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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25,1975
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITI'EE To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.O.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :05 a.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)
presiding. .
Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan,
Hart (Colorado), Baker, Goldwater, Mathias, and Schweiker.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O.
Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the
minority.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.
At the close of yesterday's hearing, Senator Hart of Colorado
moved that former President Nixon be called as a witness in connection
with the committee's investigation of the Huston plan. That
motion was considered in executive session of the committee yesterday
afternoon and it was decided by the committee that Mr. Nixon was
indeed a central witness of great importance in the matter of the
Huston plan, but that there were also other subjects that the committee
is now investigating, with respect to which the former President's
testimony would be equally important. And so the committee decided
that we should endeavor to secure Mr. Nixon's testimony with respect
to all of the work of the committee where that testimony would be
critical. And the counsels for the committee, Mr. Schwarz and Mr.
Smothers, were instructed to open negotiations with Mr. Nixon's attorney
looking toward the arrangement that would enahle the committee
to secure this testimony.
Have you anything to add to that, Senator Towed
Senator TOWER. I think that about sums it up, Mr. Ohairman.
The CHAIRMAN. This morning, we continue our examination of the
Huston plan and the events that led up to it and the continuing operations
of the intelligence agencies, following Mr. Nixon's revocation of
the plan itself. And our witness this morning is a representative of
the FBI, Mr. Charles Brennan.
Before I swear the witness, I mig-ht say that last summer I made the
remark that there was considerable evidence that the CIA had been
behaving like a ro~e elephant on a rampage. That remark was challenged.
But I think that as we close this second week of public hearings,
the evidence certainly bears out the fact that the CIA failed, in the case
of the poisons, which we examined last week, to carry out the orders of
the President. And this week. of course, as we have examined the
Huston plan, it again becomes clear that the CIA was not responsive to
the President's revocation. Not only the CIA, but the other agencies
involved. including the FBI, failed to tell the President that cer-
(95)
96
tain operations like the mail openings, for which they sought Presidential
approval, had in fact -been going on for years before that
authorization was sought. And when it was revoked, the mail openings
continued for a long period of time afterwards. We will look this
morning at the FBI's role in this particular plan. And our witness, Mr.
Brennan, is prepared to respond to questions from the committee.
Before we do that, would you please stand and take the oath ~ Do you
solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this proceeding
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God~
Mr. BRENNAN. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schwarz, would you commence questioning
please.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Brennan, were you employed by the FBI?
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES BRENNAN, FORMERLY ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (1970-71)
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes,sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. From when to when ~
Mr. BRENNAN. From April 1948 until July 1974 when I retired.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And in June 1970 were you the Chief of the Internal
Security Section of the Domestic IntellIgence Division of the FBI?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, I was.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And Mr. Sullivan was your immediate superiod
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And did you then in July of 1970 succeed him as the
Chief of the Domestic Intelligence Division ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Specifically August 1970.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And you left the FBI because of an incident in which
Mr. Hoover and you had had a dispute about the questioning of Daniel
Ellsberg's father. And I think some people will want to get into that
with you, but is that the circumstance under which you left the FBI?
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, no, sir. That was not the specific circumstance.
By the time I retired from the FBI, Mr. Hoover, of course, had been
deceased several years.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. But there was an incident involving tha,t
matter in which Mr. Hoover pllLCed you on proba,tion. Am I correct
about that?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, going back to the Huston plan itself,
you recall, Rm I correct, that there was advocacy in the plan of increasing
electronic surveillance, or bugs and taps, restoring, as the
plan -said, mail opening, increasing the coverage of envelopes and
so forth, restoring the practice of surreptitious entry, and increasing
the coverage of campus persons who were believed to be subjects of
attention to the intelligence community?
Is that in general what was sought in the Huston plan?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And all of those matters were opposed in the summer
of 1970 by Mr. Hoover. is that right?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, that's right.
97
Mr. SCHWARZ. And had Mr. Hoover been 6pposing those matters
for a few years prior to 1970 ~
Mr. BRENNAN. .Yes, sir, he had.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Was there an earlier time when Mr. Hoover had approved
the use of those techniques ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, previously during the earlier years of the
Bureau's history I think most of these techniques had been in existence.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, I am going to ask you a question that may sound
sort of strange, but I believe it is relevant from your conversation with
us 2 days ago.
Mr. Hoover became 70 years old in 1965, is that in accord with your
recollection? Now, why is it significant that Mr. Hoover became 70 in
1965? Specifically, why is that fact significant to your understanding
of his opposition to the use of the techniques which we have been talking
about?
Mr. BRENNAN. I think when Mr. Hoover reached age 70, of course,
he came within the Government's law which required mandatory retirement
at that time. And I believe that was waived by PreSIdent
Johnson, which virtually then called for the Director to be renewed
as Director of the FBI on an annual basis. And I think that Mr.
Hoover was very conscious of the fact that to a degree this put him
into a somewhat vulnerable position. I think he then also became very
conscious of the fact that any incident, which, within his understanding
might prove to be an embarrassment to the Bureau, could reflect
questionably on his leadership of the Bureau. And I think that perhaps
he felt that such an incident could provide certain individuals with
the capacity to not renew his continued role as Director of the FBI.
Mr. SCHWARZ. In your opinion, how was it that Mr. Hoover was able
to stay on as Director of the Bureau for so long after 1965? Indeed, he
stayed on until he died in what was it, 1972 or 1973?
Mr. BRENNAN. In 1972, I believe, he died.
Mr. SCHWARZ. In your opinion, why was it that the various Presidents
kept him in office ?
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, this very definitely is my opinion, but I think
that the various Presidents possibly, just for political purposes I think,
feared possibly the loss of votes. If they were to remove Mr. Hoover,
I think there mi~ht have been some-and again this is purely speculation-
there might have been fear on thelr part that perhaps Mr.
Hoover had some information that mi~ht prove embarrassing to them.
Senator MORGAN. I feel as a committee member that I must voice
my objection or dissent from this line of questioning. This man is
speculating about the reasons that people who are now dead acted as
they did.
In all fairness to the Presidents who retained Mr. Hoover and to
Mr. Hoover, I just don't think it is proper to let somebody who admittedly
had difficulty with Mr. Hoover speculate on his motives. This
would not be accepted in a court of law and I don't think it should be
accepted in this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I think your point is well taken. Let us
move ahead with the questions.
Mr. SCHWARZ. With respect, Mr. Brennan, to what Mr. Hoover
actually did, let us look at what the written record reveals. And in
98
connection with the point made by Senator Morgan I wish to move
to what he actually did and not to speculation.
'Would you examine exhibit 32 " please?
And I move, Mr. Chairman, the introduction of this document
which is dated July 19, 1966. It is from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach,
subject: "Black bag" jobs. And it contains Mr. Hoover's handwritten
note on the third page stating, "no more such techniques must be used."
The CHAIRMAN. Very well, without objection, the document will be
entered into the record of the proceedings.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 32 for
identification.]
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, Mr. Brennan, you have had an opportunity to
see this document during the course of your preparation with us.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, I have.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And does it accord with your understanding of the
procedures which previously had been employed in connection with
so-called "black bag" jobs?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, it does.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Would you read into the record, please, the
second paragraph of the document.
Mr. BRENNAN. The second paragraph states, "We do not"obtain authorization
for 'black bag' jobs from outside the Bureau. Such a
technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal. Therefore, it would
be impossible to obtain any legal sanction for it. Despite this, 'black
bag' jobs have been used because they represent an invaluable technique
in combating subversive activities of a clandestine nature and
directly undermining and destroying our Nation."
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, the document also refers to a so-called
"do not file" procedure.
The CHAIRMAN. I think, Mr. Brennan, it might be helpful if you
would iust explain to the committee what a "black bag" job is.
Mr. BRENNAN. I think in general parlance, in the intelligence community,
Senator. the "black bag" iob refers to an operation which involves
a 'Penetration which basically is designed to obtain intelligence
informatIOn, which basically constitutes breaking and entering.
The CHAIRMAN. You mean what would normally be caHed a
burglary?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes; normally, Senator, yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. SCHWARZ. 'Vould you turn to exhibit 33,2 please?
And, Mr. Chairman, in line with what Senator Morgan indicated,
I move the introduction of exhibit 33, which is Director Hoover's memorandum
to Mr. Tolson and Mr. DeLoach. dated January 6, 1967.
again stating his opinion with respect to the propriety of so-called
"black-bag" techniques.
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, before we go on, so that there will
be no misunderstanding about my position, I have no objection whatsoever
to Mr. Hoover's orders being put in the record. My objections were
to allowing or asking this witness to speculate on why Mr. Hoover did
so and so or why the President extended his term.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand the objection and I have sustained it.
1 See p. 273.
• See p. 276.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Would you read into the record, Mr. Brennan, exhibit
33, please?
Mr. BRENNAN. It is a memorandum for Mr. Tolson and Mr. DeLoach
from J. Edgar Hoover, and it states:
I note that requests are still being made by Bureau officials for the use of
"black bag" techniques. I have previously indicated that I do not intend to approve
any such requests in the future, and consequently, no such recommendations
should be submitted for approval of such matters. This practice, which includes
also surreptitious entrances upon premises of any kind, will not meet with my
approval in the future.
Very truly yours.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right, finally, in this line of questioning, would
you turn to exhibit 40 1 which is a memorandum dated July 27, 1970,
from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General, including Mr.
Hoover's comments on the Huston plan itself.
Have you got that, Mr. Brennan1
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right, Mr. Chairman, I move the introduction into
evidence of that document.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 40 for identification.]
Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question on procedure?
I notice counsel today is moving introduction of documents. I was
not under the impression that that was necessary in order to make it
a part of the records of this committee. If it is, we have got a problem,
because I assumed, then, at some point, all of the documents that have
been used and prepared by staff would be thought of as the records of
this committee and would be open to public inspection, except as sanitization
would be required. I don't want to be picayunish, but I don't
want to end up at some future date not having access to some of the
information which was before us at this committee table. Is it the chairman's
position that we must formally put documents in the record?
My position is that we should consider all of them part of the record.
The CHAIRMAN. I think all documents will be considered part of the
record. I believe that the reason counsel is proceeding this way this
morning is because he is undertaking to put these particular documents
in the record. While, normally, we have simply been asking the witness
to refer to passages of documents in the normal interrogation. But,
Senator, all of the documents, in any case, will form the record of this
committee.
Senator BAKER. Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. My view is the same as yours.
Senator TOWER. So, no formal motion is necessary?
The CHAIRMAN. I actually think that is so. And if the committee
would prefer, we will--
Senator BAKER. No; I don't object, I just want to make sure that this
Questioning which was new today does not imply that at some future
date we are going to exclude documents. I am now reassured. The
chairman, as I understand it, has ruled all of these documents will be
for the record of the committee. That satisfies my request.
1 See p. 313.
100
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Now, would you proceed, Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Brennan, is it fair to say that this document
restates the objections to the lifting of the various restraints which
Mr. Hoover had already expressed in the footnotes to the document
submitted to the President on June 25, 1970? .
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, it does.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right, the only added part that ought to be read
into the record, if you would, would be the final paragraph on the
third page. Would you read that into the record.
Mr. BRENNAN:
Despite my clear-cut and specific opposition to the lifting of the various investigative
restraints referred to above and to the creation of a permanent
interagency committee on domestic intelligence, the FBI is prepared to implement
the instructions of the White House, at your direction. Of course, we would
continue to seek your specific authorization, where appropriate, to utilize the
various sensitive investigative techniques involved in individual cases.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, is it your understanding- that Mr. Mitchell
declined to authorize, or did authorize specific techniques that were referred
to? Or is it in between in some fashion ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't recall that, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I just have one more question. After the Huston plan
was turned down, was there a program of intensification of investigation
in the security field which was proposed by your department and
approved eventually by the Director?
Mr. BRENXAN. Yes. sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I have nothing further. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRl\fAX. Mr. Smothers, do you have questions?
Mr. SMOTHERS. Just a few inquiries, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan,
I think it is a fair inference from your testimony this morning, and
certainly from your previous testimony before the committee, that you
are of the opinion that the FBI was somehow being restricted unnecessarily
in its domestic intelligence effort.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes sir, I was.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Is it your opinion that these restrictions were based
upon the FBI's past record of inexactness or ineptness in this area?
Could this at all have been based upon the fact that the work product
coming out was not a good one?
Mr. BRENNAN. No, sir, I do not feel that there is a relation there at
all. And perhaps I can clarify it for you. For example, I believe we
have to go back to 1960. Prior to 1960 the FBI was not involved to
any great extent in the investigations of organized crime or to any
great extent in the investigations of civil rights matters. And following
the advent of the Kennedy administration into office I believe particularly
because of the Attorney General's interest in organized crime
matters. specifically Robert Kennedy, the FBI quickly responded by
establishing a new division which immediately began to emphasize and
intensify investigations into organized crime. And at about the same
time, I believe that there was an intensification of investigations into
civil rights violations. And I think if you examine the record prior
to 1960 as contrasted to after 1960. you will see there was a marked
increase in the accomplishment of the FBI relative to these types of
investigations.
101
I relate this because it also relates to the impact within the FBI,
in other words, when you intensify in one area then you have to take
manpower from somewhere in order to produce those intensified investigations.
