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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS
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I was sitting here writing it and I'm going to send it to ~1r. vVallach
and I think ,ye can more cohesiH'ly tie a lot of these pieces and can
really oversight the Central Intelligence Service and I make no apology
for them at all and I don't know enough about it, but it's kind of
the greatest thing. But thank God the U.S. Senate is here and that you
are having a public hearing where it can be heard. And thank you
for letting me be heard, despIte what the rules require.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you Yery, Yery much, )11'. Reilly.
Our next witnesses are )11'. )1ontague and )11'. Cotter. If you would
come forward together and take the oath?
vVould you raIse your right hand? Do you solemnly s'Year that all
of the testimony you 'Yill give in this proceeding will be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
~Ir. MONTAGu'E. I do.
~1r. CCYITER. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schwarz, would you please start the questioning?
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. ~1ontague, will you recount, just quickly, your
career at the Post Office? I know you started and worked your way up
to the Office of Chief Inspector. vVould you say what you were doing in
1950, at the time you retired?
TESTIMONY OF HENRY MONTAGUE, FORMER CHIEF INSPECTOR,
POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE, AND WILUAM COTTER, FORMER
CHIEF INSPECTOR, POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE
~fr. MONTAGUE. I became a postal inspector in 1942 in the New York
division. I was appointed Inspector in Charge of the New York division
in ~fay 1951. I served in that capacity until February 1961, when
I became Chief Inspector and I retired from that position in February
of 1969. I continued to sene as Chief Inspector, during an interim
period, until Mr. Cotter was appointed to that position in early April
1969.
~fr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, whC'n vou were in New York, the name
of the man who was then Chief Inspector was Mr. Stephens, is that
correct ?
Mr. MONTAGUE. Correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did he come to you and tell you to give some aid to
the CIA? vVe are going to get to the kind of aid that you were asked
to give. .
Mr. MONTAGUE. I believe, Mr. Schwarz, that that started a little
earlier than that. It was at the end of 1952 when I received a letter
from the thC'n-ChieŁ Inspector that two men from the CIA would be
in to see me and that we should give them certain cooperation. It has
always been my opinion that this started in 1!?53. because I think most
of the activities started then. I know it did. but during this investigation,
when I was interviewed, I learned that actually it started in
the latter part of 1952.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now. did the man from the Post Office who wrote to
you say anything about what was to be done and what was not to be
done in connection with the CIA project?
~fr. MONTAGL"E. I don't ('xactly rC'call that. ~fr. Schwarz.
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Mr. SCHWARZ. 'Were you told by someone in the Post Office that no
mail was to be opened?
Mr. )!OXTAGL'E. That would ha\'e been understood. And we told the
CIA representati ves that.
)11'. SCHWARZ. 'When you say we told the CIA representatives, who
told the CIA representatives?
)11'. MOXTAGUE. I did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And what did you say?
Mr. MOXTAGL'E. ",Yell, apparently, after that letter they did come
into the office. The first process was just a survey to determine how
mail from Russia was being handled and what the quantity was. Then
later, I believe it was in .January or February 195:1, they got around
to \Yanting to make records of some of the names and addresses on
some of these envelopes. Then, after that, they wanted to use a
photographing process because it was becoming a time-consuming
thing and authority was given for that.
Mr. SCHWARZ. To do what?
Mr. MOXTAGUE. To make pictures of the outsides of envelopes that
were selected by them. Now, this whole project was that they would
know the mail in which they would have an interest. No one in the
Postal Service would know that. They could not give us any names, as
you could in an ordinary mail cover. They wanted the return addresses
on these envelopes. It was national secunty secret-type, classified-type
investigation and therefore they were permitted to look at the mail
to select the envelopes of which 'they wanted to make pictures, that is,
the outsides of the envelopes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, did you make clear to them that they
were not to open the mail ?
Mr. MOXTAGUE. Yes, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did they ever tell you that they were opening it?
Mr. MOXTAGUE. No.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, turning to the FBI for a moment, did you
know the FBI also had a mail cO\'er, that is, exterior envelopes project?
Mr. MOXTAGL'E. Yes..
Mr. SCIIWARZ. Did the FBI ever tell you that they were opening
certain letters?
Mr. MOXTAGVE. Not to my recollection.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, in your deposition, you said that while you had
instructed the CIA people not to open the mail, you did not make
the same statement or instruction to the FBI people, and you gave a
reason for it. What is the reason you did not tell the FBI?
Mr. MONTAGUE. According to my best recollection, we had not had
this type or any real type of cooperation in a case of this kind with
the CIA. This was something new. They were not one of the regular
law enforcement agencies and for that reason more attention was given
to laying down the guidelines as to what would or would not be
permitted.
'With the FBI, that organization was Federal law enforcement, the
same as ,ve were, and we know that they knew the laws as well as we
did or do.
