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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT CoMMrrrEE To STuny GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH REsPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AcTlVlTIEB,
Washington, D.O.
The committee met pursuant to notice at 10 a.m. in room 318, Russell
Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan,
Hart of Colorado, Baker, Mathias, and Schweiker.
Also present: William G. Millerl staft' director; Frederick A. O.
Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; CurtIs R. Smothers, counsel to the
minority.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearin~will please come to order.
Our first witnesses appeanng today are Mr. Richard Helms, who
was the Director of the CIA during the period in question, and Mr.
Thomas Karamessines, who was the Deputy Director for Plans (operations)
during that period.
They a.re appearing together at the witness table, and gentlemen, I
ask you to stand now to take the oath. Do you solemnly swear that all
the testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ~
Ambassador HELMS. I do.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Before I ask counsel to commence with the questions,
since I understand that you do not have an opening sta.tement-
TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HELMS, FORMER DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY THOMAS
XARAMESSINES, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS, CEN·
TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Ambassador HELMS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I have a letter I would like to read that came to me
this morning from Mr. Colby, the present Director of the CIA. It
reads as follows:
Dear Mr. Chairman: At the proceedings of your Committee on the morning of
16 September 1975, I may have conveyed an impression which I did not intend.
If by chance you, or other members of the Committee, got a similar impression.
it is important that I clarify the record now, since it might atrect your line of
questioning of future witnesses.
When I was 'being questioned as to the destruction of certaIn CIA records I
was thinking of the question in its broadest context; namely. drugs, bacteriological
agents and chemical agents. I thus answered that there were indications
of record destruction in November 1972.
(93 )
94
I realize that most listeners might have inferred that I was indicating that
records relating to the CIA·Fort Detrick relationship-in particular, records
relating to Project MKNAOMI-were destroyed.
The facts are these: records relating to .CIA's drug program in general were
destroyed in January 1978, but there Is no evidence that records of Project
MKNAOMI or of the CIA·Fort Detrick relationship were destroyed. other than
possibly as included in the general grol,lp in January 1978. I would appreciate
it if you would advise the other members of the committee to this effect.
I also referred mistakenly to a memorandum between former DCI Helms and
Dr. Gottlieb regarding the destruction of records. This was based on a misunderstanding
which occurred during my hurried consultation with Dr. Stevens.
We have no knowledge of any such memorandum.
And it is signed by William E. Colby. . '
Now Mr. Schwarz, would you please commence the questioning?
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Helms, without going through your pedigree in
the CIA, is it correct to say that you started at the OSS? You were
with the CIA from its beginnin~? .
You were at the covert side. You became head of the Deputy Directorate
of Plans. You stayed in that position until approximately 19&6
when you became Deputy Director of the Agency. You became Director
of the Agency in 1967 until you left in 19'73.
Ambassador HELMS. No, sir, that is not quite correct. The positions
are correct, but I became Deputy Director in 1965, and Director, I believe
around June 30, 1966.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.
And Mr. Karamessines, you were at the Agency in the covert side
for your entire career, is that correct?
Mr. KARAMESSlNES. That is correct, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And in 1970 you were Deputy Director for Plans?
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Yes, I was.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Helms, were you aware that the CIA had II
capability to use bacteriological and chemical weapons offensiyely?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, I was aware of that. If one has In one's
possession or under one's control ba.cteriological or chemical weapons,
they can be used both defensively and offensively.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And Mr. Karamessines, you also were aware of that
as of 1970 and before, were you not?
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And by use offensively, we mean to include killing
people, is that ri~ht1
Ambassador HELMS. Well, they have the capacity to kill people, if
they were used in that way.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you connect the CIA's biological capability with
the Fort Detrick Army facility?
Ambassador HELMS. I'm not certain I know what you mean by the
word "connect/, but the biological weapons, as you re,fer to them,
which the Ag-ency was experimenting- with were kept at Fort Detrick.
This was a joint program between the two organizations-the U.S.
Anny facility at Fort Detrick and the CIA. I believe we paid Fort
Detrick for that part of the facility and that part of the materials
which we used.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you know, Mr. Helms, one way or the other,
whether the A~ncy also had in its possession and in its own facilities
certain quantities of lethal biological or chemical materials?
95
Ambassador HELMS. It was always my impression that the bacteriological
warfaro agents and things of that kind were kept at Fort
Detrick. I realize that the Agency had in its possession in Washington,
and in some cases at overseas stations, things like L tablets and K
tablets which certainly we~ lethal, but which had limited uses.
Mr. SCHWARZ. RecolPlizing it is difficult to be sure of a negative,
let me ask you the questIon, nevertheless.
Did you know that the only location of CIA biological weapons was
at Fort Detrick, or was the possibilit~ in your mind that there were
such weapons located within CIA facihties themselvesi
Ambassador HELMS. I thought they we~ all at Fort Detrick.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Karamessines, did you have any different understanding?
Mr. KARAMEsSINE8. I also understood that they were at Fort Detrick
with the modification that there might be a small amount 'Of some of
these chemicals within the custody of the Technical Services Division.
Mr. SCHWARZ. In a CIA facility?
Mr. KARAME8BlNES. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Ambassador Helms, at some point did you learn that
President Nixon had concluded that the United States should renounce
biological warfare and should destroy stocks of biological weapons f
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, I was aware of this. In fact, I was aware
that the matter was under study from the early days of President
Nixon's administration, because I attended a NatIOnal Security Council
meeting at which he announced that he intended to have this study
made.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Ahd Mr. Karamessines, did you at some point become
aware that President Nixon wished to have such materials destroyed ~
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. What did either one of you do, if anything, to make
sure that such material in the possession of the CIA-Mr. Karamessines-
or in the possession of Fort Detrick-Mr. Helms-should be
destroyed?
Ambassador HELMS. A~ you directing the first question to Mr.
Karameesines aJid the second one to me, or--
Mr. SCHWARZ. Why don't you take the first, Mr. Ambassador, and
Mr. Karamessines the second ~
Ambassador HELMs. My recollection is that, when the order was
issued to do away with these bacteriological agents and toxins, that
Mr. Karamessines and I agreed that we had no choice but to comply.
And, in fact, when I say no choice, I do not mean to indicate that we
wanted any other choice, I just meant that we had understood that
this was an instruction that we were to abide by, and we agreed to
terminate the program.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And by terminate the program, you mean terminate
the program with Fort Detrick f
Ambassador HELMS. At Fort Detrick, yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. What was your understanding of what was done,
Mr. Karamessines 1
Mr. KARAMESsINES. Precisely the same.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, Mr. Karamessines, with respect to your answer
that you did know that TSD had in its own possession certain biological
agents, did you do anything to have those destroyed ~
96
Mr. KARA:MES8INE8. Yes. It was my understanding with Dr. Gottlieb
that not only would our }?rogram be terminated, out whatever materials
of this nature that mIght be in the custody of the Agency, or were
in the custody of the Agency, would be returned to Fort Detrick for
destruction.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you instruct Dr. Gottlieb to accomplish that1
Mr. KARA:MES8INES. YeB, I did; but I want to elaborate on that comment,
lest I leave the impression that there was some reservation on
the part of Dr. Gottlieb. There is no question in my mind about the
fact that Dr. Gottlieb, Mr. Helms, and I were of one mind as to what
we should do with the program and the materials.----they sijould be gotten
rid of-and instructions were accordingly issued to Dr. Gottlieb.
Mr. SCHWARZ. In that conversation, was Mr. Helms made aware of
the fact that there were materials in the possession of the CIA itself ~
Mr. KARAMESSINES. I can't recall. "
Mr. SCHWARZ. Would you both look at the document previously
marked as exhibit 1/ which purports to be a draft memorandum from
Mr. Karamessines to the Director of Central Intelligence ~
Have you both seen that document previously ~
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Yes; and I would like to make a comment with
respect to that document if I may, Mr. Schwarz. The comment relates
to a story in the Evening Star yesterday. It was a mistaken story, but
it does say that the committee provided the Star-or made availablea
copy of this memorandum, "written by me." Now, I did not write
that memorandum.
The CHAIRMAN. I might say, Mr. Karamessines, that that memorandum
was made available to all newspapers as a result of the public
hearinp: which was featured yesterday.
Mr. KARAMESSlNES. I'm sure it was. Thank you, Senator.
I never saw this memorandum; I never wrote the memorandum; I
never signed such a memorandum; and I was unaware of the contents
of the memorandum.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And, Ambassador Helms, you never saw such a
memorandum?
Ambassador HELMS. No, Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, Mr. Ambassador, I want to follow
one line with you and then my questioning will be finished.
Relating to your comment that you heard early that the Presidentthat
is, President Nixon-was interested in getting rid of biological
weapons--
Ambassador HELMS. Biological weapons in war. I think we ought to
appear pretty precise about this, because he was trying to do away with
the use of bacteriological and chemical agents in wartime. In other
words, to destroy populations and so forth, and this was the general
thrust of this whole-of that whole investigation.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Are you trying to take the same position that Dr.
Gordon did yesterday? That the President's order did not apply to the
CIA~ .
Ambassador HELMS. No; I was just trying to correct what you were
saying. You were far too generalm your statement of what President
Nncon had in mind, that is all.
1 See p. 189.
97
Mr. SCHWARZ. Is it your Wlderstanding that the President's order
did apply to the CIA 1
Ambassador HELMS. Certainly.
Mr. SCHWARZ. After the subject was first raised by President Nixon,
was there a study group formed up by the National Security Council ~
Ambassador HELMS. I would have assumed so because when matters
were taken under advisement at the National Security Council, some
staff mechanism went into effect to draft the papers and the options
and so forth so that the President could make a final decision.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you, yourself, disclose to such a body, such a
group, the fact that the CIA had, and had had, stocks of biological
weapons?
Ambassador HELMS. I do not recall having divulged to this groupin
fact, I do not think that under normal circumstances we would have
divulged a secret activity of this kind to this particular study group.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you divul,lfe such activity to Mr. Kissinger, who
was then the Secretary of the NSC ~
Ambassador HELMS. I do not recall having discussed it with Dr.
Kissinger.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you disclose such activity to President Nixon ~ .
Ambassador HELMS. Well, the existence of the activity in the
Agency, and similar activities, I am sure were known to proper authorities
over a period of time.
In the particular context of this event that you are speaking aboutin
other words, that the President decided to make a study of this, I do
not recall mentioning this to him, or conveying the information to him
in that context.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Let's be quite precise in connection with that answer,
Mr. Ambassador. Did you disclose to President Nixon, from the time
he took office and thereafter, the fact that the CIA had a .program
which included the offensive use, capability to use offensively, bIOlogical
devices in order to kill people ~
Ambassa40r HELMS. I don't recall having briefed President Nixon
on that, or several other programs, but you will recall, Mr. Schwarz,
that he was once Vice President for 8 years and was privy to a lot of
thin~ that were going on in the Agency then which he carried over to
the Presidency. So that the degree to which he was aware of this program,
I simply do not know.