Basically, that manpower began to drain away from
security and intelligence operations. And as a result, with the reduced
manpower, there was coincidentally a reduction in the various techniques
which applied to the security and intelligence field. Subsequently,
as I indicated, Mr. Hoover then, l;>y 1965, reached age 70 and
I think then he also became very sensitive to the use of investigative
techniques in the security intelligence field which he felt might prove
embarrassing to the Bureau; all of which provided a drain which
materially affected those of us who were involved in security and
intelligence investigations.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Mr. Brennan, the question is raised in part because
of a recent inquiry into this very question conducted by the General
Accounting Office. In commenting on the effectiveness of FBI investigations,
the Comptroller General, Elmer Staats, looked at and
reported on cases that were reviewed, cases of the domestic intelligence
activities here, many of which covered a period of time when you
headed that operation. Turning to page 33 of a report released by
them on yesterday, he notes that only 16 of 676 cases, less than 3 percent
of those that you investigated, were referred for prosecution. Of
those 16 referrals, only 7 were prosecuted, obtaining 4 convictions.
Of these same cases, only 12 of them, or less than 2 percent~ resulted
in the FBI obtaining any advance knowledge of planned activities on
the parts of subversive or extremist groups. The report sort of concludes
that the domestic intelligence effort may be largely an ineffectual
one. Do you agree with that conclusion?
Mr. BRENNAN. I do not think I would agree with that conclusion.
I think that basically intelligence investi~tions are designed not
specifically for prosecutive intent, but basically to develop intelligence
information which will be provided to officials of the U.S. Government
to enable them to possibly consider new types of lewslation
which may be affecting the security of the country. And I have not
had an opportunity to review that report so I am not familiar with
those circumstances. And I feel that a response to that could only
come from the FBI relative to its own record of accomplishments, in
regard to security and intelligence investi~tions.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Let me be sure I understand your last comment, then
I will conclude. Is it your contention that a primary purpose of the
domestic intelligence investigations conducted by the FBI was to
aid in some lewslative purpose?
Mr. BRENNAN. To a great extent, yes, sir. .
Mr. Sl\IOTHERS. To your knowledge, has the FBI made substantIaJ
legislative recommendations based on these intelligence activities?
Mr. BRENNAN. It is my recollection that it has, yes, sir.
Mr. Sl\fQTIll;RS. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. First of all, I would like to call your attention, Mr.
Brennan, to exhibit 2/ page 3. Now do you have that reference?
Mr. BRENNAN. I believe so, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. And if you look to the bottom of the pa.,.,ue, to part
E which bears the caption, "Development of Campus Sources." Now
the document I am referring to is generally referred to as the Huston
1 See p. 189.
102
plan. It is the recommendations that Mr. Huston made to President
Nixon to relax restrictions and to authorize certain illegal actions.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRlIIAN. Now, with respect to the development of campus
Rources, Mr. Huston recommended to the President that "present
restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded coverage of violence-
prone campus and student-related groups." And then in the
rationale for that recommendation on page 4, I read at the top of t.he
page, the first sentence, "The FBI does not currently recruit any
campus sources among individuals below 21 years of age."
So what Mr. Huston was reconunending, backed up bv the various
agencies that had put this report together, ,,'as that the restriction that
the FBI had imposed upon itself, that it would not use informants
on campuses who were less than 21 years old, should be revoked. Now
the purpose of that was to enable the FBI to recruit student
informants, was it not ?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRlIIAN. So that information could be secured from members
of the student body about activities, protests and demonstration
activities on the campuses?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, as we know, the President accepted that
recommendation and then 5 days later revoked his approval of the
entire Huston plan. That was in ,ruly of 1970.
Now I call your attention to exhibit 44,1 please. It is the FBI's plan
following the PI'f'sident's revocation of the Huston plan. It is dated
September 2, 1970, and the purpose at the very top of the page of the
plan is ''to recommend consideration be given to returning- to pI'f'vious
standards permitting the field to develop Recllrity and racial informants
among studf'nts 18 years of a~ and older with full individual
justification and Bureau approval." So here, within a month or so of the
time the PI'f'Bident revoked the Huston plan, this recommendation is
made to Mr. Hoover, that the restriction on 21 years of age should be
removed and student informants should be obtained on the college
campuses. And on the last page of that memorandum, Mr. Hoover's
approval states that you are authorized to develop student security
and racial informants who are 18 years of age or over. This presents
you with a tremendous opportunitv to expand your coverage, correct-the
last paragraph. just above Mr. Hoover's signature?
Mr. BRENNAN. The memorandum has attached to it 'PaTt of what we
call an SAC letter of instruction to the field. That is what you are
referring to ?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And in that l~lter of instruction to the field,
Mr. Hoover says in the last paragraph, "as yon n.re awa.re, you have
been previollsly instructed not to use campus student informants under
the :t~e of 21. In vipw of the current. circumstnnC1's. you are a.ut.horized
to develop student security and racial informan'ts who are 18 years of
ag-e or older." This presents you with a tremendous opportunity to
expand vour coverage.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yps. sir.
The CHAIRMAN. An rig-ht. So within a month after the time the
President had revoked the Huston plan, the FBI had reduced the age
1 See p. 323.
103
limit from 21 to 18 and then commenced a tremendous expansion of
surveillance of student groups. Is that not correct ~
Mr. BRENNAN. It was an expansion, Senator; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. We11, let us look at the size of it.
Now let us turn back to exhibit 41,1 if you please. And on page 2
of the FBI plan, I read to you from the latter part of the third
paragraph:
* * * it is felt that every Black Student Union and similar group, regardless of
their past or present involvement in disorders, should be the subject of a discrete
preliminary inquiry through established sources and informants to determine
background, aims and purposes, leaders and key activists. It is estimated
that this would cause the field to open approximately 4,000 cases involving
organizations and the key activists and leaders connected therewith.
That suggests to me a very broad expansion of the student surveillance
activities.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, but I think the foregoing, prior to that,
provides a justification for it. It indicates, for example, in paragraph
2 there, that in 1967 black student unions began forming their own
groups to project their demands, many of which indicated a commitment
to black nationalism. And it also is followed by an observation
that campus disorders involving black students increased, I believe
that is either 23 or 28 pereent of the 1969-70 school year over the
previous year.
The CHAffiMAN. Right, but if we go back to the order for increasing
the surveillance, the plan states, "It is felt that every Black Student
Union and similar group, regardless of their past or present involvement
in disorders" should be put under surveillance. So it really was a
plan to establish general surveillance of these black student groups on
the campuses of the country, regardless of their past or present involvement
in disorders ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, that is correct.
The CHAffiMAN. I think we have established on this testimony that
the President revoked this plan which he first authorized, a plan that
reduced the 21-year age barrier. A month or SO later the Bureau comes
along and reduces the age anyway, and establishes a broad new surveillance
program on black student groups, regardless of whether or
not. they had any previous record of any sort.
Senator Towed
Senator TOWER. Mr. Brennan, regarding the assumption that antiwar
activities were being financed by Communist sources externally,
was this an assumption that was held at the highest level in both the
Johnson and Nixon administrations~
Mr. BRENNAN. I do not know whether it was an asSumption, Senator,
that was held at the highest levels. I believe it was my recollection
that the FBI was continually being pressed by both the Johnson
administration and the Nixon administration as to whether or not
this was true-whether or not there was evidence to indicate that
possibly there might be financing from abroad, underlying the antiwar
protest here. And perhaps it might be that it was based on their
assumption that it could be true.
Senator TOWER. In pursuance of this, did the FBI or the CIA
monitor the principals involved in the matter of foreign travel,
1 Bee p. 317.
104
att.endance of international conferences, and recipt of propaganda,
individual guidance from external sources and external finances? Was
there an effort made to follow all of these particular aspects of the
activities in the principals involved?
Mr. BRENNAN. To the degree that we were capable, within the
limitations that we had, yes sir, we were seeking to do this and in
some instances succeeded in placing informants in groups who were
t~aveling abroad or attending Communist conferences abroad, yes
SIr.
Senator TOWER. Did you get any information or any hard intelligence
to the fact that they were getting any individual guidance from
these Communist sources? .
Mr. BRENNAN. Guidance is a difficult question to answer, Senator.
They attended conferences, for example, in Cuba, which were attended,
as I recall, by officials from Communist governments. They attended
conferences in various other countries abroad which were sponsored
by Communists. The peace movement in the United States was generally
discussed and I recall in one instance, for example, where
several of the activists who were involved in the policy committee
of the antiwar activities traveled abroad and attended conferences
where these issues were the subject of discussion with many Communist
representatives. And at the time, the ~eneral feeling- of the
antiwar movement here was that the next step in the stage should be
protest demonstrations around the United States.
It is my recollection that information at the Communist conference
abroad led to the conclusion that there should be instead a concentrated
demonstration in Washington, D.C. And followin~ the return
of these individuals to this country, I think they served to project
that view and indeed we did have a concentrated demonstration in
Washington, D.C., and it is my recollection that when that demonstration
took place, there were also concerted demonstrations at
Ameriean embassies in many foreign countries on the same day.
Senator TOWER. Did you get any evidence that the activities in
this country were indeed being financed by external sources ~
Mr. BRENNAN. We never had any evidence to that effect, Senator.
Senator TOWER. You suspected it but you could not get any hard
evidence~
Mr. BRENNAN. I personally did not suspect it, Senator. The question
was continually being Dushed to us by the White House as to whether
or not there was proof of this. I personally held the feelinO' that we
were dealin~ with what I term "credit card revolutionaries"rand that
the individuals involved in this type of activity in the United States
had ample resources of their own through which to finance these
activities. I never saw anything' to the contrary.
Senator TOWER. These international meeting'S that they attendAdthose
were under Communist auspices, were they not, financed by Commnnist
sources? '
Mr. BRENNAN. As I recall, they were, yes, sir.
Senator TOWER. So their external participation was indeed under
('A)rnmnnist auspices?
Mr. RRENNAN. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, we hlld furnished to
the White Honse in one neriod of time a renort which I recan ran
between roughly 40 and 50 pages at the specific request of the White
105
House, in which we detailed specifically the extent of the links between
Americans who were traveling abroad with the Communist
representatives of these various conferences.
Senator TOWER. Turning to another matter, after the withdrawal
of the Huston plan, was there any increase in electronic surveillances
bytheFBH
Mr. BRENNAN. It is my recollection, Senator, that there was no
significant increase.
Senator ToWER. In other words, it continued at about the same
level?
Mr. BRENNAN. I believe it did, yes, sir.
Senator TOWER. What was the general level of electronic surveillances
during the 1970 period ?
Mr. BRENNAN. If I recall correctly, Senator, in the security field,
I believe that we had somewhere in the range of 40 to 45.
Senator TOWER. Were you aware of a covert mail program in the
FBI prior toJune of 1970?
Mr. BRENNAN. Prior to June 1970 the only program of that nature
of which I am aware went way back for years, and which I had no
specific relationship with.
Senator TOWER. Were you aware of the CIA mail program before
June 1970?
Mr. BRENNAN. No, sir, I was not.
Senator ToWER. Did you become aware of the CIA mail program
during the preparation of the special report that was being prepared
for the President ~
Mr. BRENNAN. No, sir, I did not.
Senator TOWER. Did you ever inquire of any CIA personnel on the
Huston plan working group if the CIA had a mail program? Did
you ever ask any of them ~
Mr. BRENNAN. No,Bir, I did not.
Senator TOWER. Did you inquire of Bureau personnel about the
CIA mail program ~
Mr. BRENNAN. No, sir, I did not.
Senator ToWER. Were you ever aware that the Bureau was receiving
information obtained from any mail intercepts ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Not to my knowledge, no, sir. I knew that the Bureau
received information disseminated by the CIA, but as to the nature
of the technique by which information was received, no, I had never
any indication that it came from that type of a technique.
Senator TOWER. Now, Mr. Brennan, you were one of the FBI representatives
in the interagency working group which prepared the
Special Report on Intelligence Assessment. Now, was it your impression
that Mr. Huston of the White House staff, who testified here the
day before yesterday, and Mr. Sullivan, from the FBI, were in close
communication as the report developed?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, they were.
Senator TOWER. Did Mr. Huston limit his role merely to that of
an observer, or was he an active participant?
Mr. BRENNAN. I would define his role as an active participant.
Senator TOWER. In what way did he participate? Did he by chance,
or by design, guide and direct the preparation of the report ?
106
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't think he guided and directed the preparation
of the report, because it is my recollection that Mr. Huston did not have
that sufficient in-depth background concerning intelligence matters
to be able to give that strong direction and guidance.
Senator TOWER. So who would be the principal figure there-Mr.
Sullivan?
Mr. BRENNAN. I would say Mr. Sullivan was, yes, sir.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Brennan. I have no further questions,
Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tower.
Senator Mondale.
Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan, I take
it that there was no doubt in your mind that the break-ins or the socalled
black bag jobs were illegal?
Mr. BRENNAN. There was no doubt in my mind about that.
Senator MONDALE. And that some of the other activities such as unwarranted
taps, some of the efforts under the COINTEL Program that
we are going to be reviewing later, were illegal?
Mr. BRENNAN. In regard to wiretapping, Senator, the policy, as it
prevailed within the Bureau, within my understanding, involved a
legal one, which called for the written approval of the Attorney
General of the United States, and which I believe was within the
framework of legality, as the procedures existed at that time.
In regard to the counterintelligence program, I think the policy
called for specific instructions to the field, that they were not to engage
in illegal activities.
Senator MONDALE. Well, for the purpose of my question, let us just
stay with break-ins, then, because they, we can both agree, were clearly
illegal. How do you justify the law enforcement arm of the government
which itself resorts to illegal taps? You must have thought this
through. You must have wondered about. it. How do you justify it?
Mr. BRENNAN. The primary ones of which I was aware involved
organizations which were taking their direction and control from foreign
powers, and that, to me, was sufficient basis for a utilization of
that technique in order to determine the extent of the foreign direction
or control of their activities.