Mr. SCHWARZ. So, you assumed that they would not open mail and
then'fore you reached a conclusion yon did not need to instruct the
FBI; is that what you are saying?
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Mr. MOXTAGUE. 1Ve didn~t think it was necessary. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Just one final question to you. I would
like to read exhibit 9,' a memorandum datecll\Iay 19, 1971, something
that the CIA persons said about you and ask you whether it is a fair
characterization by the CIA of their relationship with you. I am
going to read from paragraph 4.
"The DCI"-that was l\fr. Helms then-"then asked. who in tIl(' Post
Office Department knows the full extent of the operation-beyond
cover surveillance. The CCI"-that was Mr. Angleton then-"replied
that only Mr. Cotter knows, for he had been witting "hile with CIA
and the Office of Security. The previous Chief Postal Inspector, MI'.
Montague, had never wanted to know the extent of examination
actually done, and was thus able to deny on oath before a congressional
committee that there ,,'as any tampering/'
Is that a fair characterization of your attitude, or do you regard that
as--
Mr. MONTAG"C"E. No; I don't know how they can say something like
that. That is an opinion of the man who wrote this~ whoever he may
be. I certainly never told that to anybody and I had never indicated
any intention that I did not or would not want to know what was
gomgon.
Now, let me explain a little, as I did in my-in answer to previous
questions-that this matter of mail cover is something which is a
small part of our overall obligations and responsibilities. We have mail
fraud, robberies of post offices, theft of mail, pornography. investigations
of postal services, inspections of the post offices. and all of the rest
of it. Once, as in this case, that a decision is made that the mail cover can
be given and the guidelines are drawn up and laid out and the thing
is started, then you assume that that is the way it is running.
Because we did not come back perhaps, and check with them on a
daily basis or a frequent basis. that doesn't mean that we were not
interested or that we didn't think it was still running as it should have.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Cotter, you took oYer as Chief Postal Inspector
for Mr. Montague in the spring of 1969 '1
Mr. COTTER. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And the mail-opening project lasted from ,JanuaryFebruary
of 1973; is that right?
Mr. COTTER. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. 'When you teak over-because you had served in the
CIA, in the Office of Security and indeed, had served for awhile in
New York, where the job was done-you knew the CIA was opening
the mail ?
MI'. COTTER. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You knew~ did you not, that opening of first-class
mail was something that was improper?
Mr. COTTER. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, you never disclosed to Mr. Blount, or anyone
else within the Post Office Department or to anybody outside the CIA,
that this improper and illegal activity~ which you knew about was
going on, did you?
Mr. COTTER. I did not brief the Postmaster General, or anyone else
in the Postal Service.
1 See p. 206.
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Mr. SCHWARZ. Or anybody else outside the CIA?
Mr. COTTER. Or anyone else outside the CIA. However, I believe I
was instrumental in bringing about a briefing of the Postmaster General
by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And that, you did about 2 years after you took over
the job?
Mr. COTTER. That is correct; in June of 1971.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Let us focus, then, on the 2-year period before that
was done, and why you felt inhibited from disclosing the activity
which you knew was illegal, which was being carried on in a postal
operation under your jurisdiction and where your specific responsibility
in the Post Office Department was to make sure that the mail
wasn't tampered with. "\Vasn't that your specific responsibility?
Mr. COTTER. Yes,sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Why didn't you disclose it?
Mr. COTTER. Might I back up a little bit, Mr. Schwarz?
Mr. SCHWARZ. Why didn't you disclose it yourself, and why didn't
you stop it?
Mr. COTTER. Might I back up a bit? I became aware of this mailopening
project of the CIA in 1952-53, when I was assigned to a CIA
field office in New York City. At that time, the project was just starting.
It "'asn't a very big project. They started it with actually just reviewing
the exterior of the envelopes, and that is the way they laid
the project on with the Postal Service. However--
Mr. SCHWARZ. That was misleading, wasn't it?
Mr. COTTER. Indeed. However, I believe, in 1953, they started to select
certain letters coming from the Soviet "Cnion-that was all mail, at
that time, either addressed to the Soviet Union or coming from the
Soviet Union-they started to select certain letters and surreptitiously
appropriated the letters, opened the letters, photographed the contents,
and returned them to the mail stream.
I left Kew York City in December of 1955, and the project, really,
at that time, still was rather small, and quite frankly, I was astounded
when I saw the statistics recently as to the mail volume. I returned to
"\Vashington. I seTYed with the CIA in many different assignments,
beginning in .Tanuary of 1956, and I was not diredly connected with
this project. However, I knew it was going on. I saw the same personalities
in Kew York. and so there was no question in my mind but that
this program was continuing.