Mr. SCHWARZ. But that is the :point. You do not know, do you, Mr.
Helms, based upon his prior service as Vice President, whether or not
he was aware of the Agency's pror-am ?
Ambassador HELMS. No j I don t.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I have no further questions, Mr. Chainnan.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smothers, do you have any supplementary questions
at this time?
Mr. SMOTHERS. I have none at this time, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Helms, I am puzzled somewhat. It has been
established by your testimony that the CIA had in its possession biological
toxins that were subject to the President's order that they should
be destroyed.
You have testified that a special study g-roup was set up by the NSC
pursuant to that order, and that that study group was not notified of
98
the possession of these materials. And you have said that you did not
think it was appropriate to give them that kind of information.
Since this was a study group of the NSC, and since, under ,the
statute you are to take your dIrections from NSC in covert operations,
why wasn't it appropriate ,to tell this study group of that
particular capability ~
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir, it is true that the statute reads that
the Director of Central Intelligence reports to the National Security
Council, which, in effect, is reporting to the President when they report
National Security Council. They do not necessarily report to the
National Security Council staff. .
Many of these study groups- that were put together on a whole variety
of matters over the years would not have been made privy to
secret intelligence information unless there was some specific request
on the part of Dr. Kissinger, or someone, that they should be so
briefed. So this was the custom, not an exception to the rule.
The CHAIRMAN. Was i·t also the custom not to inform the Secretary
of State or the President who indicated his interest that these
materials should be destroyed ~
Ambassador HELMS. Weli, sir, you know, I think that, in fairness,
when the President indicated. that he wanted -this matter studied, he
had not, at thllit time, made the decision. This National Security
Council staff group studied the matter and then made a recommendation
'to him, and it was after that th8lt he made the decision that they
should be destroyed. He had not made i·t before.
The CHAIRMAN. Well when he made the decision that they should
be destroyed, it was given great publicity. And then a memorandum,'
which 'appears in your notebook-would you please locate it ~
Ambassador HELMS. This National Security Council Decision
Memorandum.
The CHAffiMAN. Right. I call your attention to this Decision Memorandum
44, [exhibit 8 1
] which is dated February 20, 1970. It is
directed to you, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, along
with the others-the Vice President, Secretary of State, and the
Secretary of Defense. The subject of the memorandum is U.S. Policy
on Toxins. I read the first part to you:
Following a review of U.S. Military programs for toxins; the President has _
decided that, one, the United States will renounce the production for operational
purposes, stockpiling and use in retaliation of toxins, produced either
by 'bacteriological or biological processes, or by chemical synthesis.
Now, yesterday, when Dr. Gordon testified, he said that he had
never received, at any time, any instructions from you or from Mr.
Karamessines, or from anyone of his superiors in the CIA, to carry
out this order. He also testified that he had never seen the order,and,
that had he been shown the order, he would have destroyed the toxins.
I think that is a fair summ8ltion of his testimony.
He further testified that he read about the President's policy in
the newspapers, and attempted to interpret the meaning of that policy
from the way it was carried in the newspapers.
Now why wasn't this order given to him in the fonn of a directive
to make certain that the President's policy was implemented ~
1 See p.210.
99
Ambassador HELMs. Well in the first place I was under the impression
that when I had asked to have the program terminated and the
President's instructions 'abided by, that Dr. Gottlieb would have issued
the necessary orders to his people to see that this was done.
In the second place, since it was my understanding that these toxins
and so forth were at Fort Detrick, that is the place they would have
been destroyed.
And, third, as far as this document itself is concerned, I noticed
that it is cla.ssified secret. And, under the requests of the White House
at that time, top secret and secret documents were restricted in their
dissemination in the Agency quite rigidly. These documents came
to me in the first instance. This one I am sure I would have passed
to Mr. Kammeasines. Whether the document itself would have gone
further than that I do not know, but I would not think so. So that
explains the fact. that Dr. Gordon never physically saw the document.
The CHAml\Lo\.N. Certainly you are not testifying that a document of
this character cannot go to the very people to whom it is directed,
in effect, the people who had custody of the very toxins that the
President had orilered destroyed ~
Ambassador HELMS. Well, sir, I am sorry--
The CHAm:MAN. Some directive to implement the President's order
based upon this memorandum--
Ambassador HkLMS. Yes, sir, I ~01'ee.
The CHAm:MAN [continuing]. Should have been sent down to the
people who had charge of the toxins.
Ambassador HELM:s. And I thought Dr. Gottlieb had done this.
The CHAm:MAN. Did you follow up, since this was national policy
that had been given worldwide publicity, to see that your order
was complied with W
Ambassador HELMS. I never went and searched facilities, but I had
been given to understand the program had been terminated, so I accepted
that. These were employees with whom I had been associated
with for many years. I had no reason to believe that they would mislead
me or misguide me.
The CHAIRMAN. Who told you that the toxins had been destroyed ~
Ambassador HELM:s. I readahout it in the newspapers, in addition
to everything else. [General laughter.]
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Mav I make a comment on that Senatod
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Karamessines.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. After the instructions were given to Dr. Gottlieb,
instructions with which he was in full accord, he went off to carry
them out. As I testified a week: ago, he came back and reported to me
that the instructions had been ca.rried out and he was ha.:ppy to be
able to tell me further that, because Fort Detrick was gomg to be
permitted to continue to do defensive research in these areas, he had
established an arrangt'ment with one of the scientists at Fort Detrick
who would keep the Agency posted on the state of knowledge and
.developments in the defensive area. He was happy to tell me this and
I was happy to he.a,r it. And, that, as far as I was concerned-and I
am sure as far as Mr. Helms was concerned, to whom I reported
this-put a period to it.
The CHAIRMAN. Then aren't you shocked to discover 5 years later
that your orders were not carried out and tha.t not only were 5 grams
100
of shellfish ·toxin retained, but also additiona.l quantities have been
discovered in a CIA laboratory ~
Mr. K.O\RAMESSINES. Not shocked, no, sir. Disa.ppointed, perha.ps,
but not shocked.
The CHAIRMAN. Disappointed that your orders were not carried out
and that national policy was not implemented W
Mr. KARAMESSJ'NES. That is oorrect.
The CHAIRMAN. But not shocked ¥
Mr. KARAMESSINES. No, not shocked.
The CHAIRMAN. Why not shocked ¥
Mr. KARAMESSINES. I think Dr. Gordon answered $at in his testimony
as I read it in the newspapers.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Dr. Gordon's testimony was that he had grea.t
difficulty with the ·order and that he and his associates decided not
to comply with it.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Well, sir, you use the word shocked and it has
been used many times in connection with many of the activities of
the Agency and I think it is conveying a misleading impression and
I would r8ither say that my own reaction when I heard of this was
surprise and disappointment. But to tell you, since I am under oath,
that I was shocked, I do not shock easily, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Apparently not.
Senator Tower.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Helms, it has been established that although you became aware
of a Presidential directive to destroy biological and chemical weapons
stockpiles, you did not issue a writtRn directive to Agency personnel
transmitting such instructions to subordinates. It has been shown,
however, that compliance was directed orally and may have taken the
form of a direction to Mr. KaroJffiessines to veto suggestions for CIA
maintenance of chemical and biological weapons after issuance of the
order. Now, what is unclear is whether your order would have or
could have been applicable to such substances stored for the CIA at
Fort Detrick or other locations by the DOD, as well as any quantities,
however small, of such agents, WhICh may have been in possession of the
CIA itself. Now, what should a reasonably prudent Director of the
CIA have done under the circumstances ¥
Ambassador HELMS. Well, Senator Tower, I must say that I always
regarded myself as a reasonably prudent Director of the CIA, at least
I tried to behave in that regard and in that way.
Senator TOWER. I did not intend to infer otherwise.
Ambassador HELMS. I understand, but I had to start my statement
somewhere.
Senator TOWER. Perhaps a litt~e reconst~ction would help you.
Ambassador HELMS. I was dealIng here WIth Mr. Kara.messmes, and
Dr. Gottlieb, both gentlemen and officers that I had known in the
Ag-ency for many years. I do not know of any more trustworthy individuals
in the United States than these two individuals, at least based
on my long experience with them, 'patriotic, trustworthy, and loyal,
so when we had a discussion about thIS, this was as good as writing it in
letters of blood as far as I was concerned. I have never known Mr.
Karamessines to fail to do what I asked him to do or to come back and
report to me why he was unable to do it. And I think that when the
101
Chairman a moment ago was referring to our surprise ths.t these toxins
showed up in a va.ult many years later, I share with Mr. Karamessines
my own disappointment. Because, frankly, Senator Tower, we
always regard the Agency as a very well disciplined group of people.
I remember that when Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, who was my
deplity for 2 or 3 years, left the Agency, he wrote a letter to President
J-ohnson. And I remember in that letter he had words to the effect that
he had never seen a more disciplined outfit in his life, including the
United States Navy. After all, Admiral Taylor was a Naval Academy
graduate and a career member of the Naval Service and once Director
of Naval Intelligence. So, I felt that that was a compliment from an
outsider, if you like, one who had not spent his life or his career with
the Agency.
So, when we learned about this, or when I learned about it, I really
was frankly surprised because it was one of the few instances I knew of
in my 25 years where an order was disobeyed.
Senator TOWER. Was it the usual practice for you to give oral orders
or instructions to your subordinates ~
Ambassador HELMS. Constantly.
Senator TOWER. On extremely important matters or perhaps especially
on very sensitive matters, is it policy not to transmIt these things
in writing~
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, when the day comes that in an intelligence
org-anization, particularly a secret organization, everything has to be
put in writing, it is going to come to a resounding halt, I am afraid.
Senator TOWER. Now, yesterday there was evidence produced regarding'
both the toxins and the delivery systems. And we were shown a
device resembling a GI .45 pistol. In a staff interview on September 10,
you were asked about these dart guns. I would like to read from your
testimony of September 10, where we find the following comment.
Mr. Michel s.sked the question:
Were you aware of somethIng that could be fairly characterized as being a
dart gun as having been among the devices developed in stockpiling in this
program?
Mr. HELMS. I think over the years I have heard of dart guns in a variety of
contexts. I do not recall particularly in connection With the toxins. I have heard
of dart guns with poison on the end. you know. The natives use them in Latin
America. I believe the Agency had things of that sort, you know. You fire them
with rubber bands or something of this kind. I have no doubt you know, there
was quite an arsenal of peculiar things developed by TSD over the years for use
in one context or another.
