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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1975
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMI'ITEE To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.O.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :05 a.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan,
Hart (Colorado), Baker, Mathias, and Schweiker.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O.
Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, council to the
minority.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.
Yesterday the committee commenced its inquiry into the Huston
plan, our witness being Mr. Huston. And it developed in the testimony
that several illegal proposals had been made to the President-in this
case. Mr. Nixon-that he had approved those proposals, and later, had
revoked his approval. But, the very activitIes for which authority
was sought, had in fact been going on for a long period of time, prior
to the submission of the proposals to the President.
The evidence also showed that once the President had revoked the
proposals, about 5 days after he had first approved them, the activities,
nevertheless, continued, and in some cases, were expanded.
Mr. Huston testified that Mr. Nixon was not aware of these activities,
either before or after his approval and revocation of the Huston plan.
One of the illegal activities was the opening of the mail by the CIA,
and this committee will look into that mail-opening program extensively.
It is a very serious matter. and we have hearings scheduled a
few weeks from now, at the end of which we will inquire in detail
about the mail-opening program.
We will want to know, for example, why the mail of such individuals
and organizations in this country as the Ford Foundation, Harvard
University, and the Rockefeller Foundation was reg-ularly opened by
the CIA. or why the mail coming to or from such individuals as Arthur
Burns, Bella Abzug, Jay Rockefeller. Martin Luther King. Jr.,
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., Richard Nixon himself, as well as such
Senators as Hubert Humphrey, Edward Kennedy, even the Chairman
of this committee, whose letter to my mother is in the file. should have
been regularly opened and scrutinized by the CIA ag-ainst the laws of
the countrv.
And so today, our objective is not to look at this mail program in
great detail, for we will do that later. But it is, rather, to examine the
lack of accountability within the Agency and the failure to keep the
President of the United States properly advised of such activities, a
core issue if we are going to reform the intelligence agencies and law
(51)
52
enforcement agencies of the Federal Government and make them
properly responsible and accountable for their actions to the elected
representatives of the people, chief among whom, of course, is the
President himself.
Now with that brief introduction to the general topic for the day,
I would like to ask our witness, Mr. Angleton-who, I understand, is
represented by counsel-to take the oath. Before I ask you to take
the oath, Mr. Angleton, I wonder if your attorney would identify
himself for the record.
Mr. BROWN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, my name is John T. Brown, counsel
for Mr. Angleton in these proceedings.
The CHAlR~IAX. Thank you, Mr. Brown. Mr. Angleton, would you
please stand to take the oath? Do you solemnly swear that all the
testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so heIr you God?
Mr. ANGLETON. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schwarz, would you please begin the
questioning?
TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON, FORMER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY OFFICIAL, ACCOMPANIED BY 10HN T. BROWW,
COUNSEL
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Angleton, were you employed by the CIA in
1970?
Mr. ANGLETON. Yes; I was.
Mr. SCHWARZ. What was your job at that time?
Mr. ANGLETON. I was Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And when did you start working for the CIA?
Mr. ANGLETON. I began in 1947, having come from OSS (Office of
Strategic Services).
Mr. SCHWARZ. You knew, Mr. Angleton, did you not, that the CIA
was opening mail in New York City III 1970, and had been doing so for
approximately 15 or 20 years ?
Mr. ANGLETON. I did.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. Schwarz, pardon me. If I may interrupt for just a
moment. As I indicated to the counsel for the committee, Mr. Angleton
had a very brief opening statement which he wished to make, and I
would like, at this time, to ask for the opportunity to have him make
that statement, if I may.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Yes; I'm sorry. You did say that to me, and I'm very
sorry. Would you go ahead?
Mr. ANGLETON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my
name is James Angleton. I am appearing before the committee today,
freely and without subpena. I am mindful of the serious issues facing
the committee, and I know of your concern that they be resolvea
prudently and expeditiously. I have served in the intellig-ence community
of the United States for 31 years, beginning- with the OSS
during World War II. In 1954, I became Chief of the Counterintellig-
ence Staff of the CIA, a position which I held until 1974. I am now
retired.
My years of service have convinced me that the strength of the
United States lies in its capacity to sustain perpetual yet peaceful
53
revolution. It is the ultimate function of the intelligence community,
as part of our Government, to maintain and enhance the opportunity
for peaceful change.
r believe most strongly that the efforts and motivations of the intelligence
community have contributed to the sustaining of a Nation of
diversity and strength.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAX. Thank you, Mr. Angleton.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Angleton, you just said, did you not, that you
knew in 1970, and had known for a substantial period of time, that the
CIA was opening mail in New York City?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And Director Helms knew that, did he not?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, knew that,
did he not?
Mr. A::-WLETON. I would assume so, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Well, I will read to you what Mr. Helms said in his
deposition of last week. "Mr. Hoover knew all about the mail operations."
Now, you have no reason to doubt that, do you?
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And Mr. Sullivan of the FBI knew all about the
CIA's mail-opening program, did he not?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now Mr. Helms, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Sullivan, and yourself
were all involved in the process which has come to be known as
the Huston plan, is that correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover signed the plan, did
they not?
Mr. ANGLETON. They did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And Mr. Sullivan was the primary drafter, but you
and other working persons contributed to the drafting of the report,
did you not ?
Mr. ANGLETON. Correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Would you turn. Mr. Angleton, to page 29
of the Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad
Hoc), June 1970 [exhibit 1 1 J.
Now that is talking about mail coverage, isn't it?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And it distinguishes between routine coverage and
covert coverage, saying routine coverage is legal and covert coverage
is illegal, is that correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And by covert coverage, they meant opening the mail,
did they not? .
Mr. AXGLETO::-'-. Exactly.
Mr. SCHWARZ. 'Vould you read into the record the first sentence
under the heading, "Nature of Restrictions," please?
Mr. ANGLETON. "Covert coverage has been discontinued while routine
coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth of publicity
arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage during legal pro-
1 See p. 141.
54
ceedings and publicity afforded this matter in congressional hearings
inYolving accusations of goYernmental inyasion of privacy."
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now the first five words say "covert coverage has
been discontinued," and, as you just agreed a moment ago, that states
that the opening of mail has been discontinued, isn't that right?
Mr. ANGLETON. May I seek a little clarification, please?
I bE'"lieve that if you read the contribution under preliminary discussion,
we are faced with two problems. Weare faced with the
problem of domestic mail that goes from one point in the United States
to another point in the United States.
The CIA activity was devoted to mail to the United States from
Communist countries, and to Communist countries from the United
States. So there are two degrees of opening.
In other words, the entire intent and motivation of the program,
as conducted by CIA, involved the question of foreign entanglements,
counterintelligence obj ectives.
The domestic mail program was a program that had been conducted
at some time or another by the FBI.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Angleton, would you answer my question?
The words "covert coverage has been discontinued," covert there
means opening mail, isn't that right?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I will read to you from the prior paragraph, a reference
which makes perfectly clear that the committee was talking
about both foreign and domestic mail. The sentence which says the
following: "Covert mail coverage, also known as 'sophisticated mail
coverage,' or 'flaps and seals,' entails surreptitious screening and may
include opening and examination of domestic or foreign mail." Now,
the sentence which says "covert coverage has been discontinued,"
is a lie. That is false as far as your knowledge, Mr. Hoover's knowledge,
Mr. Helms' knowledge, and Mr. Sullivan's knowled~; isn't that
correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. Excuse me, I'm trying to read your preceding paragraph.
It is still my impression, Mr. Schwarz, that this activity that
is referred to as having been discontinued refers to the Bureau's activities
in this field.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Well, the words don't say that, first of all. Second,
how would a reader of these words have any idea that that distinction
is being drawn, Mr. Angleton?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, it is certainly my impression that this was the
gap which the Bureau was seeking to cure. In other words, that they
had had such--
Mr. SCHWARZ. Let's make perfectly clear what we're talking about.
You knew, Mr. Helms knew, Mr. Hoover knew, and Mr. Sullivan
knew that the CIA was, in fact, opening the mail, and the sentence
says "covert coverage"-which means mail openings-"has been
discontinued."
Mr. ANGLETON. But I still say that the FBI, in my view, are the
ones who made the contribution of that statement. It was covering
the problems that they had had in discontinuin!! their mail coverage.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Helms signed the report, didn't he?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. I just want to have you read into the
55
record from two or more documents which relate to the U.S. Attorney
General's being informed about mail opening, but being informed in
June 1971, or in other words, a year after the Huston plan.
Would you first read into the record from exhibit 56 \ paragraph
4: of that document. And while you were looking for it, I will identify
it for the record that that is a CIA memorandum, for the record, dated
)fay 19. 1971, subject, "DCI's Meeting Concerning HT/LINGUAL,"
which was a code name for the mail-opening program. And it refers,
)1r. Angleton, to a meeJting in Mr. Helms' office which involved a
number of CIA officials, including yourself.
Now, would you read into the record paragraph 4, please ~
Mr. AXGLETON. Paragraph 4:
"The DCI," meaning the Director of Central Intelligence, "then asked, who in
the Post Office Department knows the full extent of the operation-beyond cover
surveillance. The Chief of Counterintelligence," meaning myself, "replied that
only Mr. Cotter knows, for he has been witting while with CIA and the Office of
Security. The previous Chief Postal Inspector, Mr. Montague, had never wanted to
know the extent of examination actually done, and was thus able to deny on oath
before a congressional committee that there was any tampering. Mr. Cotter would
be unable to make such a denial under oath.
In an exchange between the Director for Central Intelligence and the Deputy
Director for Plans, it was observed that while Mr. Cotter's loyalty to CIA could
be assumed, his dilemma is that he owes loyalty now to the Postmaster General.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All ri,ght. In other words, for the first time, someone
was in the Post Office Department, who, for sure, knew that the mail
was being opened. Because of that dilemma, Mr. Helms went to see
the Attorney General, did he not?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, would you read into the record the
memorandum for the record, June 3, 1971, subject, "Meeting at the
DCI's Office Concerning HT/LINGUAL" [exhibit 57 2
] the second
paragraph which refers to Mr. Helms' statement that he had briefed
the Attorney General concerning the mail opening program.
Mr. ANGLETON. Paragraph 2:
Mr. Helms stated that on Monday he had briefed Attorney General Mitchell
on the operation. (NoTE.-Mr. Helms may have meant Tuesday, June 1, Monday
having been a holiday.) Mr. Helms indicated that Mr. Mitchell fully concurred
in the value of the operation and had no "hangups" concerning it. When discussing
the advisability of also briefing Postmaster General Blount, Mr. Mitchell
encouraged Mr. Helms to undertake such a briefing.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, that document was dated June 3,
1971, and the mail opening program lasted until January or February
1973, when at the insistence of Mr. Colby, who said it was illegal,
it was dropped. Is that correct ~
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct. It was actually-the Director was
Mr. Schlesinger.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And was it not Mr. Colby who was the moving force
saying it was illegal?
Mr. ANGLETON. Precisely.
Mr. ScmvARZ. All right, no further questions, )11'. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Angleton-well, first of alL Mr. Smothers, do
you have any questions at this time ~
I.See p. 365.
• See p. 368.
56
Mr. Sl\fOTHERS. Yes; I do, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Angleton, there are
two matters I would like to inquire into briefly. First. the process
regarding approval for such actions as mail opening; and second, the
nature of this working group itself. The chief counsel has just raised
the questions regarding the statement in the report of the interagency
group, and you indicated in response to his question that that may
have been put in by the FBI. Is that correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. Pardon?
Mr. SMOTHERS. With respect to the discontinuance of the covert operation,
mail opening, as mentioned in that report, you theorized, III
response to Mr. Schwarz's question, that that may have been a statement
put in by the FBI. To the best of your knowledge, didn't the
FBI do most of the drafting on this report?
Mr. ANGLETON. The FBI, as I recall it, collected the opinions after
each meeting of the participating agencies and appeared at the next
meeting with minutes and a draft of the previous session.
Mr. SMOTHERS. All right. With respect to the question then of mail
opening, is it your experience that this kind of operation by the CIA
would have been discussed in interagency working group meetings
among persons who would otherwise have been uninformed of such
operations?
Mr. ANGLETON. No; we would not raise such fin operation.
Mr. SMOTHERS. In the normal course of things, would there have
been an approval channel other than such interagency groups for securing
Presidential advice and consent to such operations?
Mr. ANGLETON. I am not aware of any other channel.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Would such channels as the Special Group or the
Intelligence Board have been a proper place for such matters to be
raised?
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not believe that an oneration of this sensitivity
would have been raised in any body. It would have been-if there was
goin!! to be submission for Presi(lentifll approval, it would have been
raised either by the Director of the FBI or the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Mr. SMOTHERS. But in any event, it would not have been raised with
this working group involved with the Huston plan?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct. That is correct.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Mr. An!!leton, if we could turn for a moment to the
process resulting in the Huston plan itself, I would like to take you
back to your testimony before the staff of this committee on the 12th
of September. At that time, you were asked about the involvement of
Mr. Tom Charles Huston in the development of this plan. I would
like to read to you from page 16 of your transcript and ask you if it
accurately reflects your commpnts at that time.
