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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1975
U.S.. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :05 a.m., in ro<?m 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (ChaIrman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Tower, Hart of Michigan, Mondale,
Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater, Mathias and
Schweiker.
Also present: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel and
Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the minority.
The CHAIRMAX. The hearing will please come to order. .
Our witnesses today are Mr. James B. Adams, the Deputy ASSOCIate
Director of the FIn, and Mr. Raymond Wannall, who is the Assistant
Director in charge of the Intelligence Division of the FBI.
Before I swear the witnesses, Senator Mondale has asked if he might
make an opening statement. And for that purpose the Chair recognizes
the distinguished Senator from Minnesota.
Senator MOXDALE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
always supported the FBI. It is clearly the finest, most professional
law enforcement agency in the Nation and probably in the world. In
apprehending robbers, foiling kidnappers, catching fugitives, the FBI
has an outstanding record. This is based on my own experience with
the FBI in my own state. ,,-here I served as attorney general. The
vast bulk of its work is devoted to law enforcement and legitimate
counterespionage.
In these fields the FBI deserves fully the admiration and respect
which Americans traditionally held for the Bureau and its personnel.
But in one area, domestic intelligence, the FBI, in my opinion, has
clearly gone astray. It now appears that there was an underworld
within the FBI which took the tools, techniques and zeal which was
so effective against the real foreign threats and turned them in upon
some of the American people.
Yesterday, this committee heard some of the most disturbing testimony
that can be imagined in a free society. We heard evidence that
for. decades the institutions designed to enforce the laws and ConstitutIOn
of our country hay,:, been engaging in conduct that violates the
law and the Constitntion. \Ve J1eard that the FBI, which is part of
the Department o~ .Justice, took 1ustice into its own hands by seeking
to pumsh those WIth unpopular Ideas. We learned that the chief law
{6U
62
enforcement agency in the Federal Government decided that i~ di~ not
need laws to investigate and suppress the peaceful and constItutIonal
activities of those whom it disapproved. .
We heard testimony that the FBI, to protect the country agall;tst
those it believed had totalitarian political Yie"'s. employed the tactIcs
of totalitarian societies against American citizens. 'Ve heard that the
FBI attempted to destroy one of our greatest leaders in the fiel~ of
civil rights. and then replace him with someone of the FBI's choosmg.
From the evidence the committee has obtained, it is clear that the
FBI for decades has conducted surveillance over the personal and
political activities of millions of Americans. Evidently, no meeting
was too small, no group too insignificant to escape their attention. It
did not seem to matter whether the politics of these Americans were
legal or radical or whether the participants were well known or obscure.
It did not matter whether the information was intimate and personal.
The FBI created indexes, more commonly called enemy lists, of
thousands of Americans and targeted many of the Americans on these
lists for special harassment. Hundreds of thousands of Americans
were victims of this surveillance program. Most of this was done in
secret. Much of it was kept from Congress and the Justice Department
and all of it from the American people. Noone outside the FBI has
ever had an opportunity to know and appreciate the full extent of the
domestic surveillance program that was then being conducted.
Thus we see that just as in the case of the CIA, the key issue was
accountability; how we can assure that the secret instruments of government
are accountable to the people, the Congress, and the law.
It is clear that the FBI's authority for these programs is essentially
nonexistent. I am not persuaded that the secret Presidential orders
of President Roosevelt support the domestic intelligence program,
and even if they did, I do not believe that any President has the authority
to order the FBI or anyone else to spy on Americans, to
burgle their homes, to wiretap them, to open their mail, or to blackmail
them.
One of the most disturbing aspects of this affair is that the FBI
never paid very much attention to whether their activities were authorized
or not. or whether they were leaal and constitutional. One
former senior intelligence officer has testified that he never once heard a
discussion about legality or constitutionality. Most governments in
history have relied on some forn1 of police power to determine what
views would prevail in their society. However. America was based
on the revolutionary concept that the people should decide what is
right and what is wrong. wliat is acceptable and what is not.
That is what we meant by a free government, and our forefathers
were convinced that it can exist only through the greatest tolerance
of speech and opinion. They placed their faith in the people to remain
alert to encroachments on their liberty.