However, I was not briefed; I was not privy to the effectiveness of
the program, who was being covered. Someplace along the line-and
maybe it was later-I picked up the fact that the FBI was also the
recipient of the product of this project.
But in April of 1969, as is claimed by Mr. Blount, I was offered the
opportunity to be appointed Chief Postal Inspector. This particular
project was not at the fore of my mind; however, it was at the back
of my mind. I was aware of it; it was a matter of concern to me, from
the very outset. However, I did accept the position.
I was not briefed on the project by anyone in the Postal Service. I
don't recall what :Mr. Montague told me about it. He did brief me, in
a matter of a few days. He may have mentioned a special project in
Kew York City. I don't recall offhand. But certainly, no one told me,
or there was no record in our files as to the nature of this particular
program.
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Mr. SCHWARZ. Of course, you felt you couldn't go look, because if
you did look, you would find out something: you already knew about,
and then you would have to expose something you didn't want to
expose, because the CIA wanted to continue it? Isn't that faid
Mr. CCYITF..R. 'VeIl, there's no question about it. After coming from
18 years in the CIA, I was hypersensitive, perhaps, to the protection
of what I belie,~ed to be a most sensitive project, and I did, indeed,
truly believe that that was a most sensitive project. And I did, indeed,
believe that, over these 13 years since I became aware of it initially,
I believed that it had been approved at the highest levels of
government.
But in any event, I did not go out seeking out this project, and
where was it in New York City. As Mr. Montague indicated, the
responsibilities of the Chief Postal Inspector are quite broad, and
moving into the Postal Service initially, without any postal background,
it took me some time to really get my feet on the ground and
to accept the challenge that this very, very fascinating and important
position held.
I maintained no records with regard to my reactions as to this
unauthorized program being carried on in the Postal Senice. There
again, perhaps it was due to my sensitivity in not recording anything:
pertaining to a sensitive project. I did, as I left the CIA-I mentioned
in previous testimony-I did sign a secrecy agreement, secrecy oath,
attesting to the fact that I would not divulge secret information that
came into my possession during the time that I was in the CIA.
As I say, I have no record to substantiate exactly how I expressed
my concern, but I think perhaps the records of the CIA will indicate
that periodically, perhaps starting in Hl69-I don't recall specifically-
I did express my feelings to the people in the CIA that I was
very much concerned about the continuation of this project.
Mr. SCHWARZ. That's true. The record does show that.
Mr. CCYITER. Now, in .Tanuary of 1971-1 entered on duty as the
Chief Postal Inspector in April of 1969-moving into .Tanuary of
1971, I received a letter from a gentleman who was the perhaps secretary,
executive secretary of an association of scientists, and this letter-
on the letterhead, it listed some very distinguished gentlemen in
the world of science, including a former Deputy Director of the CIA,
a couple of gentlemen whom I recognized as having been scientific
advisers to the President, and a lot of gentlemen of that caliber.
Well, this letter raised the question as- to whether or not mail was
being opened, perhaps being: referred to in other Federal agencies as
being open, and so on; specific question that would appear to me, and
undoubtedly did at that time, indicate that whoever wrote the letter
was aware of this CIA program in New York City. That letter went
to my staff. My staff prepared a standard response which avowed that
the rules of the organization do not allow the opening of mail. That
is the responsibility of the Postal Service, to maintain the sanctity of
the mail.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You mean a standard false report ~
Mr. COTTER. No; not knowingly. Staff prepared a standard true
response from all the information available to them. However, I
signed it, and I knew it wasn't true. And I signed this letter, and sent
it to the gentleman who sent the letter to me. At the same time, I waS
very much concerned about the letter, because it appeared to me that
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the project was known, and I wouldn't be surprised-I wouldn't have
been surprised at that time, because it had been going on for ever so
many years.
And as I say, I noted distinguished personalities on the letterhead
of this lett~r who had been with the-or one gentleman who had been
with the CIA-and others in \'ery high positions in the Government,
and since I was always under the impression that the project had been
cleared, or approved at a very high level in the Government, I pre.sumed
it \vas indeed possible, if not probable, that these gentlemen
were well awarc of this project.
I sent that letter-a copy of that letter that I received-to the CIA,
via Mr. Howard Osborn, the Director of Security, undoubtedly expressing
my concern. However. I maintained no written memorandum
for the record. Shortly thereafter-and I say shortly, because sometimes
6 months is a short time, but that was in .January-I undoubtedly
sent that letter .January of 1971. I sent that letter to the CIA.