Mr. Loch Johnson is doing the questioning, and his question to you is:
Do you think that Tom Charles Huston viewed himself as a potential arbitor
for domestic intelligence disagreements within the community?
Your response:
I think he did because his short letter of instructions to >the heads of the
intelligence community said that his role was to be what Dr. Kissinger's was in
foreign policy. It was a very clear-cut edict, so to speak, thalt he was the ultimate
authority in the Executive for domestic security.
57
Mr. Angleton, is that statement still true ~ Does that accurately reflect
your testimony on September 12 ?
Mr. ANGLETON. I think it does. I could expand on it, but I think that
is quite accurate.
Mr. SMOTHERS. But that response then is still true? You still believe
it to be true?
Mr. ANGLETON. I believe it very much so and that particularlv after
listening to Mr. Huston yesterday. "
Mr. SMOTHERS. Let me then raise with you another question regarding
Mr. Huston's role. If you would, counsel, turn to page 24 of the
same transcript. Mr. Angleton, the question is raised as to whether
Mr. Huston was in fact the White House authority, but in addition
as to whether he was competent to manage such a group as the one that
was involved in the preparation of the Huston plan.
If you would turn to the last Angleton statement on page 24, let me
read into the record your comment at that time and ask if that still
represents your view.
Talking about his experience in the intelligence area, he was very h-nowledgeable.
He had obviously gone into this matter at some length prior to the
meeting. He knew prescisely what none of us really knew, that is the depths of
the White House concern. In fact, the most dramatic moment, I think, was at
the beginning of one meeting. At some stage in the meetings after preliminary
draft had been put forward, he found it Itotally unacceptable, and his comments
were to the effect that the subcommittee was not being responsive to the
President's needs.
Does that accurately reflect your comments?
Mr. ANGLETON. It does indeed. I think it is almost a direct quotation
as it relates to his insistence, after one of the sessions. He began the
next session with the statement to the effect that the committee was not
responding~thc drafting committee was not responding to the
President's requests and was not responsive. to it.
Mr. SMOTHERS. During the course of the meetings of this interagency
intelligence group, was there any doubt in your mind that your purpose
was to respond to the White House's bidding and that the
message regarding the desires of the White House was being brought
by Tom Charles Huston ~
Mr. ANGLETON. There was no question in my mind, nor in the minds
of others. that he represented the Commander in Chief in terms of
bringing together this plan, and he certainly never qualified what his
a.uthority was. He made it very clear. and he submitted in writing that
he was to have this role for domestic intellig-ence comparable to Dr.
Kissinger's rolc in foreign affairs.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Thank you, Mr. Angleton.
Mr. Chairman, I have nothing further.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Angleton, you heard Mr. Huston's testimony
yesterday~
Mr. ANGI,ETON. I heard most of it, sir.
The CHAIRUAN. You will remember then that he represented to the
committee that in response to the President's desire to extend intelligence
coverage within this country, that he asked the various departments
of the Government involved. the FBI, the CIA, the NSA.
to come together wit.h a plan and give t.he PreA"Iident some options, and
that the purpose of the recommendations that were made to the
58
President in the so-called Huston plan, based upon the recommendations
that had come from these departments, was to secure the
President's authorization to eliminate restrictions that he felt were
obstructing- this gathering of intelligence.
Now, Mr. Huston told us that he was never informed by the CIA,
the FBI, or any agency that the mail was being opened. He made a
recommendation to the President. The President authorized mail openings,
and he testified that to his knowledge the President did not know
that the mail was being opened either.
Now, when we asked Mr. Helms, the Director of the CIA, if to his
knowledge the President had been told of the mail openings, he said,
I do not know whether he knew it or not.
So the state of the record is that to the best of our knowledge the
President had not been told that the mail was being opened. He gets
a recommendation in which it is represented that covert coverage,
which is mail openings, has been discontinued, and he is asked to
authorize the reopening of this prow-am. Now, you have referred to
the President as the Commander in Chief. Wbat possible justification
was there to misrepresent a matter of such importance to the Commander
in Chief ~
Mr. ANGI,RTON. I would say that your question is very well put, Mr.
Chairman. I can only speculate-and I do not have any record of the
discussions betweeh ourselves and the FBI during the drafting stages,
but I know we had several where matters tabled within the drafting
committee, were matters that we never explained to the ather members,
and one of them, of course, was the mail inter~pt. Again, only by way
of speculation, I believe if the President had approved, or even if
there had been some access to the President-because, I think, this is
prohably the most difficult task of all, was to have the audience in
which these things could be explained-I have no satisfactory answer
to your question, except that I do not believe that a great deal of the
mail problem centered on the Bureau's lack of coverage, not the
Agency's.
The CHAffi:MAN. But the CIA was the agency principally involved in
thp mail openings.
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct for all foreij:!n mail, not for domestic.
The CHAffi:MAN. Yes; and we will explore the whole breadth of that
program in due course. Did not the CIA have an affirmative duty to
inform thp Preside.nt Ilhout such a program ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I believe so, without any question.
The CHAIR1IIAN. But it apparently was not done. You did not inform
the President. Director Helms did not inform the President, so--
Mr. ANGLETON. I would say, sir~ not ~y w~y of any excu.se, but
those were very turbulent periods for the mtelhgence commumty and
particnJarlv for the FBI, and I think that all or us had enormous
respect for Mr. Hoover and understood the problems which he had
in sustaining the reputation of the FBI.
The CHAIRMAN. But the fact that the times were turbulent, the fact
that illegal operations were being conducted by the very a~encies we
entrust to uphold and enforce the law makes it all the more incumbent
that the President be informed of what is going on; does it not ~ It
is really not an excuse.
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not think there was ever the forum in which
these matters could be raised at that level. I think that has been one
of the troubles in domestic counterintelligence and foreign counterintelligence
that the issues never do get beyond the parochial circle
of those engaged in that activity.
The CHAIRMAN. But you have said that there was an affirmative duty
on the CIA to inform the President?
Mr. ANGLETON. I don't dispute that.
The CHAIRMAN. And he was not informed, so that was a failure
of duty to the Commander in Chief; is that correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. Mr. Chairman, I don't think anyone would have
hesitated to inform the President if he had at any moment asked for
a review of intelligence operations.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what he did do. That is the very thing he
asked Huston to do. That is the very reason that these agencies got
together to make recommendations to him, and when they made their
recommendations, they misrepresented the facts.
Mr. Al'GLETON. I was referring, sir, to a much more restricted
forum.
The CHAIRMAN. I am referring to the mail, and what I have said is
solidly based upon the evidence. The President wanted to be inc
formed. He wanted recommendations. He wanted to decide what
should be done, and he was misinformed.
Not only was he misinformed, but when he reconsidered authorizing
the opening of the mail 5 days later and revoked it, the CIA did not
pay the slightest bit of attention to him, the Commander in Chief, as
you say. Is that so?
Mr. ANGLETON. I have no satisfactory answer for that.
The CHAIRMAN. You have no satisfactory answer?
Mr. ANGLETON. No; I do not.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not think there is a satisfactory answer, because
having revoked the authority, the CIA went ahead with the program.
So that the Commander in Chief is not the Commander in Chief at
all. He is just a problem. You do not want to inform him in the first
place, because he might say no. That is the truth of it. And when he
did say no you disregard it and then you call him the Commander in
Chief.
I have no further questions. Senator Towed
Senator TOWER. Mr. Angleton, the role of certain leaders within
the intelligence community, such as that of Mr. Helms, has been of
concern to this committee. Referring back to your transcript of September
12, at page 17, you were asked about the role of ~he ~irector
of your Agency, the role of Mr. Helms. You began by dlscussmg the
first meeting of the interagency committee. You were asked who attended
it and your response was as follows, and I read directly from
the transcripts:
Mr. Helms, but he attended only for a few moments, Huston made the opening
remarks as I recall. And since it was being held in our building, Helms made a
brief appearance so to speak, the host, and he took off and I do not think from
that moment he attended any other meetings.
Now Mr. Angleton, the question is this: is this still an accurate
characterization of Mr. Helms' participation in the decisions and
recommendations leading up to a so-called Huston plan?
Mr. ANGLETON. I did not mean my statement to indicate that there
is any neglect of duty. It was simply that the working group was
62~685 0 - 76 • 5
60
qualified to adhere to certain guidelines. Mr. Helms' appearance, first
appearance, was to lend weight to the President's request and to support
Mr. Huston.
Senator TOWER. Are you saying then that Mr. Helms made no substantial
contribution to the substance of the report?
Mr. ANGLETON. No; I am speaking about the-that his original
talk was only to outline what the President required from the working
group and naturally I saw him from time to time in terms of-I
would telephone him to indicate where we stood on the report.
Senator TOWER. Now, Mr. Angleton, in these working gronp sessions,
who represented the FBI?
Mr. ANGLETON. Mr. Sullivan, sir, who was also the chairman of the
working group.
Senator TOWER. In your opinion, did Mr. Sullivan's views accurately
represent those of Mr. Hoover ~
Mr. ANGLETON. No; I do not think so.
Senator TOWER. Could you elaborate on that?
Mr. ANGLETON. Mr. Sullivan, as the chief of internal security,
Assistant Director for Internal Security, found himself handicapped
by lack of personnel and funding and in addition many of the aggressive
operations conducted by the Bureau in the past have been systematically
cut out by Mr. Hoover.
Senator TOWER. What does that mean? What is the significance?
Mr. ANGLETON. The significance being that the production of Internal
Security fell down considerably.
Senator TOWER. Now, Mr. Angleton, did you come to gain some
insight into the relationship between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Tom
Charles Huston?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, it was my understanding, sir, that they had
known one another for over a year prior to the meetings. And I would
suggest that Mr. Huston was much better educated when he embarked
on these matters than his testimony suggests. I find him extremely
knowledgeable. He was certainly aware of the gaps.
Senator TOWER. Would you say that Mr. Huston reflected the views
of Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. ANGLETON. Very much so, sir.
Senator TOWER [presiding]. I have no further questions.
Mr. Mondale ~
Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Senator Tower.
Mr. Angleton. you were in charge of the covert mail cover program
from the beg-inning; am I correct ~
Mr. ANGLETON. Not from the beginning, sir, from 1955.
Senator MONDALE. All right.
Mr. ANGLETON. I took it on as an ongoing operation which had been
lodged also in the Agency.
Senator MONDALE. What is your understanding as to who authorized
the progTam?
Mr. ANGLETON. I would say that the operation that was first initiated
in 1952, at some stage the authorization was from the Chief of Operations
of the Clandestine Services.
Senator MONDALE. As you conducted this program, under whose
authority was it your understanding that you were operating ~
Mr. ANGLETON. Within the Agency?
61
Senator MONDALE. Yes.
Mr. ANGLETON. Under the Chief of the Clandestine Operations.
Senator MONDALE. The Deputy Director for Plans, would that be ~
Mr. ANGLETON. Correct.
Senator MONDALE. For your purposes, was that considered adequate
authority or was this such that you felt authority had to flow from
either the President or the National Security Council ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I believe that I regarded that, plus the authority
from the Director who was knowledgeable of the program, as internal
authority.
Senator MONDALE. At your level of operations, that would be the
only authority with which you would concern yourself?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator MONDALE. All right. What was your understanding of the
legality of the covert mail operation ~
Mr. ANGLETON. That it was illegal.
Senator MONDALE. It was illegal. Now, you are an attorney?
Mr. ANGLETON. No, I am not, sir.
Senator MONDALE. Well, that might be an asset.
Mr. ANGLETON. That is my cover, Senator.
Senator MONDALE. How do you rationalize conducting a program
which you believe to be illegal?
Mr. ANGLETON. To begin with, I was taking it over as an ongoingoperation
and there was probability that the program, through lack
of personnel and funding, would have been scrubbed at some stage.
From the counterintelligence point of view, we believe that it waS
extremely important to know everything possible regarding contacts
of American citizens with Communist countries.
And second, that we believed that the security of the operation
was such that the Soviets were unaware of such a program and therefore
that many of the interests that the Soviets would have in the
United States, subversive and otherwise, would be through the open
mails, when their own adjudication was that the mails could not be
violated.
Senator MONDALE. So that a judgment was made, with which you
concurred, that although covert mail opening was illegal, the good
that flowed from it, in terms of the anticipating threats to this country
through the use of this counterintelligence technique, made it
worthwhile nevertheless.
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator MONDALE. How do you recommend that this committee deal
with this profound crisis between political and legal responsibility
in government, a nation that believes in the laws, and what you regard
to be the counterintelligence imperative of illegal activity? What do
we do about it ~
Mr. ANGLETON. My own belief has always been that high authority,
whether it be on the Hill, the Congress, or in the Executive, needs
to examine very closely the counterintelligence content available to
this Government regarding its adversaries, and regarding the Soviet
and the Soviet Bloc.
