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178
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Baker ~
Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to renew my previous request.
I would like very much to talk to Dr. Cowan, who may have been the
contact between the CIA and Fort Detrick on the request for the toxins
and on the recordkeeping. When the time is appropriate, I would like
to interview him. And, if it seems pertinent and relevant to our inquiry,
I would ask that he be called as a witness.
The CHAmMAN. That will be arranged.
Thank you very much, Mr. Senseney, for your testimony.
Our next, and final, witness is Mr. Robert Andrews. Mr. Andrews,
will you please come forward ~ Mr. Andrews, will you take the oath ~
Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this
proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God ~
Mr. ANDREWS. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smothers will commence the questioning.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT T. ANDREWS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE
GENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
M~. SMOTHERS. Mr. Andrews, you are currently serving as a Senior
AdVIsor to the General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Is
that correct?
Mr. ANDREWS. I am.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you have occasion to become familiar with
Defense Department efforts to destroy shellfish toxin 1
Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Would you explain the circumstances of your
familiarity to the committee, please 1
Mr. ANDREWS. By way of background, in June of this year, when
the Defense Department learned of this exercise, we appointed investigators
from the Defense Investigative Service to examine witnesses
and review records. In the course of that investigation they uncovered
a number of records which give us some indicatIOn of the scope of the
destruction program and the inventory process.
Mr. SMarHERs. It is that inventory process that I wish to address
now, Mr. Andrews. I believe you have in your possession a copy of a
memorandum dated February 17, 1970, entitled "Special Operations
Division Toxin Inventory" [exhibit 13 1.] Mr. Andrews, you have previously
seen this exhibit, have you not 'i
Mr. ANDREWS. I have.
Mr. SMOTHERS. What amount of toxin on hand does this inventory
reflect1
Mr. ANDREWS. It reflects somewhat over 2 grams.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Was this the inventory prepared at Fort Detrick 1
Mr. ANDREWS. It was.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Was this inventory prepared pursuant to discussions
between Defense and Fort Detrick personnel requiring' them to
inventory the material on hand and to indicate which matenal should
be either retained or disposed of by destruction 1
1 See p. 2••.
179
Mr. ANDREWS. Yas there is actually a directive issued January 9,
1970, to the six Fort Detrick laboratorIes requesting a complete inventory
of biological agents and munitions, and the February 17, 1970,
inventory is the first step in that process.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Was the spirit of this directive to identify any toxin
which may have been in possession of Defense facilities and to be
th~ groundwork for a basis for destruction or retention decisions ¥
Mr. ANDREW8. Initially the directive was devoted to biological agents.
Subsequently there are messages requiring inclusion of toxins in the
inventory process.
Mr. SMOTHERS. So that shellfish toxin would have been reported
pursuant to this directive ¥
Mr. ANDREWS. That is correct.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Now, looking at the February 17, 1970, inventory,
I ask you whether that inventory or any other inventory of which you
have knowledge reflected an amount of shellfish toxin of 11 grams or
more in the possession of the Department of Defense ¥
Mr. ANDREWS. It does not.
Mr. SMOTHERS. In your opinion, would some accounting for U grams
of shellfish toxin have been called for by the Directod
Mr. ANDREWS. I would say that inasmuch as the original directive
was issued in January and then later amended, that it should have
been reported.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Mr. Smothers, do your records reveal any Defense
guidance for the disposition of shellfish toxin or other substances that
were distributed outside of the Department of Defense, any guidance
regarding 'how a determination 'Was to be made on disposition, how
accounting was to be handled, or any guidance at all on that subject
from Defense9
Mr. ANDREWS. We find no such records.
I might add to the committee that in the process of checking over
our records we located 104 boxes of records in the Suitland, Md., repository.
Four of these boxes were identified as coming from the Special
Operations Division; 13 more boxes referred to the demilitarization
program. We dbtained this information from the inventory list, and
our investigators did examine 17 boxes to determine to what extent
records still were available to us.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of this
witness.
