see some faults with your rationale,
ecially with regard to the toxin part. I must say I do not attribute
bad faith or motives at your having arrived at that decision, but let
sk you further-you say you have never seen any memorandum
mthe President or from the Director of the CIA, with regard to
posalofthesetoxins~
'Mr. GORDON. That is correct, Senator Morgan.
Senator MORGAN. Your decision not to destroy these was based on
iV&ur rationale, without any guidelines from the Department of De·
"nse, the National Security Council, or anyone else j
~''illMr: GORDON. That is correct, based on the announcements that I 0.1.
,:Ud'ed to in this testimony.
nator MORGAN. Since you originally made that decision, have you,
ny time, ever seen a memorandum, even since this matter came up,
ch later set forth any guidelines for the destruction of biological
acteriological toxins ¥
r. GORDON. Within the Department of Defense'
enator MORGAN. The Depa.rtment of Defense, or the CIA ¥
r. GORDON. I have never seen anything along those lines in the
, because in my judgment, again, I am repeating myself, I know~.
cause,in my judgment, these particular press releases, and including
18ee p. 210.
82
the National Security memorandum, referred to military programs,
and was directed only to the Department of Defense.
Senator MORGAN. Dr. Gordon, as I read the memorandum of November
of 1969 and February 20, 1970, or the press release of February
14, the President instructed the Secretary of Defense to make recommendations
concerninJ!; the'disposal of existing stocks of toxins, weapons,
or agents. To my knowledge I will state to you, Dr. Gordon, that
these recommendations l~ave not been promulgated. I h&ve not been
shown a copy of them.
As a matter of fact, I refer to a document dated JllJluary 25, 1973,
a memorandum for the- President, made b;V a comIJlittee of the National
Security Council, and has been classified Top Secret. I understand,
Mr. Chainnan, I would have to have pennission from the White
House to quote from it.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well; I am told by staff that th&t is correct.
Senator MORGAN. In this memorandum, Dr. Gordon, dated January
25, 1973, the Committee reports to the President as follows: "No
procureme~tor product~onof ?ff~nsive weapons was unde~taken du~mg
the perIOd under reVlew~Wlthm the framework of &pphcable enVlronmentallegislation,
disposal or demilitarization of unneeded stockplles
of chemical we&pons has continued."
Then, let's get down to the second paragraph, the main part, and
still classified, "All research and development of biological weapons
h&s been terminated. Programs for disposal:of stocks of these weapons
is now virtually complete." Does that not indicate to you-that &S of
January 25, 1973, the pro~a.m for the disposal of biological weapons
had not been promulJ!&ted ~
Mr. GORDON. Within the Department of Defense, Senatod
Senator MORGAN. This is a memorandum from &committee of the
National Security Council to the President.
Mr. GORDON. In my judgment, I construe that as pertaining to the
Department of Defense only.
Senator MORGAN. It goes on to say, "The labor&tory quantities of
agents (not weapons) will be ret&ined to support defensive rese&rch."
Does this not indicate that as late as January 25, 1973, the President
knew that biological weapons still existed and that some biological
weapons ~ould be retained for research W Is that not &logical conclusion
to you ~
Mr. GORDON. Within, again, the Department of Defense; yes, sir.
Senator MORGAN. Referring- to the Department of Defense--
Mr. GORDON. I agree. I put it in the context of my judgment, Senator
Morgan, that it applies to the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense
Department. I keep repeating that.
Sen&tor MORGAN. If the Secret&Ty of Defense h&d promulgated re~ulations
at the request of the President for the destruction of biological
weapons, do you not think it would have applied to all of them, all
agencies¥ _
Mr. GORDON. In my opinion, this is the directive promul~ated by the
Secretary of Defense for his particul&r responsibilities, echelons within
the Defense Department, ultimately.