The founders of our country knew that the greatest danger to
freedom comes from the efforts of government to suppress the opinions
of its opponents. They set up a system which limited the powers
of government. bound it in the contraints of the law, and prohibited
it from infringing on the rights of people to free expression. And
through the separation of power, the system of checks and balances.
they tried to assure that the ExecntiYe would be acconntable to the
people through-the Congress.
63
For the 200 years of our existence as a nation, the preservation of
liberty has been a constant struggle. 'Vhether it has been the Alien
and Sedition Acts during the French Revolution, the Red Scare and
the Palmer Raids of World 'Val' I, McCarthyism after World War
II, or Army spying during the Vietnam war; the Government has let
a fear of unorthodox opinion lead it into the trap of infringing upon
the Constitution in the name of internal security.
The issues we confront today are a part of a continuing drama of
American democracy. It is proof. if we ever needed it, that the price of
liberty is eternal vigilance.
Re":elations of abuse of power do not threaten domestic security.
These hearings do not weaken the FBI. 'Vhat weakens it is its failure
to adhere to the proper role of law enforcement. Somehow it forgot
that this was its job. It began to use its energy to spy on Americans
whose only offense was in expressing opinions that some in the FBI
did not like. It confused talk of violence with acts of violence, and all
too often paid more attention to the talk than to the act.
The answer, of course, is that violence justifies prosecution, not
surveillance. Our security is not improved by watching those who
commit crimes. Security from violence lies in active and vigorous law
enforcement against those who are committing crimes. Security from
dangerous ideas. if we need any security, should come not from the
FBI but from the merit of better ideas. and the good sense of the
American people.
Our liberty is best protected bv scrupulous adherence to the law
and the Constitution by the agencies of Government. No Government
agency likes to be the subject of public scrutiny. I know these have
been difficult times for the present leadership of the FBI, many of
whom were not involved in these programs at all. But if they have
been spending a lot of time responding to congressional investigations.
they cannot forget that this is the first time in 50 years that the
FBI has been subjected to public scrutiny.
As painful as this process is. I hope the FBI itsel£ would welcome
the opportunity to let in some fresh air and come to grips with the
problems in candor and not retreat into past patterns of stirring up
public fears to distract our attention from the necessity of reform.
Mr. Chairman. may I say that yesterday, I am told, followin~
our hearing. the FBI responded exactly in the spirit that I had
hoped it would. If they can take this constructive approach. I have no
doubt that the FBI will benefit from this attention. I want to See a
strong- FBI. an FBI strong in law enforcement, in the detection of
crime, and in gathering of legal evidence for prosecution and conviction,
but an FBI without abuses.
As we proceed with these hearings today, we should also bear in
mind that the responsibility for the abuseR we have uncovered does
not rest on the FBI alone. We in the Congress have been derelict.
It should not have t3ken until this date for us to discharge our responsibility
for investi~atingthe FBI and other domestic intelligence.
We should also realize that the FBI has been performing a nmction
which many Americans. and at times the vast maiority 6£ Americans,
have wanted to see undertaken. "Wben popular opinion brands
a group un-American and subversive merely beclluse of its political
views, all too often the FBI has responded to public expectations and
from pressure from a higher authority in government.
64
While this does not excuse what happened, we should temper our
criticism of the FBI's excesses by understanding that, in large part,
it was only the instrument of our own intolerance. Indeed, I believe
that is why our laws and the charter of the FBI must be carefully
redrawn to protect the FBI's integrity from political pressures and
hysteria.
Finally, it would be a mistake to regard the abuses of the FBI as
those of evil men. The FBI has always been composed of dedicated
and hard-working public servants who seek to do their jobs as best
they can. The lesson we learn from this history is that. we cannot
keep our liberty secure by relying alone on the good faIth of men
with great power.