Now, during your tenure as Director, did you ever consider employing
this dart gun or similar weapons against a huma,n target 1
Ambassador HELMS. No, sir, I do not recall ever having considered
it, let alone authorize it. It might interest you, Senator Tower, to
know that when that gun was put on the table in front of the chairman
yesterday, that was the first time I had ever seen it.
Senator TOWER. So these kinds of things actually remained within
TSD and were not somethin~ that you were fa,miliar with in detail.
Ambassador HELMS. I certamly could have seen them if I had chosen
at any time. I never chose and they were never brought to me and
Be I simply state the simple fact that by chance I had never seen
that dart gun until yesterda.y.
Senator TOWER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chainnan.
102
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mon.dale.
Senator MONDALE. Mr. Helms, yesterday I believe you sat through
the hearings at which Mr. Gordon and Mr. Colby testified and heard
Mr. Gordon, in effect, defend the actions of his office in not destroying
the toxins on two grounds. One, that they were not chemica.l or
biological toxins, within the meaning of the Presidential order requiring
de8truction. And, two, in any event the order for destruction
ran to the Department of Defense and not to the CIA. In your judgment,
are either justifications valid ~
Ambassador HELMS. Well, sir, I do not want to characterize Dr.
Gordon's perceptions of things at the time and which was proper and
which was improper. I did listen to him yesterday afternoon and I
thought that he made a very articulate case of what he had in his
mind at the time and I have no interest whatever in criticizing him.
I just simply want to say, in order to clarify this matter a little bit,
that as I was listening to him yesterday, I realized that not being
either a chemist or a biologist and having no competence in either of
these arelliS, I would not have known how to write a directive that would
have encompassed everything that he was talking about yesterday.
So, I simply cannot contribute to this except to say that it was my
impression, and I say impression because I am not an expert, that we
were supposed to get rid of those thin~s and that is why I ordered
the program terminated and these thmgs were everything that I
thought you could draw a circle around as appl~ing to the President's
directive. But when a scientist comes to draw m the circle, he would
probably draw it differently than I would.
Senator MONDALE. In other words you are testifyin~ that in your
judgment there is doubt as to whether these were toXIns within the
meaning of the Presidential order.
Ambassador HELMS. Like I say, I do not know, sir.
Senator MONDALE. Even today do you have doubts ~
Ambassador HELMS. I have heard no expert witness except Dr.
Gordon. I do not know whether some other witness would support
him or not. I understand that you have a distinguished witness here
who developed these things in the first place and who is going to
testify before you. And whatever he would say, I would be prepared
to accept. That is the way I have had to do these things.
Senator MONDALE. What of the defense that the order to destroy
toxins, if included within the order, did not run to the CIA ~
Ambassador HELMS. Well, Senator Mondale, I do not think that
I want to take refuge in that kind of an argument. My understanding
of what the President wanted was that he wanted these things got
rid of and whether they were in the Army or the CIA, he wanted
them disposed of. I was not, in other words, taking a legalistic position
on this, I was just trying to abide by what I thought were his wishes.
Senator MONDALE. But the other day when we had our off-therecord
discussions, you indicated that what had happened was "a very
serious breach of their instructions." Would you still stand with that
description ~
Ambassador HELMS. That is the way I felt, sir. But I had not, at
the time I made that statement, heard Dr. Gordon's explanation. I
have not communicated with Dr. Gordon in many, many years, if ever,
<In thAt. T CliCl not know what he had on his mind. I simply made that
103
statement because that is based on the facts as I knew them at that
time. That was what I thought this was.
Senator MONDALE. In any event, at the time, it is your clear recollection
that it was your understanding that the toxins within the control
of the CIA were to be destroyed. You ordered, orally, their destruction
through Mr. Karamessines, and later you were surprised
to find out that they had not been destroyed.
Ambassador HELMs. Not only later, some 5 years later.
Senator MONDALE. That is correct. But in any event, this was a
breach of your instructions to destroy the toxins.
Ambassador HELMS. It seems so to me.
Senator MONDALE. What authority does the CIA have for developing
this chemical and toxic capability ~ I am now asking the question
in the context of the pre-Presidential order. Where do you draw your
authority to develop such a capability ~
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, these actIvities, as I recall it, Senator Mondale,
started back in the early fifties. I do not remember whether they
started when General Smith waS the Director or when Allen Dulles
was the Director. Nor do I recall under what rubric at that time they
made the decision to go ahead with these things. I must confess that
when I became Director I do not recall going back into the legislative
orlegal history of it. I simply had accepted the fact over the years that
the Agency was expected to maintain defensive capabilities and be in
the vanguard of these exotic things for the simple reason that a good
intelligence organization would be expected to know what his adversaries
were doing and to be in a position to protect himself against the
offensive acts of his adversaries.
During the fifties and sixties, there were occasional incidents which
reminded us that we must be very careful and stay involved in this
kind of activity. For example, I think it was in the year 1957, and I
want to say here that I have been trying to refresh my memory in the
IMt 24 hours about these events and, so if I get some dates wrong or
some names wron~, I hope the committee will forgive me. I am not intending
to mislead or falsify, but I think it was some time around 1957
a RUSSIan KGB agent, named Stachinsky, came to Munich. And, using
some kind of a poison spray or dart or weapon of this kind, killed one
of the leaders of a Ukranian dissident movement that was located at
Munich, Germany, by the name of Leo Rebet. A couple of years late1
the leader of that Ukranian movement, Bandera, was killed by a similar
assault by the same man using poison materials, as I recall it.
If it wasn't poison materials and there was a dart with poison on
it, I am sure that the records of the West German Government will
show this.
But, in any event, there were two people that were murdered. And
it is not that we assume this. Mr. Stachinsky subsequently defected to
the West German Government and confessed these thing'S and I believe
was convicted and served some kind of a sentence or other. So, it is in
the public record that this occurred.
In the sixties, a West German Government technician, an audio
technician, was sweeping. And for the benefit of those who are not
technicians, there is a device whereby one can go over a room to- find
. out if there are any listening or audio devices having been planted
in the room. Havin2' swept the West German Embassy in Moscow,
104
he came across various microphones and other audio installations in
the Embassy and obviously they-were pulled out and the work of the
KGB or whoever put them in was obviously brou~ht to naught.
This poor fellow one Sunday went on a train nde up to some mono
astery outside of Moscow and in the process of this holiday of his he
was sprayed with mustard gas or some similar poison substance on the
legs. the result of which he lost the use of his legs for the rest of his life.
These exotic matters are seldom in the hands of the ordinary citizen,
so one would have to assume that this was a KGB or GRU operation.
With these things recurring constantly in life, the Agency obviously
felt it had to keep up to speed on these, not only to protect our own
people against such attacks, but, if worst came to worst, and we were
ever asked by the proper authority to do something in this field, we
would be prepared to do so.
Senator MONDALE. Mr. Karamessines, could you tell us what you
think happened which resulted in the countermanding of your order to
destroy the toxins ~
Mr.'KARAMESSINES. Sir, of my own knowledge, I do not know what
happened which resulted in the countermanding of the order. I do
not think there was a countermanding of the order, Senator Mondale.
I think there was a failure on the part of someone to carry out an
instruction that he had been given. At least that is the impression I
get from what I have read in the newspapers of some of the testimony.
Senator MONDALE. However, it is defined, you issued an order to
destroy the toxins, and in fact, they were not destroyed.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Mr. Helms, I, and Dr. Gottlieb jointly agreed
that this program had to come to an end, a.nd Dr. Gottlieb took off
with that instruction.
Senator MONDALE. And were you surprised, then, to find out that the
toxins had not, in fact, been destroyed 1
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Yes, sir.
Senator MONDALE. One final question-who or what is P600 1
Mr. KARAMESSINES. I never heard of it before.
Senator MONDALE. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAmMAN. Thankyou, Sena.tor Mondale.
Senator Baker.
Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairmanu.
Mr. Helms, I have reread now the letter from Director Colby to
the chairman dated September 16, in which he indicates that he may
have misspoken of the situation with respect to the destruction of
records. It is my summary of Mr. Colby's letter that he says that when
he was being questioned-and I assume that was my question to Mr.
Colby-about the destruction of certain CIA records, he was thinking
of the question in its broadest context, namely, drugs, bacteriologic
agents, and chemical agents. "I thus answered that there were indications
of record destruction in 1972." To me, that sentence says that there
was a destruction in November of 1972, but it was not the records that
you think, or that may have been inferred from my testimony.
You were Director of Central Intelligence Bot that time; were you
not~
A --1..- ..1~_U~.....a T... 1Q'T9.. V"'Q. Ai,..
105
Senat?r BAKER: Ye~, sir; in November of 1972. Can you give us any
further ~nformatlonIn that respect ~ What records might Mr. Colby
be speakmg of that were destroyed in November of 1972 ~
Ambassador HELMS. I do not know of any records that were
destroyed in November of 1972. There were some records on the
drug te~ting program, which have nothing ro do with bacteriological
or chemlcal agents. It was an entirely different thing, I think, in 1973,
just before I left the Agency.
Senator BAKER. But there were none destroyed, that you know of,
in 1972~
Ambassador HELMS. No, sir.
Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I would ask either that Mr. Colby
return or that he give us a further supplement to his letter in that
respect, because the second paragraph of the letter would su{:!;gest to
me that something was destroyed in November of 1972, and It is not
clear from the record, what; and in view of this witness' testimony, I
think that becomes important.
The CHAmMAN. I think the committee will follow up in an appropriate
way.
Senator BAKER. Thank you, sir.
In the third paragraph, Mr. Helms, Mr. Colby says that "I realize
that most listeners might have inferred that I was indicatin~ that
records relating to the CIA-Fort Detrick relationship, in partIcular
records relating to Project MKNAOMI, were destroyed," MKNAOMI
being the code word for chemical, bacteriological warfare agents.
Ambassador HELMS. At Fort Detrick, that whole project.
Senator BAKER. Mr. Colby continues, "The facts are these: Records
relating to CIA's drug program in general were destroyed in January
of 1973, but there is no evidence that records of Project
MKNAOMI or of the CIA-Fort Detrick relationship were destroyed,
other than possibly as included in the general group in January of
1973." During the Watergate hearings, you and I jousted a little llibout
what was destroyed in January of 1973, I'm sure you recall, as I do.
Ambassador HELMS. Yes j I do, Senator Baker.
Senator BAKER. I will not belabor that point, except to say that I
would appreciate any further information you could gIVe me about the
documents that might have been destroyed relating In general to the
drug program in January of 1973.