Senator MORGAN. I am not reading a document of the Department of
Defense. What I am saying, Dr. Gordon-you may not understand
83
me-I think the President understood that there would be some prob·
,1~ms in the disposal of biological and bacteriological weapons, and I
'think he must have understood that there would b~ some need to retain
sqIne for research, and I think this is why he asked the Secretary of
,!)dense, who is on the Na.tional Security Council, to promulgate some
,guidelines for doing this very thing. I
And according to this memorandum to the President, it appears to
nie that as of as late as January 25,1973, these guidelines had not been
})xomulgated. I think what I am-saying, Dr. Gordon, is that somebody
IS trying to tree you, and I think we are treeing the wrong one. I think
.,the fault lies at a higher level.
'Mr. GORDON. Senator Morgan, I would appreciate some clarification
as to how you see the A~ency's role in that particular directive, sir.
Senator MORGAN. I thmk the Agency role would have been to follow
(wnatever guidelines the President and National Securit:y Council may
have set up after receiving recommendations from the DOD. I think
you exercisedlour judgment, perhaps wrongly, but exercised it, based
,:on the fact 0 what you understood it to mean-from what I read,
:What I have here, something else may turn up later on. The way I read
',this, as late as 3 years after the original order there had been rio program
devised or prepared or promulgated for the disposal of these bac>
teriological or bIOlogical drugs, and it was the responsibility of the
President to enuncia,te this program.
I have 1 minute left. If I could ask you one question. What quantity
of shellfish toxin was considered to be adequate for laboratory
';'purposes ~
Mr. GORDON. For ex;perimentallaboratory purposes, from the point
of view of immunizatIOn, serving, defense, I am informed-and it is
("Mt too unreasonable-b~ my technical consultant, Dr. Batlin, that the
'2,3,4 gram-that range 1S not unreasonable.
,Senator MORGAN. Thank you, sir.
Mr. GORDON. Thank you~ flir.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Baker.
Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent from the
hearing room. Therefore, I will relinquish my rights at this time for
1(}\lestioning.
The CHAIRHAN. Senator Hart.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Gordon, if you had been the President
of the United States in 1970, and you had wanted to order the
destruction of highly toxic material that the CIA had had produced
,.~ ,the Department of the Army, what kind of language would you
!.have used ~
Mr. GORDON. Wow. Senator Hart, with all due respect, I do not think
'I-could possibly put myself into the position of the President of the
United States. I do not know how to answer that question, Senator.
Senator HART of Colorado. Was there no language, as far as you
"'ere concerned as an operating officer in the CIA, that would have
'Conveyed to you the proper meaning, that you and Dr. Gottlieb should
'ha-ve destroyed that material ~ You could not devise that lan~age in
'fQUf mind, other than to say "Now, Dr. Gordon, Dr. Gottlieb, I under!
lstarnd you have some material over there. I want it destroyed, along
'With everything eIse."
Mr. GORDON. Senator Hart, with all due respect, if we are going to
"<build this scenario, I would be happy to participate in a scenario that
84
follows. If I were the President of the United States, and it bothers
~e to say t~is-in w1?-at way, it al?pears to me possibly that the NatIonal
SecurIty Councll representatIves-the Director of the CIA being
one of them, might have been &$ked in some manner whether or not
these kinds of materials were materials that were of interest at any
one time, current interest--if so, a report on that whole subject matter,
pursuant to the White House announcement possibly could have been
requested from the CIA. If such a report had been requested, I think
~uch of this would have surfaced undoubtedly, in my mind, at that
tIme.
Senator HART of Colorado. Following up on that point, if the Director
of the CIA had asked you whether to your knowledge the CIA
possessed, either in its own facilities, or someplace else, materials fallmg
under the Presidential order, would you have responded affirmatively
or negatively ~
Mr. GORDON. Affirmatively.
Senator HAm' of Colorado. Is that with hindsight ~
Mr. GORDON. Let me think this thing through, Senator Hart. If at
that particular time, the Director, through the chain of command had
indicated by memo or by some indication of a request which reached
me, to ~ea~ch and re.r0rt tmd inventory-for th1l.:t matte.r, ~ suspect
any belJ.avlOral materIals, whether they be lethal, mcapacitating, of a
biological and/or chemical nature, or in the case of toxins, the grey
area of both, that would have immediately been complied with.