As Mr. Justice Brandeis once wrote:
Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when
government's purposes are beneficient. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in the insidious encroachment of men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
It is my hope that the FBI witnesses we will hear today can enlighten
us as to how it can conduct internal security surveillance
programs which do not infringe on our constitutional liberties. I hope
they can suggest ironclad assurances that the abuses of the past will
not be repeated. We need more protection than promises of self-restraint
by men of good will.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Mondale. That is an excellent
statement with which I would like to be fully associated.
Senator HART of Michigan. I would, Mr. Chairman, also, except
that I want to make clear my family certainly did not support, encourage,
or by its vocal position give any indication to the Bureau
that they could do what they did. I don't want to go too far in suggesting
that what we heard yest~rday was simply responding by the
Bureau to the mood of those years. In those years if we had known what
you were doing, I lay dough, most families would have said stop it.
Senator MONDALE. That is true. I think one of the points that we
might aver to is the Huston plan and the tremendous pressure the
FBI was placed under to again resume techniques that it had abandoned
in 1966. There is no question that they were getting private pressure
from higher authority to do things. In that instance, they didn't
want it.
The CHAIRMAX. Well. I was struck with the fact that the Huston
plan, as illegal as it was, was limited to techniques far more restrictive
than the far-reaching methods that were employed by the FBI
during the years that we have reviewed in yesterday's hearings. They
led beyond anything that was ever contained in any official document
requesting additional authoritv from the President.
Now I think, Mr. Adams, Mr. Wannall, in addition to swearing
you both, if you are going to have occasion to ask others who are
with you to testify in response to certain questions, that it would be
well at this time to swear them also. So if that is the case, anyone
who anticipates that the may be testifying in this morning's hearing
in response to questions, if you will all stand and take the oath at
this time.
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Do you and each of you solemnly swear that an of the testlmony
that you will give in these proceedings will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God '?
Mr. ADX:I1S. I do.
Mr. \YXXXALL. I do.
.The CJL\IR3L\K. After yesterday's hearing I asked the staff to furmsh
me with the statutory authority that presently exists that could
be said to relate to the FBrs intelligence actlvities, whlch was of
course the subject of yesterday's hearings. And I am furnished in
response to that request title XVIII, section 533, of the United States
Code, which reads as follows:
The Attorney General may appoint officials: 1. to detect and prosecute crimes
aganist the United States: 2. to assist in the protection of the person of the
President; and 3. to conduct such other im'estigations regarding official matters
under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State
as may be dir~ted by the Attorney General.
Now yesterday, Mr. \Vannall, we were told about a series of activities
that were undertaken by the FBI, and lndeed. lnitiated wlthin the
FBI, the purpose of ,,-hieh was to harass and discredit Dr. Martin
Luther King. I am not referring to the results of any FBI lnvestlgative
activity, but rather. I am referring to these kinds of initiatives
that were undertaken for the purpose of either harassing or embarrassing
or otherwise discrediting Dr. King himself. My first question
is: was Dr. King, in his advocacy of equal rights for black
citizens, advocating a coul'Se of action that ln the opinion of the FBI
constituted a crime?
TESTIMONY OF lAMES B. ADAMS, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
OF THE FBI, AND RAYMOND WANNALL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
FBI INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. So he was not then thought to be engaged in any
criminal activity. In fact, he was preaching, as I remember those
days, nonviolence, was he not, as a method of achieving equal rights
for black citizens? .
Mr. ADAMS. That's right, his advocacy for civil rights.
The CHAIRMAN. His advocacv of civil rights was nonviolent and
therefore legal in character. '
Mr. ADAMS. That was not the basis of our investigation of him.
The CHAIRMAK. But as you have said, he was not engaging in any
unla,dul actidty in connection with his advocacy of equal rights for
black citizens. Is that correct ?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRl\fAN. \Vell, is it true that at one time the FBI undertook
to discourage an American college from conferring an honorary degree
on Dr. King?
Mr. ADAC\IS. Yes. sir.
The CHAIRl\IAN. On what legal basis does the FBI have a right to
interfere, in an effort to discourage a college from conferring an
honorary dpgree upon a man like Dr. Martin Luther King. who was
not engaging in or suspected of engaging in criminal activity ?
Mr. AD,HIS. I know of no basis.