To my knowledge, there has never been such an examination. I
believe very much in a statement made by Director of the FBI,
Mr. Kelley, that it is his firm view, which he expressed in Canada
62
at a bar association convention, that certain individual rights have
to be sacrificed for the national security.
Senator MONDALE. Do you believe that national security cannot be
protected except through the sacrifice of these rights?
Mr. ANGLETON. I believe that all matters dealing with counterespionage
require very sophisticated handling and require considerable
latitude.
Senator MONDALE. Who do you think should be empowered to determine
which rights should be set aside?
Mr. ANGLETON. I think that, sir, not being an expert in these
matters, that it should be a combination of the Executive and the
Congress.
Senator MONDALE. How would the Congress express itself? Traditionally,
it is through the adoption of laws.
Mr. ANGLETON. I am afraid I do not--
Senator MONDALE. As I understand the progression of this discussion,
it is your opinion that this Nation cannot protect itself without
setting aside certain personal liberties. Then I asked you, who
would determine ,,,hat liberties were to be set aside? And you have
said it should be a combination of the Executive and the Congress.
Of course, the Congress acts through laws. Are you saying that we
should take another look at our laws to see whether they fully meet
the needs of national security?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator MONDALE. Would it not have been better then, when these
laws were violated in the past, to do just that? Come to the Congress
and say, "in our opinion we cannot defend you under the present laws
and, therefore, we make these recommendations for change." That
was not what was done. Surreptitiously and privately and covertly,
legal rights of the American people were violated; in this case, mail
was opened, without any such approval in the law. Is that correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator MONDALE. Do you think that was a correct way to proceed?
Mr. ANGLETON. I think in an ideal world dealing with intelligence,
and I have never seen one yet, that these matters should have been
brought up vigorously. All through the life span of the CIA, I do
not think there was the proper forum here for the airing securely
of these matters.
Senator MONDALE. I disagree with you on the question of national
security. I think our Constitution provides plenty of power to protect
this country. In any event, I see no authority for anyone in the
executive or in the Congress or anywhere else for determining, on
his own, that the law is not good enough and therefore taking it into
his own hands. I see no way of conducting a civilized. democratic
society with those kinds of rules.
Now in your system for covert openings, there was prepared a
watch list which set forth certain names of organizations and purposes
and those names were the trigger for opening mail to or from them
which was sent internationally.
Mr. ANGLETON. To the Soviet Union.
Senator MONDALE. To the Soviet Union. The list included Linus
Pauling, John Steinbeck, the author, and Victor Reuther of the Auto
Workers. What counterintelligence objective was it you thought you
63
were achieving in opening the mail of what most of us would assume
to he very patriotic. thoughtful, decent Americans 1
Mr. A~WLETON. Sir, I would prefer, if possible, to respond to that
question in executive session.
Senator MONDALE. Well, I would like the answer. The chairman is
not here so I think we ought to pass that request up until the chairman
is back.
I have several other questions along that line with other names. But,
in any event, let us wait until the chairman returns.
Senator TOWER. 'What was the request of the witness 1 That it
not be answered except in executive session 1
Senator MONDALE. Yes; I asked about three names thaJt were on the
watch list and he asked to answer that in executive session. I think we
should await the chairman.
Mr. ANGLETON. Sir, may I please modify that 1
Mr. BROWN. "Vould the Senator please just indulge us for just a
moment so I can confer with Mr. Angleton ~
Senator TOWER. Let us have order, please.
Mr. Angleton, should you answer this question in open session,
would you be disclosing classified information that has not been
previously cleared for disclosure ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I would also need to have the opportunity to review
files in the agency before making any response.
Senator TOWER. In other words, you do not know whether it would
be disclosing classified information that has not been cleared ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I would not depend on my memory, sir, at this time,
because these are cases or matters which apparently were some time
back.
Senator TOWER. The Chair will rule that for the time being, you
will not be required to answer the question in open session; but that
the matter can be reopened, should the committee decide that they
should be disclosed in public session.
Mr. ANGLETON. Thank you.
Senator MONDALE. I have got some other names I would like to submit
to Mr. Angleton which I wish he would use in his review in preparation
for that answer, whether in public or in private.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Senator Mondale. Senator Baker~
Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I believe most of the information relevant to the Huston plan document
have been covered by other members of the committee and by
counsel. But there are two or three things of a more general nature
that I would like to direct Mr. Angleton's attention to, and ask his
reaction or comments on.
Before I do, however, what was your job at the time of your retirement
from the CIA ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I was the head of counterintelligence.
Senator BAKER. Counterintelligence, in layman's terms, implies
something other than intelligence. I take it that it implies something
to do with keeping up ""ith what the other fellow's intelligence
would be: .
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
64
Senator BAKER. Was a major part of your operation concerned with
intelligence operations against the United States by, say, the Soviet
Union or other countries?
Mr. ANGLETON. It was a question of all hostile intelligence services
where we have a situation, for example, that in the Soviet bloc alone,
there are over 27 intelligence services who would conduct activity in
the United States and in the territories of allies.
Senator BAKER. Well, to put it in lay terms again, counterintelligence
was to protect our intelligence resources ?
Mr. ANGLETON. It was to penetrate and frustrate the espionage and
subversion from outside.
Senator BAKER. How, then, was counterintelligence, your area of
concern and expertise, important to that area to be involved with mail
openings?
Mr. ANGLETON. 'Well, since the mail openings were to the Communist
countries, it meant that there was a contact, regular contact, with
Americans and third country nationals who were here. For example,
there are many third country nationals that were here studying, who,
in turn, had relatives who were studying in Soviet institutions.
Senator BAKER. I can follow that. 'But what prompted the question
was, why on earth would you have, for instance, Frank Church or
Richard Nixon on that list ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I would say it was very much an error.
Senator BAKER. It was an error to have them on the list?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is precisely correct.
Senator BAKER. Are there other members of this committee that
were on that list?
Mr. ANGLETON. I'm not aware of it, sir. I've not gone through the
listings.
Senator BAKER. You began this operation in 1954 or thereabouts,
I understand.
Mr. ANGLETON. It was started in another part of the agency in 1952,
and it was taken over by us~ounterinte11igenee---in1955.
Senator BAKER. I understand from your testimony to Senator Mondale
that you think that it is of sufficient value so that it ought to be
continued.
Mr. ANGLETON. It is certainly my opinion, and the opinion of my
former associates.
Senator BAKER. It should be continued even if it required the change
of the statute law-and I am not sure that would even do it. Let us
just assume for the moment that you have a congressional debate on
the necessity for doing it, and thus change the nature of the postal
system; that is, people no longer would assume that their mail was
inviolate, that people probably were going to inspect it. That gets us
terribly close to Big Brotherism; the idea that when you mail a letter,
you have got to assume that somebody may read it, at least a letter
outside the country. Even if you assume that that would be the range
and scale of the debate in Congress, you would favor the passage of
such a bill?
Mr. ANGLETON. I didn't quite say that. sir. I believe I would prefer,
if possible. to stick to what I believe to be the approach to the problems
within the intelligence community; and that is that both the
executive, at a high level. and the Congress examine in depth the nature
of the threat to our national security.
Senator BAKER. If I may interrupt you for a minute, I think I ought
to explain why I am proceeding in this way. I know, from readmg
your briefing papers, and from a general impression of your service
to your country and to the CIA, that you have been an extraordinarily
important figure in the intelligence and counterintelligence scheme of
things for many, many years. I believe, based on your testimony, that
you have a grave concern for the nature and the scope of the foreign
threat, and the importance of the methods and techniques that are
employed or may be employed by the CIA, by the DIA, and by other
intelligence agencies.
That is my general impression. But your impression of us should be
that, while we recognize the importance of that, it gets right sticky
when it would appear, in some cases clearly, that those methods and
techniques violate either the statute law or the Constitution of the
United States. What I am putting to you is whether or not this country
should engage in a debate in the congressional forum-which is
where laws are made and changed-about a matter such as the changing
of the fundamental nature of the postal system-that is to say, to
create a situation where people must assume that their mail is being
read.
Now, are the techniques for intelligence gathering-is the nature of
the foreign threat such that we should go ahead with that debate, or
even pass such a statute ¥
Mr. ANGLETON. I think in the present atmosphere, it would be
impossible.
Senator BAKER. That is sort of our job, too; to guess what is possible
and impossible in the Congress, an.d I am often fooled about what is
possible and impossible. From your standpoint, what I am trying to
drive at is whether or not you believe the scope and the extent of the
threat to this country from abroad is sufficient to launch this Congress
into a debate on whether there should be such a change in the postal
laws or not.
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I must accept, sir, the faot that again, that I do
not believe that the atmosphere would even tolerate this subject being
the subject of debate. I think these perceptions of dangers and threats
have changed very greatly in the last 2 years. I think the policies of
detente and, prior to that, peaceful coexistence-
Senator BAKER. What do you think of the policies of detente ~
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I would only speak to the question of detente,
peaceful coexisten,ce, strictly from counterintelligence observation.
Senator BAKER. That is why I asked you. You were the head man in
that field. What do you think of it ~
Mr. ANGLETON. My view is that there is complete illusion to believe
that, on the operative, clandestine side-which is, in a sense, a secret
war that has continued since World War II-that the Soviets or the
Soviet bloc have changed their objectives. And I base this on counterintelligence
cases.
Senator BAKER. I do not mean, to embarrass you, Mr. Angleton, but
I want to ask you this question. In that respect, is your disagreement
with detente as a national policy part of the reason why you retired
from the CIA at the time you did ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I really cannot say. Every day that passes, I discover,
much to my amazement, certain points of view and activity in which I
66
might say, neither myself nor my colleagues were in great favor. I
cannot be specific. I do not have the facts.
Senator BAKER. Mr. Angleton, there are many questions I could ask.
Your experience covers a turbulent time in history, and the temptation
to ask you specific details about it is almost irresistible. But
for the moment, in view of the time restraints, I will postpone that.
I would ask only a single thing, and that is whether or not you think
there should be a significant national debate in a congressional forum,
as well, on the question as to whether or not we should legalize some of
the activities that now appear to be illegal in the intelligence-collecting
field. Now, it is my own personal view that if you are going to do
some of these things, the country will not accept them, and should not.
They are intrinsically an intrusion, beyond the scope of the permissible.
But if you are going to do some of the others, that are more closely
held, you ought not to do them without asking. You ought to send
them up to Congress and find out what the likelIhood of the law being
changed may be. Would you generally agree, in retrospect, that that
ought to be the way this matter is approached ~
Mr. ANGLETON. There is no question in my mind.
Senator BAKER. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator TOWER. Senator Huddleston ~
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Angleton, first I wonder if we might bring some of the intelligence
terminology down to lay language, so that the people will have
a complete understanding of what we are talking about here. I think
we have pretty well covered mail coverage, but just to clarify it maybe
somewhat further, we are discussing the actual opening of mail of certain
citizens who appear on a predetermined list. Does some individual
actually read this mail, or is it photographed, or just how is this
handled ~
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, sir, the process was to collect mail at an international
terminal before it went abroad, and mail coming from abroad
from Communist countries, and having the opportunity to surreptitiously
open the envelopes, photograph the contents, and to dispatch
the mail to the addressee. The photographs of the mail were brought
through another part of our organization to us in Counterintelligence,
where we had a group of some six people very fluent in languages, and
also in holograph and flaps, and they were very sophisticated technicians
and analysts. They would make abstracts of the mail where it
was important. together with internal findings and dossiers, and direct
it to certain selected customers.
Senator HUDDT..F.STON. Customers being specific agencies of the Government,
either CIA-- -
Mr. ANGLETON. For all intents and purposes it was only to the FBI,
although there was some mail that did-there were some special items
that went to military intelligence.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, electronic surveillance-what all does
this involve ~
Mr. ANGT;F.TON. Pardon. sir?
Senator HUDDLESTON. Electronic surveillance-what does this involve
snecifically ~
Mr. ANGU:TON. 'Ve were not involved in electronic surveillance.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You know what it is, do you not ~
, ,
67
Mr. ANGLETON. Yes, sir. It is all forms of eavesdropping.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Is this tapping telephones?
Mr. ANGLETON. Telephones.
Senator HUDDLESTON. That is, a wiretap.
Mr. ANGLETON. Bugs.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Bugs in rooms, or in places where people
might assemble?
Mr. ANGLETON. Precisely.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Without their knowledge?
Mr. ANGLETON. Hopefully.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Surreptitious entry-what is this describing?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is the ability to penetrate into either a building
or mail--
Senator HUDDLESTON. Break it down into a simple context that we
hear in every police court in the country on Monday morning. It is
breaking and entering to a great degree, is it not? It might beMr.
ANGLETON. As long as there is no-I say I agree, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. It would be breaking into someone's home
or into his office or his apartment, and, in effect, taking what you consider
to be important to the objective.