The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand, Mr. Andrews, that the DOD inventory
that was supplied at the time that the President's orders to
destroy these toxins were issued, that your records do not show any
inventory in which about 11 ~ms of shellfish toxin appears ~
Mr. ANDREWS. No. I think there isa--
The CHAmMAN. Well, we know there is about 11 grams in the possession
of the Defense Department. Why does not any inventory show
the existence of that position which the President had ordered to be
destroyed'
Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I think there is a question of dates, and I think
it is very important. On January 9 the first directive was issued askinp;
for an inventory of biological agents and munitions, and then on
February 14 the Presidential order was handed down. Now, on Feb180
ruary 17, apparently the first inventory reports were completed and
submitted to higher headquarters Qn the 18th.
The CHAIRMAN. And that was after t.he toxin had been slipped back
to the CIA. ,
Mr. ANDREWS. That is correct. Your records indicate that on February
16 there was then an unsigned memorandum containing the bottom
line, Mr. Karamessines; on February 17 our people went on record
with a report. It is entirely possible that the toxins made a transfer
somewhere between the 16th and the 17th, probably the 16th because
the 17th, if they were still in the Defense Department possession,
they should have been reported. '
The CHAIRMAN. I would have to agree to that. I think that must
have been what happened. But, it seems very strange to me that the
inventory presented by the Defense Depa.rtment should be made 1 day
after these forbidden toxins had been slipped back to the CIA.
Mr. ANDREWS. I must say, as a lawyer examining a case, I find it very
unusual, too.
The CHAIRMAN. Since the testimony shows that the CIA could lay
legal claim only to 5 grams of this and witnesses have testified that the
CIA agreed to take Irepossession of its 5 grams, can you account for
why nearly 11 grams turned up in the CIA laboratory ~
Mr. ANDREWS. I was not on the scene, and I cannot explain it. That
is one version that the CIA witnesses and others have made.
I think you should bear in mind, however, that the containers containing
the 11 grams also contained a notation P600.
_ The CHAIRMAN. What did that mean ~
Mr. ANDREWS. I provided the Committee this morninsz: with a statement
as to what it does mean. It is not very sexv, not very much I'
James Bond matter. The Inspector General's Office, Department of
the Army has confirmed that P600 stood :for a research and development
account number. Fort Detrick used this designation to describe
the working funds used by the Special Onerations Division at Fort
Detrick which had been supplied by the CIA.
The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean, then, accordinsz: to your interpretation
or vour understanding, that all of it, the whole 11 grams, belonged
to the CIA ~
Mr. ANDREWS. That is a reasonable inference.
The CHAIRMAN. Your inference runs contrary to previous testimony.
Mr. ANDREWS. You asked for my opinion, and I do suggest that the
P600 appears on both conta.iners.
The CHAIRMAN. And the reasonable inference to be drawn from
that was that the whole 11 grams. not just 5 grams, belonged to the
CIA, and that amount was returned to them ~
Mr. ANDREWS. That is the way I would read it.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Are there furthflr questions:of this witness 1
Senator Towed _
Senator TOWER. Mr. Andrews, WII,S nOD aWRre of the transfer of
shellfish toxin to more thll.n 60 individual institutions, some located
in foreilZ'n countries, including the defense establishments of some foreipn
countries ~
Ml'. ANDREWS. This is 1\ matter that we rlisrovered durin!!: the course
of the investillation, aJthousrh the extent of this dissemination just . . . .. .. ... .. . ...
181
Senator TOWER. From where did the authority for that disseminationcome~
Mr. ANDREWS. I do not know of any express authority. As I understand
it, the scientific community has a way of exchanging its specimens,
and there is, apparently, quite an interchange.
Senator TOWER. Are you suggesting this is something that was left
to the arbitrary will and discretion of perhaps a field-~rade officer
or civil serva.nt 1
Mr. ANDREWS. I do not have the answer as to where the level of authority
resides. I could obtain that for the record.
Senator TOWER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias 1
Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Andrews, are you aware of the procedures
that were established at Fort Detrick, and I aSsume at other Defense
installations, for the destruction of toxins, toxic material of all kinds 1
Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.
Senator MATHIAS. Could you describe those procedures 1
Mr. ANDREWS. Well, there are really two kinds of material. There
is the demilitarization prol{ram, which has been referred to here
earlier in your hearings, which was conducted at Pine Bluff Arsenal.