66
The CHAIRMAX. Why did the FBI do it?
Mr. ADAMS. 'Yell, we have to approach two parts, in my estimation,
Senator Church. One, the basis for our inn>stigation of Martin Luther
King, which was to determine Communist influence on him. my hands
are tied in discussing that. somewhat on the basis that there is certain
inf?rmation which today, from an ongoing operation is sensitive and
whIch, of course, we have made known to you and certain staff members.
I would like to say on the basis that from our r('view we feel
that we initially had a hasis for inwstigating ~1artin Luther King.
Now as far as the acti,'ities which you are asking about. the discrediting.
I know of no basis for that and I will not attempt to justify it.
The CHAIRMAN. You never made a finding, did you, that Martin
Luther King was a Communist?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir, we did not. We ,,,ere investigating Communist
influence and the possible effect on him. 'Ye neYer made such a determination.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Then there was no justification :for the
FBI to interfere?
Mr. ADAMS. To discredit him.
The CHAIRMAN. In conferring an honorary derrree UDon him?
Mr. ADAMS. I cannot find any justification for that. .
The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that the FBI on another occasion intervened
in an attempt to prevent Dr. Martin Luther King from seeing the
Pope?
Mr. ADAMS. I believe that is correct. sir. There were approximately
25 incidents. I believe. of actions taken in this regard. I think Mr.
Schwarz has those available, that I would lump basically all of them
into the same situation of I see no statutory basis or no basis of justification
for the activity.
The CHAIRMAN. Rut what was the motive. there being no statutory
or other valid basis? 'Vhat was the motive for attempting to prevent
Dr. Martin Luther King from visiting with the Pope?
Mr. ADAMS. In looking at absolute motive, I don't think the files
which we have reviewed and made available to the committee, give me a
clear picture of what the motive was. I think that there were, the
motive waS certainly known to Mr. Hoover. It was known to one top
official who is no longer with the Bureau and mavbe known to others.
an of whom have been interviewed by the committee. Matters bearing
on what might have been the real motive or the possible motive, I again
feel, because of reasons of privacy and delicacy, are not a proper subject
of discussion at a public hearing. I think we know what could have
influenced this, but one, the primary individuaL Mr. Hoover, is not
with us. Individuals who ,verI' closest to him in this effort are not with
us. And the committee itself has interviewed them. So I reany am not
in a position to discuss this motive issue. .
The CHAIRMAN. Nevertheless. you would agree that whatever the
motiYe. it was a very improper thing to do.
Mr. AIH:\IS. I cannot find [lIlV justification. no. sir.
The CHAIR:\IAN. Is it true that after Dr. Martin Luther King had
been nominated for the Xobel Peace Prize. that an anonymous letter
was sent to him and to Caretta King, his wife, 34 days before he was
to recei,'e the Nobel Peace Prize? rSee footnote p. 21.J
67
Mr. ADA11S. I do not think those dates are correct.
The CHAIRMAX, 'Yell, it was sent--
Mr. ADA1fS. It ,,'as before he was to receiYe it. I think 34 days-upon
reconstruction by one of the members of my staff, 34 days would have
been Christmas Day. and ,,-hether that 34 days--
The CIL\IR1L\X. It is hard to belieye that such a letter would be
written on Christmas Day.
Jfr. AO.U1S. It was not' written on Christmas Day, but 34 days-the
Nabel Peace Prize I think was on December 10, the letter-34 days
from the date of themailingoftheletterashasbeenreconstructed.as
best as possible, would have been Christmas Day.
The CHAIR1IAX. 'Yas the letter written and sent by the FBI?
Mr. ADA1IS. "\Ye haye no information to that effect. All we know
is that the draft, or original, of what may haye been the letter was
found in papers of the FBI left after a former offieial departed the
FBI. 'Ve know that based upon inquiries that we have conducted
and you haw conducted. we know that the letter was no~I mean it
"-as In connection with other material. So I think we can assume--
The CnAIR1IAx. Other materials which were sent.
JIr. AD.\1IS. That"s right. So I can assume that the letter was sent.