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, I do not understand Mr. Colby's wording
there, quite frankly. I have testified before the committee members
this week about what I understood has been destroyed in connection
with an entirely separate drug testing program. I wish you would
read my testimony. But as far as MKNAOMI is concerned, and this
bacteriological and chemical business, I know of no destruction.
Senator BAKER. I think that probably is where we are going to end up
in this line of questioning. Would you now testify, or do you now
testify, Mr. Helms, that you have no knowledge of the destruction of
any records at any time aboutMKNAOMI ~
Ambassador HELMS. That is correct, Senator Baker. I have no
recollection of any such.
Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not mean to press
the point. In view of the lIDplications of the letter, I do respectfully
request that we ask for a further clarification of the point; that is to
106
say, what, if any records were destroyed b~ the CIA relating to their
drug program, relating to MKNAOMI, with respect to the Janu.ary
1973 destruction, and with respect to the November 1972 destructIon.
What I am after is to find out what records were destroyed, why, and
on whose authority.
Ambassador HELMS. Senator Baker, may I ask your ~dulgen~e that
when this information is acquired trom the A~ency, If there IS a~ything
about it that runs counter to my recollection, would you be kmd
enough to advise me?
Senator BAKER. I will, indeed, Mr. Helms, and I fully understand the
difficulties that you have, not only in trying to recall with specificity
the events of that period, but also to travel back and forth between
here and Iran, where you are our Ambassador. I remarked to the
chainnan previously, it seems like every time we run out of something
to do, we call Dick Helms back from Iran to testify. But if there is any
conflict, most certainly I will see that you have an opportunity to
elaborate on it.
Ambassador HELMS. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator BAKER. Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Baker, your request is a matter of record,
and I instruct the staff of this committee to pursue this matter, so that
the necessary answerS and information is received by the committee.
Senator BAKER. Thank you. -
The CHAIRMAN. I a~ree with you that that question of the destruction
of records needs to be cleared up.
Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not allege that there
was a destruction of records, but it seems to me that, in view of the
testimony yesterday, the letter today, and the testimony of this witness,
that the whole question needs to be clarified, and it can be done in a
number of ways, and I appreciate your help in that respect.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well.
Senator Huddleston.
Ambassador HELMS. Good morning', Senator Huddleston.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Good morning, Ambassador; Mr. Karamessines;
Mr. Chairman.
In reference to Senator Mondale's question to Mr. K:aramessines
about P600, Mr. Helms did not have an opportunity to respond to that.
Have you ever heard of, or do you have any knowledge about P600?
Ambassador HELMS. No, Senator Huddleston, I do not. And when
I was listening to the questioning of Dr. Gordon, I obviously was wondering
about this, and then, suddenly, I realized-am I not correct,
tlutt label was written by somebody at Fort Detrick? In other words,
by an employee of the U.S. Army, and not by an employee of the
Agency, and therefore, it possibly did not have to do WIth the tricky
words, rubrics, code words, and so forth that we use. But in any event, I
have never heard of it.
Sen~tor HUDDLESTON. It is quite possible. I do not believe we have
establIshed yet just who did place that label on this merchandise.
You said you were surprised, or that you had never before seen the
dart gun that was displa):"ed here. yesterday. You were surprised,' but
pot s~ockedto find that thIS materIal had been retained contrary' to the
reSl ent's ~rde.r. Would you be surprised or shocked t~ learn that that
h~n, or °bn~ hk~ It, had been used by agents against either watchdogs or
uman elUnt
107
Ambassador HELMS. I would be sur~rised if it had been used against
human beinf' but I'm not surprised It would have been used against
watchdogs. believe there were various experiments conducted in an
effort to find out how one could either tranquilize or kill guard dogs in
foreign countries. That does not surprise me at all.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know whether or not it was used, in
fact, against watchdogs?
Ambassador HELMS. I believe there were experiments conducted
against dogs. Whether it was ever used in a live operational situation
against dogs, I do not recall.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Karamessines, what is your knowledge~
Mr. KARAME8SINES. I have no recollection of the actual use of any
of the materials we have been discussing, sir, operational use, I mean.
I was never asked to approve an operational use of any of these materials,
to my very best recollection.
1: want to add this. In fairness, I am not sure I would have been
asked, if it were a question of putting out a watchdog in connection
with a border-crossing operation in Southeast Asia or somewhere.
I am not sure I would have been asked, but in any case, I have no
recollection of having been asked, and I have no knowledge whatever
of the actual use of any of these materials against a human bein~.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Let me put it this way, then. How low in the
echelon of command within the CIA would an individual be that
would have the ability to give permission for use of any of these
weapons in any kind of circumstance ~
Mr. KARAMESSINES. They would have to come to me, and needless to
say, I would not feel justified in giving a yes or a no on my own authority.
I would take it to Mr. Helms.
You are speaking now about using one of these operationally
against a human being-is that correct, Senator ~
Senator HUDDLESTON. That is correct; yes, sir.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Well, I would take it, without any question,
to Mr. Helms, if I entertained it at all. I would recommend against
it. And my guess is that Mr. Helms would take it further, but that is
a guess.
I want to add one thing. Mr. Helms and my other associates at
the Agency have known-my close associates have known for years
that I would not continue in the Agency if there were a requirement
for the killin~of a human being.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Just to set the record straight, was there
ever, at any time, a discussion between you two gentlemen, or between
you, either of you with Dr. Gottlieb, or any other person in the
organization! a question of whether or not shellfish toxin did, in fact,
come under the jurisdiction of the President's order?
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, if I may answer the question first. I do
not remember any discussion of shellfish toxin, as such, and I certainly
do not remember a discussion of whether or not it came under the President's
order. And as I, Senator Huddleston, was sayin~ when I was
addressing myself to Senator Mondala's question, I ani not a technician,
so I would not have even been able to debate the matter.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But you never discussed it 1
Ambassador HELMS. No, not that I recall.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Karamessines.
108
Mr. KARAMEBBlNEB. Well, sir, if discussion-if you are including
in the ~ord di~cussion the fact that ~e a~eed to get rid of this program-
If that 18 what you mean-by dIscussIon, well, we agreed to get
rid of the program.
Senator HUDDLESTON. 'But in that agreement, arriving- at that agreement,
did you ever consider whether or not shellfish tOXIn, or any other
material that you had, might not be included in the order ~
Mr. KARAHESSINES. No material was identified to me by that name,
sir. It was a question, really, of dangerous chemicals.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, we have had a great deal of testimony
from you gentlemen and from others in the organization that referred
"to my understanding that certain orders were given", or "my understandIng
that the orders were carried out," or "I had an understanding
that we had approval from higher authority to do certain things."
This has come Up a number of times, in other phases of our inqUIry.
Mr. Helms, you said that it was not unusual for you to give verbal
orders, presumably to be transmitted on down the line. Are we to infer
that that not only is not unusual but that was a standard operating
procedure, regardless of the nature of the orded
Ambassador HELMS. Well, it was certainly, Senator Huddleston, 8.
standard operating procedure to give oral instructions. The question
of the sensitivity of the matter might have something to do with it.
If it was inordinately sensitive, there was every chance that the discussion
would have been entirely oral.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Looking at this particular matter-and I recognize
we are looking at it in hindsight...::-aoes it not have a certain
sensitivity in reverse f That is to say that, recognizing that this was a
policy of the U.S. Government, which was being enunciated by the
President for consumption around the world, and thllit at some future
date, when some foreign country might have cause to question whether
or not the United States was sincere in this order, and whether it did,
in fact, carry i,t out, would it not be very helpful under those circumstances,
to have written instructions from an agency such as the CIA
and all of the Government agencies that did, in fact, implement that
order?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, I think it would have been helpful, sir.
As a matter of fact, I noticed in this National Security Council Desion
Memorandum that the Secretary of Defense was given the charge
of carrying out this affair. I do not recall any correspondence from
him with regard to it.
.1 think tliat maybe several other memorandums from various .people
mIght have been h.elpful i!1 this situation, iIl.pluding a definitlO!1 of
exactly what a tOXIn was, If Dr. Gordon waS as bothered about it as
he indicated yesterday.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Let me say that also in our inquiry there have
been at least indications that in other instances in which the CIA was
involved, and in which the various embassies of various countries were
ve~y much concerned, and also our National Security Council, great
paInS have been taken to pre.pare minutes and instructions in writing,
and that those minutes and Instructions be very carefully devised so
that they would indicate precisely what the actions were, what the
-:\merican position was-now, why, in a matter this important, that
mvolved a chang-e in policy of the U.S. Government, was it not felt
109
that here again, it would be important to have incontroverti~le evidence-
that can only be done in writing-, and eyen then, there!s often
some que~ion-that your Agency did, ill fact, Implement the mstructions
of the President of the United States ~
Ambassador IiELMs. Senator Huddleston, I cannot help saying t~at
if I had various things to do over again, I would have done t~em dIfferently
and I think in light of what has transpir~d here, I~ I ~ad
known then what I know now, I certainly would have Issued a dIrectIve
in writing.
Senator HUDDLESTON. In light, too, sir, of .your pr~se~t positiol~ as
Ambassador to Iran, how serious would you Judge thIS kmd of action
if it were discovered that an agency of the Federal Government had,
in fact, contravened, or failed to carry out, an instruction of the President
on a matter of international concern ~
Ambassador IlELMS. Well, sir, I agree that when it is isolated as a
particular instance in time, that it can be made to assume large and
significant proportions. I would like to remind you that the Agency
activity was a very modest one. It had nothing to do with vast bacteriological
and chemical substances, large in quantity and large in
scope. In addition, I have to say that all of us in the Federal Gov;ernment,
for better or for worse, have many decisions on many things
that we are obliged to do every day, and I cannot say at the ,tIme that
this particular Presidential order, of which there were many every
week, loomed as large as you make it seem to 100m. That is all I can
say.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But the President went to great lengths, this
country went to great lengths, if I recall correctly, to make quite a public
relations display of this fact, and even to the extent of publicizing
the destruction of some of this material.
Ambassador HELMS. I realize that, sir. And I testified earlier, I
thought the material had been destroyed, and did not give it another
thought. And I must say that when it showed up, as I understand it,
some days later, its existence in the Agency vault was unknown to me,
and it is a little bit hard to look for something that you do not expect
to find.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Just one more question. In the matter of oral
instructions versus written instructions, was it assumed that when an
oral instruction was given by you as head of the Agency to Mr.
Karamessines, who in turn would ~ive the instruction, in this case,
presumably to Dr. Gottlieb, that thIS would prevail all the way down
the line; that all of the communication would bl.'- simply by words 1
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir, and this happened constantly.