We have various documented records on that. However, the amounts of
the di~posal of the toxins in the laboratory is a matter that we have
found no records of, and we do know, for example, that one of the early
inventories shows that certain toxins were to be retained for defensive
research purposes, and that certain other amounts were to be destroyed.
The exact amount that was used in this case I do not know.
I did,ask our investi$.rators to check with the experts as to how this
particular toxin could be destroyed, and I was told that any bunsen
burner properly applied for the right period of time would destroy
the toxin.
Senator MATHIAS. Now, with regard to the procedures that were established,
was this by word of mouth, or were there carefully organized
procedures and publication of orders which detailed them ~
Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, Senator Mathias.
I think it might be well to J{o over some of the major actions that
were taken by the Defense Department. Following the President's
announcement on November 25, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs issued a memoranClum on November
28 announcing the President's determination. On December 17, 1969,
the Secretarv of Defense issued a memorandum assigning responsibilities
for implementin~each of the President's decisions. On January 7,
1970, an ad hoc task force on inventory matters was established.
On January 9 the first orders were issued to makE' a complete inventory
of biolo~ical weapons. Followin~ the President's Valentine's Day
order, as you referred to it, on Febru~ry 14. the first of the inventory
reports was prepared and submitted to the Director of the Commodity
Development En¢neerin,:r Laboratories on February 18. On February
17, tl Department of the Armv meSSRg-e was sent to Fort Detrick and
the Army Materiel Command reQuirin~ the inclusion of bulk toxins
in demilitarization plans of biolo~calstockpiles.
On February 20, the NSDM-44 was issued re~arding the destruction
of toxin a~ents and weapons. On February 28, this' order was relayed
to the immediate offices in the Department of Defense concerned
182
with such matters. On March 18, 1970, the Assistant Scientific Director
of Defense and Engineering referred to the plans for the inventory of
toxin materials and directed disposal of all excess materials using
standard laborat()!'Y 'procedures.
On June 15, It WhIte House memorandum was sent to the Secretary
of Defense requesting his recommendations for the destruction of
biological agents and weapons and toxic agents and weapons. On July
6, 1970, the Secretary of Defense reported to th~ President, submitting
his recommendations for carrying out the demilitarization program.
On September 3, 1970, there was a White House memorandum to the
Secretary of Defense directing an environmental impact statement in
connection with the Pine Bluff project.
On December 15, 1970, there was a White House memorandum sent
to the Secretary of Defense announcing the President's appproval of
the detailed plan. On November 10, 1972, the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Force Development, Department of the Anny, provided the Undersecretary
of the Anny with a report announcing the completion
of the destruction of the entire U.S. stockpile, and also indicated, incidentally,
at a cost of $15 million.
On January 25, 1973, the National Securitv Council Undersecretary's
committee provided the President It memorRlldum reportingits
review on the U.S. chemical warfare and biological program, which
had been laid on them by NSDM-35.
Senator MATHIAS. Now, Mr. Andrews, can you tell us what happened
to those materials that you mentioned which were retained for defense
research? Did they go to Dugway, or did they go to some other laboratory¥
Mr. ANDREWS. We have just made a complete inventory of all of
our facilities, and we have received reports from the Army, Navy,
and Air Force. The only facility that now has any toxins for defensive
research purposes is the Edgewood Arsenal.
Senator MATHIAS. Nothing at Dugway?
Mr. ANDREWS. There is nothing at Dugway; 110, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. One final question. We have discussed several
times during the hearings the materials that were sent out from Fort
Detrick for research purposes to scientists in various parts of the
world and all over the United States. Is it your understanding that
this was a common practice at Fort Detrick ~
Mr. ANDREWS. Based on the testimony today, it appears that it was.
Senator MATHIAS. I am asking if you have any independent knowled~
e or any records which would indicate it.
Mr. ANDREWS. In the course of our talking to 11 number of people
we learned this is a rather common practice in the scientific community.
Senator MATHIAS. And it was not confined to shellfish toxin?
Mr. ANDREWS. No, sir. It applied to many items.