Senator HART of Colorado. If you had used the langua~e that the
President had used, would you have printed these materIals on the
list?
.- Mr. GORDON. The President's language in the public announcements?
Senator HART of Colorado. Would you please put these materials on
your list, if the Director of the CIA, Mr. Helms, had asked you to list
all of the materials that you knew of that fall within the description
of the statement of the President?
Mr. GORDON. Yes j I would have so indicated that a stockpile of these
particular materials were being held at the Special Operations Division
of the Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, Fort Detrick.
Senator HART of Colorado. Contrary to what opinions you may have
fonned this afternoon, this committee is not prosecutorial. Our function
is remedial and not one to find out who was wrong in the past but
prevent any wrongdoing- from happening in the future. Based on the
hindsight that you now possess, what kinds of guidelines would you
suggest that this commIttee recommend or would you recommend
directly to the CIA to prevent misunderstanding- of this kind arising
in the future?
Mr. GORDON. I do not see how this kind of a thing could ever occur
again within the Agency.
Senator HART of Colorado. Why is that ~
Mr. GORDON. :Because of the fact of the discu!'lSions, testimony that
you have heard here from myself and will hear from others that there
was a loose control existing, established by my predeceesors and continued
to be established because of the nature of that particular vault,
tha.t of a storeroom. In hindsight and I am not at all sure on hindsight.
I do not know whether or not a storeroom is really ever inventoried
because there is no in or out traffic, Senator Hart.
85
Sena.tor HART of Colora.do. I a.m ta.lking a.bout the brea.kdown of
;communications between mid-level and higner level officials, not just
~his particular vault. i .:,Mr. GoRDON. If, in your judgment, Senator, of the policy of the
Jjldlest level, if they, f,elt that th~ particular directives we~ appli~
l101e to Agency polICies and actIOns I suspect that there IS a case
~:be made, Senator Hart, that some implementation for Agency conlSicteration
and interest should then have come down as a directive
tJirough channels.
'.' Senator HART of Colorado. You are suggesting as a remedial step,
:tQa.t under circumstances such as this, not identical but such as this,
t1j,at the Director and his deputies send down orders spelling out
'Plhat the CIA's obli~ationsare.
,~'Mr. GORDON. I think that is a reasonable statement, sir.
Senator HART of Colorado. How about information flowing up ~
}¥hat if they have no idea that this kind of capability exists; how
a,ra they supposed to find out1
Mr. GORDON. Correct. I think that it is a two-way street. I think
~l:iodicallyand I suspect to some degree at the time, I do not know
£he de.pth because I cannot speak past my particular position, con~
l'SatlOns were held. I am not aware of anything in writing, but I
$llspect that conversations were periodically held; to what depth I
navano idea, sir.
.Senator HABT of Colorado. In your career in the CIA, were you
ever aware of events or facts that you thought the Director or his
immediate staff did not want to be aware of or did not want to know ¥
'Mr. GORDON. Could I have that question again, sir~
Senator HART of Colorado. In your career in the CIA were you
ever aware of a set of facts or a set of circumstances that you thought
tnat the Director did not want to know about and it was made clear
tQyou that you were not to convey up 1
Mr. GORDON. No, sir.
Senator HART of Colorado. That is all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
, c:The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart has suggested, Dr. Gordon, that pertmps
you are overly generous in assumin~ for you and your immediate
associates the blame for what has happened here. I would like to put
,this one question to you and then Senator Mathias has a final Question.
",If you had been shown the memorandum.of the National Security
Council, dated February 20, 1970, and had read it, and had been told
,tnat it applied to the CIA and had read the first paragraph of the
memorandum, which reads: "The United States will renounce the
fU"Qduction for operational purposes, stockpilinlZ' and use in retaliation
of toxins produced either by bacteriolo~cal or biological processes or
by chemical synthesis;" would you have read that and understood
that to mean the shellfish toxin?