Mr. ANGLETON. It is not so much taking as it is photographing.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Or photographing.
Mr. ANGLETON. There is not really much breakage.
Senator HUDDLESTON. What do you mean by development of campus
sources?
Mr. ANGLETON. Is that in the context, sir, of the Huston plan?
Senator HUDDLESTON. Yes, that was part of the Huston objective.
Mr. ANGLETON. It simply meant the eventual recruitment of sources
on the campus.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Would that be students?
Mr. ANGLETON. I believe it referred specifically to students and
perhaps some instructors.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Who would perform as informants or as-Mr.
ANGLETON. They would be spotters in terms of possible recruitment
of people, or informants.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I think it is important that the people understand
what we are talking about when we talk in intelligence terms,
Mr. Angleton, and those descriptions I think will be helpful.
Now, prior to the development of the Huston plan, would you say
that one of the reasons that this development occurred was that conflicts
had grown specifically between the CIA and the FBI?
Mr. ANGLETON. Unfortunately, yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Would you describe what some of those conflicts
were, some of the things that were troubling Mr. Hoover?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, to begin with, in all fairness to Mr. Hoover,
after World War IL he was not happy with his activities in certain
parts of the world which he conducted during wartime, being transferred
to another agency. I do not believe that this was jealousy, as
has often been stated. I think that he only had to look at the fact
that during World War II. the OSS had many people who were loyal
to General Donovan, but also had loyalties to the opposition-and I
do not want to characterize it as many. I think it is in many records.
68
And therefore, there was a very grave problem of the security standards
of the Agency coming from World War II.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Did this result in the concern that he had that
there were informants within the FBI that were telling the CIA
things that Mr. Hoover did not think they should be telling?
Mr. ANGLETON. Sir, I think you are referring directly to the one
straw that broke the camel's back.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Was this a single incident?
Mr. ANGLETOX. A single incident in which an officer of the CIA received
information to which he was entitled regarding a foreign national
who disappeared and he received this information from an
unnamed FBI officer. Mr. Hoover demanded the identity of the FBI
officer. The CIA official as a matter of personal integrity refused to
divulge the name of his source and he also offered to the Director,
Mr. Helms, his resignation.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You indicate this was a one-time incident. Are
you suggesting that the CIA did not have other sources of information
from within the FBI that may not have been known by the
Director, Mr. Hoover?
Mr. ANGLETOX. I would never call them sources. The CIA had many
contacts with the FBI at various levels.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Were there also instances where the CIA requested
of the FBI and of Mr. Hoover to undertake certain wiretaps
for domestic surveillance that Mr. Hoover declined to do?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Did this also create friction between the
agencies?
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not think that that in itself necessarily created
the friction. I think the friction came from the case I described earlier.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Just that one case? 1Vas that enough to cause
Mr. Hoover to eliminate the liaison totally and formally l:>etween the
two agencies?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator HUDDLESTON. And he did that, in fact?
Mr. ANGLETON. He did, indeed.
Senator HUDDLESTON. During the early sessions of the group that
was setting up the Huston plan, was this friction evident to you as
a participant of those meetings, that the CIA and the FBI were not
getting along at the top levels as they might?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I do not think that the relationship at the
top levels was ever satisfactory. I believe-and this may be somewhat
of an exagp-eration-but I believe that o\'er a period of some 25 years
I do not think there were probably more than three or four or five
meetings between the Director of FBI and the Director of CIA except
those that might have been casnal, where they bumped into one another
in a national securitv conference. ,
Senator HUDDLESTON. Did this adversely affect the efficiency of our
intelligence community?
Mr. ANGLETON. It did.
Senator Hl;I)DLF.RTOX. no vou think Mr. Hoover's concern in the
FBI's dealings with the crA was principally due to the questionable
le!!ality of some of the thin!!S that the CIA ,vas asking him to do?
Or was it a concern for the public relations aspect of his agency?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I think that Mr. Hoover was conscious of all
aspects of situations.where the Bu~eau~s inte~ests w.ere affected,
whether it be professIOnal, whether It be pubhc relat.IOns, h~ .was
without question the number one la,,' enforcement officer m the l lmted
States and probably the most respected individual ontside the United
States among all foreign intelligencB and security .services. And I
believe that Mr. Hoover's real concern was that durmg the Johnson
administration, where the Congress was delving into matters pertaining
to FBI activities, Mr. H,oover looked to ~he President to give him
support in terms of conductmg those operatIOns. And when that ~urport
was lacking, Mr. Hoover had no recourse but to gradually ~h~lnate
activities which were unfavorable to the Bureau and whICh m
turn risked public confidence in the number one law enforcement
agency.
And I think his reasoning was impeccable.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, did the CIA, on occasion, ask Mr.
Hoover and his agency to enter into "black bag" jobs?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator HUDDLESTON. And that is surreptitious entry or in layman's
terms, breaking and en~ring.
Mr. ANGLETON. It deals basically with handling couriers, the man
who carries the bag.
Senator HUDDLESTON. During the initial stages of the interagency
committee developing the Huston plan, did it occur to you to inquire
'whether or not-since you were aware that you were suggesting or
talking about doing things that were illegal-did it occur to you to
inquire whether or not the Attorney General of the Uni~d States had
been advised or questioned about this plan?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I did not have, as a rule, relations with many
Attorneys General except on very special cases.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I am not suggesting you would have inquired
yourself, but that his approval would have been given or at least he
would have been consulted.
Mr. ANGLETON. My approach, sir, on that--
Senator HUDDLESTON. Did it even bother you to wonder about it?
Mr. ANGLETON. No. I think I can reconstruct my attitude over many
years on that matter, that I felt it most essential that the Attorney
General be aware of the program in order to read the mail and to read
the production. In other words, I think that an Attorney General
who does not know the minutiae of the threat is a very poor Attorney
General.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Were you surprised then to learn that he had
not been consulted about the Huston plan?
Mr. ANGLETON.. I was absolntely shocked. I mean it was unbelievable,
because one belIeved that he had everything relating to Justice
Department.
Senator. Hl.'DDLESTON. Is that the reason that you testified you were
not surprIsed when the President rescinded his approval after Mr.
Hoover went to the Attorney General?
.Mr. ANGLETON. I must repeat that I could well understand how
WIthout even going into any inquiries. that the Huston plan was dead.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You expected that to happen?
Mr. ANGLETON. Absolutely.
70
The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much. I want to thank
Senator Tower for taking o-yer and ~residing f~r me. I h~d to ~e at
a meeting of the Senate ForeIgn RelatIOns CommIttee that IS conSIdering
the Sinai agreements and for that reason I had to absent myself.
Let us see, we are now at Senator Schweiker, please.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. . ..
Mr. Angleton, did you support the Huston p~a!1 III pr~nClple~ At
the time that this became a function of your declSlonmakmg process,
your administrative responsibility, did you support the Huston plan ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I did. .
Senator SCHWEIKER. Afulr the Huston plan was shot down, I guess
by a combination of John Mitchell and J. Edgar Hoover, ther~ were
some other actions taken. First of all, John Dean was moved m and
somewhat replaced Mr. Huston in his duties and then he wrote a
memo on September 18, 1970 [exhibit 24 1
], within 2 months of the
decision to abandon the Huston plan. And he set up a new committee
and I quote now from his memo, I'll. key to the entire operation will
be the creation of a intera!~ncy intelligence unit for both operational
and evaluation purposes." You were a part of that new unit; was that
correct~
Mr. ANGLID'ON. I was present.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And as I understand it, the very first meeting
of that unit was held in John Dean's office in the White House. Is
that correct ~
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator SCHWEIKER. So in essence, by this move, did you not really
begin to accomplish many of the objectives that Mr. Huston set out,
but you did it in a way that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Hoover did not
strenuously interpose their objection. Is that correct ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not have any evidence of that.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, on April 12, do you recall there was a
meeting among Mr. Helms, Mr. Hoover, and Admiral Gayler to discuss
loosening up or broadening, whatever way you want to call it, the
information gathering techniques to the point where some of the
elements of the Huston plan were being reconsidered. Do you recall
such a meeting ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I know that that was something- that was of concern
to the intelligence community prior to and after the Huston plan. The
Huston plan itself had no impact or did not impact on the meeting,
the question of espionage assistance to the National Security Agency.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Of the seven or eight individual elements or
the Huston plan concerning new ways of getting intelligence more
easily, weren't some of these similar to the proposals that were discussed
at the April 12 meeting as well as at the interagency meeting~
Certainly you did discuss them, and did they not come up for consideration
in different forms ~
Mr. ANGLETON. Excuse me, sir.
Senator, I am trying to be responsive to your hypothesis. The Huston
plan, in effect, as far as we were concerned, was dead in 5 days and
therefore all of the other matters of enlarging procurement within
the intelligence community were the same concerns that existed prior
1 See p. 255.
71
to the Huston plan, and subsequent to the Huston J?lan. The Huston
plan had no impact wha.tsoever on the priorities within the intelligence
community.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I understand that, Mr. Angleton. But at that
meeDing where Mr. Helms and Admiral Gayler and the others met,
was there not a discussion to do some of the very same things tha.t
ha.d been referenced in the Huston plan?
Mr. ANGLETON. Tha.t part is correct, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I am trying to establish.
Mr. ANGLETON. But it had a life of its own prior to the Huston plan.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And then did not the Plumber's unit at a later
time perform some of the same illegalities, such as breaking and entering,
that the Huston plan has proposed?
Mr. ANGLETON. Pardon?
Senator SCHWEIKER. I realize you are not directly connected with
the Plumbers, but did the Plumber's unit not do some of the same
things, breaking and entry, illegal burglary, that the Huston plan
proposed? Is that not a. fact?
Mr. ANGLETON. Yes.
Sena.tor SCHWEIKER. So in essence, they went a.round the back door
instead of the front door. Even though the Huston plan was dead I
believe it had nine lives. Now, Mr. Angleton, you were head of the
Counterintelligence Unit of the CIA and under you was a group called
t·he Special Operations Group, headed by Mr. Richard Ober, who we
will be hearing from tomorrow. But inasmuch as you were involved
as his immediate supervisor, it is correct to say that Operation CHAOS
was under your supervision, although not immediately Y
Mr. ANGLETON. It was technically under my supervision for "rations
and quarters."
Senator SCHWEIKER. And you supported and went along with Operation
CHAOS as an executive of CIA, is that not correctY
Mr. ANGLETON. I was not familiar with all of the operations of
CHAOS.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Did you object to it? Did you oppose it ¥ Did
you fight it in any way ¥
Mr. ANGLETON. Those operations I knew a.bout I approved, I mean,
I was approving of.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Were you aware that some of the Operation
CHAOS agents were operating in the United Sta.tes?
Mr. ANGLETON. I was not. I would qualify that to say, as I have said
before, before the Rockefeller Commission, that there was a. period in
all operations. of that nature where the ~nt had to build cover in
the United States. But I suggested, and I still believe, that those operations
should be examined in terms of what was Mr. Ober's motive.
And I think that one will find, as far as I know, that his motive was
to send these people abroad for intelligence collection.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, were you aware of the memos [exhibit
65 1
] that CIA sent to Walt Rostow, and then Henry Kessinger, which
said the following, and I quote "you will, of course, be aware of the
peculiar sensitivity which attaches to the fact that CIA has prepared
1 See p. 402.
72
a report on student activities, both here and abroad." Were you aware
of either memo, number one, or number two, that you were following
student activities here?
Mr. ANGLETON. Do we have this memorandum?
Senator SCHWEIKER. I will ask the counsel whether you have it.
This was received from the Rockefeller Commission. You might not
have it immediately before you.
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not recall it.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Let me ask you this way. Were you aware of
any activities under you, or under people under your direction, that
had to do with preparing a report on the domestic activities of students
here in the United States of America?
Mr. ANGLETON. There were reports that I cannot identify unless
I see them.
Senator SCHWEIKER. That is not my question. My question is were
you aware of ap.y counterintelligence activities directed against the
students of the United States of America here at home? You were in
charge of supervising this whole counterintelligence unit.
Mr. ANGLETON. I tried to explain, sir, that I was not in charge.
Senator SCHWEIKER. What does being Chief of Counterintelligence
mean? You were Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, were you not?
Mr. ANGLETON. Yes.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And that did not come under your purview?
Mr. ANGLETON. I said that Mr. Ober's unit was in the Counterintelligence
staff for rations and quarters. I did not have access to
many of his disseminations. We were not even on the carbon copies
for dissemination. I did not know the identity of his agents. I did
not have any knowledge or appurtenances of a case officer over these
activities.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Let me ask you something that you did testify
to that we will not have a problem of communication on. On page
109 of your September 12 testimony, in a deposition before this committee,
you were specifically asked about how the CIA might either
ignore, or not follow, or contradict an order relating to the destruction
of shellfish toxins and poisons, about which we held hearings last
week. Now you are quoted in your deposition, "It is inconceivable that
a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all
the overt orders of the government." Is that an accurate quote or not?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, if it is accurate it should not have been said.