Senator MONDALE. So the reason was not, in your mind, that it was
legal, but that even though it was illegal, the pUf{>ose sought was
sufficiently important that you felt the law could be VIOlated?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator MONDALE. In retrospect, when we look at this whole period
of the late sixties and the early seventies, did that foreign threat,
the alleged foreign control and foreign funding, in fact, prove to be
a seriolls cause of domestic unrest?
Mr. BRENNAN. No, sir, it did not.
Senator MONDALE. And, as a matter of fact, when we were all
through with these techniques you concluded and I quote, "It is my
recollection that we never developed any information to indicate that
Communist sources abroad were financing; the antiwar activities of
the United Stntes." Would that be accurate?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, that is true.
Senator MONDALE. Further, you said, "I felt that the extremist
groups and the others who were invQlved in the antiwar activities and
107
the like at the time were of middle- and upper-level income, and we
characterize them generally as credit-card revolutionaries." Is that
-correct~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator MONDALE. So that, when we spent several years trying to
find, under Presidential directive, this evidence that domestic unrest
was directed, financed, and heavily influenced by foreign enemies, in
fact, we found it was pretty much a domestic source of unrest. Is that
correct~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, but we were continually being asked by
the White House as to whether or not there was foreign funding of it,
and in response to that, then, I felt that it was necessary for us to try
to respond to the question.
Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Brennan, because I think that is
exactly the point. And I return to Senator Hart's point yesterday. Our
hearings thus far have necessarily involved questioning people like
yourself, but, in fact, you were carrying out what you thought was
official governmental policy, were you not ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator MONDALE. And you thought you were doing what the President
of the United States wanted you to do ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, yes, to a degree that when the White House
asked a question, I felt that it was necessary for the FBI to respond
through the utilization of the appropriate techniques, to try to ascertain
the answer.
Senator MONDALE. And you were under tremendous pressure in the
late sixties and the early seventies to find evidence that these protesters
were being financed and directed by foreign sources. Is that not correctW
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, no question about that.
Senator MONDALE. As a result, you, following these orders, expended
tremendous effort, money and the rest, to try to prove the existence of
such foreign influence ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes,sir, we did.
Senator MONDALE. And except for these meetings about which you
testified before, you found little or none ~
Mr. BRENNAN. That is true.
Senator MONDALE. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that part of the
problem that we have uncovered here is a lack of accountability, and
even some lawlessness on the part of these agencies, but above all, it
seems to me what we have seen is a pattern of Presidential unaccountability
to the law. It seems, if we go back to the sixties and the seventies,
there was rising domestic concern and bitterness about this war,
and those Presidents, instead of deciding there was something wrong
with the war, decided there was something wrong with the people, and
instead of trying to meet those arguments as though they were honest
protests against the war, they tried to characterize them as being
foreign-dominated-influenced, and in effect, the critics would be corrupted
by an alien power.
Nmv. maybe som(' werl', but there is very little evidence of it.
Our task is' not only to try to restore some "kind of accountability
to these agencies, btit a much more difficult one. What do we do to
make certain that Presidents in the future do not use these secret
62 ~685 0 - 76 - 8
108
agencies to carry out their fantasies, to try to shift the blame from
themselves to somebody else, and if possible, to foreigners ~ I think it
is asking a lot of human nature to ask people at the second level of
Government to disobey the orders of the President. That means you
lose your job. It means destruction of your career, r:naybe more, if that
should happen. I think it is hard to expect, nor is it likely, that those
agencies are going to proceed with policies which they think are
really alien to what the President wants. And I think it was interesting
that in 1966, when Ramsey Clark was Attorney General, they did, in
fact, stop "black hag" jobs. At least an order went from Hoover to that
effect, I think, reflecting this as the official policy at the time.
And onr great task is to see how on earth we can address this problem:
The grant of power to the CIA and to these other agencies is,
above all, a grant of power to the President, and a dangerous grant,
because he can operate secretly. And that is what I think makes our
tnsk so very difficult. Thank you.
Mr. BRENNAN. If I may inject an observation, Senator, and hopefully
I will not be out of line in doing so, I would suggest that perhaps the
~roblem is even more complex. In other words,' the requests of the
White House were just not simply to answer that one specific question.
I think yon have to look at the social, political, and economic complexities
that were related, which built tremendous pressures on the
White House, and these, I think, stem from the thousands of bombings,
the arsons, the disruptions, the disorder. Our academic communities
were being totally disrupted, and I think that a vast majority of the
American people were subjecting the Representatives of Congress and
thememoors of the White House staff and other people in Government
to a great deal of pressure, as to why these things were taking place
and why something wasn't being done about these, and I think in a
broader context, then, the FBI was getting a tremendous amount of
pressure from the White House, in response to the overall problem.
Senator MONDALE. The irony was that their conclusion, without any
e-yidence, was that the unrest was supported by foreign money and
dIrection,and you conld not find any.
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, I would say--
Senator MONDALE. But they continued to pursue that theory long
after no one conld prove it, and the whole idea behind the Huston plan
was to criticize the FBI for failing to find what the President was snre
existed. And they found a dollar or two here and there, and they found
some meetings, and no doubt there were some Communists involved. I
have no doubt about that. But the mass of the protest was indigenous.
It was domestic. It was prompted not by disloyalty, but by a profound
feeling on the part of millions of Americans that the war waf> wrong.
Mr. Chairman, I think a very instructive memo on this Presidential
point is dated September 18, 1970, by John Dean [exhibit 24 1
]. It
went to the Attorney General. What it says, in effect, is that now that
we have rejected the Huston plan, we fOhould put it, in effect, back into
place, and remove the restraints as necesfary to obtain such intelligence.
In other words, they rejected the formal plan, and then they
proceeded surreptitiously, according to this memo, to go ahead and
do it anyway.
The CHAIRMAN. I think that is correct. Senator.
Constantly we have this theme raised, Mr. Brennan. You have raised
1 See p. 255.
109
it in complete good faith, I am sure. Other witnesses have raised it,
that this was a time of turbulence. Yes, there were great pressures on
the Agency. The White House was deeply concerned about the extent
of the antiwar protests.
But that is the very time, in times of turbulence and distress, when
an even greater obligation falls not only on the agencies but on the
President. himself, to operate within the law. Stress or turbulence does
not really excuse law enforcement agencies of the Government or the
President himself from rising above the law and proceeding in lawless
fashion.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes; I agree with that, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, that certainly is not the record of what happened
during this period. And I can only say that remembering those
protests, it dId not take an FBI agent to tell me that the students out in
the campuses were upset with the war because they thought it was a
foolish, futile war, and that is what it was. And I was upset with it, too,
in the U.S. Senate, and I was protesting it. And I did not go to any
Communist meetings in Cuba. It was a foolish policy for the country,
and that was what the students were upset about, and it was an indigenous
movemf'nt, basically, and a lawful one-not the violence, but the
protest was lawful. This is a free society, and students have a right to
protest when they do not think the Government policy is sound, particularly
when they are the ones who are drafted to fight a war
thousands of miles away in the jungles of Southeast Asia. So I just
want to emphasize that our concern here is lawlessness.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRM~N. And that is all the more important in times of
stress.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, may I be indulged a comment at this
time?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Senator TOWER. However indigenous this may have been, I am convinced
there was some external influence. In 1967, I made a speech from
the steps of Sproul Hall at the University of California at Berkeley.
I was lucky to get away with my life. My speech was punctuated by
such editorial comment consisting of four-letter words that I will not
repeat here in mixed company, and I was called among other things,
a Fascist pig, and I heard all of the rhetoric of the Communist antiAmerican
propaganda mill. So that influence came from somewhere.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We all had that experience. I recall being
called a Commie symp, because I opposed the war, so it was a time of
stress. My point is that that is the time when it is more important than
any other that everybody live within the law.
~fr. BRE~NAN. Yes; and I agree with the Senator that certainly there
was evidence of external Communist direction, whether that direct or
not~ the point is we were getting to the point of whether or not it was
being funded from abroad, SO there is no inconsistency in the two
observations.
Senator TOWER. Let me just reinforce what I said by reading from
page 62 of the transcript of the testimony of Mr. Angleton in an executive
session of this committee, on September 12, 1975, "It has also come
out in mail intercept that certain groups went to Moscow for politicnl
indoctrination, and they went to North Korea for weaponry."
110
The CHAffiMAN. Senator Baker ~
Senator BAKER. It is my turn ~
The CHAIRMAN. I believe so.
Senator BAKER. I want my 10 minutes, plus the time to speak and a
time for rebuttal, Mr. Chairman.
[General laughter.]
Senator BAKER. I will take my time in rebuttal first.
You know, really, it is awfully easy for all of us to be morally
righteous and indignant. But as Senator .Jim Pearson from Kansas
told me when I was a young Senator, and excited about something,
"You know, if you're in the Senate, you're only entitled to be a moral
giant once a week." I don't propose now that we are excessively indignant
about the turbulence of the times in Vietnam, but it is awful
difficult for me to see how that relates to an inquiry into the Huston
plan.
I think that these things ought to be kept in mind in that respect.
One, those folks are still out there..--the people who did, in faot, disrupt
this country, who demonstrated in massive numbers here in the
Capital and tried to block the streets that led to the Capital City, to
shut down Washington, as they said. I remember driving down
Virginia Avenue and having oil drums thrown in the path of my car,
and my staff man who was driving that day is a big, burly young
fellow who managed to get us to the Capitol with his nerve and the
assistance of about 300 horsepower.
But those people are still there. There is no doubt that most of the
protest was domestic, and indigenous to the American opportunity to
expres.', disagreement. But there also is no doubt that people who
want to disrupt this country, and who want to change our system,
thrive on the distrust that goes on during national upheavals.
So we cau't sit here-as I sometimes get the impression we are doing-
and throw the baby out with the bath water. We can't say the
CIA, the FBI, the DIA, and whatever else we have got, were patently
wrong in their efforts to investigate these situations, and they are bad
and they ought to be disbanded. If we do, we will be totally at the
mercy of those folks who are still out there.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, nobody is suggoesting that, Senator.
Senator BAKER. I know that. But I hear the reports from time to
time that 1976 will be the year of the resumption of the revolution.
And I expect we are going to have a pretty good time next summer.
This is the point that bothers me, Mr. Brennan, and I hope you understand
that my energetic remarks in this respect have very little to do
with you.
But the great tragedy of Watergate, or the tragedy of the Johnson
era in its response to civil distress, or of the Nixon times-and God
lmows, tpe country went through a lot, and I went through a lot during
that time politically-but the ~at tragedy of that time is not the
resignation ofa President, or the fact that another was killed-as bad
as that was-or another terminated his political career under the stress
of the war.
The great tragedy is, under the most tumultuous civil strife we
have ever known except during the time of the Civil War, our institutions
failed us. I am terribly unhappy to hear you say, and to hear
others say, that we knew so-and-so was illegal, therefore we thought
111
the national good justified our going ahead with it. That is the greatest
disservice that you could render this country, is to say that the constitutional
protections and guarantees are not valid and relevant in
times of great national stress. I think they are. And I think we can
guard ourselves against those folks who are out there who would disrupt
this city and this country, and burn our campuses, and destroy
our banks and our public institutions. We can do all of those things
and still not trample the rights under the Constitution. Our purpose
here is to try to find out what went wrong and how we can prevent
those events in the future.
I have two or three questions, and then I will stop. I made my speech,
Barry. I took my speech and my rebuttal all at the same time.
The CHAIRMAN. You ended up in agreement with the chairman.
>Senator BAKER. Well, no; the chairman had difficulty understanding
why he agreed with me.
[General laughter.]
Senator BAKER. It's just that I expressed it in a different way, Mr.
Chairman. I want to make sure that the chairman understands-and
everbody else understands-that it's all well and good to be concerned
about this, but don't throw the baby out with the bath water. Those
folks are out there, you're going to see them again next summer, and
you mi~ht as well be prepared for it.
Mr. Brennan, when did the "black bag" jobs start with the FBI?
Mr. BRENNAN. That I wouldn't know, ,Senator.
Senator BAKER. Did it start before you came to the FBI ~
Mr. BRENNAN. That would be very difficult for me to say.
Senator BAKER. Certainly you're in a better position to say than I
am. Were they going on at the time that you came to the FBI?
Mr. BRENNAN. If they were, I had no knowledge of them. I gained
no knowled!!:e of them until the early fifties.
Senator BAKER. When did you first have knowledge of the '~black
bag" jobs~
Mr. BRENNAN. Tn the early fifties.
Senator BAKER. What was your understanding of who authorized
them~
Mr. BRENNAN. It was my understanding that they were authorized
by the Director, Mr. Hoover.
,Senator BAKER. Is that understanding based on documentary proof,
on conversation with Mr. Hoover, on the statements of other people,
or what~
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, it was just the general knowledge that I
gained through my investigative experience in the FBI.
Senator BAKER. When was a "black bag" job authorized ~ When was
it used ~ Unrler what circumstance for national security, or in orrler to
assist a U.S. attorney in prosecuting a lawsuit ~ Out of curiosity,
when was it authorized ~ When did you use the "black bag" job that
you today say is illegal ~
Mr. BRENNAN. The "black bag" iobs that I knew of-which I guess
you have to say were technically illegal-but, as I know of the technique,
for the most part through the years it involved counterespionage
operations, sir.
Senator BAKER. Is that all ~
Mr. BRENNAN. To my knowledge, yes sir.
112
Senator BAKER. Domestic espionage or international espionage ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I'm speaking of counterespionage.
Senator BAKER. You're speaking of counterespionage in the sense
of a spy of a foreign country operating in this country, and you were
trying to counter him ~ Is that the counterespionage you're speaking
of ~.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes sir.