Senator HUDDLESTON. And iit was always carried out, but in spite of
this discipline that the organization has-and I have no reason to
9uestio~ it-~r. ~ordon testified yester~ay that he had never seen any
mstruchons WIthin the CIA for hIm to dIspose of ithese lethal weapons.
Ambassador IlELMs. I believe that was his testimony.
Senator HUDDLESTON. That is corr~. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAmHAN. Thank you, Senator Huddleston. Senator Mathias~
Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A few minutes ago, Senator Baker commeilited on the very heavy
demands that we have put on Mr. Helms j the number of times we
have asked him to corne back from Iran, and I think that is certainly
110
true. And the committee owes him a debt for the cooperative way in
which he has wttempted to assist us. But I might offer him, ~ consolation
what we might 0011 a Bicentennial thought on that subJect.
J ~mes Madison, in contemplating the kind of structure of Government
that was set u~ 200 years ago, said of these hearings that the
right of freely examming public characters and measures 1S the only
effective guardian of every other ri~ht. An.d I thinJr that puts the ~tlmony
which Ambassador Helms g1Ves thIS mornmg, and that which
Mr. Colby and others gave yesterday, in the kind of context in which
it ought to be. This is a very important process of Government, and
I think it underscores the suggestion made by Senator Baker ,yesterday
th8lt we need to have more public hearings which help to mform
the public as to exactly what this is all about. This is no secret rite·
which is conducted by high priests behind the screen. This is everybody's
business, and I think it is important that everybody understand
exaCitly what it is all about.
Mr. Helms, you know, I think, tha,t I feel that the case that we
are considering is an illustrative one. I think it is more important in
what it tells us about how the CIA works than perhaps on its own
meri,ts. With that thought in mind, I wonder if you could tell us
exactly how, in a mechanical way-just a pedestrian, mechanical wayorders
from the President of the United States are received by the
CIA and how they are carried out by the CIA.
Ambassador HELMS. Well, sir, I will do my best.
Formalistically, Presidential orders are sometimes received in the
form of National Security Decision Memoranda.
Senator MATHIAS. These would come from the National Security
Council ~
Ambassador HELMS. That's right, and they would be signed by the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. I would like to
point out that the terminology I'm using is the terminology that
derives from President Nixon's administrl1ltion. The..e::e. were not called
National Security Council Decision Memorandum in President Johnson
or President Kennedy's administration. They were called something
else. But it is a written directive promulgating, if you like, the
decision of the National Security Council.
Those normally came to me, particularly if they were highly classified,
in my capacity as the Director. And I made a decision as to
which ones of my colleagues should be informed wbout the contents of
the decision. There were times when we met together to decide how
the decisions ought to be carried out.
There was another kind of Presidential order, and tho.t is the kind
that would be issued via his Assistant for National Security Affairs, be
it Dr. Kissinger or be it McGeorge Bundy, or whoever was acting in
thDit capacity. He might call on the telephone, on the secure phone, and
~ive an ,nstruction tho.t the President wanted carried out, a request for
mformo.tion.
Obviously, I would then do wha.tever I thought was appropriate to
either ~et the answer to the question or to pass the order down the line.
ObVIously, there was a third kind, in which the President himself
might request something. He might call on the telephone himself, or
he might call one into his office, and he would decide upon what you
were supposed to do. And then, the Director would go back to the
111
Senator MATHIAS. Would that third kind of category be in the crisis
situation, the Cuban missile crisis, that kind of--
Ambassador HELMs. It might be in a crisis situation, or interestingly
enough, it might be in a dead calm situation. I do not think that the
President, at least in my experience, particularly calculated whether
they were putting the request in writing, or whether they were making
it ?rally. It just was the fact that on a certain day, they wanted som~thmg
done, and took whatever measure there mIght be to see that It
was done.
I want to say that generally, at least Presidents Kennedy, Johnson
and Nixon, for whom I worked most closely, usually left it to me as to
how the order was to be carried out within the Agency. I do not think
that any of them have ever gone to the pains to find out exactly what
the A~ency hierarchy was, or who would be the next fellow to learn
about It. So they left that judgment to me. But these did come in at
least these three ways.
Senator MATHIAS. And then what would you do to transmit these
orders into action within the Agency?
Am'bassador HEIMS. Well, I like to think that I was an orderly
executive, and I would normally call in the Deputy Director who was
in charge of the particular activity, where I thought this request fitted.
If it involved two of the Deputy Directors, I would call the two of
them in. In other words, I would get into my office all of those individuals
that, it seemed to me, would be helpful in carrying out whatever
instruction we had been given.
Senator MATHIAS. Now, you say you would call in the ones who
were involved in the execution of the policy that the President had
directed?
Ambassador HEIMs. Senator Mathias, may I-maybe not for your
benefit, certainly, because I realize you know these things, but maybe
for the benefit of others-the Agency was divided into directorates,
and there were four of them, and they had rather specific functions.
There waS a support directorate which had within it the various elements
that supported the operations and the existence of the administration
of the Agency.
There was a Directorate for Intelligence, which did the collation
and analysis on the various intelligoence studies, current and otherwise.
There was a Deputy Director for Plans in my time, who was in charge
of covert operations, and there was a Deputy Director for Science and
Technology who had both operational and analytic capabilities in the
science and technology field. So, I would have to judge exactly into
which one of these categories the instruction fell, or under which two
or three categories it fell.
Senator MATHIAS. Now, were these Directorates segregated very
carefully from each other, or was there intercommunication between
them?
Ambassador HEIMS. The Deputy Director of Plans is segregated in
the building from other Directorates. In fact, there are signs in the
halls indicating when you got into that part of the building. As for
the rest of it, they were not so particularly segregated. There was a lot
of visiting back and forth.
Senator MATHIAS. So that that was a watertight compartment. But
there might be intercommunication elsewhere.
112
Ambassador HELMS. In Navy tenns; sir, far from watertight integrity,
I want to tell YQU. But n~vertheless, there was effort made to
~re~~~ ~
Senator MATHIAS. Well, if there was this compartmentation, did
that inhibit understanding of a Presidential directive which came
down through you, through whoever was Directod Was it desirable
that knowledge of a Presidential direotive or direction was widespread
throughout the Agency, or was it" desirable to hQ,ve it only
known by the people who were immediately involved in executing it ~
Ambassador HELMS. Well, it was generally, sir, the latter, particularly
if it was on a sensitive matter. But I do not thin,k in this particular
case that would have entered our minds. I think that in the"case of
the toxins and the bacteriological weapons that we would have gone to
the man who had this under his aegis, III this case Dr. Gottlieb, and ask
him to carry out the instruction.
I must say that, in hindsight-I say even in hindsig-ht-this looks
like a fairly simple matter. And the fact that it has been so complicated
with the passage of time is a great surprise to me.
Senator MATHIAS. How did you normally carry out the oversij:!;ht
in the execution of a Presidential order?
Ambassador HELMS. I suppose that there is no good, clear-cut answer
to that, because Presidential orders and instructions were of such
variety. If the instruction, for example, were to produce some evidence
or a document, then that was the answer, and that was the followthrough.
In certain other categories of things, we had an inspector
general system that ran various checks through all elements of the
Agency, or almost all elements of the Agency, periodically, in an
effort to find out if there was compliance with directives, and arrangements
for covert agents and all kinds of things of that sort.
In other words, we thought it was what was an orderly procedure;
to make sure, in these farflung field stations, for example, people
were doing what they were supposed to be doing in keeping with the
re~lations.
I want to say that, in this particular case, I realize that there was
no followup that found these toxins. But I have been scratching my
head ever since I heard about this as to what would have been a normal
practice in a situation where you did not know that something existed.
I mean, I had genuinely thought these things had been destroyed at
Fort Detrick.
Senator MATHIAS. If, just as a matter of organization, and I am
thinking now of the kind of recommendations this committee will
ultimately have to make-if, as a matter of organization, there had
been less compartmentation, more sharing of information, might a
situation of this sort have come to light?
Ambassador HELMS. I do not want to seek refuge in that, Senator
Mathias. I do not think so. I do not think that compartmentation
in this case was at fault. Maybe human communication was at fault,
but not compartmentation.
Senator MATHIAS. Of course, if there is greater communication, then
you have a wider participation, wider knowledge, wider sharing of an
oversi~ht capacity, rather than falling into the kind of trap that is
described by the old saw: Who is taking care of the caretaker's
daughter when the caretaker is busy taking care 1
113
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Mathias. Thank you.
Senator Hart?
Senator HART of Colorado. Gentlemen, you both testified thatyou
were generally aware that the CIA had some relationship with Fort
Detrick's Special Operations Division to investigate toxic capabilities.
Is that correct?
Ambassador HELMS. Well, I knew that we had an arrangement with
FortDetric~in this g-eneral field, yes, sir.
Senator HART of Colorado. That is my question.
In connection with this investigation, I would like to cite three
experiments or studies that were conducted, to see or to test your
recollection and knowledge of those experiments. First of all, I will
quote from a June 1, 1969, study report done by Fort Detrick on this
toxic experimentation. Quoting from that report, one study that was
conducted:
The General Services Administration and Fort Detrick entered into a cooperative
project to investigate the vulnerability of drinking water in Federal
buildings to covert biological attack. After consultation with the design engineers
in the GSA, the Food and Drug Administration Building in Washington,
D.C., was selected for investigation. The engineers assured us that the drinking
water system is typical of that installed in modern multistory buildings.
,They then proceeded to conduct two tests, one to eliminate chlorine in the
water. The second test was a simulated covert test. A colipheed was introduced
into the system by back pressure . . ,"
Ambassador HELMS. A what ~
Senator HART of Colorado. C-o-I-i-p-h-e-e-d. I think it is a non-toxic
chemical of some kind. I am just laying out the background so you
will undersband the nature of the question.
. . . was introduced into the system by a l>ack pressure technique at a drinking
fountain. This is a technique a saboteur might use. Neither the building occupants
nor operating personnel were advised that such a test was planned. We
were not challenged, and apparently undetected.
The final quotation from the study:
From limited consultation with design engineers, it should be possible to develop
simple guidelines for 'Planning an attack on a group of people that work
in a building constructed with the circulating chilled drinking water system.
The question to both of you is, were you aware of this experiment?
Ambassador IlELMS. Senator Hart, I was not.
Mr. KARAME8SINES. I never heard of it. This is the Department of
Defense and GSA, did you say, sir?
Senator HART of Colorado. That is right, at DetriCk; Special
Operations.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Well, whoever it W'aB, I never heard of it.
Senator HART of Colorado. Do you know whether or not CIA personnel
were involved in this study?