I haye determined nothing from my review of the files, and neither has
your staff. to my knowledge, or has been reported back to me which
"'ould indicate that this action was duly recorded in any file or was
a part of any authorized program or anything else. This is a void that
I do not think any of us has been satisfactorily able to resolve.
The CHAIIDIAX. "\Ve knm, the letter appeared in the files. 1Ve know
t hat the letter ,yas receiwd. 'Ve knmy it was associated with other
matters that ,,-ere sent by the FBI to Dr. Martin Luther King.
Mr. ADA1IS. The letter 'was never in our files in the sense that it was
entered into the official files of the FBI. It "-as among papers-The
CnAIR1L\x. It was among papers.
Mr. ADA1IR. Left by an individual who had departed.
The CIIAIR1L\X. That individual being Jfr. Sullivan?
Mr. AD.U[S. Yes. sir.
The CH.\IR1L\X. The letter read: "King. there is only one thing left
for you to do. You know what it is. You have just M days in which
to do it. this exact number has been self'cted for a specific reason. It has
clefinite practical significance. You are done. There is but one way out
for vou."
Now, if vou had received such a letter, how would vou have interpreted
it? '\11at would you haw thought it meant? .
~fr. ADA1IS. I have read that statement. r haw heard the conclusions
of vour staff that it ,,-as a suicide urging. r can't find any basis
UpOl! which they drew that conclusion. r think that, approaching it
from an obieetiw standpoint. as I read it. I ,lon't know what it means.
I think rather than a conclusion it should he a speculation in a realm
of possibilities as to what was intf'nded, hut I eannot-I don't understand
the basis for it. It is a possibilih-. but I ef'rtainlv won1rl not reach
such a conclusion from m:v reading of that statpment.
The CIL\TR1L\X. Xow. if yOU had ]wei\-ed a letter of this kind and
it had been rlireetcd to YOll: and yon \Yel'e in Dr. King's position and
yOll read. "King, there is only one thing left for yOll to do. You know
what it is. You have just 34 days in \vhich to do it." Xow, that hap68
pened to correspond to the time before which he ,vas to receiye the
Nobel Peace Prize. 'What would yOU think that it meant 1
Mr. ADAMS. I would haye to coD'sider what I was being accused of. I
would have to consider what the facts ,vere. I would have to consider
what the intent was of the person writing such a note, coming just
before Christmas. I don't know if it means, it is an urging to repent
from something this person, whoever he was, that had sent it, I have
no idea what it meant.
The CHAIRMAN. It is certainly no Christmas card, is it?
Mr. ADAMS. It is certainly no Christmas card.
The CHAIRMAN. It reads, "You are done. There is but one way out
for you." What does that mean?
Mr. ADAMS. I don't know. I don't know if it means confession. I don't
know if it means suicide, as has been raised. I have no idea. 'You have
the statement. I am not in a position to say. I haven't interviewed anyone
that was with him at the time he received it.
The CHAIRMAN. \Yould you disown this statement and say that any
connection the FBI had with it was utterly improper and grotesque?
Mr. ADAMS. I certainly would say it was improper, and I can't justify
its being prepared or sent, yes, sir.
Senator MONDAL~Mr.Chairman, if I might just interrupt.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mondale.
Senator MONDALE. \Vhat I asked the staff yesterday was what Dr.
King took it to mean. I have no knowledge of what those who framed
this letter intended, and those who were with him at the time he read
it, including Congressman Young who was one of his assistants at the
time, said that they took it to mean a suggestion that he take his own
life.
Mr. ADAMS. I am not in possession of that information. I am beingput
in it position, I don't know what the staff determine(1. They did not
report back to me on their findings.
The CHAIR~L\X.The letter will speak for itself. You personally haye
disowned it.
Mr. ADA:\IS. AbsolutelY.
The CHAIRMAN. It was a highly improper thing for the FBI to be
connected with in any way. Do .vall agree ,vith that?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir; ves, sir.