Then I noticed-I was not aware of this, however-after Mr. Colby
announc€Cl the fact that they had been opening these letters for 20
years, I did request the CIA to M me know what the CIA had told
the President or tIlE' Rockefeller Commission as to this mail program,
since I was caught in the middle of this thing. And they did permit
me to re\'iew a CIA folder on the project. .And in that folder, it indicated
that subsequently they had discussed this particular letter I sent
to the CIA, and after pros and cons as to the project, whether they
should continue the project or stop the project. ~fr. Helms, I believe,
suggested to talk the matter over with me, and subsequent communications,
for the record, indicated that, indeed, that meeting was held
and it was held. '
At that time, I expressed-I don't recall exactly what the discussion
with Mr. Helms was, but undoubtedly, I indicat~d to him that I was
not interested in getting into the details of more than I already knew
of most sensitive CIA projects, but I did highlight the fact of my
concern, typified by this letter that I receind from the scientific group,
and suggested that if the project had not been currently approved at
the highest level, such action should be taken. It was decided by Mr.
Helms to brief the Attornev GeneLaI and the Postmaster General. He
told me that he would talk to the Postmaster General, and I left.
A couple of days later, as I recall, I received a telephone call from
the Postmaster General. and he said something to the eft'ect that, "Bill,
I saw your former boss. Dick Helms. yesterday,or the other day"-and
I don't recall, again, specifically what he said, but I understood him
to mean: carryon with the project.
The CHAIRMAN. 'Was this Postmaster Blount?
Mr. COTIER. Yes, sir; Postmaster General Blount. Now, I must
restate, however, that I am not aware. and I've never spoken to anybody
as to specifically what conversation transpired between Mr.
Helms and Mr. Blount.
I also understood that just about that time-whether or not the
Postmaster General mentioned it to me, I don't recall-that the Attorney
General also was briefed, and I assume that he was briefed with
regard to the complete nature of the program, but I cannot certify
that observation. So this is in the middle of .June of 1971.
Now, time went on. and Postmaster General Blount did leave the
Government not too long after that to run for the Senate, and Mr.
Mitchell, I guess, left his position of Attorney General the next year.
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Now, I didn't sit down with )11'. Blount subsequently and chat with
him with regard to what Mr. Helms spoke to him about. Here again,
perhaps I should, but the way-again. my whole history of being in
the intelligence business has not been to pursue things and take short
communication and accept that at its face value.
So, subsequently, after )11'. Blount left the Gowrnment service, and
the Attorney General left the senice, undoubtedly during this period
I continued to express my concern, still, at the office, about the continuation
ofthe project and, in fact, toward the latter part of 1972--
Mr. SCHWARZ. Excuse me, )11'. Cotter, didn't you then tell Mr.
Klassen about the project?
Mr. COITER. I did not. I didn't ewn take the initiative to ask whether
or not Mr. Blount had briefed his deputv, Mr. Klassen, who was deputy.
I did not take the initiatiw, because I decided to continue pressing
the CIA for a halt in the program.
I didn't feel it appropriate for me to take the initiative to stop the
program myself. I still was under the impression that it was a project
of most significant sensitivity to the United States. I had !he idefJo
going way back to 1953, 1954, 1955. For example, the proJect was
designed to endeavor to identify illegal agents in the United States,
that type of thing, very, wry significant thing. And it has been
touched upon before.
"WhethC!" or not that was the purpose, I don't know, but to me, that
was a wry, very important mission to try and locate the type of fellow
that they found up in Brooklyn. and traded for Gary Powers, who had
been there for years, assuming that the eommunication directly between
the United States and the SO\'iet "Cnion was used as a nhicle for innocent
communication to agents from the "Cnited States and back home.
Another fact. or someone suggpsted to me, why did I go to Dick
Helms, to the Direetor of Central Intelligenee and brief the Postmaster
General, the Postmaster General Blount. ",Vhy didn't I just take the
initiatire ? Now, I was constrained too by my seereey oath, but I surely
could have gotten in toueh with the CIA and requested a release from
that secreey oath to enable me to brief the Postmaster General. Mr.
Helms well may have said go right ahpad, or his staff membprs down
below. I don't reeall if I raised the question, but I must say this thing
too, as a postseript: I don't think I would ha,-e been very effective in
briefing Postmaster General Blount. or the Attorney General or anybody
plse as to the nature of the proieet. if thev ,vere' going to be given
an in-depth briefing. beeause I really didn't know-I knew it was a
very small. sketchy projpd baek in the 1950's. I was not aware, for
rxample, as I mentioned before, as to the yolume of mail being run
through this operation, and so on.
So, in any event, in 1972--
The CIIAIR;\[AN. I think ,ye haye the story, and I want to say, first
of all, before I go on to my qupstions, that it is my understanding that
you haye an exeellent reeord in the Post Office Department with respect
to the general discharge of your duties there.
Now, when you took Oyer as Inspector General, you understood that
your new responsibility was to see to it that the mails were handled
by the Post Offiee Depa'rtment in a lawful, proper ,,-ay. That was your
dutv. was it not?