Senator BAKER. And that's the only case you knew "black bag" jobs
to be done~
Mr. BRENNAN. Subsequently, after I got to Bureau headquarters,
I learned there were some "black bag" jobs which were directed at
what I would have to term domestic subversive groups, and some
domestic extremist organizations, but they were quite limited.
Senator BAKER. How many "black bag" jobs were done in the course
of your tenure at the FBI ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I would have no idea, sir.
Senator BAKER. Well, you've got to have some idea. Was it 1, or was
it 1,000~
Mr. BRENNAN. I do not think I would be capable of commenting. I
do not have that range; I did not work in that field where it was generally
employed as a technique, Senator. .
Senator BAKER. How many do you have knowledge oH Somethmg
in the range of what, 1, 10, 100, 1,OOO~
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't think I'm in a position to be able to answer
that, Senator.
Senator BAKER. Do you have any knowledge on that subject ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes; in a general range.
Senator BAKER. Then I would like to have that general range.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Baker, we have figures. Would you like to
have them~ We have documentary figures.
Senator BAKER. I would like that, and I would like the witness'
impression too, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. What was your impression~
Mr. BRENNAN. Can we get a given time frame~
Senator BAKER. No. That you have knowledge of.
Mr. BRENNAN. The overall impression on my 26 years in the FBH
Senator BAKER. Yes.
Mr. BRENNAN. I would have to say-I would put it in a frame,
possibly, of maybe 30, 40.
Senator BAKER. Did the FBI ever get caught ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't think we did, Senator.
Senator BAKER. As a matter of fact, you didn't.
Mr. BRENNAN. I never heard of anybody getting caught, sir.
Senator BAliER. And the t(',chniques involved-were they with the
cooperation of the local police ~ How many men did it take ~ What
techniques did you employ to keep from getting caught ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I never engaged in one, Senator, so again, I would
have to speculate on that, or speak from hearsay.
Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, do you have some figures ~
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I was just going to congratulate you, Senator,
because you have managed to get your rebuttal and a good speech and
your questions all within 10 minutes.
Senator BAKER. I think I'm being politely told to shut up.
[General laughter.]
113
The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me just give these figures. These are figures
that have been supplied to us by the :federal Bureau of Investigation;
they have, at our request, been declassified. And I would like to
read them into the record.
At least 14 domestic subversive targets were the subject of at least
238 entries from 1942 to April 1968. In addition, at least three domestic
subversive targets were the subject of numerous entries from October
1952 to June 1966. Since there exists no precise record of entries,
we are unable to retrieve an accurate accounting of their number, but
that is the best figure we have.
Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This final question, Mr.
Brennan, since my time apparently has expired. Was your division
the one involved in any surveillance of political figures at the Democratic
National Convention in 1968?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir. We developed all of the intelligence information
relative to the activities of the dissidents who went out to
Chicago to disrupt the convention. However, I don't recall any time
that any instructions were given to include surveillances of, as you
say, political figures, Senator.
Senator BAKER. Yes. I'm talking about the allegations and the
charges that the FBI kept surveillance on Robert Kennedy and
Senator Edward Kennedy and Martin Luther King, and a number of
other political figures, and that, in fact, there was a communications
link-I believe a telephone-from FBI headquarters in that city
to the White House----€ven to the Oval Office.
Mr. BRENNAN. I am not familiar with such surveillances. But
basic--
Senator BAKER. You're familiar with those allegations and charges?
Mr. BRENNAN. No. As a matter of fact, I'm not.
Senator BAKER. You've never heard them before?
Mr. BRENNAN. No. Not those specific ones.
Senator BAKER. Well, generally, maybe I'm not describing it, with
exact accuracy.
Mr. BRENNAN. I recall that there was an Earth Day affair, which J
believe Senator Muskie made a speech, or something, and I believe an
FBI report dealt somehow with the Senator's appearance on that
occasion. But any information of that type was purely coincidental
to the investigative efforts of the FBI which were basically directed
at the activists who were involved in those types of movements. And
anything related to political figures was actually coincidental.
Senator BAKER. I'm told I was wrong. It was not at the 1968 convention;
it was the 1964 convention that I was referring to. Does that
alter your answer at all ?
Mr. BRENNAN. I had little knowledge of the 1964 convention. That
was not coordinated out of the Domestic Intelligence Division. It is
my recollection that that was basically coordinated by Mr. DeLoach.
Senator BAKER. Are you aware, generally, of the situation that I
described in reference to the 1964 Democratic National Convention ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I'm aware in general, because the FBI personnel that
were there at that time were phoning in reports concerning the activities
of individuals and groups over which Domestic Intelligence Division
had an interest.
114
Senator BAKER. Did they phone in reports on Martin Luther King or
on Robert Kennedy?
Mr. BRENNAN. I do not recall that they did that; no, sir.
Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Baker. The Foreign
Relations Committee is considering the Sinai agreement, and I have
to stop in there this morning for a few minutes. I am trying to get the
agreements declassified, and I'm going to ask Senator Tower to take
over during the time I have to be away. Senator Huddleston is next.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I regret that I had to miss most of the session so far this morning;
I was at another subcommittee looking into another operation in our·
system-the matter of our grain inspection program and the corruption
that has been discovered there and all its implications for this country
and for our dealing with countries in the other parts of the world. So
I will be brief, and hopefully not trespass on subjects that have already
been covered by the witness.
Mr. Brennan, were you aware while you were with the FBI that prior
to the development of the Huston plan there was a growing feeling of
conflict between the FBI and the CIA, particularly at the top levels
involving Mr. Hoover?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir. I was.
Senator HUDDLESTON. How do vou think this conflict affected the efficiency
of the total intelligence-gathering community?
Mr. BRENNAN. Are you speaking now, Senator-you will have to
put me within the correct time frame. Are you speakingof--
Senator HUDDLESTON. Leading up to the formation of the Huston
plan, 1969, 1970.
Mr. BRENNAN. It is my recollection that the Director of the FBI discontinued
direct liason with the CIA, I believe, in February of 1969
or 1970.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I think that is very close, if not the exact date.
Mr. BRENNAN. And basically, I do not think that had a great deal of
effect, relative to our participation with the CIA in the Huston plan.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, this conflict resulted primarily from a
reluctance on the part of Mr. Hoover to participate in certain suggested
intelligence-gathering activities. Is that correct ~
Mr. BRENNAN. The conflict between CIA and FBI?
Senator HUDDLESTON. Right.
Mr. BRENNAN. No. sir. That arose out of a dispute which arose from
a set of circumstances which occurred in, I believe, Denver, Colo., in
which an FBI agent gave some information to a CIA agent, which Mr.
Hoover learned about. He objected to-he had Mr. Helms call the CIA
agent back to Washington, and he insisted on knowing the identity of
the FBI UP'f'nt who had divul~ed the information.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Right. Mr. Angleton described that incident
yesterday. He described it as the straw that broke the camel's back, I
believe.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Which would indicate there were other instances.
too, such as a request by the CIA for specific wiretaps, this
type thing-are you aware of any of this?
115
Mr. BRENNAN. I'm not too much aware of those, Senator, because I
did not assume the position as Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence
Division until August of 1970. And I think that the incidents,
or whatever, that may have led up to a relationship of friction between
the two agencies, had gone on before that. And I was really not all that
aware of the details.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Were you aware that Mr. Hoover resisted the
proposals that were included in the Huston plan ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, I was.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Did Mr. Hoover also resist-at least for some
period of time-the suggestions for the intensification program that
followed the demise of the Huston plan ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, the intensification program was not, let us say,
an intensification program as might be defined within the concept of a
program, sir.
What I am saying is, if you put aU of these individual recommendations
together, it resulted in intensification, but it was not a one-package
program. .
Senator HUDDLESTON. Wasn't it a fact that Mr. Hoover had great
reservations and resisted some suggested intelligence-gathering activities
during this period ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, he very definitely did.
Senator HUDDLESTON. And it was Mr. Hoover going to the Attorney
General, and then perhaps both of them going to the President, that
actually scuttled the Huston plan. Is that correct?
Mr. BRENNAN. That is my understanding of what happened, sir;
yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. And why, in your judgment, was Mr. Hoover
so reluctant to participate in these suggested intensifications of the
intelligence-gathering activity?
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, sir, I think I previously explained that I feel
that these techniques enCDmpa..<;s some de,gree of risk which might
constitute a backlash, which Mr. Hoover was desirous of avoiding.
Senator HUDDLESTON. The kind of backlash that would reflect on the
agency?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir. Embarassing incidents in which agents
might be involved.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You think this was a greater concern of his
than any abridgment of individual liberties or freedoms that might
occur because of these activities?
Mr. BRENNAN. That is my personal feeling. He hadn't demonstrated
a previous concern of this nature in the past.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But then after some insistence, and after developing
additional activities that might be employed, on October 29,
Mr. Hoover and the top echelons of the FBI did agree to certain types
of activities which would, in fact, double the caseload of the FBI in
intelligence; is that correct?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir, I believe so.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Upon what basis do you believe this agreement
came about, or this change in position, on the part of Mr. Hoover?
Mr. BRENNAN. It is difficult for me to recall the time frame, Senator,
but I believe that possibly it might have been motivated by possible
budgetary considerations.
116
Senator HUDDLESTON. Are you saying, then, that Mr. Hoover and
the other top officials of the FBI entered into this kind of a program
which intensified its intelligence-gathering activity-and went beyond
what might have been legal-for the purpose of increasing the
caseload so that the budget of the FBI could be sustained or increased?
Mr. BRENNAN. No. I don't know that-can you clarify for me which
techniques that you are stating the Director approved which would
have been illegaH
Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, there were a number of activities included.
The lifting of a moratorium on investigations of 7,000 individuals
on the Security Index-what did that mean ~
Mr. BRENNAN. That was involved in a procedure whereby cases
would be opened at periodic intervals to recheck whether or not the
individual might possibly still be employed at the same place, and so
forth.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Which required agents in the field to intensify
their surveillance of these individuals, whether or not there had been
any indication that these individuals were, in fact, engaging in any
kind of wrongdoing.
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't think it constituted surveillance, Senator. I
think it merely involved reopening--
Senator HUDDLESTON. Some kind of checking would be required.
Mr. BRENNAN. A check, yes. A check.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Exhibit 41 1 mentions opening cases on approximately
4,000 black student activists, all members of the Black
Student Unions, and similar groups, regardless of their past or present
involvement in disorders. Does that constitute a check?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Would this not, too, involve further checks,
further investigation and surveillance, against people who had no
record of any kind of participation in any sort of wrongdoing or
disturbance?
Mr. BRENNAN. It was designed to try to develop infonnation about
the types of individuals who were activists in such groups who might
further instigate individuals who had propensities for violence.
Senator HUDDLESTON. It involved the opening of cases on approximately
6,500 New Left student activists, black and white, to determine
whether they had a propensity for violence. Now. how do you investigate
a person to find out whether or not he or she has a propensity for
violence?
Mr. BRENNAN. You cover his activities in connection with demonstrations
and the like, and attempt to ascertain whether he is exhorting
other individuals to engage in violence. A number'of these individuals
publicly professed their determination to destroy or overthrow the
Government of the United States.
A number of them advocated means by which these efforts should be
furthered, and Bureau investigations were broadly encompassing to
make a determination as to whether or not they did, in fact, do certain
of these activities.
Senator HUDDLESTON. We're looking at 6,500 people. You're surely
looking at a number of people who have no experience in violence, and
1 See p. 317.
117
who have no activity that would suggest that they have been involved
in violence.
Mr. BRENNAN. That is true, Senator, but I think that-
Senator HUDDLESTON. It's a dragnet, "shotgun" type of operation.
Mr. BRENNAN. I think that's true. But by that time I believe that
the leaders of the New Left movement had publicly professed their
determination to act to overthrow the Government of the United
States. And I felt that with them on public record as having this basic
objective, anyone who joined in membership in their cause, possibly
should have their names recorded for future reference in FBI files.
And I was reminded of the circumstances of the thirties, when many
individuals, who at that time were involved and concerned as a result
of the economic depression, became involved with Communist
activities.
A great deal of Communist cells developed, and many of the individua1s
who at that time were in colleges, subsequently were employed
in sensitive positions of Government, and the Government had
no record of their previous Communist involvement. I did not want to
see a repetition of that sort of circumstances come about.
So that when individuals did profess themselves to be in adherence
to the concepts which aimed at or called for the overthrow of their
Government, I did feel that the FBI had the responsibility to record
that type of information so if they ever obtained sensitive Government
positions that could be made known, and known to the agency for
which they were going to go to work.
Senator HUDDLESTON. So it is better to go with a blanket approach
rather than possibly miss somebody who might turn up somewhere
down the road.
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, sir, I feel that the absence of any type of approach
in the thirties indicated to me that history proves that you can
make tragic mistakes. And I felt that this Government should not fall
into that type of a tragic mistake again.
Senator HUDDLESTON. My one point On the investigations of the
7,000 individuals on the Security Index is that it puts a person in the
position of being locked up. So that is a rather serious position for a
person to be in, or a category for him to be in. And this was part of this
effort to increase the caseload, is that correct ~
I think the total of these certainly represents a substantial intensification
and increase in the activity of the FBI in this field of domestic
intelligence. And I believe during this period-if it hasn't been
pointed out already-you switched almost entirely from a counterintelligence
operation to a domestic intelligence operation.
Mr. BRENNAN. No; I don't think that is true, Senator. I think that
there was a different type of balance.
Senator HUDDI..ESTON. The emphasis-
Mr. BRENNAN. There was more of an emphasis on the domestic, but
I think that the emphasis stemmed from the activists in this country
who were using explosives and the like to such a disruptive effect,
when, to me, it was a question of putting your priorities in order, and
I personally felt that the domestIC situation had a higher priority at
that particular given time.