The CHAIR:\IAX. Now', without goin,,! through the many different and
specific undertaking'S that were intended to publicI v r1iscredit Dr. King,
because mv time will not permit that. and others will want to question
vou on other snecifie matters, I haw iust one further ouestion to put
to vou. Yesterday there was a docllment of the FBI whirh sll.!!.crested
tl1l1t in the oninion of the Bun'au. Dr. Kin.!! was an unsuitable leao.er
for the civil ridlts mowment, nnd that :lllother man shonld be looked
for, ano. ino.eed. another candirlate wns actnallv sn'!!!este,n. to Mr.
Hoover as one who should be nromoteo. in yarions ,vavs so that he
micrht assnme the leadershin of this mowment.
Now, can YOU tell me of anvthinO' in the law. or nnv other iustifiration,
.O'iwn the mission of the FBI. thnt w'on1cl mtitlp it. to o.p('ide
who shonlo.lpnd noliti(,fll Tllovements in this ('ountrv or to nndprtake
to de.!!raoe a mnn who hnd fOllrrht nnd won Slll'h lendPrRhin nnd hllrl,
thp support of a grpat many black ppoplp in this country, ano whitp
69
people as well, and to substitute in his place someone of the FBI's selection
or someone ",'ho stood in the FBI's fayor? Can vou think of anv
justification for such aetiyity on the part of a Jaw enforcement agency'?
Mr. AD,UfS. I can't think of any ofl'hand: no, sir.
The CIL\IR.~L\X.Xeither can 1. Senator Tower?
Senator TOWER. Thank you. ~Ir. Chairman.
\Vhat is your undel'sta'mling of the underlying causes of the feud
between Mr. Hoover and Dr. King?
~fr. ADAl\IS. Senator Tower, I feel if ,,'e got into any discussion of
that, I think we would haye to take into consideration certain material
which I feel should not be diseloseel publidy. and I would respectfully
ask that a question of motin of ~fr. Hoonr and the spat with Mr.
King shoulel be discussed in executive session. if at all.
Se-nator TOWER. In 1£l65. Attornev General Katzenbach was informed
b:v Mr. ,Hoonr of the Bureau's surveillance of Dr. King. \Vhat
was the Attorney General's reaction? \Yhat was his position once he
was informed hv ~Ir. Hoowr of this surnillance?
Mr. ADAl\IS. I don't recall having seen it.
Senator TOWER. In other words. did the Attorney General give any
direction to the Bureau in the matter that vou know of?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes. sir. I know that. of course. on the wiretapping on
Martin Luther King. it ,,,as approwd by the Attorney Grneral. I know
that the President of the United States and the Attornev General specifically
discussed their concern ,,,ith Dr. King over Communist influence
on him. I do know there was concern. but I don't tie in this
date. 1965.
Senator TOWER. Do vou know whether or not Mr. Hoover ever
sought direct authorization from Mr. Katzenbach for this very sensitive
surn·illance of Dr. King?
Mr. ADAl\Is. I don't know. Attornry General Kennedy approved the
actual suneillance that was instituted on Dr. King. I elon't know of
anv correspondence between Attornev General Katzenbach-Senator
TOWER. Or any personal communication betwern them that
would han indicated the level of the Attorney General's involvement?
Mr. AD,UIS. No. If mv recollection serws me correctly. as far as
Attorney Grneral Krnnedy ,vas concerned. he requested coverage on
Dr. King. The Bureau responded ,vith a request in writing. which is
onr normal procedure. He declined to apnrove that request. and then
we camr back later. a few months later. and requesteel it again. at which
time he did approye. That is my recollection of that.
Senator TOWER. \Yhy did the Attorney General change his mind?
Do yon have any idea.' or is that again a' matter of sensitivity?
Mr. Anxus. I don't know why hr aetnallv changeel his mind from
originally rrquesting. then drclining ,,,hen it was submitted. and then
approving it on thr second go-round. It may br in the files. If it is, I
would be glad to see ,,,hat I could determine.
Senator TOWER. If you conld. 've wonldlike to have that. [See footnote.
p. 21. ]
Mr. An.HIs. Yes. sir.
Srnator TOWER. ~fr. Adams. yOU han bern familiar with the Bureau's
domestic intelligence work for many veal's. How did the Bureau
come to launch tllP COIXTELPRO,' a'nel ,,,hat in ('ssence did
COI~TELPROaccomplish?