Mr. GORDON. Senator Church, if I had seen such a directive from
the top mana~ement levels of the CIA. I seriously doubt whether I
~~my little sta.ff would have moved-in our jud~ent-I seriously
,floubt whether we would have not been tri~~ered by such an announce,
q),ent and certainly would have had a different kind of discussion which
would have rendered a different kind of a decision.
,The CHAIRMAN. What you are sayin~ is, had you been told of such
a directive and had it come down properly through channels to you,
that you would not have taken the action that you did in fact take'
86
Mr. GORDON. I believe that is correct, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias ~ ..1
Senator MATHIAs. Mr. Chairman, ''it seems to me that this phone
call that Dr. Gordon received from Fort Detrick raising the question
of retention of the shellfish toxin mllY be of some importance in our
investigation, as apparently it was in his thinking, because he testified
that is really where the idea origiuated. Dr. Gordon, were you aware
of what was happening at Fort Detrick at about the time you received
the call ~
Mr. GORDON. With respect to ~
Senator MATHIAS. Let me be mOl'\! specific: Were you aware that the
Army had set up an elaborate system of procedures, a very complicated
and dramatic procedure by which they were destroying the existing
biolog-ical warfare stockpiles 1 .
Mr. GORDON. That this was to occur, ::;enator, yes indeed.
Senator MATHIAS. You were aware of that at the time of the ca1l1
Mr. GORDON. As of the DOD directive lUld program, hence the two
announcements. .
Senator MATHIAS. I do not believe you told me from whom the call,
came.
Mr. GORDON. I believe I did, sir. I believe, to my recollection, it was
from the project officer, a Mr. Senseney, in the Special Operations
Division of Fort Detrick, Md., Army Biological Warfare Laboratories.
Senator MATHIAS. On whose payroll was he?
Mr. GORDON. Biolo~ical Laboratories payroll, the Army project
officer, to my recollection.
Senator MATHIAS. He was a Detrick employee and not an Agency
employee? .
Mr. GORDON. That is correct, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. Now, since he was a Detrick employee, Ilnd since
he was presumably speaking for the Anny, did you read anything
special into his message ~
Mr. GORDON. No, sir, because I suspected his consideration for salvaging
the shellfish toxin was no different than the considerations that
we had expressed earlier of the extreme amount of time, money, and'
resources that have gone into getting the shellfish toxin in those quantities
to the particular component.
Senator MATHIAS. You recounted the conversation. You said he
merely called up and said, "If you want to, come get it."
Mr. GORDON. That is correct.
Senator MATHIAS. Did he imply that this procedure had been considered
or discussed by anyone in the Army or was this just his own
idea ~
Mr. GORDON. Procedure meaning the offering¥
Senator MATHIAS. Yas j the offering.
Mr. GORDON. I have to simply indicate in retrospect that he was representing
the feelings of the Special Operations Division to offer-·
Mr. Senseney being, in my opinion, the spokesman, for I suspect 80ma-;
conversation had t8.ken pja.ce at the SpeCIal Operations Division.
Senator MATHIAS. The conversa.tion did not reflect either that the
retention of the toxin would or would not be violative of the President's
order or that it would or would not be within the exceptions
that might have been created for research purposes.
87
'Mr. GORDON. No, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. Thank you.
~'I'he CHAIRMAN. Senator :Mondale 9
ilSenator MONDALE. I believe that you just testified that Mr. Sensenl'y
~'the Department of Defense in hIS conversation with you suggested
.Il,~ransfer of their stocks to CIA. Did I understand that correctly ~
:Mr. GORDON. Our stocks, the Agency's holdin2's.