The CHAIRMAN. That is right, Mr. Angleton.
Senator SCHWEIKER. It looks like we are on plausible denial again
is all I can say here, Mr. Chairman. It is a direct Quote and I understand
the procedure is to give you an opportunity to review your
testimony each day, in case you want to correct it. Did you not have
that opportunity?
Mr. ANGLETON. I did not expect, sir, to be called Friday night late
and told I would be here today. I intended in due course to see my
testimony. I was informed that I would be present in October.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, getting back to the issue at hand, Mr.
Angleton. do you believe that statement that you made or do you not
believe it? ''''hat is your belief of whether a secret intelligence agency
has the right to contradict a direct order of a President or whether it
does not apply?
73
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I would say I had been rather imprudent in
making those re,marks.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, it raises the problem
that this committee is really confronted with. And I don't want to
say that-unfortunately you are not the exception in this belief, Mr.
Angleton, because I think our work, our intellIgence investigation, has
turned up an awful lot of people in the intellIgence community who
really feelthis way. .
I think that is exactly how the toxin situation got to where it was.
And, while this may not have been the biggest thing that happened, I
think it is indicative of the problem that this committee and the Congress
have to deal with. And you feel, or the intelligence community
feels, that they are removed from even a direct order of the President.
And I think that does come to the heart of the issue. I think you were
honest in your statement and I think actually this is the issue before the
committee and the Congress now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAffiMAN. Well I might observe that Mr. Angleton has not
denied the statement, nor has he changed his position. He said it was
an imprudent thing to say. That was your answer, was it not~
Mr. ANGLETON. I have not pursued the question of toxins from a professional
point of view. I did not listen to all of the hearings on it. It is
a matter very much outside of my professional background.
The CHAIRMAN. But your statement, Mr. Angleton, IS not related to
toxins. It is a very general statement, which I do believe represents
your vIew.
Mr. ANGLETON. I am sorry, sir, but it does not necessarily represent
my views.
The CHAIRMAN. You said it is inconceivable that a secret intelligence
arm of the Government has to comply with all of the overt orders of
the Government.
Mr. ANGLETON. T() comply with all overt-
The CHAffiMAN. Do you retract that statement now, or do you merely
rep;ard it as imprudent.
Mr. ANGLETON. I have not studied the t:e;;timony, sir.
The CHAffiMAN. May I call your attentIOn to it on pap;e 109 of your
testimony before this committee, September 12, beginning on line 9,
and I read, "It is inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the
Government has to comply with all of the overt orders of the Government."
Mr. ANGLETON. I withdraw that statement.
The CHAffiMAN. Do you withdraw that statement ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I do.
The CHAffiMAN. Did you not mean it when you said it the first time 9
Mr. ANGLETON. This was stated before the hearings, before you held
your hearings on this matter ~
The CHAffiMAN. Yes, but when you said it to us, did you mean it or
did you not mean it ¥
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not know how to respond to that question.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not know how to respond to the question 9
Mr. ANGLETON. I said that I withdrew the statement.
The CHAffiMAN. Very well, but you are unwilling to say whether or
not vou meant it when you said it.
Mr. ANGLETON. I would say that the entire speculation should not
have been indulged in.
74
The CHAIRMAN. I see. Senator Morgan.
S.enator MORGAN. First of all, with regard to the question that the
chaIrman asked you, do you .know what specific order was being
referred to in that case ?
Mr. BROWN. Excuse me, Senator, just a moment please.
Mr. ANGLETON. No; I did not know the orders.
Senator MORGAN. Then you are not talking about any particular
order, but you were talking about orders in general ~
Mr. ANGLETON. Sir, I have not reviewed this transcript.
Senator MORGAN. I understand that, Mr. Angleton. And that is why
I was looking back at it myself. .
Ii I could pursue for a moment the questions of Senator Mondale
and Senator Baker, first of all, would you again draw the distinction
between counterintelligence and intelligence gathering~
Mr. ANGLETON. In the ultimate, they are about the same thing.
Counterintelligence is more or less all of the programs of which the
distillate is counterespionage. In other words, the sum total of counterintelligence
activity includes dossiers. identification of individuals,
travel control and a whole series of other dossier items. It forms the
counterintelligence base. From that can be developed a product which
is counterespionag-e, the dealing in confrontation with other intelligence
services: as It rule, dealing with their aggressive aspects,
whether it be subversion, whether it be espionage, and in certain
ins~ances in the world of double agents, dealing with their counterespIOnage.
Senator MORGAN. Now, as Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff,
how much of your work was involved in this country?
Mr. ANGLETON. Relatively little.
Senator MORGAN. Was the mail cover part of it ~
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator MORGAN. And before the Huston plan, you were intercepting
all mail g'Oing to Communist countries. photographing it., and
intercepting all mail coming from Communist countries.
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct. But there was a limit as to the
amount of mail which we opened and photogTaphed.
Senator MORGAN. What limitations were placed on the amount of
mail~
Mr. ANGLETON. It is where it was of no interest.
Senator MORGAN. How did you determine whether or not mail was
of no interest if you--
Mr. ANGLETON. It was, as a matter of procedure, one of the customer
agencies would indicate that it, having levied a requirement
previously, would state that they no longer desired such coverage.
Senator MORGAN. Well, now, was it coverage of those who were
on the watch list, or was it coverage of all mail going to and from
Communist countries ~
Mr. ANGLETON. The basic thrust of the program was a watch list.
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Angleton, did you at that time consider the
mail coverage indispensable to your job ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I believed it was one of the few resources, routine
in nature, available to counterintelligence.
Senator MORGAN. Well, Senator Mondale asked you about your
rationale behind opening the mail. How do you reconcile it with the
75
ri~hts of the individuals in this country under our Constitution ~ How
did you reconcile your action?
Mi,. AXGLETON. ""VeIl, Senator, I reconciled it in terms of the knowledge
I had, and my colleagues had, regarding the nature of the threat.
Senator MORGAN. ""Yell, assuming, Mr. Angleton, that you were
justified in your actions, which I don't think you were, but assuming
that, what is to prevent some other individual from deciding on
his own that such activities are justified? And what is to prevent him
from carrying out such activities ~
Mr. A::-<GLETON. Senator, I don't want to quibble. But I will have
to say the operation was in being 3 years before I entered
the scene. It was not something of an individual initiative, it was
a grou~ of like-minded men who arrived at similar and the same
concluslOns that this was an indispensable means of collecting foreign
intelligence on the Soviets, who regard this country to be the
main enemy, and, together with the Soviet bloc, coordinates their
activities on their ideological basis. This is very persuasive to someone
who has given up 31 years of their life with certain very high
ideals for this country. When I left the Army, as many of us did, I
believed that we were in the dawn of a millenium. When I look at the
map today and the weakness of power of this country, that is what
shocks me.
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Angleton, the thing that shocks me is that
these actions could be carried on contrary to the constitutional rights
of the citizens of this country. Do you not believe that we can gather
the necessary intelligence that we need for the protection and security
of this country, and at the same time live within the Constitution?
Mr. ANGLETON. I am not a constitutional lawyer and I do not have
at my fingertips those parts of the amendments which appear, on the
surface, to give the President certain rights in wiretapping and electronic
surveillance.
And if I understand it correctly, I do not believe there is too much
of an extension to the next stage, which is the question of American
and Soviet communications, or Soviet bloc communications.
Senator MORGAN. I would beg to differ on that, and on the analysis
that you made, and also the one that Mr. Huston made. But for the
purpose of the guidance of this committee, can you give us any suggestion
as to how the actions of that Central Intelligence Agency can
be monitored in such a way as to protect the fundamental rights of
the American citizens of this country?
Mr. ANGLETON. You mean how it should be restructured?
Senator MORGAN. Yes; earlier you suggested that maybe the Congress
and the President should take some action. But the thing that
bothers me, Mr. Angleton, is how can we act if we don't know the
facts? And, if we do act, the intelligence agencies refuse to obey the
guidelines and ordinances. In other words you were doing all of these
things before the Huston plan was ever devised. You continued to do
them after the President rejected the report. So, what assurancs do
we have that an intelligence agency would follow any mandate of the
Congress or the President? And how can we prepare some mandates
that would be followed? That is what this committee is searching for.
Mr. ANGLETON. I have nothing to contribute to that, sir, beyond
what I have said already.
62-685 0 - 76 - 6
76
Senator MORGAN. In other words, you just don't think it can be
done. You feel that an intelligence agency has to have unlimited
rights to follow its own instincts in gathering intelligence?
Mr. ANGLJ<.Yl'ON. No; I do not.
Senator MORGAN. What limitations would you place on it ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I think the mail-intercept program is probably one
of the few exceptions that I could conceive of.
Senator MORGAN. But if the Agency will not obey the orders of the
President, do you have any suggestions as to what we can do to assure
obedience in the future ~
Mr. ANGLETON. Sir, I don't regard the submission to the President
as being a black and white matter, because I don't know all of the
facts surrounding that. But my reading of that language had a great
deal to do with the question of gaps in the plan filled by the FBI in
the question of domestically intercepting mail, rather than as we
Were doing excepting-directing it entirely to mail between the United
States and Communist countries. And I do draw that distinction. In
other words, our motive had nothin~ whatsoever to do with infringing,
or I mean in harming, Americans. Our problem was to try to uncover
foreign involvement in this country.
Senator MORGAN. ut me conclude by observing that I am concerned,
from the testimony we have heard today, and also from the testimony
we have heard in the past, about the fact that it seems from the testimony
that many of these plans are devised and put into practice, and
then at some later date, publicly, or for the record, the plans are rejected.
But, notwithstanding such rejection either by tne President
or some higher authority, all of the plans are carried out anyway.
And it makes me wonder whether or not the rejection of such plans is
for the purpose-as Senator Schweiker pointed out-of plausible
denial. Are they really rejections of the plans, or are they rejections
for the purpose of the record ~ If it is a real rejection, how can we
secure compliance with it by the various agencies ~
Thank you, Mr. Angleton.
The CHAmMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Morgan.
I think just for purposes of clarIfying the matter I ought to say that
we have found the CIA files on mail that has been opened, and we are
now in the process of investigating and preparing ourselves to look
into this whole question of mail opening in a much more detailed way.
At the beginning of this hearing this morning I mentioned such or~
anizations as the Ford Foundation, Harvard University, the RockefeUer
Foundation, and such individuals as Arthur Burns, Congresswoman
Bella Ahzug, Jay Rockefeller, President Nixon, Martin Luther
King, and Senator Hubert Humphrey, Senator Edward Kennedy, and
myself whose mail had been opened, and I would like to make it clear
that these names were never on the watch list, so far as we can determine.
So that it is obvious that the opening of the mail was not restricted
to any particular watch list, but may have gone very far afield,
indeed.
I am going to get that letter I wrote to my mother. I want to see
what is in that letter that was of interest to the CIA. And I say this
because the privacy of the mail has been one of the most honored
practices in this country and it is protected by the statutes. The Supreme
Court of the United States passed on this very early in our
77
history, back in 1877. I just would like to read a passage of what the
Supreme Court said about the privacy of the mail and the rights of
American citizens. It said:
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the .mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if
they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their
papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus
closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can
only be opened and examined under like warrant • • •
I think one of the real responsibilities of this committee is to make
certain that in the future our intelligence agencies recognize that in the
name of protecting freedom, they had better honor the Constitution
and the laws, because that is what freedom is all about.
Senator Mathias.
Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Angleton, I suspect that there will be no wit·
nesses coming before this committee who can be of more help to us than
you in understanding the intelligence community as it developed after
World War II, in understanding- the kind of work that the intelligence
community ought to be doing, and in helping us to see what
needs to be done in the future. But in understanding exactly how you
worked, I think we need to know some of the mundane, mechanical,
things.
For instance, when Mr. Helms was before the committee last week,
we discussed the question of compartmentation, the fact that certain
parts of the Central Intelligence Agency were totally compartmented
from other parts, and I think it is important to understand exactly
what that does to the execution of national policy. For example, if a
project would come to you about which some question of legality is
raised, was compartmentation such that you could not consult the
General Counsel of the CIA for a ruling on its legality?
Mr. ANGLETON. I would say that the custom and usage was not to
deal with the General Counsel as a rule until there were some troubles.
He was not a part of the process of project approvals.
Senator MATIDAS. There was no preventative practice?
Mr. ANGLETON. Not necessarily.
Senator MATHIAS. So that on this question of opening mail, the question
of whether it was legal or illegal never was discussed with the
leg-al officials of the Agency?
Mr. ANGLETON. Not to my knowledge.