~fr. ('OTIER. Indeed, Senator (,lmrch, and I eyen became mueh more
aware of it as eaeh month went by, beeause of the sensitivity of postal
77
inspectors to their basic responsibility of maintaining the sanctity of
the mails.
The CHAIRl\L\N. Right. So you had this basic responsibility, now
that you had left the CIA, you had come to the Post Office Department,
to protect the sanctity of the mail. Now, suppose you didn't have that
secrecy agreement. Just for the benefit of those who may not be aware
of it. every employee of the CIA signs an agreement with the Agency
that he will not reveal any secrets that he may take with him after he
leaves the Agency. And if it had not been for that secrecy agreement,
when you became the Inspector General, knowing that the mails ·were
being improperly opened by the CIA, the first thing you would have
done, would it not, ,,'ould have been to go to the Postmaster General
and say. "Look. I know sOlllething that yOIl lllay not know about, and
th('r(' ar(' a lot of lett('rs b('ing opened and that is against the law?"
Now, I am saying, if you didn't have that secrecy agreement which
you took with you when you left the CIA and entered the Post Office
Department, and had you not felt bound by it, that surely would
ha,'e been the first thing you would have done, isn't that correct?
Mr. COTTER. I don't knmv. Senator Church.
The CUAIR)IAX. If it is not correct, why not?
)11'. COTTER. Again, as I indicated. I was very, very sensitive to the
need to protect most sensitive intelligence operations. Now, recognizing
that the heart of .what you're driving at, I agree that I couldwelL
regardless of qmte frankly, the secrecy oath, I could have communicated
to the Postmaster General the fact that this project was
going on. but I do believe that the way I went, although 1971, June of
1971, ,vas the most sensible Iway to go. to request--
The CIIAJR)IAX. But vou \vaited, 4 years was it?
)11'. CorrER. A year'and a half. The thing that triggered me off
was January of 1961, which would be from April of 1969 toMr.
SCHWARZ. 1971.
)11'. COTIER. 1971, I beg your pardon. From April of 1969, I came
on board getting my feet on the ground for a while. In .Tanuary of
1971 I received that letter from the scientific group at which point
I really pushed. Now. I may have been pushing before that time, Senator,
and I have no record. I would suggest perhaps the CIA files
show something.
The CHAIRl\IAN. Let me go to that letter then. You say that was
perhaps the triggering device, the letter? You received on January 13,
1971 a letter from Jeremy .J. Stone, the director of the Federation of
American Scientists. And :Mr. Stone raises some questions concerning
how the Post Office Department is handling the mail. And among
those questions was the follmving : "Has the Post Office ever discovered
efforts by State or Fedeml agencies to corrupt postal officials to violatemail
covering regulations by inducing' them to open first class
mail or to lend it to other agencies for the purpose of obtaining information
contained therein?"
On February 10, 1971, you wrote back to Jeremy Stone and you
said in part:
The Department has no knowledge of any efforts by State or Federal agencies
to induce postal officials to violate the mail cover regulations or to allow any
class of mail to leave the custody of official postal channels for the purpose Df
permitting other agencies to obtain the information contained therein.
Now, that was a falsehood?
64-663 0 - 76 - 6
78
Mr. COTTER. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. And you knew it to be when you signed the letter?
Mr. COTTER. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, having done that, as the man "'ho held the
office, whose duty it was to protect the sanctity of the mail, what was
your chief concern? I took it from your testimony that your chief
concern was that Mr. Jeremy Stone's letter itself signaled that the
word might be out and that citizens of the country might have heard
something that gave them reason to suspect that this program was
going on. And, therefore, you became alarmed. 1Vas that your first
reactIOn to the receipt of this particular letter and was that the motive
that stimulated you then to consider taking it up with higher
authority?
Mr. COTTER. I think indeed there was no question at all, Senator
Church, that I did react in that direction. W"hether or not it was my
primary reaction at the time, or secondary, I don't recall.
Might I just add an aside here at this point, Senator?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; certa,inly you may. But what I am trying to
really get at is this problem of serving two masters. You see, you
were trained in the CIA all of these years and you see the world from
that peculiar perspective. And then you come on with new duties
and you are still largely influenced by your previous perspective. We
see it all the time, military officers going into the munitions industries
and the close relationship, the tie-up between the two and the great
costs that are sometimes entailed as a result, contract overruns and
all of that.
So, I think it is important here to try to determine how, wearing
these two hats, even though you had left the Agency, still being so
strongly influenced by it, affected your new responsibility to the Post
Office Department.
Mr. COTTER. I don't think there is any question, Senator, that my
long service with the CIA had an influence in my judgment and my
reactions.