&nator MONDALE. Let me understand, woufd it be that you would
~ept control of the DOD toxin, shellfish toxin f
1",Mr. GORDON. All these years they had been holding in their reposi~
i-y, Senator Mondale, the Agency's stockpile-is all that was being
~ffered, and again for the record, to the best of my recollection'--and I
tnalcated this earlier in closed session-I use the name of Mr. Senseney
JI,S,the project officer. I do n~t have a:ny doeu.mentation. The phone call
~~ld have been made by hIS superIOr but It was the SpeClal Operamms
Division representative-but it was our particular Agency stockpile,
Senator Mondale, that was being offered back to us. We never
I't~d it as a repository. Now, it is being offered back to us to maintain
m9ur secure safe vault.
Senator MONDALE. As I understand it, in the same vault there were
lOme CIA stocks of shellfish toxin at the Fort Detrick facility and
there were also some DOD-owned stocks.
Mr. GORDON. It appears that way.
Senator MONDALE. Both the DOD- and the CIA-owned stocks were
~e'turned to Washington and placed in the warehouse here, is that
~rrect1
'Mr. GORDON. In a secure safe.
;;:tSenator MONDALE. Were you aware that these stocks which were
,rllinsferred then to the warehouse in Washington contained toxins
formerly owned by t~e DOD9
,Mr. GORDON. No, SIr.
Senator MONDALE. You did not know that1
·!Mr. GORDON. No, sir. I thought in all good faith I was to be given
'fhe Agency stockpile of five grams. I read, of course-I just do not
.&11 the exhibit shown to me with the specific listings of the contents
lOf.those cans.
Senator MONDALE. As I understand it, as the testimony developed
'toGa.y, your final judgment was that the order to destroy shellfish toxin
was directed at the Department of Defense and not CIA~
:)Mr. GORDON. That is correct, sir.
Senator MONDALE. All right. That der,ision was made by you, Dr.
Qottlieb, and who else 9
,Mr. GORDON. Let me, if I may, refer back to the conversation that
I:i.ndicated here, where after the memorandum outlining the options,
the possibility of transferring our stocks to the private laboratory was
(turned down. I was informed b;r Dr. Gottlieb and I hastened to comply
and I went up to Fort DetrIck to terminate our particular project
:and told them that all the Agency holdings were to revert to their
:iJ)wn particular repository, to do whatever they pleased with. That
\Was the extent, to the best of my recollection, of the conversation.
.. Senator MONDALE. The decision was that the CIA stocks need not
be destroyed because they were owned by the CIA and not the mili88
tary and that the order was directed to the military, not the CIA j
is that correct?
Mr. GORDON. Senator Mondale, after that conversation from Fort
Detrick subsequent to going up there, the particular stockpile was to be
theirs for their use in the disposition. The only subject that then became
a topic for conversation was shellfish toxin, not anything else.
Senator MONDALE. Right. Listening to your testimony today I
thought what you were telling us was this: that the reason that it was
fundamentally determined that you need not destroy the toxin was
that the order ran to the Defense Department, not the CIA.
Mr. GORDON. That, plus the consideration that we, in our judgment,
considered this as a chemical entity. ' , _
Senator MONDALE. All right. In urgjng that consideration" you,
Dr. Gottlieb, and who else decided it1
Mr. GORDON. Dr. Gottlieb was not informed at the time that a smdl
group made the decision to receive the shellfish toxin. Dr. Gottlieb
was not in the picture, Senator Mondale.
Senator MONDALE. It was you and others in your shop who made the
decision that because you were not in the military, the order of
destruction did not apply to you.
Mr. GoRDON. That is coITecl.
Senator MONDALE. You are oJI technicians, chemists, biologists, and
so on. What led you to believe that you had the authority to make
what is essentially a legal judgment1
Mr. GORDON. We did not look at it in that light. We looked upon it
as a technical consideration.
Senator MONDALE. How could you do that1 This is a consideration
of the order as to whether you were technically in the reach of the
Presidential decree to destroy these toxins. You decided that you were
not because you were not in the military. Did you assume that you had
the authority to make that legal judgment 1 --
Mr. GORDON. I can only repeat that I never, in our conversations
among ourselves, ever considered or talked about, not being lawyers,
any legal considerations or implications, sir. We worked on the sub- ,
ject matter strictly from the point of view of a chemist. Was this;
substance something that had definite, interesting, hi~hly lethal qualities
as a chemical agent1 The answer collectively after much discussion
apparently was yes, and we made the decision on that basis.