Senator HUDDLESTON. All right. Yesterday Mr. Angleton indicated
to this committee that the most appropriate subject for investigation
118
into the intelligence-gathering community of this Nation would be to
look at the product of what is being produced, and determine whether
or not that was adequate.
He suggested by that statement, I think, that it is the end, rather
than the means, that is important. And maybe the methods usedwhether
or not civil liberties might be abridged, or the Constitution
violated-wllS not as important as what the final product was. Now
Mr. Angleton, I assume, was speaking for himself and not the CIA.
I am wondering what your concept is and whether this is the
attitude that prevails in the FBI and in other intelligence-gathering
operations.
Mr. BRENNAN. No; I don't think so, Senator. My ~articularfeeling
on that score-and I feel this is possibly representatIve of the general
level of feeling inside the FBI-is that the end never justifies the
means. I believe that we are a society of law and order, and I believe
that our intelligence agencies, or any organization acting on behalf of
our Government, should behave within the concept of the laws that
they are trying to uphold. And I feel that the problem that has been
long lacking has been the fact that we have not had the legislation
which has clearly defined for the FBI the role that it must play in
order to enable it to fulfill its responsibilities.
And I believe that this problem arose when the fact that we were
operating basically out of a directive by President Roosevelt in 1939,
which enabled the FBI to cope with problems which dealt with subversive
activities, so-called because they were clearly and directly
related to foreign interests. But I believe that once we passed 1960,
when we got into a new era that marked a drastic social, political, and
economic change in our society, and we saw a number of individuals in
our country who professed themselves to be revolutionaries, dedicated
to the overthrow of our Government, this posed new problems which
should have brought about better defined legislation to enable the FBI
to fulfill its responsibilities.
And I hopefully feel that, if nothing else, something may come out
of the hearings of this committee that will give the FBI the applicable
legal framework to enable it to go ahead and do its job.
Senator HUDDLESTON. That is our objective, Mr. Brennan. I think
your concept would conform to those of the members of this committee.
We are trying to find out how to do it, and your testimony
will be helpful in that regard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator TOWER [presiding]. Senator Goldwater?
Senator GOWWATER. I have no questions.
Senator TOWER. Senator Morgan ~
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Brennan, many of the 7,000 individuals who
were on the Security Index were on there simply because they belonged
to a given organization or some other group that you were suspicious
of. Is that not true ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator MORGAN. In other words, as far back as 1950, you and others
in the Bureau followed the doctrine of guilt by association.
Mr. BRENNAN. No; I wouldn't say that's true, Senator.
Senator MORGAN. Well, if you put a man's name on a list because he
was a member of an organization that was not illegal, he was put on
there because he was associated with other people who are in that
group that you might have suspected. L'3 that not true~
119
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, that possibly would be an interpretation that
you could put on it.
Senator MORGAN. And from that time on, right on through the antiwar
demonstrations, you and the Bureau had followed a policy of holding
anyone else guilty, or holding others guilty by association, if they
associated with groups that you were suspicious of. Is that not true ~
Mr. BRENNAN. No; I don't think that's true. And let me clarify for
you, Senator, something relative to the Security Index. The Security
Index was something which was in existence years before I ever arrived
at FBI headquarters. And as the Senator here indicated, it also
involved one aspect of potential emergency detention.
I was opposed to, in general frames, the existence of a Security
Index of that nature, and I think if you review FBI files you will find
that I worked actively to reduce the number of individuals on the
Security Index. and I changed the policies and procedures which
drastically reduced those numbers. And I also changed the priorities
which would determine the basis for which individuals might be considered
for emergency detention.
Senator MORGAN. But on through the years, durin~ your association
with the Bureau, you have engaged in illegal activitIes such as unlawfully
breaking and entering, because you felt that the ends justified
the means. .
Mr. BRENNAN. I never did, Senator. No.
Senator MORGAN. Well, under your direction did the Bureau not do
that!
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't recall any specific instances under my
direction, Senator.
Senator MORGAN. Well do you not know of such incidents in the
Bureau'
Mr. BRENNAN. I know of such instances; yes.
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Brennan, I ask you, as early as the sixties-and
I believe you indicated that is when most of it commenced-if
you didn't, for instance, unlawfully break into the Ku Klux Klan
headquarters in Louisiana, obtain the list of the membership and the
financial records, and then proceed to arrest those members'
Mr. BRENNAN. In 1960'
Senator MORGAN. Somewhere in the sixties. I don't remember the
exact date.
Mr. BRENNAN. I was shown a document which related to a penetra.tion
of what I would term a domestic extremist group, and I believe
I indicated in there that I had no specific recollection of the specific
penetration which may have been indIcated.
Senator MORGAN. By penetration, you mean breaking and entering,
and getting into the or~anizations,right'
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes sir.
Senator MORGAN. I ask you to look at exhibit 32 1 which is a memorandum
dated July 19, i966, from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach.
Do you see that memorandum'
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes sir, I see that.
Senator MORGAN. Look on the bottom of the second page.
1 See p. 273.
120
Mr. Chairman, I am advised that an agreement would be reached
that we would not talk about specific instances of unlawful breaking
and entering. Is that correct?
Senator ToWER. I will defer that to Counsel.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Senator Morgan, they have not aeclassified the
specific instances, and we are open to talking about the generalities
at this point. We intend, I believe, to pernaps get back to specifics at
another point.
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Brennan, it is true that you broke into these
organization's headquarters, obtained membership rosters, financial
information, not only with the white extremists, but, as you have
already testified, you investigated the black extremist groups, regardless
of whether you had had trouble with them or not.
That is true throughout the decade of the sixties, isn't it?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes sir.
Senator MORGAN. And you went beyond that. You not only broke in
and obtained this information, but you then proceeded to harrass
these people by having their income tax records checked, did you not?
Mr. BRENNAN. I assume, Senator, when you say, I, that you did this,
that you are referring to the FBI?
Senator MORGAN. Yes; speaking with regard to the FBI.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes sir.
Senator MORGAN. And you, as a member of the FBI and part of the
Justice Department, had access to every income tax return filed in this
country, didn't you, simply by the attorney for the Justice Department
certifying that it was needed in the course of your investigation?
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't know that we had access to the tax return of
every individual in this country, sir.
Senator MORGAN. Did you ever hava any trouble getting the tax return
of anyone you wanted, whose return you wanted because you
were investigating ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I'm not too familiar with the use of that technique,
Senator.
Senator MORGAN. I will ask you, sir, if you don't know that the FBI
made it a practice of harrassing, or calling for tax investigations of
those that they thought, in good faith, were dangerous, such as black
extremists, white extremists, war demonstrators, those who wanted to
go to the Democratic and Republican Conventions, in order to keep
them busy, in order to keep them occupied?
Mr. BRENNAN. I was never aware that the FBI requested the IRS
to harrass any individual on the basis of his tax return, Senator.
Senator MORGAN. Well, did you harrass them in any way through
your investigations in order to keep them occupied, to keep them busy ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Not that I have specific recollection of-the nature of
that incident.
Senator MORGAN. Now the Director issued an order to stop the unlawful
breaking and entering in 1966.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes sir.
Senator MORGAN. But it did continul' some after that, did it not?
Mr. BRENNAN. Not to my knowledge.
Senator MORGAN. Not to your knowledge. I believe you told Senator
MondaIe that you thoug-ht that at times, in the main interest of national
security, such break-ins and enterings were justified.
121
Mr. BRENNAN. I think I told the Senator that I feel there is a need
for legislation which would provide the legal framework for whatever
action is decided the FBI should be engaged in.
Senator MORGAN. Did you not say also that you thought that there
were times when such unlawful entry was justified and warranted ~
Mr. BRENNAN. In the absence of any specific legislation, and if the
FBI had the responsibility to develop information regarding the
efforts of agents at a foreign power who were actively engaged in spying
on intelligence activities in this country, I would say, yes sir, it
would be justified.
Senator MORGAN. What do you refer to as domestic counterespionage
~ What is that ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Do you have a reference to domestic counterespionage~
Senator MORGAN. I believe you referred to it earlier as domestic
counterespionage.
Mr. BRENNAN. I do not think those two terms are coinc.idental Or r€;lated.
I referred to counterespionage as related to the type of activity
which would be designed to block, negate, nullify, or deyelop information
for prosecutive purposes concerning the activities of individuals
who have been sent to this country, either under the guise of diplomatic
cover legally, or as illegal agents, or utilizing Americans in conceIt
with foreign agents, to engage in intelligence operllJions here. I
would interpret the domestic groups to be basically related to thr:>
Americans who were involved in either, let us say New Left-type
activities, Old Left activities, or extremist type adivities.
Senator MORGAN: All right. But going back to domestic activities,
and especially to the question that the chairman asked you with regard
to your instructions, or the Bureau's instruction, to investigate every
black student group, regardless of whether or not that group had been
involved in any unlawful activities, was that sort of an effort to intimidate
the black students from belonging to those groups ~ Was it not a
type of espionage ¥
Mr. BRENNAN. No sir. I think if you look-as I pointed out to the
chairman, I believe-the basis for that cited the fact that there had
been a significant increa.".e in disruptive activities on the part of some
Black Student Unions, and I think the instructions concerned the initiation
of investigations to determine which ones may have developed
a propensity for violence.
Senator MORGAN. I only have a minute left, Mr. Brennan. Let me
use that minute to say to you that I, of course, can understand the apprehensions
of the Bureau, and your efforts to apprehend those who
violated the law. But as a former chief law officer of my State, and one
who directed a substantial law enforcement agency, I believe that there
are !tdequate laws on the books today to enable any competent and
effiCIent law enforcement agency to enforce the laws of this country
without engaging in unlawful breaking and entering, without engaging
in unlawful wiretaps, without using the IRS for the purpose of
harrassing the citizens that we may suspect even though they may be
gui}ty of nothing, but who, in our judgment, might be dangerous to
SOCIety.
I think it may take a little more effort on the part pf our law enforcement
agencies. They may have to be better trained. But I think it
122
can be done, and I don't believe that in this country that we can tolerate
people in Government violating laws themselves in order to apprehend
others that we may suspect of violating the laws. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator ToWER. Senator Mathias ~
Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan, I rejoiced
a moment ago when I heard you say that under the pressure
of what appeared to be a domestic threat that the proper solution
should have been to seek legislation to deal with it. I Just want to say
to you that I think that was absolutely the right reaction, and that it
is a tragedy that your advice in this matter was not carried out.
The temptation is very great to say, "Well, we are in an emergency
situation, we have to take emergency action." But, I think we ought to
keep in mind some of the thoughtful advice we have had from great
Americans in the past on this.
Chief Justice Hughes, who I look upon as a very great American,
writing in a case in 1934 said that "an emergency does not create
power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish
restrictions imposed upon the power granted or reserved. The
Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants
and powers to the Federal Government and its limitations to the power
of the States were determined in the light of emergency, and they are
not altered by emergency." And I think this, in essence, is what you
were telling us, and I think as we look to the future we want to try to
insure that institutions, as they carry out their lawful duties, remember
that emergencies alone do not create the power that is necessary
to cope with. But there are within the constitutional framework sources
of power which I think are capable of meeting any emergency, so it
is the process that is important.
Mr. BRENNAN. I appreciate your observation, Senator. I agree with
you wholeheartedly, and I think the record should show that I am
very proud to be a member of the FBI. I think the FBI did an outstandmg
job over the years, and I think the people of the FBI represented
the finest group of individuals that I have ever had the opportunity
to associate with and I think as they stand today, they are ready
and willing- to do a further and better job for the country, and I do
feel that there is a specific need for legislation to enable them-all
they want to know is what are the guidelines, what do you want us to
do, and tell us what are the limits that you do not want us to exceed,
and I am very confident that the FBI will agree with that concept.
Senator MATHIAS. It seems to me it is the work of this committee, for
the first time in a goeneration, to try to provide those kinds of guidelines
for the FBI, the CIA, the DIA, the NSA and the other intelligence
agencies that are important to the work of Government--
Mr. BRENNAN. I agree, sir.
Senator MATHIAS [continuingo]. And this is the long overdue discharge
of responsibility for the Congress.
I would like to look with you at the .July 19, 1966, memorandum [exhibit
32 1
] from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Sullivan with reference to "black
bag" jobs, and, without reviewing the terms of that memorandum,
it would appear from it that it confirms your earlier testimony that
1 See p. 273.
123
the "black bag~' jobs had, in fact, been going on for some period of time
pnor W 1,}\)V, wumu IL nuL!
1\'1l'. bRENNAN. I es, SIr.
~ellaLOr .lH.ATHlAlS. .AliU it also then confirms Mr. Huston's testimony
01.1 uesuay, LllaL aL leaSL as lat' as SUl'l'epLHlUUlS elHnes are cuucel'lleU,
they wu nul, oegl.ll wltn the huston plan, wowa it not!
.ll'H'. bRENNA~'l. .l:~o, Sll'. .L mean H womu COUllI'm .ll'lr. Huston's testimony.
~enator .MATHIAS. It would confirm it so that Mr. Huston really does
not ueserve cremt as belllg an 1llllovator, if you can call it credit; he
was SOrt 01 a comner or a practIce that had already eXIsted.
.Mr. .tiRENN_-\N. res; as a matter 01 ract, I ao not know that Mr.
Huston ever berore, aner, or at any time between, ever had any connectIon
WIth any so-called "black bag" JOb.
~enator 1\lATHl.AS. 'l'lllS gIVes me, .1 wmk, greater concern than if he
haa tnougnt It all up. It is very sllllple to ueal with one man. We can
get rIa or mm. Vve, 111 ellect, nave gULwn rlQ ot mm. but ueallng wlLh
lllstltutlOnal practiCes that have been in effect for a long time is a much
tougner JOb.