Might I say just one item that gets into maybe perhaps the area of
controversy; but, you know. going wav back in the fifties when I first
became exposed to this type of operation and many, many other very
fine offiCBrs of the CIA, dedicated great Americans at a time when
the Cold War was at its peak, and that sort of thing. and fighting the
big fight against the KGB and an of that, I don't think the majority
of us, in the CIA, reacted to this as an unlawful, illegal operation.
We assumed that perhaps the powers that be up on the high had
obtained necessary a,pprovals for this project. Now, this area had been
touched upon by other people. You have been over it very clearly yourself,
Senator, as saying there is no question at all what the law says,
the fourth amendment and so on, with regard to the sanctity of the
ma,ils. And I agree wholeheartedly with that. but some of the gentlemen
have brought up, perhaps Mr. Colby, perhaps Mr. Day, touching
upon an area that-well, is it or isn't it-is it absolutely, finally~
positively illegal?
And I say, with regard to that question, I would have to dpfer to
the Justice Department. Why-point one. this is not like in the
Huston plan case where they wpre talking about mail covers. I really
think what they were trying to do was persuade the FBI to use the
79
mail opening domestically. This thing over here ,vas totally foreign,
the ::ioviet Lnion and the Lmted ::itates.
So, I would say whether or not-and I "'ouldn't debate this thing
because I don:t have the knowledge or the background-whether or
not it would be within the power at the President of the L'nited States
in the foreign relations area-and this is foreign intelligence businessto
authorize this type of a program to the same degreB that he can
perhaps authorize a wiretap, as it affects international foreign relations,
which point, I understand, has not been resolved precisely finally
yet.
So, I just bring that up as to that also affecting my thinking, for
example. 'Vhen I joined the Postal Inspection Service I had that
feeling, the old CIA feeling that perhaps this project was a specially
approved program and authorized regardless of title 18, fourth
amendment, and so forth.
The CHAIRl\IAN. All right. I understand the quandry you were in that
eventually led you to do the right thing, in my judgment.
How did you get this job in the Post Office Department after having
left the CIA? Can you tell me if .Mr. Helms urged you to take thi~ job '{
Mr. COTTER. .Might I back up a little bit to give a little of my background
to show why I was perhaps considered for this position?
Back in 194:2, 194:6, I was a captain in the Air Corps, Army Air
Corps, then I was special agent of the FBI from 194:7 to 1951, and in
1951 to 1969, I was in the CIA.
I had just come back from overseas around 1967, in 1968, early 196,9,
perhaps January 1969, I was in an extremely fascinating job. I hadn't
left the CIA. I was still with the CIA and I had another. As always,
my positions with the CIA were challenging and fascinating. I had a
call from the Director of Security one day in the early part of 1969
asking me "how would you likE> to be promoted to grade X?" And I
said "I will take it." He said, "Seriously, the Postmaster General has
queried the Director of Central IntBlligence as to whether or not he
might have some candidates for the position of Chief Postal
Inspector."
And I said, "'Vell, I would like to think about it." And they said they
would need the answer in a hurry so I said, "All right, throw my hat
in the ring.:' And that ties in, as I heard later, from the discussions with
Mr. Blount, that is exactly what happened. He requested candidates
from Mr. Hoover, from Mr. Helms, and from a lot of other people. In
fact, they had to provide a big, long list to the Civil Service Commission,
perhaps 45 or 50 people ,vho were the candidates for this position.
I was invited over to meet Deputy Postmaster General Klassen and
Postmaster General Blount, and, of course, my predecessor, Henry
:Montague. And after some conversation they said they liked my background.
:\fy background was a blend. I had majored in accounting. We
have the internal audit function in the PQstal Inspection Service. I also
studied law, although I did not practice law and I had law enforcement
background and so forth.
So, they concluded that this balance of my background qualities
made me a fine candidate for the job and they offered me the job and I
accepted the position. I didn't know anybodv. I don't think I had
spoken to Mr. Helms. maybe once prior to that time. and I haven't
spohn to him since, except for the 1971 meeting.
80
The CHAIR~IAN.Senator Sclmeiker, do you have questions?
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, 1fr. Chairman.
Mr. Montague, we have a ronsiderable amollnt of testimony by Postmaster
General Gronouski about his relationship with the Long subrommittee
investigating the invasion of privacy. And vou had testified
that you knew Government agencies \wre given direct access to the
mail. To our committee you gave testimony and you testified back in
the time of the Long hearings. I would just like to read a question
from Senator Long to you.
Senator I,ONG. "Did you know at any time that mail that haR bf'en placed under
cover, like that, is taken hy the RUp{'rvisor out of the Post Office or any other
postal official and givf'n to any other agf'ncy of the Government and permitted
to hf' taken out of the Post Office facility?
Mr. MONTAGUE. 'Ko.'
Senator LONG. You had no personal knowledge of that?