70
Mr. ADAMS. ",VeIl, the program as such, as I can reconstruct from t~e
files, was indicated as concern orer conspiratorial efforts ?f cert~m
groups, and a decision made that perhaps more affirmative action
should be taken to neutralize riolence which was becoming of more
concern to the FBI in that regard. I believe these are some of the basic
considerations that went into the launching of the COINTELPRO.
Now, as far as the first one, which was the Communist Party, of
course, there was the concern here to neutralize the effectiveness of the
Communist Party in the United States. In fact, out of all of the
COINTELPRO operations that were approved, 59 percent of them
were directed at the Communist Party. The bulk of the concern initially
was with the Communist Party, and it was a desire to create factionalism
within the Communist Party and try to neutralize its efforts.
The Communist Party-Congress itself still has a determination on
the record as to the threat of the Communist Party in a statute. The
Supreme Court has held that the Communist Party 'is an instrument of
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union certainly has not relinquished
its interest in the United States as a target. All of these considerations
went into should we do something not only to follow the activities of
the Communist Party, but should we destroy its effectiveness in the
United States. That was the first program, I believe, that was initiated.
Senator TOWER. Now, did the Bureau ever seek direction and counsel
from the Attorney General on any of its COINTELPRO efforts or
specific programs?
Mr. ADAMS. As best as I can reconstruct. Senator. there was no direct
authority requested from any Attorney General for the initiation of
these programs, and it is only a question. as your staff presented yesterday,
that the Attorneys General, Presidents, Congress, had been made
aware of certain aspects of programs after the fact and those were
primarily concerned with the Communist Party, and on one other
organization but not the New Left and these other types. So I cannot
find any evidence, and I have no reason to believe, that there would be
any evidence that the Bureau initiated these programs other than as
an internal decision.
Senator TOWER. 1Vere reports on these programs made to the Attorney
General? "'Vas he informed of them? ",Yas he kept informed on a
continuing basis?
Mr. ADAl\fS. He was kept informed by letters, which again the staff
has alluded t<>, letters reporting certain derelopments. For instance,
one ?f them that went to one Attorney General, reading of that letter
o~lthned almost in complete detail Klan activities. activities taken to
chsrupt the Klan. It used terms of neutralize, disrupt. There were a
clear explanation of what we were doing against the Klan in that
regard.
Senll;tor TOWER. ~ow is it that yOll came to believe that you had the
authorlt~ to neutralIze or disrupt these organizations rather than proceed
agamst them frontally through prosecuting them for violations
of the law?
Mr. ADAl\[s. I gllf'SS you \yould have to say, in a position like this.
that it is just the Smith Act of IMO. which is designed to prevent
revolutionary groups from advocating the overthrow- of the Government.
and then subsequent interpretations as to the constitutionality
71
of it leaves us with a statute still on the books that proscribes certain
actions, but yet the degree of proof necessary to operate under the few
remaining areas is such that there was no satisfactory way to proceed,
and it was an area where--
The CHAIR~IAN. 'Yill the Senator yield at that point, please? What
you are saying, Mr. Adams, is that you did not operate within the
law because the law didn't give you sufficient latitude. Therefore, you
undertook direct action to disrupt and otherwise undermine these
organizations.
Senator TOWER. Did you proceed on the assumption that these
organizations would eventually break the law, and therefore you sought
to neutralize and disrupt them before they did?
Mr. ADAMS. I can't say that, sir. I think that the investigations of
them were based on this belief, that they might break the law or they
were breaking the law. The disruptive activities, I can't find where
we were able to relate to that. 'Vhat it boils down to is what we have
gotten into a question on before: in our review of the situation we S&\
men of the FBI recognizing or having a good-faith belief that there
was immediate danger to the United States.
Senator TOWER. All right, but to rE'pair to Senator Church's question,
you don't say that you rE'ally had specific legal authority?
~fr. ADAMS. No. And this isthe hang-up with the whole program, and
which we are not trying to justify, that there is some statutory basis.