Senator MATHIAS. What about relationships with law enforcement
agencies outside the Central Intelligence Agency? For instance, in
the Huston plan, Mr. Hoover appended a note to the recommendations
on mail opening in which he objected to it, and noted that it was
illegal, and indicated that he was aware that other agencies might
be doing it. Now, if a project of that sort were undertaken, was there
any preclearance with an agency like the FBI, a law enforcement
agency? .
Mr. ANGLETON. As it related to this, of course, the Bureau was fully
apprised after they were informed in 195R. The Bureau would bewe
would coordinate any domestic activity, or even with the three
areas w~th the FBI in advance. By the same token, they would coordinate
with us in advance any overseas activity, and in this respect I
78
was always a firm believer that when the Bureau developed certain intelligence
sources, they should have the operational control over
those sources, regardless of geography, as long as there was coordination.
Senator MATHIAS. You are going to lead me to my next question.
But before I get to that, would the coordination with the FBI include
immunity?
Mr. ANGLETON. It would depend, sir, On the parameters of the operation.
If their own interests were impinged upon, there would certainly
be coordinations in the community.
Senator MATHIAS. Yes, but would your operator, who might be apprehended
in the course of the operation, be understood to be immune
from legal prosecution as a result of the coordination with the FBI?
Mr. ANGLETON. You mean for an illegal act in the United States?
Senator MATHIAS. Yes. Was there any agreement that he would not
be prosecuted, as would an ordinary citizen who was apprehended
in the same act?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I must confess that until it was brought out in
these hearings, I was unaware of the agreement between the Department
of Justice and ourselves, even though I can well understand why
there was such an agreement. But in the few cases I do know, I never
saw the Agency ever interject itself on anything frivolous. In other
words, it went to the heart of an operation or to the security of an
agent.
Senator MATHIAS. In other words, you are saying that he took his
lumps if he were apprehended in any legal difficulties?
Mr. ANGLETON. If he had not been instructed by the agency, and he
strayed, he obviously was, to my recollection-this was a subject matter
for the General Counsel to take up with the Department of Justice.
Senator MATHIAS. And when the General Counsel took it up with
the Department of Justice, would it be merely to provide representation
in a court of law, or would it be to make some arrangement by
which immunity would be granted because of the nature of the duties
he had been performin~ that resulted in the illegal act?
Mr. ANGLETON. I would assume that it would ~the purpose of this
would be for our General Counsel to disgorge all relevant facts and
all documents and papers, and present an Agency position, and that
the argumentation for any special treatment would be supported by
the facts.
Senator MATHIAS. And I have been deducing from what you say
that you made the best deal that you could at the time, under the circumstances.
Mr. ANGLETON. Not entirely. I have known of-well, I won't go that
far. But there have been cases which have involved, say, misuse of
funds or whatnot, in which the Agency, as I recall, threw the party
very much to the dogs.
Senator MATHIAS. Right. But those were the cases where there was
no relief.
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, they were cases where a superior interest of
the Government was not harmed.
Senator MATHIAS. I think I understand what you are saying. Now,
getting back to the question that you raised a minute ago, in which
you said you thought that a source that you developed belonged to
?,ou, regardless of where it might happen to lodge geographically,
It could be within the United Staws, could it not?
Mr. ANGLETON. It could be, and I think that if I might pursue that
somewhat-
Senator MATHIAS. Yes; I wish you would tell us how you distinguish
between CIA domestic activity that is prohibited by statute, and
counterintelligence that may lead you into some domestic scene.
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I think there are many ap:proaches to this.
But I would begin first with the agent-principal relatIOnship. In other
words, when we are dealing with agents, we are not dealing with pieces
of merchandise. There are very tenuous psychological realmements between
a case officer and his agent, and therefore he is threatened even
if you change case officers, let alone the question of jurisdiction.
Now, assuming that an agent of ours comes to the United States, we
are presented with a problem, therefore, of is he to be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the FBI? The moment that the answer is yes, we are
subjecting that individual to risk. Now, in the recruitment of that
man, it is quite possible--and in more cases than one--that he has
been given assurances that his identity is only known to a very limited
number of people. And on occasions, his identity may only be known
to the Director, so that this is a case-by~e matter.
In other words, we are in a sense the contracting agents for the
Government, and we do contract, and we do accept conditions of employment.
And to our WRy of thinking, we must abide by it. But in
order not to jeopardize the domestic activities of the Bureau, and at
the same time to give them the full benefits of the individual, there
is a coordinating process with them as to this person. And I have
never really known of many cases where there was not agreement.
Senator MATHIAS. So that there was, in fact, a gray area?
Mr. ANGLETON. It is a gray area, but it is a gray area by virtue of
the actuality of a principal-agent relationship, not because of jealousies
or internecine infighting.
Senator MATHIAS. And there were clearly pragmatic solutions to
the problems that arose in the gray area?
Mr. ANGLETON. Correct.
Senator MATHIAS. One final question, Mr. Angleton. If we are to
construct an intelligence community for the future, I think we have
to understand what the nature of the problem is tooay. How would
you assess the tensions that exist today between the United States and
potential antagonists or enemies in the world, the kind of tensions
that create the basic intelligence problem with which we have to cope?
Mr. ANGLETON. This would open up an extremely complicawd channel
of discussion.
Senator MATHIAS. I think it is important that we try to grapple with
it, no matter how complicated it is.
Mr. ANGLETON. If I may go off on a tangent for a moment, I have
observed the hearings as printed in the press being conducted by
Congressman Pike; and with the exception of the security leakage
which was highlighted by a press interview and whatnot, I would say
that he is probing the intelligence community in the most productive
avenue of evaluation, and that is the question of estimates, as to
whether the American public are receiving an adequate return for their
80
investment. And I would suggest that if we are unable, in less sophisticated
areas of the ,vorId, to arrive at accurate evaluation of the outbreak
of wars, you can then have some slide rule as to our ability to
cover the Communist bloc, which is composed of 27 different intelligence
and security organizations, which deploys hundreds of thousands
of secret police, both by way of troops and where we have the major
challenge in every aspect of <the running of an agent: communications,
the posSIbility of leakages; and I would also note that two agents of
the Agency were most productive for a short time, but were discovered
and executed. I call attention to the inquiry that is going there, because
I have followed it with very, very great interest, because I think it is
hitting the nerve of the problem, namely, are we getting the production,
and are we having the proper estimates? .
Now, relating this to the Soviet, our information--
Senator MATHIAS. I would just call your attention, I think, to the
fact that the cost of intelligence, the cost of the product is not only
money. It can be in risk, as was demonstrated by the Gary Powers U-2
incident. It can be in damage to our own constitutional process, which
is one of the elements of cost thwt I think we are trying to determine
here.
Mr. ANGLETON. I think that as far as the bloc is concerned, you have
a unified approach to the United States as the main enemy. They are
bound together by ideological ties. There has been a process of deStalinizrution
which was concluded in 1959, which reconciled vast
differences, and which in essence was a return to Leninism. There was
enunciated the policy of the main enemy, and the main enemy was the
United States. And all agents working in bloc countries who priorly
had been working on small members of NATO were redirected against
the main target.
Recen'tly in the newspaper, there was the announcement of the defection
of a Romanian intelligence officer in Oslo, and there has been a
major flap. And one can ask oneself the question that if Romania is so
independent of Moscow and moving away from it, why is it that their
intelligence service, which is most effective of their Central Committ(\("
is working hand in glove with the Soviets ?
Now, this is not speculation. These are facts. There have been ag-ents
captured playing out these roles who are now in jail, and it has shown
total cohesiveness within the bloc in terms of strategic questionnaires
of no possible use to Romania. Romania, however, has received mostfavored-
nation treatment, and it also received the visit recently of the
President, not too far distant from the arrest in Oslo of the intelligence
officer.
So I come back again to the nature of this threat. The nature of the
threat rests within some thousands of pages of interrogation of veryhigh-
level Soviet and bloc intelligence officers who were, in turn, very
cloSl' in their activities to the political gniclance of the Central Committees.
And this cohesiveness dates from the period of 1959, when the
intelligence services were changed from being the protectors or the
preservers of the cult of personality of Stalin, and reverted back again
to the days of Duchinsky and the revolution and Lenin, where every
intellig-ence operation has a political objective.
And it ties together with the entire philosophy-and I do not ba~e
this on reading information available at the corner drugstore; thIS
81
comes from the interrogation of individuals who were in the system
and had positions of high responsibilty in intelligence-and the
underpinnmg of those regimes are their intelligence and security
services.
So, in conclusion, I would suggest that some day-and I know that
I have proposed many things here "which will never see the light of
day-that the nature of the Ithreat be diagnosed with a view that this
country, having taken stock of those problems, and being faced, as I
think Dr. Schlesinger has eloquently put it, with the possible change
of the balance of military power; and I hope and I believe that some
of his speeches on these matters were gained by him-the viewsduring
his short tenure as the Director of Central Intelligence, where
he was an avid reader of the secret information thwt I refer to.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee's concern in this investigation is the
nature of the threat, to be sure. And an efficient intelligence organization
is needed for this country; that is not the issue here. 'What is at
issue here is running it in such a way that we don't slmvly become the
kind of police state you have described.
Mr. ANGLETON. I understand, Mr. Chairman. I was only responding
to Senator Mathias.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. But I just wanted to emphasize that our concern
is that this country should never slide down that slippery slope
that finally ends us up with the kind of police state you have described,
and that is the whole reason that this investigation has been undertaken.
Now, Senator Hart.
Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MI'. Angleton, much of the ju~tification for domestic intellig-ence
and surveillance during the sixties and early seventies was based upon
foreig-n contacts. I would like to quote, first of all, a letter from Mr.
Helms to Mr. Hoover, dated March 20, 1970-1 think at the dawn of
the Huston era [exhibit 50 1
].
On page 5, paragraph 8, entitled "New Left and Racial Matters,"
Mr. Helms says, "There is already a substantial exchange of information
in this field," and then skipping a sentence, he says, "The increasingly
close connection between these forces in the United States," pressumably
meaning the new left and racial groups, "and hostile elements
abroad has been well established by both of our agencies."
Now, Mr. Angleton, in your deposition before this committee, you
said as follows: "Within the Agency itself, there were those who took
a very staunch stand that there was no foreign involvement." And
then, skipping a line, "And these were fairly senior individuals, mainlyon
the overt side of the business. This attitude was very definitely
that there was nothing to it; namely, foreign contact."
Are we to believe your deposition before this committee, or Mr.
Helm's letter to Diredor Hoovpr in Marph of 1970, as to the extent of
foreign involvement in domestic groups? "
Mr. ANGLETON. It is not inconceivable-I mean, I cannot reconstruct
this paragraph and put it in the time-frame that you have pORed it.
But it is not inconceivable that Mr. Helms did have disagreements
with those senior people on the overt side, or that he had access to the
content of mail intercept which would, of course, not be in their possession.
I mean, that is one explanation.
1 See p. 349.
82
Senator HART of Colorado. His letter leaves almost no avenue open
for question as to the degree of contact. He said, "has been well
established." Mr. Angleton, let me rephrase the question. Was it
or was it not well established in the spring of 1970, that domestic
groups, described as the new left and racial groups, had substantial
foreign contact?
Mr. ANGLETON. 'l'here were a number of people from these groups
who traveled to Moscow and to Korth Korea, and traveled abroad.
Senator HART of Colorado. And they had contact with "hostile
elements ~" .
Mr. ANGLETON. It is my understanding, not having reviewed the
mail intercepts, that it involved exhortations to violence, that it
involved sending letters from the United States to Soviet institutions,
inviting them to support the group in the United States by destroying
U.S. property in Moscow and in other countries, and keeping them
advised of their own plans and actions. It's also come out in mail intercept
that certain groups went to Moscow for political indoctrination,
and they went to North Korea for weaponry.
Senator HART of Colorado. Then how could senior officials in the
CIA conclude that there was absolutely no foreign involvement ~
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I mean, there are many who believed that the
foreign involvement matter was immaterial to the--
Senator HART of Colorado. That is not what your deposition said.
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I thought my deposition stated that there were
senior officials in the Agency who would not buy it.
Senator HART of Colorado. They didn't say it was insubstantial;
they said it didn't exist. "There was no foreign involvement." The
attitude is very definitely that there was nothing to it.
Mr. ANGLETON. I think it could be qualified as stating that the counterintelligence
data which they received-and I don't know what they
received-did not strike them as sufficient to go on this investigation
of leftwing groups in this country. In other words, they were opposed
to it.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Angleton, the record before us
strongly suggests that there was not only one Huston plan, but there
may have been several operating almost simultaneously. I refer to your
deposition before the committee in which you say, "What I'm trying
to explain is that people are reading a lot into the Huston plan and,
at the same time, are unaware that on several levels in a community
idcntical"-I suppose you mean in the community-"identical bilateral
discussions were going on." That is, between yourselves and the
FBI. In other words, the Huston plan did not affect one way or the
other the normal flow of business.
I also refer to--
Mr. ANGLETON. I don't think there was any-I'm afraid I don't have
the time sequence here, What is the question, sir ~
Senator HART of Colorado. Let me complete my question.