Senator MATlIIA8. It applied to many items that were under study
at Fort Detrick. Of course, when this pattern or practice of moving
materials of this nature was established, that made it much easier
actually to handle, disburse, and dispense these materials, because
it was a recognized course of action. Is that not true'
Mr. ANDREWS. Yes. sir, that is correct.
Senator MA'rHIAs. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
183
The CHAffiMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Huddleston 9
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Anqrews, I think you mentioned that
the estimated cost of disposing of these materials was $15 million.
Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. In your investigation, did you get any indication
as to whether the suggestion or idea that the CIA would take
possession of its stock and it would be stored away originated with the
CIA or with the Special Operations Division there at Fort Detrick ~
Mr. ANDREWS. We received conflicting reports on that and I think
the confusion as to what happened continues. I would he reluctant
to speculate as to just how it happened.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Would you say that there is a tendency within
the Army and maybe within other agencies of Government to treat
requests from the CIA differently than you would treat requests from
other agencies or other departments ~
Mr. ANDREWS. I have been the recipient of very few CIA requests
until recently. They are not known for their loquaciousness. Since
the investigation has been conducted, I must say, they have been most
helpful and there has been a full and frank exchange, I think, between
this committee, between the CIA, and between the Defense Department.
But I have some hesitancy in answering your question, because
I just do not have enough experience as to what the response has been
to CIA requests. I think the Pentagon is a pretty big department and I
do not think we are easily impressed.
Senator HUDDLESTON. What do you think of the testimony by Mr.
Senseney that while he had questions about not g;etting any feedback
from the use of material that he had developed, he was never compelled
to ask those questions. Is this typical of dealing with the CIA
on the part of the Army?
Mr. ANDREWS. I do not know whether it is typical of the Army. I
think the CIA has in the pllst conducted its operations in such a way
that there be a minimal I11110unt of information flow back from them.
I think this is consistent with their strategy.
Senator HUDDLESTON. So that was to be expected. And even though
a person ml\Y have questions, even though the requ('Ht may be somewhat
strange, the general procedure would be just to carry it out
without going beyond the order itself 1
Mr. ANDREWS. I can assure you in the Defense Department that
we have examined very carefully into our working relationships with
all Government agencies. We have reviewed this extensively in terms
of detailing of people to us and detailing of people to the other
agencies, and I think that we are very aware of our responsibilities.
Senator HUDDLESTON. This review and this examination has been·
recent.
Mr. ANDREWS. It has bl~lm before this particular investigation broke
forth.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thel'e was no hestitancy on the part of the
Army to accept, for instance, a false name to identify CIA participation
1 Even on this particulal' project that we are talking about they
were identified as being an officer support group.
Mr. ANDREWS. That 18 my understanding as it existed in 1970.
184
t~rHunDLESTON. And this was no problem for the Army or for
ieular division even though many of them knew that they
et dealing with the CIA1
,REWS. As the CIA reported to you, this was a most comted
projeet, even under CIA standards. And in the course of
':,Bstigation we had a great deal of difficulty defining who the
, I were. and where they: belonged. So I can well understa~d the
1>f:certamty by the Detnck people as to who they were talkm~ to.
jl,i,$nll.tor HUDDLESTON. But this was accepted practice *It was not a
~atlconcern of theirs apparently. ,
'Mr. ANDREWR. I would just have to iudge that apparently it was an
lfccepted practiee becanse it continued during that period.
Senator HUODLESTON. They were operatin~ in a higohly sensitive,
mhighly secret, highly classified area, one demanding- great security,
ilind yet they were dealing with people who were there under false
,credentials, so to speak, and this was acceptablp, to them.
Mr. ANDREWS. I understand that is the nature of some of the operations.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Schweiker1
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
First of all, did you find any of the records of contracts besides the
one of the $194,000 from Anny to the Taft Cented
Mr. ANDREWS. I have not vet, but I have laid on the requirement
for the Inspector General's office to develop any additional information
you need.
Senator SCHWEIKER. The other can or lid label would indicate that
there is some arranaement. beCR,use it said on thp- label of the second
can "Working Fund Investigation)'. which would indicate that would
be nomenclature that your bookkeeping- system just quoted in the original
memo. Would that be correct or not 1
Mr. ANDREWS. I would assume so; yes.