'ine memorandum does say on page 2 that "Also through the use of
this tecl111lque we have on numerous occasIOns been able to obtain matenal
held hignly secret and CloselY guarded by subversive groups and
orgaruzatlOns whiCh consisted of membership lists and maillng lists of
these organizatIOns." 1 wondered what criterion you imposed on yourself
and your organization to decide whether the pursuit of domestic
intelllgence had crossed over the tnreshold. 1t was no lOnger the pursUlt
of SUbverSIve information, but actually interterence in legitimate
domesLic POlitical actiVIty. Did you have any sort of test Lllat you
made yourself when some investigation was undertaken as to whether
this was a proper investigation ~ how did you approach it ~ I am interested
in your thought process.
Mr. BRENNAN. WeH, it gets to be a little bit of a complicated question.
You mean the basis on which investigations were initiated?
Senator MATHl.AS. Was there ever any point in which a red light
flashed before you and you said "Well, I do not think we ought to get
into this, I think this is getting into a constitutionally protected area" ?
Mr. BRENNAN. There may have been some instances. I am sure there
probably were some instances, Senator. Right offhand, I cannot recollect
or recall.
Senator MATHl.AS. But you did not even have sort of a mental checklist?
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, you had the basic responsibility of the FBI
within the framework of the Presidential directives that may have
existed within the degree of legislation that might have been passed
by Congress, and based on the instructions from the Attorney General.
This provided a broad framework for FBI operations and there was
no-I do not think there was a situation within the FBI where anyone
individual, in other words, would have given a green light, so I think
we had relatively a series of checks and balances, that prior to a really
serious investigative matter, you would have to get approval along the
line in the chain of command.
62-685 0 - 76 -9
124
.
Senator MATHIAS. But these were internal checklists, and what I
interpret as an appeal for you for congressional guidelines would be
applicable in this very kind of situation.
Mr. BRENNAN. I feel that the possibility here, Senator, might arise
for, let us say, a congressional legislative oversight committee, which
would encompass agents from the FBI and which would also encompass
attorneys from the Department of Justice who could, thereby,
sit down and analyze the nature of the problems that the FBI is confronted
with, have the prosecutive opinions of the attorneys, and get
the overall legislative impressions of the Members of Cong-ress. And I
feel, by working together in this groundwork, perhaps it can all be
brought together so that there can be a concise framework established
for the future operations of the FBI.
Senator MATHIAS. But there was never any such consultation during
the periods in which the "black bag" practice developed, which was a
long period of time.
Mr. BRENNAN. Not to my knowledge, Senator.
Senator MATHIAS. I would like to move on to the memorandum or
the letter written by Mr. Helms to Mr. Hoover which is exhibit 36,1
dated February 26, 1970, and I would refer to the notation in Mr.
Hoover's handwriting at the bottom of page 3, which says, "This is
not satisfactory. I want our Denver office to have absolutely no contacts
with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated and
any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only." Signed "H."
Were you aware of this directive by Mr. Hooved
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir. I was.
Senator MATHIAS. Did this affect the operations of the FBH
Mr. BRENNAN. I very definitely believe it did because I feel the various
members of the intelligence community must work together in
order to fulfill everybody's basic intelligence responsibilities, and I felt
that the decision by Mr. Hoover to cut off relationship with the CIA
was just totally an atrocious decision and was not consistent with what
the responsibilities of the intelligence community are.
We rely upon and deal with CIA closely, as they do with us. in the
interchange of matters of mutual interest to both of us, and it just did
not ~uare with the abilities of each to be able to carry out the responsibilities
and perform the functions by saying, "discontinue liaison
wth the CIA."
Senator MATHIAS. So you think the best interests of our Government
and our people were injured by the rupture between the FBI and the
CIA in 1970.
Mr. BRENNAN. It certainly did not improve things, Senator. I feel it
certainly did hurt.
Senator MATHIAS. Now, in considering the recommendations of this
committee to govern the whole intelligence community in the future,
do you think this kind of liaiS'On ought to be mandated by the Congress
so that one official, even an official as important as the Director of the
FBI or the Director of the CIA, would not be able to cause such a total
breach?
Mr. BRENNAN. Very definitely. There should have been some degree
of objection right then and there which would have brought the mat-
1 See p. 283.
125
ter to a head and which would have resulted in calling Mr. Hoover to
task fo: an e~pla~ation as to why he arbitrarily was able to discontinue
a relatIOnshIp wIth the CIA, and unfortunately that did not come
about. But I a~ree that there should be some means in the future by
which no indivIdual in a position of directorship of a particular Government
agency should be able arbitrarily just to say who he is going
to have contact with and who he is not, especially if it comes down to a
poin~ where it is injurious to the functions of the intelligence commUlllty.
Senator MATHIAS. To your knowledge, was there any objection to
this from any higher authority in Government ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Not that I know of. In effect, we worked around it.
Senator MATHIAS. And in fact, it may not even have been known to
higher authority in Government, is that not true ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I believe it must have been known, Senator.
Senator MATHIAS. So that, really, the only remedy is tOjrovide by
law for the kind of liaison which is absolutely necessary i we are to
have the most effective use of the intelligence agencies?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Brennan.
The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Senator Hart.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, did the FBI conduct any
surveillance of political figures at the 1972 Democratic Convention ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Not to my recollection, Senllitor. And if they-political
figures--in other words, I was not in-which one, 1968 ~
Senator HART of Colorado. 1972.
Mr. BRENNAN. 1972. I do not believe they did, Senator.
Senator HART of Colorado. Could you find out and let the committee
know?
Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I am no longer in the FBI.
Senator HART of Colorado. All right, we will find out. Thank you.
Mr. Brennan, how do you define the New Left, and whose definition
was used by the FBI ~
Mr. BRENNAN. The New Left was sort of an amorphous, disjointed
collection of individuals that ranged all the way from those who were
relatively, let us say, to put it in a nice style, were adopting a new style
of life, and some of those who were involved in the drug scene, moving
all the way up the ladder to those who were more legitimately concerned
with-and I think this probably constitutes the overwhelming
bulk and majority of it-several millions, clearly, of students who
were clearly and objectively opposed to our involvement in the Vietnam
situation, and then a relatively small, let us say, a few thousand
individuals who were involved in the extremist sense of feeling that
the only way to resolve the difficulties they saw confronting us was to
take matters into their own hands, to use violence to achieve their
ends.
Senator HART of Colorado. That is a pretty sweeping definition,
is it not?
Mr. BRENNAN. I think that constitutes in my framework of reference,
anyway, Senator, what I would term the New Left movement.
Senator HART of Colorado. A lot of the documents that we have
before us and that are in the record refer to the need to watch and!
follow and otherwise survey the New Left. That is quite a bit of this
country, not to mention a whole generation.
126
Mr. BRENNAN. I think, Senator, within the context of the reference
to the New Left, as it is contained in FBI communications, I think we
are basically referring more to trying to isolate out of this broad amOfph~~-
type grouping, the gro~pmg I described for you, basically the
mdIVIduals who advocated VIOlent-who displayed a propensity for
violence, individuals who publicly professed their supposed revolutionary
drive, and individuals who espoused Marxist-Leninist concepts, at
the same time individuals who denounced the Communist Party as a
moribund defunct party, and who aligned themselves in a greater
sphere with the revolutionary leaders of Communist movements
throughout the world.
Senator HART of Colorado. I do not find that qualification anywhere
in the documents I have seen. You sent out dragnet kind of instructions
to your special agents in charge of field agents and so forth, concerning
the New Left, not using anv of the qualifications that you have just
stated here, which gave the"agents a broad latitude as to whom they
could watch, follow, break in on, and anyone of a variety of other
activities.
Mr. BRENNAN. I do not think, if you are implying that we watched
and followed and broke in on millIons of individuals, Senator, I do
not think that is true. I think that you have to give us some credit for
some degree of circumspection in the handling of these matters, and I
think if you-in the context of specific instructions that related to the
investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, I think that it emerges
that there is a framework for our investigative responsibilities.
Senator HART of Colorado. Well, Mr. Brennan, if that degree of
circumspection that you were relying on had not broken down, I doubt
that this committee would be in existence. Let me refer to a document,
exhibit 44 1 that I think has already been brought up in this hearing,
a memorandum from Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson, dated September 2,1970.
It is a document relating to whether people of age 18 to 21 should be
recruited as informants.
At the bottom of the first page of that memorandum, it says, "If we
could develop informants among these new members," talking about
the younger people of various groups, "we could guide them to key
positions. By the time they are 21 years of age they are almost ready to
leave college and have been subjected to the corrosive influence a.nd
brainwashin~ of ultra-liberal and radical professors." An observation
that follows says that "The importa.nt consideration, of course,
is to protect the Bureau from possible embarrassment. Many of our 18-,
19- and 20-year-old men and women are highly intelligent, mature,
and loyal citizens."
That is a nice observation. "This has recently been reco~ized by
the Congress in lowering the voting age to 18 years. It is felt the same
concept can logically be applied to the revolutionary conflict at home
and particularly on campuses."
There follows a nenciled notation or a pen notation. "I don't hold
this view. [Signedl H," which I understand is the Director of the FBI.
Could you tell this committee why Mr. Hoover did not like young
people ¥ [General laughter.]
Mr. BRENNAN. I think you have drawn that conclusion from that.
I do not know whether I could agree that that was a conclusion that he
had arrived at. I was reminded before that I should not engage in such
1 See p. 328.
127
speculative conclusions as to why somebody else may have felt something
of this nature.
Senator HART of Colorado. You do not know why he made that
notation?
Mr. BRENNAN. I do not know.
Senator HART of Colorado. There was a lot of merriment around
this town recently when a journalist inspected the Secretary of State's
garbage. Did the FBI ever involve itself in trash or garbage
surveillance?
Mr. BRENNAN. I believe we had a program some years ago which involved
an assessment of trash.
Senator HART of Colorado. What kind of things were you looking
for in the trash?
Mr. BRENNAN. Basically, as I recall, we were looking for notes or
materials related to individuals we susJ;>ected to be intelligence agents
of foreign countries or engaged in espIOnage activities in the United
States, and anything that might give us a clue as to types of individuals
in the United States that they might be in contact with.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, in your many years at the
Bureau, have you ever known a trained agent of a foreign power to
put incriminating documents in his trash or garbage?
Mr. BRENNAN. It is conceivable.
Senator HART of Colorado. I did not ask the question whether it is
conceivable. I said, did you have a specific case where that had happened
~ Colonel Abel or anyone else ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Specifically, at the moment, I cannot recall any. Perhaps
the FBI records might provide a better indication of whether
they had achieved through that degree of investigative technique anything
that was of a positive nature.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, can you account for the
reasons why the so-called Thomas Riha case caused the seriousness
of the breach between the CIA and the FBI ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Why it caused the breach9
Senator HART of Colorado. What having to do with Professor Riha
accounted for the seriousness of the breach between the CIA and the
FBU
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, I think it was a breach which was totally out of
proportion with the nature of the incident. Are you asking me now to
relate back the incidents concerning the Professor9
Senator HART of Colorado. No. I want your judgment as to what
was so important.
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, I feel that-again, you are asking me for a sort
of an opinion or speculative observation-but I feel I am safe in saying
that over the years through my observations in the FBI, Mr.
Hoover had no close regard for the Central Intelligence Agency, and I
believe that this particular incident constituted just a basis on which
he could demonstrate to them his degree of arbitrary rule relative to
the relationships between the two agencies, and I believe he seized upon
that as an opportunity to be able to do so.
Senator HART of Colorado. But, to your knowledp:e, it had nothing
to do with whether Professor Riha was an agent. double-agent, or was
workin~ for any ap."ency of our Government or any other Government 9
Mr. BRENNAN. No; and to my recollection, this is the sad part of it.
It just-I mean Mr. Riha just apparently happened to pop into a
128
set of circumstances where the real vital question here was the fact
that an FBI agent disclosed some information to a CIA agent which
disturbed Mr. Hoover.
Senator HART of Colorado. Without going to great lengths-it is
fairly crucial in the case because the purported FBI agent who spoke
to the CIA agent said, "Calm this thing down. Get out to the press
that Riha is alive and well." Riha, as you know, disappeared and has
never been found.
H an unnamed FBI agent knew something about Professor Riha
that he was not telling anyone else, I think that is fairly important.
You do not have any information on what happened to Professor
Riha?
Mr. BRENNAN. My recollection is that he left this country voluntarily
and that there was no indication or evidence to indicate that,
as many alleged from that section of the country, that he had been
spirited off by Communist agents.
As I recollect, he was possibly of Czechoslovakian background. He
was in this country, teaching here, and he suddenly disappeared. The
information which the FBI had available to it at that time indicated
that he had voluntarily left, and there was no substantiation of any
involvement in any intelligence activity or any spying. There was
just no basis for the flap that arose, as I recall the incident, and this
is why I say it would seem then to me to be a relatively ridiculous
situation which blows up to the point where it then leads to a cutoff
in relations between the two agencies.
Senator HART of Colorado. I am interested in the information vou
have given us, because neither the CIA nor the FBI nor the local1aw
enforcement agencies had that information as to what happened to
him. They still think he is a missing person.