Ambassador HELMS. I did not hear of the study, sir, so I do not
know whether they were involved.
Senator liART of Colorado. But you have no knowledge as to this
experiment or vulnerability study tha;t your personnel were involved?
Ambassador HELMS. Not that partiCUlar one.
Senator HART of Colorado. Let me cite another, with the same questions.
This is quoting from an internal CIA document, which is dated
October 18, 1967, Technical Services Division.
114
In anticipation of '8 future need for information, and to esta'blish 8. capability,
a stuuy on the vulnerability of subway systems to covert attack and development
of 'a method to carry out such ana,ttack was conducted. The suitability
of the system was lI8Sessed and evaluated eovertly, utilizing the New York City
subways as the trial model. The result provided information on distribution
and concentrations of organisms which are obtained. I do not know what that
means.
The data provided the means of assessing the threat of infeetion to subway
passengers. The study provided a threat ·model and information on ease of ilissemination
and methods of delivery which could be used O'1fenaively.
Now, because of the fad that this isa memorandum originating in
the CIA, I would ask if either of you were aware of this vulnera;bility
study for the development of this defensive cap1libilit'y.
Ambassador HELMS. Excuse me, Senator Hart. Did you say who
had written the memorandum to whom ~ ,
Senator HART of Colorado. It is my understanding we have been
requested by the CIA not to divulge the name of the individu8.l. It
was a middle-level officer in the Technical Services Division of the
CIA, and the date was October 18,1967.
Ambassador HELMS. I do not recall the study.
The CHAIRMAN. I would suggest, Mr. Helms, that you take a look
at this memorandum. It might be placed before you.
Ambassador HELMS. That would be helpful.
The CHAmMAN. It is exhibit 6.1 So you can examine the document
itself before replying.
Ambassador HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chainnan.
Senator HART of Colorado. Now, to repeat the question, were either
or both of you aware that this study or experiment was conducted ~
Ambassador HELMS. I was not, sir.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. I was not.
Senator HART of Colorado. Would it be your assumption. based upon
this memorandum, that CIA personnel were involved in this study ~
Ambassador HELMS. I cannot tell from the wording of the memorandum
whether these CIA people were involved. or whether it was
other people involved, and we were riding piggyback.
Senator HART of Colorado. Quoting from the same document, page
2, paragraph '{ :
Three methods and systems for carrying out a covert attack against crops
and causing severe crop loss bave been developed and evaluated under field
conditions. This was accomplished in antictpation of a requirement which later
develoved but was subsequently scrubbed just prior to putting into action.
Were you aware of this study or experimentation ¥ .!~
Ambassador HELMS. Well, I do not know whether I was aware o·:ei~
this particular one, Senator Hart. But I know that at one time in thi~~
Government-and it was not only in the CIA; it. was other places as~~!
well-there was a great deal of attention given to what wheat Mlstii\l:
or rice rust would do to crops in various parts of the world. And, if
know there were studies undertaken by someone to try to ascertain he>Wi
destructive this particular disease was.
It is my distinct recollection that nothing was ever done about
but I know there were studies being conducted. and I would not ha,
been at all surprised if the Agency was involved in those studies.
1 See p. 204.
115
Senator HART of Colorado. Would you accept that answer, Mr.
Karamessines ~
Mr. KARAHE88INE8. Yes. I am not sure we were involved in the
studies, but it would be my guess that we received the benefit of such
studies. In other words, we were kept posted through the liaison that
is reflected in this memorandum.
Senator HART of Colorado. Now, gentlemen, I apologize for pursuing
this at some length, but the record we have developed so far has
to do largely with a defensive capability. That is, a lot of this toxic
experimentation was going on so that we could be prepared to counter
any threat posed by any other country and that we had to conduct
these experIments Just to be on the safe side, to know whatever we
could find out a.bout them. But in each of the cases I have cited, there
is strong reason to believe-in fact, the language in two of the passages
that I have cited specifically states that we were preparing in these
areas offensive ca.pabilities.
Now, my question, to conclude this line of interrogation, is, if we
were preparing that kind of offensive capability, why did not individuals
of your stature in the Agency know about this?
Ambassador IlELM:8. Well, Senator Hart, I would have said, in connection
with the Fort Detrick study, there was no reason why we
''should have known about it. And in connection with the other matters,
the ongoing responsibilities of these various elements were to make
,such studies.
The question that I think is most important, however, is that we
never gave any authorization for any offensive use of these things.
And I think that, in the end, is the important question.
Mr. KARAHESSINE8. I would simply add, Senator Hart, that one of
6ese is described, in part at least, as a vulnerability study. That would
ijM'gest that the idea here was to-from those who are conducting
ithe experiments or studies, their purpose, at least in part, was to see
~b:at effect the use of these methods against us would have and how
'~te could counter the use of such methods. Senator HART of Colorado. I understand that.
~'Mr. KARAM:E88INES. And this is a recurring theme, as a matter of
"'ct, throughout all of the work of the Technical Services Directorate.
~en letter bombs became fashionable 3 or 4 years ag'O and were
..\ ping off in various offices here and abroad, it was the TSD and
.kind of work that is reflected in the matters we have been discussthat
was in a position to provide the rest of the Government, in'
ng the FBI, with the solution of the proper defusing of letter
. It was they who analyzed the letter bombs and found how to
'with it. This IS the kind of work we expected TSD to be carrying
'. nstantly, to be in a position to use the method to counter it if
upon.
ator HART of Colorado. Was it also within their mandate, and
you expect it to be within their mandate, to go ahead and profiensive
operatin,g capabilities without instructions from above 1
KARAHE8SINES. Well, that depends on what you mean by offen,
rating capabilities.
~tor HART of Colorado. I think the language in the passages that
e.cited clearly indicate that we were preparing, in the case of
116
sabotaging the drinking supply of buildings, of subway systems, and
crops, to be able to do this to somebody else.
Mr. KARAMEBBINES. Yes; I think it w&uld have been within TSD's
purview to be in a position to do this if they were directed to do 80
by proper authority, and I would assume that could onl:}' be the President.
And I cannot describe the circumstances under WhICh that would
happen, because I do not know. .
Senator HART of Colorado. Well, both of you gentlemen have already
testified that you were surprised, although not shocked, that
your understanding and direction was not followed in the matter of
the destruction of the toxic materials. Is it a possiBility that those
same midlevel people who disobeyed the understandin~of the hill;hest
levels in the Agency might also have taken it uJ;>on themselvacl to implement
these operating ca.pabilities WIder some CIrcumstances ~
Ambassador HELMS. Do you know of any case, Senator Hart ~
Senator HART of Colorado. We have been studying that subject {o~
8 months.
Ambassador HELMS. I think you are drawing a very long bow and,
may I say, an unfair one. .
Senator HART of Colorado. I am asking a question. I am askin~ a
question.
Ambassador HELMS. Would you rephrase the question ~
Senator HART of Colorado. The question is, based upon your surprise
that your understanding and what you thought were your orders
were not carried out as to destruction 0-£ these toxic materials, what
guarantees would you have that the capabilities being developed in
the studies and experiments that I have described might not be carried
out by some people without proper authorization ~
Ambassador HELMS. I think in human life it is always possible that
something may ha'ppen that one does not expect, but I know of no
cases in this eategory.
Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Tha.nk you Senator Hart.
Senator Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. .
Mr. Karamessines, when you were at the Agency and runmng your
operation and critical or dang-erous materials came to your charg-e, ,
either directly or throug-h one of your subordina.tes, would it have
been normal procedure under your administrative procedures to lo~
them in?
Mr. KARAMESSINES. To log them in. .
. -Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes. In other words, if you received critical Of:
dangerous materials--
Mr. KARAMESSINES. I did not receive critical or dangerous materials.
A component under my overall jurisdiction, one component out ofai
considerable number, would have rooeived these dangerous materials,
and that WIlS the Technirltl Services Division.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Would it have open normal procedure, forg.et-:~
tin 0' this particular ca.se now. to IOIr them in ~ ..:
Mr. KARAME8F1!NES. Probably, hut I am not sure they did. I ~o n~~
know tha.t they dId, how thev handled them. Thev were the best lud@..
I could not try to tell a technician, It spedalist in a certain field, ho~
.- .:1- 1.:.. ;,,1.. ;
117
Senator SCHWEIXER. How about taking inv8Iltory ~ Did you periodically
take inventory of whatever assets you had under your control
and command 9
Mr. KARAMESSINES. No; I did not.
Senator SCHWElKER. You did not 9
Mr. KARAMEBBINEB. I personally did not, sir. I assumed, however,
that this was in the records of the Technical Services Division.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Did you sign spending vouchers or authorizations
for money spent throu~h you ¥
, Mr. KARAMESBINES. I would either siWl-I might have signed. I more
probably recommended the signature, but I might have signed, too. I
do not recall that.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I was under the impression that, lacking oversight
by Congress, that there was a very tight internal auditing procedure
where each department head and agency head within CIA had
t& put his name on the line, because we lacked these controls. Is that
not correct ~
Mr. KARAMEBBINES. It is correct.
. Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, then, in terms of spending- money for
shellfish toxin, this normally would have come under your purview
as the job you held, even though it might have been two or three levels
below you. Is that not correct ~
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Yes j that is correct.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Now, we were trying to identify yesterday
from where some 6 grams, which was 60 percent of the whole supply
~hat was found there, came. Can you shed any light on this at all ?
Mr. KARAMESSINEB. No, sir, none at all.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Overnight, I found out that instead of being
'1~e Public Health Service laboratory involved, which, at that point,
"Was Narragansett, R.I., the other can also come from a Public Health
,iervice lab, which name was not clear on the can but was clear on the
:label itself, the Taft Center at Cincinnati, Ohio. Were you aware that
!toney was going from your,department to the Public Health Service
~n both cases for shellfish toxm research 9
~tiMr. KARAMESSINEB. I am not aware of that; no. sir, as I sit here
~.. " ay. That is not to say that I was not aware of it at the time in
mmending approval or signing off on expenditures for these
ities.
enator SCHWEIKER. But somebody did have to si~ for it. Normally,
ould have been you. You are juSt saying you do not recollect that
ccurred 9
r. KARAMESSINES, Well, these approvals for expenditures of funds
based on the written record.
bassador HELMS. Senator Schweiker, may1--
. KARAMESSINEB. And the written record should show what the
is. You are asking me something now that my memory simply
t throw li~ht on. .
bassador HET,MS. Senator Schweikfir. may I interrupt to ask 8
.on of fact ¥Has it been ascertained that the Agency paid for the
reh that was ~oing on in the Public Health Service at Narragan.:
t~nd Cincinnati 9
nator SC~IKER. You are anticipating my next question, Mr.
s. That is exactly my next question. I was going to direct it to
118
either one of you, whether in fact the Public Health research labs were
paid from the CIA directly, or whether contracts were issued from the
Army to the Public Health Service stations involved.