Mr. MONTAGUE. That is correct, yes, sir.
I wonder if you could help this committee understand the difference
in that response?
Mr, MOXTAGlJE, Yes. sir. In the first place, it was my impression
that the committee at that time did not want to get into national security
cases. If you would look at the report the committee-the chairman-
stated that they had not interviewed or looked into the activities
of the FBI, the CIA, or the military intelligence agencies. Also, those
agencies were not requested to answer the questionnaire, which the
other agencies involved in the inquiry had to answer.
In posing a question regarding two incidents during this hearing,
and this occurred shortly after the fluestion that vou have, Senatoraccording
to my recollection, the chief counsel for the committeecautioned
me on two things: (l) that if my replv would disclose some
implications about a national security case that I should not answer it;
and (2) that I should remember I was still under oath.
And also I have a recollection that during the investigation and
the other activities connected with that hearing, that in a conversation-
Senator Long said that he had advised the Attorney General
that he did not intend to become involved in national security cases
during, at least, this phase of the hearing.
Whlm I got the question with all this in mind. I am faced with this:
My answer to this question could lead into the disclosure of national
security matters. It is a case which is not ours. I don't know the particulars
of it. I don't know what damage my answer would do if it led
into the disclosures. Besides that, at the time I thought it was a violation
of the law to disclose information about national security matters.
So, I was faced with all of these problems in trying to answer this
question. And, under those conditions, I thought I answered it correctly.
Senator SCHWEIKER. All right. You are quite right that the counsel
did talk about national securitv. And. of course, I have Mr. Fensterwald's
question here, an admonItion to you. .
~Ir. ~Iontague, I would like to ask you a couple of questions and I want to make
two things clear; one. if these questions have national secnrity implications I do
not want you to answer them; and two, I want yon to realize again that you are
still under oath.
Now, again it is hard to go back in this rontext, but it would seem
to me that what he is saying is not that you should mislead the committee,
but you should not answer a question if it cut into the area
81
of national security; this is the way that I would interpret what Mr.
Fensterwald said, because he said, "you are still under oath." And then
he said. "Are there any exceptions where a letter can be opened in
connection with a mail cover?"
K0; you say there are no exceptions where a letter can be opened
in connection with a mail covel'. You are asked by )11'. Fensterwald
whether under any circumstances mail could ever be turned over to
the Secret Service and you would refuse to turn the mail over to the
Secret Service. There i's no other course of action that mail cannot
be turned over without a ,,'arrant. And yet. of course, at the same time
you were turning mail onr to the FBI and the CIA.
)11'. )loXTAGL"E. 'Yell, Senator, the Secret Service was not consideTed
by us to be a national secllrity agency. That is, they did not deal,
to Ollr knO\Yledge, with espionage cases and things of that sort. We
considered the CIA and the FBI and perhaps some of the military
intelligence to he in the national secm'ity field.
And my answer there to the Secret Service question was based on
(>xperience, because ,,'e had had a great deal of cooperation with the
Secret Seryice oyer the years in connection with threatening letters,
obscene letters, and yiolations of that sort which had been addressed
to the Presidellt. And neyer. to my recollection, was there any mail
co\'('r in which mail ,yas tumed over to the Secret Seryice. So, my
answer to that ,,'as based on experience.
K ow, may I go back to that other question just for a moment? In
addition to my quandry about what the committee wanted to get into,
and also about the other questions I had with regard to national security,
that question followed almost two pages of explanation about a
mail coyer. ,vhich started with a question from the Senator aboutsuppose
a justice of the peace or a constable in St. Louis, Mo., had
come in and asked you for a mail coyer on a fugitive. Now, how
would you proceed?
And then I was trying to explain that all the way through those
two pages of testimony. And then ,ve wind up ,vith the question at
the end. Now, I could haye thought in my mind that this related in
context with what ,ve had been talking about because even after that,
if you ,vould look at the testimony. I think that there were further
remarks made about a mail-coyer request by a constable, which could
have an indication that we ,,,ere still in the same context.
In fact. Senator Burdick. I believe, made a remark in that connection.
Following my answer to that. Senator Long referred to
Senator Burdick. Senator Burdick said, "Mr. Chairman, this sequence
of questions and the other question arose in a hvpothetical, under the
stated facts, that the whole procedure ,vas started with the complaint
from a local constable." So that. in addition to thinking about the
national security, I could han been under-I could have thought that
this was in context with what we had been talking about, and naturally
,ve han never made mail available to any justice of the peace or local
constable iN! connection ,vith a mail cover.
Senator SCIIWEIKER. After the public session was over, did you
subsequently talk to Mr. Fensterwald or to Senator Long privately
and tell them in fact what was happening?
Mr. MOXTAGUE. Not to my recollection.