Finally, Mr. Brennan, Senator Mondale had a discussion with you
in which you talked about the pressures on the FBI and other agencies
by elected officials. I feel very strongly, as he and other members
of this committee do, that this is certainly a factor in some of the
things that went wrong. Can you account for the fact that when that
pressure occurs, from the White House or from elected officials, or
from the Congress, for the FBI to do something-why professional
agencies such as this cave in under that pressure ~ Why concoct, if
you will, information to satisfy those inquiries, rather than tell the
President of the United States the truth ~ Why dredge up and examine
people's trash, and everything else, to try to make the kind of case
that the President of the United States or some Member of Congress
wants to head Why not tell the Director of the FBI to-tell the President
of the United States that there is no case here ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't think the picture you have drawn quite
applies to what prevailed in the FBI. I feel that Mr. Hoover, as
Director of the FBI. was a very strong personality who at no time
really hesitated to tell anybody in town what he felt, including the
President of the United States. And I think that if he, at any time,
had been directed to take upon himself, or on behalf of the FBI,
activities which he personally objected to, for whatever reason, he
would make these objections known.
Senator HART of 'Colorado. Mr. Angleton testified yesterday, and
I think the records here today indicate that high level senior officials
129
in both the CIA and FBI seriously doubted, in fact never believed,
that there was substantial foreign connection with domestic dissidents.
Yet we have no record whatsoever that that case was ever laid before
the President of the United States or his delegates.
Mr. BRENNAN. I cannot vouch for what Mr. Angleton had to say.
I think, on the basis of my testimony here earlier today-I think I
made it clear that in one instance we furnished the White House with
a 40- to 50-page report which detailed the extent to which Americans
involved in the antiwar movement were traveling in Communist
countries and attending Communist conferences.
I think the only question was a continuing hammering of the fact
of whether they were being furnished money. Are Communist funds
subsidizing this activity? But I don't think the theory was held within
the FBI, that there was no foreign involvement on the part of a number
of individuals who were activists in the antiwar movement.
Senator HART of Colorado. I am past my time, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Schweikert
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brennan, I wonder if you would turn to exhibit 32.1 I would
like to just read a couple of paragraphs from that; then I would like
to ask you a few questions about those _pa~graphs. This is a July 19,
1966 memo of Mr. DeLoach and Mr. SullIvan, and the unusual caption
to the right of it says "Do Not File," in caps, underscored. And
I am reading the third and fourth paragraph&-
The present procedure followed in the use of this technique calls for the Special
Agent in Charge of a field office to make his request for the use of the technique
to the appropriate Assistant Director. The Special Agent in Charge must
completely justify the need for the -use of the technique and at the same time
assure that it can be safely used without any danger or embarrassment to the
Bureau. The facts are incorporated in a memorandum which, in accordance
with the Director's instructions, is sent to Mr. Tolson or to the Director for
approval. Subsequently this memorandum is filed in the Assistant Director's
office under a "Do Not File" procedure.
In the field, the Special Agent in Charge prepares an informal memorandum
showing that he obtained Bureau authority and this memorandum is filed in
his safe until the next inspection by Bureau Inspectors, at which time it is
destroyed.
Now, I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about this rather unusual
"Do Not File" procedure. How did this work, Mr. Brennan1
Mr. BRENNAN. I think the memorandum speaks for itself, Senator.
In other ,vords, what it is saying is that the special agent in charge
of the field office would call the Assistant Director, relay to him the
basis for his feelings that a certain action should be taken relative
to a "black bag" job. The Assistant Director would prepare that
memorandum, send it to Mr. Hoover for approval. The memorandum
was not recorded in the usual recordkeeping functions of the FBI,
but returned to the Assistant Director of the FBI and would be filed
in his office, under a "Do Not File."
Senator SCHWEIKER. Let me ask you another question this way. If
it had been filed in the normal procedure, and then somebody subsequently
removed it from the normal file and destroyed it, why was it
not done that way ~
Mr. BRENNAN. There would have been a record of it.
1 See p. 273.
130
Senator SCHWEIKER. In other words, each file of the FBI is
serialized, and as new information is put in, a serial number is assigned.
So is it not correct that if it had been filed in the normal procedure
and then removed, there would have been a gap, as far as the number
is concerned. Is that correct?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I gather this is a procedure. How did the agents
in the field know about this procedure? Was this in the manuals or
rules and regulations, manuals of instructions? Or how did they
know that this procedure was to be followed? Was it from memorandums
like this? How did the field offices know about the "Do Not
File" procedure, and the destruct mechanism? ,
Mr. BRENNAN. I frankly cannot answer that, Senator. I don't believe
there was any reference in any manual or the like that referred
to "black bag" jobs. Maybe there was, but I doubt it. And I did not
have that much of a-well, I just didn't have any participation to a
degree that-well, frankly, I don't know how they knew. Apparently,
it was a very highly "need-to-know" type of operation.
Senator SCHWEIKER. All right. They do, of course, call it a procedure.
So obviously, it had been invoked and was invoked, and they
had a quote obviously indicating that that was a signal that this procedure
was to be followed. I gather that one purpose of it was that if a
"black bag" job went afoul, and somebody got hauled before a court,
the Bureau or someone in the Bureau or an official of the Bureau could
make a statement to the court, or to any other person investigating,
to the effect that we searched our files and records, and there is nothing
to indicate we did such and such. Would that be a fair assumption, on a
"black bag" job1
Mr. BRENNAN. I think so, Senator.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And I think that it, of course, could apply in a
lot of other areas as well.
As I see it, it looks to me as if the Bureau has had a better perfected
technique of plausible denial than the CIA had, because number one,
the Assistant Director makes a decision to follow the "Do Not File"
procedure. The special agent is informed. He can put a special memo
only in his personal safe. When the FBI investigator comes around,
the Director or his Assistant Director is assured the procedure has been
followed, because the inspector reads it in a safe. He knows his command
and control is there, but he also knows it will be destroyed
immediately after that. To me it is really the perfect coverup, and a
lot more sophisticated and more refined than the plausible denial of
the CIA.
I think that one other point that ties in here, of course, is that it
would permit anybody to swear in an affidavit, in such a way for
example, "He has caused a search to be made of the records of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Department of
Justice, by the employees of the said Federal Bureau of Investigation,
acting under his direction, and that said search discloses," and so on
and so forth.
Now, the point I am making here-and I realize this does not
directly involve you, Mr. Brennan-I want to be fair and make that
very ciear-is tliat anyone who went to court or filed an affidavit,
or made a sworn statement to another Government agency or to a
commission would be technically telling the truth because of the way
131
that wording is constructed. Yet, in fact, it would be nearly total
deception.
And I think we have seen an illustration just recently in Dallas,
where destruction of FBI documents has come to light. And I am
not going to ask you about that, Mr. Brennan, because I understand
there is an ongoing investigation, and it would not be appropriate.
But I do want to say that I commend Director Kelley, because I think
he is doing a good job. I think he is trying to get things straightened
out, and I commend him for his approach in this area.
But I do think it is interesting that here we look at the chief
investigative arm of the Government, and anytime that somebody at
the Director or sub-Director level decides that they do not want anybody
to know about something, there is a formal procedure whereby
the whole apparatus jumps into line and can do it, and can deny in a
court of law that such a thing ever occurred, and supposedly, technically
be telling the truth.
And it just seems to me this is at the heart of our investigation
here, because how can we, in Congress, even though we are investigating,
know what is going on ~ We found the theory of plausible
denial in our investigation of the CIA on the subject of assassinations.
We find it here as a technique that the FBI used. It certainly makes
it very difficult for bodies like the Warren Commission and Congress
to do their jobs. And I think it is very significant, and I think the record
should very clearly show that this procedure was used at the uppermost
levels, and was used for certain purposes, and I think we just touched
the tip of the iceberg as to what purposes and what motivation and
what the situation was.
Now, Mr. Brennan, I would like to turn my attention to one or two
other subjects for a moment, and that is that in the mail-opening that
was discussed earlier, we now know, of course, that the CIA did not
discuss at the meetings about the Huston plan the mail opening procedure.
And I understand from preceding testimony that the Counterintelligence
Program was not discussed at these same kinds of meetings.
I wonder if you could tell us why the COINTEL Programs, or Counterintelligence
Programs. were not discussed at these meetings ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't believe they were pertinent to the basic purpose
of the meetings. I believe the basic-in other words, as I interpret
what happened relative to the Huston plan, you have to go back to
the original question again being asked consistently by the White
House. Are foreign, Communist elements subsidizing financially the
activists in the antiwar movement ~ And part of the apparent inability
to be responsive to that arises from what I perceive to be a degree of
provincialism which existed among the various organizations of the
intelligence community at that time. I think the general feeling being
let us say, among the FBI, DIA, NSA, you know, we do our thing, you
do yours, and let us not get involved in each other's area of operations
here. And I think there was a feeling that possibly we could overcome
what I would term that frame of provincialism if we could analyze
each other's resources, techniques, and possibly broaden the scope of
our own overall respective capacities. Perhaps we would do better
toward being responsive to what the basic question of the White House
was.
132
Senator SCHWEIKER. Did not the basic question also relate to radicals
on campus and radicals domestically? And I have a hard time drawing
the line between the distinction you just made and what I thought the
White House group and Mr. Huston were focusing on, because Huston
was focusing, when he testified before us, on violent revolutionaries, on
what they were doing to our streets and to our campuses. And certainly,
as I would understand the program you were working on, that would
certainly go to the heart of the same kind of thing, whether you are
talking about using a student as an FBI informant, or what.
Mr. BRENNAN. Right. I agree, Senator. But I feel that then, stemming
from that, what you have is the question of, are you utilizing
enough wiretaps, and are you utilizing enough bag jobs, are you utilizing
enough of these sophisticated techniques that perhaps you'd used
in the past which have since been cut back, and should there be reconsideration
of an intensification of the use of these techniques?
Senator SCHWEIKER. I see my time has expired. That is all the questions
I have, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Schweiker. Senator Morgan has
asked to be recognized for one additional question.
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Brennan, to follow up on my line of questioning
earlier, would you turn to exhibit 46,1 on the second page, a memorandum
from the Director of the FBI to the agent in charge in
Albany, I believe.
Mr. ·BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator MORGAN. And on the first page, there was a memorandum
to you, requesting that this memorandum be sent to all stations which
I assume you approved?
Mr. BRENNAN. Apparently so, yes.
Senator MORGAN. I beg your nardon ?
Mr. BRENNAN. Apparently. That looks like my initials up there.
Senator MORGAN. All right. Now, Mr. Brennan, that memorandum
included instructions as to how to keep surveillance on individuals
that were desiWlated as "Key Black Extremists," and "Key Black Extremist
Organizations," did it not?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator MORGAN. And among the things that were listed to be done
was, number nine, that "the Federal income tax returns of all Key
Black Extremists must be checked annually, in accordance with existing
instructions." Do you find that?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. sir.
Senator MORGAN. That was one of the policies, was it not, to use tax
returns for such purposes of surveillance, and whatever other purpose
that you had?
Mr. BRENNAN. There was use of some tax returns; yes, sir.
Senator MORGAN. In other words. anyone who was designated by the
Bureau as a person of interest would have his tax return checked annuallv.
in accordance with instructions that were prenared--
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't think that's what that says, Senator. Doesn't
it say that consideration shall be given?
Senator MORGAN. The beginninl! paral!raph savs: "The desirable
coveragoe must include, but not be limited to, the following investiga-
1 See p. 338.
133
tion." I am reading from the top of page 2-;'must include, but not be
limited to." And then item number nine was "The Federal income tax
returns of all Key Black Extremists must be checked annually in accordance
with existing instructions."
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. Apparently that would apply to checking the
income tax returns of the Key Black Extremists, or individuals designated
as such.
Senator MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe we will be following this
up later, but I would like to comment for the record that this concerns
me greatly, because if the Bureau decided that any given person should
be on their list, then he could have his tax returns checked every year.
And you know, even I might-I will put myself in there-I might belong
to some organization that the Bureau might decide is extremist,
and if so, I could have my tax returns checked every year. I think this
raises an important question.
The CHAIRMAN. ",Vell, indeed it does. And I have known you to oppose
certain policies of the Government. Does that mean that you get
your tax returns examined every year? This business of using the tax
returns for surveillance and la'v enforcement purposes unrelated to
the question of whether or not the citizen has paid his taxes, using it
as a form of harrassment, you know, is a very serious question, Senator
Morgan.
And maybe this is the appropriate time to say that next week the
committee is going to explore this question of what we regard as improper
practices, where the IRS has begun to use surveillance techniques
for purposes other than determining whether the citizen concerned
has paid his taxes, for purposes of harrassment. We are going
to examine the ways that this is done in liaison with other agencies of
the Government like the FBI.
Senator Tower has asked to be recognized.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brennan, the GAO report that was mentioned earlier today
by Mr. Smothers raises a question which I believe is critical to our
evaluation of the need for new tools and techniques on the domestic
front, as apparently espoused by you today. From a law enforcement
standpoint, a 3-percent rate of referral for prosecution of domestic
intelligence cases is not terribly impressive. However, the report also
noted-and I quote-"Who is to say that the Bureau's continuous
coverage on such groups and their leaders has not prevented them to
date fromachieving their ultimate subversive and extremist goals?"
I also raise the question of whether, despite the limited number
of criminals identified to date, this Congress should recognize the
need for FBI activity extending beyond the strict parameters associated
with law enforcement functions. Mr. Brennan, I ask your comment
on the question of whether this committee should ask the Congress
to clearly establish by statute a domestic surveillance role for
the FBI.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. I think the FBI would welcome that type of
clarification.
Senator TOWER. I mean, statutorily authorize a surveillance role
that may not now be authorized, or may be proscribed by law as it
now stands----ronsistent, of course, with the Constitution, and our
theories of law and rights.
134
Mr. BRENNAN. I am not quite sure I understand what you mean,
Senator.
Senator TOWER. We are talking right now about the FBI going
beyond its authority. We are talking about aspects of FBI activity
that might be considered unconstitutional. What I am trying to establish
here is, should we recommend legislation that might perhaps
remove some of the parameters that surround the FBI at the moment,
and give specific authorization for surveillance under certain circumstances?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes; I definitely feel you should.