Because the decision was rendered as, in our judgment, as a chemical
agent, we felt that this was an ordina.ry, highly letha.l a.gent to be kept
in a safe, secure storag-e area, and proceeded to do so.
Senator MONDALE. We have gone far enough.
The CHAffiMAN. It never even occurred to you to raise the question
with legal counsel as to the scope or direction of the Presidential order,
and how it would apply to you ~ Do you think that is a. judgment that
scientists a.re competent to make ~
Mr. GORDON. I have to answer candidly. It did not occUr to us a.t
that particular time that we were in violation of a particular directive
that we had referred to the White House announcements and aga.in,·
in our judgment, based upon earlier considera.tion, the course of events
was made and followed, sir.
Senator MONDALE. It seems to me that when we press the defense,
that this was not practicable within the meaning of the order because
89
i~as a chemical, we hear the military defense and when we press
the military, we get a chamial defense. There is no way to get an
;answer.
... .The CHAJiRMAN. Senator Sehweiker has asked for a final question and
lenator Hart will follow.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Gordon, when you received these two cans of material, did you
'log them in in any way W
·Mr. GORDON. No; we did not, sir. We did not have a practice of
fegging. We did not have a practice in that small, secure laboratory
'oHoggin~ in material because the degree of activity was practically
nil. We d1d not look at it as a use laboratory, Senator Schweiker. It
was essentially, in effect, a storage, secure storage area-in the event
ihat it would ever be needed for an operational need, pill, or any
'other application.
,Senator SCHWEIKl:R. Here is a toxin that could kill thousands of
.people. If you walk into the CIA building you have to be logged in. I
~o not know why we do not log a toxin that could kill many thoUS8J1ds
of people.
Mr. GORDON. I would like to make a comment with respect to what
has been in the press a number of times. The only way admittedly, and
t~equ~voc~lly,that is a large amount of material for any purposes of
~p'plymg 1t m a lethal form to people-the only way th~t you could
/kIll those large numbers of people as related to the quant1ty of stock-
'pile, is, in my humble opinion, to put some of them in one long line
)&nd inoculate each and every one.
i~' Senator SCHWEIKER. My next question is, did you take periodic in~\
V,entories of your laboratory ~
Mr. GORDON. We did not, sir. I indica-ted, we did not ever take in.'
w,entory during my stay. I relied upon my project officer for that kind
.l9'ithing and I myself did not take inventory.
Senator SCHWl:IK:ER. Is it true throughout the whole CIA that you no not take inventory of the assets you have, the investment you have
3rtiiode, and the materials on hand ~ Is that a nonnal policy throughout
lithe organization W
Mr. GORDON. I do not understand that.
Senator SCHWElKER. It is hard for me to understand. That is, I
;·t'hought the CIA pretty much had to OK everything that went in or
:''()t.lt or had any money attached to it whatsoever. Do I understand we
9h'&dno policy for this, none at all, no recordkeeping at 0.111
,. Mr. GORDON. I can only address myself to the specific laboratory or
'lsecure vault area. We did not. in my particular period, even run an
mventory on those materials. They were simply there as they would be :m storage. If one were to inquire whether compound A was in the fa~
ty, I would simply ask mvproject officer to go down and inspect the
:bo-Idings and tell me or tell someone whether that substance existed.
.In retrospect, and I concur, we should have had an inventory.
.Senator SCHWElKER. The other question I had-basically you testi;
ed earlier that you asked a scient1fic colleague of yours whether the
i6W:ective issued by the President covered shellfish toxin; is that cor~
t qYou asked someone their opinion q
,Mr. GORDON. My project officer and technical consultant and myself
:were the people concerned in the discussion.