Senator SCHWEIKER. All right, now you saii! a moment ~o that
basically, Mr. Andrews, this transfer might have taken place on the
16th or 17th of February and that is why it did not show up *
Mr. ANDREWS. That is one possibility and I might add this and this
mi,g-ht help the committee, although it may only comnound the confusion.
The memorandum which you have idE--ntified, the so-called
unsianed Karamessines memo you have identified as beinp: written
on February 16. When we obtained our copy of that from the CIA
it did not contain a date on it. Perhaps you got another copy. So we
were in the dark. so to soeak, as to when the memo was written. A~:sumina
that February 16 is right) then my answer to you is yes;
that it happened the 16th.
Senfttor SCHWETKER. Now, the 'inventorv that you took and the report
shows, was tak-en by the Army on February 17, is that correct 1
Mr. ANDREWS. Yes,sir. .
Senator SCHWEIKER. The other day at the committee hearin,g-, we
looked 'at this pirture of the labels toe-ether. and the can label shows
an inventory d'a.te of February 18, 1970. Now that would certainly
indicate to me tha't somebody missed 'R d,ay in inventory and it was
inventoried l\ day after the other materials 'and probably in building
""V, !_- ...:1..- ... ~~~- ._.,1~ Q.n;~ ,..,.l\n1rl innlM.t.n to me that the material
185
probably did not leave Fort Detrick at tha.t point since th-e.- m~~ry
date was a day after the inventory.
Mr. ANDREWS. Senator Schweiker, I had neVer $ee~ t~l\~ ptc~
until the other day. I did not realize there W'IlSIli Februlllryll!iS'«_
on it.
Senator SCHWEIKER. All right.
Mr. ANDREWS. I would agree that that just adds to the confusron
again.
Senator SCHWEIKER. The other thin~ that adds to the confusion is
that the Army has an annual report dated June 1009 in which they
show 'an inventory of their stock items,and there is 5.193 grllimS' on
the Army's own Inventory 'at that point. This is not 3 grams or 2.8
grams, but the exact amount of one of these cans. So I would hope
t11at in your ensuing investigation you would t-ake into account this
summary report, the working fund investigation of some 5.19 grams.
CIlJl you shed any light on that?
Mr. ANDREWS. Let me consult with the investigator to try to shed
some light on this.
We have noted that the figure in the 1969 report which you have
just referred to also is the same figure that appears on the Karamessines
unsigned memorandum. Now, we do not know the answer but
there is the possibility that the Karamessines memorandum merely
took the 1969 inventory report and put it in their memorandum. I am
sure that the stockpile probably changed, may have changed, during
the course of that period of time.
Senll;tor SCHWEIKER. That might 'also indicate that only 5.19 was
in fact, the CIA 9.uantity. I think you can read that meaning two
wayEi. It could indlcate that that was the CIA amount and we still
have not 'accounted for the other 6 grams, although I agree that is
just speculation.
Mr. ANDREWS. I will admit that we have generally had people refer
to the CIA stockpile. They have not referred to it 'as the CIA stockpiles,
plural.
Senator SCHWEIKER. You have, as I understand it, an ongoing investiga:
tion in this matter, is that correct ~
MI'. ANDREWS. Yes, we have.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I see also on the same cans that the inventory
date is in a personal handwriting and it seems to me that one of your
obvious checks is to find out w'ho it was that inventoried both cans
on February 18 and why he or she did not, in fact, put it on the 17th
list and why he or she did not report it upon the chain of command,
Whoever wrote that inventory date in personal handwriting
would obviously know why the materi-al was not disposed of in the
proper channels. So I would like to suggest, for your investigation,
that a check be run of who with that handwritin~was in the lab 'and
had access to the vault, because that person could certainly shedlln
awful lot of light on what happened in this regard.
Mr. ANDREWS. Senator Schweiker. we would be very happy to work
with the committee staff in developing any further facts that will be
of assistance to this committee.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Allegedly only two or three people had access
to the safe, so it would not be very hard to find out whose handwriting
it was.