Senator SCIIWEIKER. Mr. Cotter, you han testified that you knew
of the CIA's mail opening in New York. Yet when the CIA ap82
proached the Post Office to start a program in San Francisco, you
apparently did not ask your assistant to watch out for a mail opening
in connection with the mail cover project?
Mr. COrrER. I did not. 'When I joined the Postal Inspection Service,
one of the first things I did was to designate someone other than myself
to handle liaison with the CIA. 'When they did indeed contact me
with regard to that California. suney that they were interested inI
believe that was in the latter part of 1969-1 suggested to them to
:ret in touch with my very able Deputy Chief Inspector, which they
did.
I did not mention anything to Mr. Conway with regard to the
New York thing since I at this point still had not mentioned that
New York project to anyone in the New York Postal Inspection
Service. I quite frankly did not deem it necessary to warn my deputy,
an exceedingly able officer, with regard to that matter. I thought he
would lay this project on down the line with due cognizance to the
necessity for security.
However, the way it turned out, I see from :Mr. Colby and the
CIA people, they did indeed gain access to the letters, regardless of
the a~monition of the Deputy not to remove any letters from the
premIses.
Senator SCHWEIKER. You did take a very decisive stand on a very
critical point, as was commented on before, and I commend you for
that. I wonder whether you can give this committee any advice un how
to make sure thaHhis kind of thing does not happen in the future and
to back up people like yourself when you do feel compelled to blow
the whistle, as you did then? What can you tell us that we ought to
be doing legislatively or structurally to prevent it from happening
and to back people up, such as yourself. in making a judgment that
may be useful within an agencv?
Mr. COTTER. Well, Senator Schweiker, the point I mentioned to
Senator Church earlier in regard to this area that might be fuzzy in
some people's minds, maybe a very, very small minority of people
with regard to the possible authority of the President in authorizing
this type of program, perhaps should be clarified. How, enactment
ora law, I don't know.
Another thing-and here again it perhaps might be my fault in
not pursuing it further-I assumed that this project was discusse.d
at the highest level of government and had been approved at the
highest level of government. Now, I would think that-and the reason
1 felt it, if I might say, I was involved in the Agency with another
most sensitive, highly productive-one of the greatest intelligence
programs of all times for about 4 years, and before we made a move,
anyone single move of this particular project, it was cleared with a
special group in the White House.
Therefore, I was under the feeling, and I felt Quite confident that
this type of operation was cleared at the highest level. Now, I don't
know what I'm getting around to recommending here. Perhaps it is
recommending that this title-any kind of an operation that mi!!ht be
in the slightest considered as a violation of anv law, it should certainly
be approved by the Attorney General, all the way up to the
President.
The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we can find out this afternoon when we
question Mr. Helms how high the highest level was.
83
Senator SCHWEIKER. I just ,vant to say I agree with your point that
when somebody from an FBI agency or CIA agency comes in and
tells you a project is secret, immediate assumptions are formed in your
own mind, and I think this is what is wrong with the system. One
assumes that if a project is secret, somebody up there knows it and
somebody else approves it, and obviously this is not the caiole, but I
can understand that assumption. I think this is what we have to deal
with in the committee.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. MONTAGUE. ~\fay I make just one comment, Senator?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Montague.
Mr. MONTAGUE. Along the line of the Long hearings that Senator
Schweiker asked about, according to my recollection during that
entire hearing there was not one direct question to me on CIA, FBI, or
other intelligence agency mail coverage.
The CHAIRl\fAN. Time and time again in the course of this investigation,
we have had agents in the CIA tell us-and I think honestly sothat
what they did they did because they assumed it was approved.
But as we trace the line of authority upward, we often find that the
men at the top were not informed and had not authorized the
activity.
That concludes the hearing this morning until 2 o'clock this
afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 12 :58 p.m., the select committee was recessed, to
reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing win please come back to order.
Our witness this afternoon is Ambassador Helms, formerly the
Director of the CIA during- much of the period under investigation.
Mr. Helms, would you please stand and take the oath?
Do you solemnly swear that all of the testimony that you will give
in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?
Ambassador HELMS. I do, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schwarz, will you commence with the questioning,
please?
TESTIMONY OF HON. RICHARD HELMS, AMBASSADOR TO IRAN AND
FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Helms, as I informed you during the luncheon
recess, the line of questioning I am going to follow will trace what
disclosures about the CIA mail-opening projects were or were not
made, first to Postmasters General, second to Attorneys General, and
third to Presidents. 'Ve are going to start ,vith Postmasters General.
Have you before you the chart headed "Postmasters General"?
Ambassador HELl\IS. I haw. Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. SCHWARZ. First, focusing on the not-informed individuals, is
it correct to the best of your knowledge that Messrs. Gronouski,
O'Brien, "Watson, and Klassen were not informed of tImt project?

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