Mr. KARAMESBINEB. The only one I WaEl aware of was the Fort Detrick
arrangement. I did not know about the others that you have mentioned.
Senator SCHWEIKER. So you are not certain whether or not the CIA
contracted directly or whether only indirectly, with the Army being the
prime contractor?
Mr. KARAM"ESSINES. That is correct.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I do have knowledge now that there was a
$194,000 contract on at least one of the instances between the Army and
the Taft Center at Cincinnati, Ohio. .
Mr. KARAMESSlNES. How does that relate to the CIA, sir?
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, because that produced some of the toxin
that you ended up with at the CIA laboratory. So that was the point
I was making yesterday; that somewhere along the line, we used the
Public Health Service to produce deadly biological toxins and weapons.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Are they biological or chemical, sir?
Senator SCHWEIKER. They are toxins. You can argue it either way.
Mr. KARAMEBSINES. Biological sounds so terrible. Chemical sounds II;
little better.
Senator SCHWJl}IKER. Would you think that is a normal--
The CHAIRMAN. No matter how you describe shellfish toxin, it does
not sound good.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. It's deadly, no question about it, sir.
Senator SCHWElKER. As it came up the other day, 10 seconds and the
dog is dead. I do not think it is much of a question whether it is a
chemical or a biological weapon, sir.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. It is not as bad aEl the atom bomb, sir, and we
have quite a few of those around here.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Going back to the issue at hand, you are com;'
pletely unaware, then--
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Karamessines--excuse me, Senator.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes.
The CHAmMAN. I just think we ought not to begin to get flippant in:
this hearin~. Obviously, we have atom bombs. Obviously, the President!:
has not ordered them destroyed. We llre discu8sin~ II failure to ca~
out a Presidential order on a matter of national policy that was widel~
publicized to the world. So let us not get off the subject. ~
Senator SCHWEIKER. I think it means an evasion, obviously, of th~
question at hand, and it to me indicates a little bit of the attitude iri~
this situation. .;;
Going back to the case at hand, the slips that were on top of tht
two cans that came into the CIA lab indicated that they were bothlJ
stored in the sa~e safe at Fort Detrick. in room 202. So both cans, t~~
5-gram can, whICh corresponds to the CIA inventory, and the 6-gJ1~'nl
can, of which we do not know the origin, were both stored in the safflt
safe at Fort Detrick. During the course of your discussions about
destroying materials and about the question of whether you wo~
retain stocks, was any mention made at all of additional material, pRJ
siblv, that was in this same safe up at Fort Detrick1
Mr. KARAMESSINYA!l. No, sir.
119
Senator SCHWEIKER. You had no discussion at all about Army surplus
stocks or other surplus stocks that might be commingled with
yours in the same safe up at Fort Detrick ~
Mr. KARAMESSINES. No, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Would you think, Mr. Karamessines, that this
ia a proper and appropriate use of the Public Health Service, as far
as the CIA and Army are concerned' What is your professional
opinion, as a retired CIA officer, whether in fact the Public Health
Service should be utilized for this kind of chemical research, if you
~ant to call it that, but deadly toxin research?
Mr. KARAME8SINES. I would asume, sir, that the Public Health
Service would have a very vital interest in keeping abreast of developments
in the field of toxins. And if the Public Health Service was
participating in such an activity, I would not find that l\lIlusual, because
Itis part of their job to protect the country, isn't it, against this type
:pf thing ~ So I would not find that unusual.
z.Senator SCHWElKER. Well, it is part of their job, certainly, to proitect
the people. I am not sure that making poison that kills tens of
~Jiousands of people is protecting anybody, and I think, really, that
:.mll3 be a normal judgIl!ent of yours, but I happen to think this is a
i'p~rversion of the U.S. Public Health Service to use it for this purr!,
ose. And I guess that is what this hearing is all about; is it not, the
.1. • jference of opinion here'
bassador HELMS. Senator Schweiker, may I interrupt just a mont,
please' I am not aware of any relationship between the CIA
the Public Health Service in this matter. If you say it is so, I
accept your word, but I have never been told before this morning.
And, second, I believe that I have read in the paper that a scienhad
said that shellfish toxin has a very real value in development
immunization and possibly in the treatment of disease. So I
. k that it is rather difficult for me to accept the fact that we are
g cavalier and that the Public Health Service is being cavalier
various people are being subverted and suborned here, when I
not think that is the case at all. And I am sorry, but I just feel I
tspeak this way.
nator SCHWEIKER. I think there are two points, Mr. Helms, to
in mind. No.1, we do now know there was a contract, at least
the Army, to the Taft Center in Cincinnati, Ohio. That is a very
t, specific relationship with the biological arm of our intelligence
cies to the Public Health Service.
. bassador HELMS. I believe the biological arm belongs to the
artment of Defense, not to the Central Intelligence Agency.
ator SCHWEIKER. By the same token, you folks financed it. You
, whether the money went from A to B to C or A to C is imial.
You were financing that program, so I think it is a very--
..3bassador HELMS. We were financing; a part of that program .n applied to the Agency, but not the entIre program.
.,nator SCHWElKER. And the second thing I question is that this is
al occurrence for the U.S. Public Health Service to spend $3
pn of Government money to get all of these toxins. Obviously,
,··"not just an offshoot or byproduct of research going on at Public .1P Service's laboratories or you would not have had to spend
120
$3 million. You had 1:;0 distill it, yo~ had to c~mpil~ it, you had to separate
it, and the Pubhc Health ServIce was domg ~liiS. .
And I think it gets to the heart of the questIon of wh.ose ~eryIce
some of the Government services are serving. And I thmk It 18 a
very direct issue, and I realize t~at you differ with me on i~. But that
is what this is all a.bout. That IS why we are here, that 18 why we
got to this state of debate between the intelligence community and
the rest of the Government and the people.
Tha.t is all I have. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAmMAN. Thank you, Senator Schweiker. I believe Senator
Morgan is now to get a chance to ask questions. '"
Ambassador HELMS. Good morning, Senator Morgan.
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Helms, I apolo~ize for not
being here earlier but I had a hearing on a bill that I had introduced
that was in the Banking Committee.
Mr. Helms, yesterday I asked Mr. Colby whether or not the CIA
had ever received any instructions from the President or the National
Security Council with regard to disposing- of the toxins in carrying
out the President's announced orders on February 1970 and in November,
I believe, 1969. Do you recall ever receiving any instructions
from the National Security Councilor the President with regard to
the toxins~
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, we received the National Security Council
Decision Memorandum on the subject of toxins and the Presidential
policy to include those in the ban that he had issued earlier in
November.
Senator MORGAN. You say now you received those memorandums.
Is that the memorandum of February 20?
Ambassador HELMS. May I check, sir, to see 9
Senator MORGAN. Yes.
Ambassador HELMS. February 20, yes, sir.
Senator MORGAN. Also the one on November 5, 19691
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir, I believe that is the one just in front,
yes, sir.
Senator MORGAN. Now, in both those memorandums, the Secretary
of Defense was instructed to su'bmit recommendations concerning the
disposal of existing stocks of toxin weapons and/or agents. Now, as of
yesterday, I have not been able to find any report to the National
Security Council that that had been done. As a matter of fact, I introduced
into the record yesterday parts of a memorandum from a
committee of the National Security Council to the President, datOO
January 25, 1973, in which it was reported that the destruction of
chemical weapons was being carried out and then it made this
statement.
All research and development on biological weapons bas been terminated.
Programs for disposing of stocks of these weapons are now virtually complete.
Now this clearly indicates to me that they were rep'0rting to the
President as late as January of 1973, that they were still working on.
the program for how to go about disposing of the toxins. And th~
next sentence is, "labora.tory quantities of agents will be retained to
support defensive research."
Now, to your knowledge, was the CIA ever requested to give an
inventory to the National Security Council of any toxins that It held'
121
Ambassador HELMs. No, sir, and I do not recall, Senator Morgan,
ever having received any communication from t~e Sec~etary of De·
fense as such or the Department of Defense on this subJect.
Senator MORGAN. It is clear to me, Mr. Helms, from the memorandum
of the National Security Council that it was intended that the
Department of Defense would devise methods and ways of destroying
these toxins and also to determine the amounts to be retained for
la:\>oratory purposes. And I find no evidence that it was ever promulgated
to any agency other than interdepartmental agencies.
This morning I have been handed a memorandum from the Sec.
retary of Defense addressed to the Deputy Secretaries and to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to various other officials within
the Defense .Department on the subject of implementation of the
fresident's decision on chemical warfare and the biological research
»lograms. It was not addressed to the CIA or any other agency outfTie
of the Defense Department. Did you ever have any knowledge of
~s having come up in the National Security Council ¥
,,Ambassador HELMS. I have no recollection of this memorandum
;&nd I do not think I have ever seen it, Senator Morgan. It is not
~miliar to me as I sit here now.
Senator MORGAN. Well, in all fairness to you, Mr. Helms, I find no
reason why you should have seen it. It was not addressed or directed
'to you. Now, in this same package of materials, and I quite frankly
4lave not had the time to go through all of them, at various places it
·.!~~ignates the amount or quantities that are to be retained or deemed
;~ecessary to complete current research in support of public health reiquirements
and for future work in the defensive research department.
:7'here they list 1.53 milligrams of shellfish toxin. Under another section
ctnat lists, for commodity development and engineering laboratory,
~.grams of shellfish toxin: shellfish toxin A redried, 1 gram; shellfish
~Gxin A clam, 1 gram; and in another place I have noticed or observed
"'here the Secretary of Defense apparently was saying what was
@eemed necessltry. You never had any indication whatsoever with reIa~
rd to any shellfish toxin you may have had ¥
.Ambassador HEI,MS. Not that I recall, Senator Morgan. May I, sir,
fisk you a auestion since you seem to be most familiar with this whole
froblem ¥ I read somewhere recently that the end of this year was the
~rminal date for the destruction of all of these materials. Is that cor!
teet¥ In other words, was there a period of 5 years during which they
Fete all to be got rid of ¥
.Senator MORGAN. Mr. Helms, I do not know and I am quite frankly
~fraid and I doubt that we have-
The CHAIRMAN. May I iust respond to that, Senator Mor~an¥
iOur next witness is Ambassador James Leonard and he will describe
~Qr the committee the particular provisions of the convention and I
!believe that that will answer the point that you have raised.