186
Thnt is all I have, Mr. Chll.irmll.n, thank you.
The CHAIRMAN, Thank you, Senator Schweiker.
I want to say that since this discovery the Defense Department has
been very coopel'lltive, as indeed the CIA has been, in tryin~ to piece
togetl1er what happened, And we will pursue these lines of mvestigation
through the staff in hopes that we might complete the picture.
And I want to thank you and others in the Defense Department for
the cooperation that you have extended to the committee.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for one
clarification that I think ought to be on the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddleston ~
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Andrews, you referred to your receiving
the Karamessines unsigned memorandum and I presume you meant
that you received it during the course of your current investigation,
and not back in 1970 at the time it was purportedly written.
Mr. ANDREWS. That is correct. This is a very new ballgame for us.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I think that ought to be made clear.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator for clarifying that item.
Mr. ANDREWS. On the part of the Department of Defense, I want
to say that I think this committee has operated in a very responsible
manner and the Department of Defense, I hope, has been very responsive
to vour needs.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Now, earlier today I read into the record a letter by which the
Committee would waive the ban that presently prevents the executive
branch from disposing of these toxins. Members of the committee have
suggested some changes which have been incorporated in the text of
the letter, and I would like to read the revised letter and bring it to
the vote of the committee.
As revised, the letter reads:
Dear Mr. Colby:
Last January when the Senate Select Committee was created, Senator Mansfield
and Senator Scott asked that the Central Intelligence Agency not destroy
any material that would relate to the committee's investigation. The toxins that
are the subject of the committee's flTst public heariDRS are subject to the ban
on destruction.
The purpose of this letter is to inform you that at ,the completion of the commitltee's
investigation into the improper retention by the CIA of the deadly toxins,
the committee voted to waive further interest in these toxic materials. However,
before the CIA proceeds to destroy these toxins, we would direct your attention
to the attached testimony.
If adequate safety and security cautions could be taken, and if it is consistent
with our ,treaty obligations, ,the Committee believes that it might be appropriate
for the CIA to consider donating these toxins to properly supervised researeh
facilities which can use these poisons for benign uses such as curing such debilitating
diseases as multiple sclerosis.
It is fitting that out of an admHted wrongdoing, some benefit might be had. It
is hoped that in this particular instance the Committee and the Executive Branch
reach a mutual solution for disposal ot these lethal poisons that will be directed
toward bettering the l~ves of our citizens.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Chainnan, I move that the committee waive
further interest in the toxic materials and that the letter be authorized
The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection ~
rNo response.]
The CHAIRMAN. I would ask for the vote of the committee. Those in
favor of the motion, please indicate by raising your right hand.
187
[Show of hands.]
Senator TOWER. Senator Baker by proxy. . ,
The CHAIRMAN. Other members have indicated that they contur
with this vote and it is therefore the unanimous decision of the committee.
The letter will be signed. Do you have a pen, Senator?
I would like to conclude the hearing this morning by noting that
the committee's investigation into the 11 grams of shellfish toxin may
have reminded some of H. G. Welles' comment on the American novelist
Henry James. He described him as a hippopotamus rolling a pea.
However, a more discerning look into the CIA vault of poisons opened
this week brings to light a series of problems which go far beyond
this sin~le case.
Like other examples discovered in previous executive sessions, ana
which continue to emerge from the ongoing investigation of the committee,
the case of the shellfish toxin illustrates how elusive the chain
of command can be in the intelligence community. It underscores
dramatically the necessity for tighter internal controls for better
recordkeeping, for g-reater understanding of code words, compartmentation
and the whole range of secrecy requirements. Above all. it
emphasizes the necessity for improved mechanisms of accountability,
all the way from the White House to the outer branches of the intelligence
establishment.
The dilemmas which have surfaced in this week of hearings represent
in miniature those which will confront us throughout these proceeding-
s. Their resolution will surely test the ingenuity of those engaged
in this undertaking. Our success will require diligent research,
persistent investigation, a series of intensive hearings and the most
careful study and reflection. This is our mandate and this is our
purpose.
The hearings will now stand adjourned subject to the call of the
Chair.
[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call
of the Chair.l

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