In addition to that testimony which you have already given, I refer
to an April 12, 1971 memorandum for the files from Director HoovfH'
[exhibit 31 1
].
1 See p. 272.
83
He says~ and I quote:
This meeting had been requested by Mr. Helms and was for the purpose of
discussing a broadening of operations, particularly of the very confidential type
in covering intelligence, both domestic and foreign. There was some discussion
upon the part of Mr. Helms of further coverage of mail.
Then I also refer to the Helms letter that I quoted in the previous
question that was a March 1970 letter.
What all of this suggests, Mr. Angleton-and I think the committee
would be interested in whether the facts support that-that not only
was the so-called Huston group the inter-agency task force operating
on the question of what restraints should be lifted~ but, in fact, there
were constant contacts going on, formally and informally, between the
CIA, the FBI, XSA and perhaps other agencies about similar ongoing
domestic intelligence programs. Is it safe for us to conclude that not
only are we dealing with one Huston plan, but in fact, less formally,
with perhaps several?
~lr. AXGLETOX. Since the creation of the Agency, there has been
constant discussion of operations and improvement of collection, so
t here is nothing unusual in this happening at this time, the fact that
this, from 1947 on, was still taking place.
Senator HART of Colorado. "'Vas it possible Mr. Huston was just
being- dUI.lt:'d by the Agency into thinking that the W~lite I-Iouse ,~'as
a,vare of what was gomg on, when, in fact, the agenCIes were havmg
discussions of their own behind the back of the ",Yhite House officials
as to ,,,hat should be done about domestic surveillance?
Mr. AKGLETON. Well I think that answer could only be had if Mr.
Huston had been asked to explain in great detail, chronologically, his
contacts with the FBI and the subjects of discussion. I do not believe
that he could have met with Mr. Sullivan, and not have been exposed
to all of these matters of operations a year prior to the Huston plan.
I know Mr. Sullivan very well, and he doesn't usually waste his time.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Huston has testified under oath, and
therefore subjected himself to perjury charges, that he didn't--
Mr. ANGLETON. I'm not suggesting that the actual language he used
c~Hlld not ~e also interpreted to remove any taint of perjury. I am
SImply statmg that I have known for a long time that he was very
close to Mr. Sullivan. and I do know what Mr. Sullivan's concerns
were in terms of gaps within the community. And simply because there
,:as a Huston plan, there were a number of ongoing bilateral discusSIOJ.
lS every day with other elements within the intelligence community,
WhICh mayor may not have duplicated the broad, general plan that
Huston brought about.
Senator HART of Colorado. One final question.
Mr. Angleton, are you familiar with the name Thomas Riha,
R-i-h-a?
Mr. ANGLETON. I am. indeed.
Senator HART of Colorado. And you are aware of the fact that the
so-called Thomas Riha CllSP nlaved a key role in the breach of liaison
between the CIA and the FBI ~ . .
Mr. ANGLETON. I am.
Sen~tor HART of Colorado. Do you have any information for this
commIttee as to what happened to Prof. Thomas Riha?
84
Mr. ANGLETON. What has happened to the subject?
Senator fuRT of Colorado. He has disappeared.
Mr. ANGLETON. I haven't heard anythmg. I have not actually inquired,
but I have no knowledge. I think I heard speculation at one
time, but it was back, more or less, in the res gestae ,of this trouble,
that he was in Czechoslovakia, but I do not know.
Senator HART of Colorado. In your previous deposition you stated
that the counterintelligence information was only as good as relations
between the FBI and the CIA. That is a paraphrase of what you
said. And since there was a termination of relationships between Mr.
Hoover, the FBI and the CIA in the spring of 19'70 over the Riha case,
I think the committee might look into this termination with some degree
of intensity. That is all, Mr. Chairman..
Mr. ANGLETON. I would like to suggest, Senator, that it was much
deeper than that. It was a cutting off of all liaison within the intelligence
community with the exception of the White House.
Senator HART of Colorado. Over this one case ?
Mr. ANGLETON. Over this one case.
Once having established the principle with us, then it was simply
a matter of a short period of time when the liaison office itself was
done away within the Bureau.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I have a matter of committee
business that I will take up at the appropriate time.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the matter you want to bring up?
Senator HART of Colorado. It has to do with an additional witness
before this committee on this subject. But if there are further questions,
you may want to go to those first. I don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. If there are further questions let us
take them first. Senator Tower ~
Senator ToWER. Mr. Angleton, was the mail intercept both for intelligence
and counterintelligence purposes ¥
Mr. ANGLETON. Yes, sir.
Senator TOWER. Was there a feeling that the Soviets relied on a lack
of authorization from the Government to open mail, and therefore,
widely used the mail system?
Mr. ANGLETON. My assumption is that much of the mail and the content
of the mail would not have come to us if they had been aware of the
program.
Senator TOWER. Now returning to the comment at page 29 of the
Huston plan [exhibit 1 1
], the report noted that "covert coverage had
been discontinued due to publicity arising from congressional hearings
on privacy." You have testified that you believe this referred
to FBI mail openings. Is that correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. I say that it is my impression that the thrust of that
related directly to the Bureau's having abandoned the mail-intercept
program domestically.
Senator TOWER. Is it your belief that disclosure of the CIA's continuing
intercept to a working gT0UP, including representatives of other
agencies, might lead the Soviets and others to discontinue use of the
mails, and thus, deprive the United States of an important source of
intelligence ~
1 See p. 141.
85
Mr. ANGLETON. I'm sorry, I don't quite get the thrust of this
questioning.
Senator TOWER. Well, in other words, did you continue to do this
and did not let anyone else know that the Agency was intercepting
mail because you felt that the Soviets might get wind of it and, therefore,
discontinue the use of the mails, thereby denying us an important
intelligence source ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I would say that does represent my analysis of the
situation because I am quite confident-for example, we had in the
Weathermen case, Cathy Boudin, who, in Greenwich Village, was
a part of the Weathermen group building bombs. The bombs went up,
and she and another person, a woman, fled from the house, and she was
identified as one of the people fleeing from the house. And those were
the facts-the only facts-in possession of the FBI dealing with a
bomb-making house in Greenwich Village.
Now, when we went back and continued--or went back into our mailintercept
program, we found that she had written from Moscow some
30 to 40 letters to people in the United States, and these were the only
leads that the FBI had that were in any way important. And to this
day she is a fugitive from justice. It would raise in anyone's counterintelligence
mind as to whether she is in Moscow, but she is an active
fugitive from justice.
Senator TOWER. During working group sessions, did anyone, at any
time, ask you whether the CIA was conducting covert mail coverage ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I don't recall, myself. I mean, I don't recall that and
I don't recall details on how we arranged with the Bureau--or the verbiage
in that report-in a way that would hide our use of the mails.
Senator TOWER. Did you at any time receive instructions, or attempt
on your own initiative, to mislead the President on the issue of covert
mail coverage conducted by the CIA?
Mr. ANGLETON. It is very difficult for me to respond to that because
I do not have the facts as to the--us to what we were going to do regarding
this question of including within the Huston project the fact
that the FBI were recipients of our mail coverage.
I find it, therefore, very difficult to know how to reply to your question.
I do know-and I think that this was my conviction at all timesthat
if there was ever an audience with the President of the United
States to go over internal security in this counterespionage matter,
there would never be anything withheld from him.
Senator TOWER. So you were never ordered to, nor did you ever on
your own, attempt to mislead the President in this matter?
Mr. ANGLETON. I did not.
Senator TOWER. Thank vou.
The CHAIRMAN. Senatoi· Mondale?
Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Angleton, would
it be fair to sav that starting. say, in 1967. with the rise in antiwar
protests, that the CIA. the FBI and the other intelligence agencies
were placed under tremendous pressure by the ",Vhite House to investigate
and determine the source of th('$e protests?
Mr. ANGLF.TON. That is correct.
Senator MONDALE. So that while we ask questions about what you did
in your department, it has to be placed in the context of what you referred
to earlier as the mood and the temper and the fear of the times.
86
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator MONDALE. I think that has to be understood, because I think
it is quite obvious that the Presidents-starting with Mr. Johnson in
the beginning of the high rise in protests-tended to interpret those
protests as being' foreign-inspired. I don't have all of the documents
with me by any means, but here is the memorandum from Mr. Huston
to the President on June 20, 1969 [exhibit 6 1], stating-this is to the
Director of the FBI, but he quotes the President:
The President has directed that a report on foreign Communist support of revolutionary
protest movements in this country be prepared for his study....
"Support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign Communists
designed tC' encourage or assist revolutionary protests....
And then I have a document here [exhibit 7 2
] which we have just
obtained from President Nixon's files, entitled "Presidential Talking
Papers," on June 5, 1970 [exhibit 63 3
], and this is the descriptioo of
what he apparently told Mr. Hoover, Helms, General Bennett and
Admiral Gayler.
He said-
We are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in our country, one which
we know too little about. Certainly hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans,
mostly under 30, are determined to destroy our society. They find in many of the
legitimate grievances of our citizenry opportunities for exploitation which never
escape the attention of demagogues. They are reaching out for the supportideological
and otherwise-of foreign powers, and they are developing their
own brand of indigenous revolutionary activism which is as dangerous as anything
which they could import from Cuba, China or the Soviet Union.
And then, among other things, he says, or his talking papers indicates
he planned to say-
Third, our people, perhaps as a reaction to the excesses of the McCarthy era,
are unwilling to admit the possibility that their children could wish to destroy
their country, and this is particularly true of the media and the academic
community.
In other words, this is a reflection of the President's attitude that
there was a possibility that thousands of American youths desired to
destroy this country.
Do you have any doubt that that is the motivation of Presidential
orders and the temper of orders during that time?
Mr. ANGLETON. None whatsoever.
Senator MONDALE. If that is their view, namely, that the American
people increasingly-including the media and the parents-could not
be trusted to perceive this threat, isn't a series of agencies, uncontrolled
by the law, reaching out to apprehend a threat which they
perceived to threaten the very survival of democracy, an exceedingly
dan!.{erous tool indeed?
Mr. ANGLETON. Would you repeat the first part of that question?
Senator MONDALE. If I were a President, and I believed there were
thousands of American youths wishing: to destroy American society,
and the parents couldn't see what the kids were up to, and the media
wouldn't understand what they were up to, wouldn't I likely proceed
to use agencies such as the CIA to move in most exaggerated and intensive
ways to try and meet this threat?
1 See p. 204.
• See p. 205.
• See p. 396.
87
Mr. ANGLETON. I think that is correct, and that is the reason why
earlier I referred to the strong statement made by Mr. Huston to us
that we were not complying with the Presidenfs request.
I do not have a record of those first meetings as to anyone raising
problems or political differences, but I know there was-the question
of political implications was raised and discussed and they were
knocked down by him.
Senator MONDALE. Yes. Because I think while we probe, as we should,
in hard and intensive ways, with persons such as yourself who have
worked in these agencies, the truth of it is that this problem began in
the White House with the concern on the part of the President that
these protests came not from legitimate concerns of Americans against
the war, but probably were inspired by foreign support and leadership.
Their protests were considered to be compromised and corrupted
expressions, rather than the good faith protests of Americans concerned
about that war. I think that attitude shows how dangerous it is to ha,ve
agencies which themselves do not feel that they are bound by the restrictions
of the law. That attitude, that fear, that distrust of the
American people, coupled with agencies which feel they are not restrained
by the law, I think is a road map to disaster.
Mr. ANGLETON. Senator, I would like to make just one comment. I
believe that the depths of the President's feelings were, in part, justified
because of the ignorance, so to speak, in the West regarding these
matters. In other words, the quality of intelligence going to him he
found totally unsatisfactory.
Senator MONDALE. That's right. Because it did not square with his
paranoia that the American people were trying to destroy the country,
and in fact, there was never any evidence of any significance that that
paranoia was justified. That is what, I think, has been the traditional
dispute in maintaining a democracy-whether you restrain power lest
it be turned on the people, or whether you restrain power because you
trust the people in the long run as the primary salvation of society.
I think this document, expressing as it does enormous, unrestricted
paranoic fear about the American people, is an excellent expression of
why we have to have laws that restrain the action of the President.
Because, really, you were an agent of the President in all of these
matters.
Mr. ANGLETON. Mr. Senator, I do believe that it is difficult to judge
the President on the basis of that document. I am certai.n that anyone
who has his responsibilities, and was receiving in-depth, around the
clock reports from all over the United States, of bombings and civil unrest
and murders-and I can go all the way down the long, grizzly
list--
Senator MONDALE. Oh, yes. But--
Mr. ANGLETON. You can induce that, but it was not, in my view,
paranoia.