Ambassador HELMS. Thank you, thank you. Mr. Chairman.
.$enator MONDALE. I think the situation is this. The President ordered Ie immediate destruction of our toxins. but under the international
~JFeement, all countrieA, includin2' the United States, must have deh¥
ed their toxins by the end of this year.
,.!mbassador HELMS. I see. thank you. Senator Mondale.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I believe that is the situation.
122
Senator MORGAN. I think, Mr. Helms, as I read the President's
memorandwn to the National Security Council of February 20, 1970,
it looks to a further directive as to how to destroy these and I think
any logical reading of it would lead to that interpretation. And quite
frankly, I have found no followup. It seems to me somewhere along the
way someone did not follow up and surely from this National Security
Council memorandum to the President, or from a committee to the
President, as late as January 25, 1973, the President himself was advised
or should have been advised that programs for the disposal had
not then been completed.
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions ~
Senator Mondale ~
Senator MONDALE. Mr. Helms, you have spent your whole life virtually,
all of your adult life, in OSS intelligence services. There is
absolutely no one, I think, who is better equipped by experience at all
levels to help this committee understand what this evidence means and
what policy implications it might have for the Congress and for future
command and control directions, restrictions, and the rest affecting
these kinds of matters.
As I tr,Y to piece together what we have heard, it seems to me the
evidence IS somewhat as follows. First, in late 1969 we had a Presidential
decree ordering the destruction of biological weapons and substances.
Then, because there was confusion as to whether toxins of all
kinds were included within that order, a followup order was issued
on February 14, 1970, specifically directing the destruction of all forms
of toxins, whether biologically or chemically created. And that order
was issued on February 14. There seems to be no evidence to contradict
what you and Mr. Karamessines have said; namely, that the two of
you orally ordered the destruction of those toxins in pursuance of the
President's order.
But wha.t seems to have happened is tha.t once that February 14
order came out, there was a good deal of ,activity andsc~uss'i n at
the lower level where these toxins were held and control d. ong
other things, a proposed memorandum was developed for r. Karamessines
which he apparently never saw, suggesting that these toxins
should not be destroyed, but in effect, what you mIght call lateralled
into a private warehouse to be leased. Asa result of the need for publiC'
funds, that was turned down. Then the fact of what happened WItS
that these toxins were transferred, both those owned by the CIA:
at Fort Detrick and those owned by the Department of Defense at
Fort Detrick, except for a modest amount retained for research. They
were all transferred to a warehouse in Washington under the control
of the CIA. And higher authorities were not alerted to this transfer;
because the day they were tra.nsferred or thereabout, an inventory was
prepared that went up, that did not list the toxins, as Senator Morga.t.·.i·
~~~~ ~
I would not say that that inventory is a fraud, but I think it cOnNf
close to it beca.use they waited until the toxins were gone and thet
they prepared an inventory which said they were not there. So,'6f
the basis of that, these memorandums were then prepared to the Pr~
ident. to the National Security Council, for the head of the CIA,·arifi
.• ! -,- 't'r1kA_ ;" fal't. 11.11 hp, did d
123
So. we at:e at this point where a formal and profound, much debated
publIc pohcy w.as determ~ed by the President of the United States
and by the Nahonal Secunty Council to get rid of poisonous toxins
except for modest amounts needed for research but instead lower level
effil?loyees in the Department of Defense, pos~ibly the CiA or both,
deCIded to keep them.
Now I suppose we could get personal about it, but I had some sympathy
~or Dr. Go~don becau~e he seemed to be sa.ying he spent his
~hole lIfe developm~ these thmgs. He had spent all of this money on
It. He thought we mI~ht need it sometime later and therefore because
of his interest in serVIng this country, kept them anyway. N~w, what
do we do a.bout it?
Amba.ssador HELMS. Senator Mondale, I do not know. I think that
your ~derstanding of Dr. Gordon's position is very decent because,
a.s I hstened yesterday afternoon, it seemed clear that not only Dr.
Gordon but several other scientists who had been familiar with the
work on shellfish toxin had rather conspired, if you like, or colluded
or whatever the most pleasant legal word is, to' find someplace that
they could put thio ma.terial where it would be safe, secure, would not
&l\1trt anybody but would be there in case it were ever needed. I can
ionly a.sSUlDe that the reason tha.t they came to this conclusion was
th-at they had enormous difficulty acquiring the clams, or whatever it
is, in the first place, and that the process of extracting the toxin is
~extraordinarily difficult and that maybe some of them h~d thoughts
"about immunization and other things, or treatment of dIsease where
it might be useful. . . .
And I think that they were yleldmg to that h\;lman. Impulse of the
,greater good. That is the only way ! can e~plam thIS bec~use, as I
listened to Dr. Gordon yesterday, I dId not hsten to a man, I~ seemed
'to me, who was doing something criminal or dirty or anythmg else.
tHe seemed to be inspired by perfectly decent motives.
.... Senator MONDALE. And we can understand that. But in fact, what
:he, was doing was deliberately disobeying a serious Prel?idential o:der
~h.ich had profound implications in terms of internatIOnal relatIOns
~n~ which raises questions about the whole process of command ~nd
,~ntrol in an instItution which, I think, must be secret but whIch,
;'ithink cannot be unaccountable. So, what do you believe are the
! ',blicpolicy implications of this record?
mbassador HELMS. Sir, I find it enormously difficult to suggest a
,tion to an aberration, something that happened once to my knowle
and I realize that the point you make about the command and
control over the employees and ~o f?rth. Ihaye .atf:empted to .Say
. I thought we were an extraordmar~lywell d.lsClplmed org~mzaand
r just do not know how you le~Islate ag~mst the odd mIstake
e odd disobeying of orders or the odd aberratIOn.. .
nator MONDALE. We have been through many other Issues, not m
'c and we always seem to end up with the same kind of fuzzy
d: Something happened and nobody did it. And I want to see a
'agency. But, in order to have one that is accountable to the
c and to the President, it must be an agency that first of all obeys
, whether oral or written, and second, that is accountable in case
at to find out what happened. And that is what bothers- me,
elms.
124
Ambassador HELMS Senator Mondale, I have no problem with your
statement. I think yo~ state the case accurately and I think in 1975
there are new national perceptions of these matters, if I may say so,
at least they are different than they were 10 years ago or 20 years ago.
I do not know how different. I am not here enough to know what exactly
all the shifts have been, but I would certainly agree that in view
of the statements made by all of ;you distinguished gentlemen, that
some result from this has ~ot to brmg about a system of accountability
that is going to he satIsfactory to the U.S. Congress and to the
American people.
Now, exactly how you work out that' accountability in a secret
intelligence organization, I think, is obviously going to take a good
deal of thought and a good deal of work and I do not have any easy
ready answer to it because I assure you it is not an easy answer. In
other words, there is no quick fix.
Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morgan has a final question.
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this observation
that I think this very clearly points up the dilemma in which we
find ourselves, as Senator Mondale has pointed out, and that is the
unaccountability of anyone in the CIA. Now, as I heard Dr. Gordon
yesterday afternoon, I heard him distinctly say that had he had an
order from the Director to destroy the toxins, he would have carried
that order out. And I think I heard him say he did not have an order
and as I understand it this morning, you have testified and so has Mr.
Karamessines that both of you orally directed him to destroy it.
The dilemma in which we find ourselves is that the manner in which
the Agency has been conducted is such that we cannot find the truth.
'Ve have conflicting testimony. Senator Mondale is perfectly reasonable
in drawing the conclusion that he drew. I could draw the same
conclusion. I could draw another conclusion that Dr. Gordon did not
know and would have carried out the orders had they been given him.
It seems to me that this points out very clearly an area which should
be looked into so that in the future there will he an area of accountability
or a degree of accountability and it seems to me, Mr. Chairman,
this may be another area where we find plausible denial coming in.
The CHAmMAN. Senator Morgan, I concur in your observations and
in those that Senator Mondale has made. And I simply want to underscore
the fact that this is not the first time that this dilemma has faced
the committee. We have faced it again and again in the course of our
deliberations, investigations of the whole assassination issue. And
that will become clear when the committee issues its report in which
the evidence taken will be laid out in careful detail. But it goes to the
?e~rt of the reason for this i~vestigationand I hope that we conduct
It m such a way that by the tIme we are finished we will have found
some answers.
Are there any further questions of these two witnesses 1
Senator MONDALE. I have a comment. I think we found out what
P600is.
Ambassador HELMS. Good.
The CHAffiMAN. If you found out, let us hear it.
Senator MONDALE. We are told by Robert Andrews, a Defense Denll.
rtmflnt. nffil1ill.J. whn iR wit.h l1R t.OOIl.V. t,hll,t. hfl think-R it iR a. working
125
fund number, work relating to CIA funds, and he thinks it is a reference
to an account number.
The CHAIRMAN. We will pursue that further because, as I recall
the labels on the containers, "Do not use, unless directed by P600."
That does not sound like a system of accounts or an account ledger.
Senator MONDALE. I know It but--
The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will track that down.
Senator MONDALE. Could we ask them to give a full report ?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; of course we will track it down. If there are
no further questions of these two witnesses I would like to move on to
Ambassador Leonard.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Ambassador HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Leonard, if you would please come
forward at this time. Because of the confusion here, we will take a
5 minute recess so we can get back to order. Mr. Ambassador, if you
would come forward and take your place at the witness stand during
the recess I would appreciate it.
[A brief recess was taken.]
The CHAlRMAN. The hearing will please come back to order.
Mr. Ambassador, would you stand and take the oath, please.
Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this
proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. LEONARD. I do.
The CHAffiMAN. Thank you. .
I understand that you have some opening remarks you would hke
to make, and I invite you to make them now.
TESTIMONY OF lAMES LEONARD, PRESIDENT, U.S. UNITED
NATIONS ASSOCIATION
Mr. LEONARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is not a prepared statement; I simply would like to state
briefly for the record, my relationship to this question which you are
looking at.
My name is James Leonard. I am, at the present time, the President
of the United Nations Association in New York. I left the U.S. Government
in 1973, after 25 years in the State Department, and for the
last 4 of those years, I was on loan from the State Department to the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as an Assistant Director, and
I wore a second hat during that period.
I was also the head of the U.S. dele~ation to the Disarmament
Conference in Geneva, known as the CCD-the Conference of Committee
on Disarmament. That was in 1969, 1970, and 1971. And in 1971,
basically between March and September, we neg-otiated at that conference,
the Treaty on Biological Weapons. .
That convention was then discussed in the General Assembly In the
fall of 1971, and it was commended by the General Assembly by a
vote of 110 to nothing. There was one delegation that abstained, and
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