90
Senator SCHWEIKER. Did you ask the General Counsel of CIA for
his legal opinion about the orded
Mr. GORDON. No; I did not, Senator. We did not ever in o~r discussions,
not being lawyers, think in those particula.r terms-of legal counsel
or legal opinion, sir.
Sena.tor SCHWEIKER. Not being a lawyer, Doctor, it seems the first
person to call is a lawyer to find out what the legal parameters are of
the problem. .
Mr. GORDON. We looked upon this as a technical consideration only.
Hence, I have to indicate to you, Senator, that we did not think-or as
a result of not thinking-we did not ask· for a.ny legal opinion ot
counsel.
Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I have, thank you.
The CHAffiMAN. Senator Hart W
Senator HART of Colorado. One final question, Dr. Gordon. Is it your
view that, had you to do it all over again, you would have swallowed'
these poisons ~
Mr. GORDON. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddleston W
Senator HUDDLESTON. One question. You said that Dr. Gottlieb was
not a party to this decision. Is that correct1
Mr. GORDON. That is correct.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Was he subsequently advised1
Mr. GORDON. No; he was not.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Was any person higher than you 1
Mr. GORDON. No; the only people informed among our own low
group was myself, my pro;ect officer, and technical consultant.
Senator HUDDLESTON. For what purpose did you conceive that you
were storing this and retaining it1
Mr. GORDON. I will answer that and then before I close this session,
Senators, I would appreciate if I could ha.ve the opportunity of a. concluding
statement1
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; of course.
Mr. GORDON. We felt that we would retain this material first of all
because of an extremely high cost in resources that had gone into it as
we knew it at that time-into the preparation and accumulation of this
kind of material in that amount.
Second, we knew that this was information that I became aware of
following discussion with my technical consultant, that this material
was a kind of material that. was used in the suicide device that was
issued to U-2 pilots.
Senator HUDDLESTON. How did you perceive that this might be utilized
for this purpose and that the indIviduals who had a responsibility
for making that decision did not know that it existed ~
Mr. GORDON. If we were asked from the highest level on down what
substances we would recommend for the kind of purpose to super·,
cede the cy..anide pill which was the state of the art. I would then
undoubtedly, after informing my colleagues, my project officer, and
technical consultant, making our decision-this is hindsight-that we
would have informed those who had a need, that we had these materials
and we could service their requirement. '
Senator HUDDLESTON. You just kept it as a hedge a.gainst a. possible
order or instruction' J
91
Mr. GORDON. Operational need.
Senator HUOOLE8'roN. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. You would then be in the position to say, "We have
Ipod news. In a little corner here, we have some of these poisons, and
~e have not said anything about them until now, and you have asked
itts.We iust happen to have a supply available."
"Mr. GORDON. One of the things I indicated, Senator Church, over
Ire years, my rredecessor-or predecessors, if you will-accumulated
~any chemica agents that have been experimented with for a variety
t)J purposes in the physically incapacitating or mentally incapacitating
area. These are the things that became physical objects, if you will,
In those particular areas.
The CHAffiMAN. That was before the President issued his order di·
recting the elimination ~
Mr. GORDON. Much before.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
You have asked to make a concluding statement, Dr. Gordon. Would
fOU please proceed ~
Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Senator Church. I appreciate the opportulrlty
to make this concluding statement.
I thank the committee and staff for the close attention they have
~iven me during the course of this public testimony. Finally, I believe
IImcerely that our action at the Technical Services Division was in the
Jnterest of the Agency's policy in the field of behavioral materials,
~th biological and/or chemical, to maintain a potential capability'
emphasize potential capability-in the event that the need should
/arise to use these materials operationally one day. Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Gordon.
.. The committee will meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. Our first
~.. '.•.·tness will be Ambassador Richard Helms, who was Director of the
. ency at the time under examination this week.
. I· his hearing is adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
.. [Whereupon, at 4 :40 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
!to a.m., Wednesday, September 17, 1975.]

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