Senator MmmALE. Do you think the possibility that there were
thousands of American children under 30 determined to destroy our
society is not paranoia ~
Mr. ANGLETON. I will not take that out of context. The overall purpose
of that talking paper was to address it. to intelligence collectors,
the heads of agencies. And it was to give them a hot foot of getting
down to business and supplying facts. And those facts were very diffi88
cult to come by. Outside of the mail-intercept program, there was very
little hard, incontrovertible evidence. There was nothing known regarding
Cleaver's operations, his stay in Algiers, his dealing with
Soviet bloc countries, his going to North Korea, and other activities of
this sort. And these were hard facts.
Senator MONDALE. But as an old law enforcement officer, Mr. A~gleton,
I can tell you there are ways of going after those people based on
prob3;ble suspicions entirely consistent with the laws and the Constitution,
without undertaking efforts of the kind that were recommended
here that were shotgun, unrestrained and unconcerned with the Constitution.
We have ways of taking care of people who resort to violence
in this country, and this way is not one of those permitted by the
Constitution.
There is one other problem that bothers me, and that is this: what
was really the problem in 1967, until the end of that war? Was it that
Americans were bad people and therefore had to be spied on, or was
it that we had a bad war that needed to be stopped ~ What I think
this reflects is, instead of Presidents asking themselves, "is there something
wrong with this war that is creating these protests?" Instead of
that, they said, "there is something wrong with the protestors. They
are getting foreign money, foreign directions, foreign spies, and therefore
what we need is more counterintelligence." That may have delayed
the day when Presidents realized the need to change and end that war.
The CHAffiMAN. 1 might just say, Senator, 1 think your point is
well taken and we might just remind ourselves of the constitutional
duty of the President. It is not just to perceive threats and then think
up ways to deal with them outside of the law. The constitutional duty
of the President is that he shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. And when he takes his oath of office as President of the
United States, he takes the following oath: "1 do solemnly swear that
I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States
and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States." Those are his duties.
Mr. ANGLETON. Yes; 1 understand.
The CHAffiMAN. And when Mr. Nixon approved the Huston plan,
he forgot those duties. And when Mr. Mitchell, the Attorney General
of the United States, was informed of the illegal opening of the mail
a year later, as the chief law enforcement officer of the United States,
he forgot those duties, too. Are there further questions?
Senator Mathias?
Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Angleton, 1 think you raised a very important
and useful question when you pointed to the issue of measuring
the value of the intelligence you received against the cost of
producing it, and I have always felt, from the inception of this study,
that that would have to be one of the major elements of our consideration.
1 would suggest, as 1 did a few minutes ago, that that cost has to
be measured in more than just dollars. It has to be measured in the
financial cost-what it costs the taxpayers-it has to be measured in
the kind of risks that it exposes the United States to, risks of various
kinds. It may be loss of personnel, loss of equipment, loss of face, loss
of prestige, various kinds of risks; ultimately, the risk of war. And
finally, of course, it involves the third element which you have just been
discussing with Senator Mondale, the question of the cost in terms of
erosion of the constitutional process.
But for our purposes today I am wondering if you could tell us
how you, in your career, went about assessing- the cost of intelligence
that you felt might be procured in terms of risk to the United States.
How would you make that delicate balance between what you wanted
to know and thought would be useful for this Government to know,
against what we might lose in the process of getting it?
Mr. ANGLETON. "Well, sir, I think those of us who were in the war
had the advantage of having been backstopped by thousands of troops
in the event of error. And I might add that that is a testing ground
that younger people in intelligence have not had. In other words, when
they embark on operations, they are apt to not have the period of trial
and error. I would say that all of the officers I have known in my experience
in the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly in Counterintelligence,
have a very acute sense of making this judgment factor.
That is, we have handled so many cases that it builds up sort of a
body of expertise in its own right as to how much you will risk to go
after certain targets. ..
Naturally, the highest quality of intelligence that exists is in the
field of radio signals and related matters. And then it goes in descending
order of documents and to individuals who have had great access,
or access. Now, all of these matters have to be brought to bear on what
the expectancy will be, what one expects from the operation.
When the risks get very great, without exception that is taken to the
Director. And then, if he has to seek outside guidance or consultation,
he does so. And Mr. McCone was a great stickler for being brought in
when anything reached a Cabinet-level decision.
Senator MATHIAS. Now, when we talk about a risk being very great,
are we talking about the chance of losing an airplane and a pilot, or
are we talking about the chance of involving this country, in a serious
way, with another government? I'm trying to get some scale of values
that would be considered.
Mr. ANGLETON. Obviously, anything that sets back the prestige of
this country is almost controlling in terms of the Director's final decision.
I mean, if the risk is one that is going to undermine the prestige
of the United States, I don't know of any Director who would not
take that up with Dr. Kissinger, or with the National Security Council,
or the Forty Committee, or with the President.
Rut I think there is great responsibility within the Agency. I mean,
I make no excuses regarding going ahead on the matters of illegal
mail coverage, but that is a very small part of our activity, and I am
not excusing it.
Senator MATHIAS. Going back into history, to pick up another example
in which this kind of evaluation of what you might learn as
against what you might risk is involved, do you know how that was
weighed in the Gary Powers U-2 flight?
Mr. ANGLETON. It is purely hearsay. It is simply that a decision was
made by the President.
Senator MATHIAS. We are not bound by the hearsay rules here.
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I at least would like to so label it. But it is my
understanding-and I know Mr. Dulles quite well in this regard, because
later on it was my man who handled Gary Powers as to his
debriefing-and what happened, it is my understanding that the question
of the U-2 flights-and I may be wrong on this-were cleared
with the President in terms of his own activities-in this case, his
90
travels to Paris to meet Khrushchev. And I would say the history of
the Agency is sprinkled with cases which have gone forward and
which have been canceled or changed because of some overriding
political factor.
Senator MATHIAS. So it is your considered judgment that the question
of the exposure of an important national interest is consistently
weighed when a project is undertaken?
Mr. ANGLETON. Yes; but I would like to draw attention to the recommendation
of the Rockefeller Commission, of which I happen to be
much in favor. And that is that there be two Deputy Directors who
would be approved by the Congress, one military and one civilian.
And I would say there is very much need to have accessihle a Director
who can take the time to go into the nuts and bolts, because his absence
means that there will be this slippage. And I think there is more
than enough business for two Deputy Directors to be fully occupied.
Senator MATHIAS. Deputies who can measure this element of cost
before--
Mr. ANGLETON. But who are looking into the Agency. Not being in
the Agency looking out into the community. And there is a very
proper role for the overall DCI. But I think Mr. Colby would be the
first to admit that the burdens which he has had since he assumed
the directorship-that he has been able to give a very small percentage
of his time to the actual workings of the Agency.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart?
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, the so-called Huston
plan has been called one of the most dangerous documents in the
history of this Republic. Mr. Huston testified that the President did
not know that questionable surveillance techniques were being used
prior to the development of this plan, that he thought when the order
was given to terminate them, that they were terminated. There is
other testimony and evidence about what the President knew or did
not know. As I think all of us have tried to indicate to the
people of this country, the principal part of our concern is the question
of command and control. ·Who is in charge? Who gives what
orders? Are they carried out? And if they are not carried out, why
not?
I think it comes down, in this case, to a phrase that one of our distinguished
members used in another context with regard to the same
President. What did he know, and when did he know it? I have felt
since the beginning, as a member of this committee, that we stand in
constant danger of repeating a kind of perennial Government pattern
that when something goes wrong, or when there are governmental
abuses, the politicians and elected officials take it out on the appointed
people, the career people, in various departments or agencies.
And I think we, particularly, stand in constant danger of doing that
in this case, and in other cases that we will be looking at.
I frankly don't find it very tasteful, and I don't think the American
people will. If all we accomplish is public and private thrashing
of people like Mr. Angleton and Mr. Huston and others, whether they
deserve it or not, that is not our particular function.
I think the question comes down to: Who was giving what orders?
What people at the highest levels of government, particularly the
elected officials, knew or did not know about this plan and other activi91
ties? "Vere the causes shared equally among, or in part, by elected
officials with appointed officials? .
Consequently, Mr. Chairman, although I do not intend at this point
to seek its immediate consideration, I would move to ask this committee
to consider using all methods within its authority and control to
seek the presence of former President Nixon before this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. I think the point is well taken, and I personally concur
in the Senator's views. I think that in the Huston plan, Mr. Nixon
was the central figure. We can get and arc getting testimony as to what
he appeared to have known, and the representations that were made to
him, and what he appeared to authorize and then revoke. But he is the
best witness as to what his intentions were, and he is the ultimate witness
as to what he was told and what he was not told, and for that
reason I concur fully in the Senator's view.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Tower.
Senator TOWER. I think this is a matter that should be taken up in
a closed business session of the committee so it can be fully discussed
in that context as not to engage in a discussion of it here or a resolution
of the matter here.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, the matter has been raised. As I understood
Senator Hart to say he is not going to press for an immediate vote.
Senator, have you made a motion?
Senator HART of Colorado. The motion is made, and I do not intend
to press it in this session.
The CHAIIL'fAN. At this time.
Is there any further discussion that members would like to-Senator
MATHIAS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can only say that I personally
asked Mr. Nixon about the Huston plan, and I hope the committee
has more luck than I have had as an individual in getting any
information on it.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have also asked for other information, and
we have had to subpena some of it, as the Senator knows. I think that
we will just have to find out if the former President is willing to come
and tell us about this and his part in it, what he knew about it.
Senator MATHIAS. I do think this, Mr. Chairman, if you would yield.
The CHAIRMAN. And ultimately, of course, we have the question of
a subpena in the event that he declines to do so.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, I do not think we should discuss that
here and raise publicly the threat of a subpena because I think the
matter can be resolved privately and should be. If we i!et into the business
of a subpena, we are looking at a long court battle that could go
on well beyond the life of this committee as authorized by the ConJ!fess.
There are ways to do things and ways not to, and I think we ought to
e~plore every means short of that before we even suggest that we conSIder
a subpena.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think that the Senator is not i!oing to press
his motion at this time, and I feel we should take it UD more fully
and consider the proper step to take, and that then the committee
should make its decision, and that decision will be announced publicly
as soon as it is made. Is that agTeeable to the committee?
62-685 0 - 76 - 7
92
Senator MATHIAS I would just make this comment, that this of
course is not the first time that the question of Mr. Nixon's testimony
has been raised in this committee. We have talked about it on several
occasions, and I think it was Marlowe who said, "But at my back I
always hear Time's winged chariot hovering near." Now, this committee
has got to someday make a report. Time is moving very rapidly,
and I would suggest to the Chair that We schedule the appropriate
amount of time to discuss this subject and then make a decision one
way or the other.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well, that will be done, if there is no further
objection. That is the decision of the Chair. As soon as the committee
has reached its decision, an appropriate announcement will be made,
If there are no further question&--
Senator Hl'DDLESTON. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, Senator Huddleston, do you have a further
question?
Senator HUDDLESTON. May I ask one further question that I did
not get to during my allotted time?
Mr. Angleton, the Huston plan was an operative policy of the
White House for some 5 days.
Mr. ANGLETON. Y(lS, 5 days.
Senator HUDDLESTON. During that time were there any internal
instructions or memoranda or direction given within the CIA relating
to implementing that plan?
Mr. ANGLETON. None to my knowledge.
Senator HUDDLESTON. None to your knowledge. After the President
rescinded his authorization, following that time were there any
internal memoranda involving instructions or directions within the
CIA?
Mr. ANGLETON. No.
Senator HUDDL~TON. So it is accurate to say that the Huston plan
presumably could have been implemented by the CIA without any
further directions in addition to what they were already doing, and
that there were in fact no directions can('eling any effort that might
have been started relative to that plan? It is almost as if the status
quo were maintained from the beginning to the end, before and after
without any actions being taken.
Mr. ANGLETON. With one exception, Senator, and that is that the
plan marched up the hill and then it marched back again, and this
was one of the few times that any programs involving counterintelligence,
interagency counterintelligence, were ever read by a President.
Senator HUDDLESTON. That was the plan itself.
Mr. ANGLETON. The plan itself, but it had its own-Senator
HUDDLESTON. The paper went up the hill and back.
Mr. ANGLETON. It had certain impact.
Senator HUDDLESTON. The paper went up the hill and back, but the
plan, the activities related in that plan, in fact, did continue.
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not think all the activity continued. I think
there were a number of activities of the Bureau that fitted within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau that were not rezoned.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But there were mail openings.
Mr. ANGLETON. The mail openings were within the Agency.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Wiretaps, surreptitious entries.
93
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not think there were any surreptitious entries,
b~t I am giving an unqualified answer. But I understand your point,
Sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But I think the evidence indicates there were.
But that is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is almost as though from the state of evidence
to date that the President were really an irrelevancy.
Tomorrow, we will meet again at 10 o'clock, and our witness tomorrow
is Mr. Charles Brennan of the FBI.
Thank you, Mr. Angleton, for your testimony.
Mr. ANGLETON. Thank you, Senator.
[Whereupon, at 1 :05 p.m., the select committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, September 25, 1975.]

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