Senator TOWER. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions from the committee? Senator
Hart~
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, the last question I asked
you had to do with the degree of foreign involvement, particularly
financing domestic disruptions. And why, if there were senior people
in both CIA and FBI that believed that there was not substantial
foreign involvement, that case was not made to the President ? You
said you could not speak for the CIA, but you thought the FBI
consistently took the view that the domestic unrest had substantial
foreign involvement.
The reference that I was referring to was your deposition before
the committee. The question was asked, "Is it your judgment and
was it your judgment at the time that there must have been a great
deal more foreign money coming in?" Mr. Brennan: "Based on my
experience, I personally did not believe that that was true. I felt that
the extremist groups and the others who were involved in antiwar
activities and the like at that time were of the middle- and upper-level
income, and we characterized them generally as credit-card revolutionaries."
My question is why you and people like you in the FBI and the
CIA did not flatly tell the White House that. That case never seemed
to ~t up there. It was always what the President wanted to hear.
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't think that is true, Senator. As I indicated
to you, we had ample evidence of the travel of leading activists in the
antiwar movement to foreign countries, where they attended meetings
of Communist groups abroad concerned with the so-called peace
movement in the United States. We submitted a 40- to 45· or 50-page
report dealing with the extent of this activity.
Senator HART of Colorado. Did that report include a statement
such as I have just read ~ That is the question.
Mr. BRENNAN. We at one time were required to submit a renort
dealing with the extent of our knowledge of Communist funding.
And I believe it was our observation therein that there was some
evidence. for example, of one subversive woup or one extremist gTOUP
of individuals who WPf£> trav£>ling to Cuba. who were th£>reby, let us
say, entertained to a degree at the expense of the Cuban Governm~nt.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, that is not my questIon.
My question was, did these lengthy reports ever contain an observation
such as you made to this committee that you did not believe there
was substantial foreign funding'~
Mr. BRENNAN. No. I don't feel that that would be appropriate
for inclusion within an FBI report as to the expression of a belief.
135
The Bureau took the position it was a fact-finding agency, and it
would stick to basically what it knew. But I don't think that, even
if we had been asked, "what is your feeling about it," that the Bureau
would have been able to respond that, "well, we happen to believe
such and such."
Senator HART of Colorado. I assume your belief was not based on
imagination, but your opinion was based upon facts. If you saw a
set of facts that showed substantial foreign funding and then had a
belief that there was no substantial foreign funding, I would think
that you would be subject to dismissal.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. But if I gave you a report dealing with 15
separate organizations which relatively set forth the degree of information
concerning whether or not they were receiving funds from
foreign sources, I think that you would be able to draw the conclusion
for yourself as to whether or not there was any extensive foreign
funding.
Senator HART of Colorado. Not if you did not present the other
side of the case, and I think it is a classic example of an agency's
being given the obligation to tell the facts to the White House, and
instead telling the White House exactly what it wanted to hear.
Mr. BRENNAN. I think you are asking, then, for interpretations,
and the Bureau did not engage in interpretations.
Senator HART of Colorado. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAmMAN. Senator Baker ~
Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, just briefly, for the sake of clarification,
I understood Senator Hart's question to be that it was your
conclusion that there was no foreign involvement in these demonstrations.
Is it your testimony that there was no foreign funding ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes,sir.
Senator BAKER. Now, is there a. distinction between these two~
Mr. BRENNAN. I think there is. I do not know whether I have confused
the members of the committee. Clearly, what I again state is
that we had developed no evidence to indicate any substantial Communist
foreign fundin~ of the antiwar movement in the United States.
But on the other hand, we had extensive evidence of the leading activists,
many of the leading activists of the antiwar movement, attendin~
Communist conferences abroad where the matter of what
~hould transpire relative to demonstratiollf'! in this country was discussed.
And you may want to regard that as perhaps indirect guidance,
or perhaps even mOre direct guidance, of what the antiwar movement
should do in this country. Those, I think, are two separate and distinct
things which led you, on the one hand, to say, "yes, there was extensive
contact lx>tween American activists and forei~ Communist elements,
but no evidence that the foreign Communist elements were
pouring money in in support of whllt was takin~ place here."
Senator BAKER. Thank you.
The CHAmMAN. Senator Schweiker has a question.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brennan, as I recall, a few minutes earlier you testified that
you were not aware that any "black ba~" jobs were done after the
January 6, 1967, memorandum of Mr. Hoover's. Is that correcU
Mr. BRENNAN. That is my recollection, Senator.
136
Senator SCHWEIKER. All right. Now, We have, of course, on file with
the committee the fact that such a "black bag" job did occur in April
of 1968, some time after that. Now, I realize you were Chief of the
Internal Security Section at that time, in the 1968 time frame? .
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And your immediate superior would have been
the head of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Is that the correct
chain of command?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And then, the next step would have been Mr.
Hoover himself?
Mr. BREXNAN. You have an intennediate step of Assistant to the
Director.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Let's assume that basically, to your knowledge,
it was not a,pproved through you. If, in fact, as the FBI report shows,
it did occur, someone in the sequential steps above you, one, two or
three, would pretty well have had to have approved it for a "black
bag''' job to have occurred. Is that correct.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. It is really inconceivable to you that it really
would not have occurred if one, two or three ladders above you did
not somewhere give an OK to it? Would that be a fair assumption?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I think again this points out the clear-cut situation
where a memo says one thing, and yet one or two people at the
top are doing something differently, whether it is settin~ up a "Do Not
File" procedure, or g'oin~ against a memo they issued. I think it pretty
well gets to the he.'l-rt of the problem here·; and again realize, Mr.
Brennan, I am not tying you into it. But I think it is Important to put
it into the record. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Schweiker.
I have just one other matter I would like to question you about before
we close this morning. Our figures show, based upon the reports of
the FBI, that when the agency decided greatly to increase its campus
surveillance, it estimated that by its surveillance of all SDS members,
6,500 new cases would be opened. And it estimated that in its surveillance
of all black groups on our campuses, 4,000 new cases would be
opened.
Now, what does that mean, opening a case? Does that mean that you
establish a file on the person? Give me a better understanding of what
opening a case means. There is a human element here. What does it
mean to the person on whom the case is opened? You have agents going
on these campuses asking' questions about certain people who are within
this new 4,000 group of black students, or within this new 6,500 group
of SDS members, and then a case is opened with each one of them.
·What does that mean? What are the mechanics?
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, the field office basically would have the responsibility
of opening a case file on the org-anization.
The CHAIRMAN. Or on the individual?
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, let me try to give it to you in sequence, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Mr. BRENNAN. And-the field office-through investigative procedures,
would attempt to develop sources and informants who could
137
give them information relative to the individuals who were the leaders
of the organization, and through appropriate investigative techniques
and efforts, attempt to determine who the individual members of an
organization were; at which stage, an individual case would be opened
on each individual member.
They now would be investigated with sort of a preliminary background
investigation, to draw together the picture of the individual.
But inherent in all of this, then, 'would be the need to make a determination
at some point in time, is this merely a rank-and-file type of
individual, or has this individual through his activities demonstrated a
propensity for violence, or does he occupy a strong leadership position
in the organization, and has he or she been responsible for public
exhortations of violence?
The CHAIRMAN. Once a file is opened, and the individual is placed
under surveillance, suppose it develops-as I am sure it did in a great
many of these cases-that the individual is found not to be engaging
in any unlawful activities, but simply expressing his opposition to the
war, his opposition to being drafted to fight the war, or whatever.
Then is the file destroyed ~
Mr. BRENNAN. It is closed.
The CHAIRMAN. It is ylosed, Well, suppose that individual later
wants to get a job, let us say, with the Government. He is gTOwn up
now, he has left the campus. He wants to get a job with the. Government,
and he applies for a job, and the FBI is asked to nm a name
check on him. Now, would that name check turn up that file, even
though it were closed 1
Mr. BRENNAN. I am not sure, Senator. I am not too familiar now with
the operation of the name-check function, and the degree to which they
would include types of information pertinent to the inquirer's interest.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you testify that such a name check would not
turn up that name because the file had been closed ~
Mr. BRENNAN. No; I don't think I could, Senator. As I say, lam
not all that certain, and I would hate to really run around in areas
where-
The CHAIRMAN. Do you see what I am concerned about ~
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes; I understand.
The CHAIRMAN. Here It file i~ set IIp. The agency itself decides, after
surveillance, that this young person has not violated any laws. The
file is closed. Later, he tries to get a job with the Government. A name
check is run by the FBI, and the FBI makes a little reference to the
agency, and says, "this man's name appeared on a subversive file."
You see, this is an intensely human thing. These people who get
caul!'ht up in this thing can be affected for the rest of their lives.
Well, I think today the testi.mony has established that the
Huston plan called for a relaxation of restrictions that then applied
to surveillance on the campusps, following its revocation by the President.
And within a month or so thereafter, the FBI greatly expanded
that surveillance. The 21-vear limitation, which was meant to avoid
student spying on students on the campuses, was eliminated, and informants
were obtained on the campuses among the student body. Also,
all SDS members were placed under surveillance, and 6,500 new cases
were opened. Also, all black groups were placed under surveillance,
138
even though there was no previous evidence of violence or a tendency
toward violence; and that involved the opening of 4,000 new cases.
My final question, Mr. Brennan, is, do you know whether this rather
dramatic expansion of the FBI involvement on the campuses of the
country began within a month or so after the President had revoked
his authorizntion of the Huston plan, whether all of that was told to
the President ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I don't believe it would have been, Senator. I believe
that the most that would have been done would have-possibly at the
next appropriations testimony, where Mr. Hoover would be called
upon to spell out what the areas of inve.stig-ative interest the FBI had,
that he, at that time, would have been subject to the congressional
inquiry which would have enabled him to draw out the scope of our
activities.
The CHAIRMAN. Tell me this. The record shows that Hoover was
objecting to the Huston plan, and then shortly after the President
revokes it, he is approving a big expansion of surveillance on the campuses,
reducing the age from 21 to 18 and all of the other things we
talked about. What accounted for the change of position ~ Why did he
object to it in the Huston plan and then shortly thereafter turn around
and approve it ~
Mr. BRENNAN. I frankly don't know, Senator. There were inconsistencies
of that type that went along from year to year, and Mr.
Hoover was not the type that would call you in and explain to you why
he changed his mind.
The CHAIRMAN. Then you have no explanation to give@
Mr. BRENNAN. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tower has a comment.
Senator TOWER. I just want to make one comment, Mr. Chairman,
consistent with Senator Morgan's objection to the chief counsel,
Mr. Schwarz's line of questioning at the beginning of the session
today. I would like simply to say for the record that the response
that Mr. Brennan gave to Senator Huddleston's questions concerning
Mr. Hoover's motivations for recommending rejection of the Huston
plan was Mr. Brennan's opinion, and was speculative entirely.
I would like to further note-this should not be inferred as a criticism
of Mr. Brennan, because he has got a perfect right to respond
to qnestions as to what his opinion is-but I would point out that
Mr. Hoover is not around to comment on what his motivations might
have been at the moment. I think we should note that the witness'
answer stands as an opinion, as speculative, and not a matter of fact.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Chairman, there are other FBI witnesses who
have contrary opinions, of course, and we have spoken to some who
believe that Mr. Hoover did have a genuine interest in the matters
that he was talking about. So there is a difference of opinion among
the people of the FBI.
Senator BAKER. I might ask, Mr. Chairman, whether anybody
really knows why everybody was scared of J. Edgar Hoover. If
this witness knows, we ought to let him say. We stopped him a minute
a~Z'O betore he had a chance to say.
The CHAI"RMAN. Are yon pntting a question, Senator Baker~
Senator R,<\ KER. Sure: Mr. Brennan. do you know ~ Did you ever
discuss with Mr. Hoover why the President or anybody else had such
139
a concern or respect, or even fear, of him ~ I assume you do not,
butnobody has asked that question.
Mr. BRENNAN. No, I don't.
Senator BAKER. I remember, Mr. Chairman, that this is a legend
that has gone on for some time. But I rather suspect we may never
find the answer.
Mr. BRENNAN. 'Well, I think it possibly arises, Senator, from reports
of certain observations perhaps made by President Kennedy,
when he was asked whether or not he intended to reappoint Mr.
Hoover or to get rid of him. If I recollect correctly, his observation
was-you know, you don't fire God. And I believe that President
Johnson also was posed a further question as to whether or not he
intended to keep Mr. Hoover on. I think he made a response of similar
content.
Senator BAKER. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. At the birth of this country, John Adams resolved
that our society must have a government of laws and not of men.
This was necessary, he said, because the law, in all vicie;;itudes of
Government, fluctuations of the passions or flights of enthusiasm,
will preserve a steady, undeviating course. It will not bend to the
uncertain wishes, imaginations and wanton tempers of man."
What we have heard this week reflects a sad change from this
original conception, so rightly cherished by our Founding Fathers.
Now we discover that even the mail of our citizens has been unlawfully
read by secret intelligence agencies. Instead of all being equal
before the law, we find that any number of citizens, from Presidential
candidates on down, have had their letters opened, copied, photographed
and filed in the vast vaults of the Federal agencies. We
learn that other unlawful intelligence operations have also been
concealed from Congress and from the President himself. This cannot
be allowed. For as John Locke wisely knew, whenever law ends,
tyranny begins.
This hearing is adjourned until 10 o'clock next Tuesday morning.
[Whereupon, at 12 :50 p.m., the f>elect committee adjourned, to
reconvene at 10 a.m. Thursday, October 2, 1975.]
62-685 0 - 76 - 10
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