I would not make that effort whatsoever. All I'm trying to do is say
that at the time it was initiated, we had mE'n who felt that there was
an immediate dangPr to the country. They felt they had a responsibility
to act, and having felt this responsibility, did act. And this is the whole
problem we have at the present time, because we do have one, we can
see good evidence of their beliE'f there was a threat. 'Ve had cities being
burned; we had educational institutions being bombed. 'Ve had deaths
occurring from all of these activities. 'VI' had a situation that we didn't
know what the end was going to be.
'Ve never can look around the corner in intelligence operations. We
don't know if ultimately this might bring the destruction of the country.
All we know is we had an extremely violent time. So I don't find
any basis in my mind to argue with tlH~ir good-faith bE'lief they were
faced with a danger. .
Now, when they move over to the second area of responsibility, here
is where we have the problem. and I think it is the whole purpose of
this committee, the Attorney General, Mr. Kelley, all of us realizing
we can't operate in these areas wherE' we fE'el responsibility, but WE'
don't have a mandate by Congress. So in that area, this feeling of
responsibility I feel camE' from the fact that PresidE'nts, as your staff
said yesterday, Pre~idE'nts. Congressmen. the Attornev GeneraL no one
really provided direction and guidance or instructions don't do this,
do thi~. don't do tl1at, or what are you doing and how are you doing it.
For mstance. thE'rE' is some feeling on the part of some that our whole
domestic intelligE'nce opE'rations was socret. The COINTELPRO
operation was. I mE'an. I think we all agree that this was, to be effective,
thE'Y felt it should bE' seeret. But back in our-this is printed appropriation
tE'stimony which WE'nt to the members of the committee. It
was mailed out to newspapers, friends, anyone that was interested in it,
56 -077 0 - 76 - 6
72
back in 1967 talking about Internal Security's operations, the New
Left movement, Young Socialist Alliance, Chicago trial, nationwide
demonstrations, studerlt agitation, antiwar activities, the Committee
of Returned Volunteers, Communist Party, L.S.A., Progressive Party,
Socialist Party, extreme organizations, Black Panther Party.
All of these items and statements about extremists, white extremists
and hate-type groups, the Republic of Xew Africa, Minuteman, our
coverage of subversive organizations-there are several groups, organizations,
and movements which I discussed showed the wide coverage
we must maintain to follow on their activities and changing tactics,
and in spite of the proliferation of these organizations, our informant
coverage at all levels has been of great value and assistance, enabling
us to keep abreast of our investigative responsibilities. This is the
same way through all of our public appropriation testimony. We have
told the world we are investigating black hate groups, New Left
groups. So, I merely mention this to try to put in the frame of reference
of these men, feeling, they know we are investigating them.
They didn't tell them, though, in sufficient detail other than scantily
before the Appropriations Committee, what we were doing to disrupt
these activities, and my feeling is that the men recognized the danger,
they pointed out the danger to the world. They said, we are investigating
these organizations, and they felt then that the comfortable
climate of leave it up to the FBI, we should do something more. And
that is what we are looking for guidelines on, the Attorney General,
Mr. Kelley, you, to give us the guidelines under which we should
operate.
Now, there are certain guidelines that we don't need to be given,
we shouldn't do this. vVe don't have such activities today, programs
designed to disrupt and neutralize in the domestic intelligence field.
But beyond that, we need guidelines on what does the whole of Congress,
representative of the people, by passing of legislation say this is
the FBI's role in domestic intelligence.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, my time has long since expired.
But I would like to note that I saw Mr. Kelley on the "Today Show"
this morning indicating strong support for a response to congressional
oversight, and that is a healthy attitude.
The CHAIRMAN. ",Vell, I think it must come because, as you have
conceded, you shouldn't have ever had to have had the guidelines
that the Federal Government's chief law enforcement agency ought
not to disobey the law, and reallv, you don't need explicit guidelines
to tell you that, or you shouldn't. ",Vouldn't you agree?
Mr. ADA:lfS. I would say that looking at it today, we should have
looked at it that way yesterdav, but I do feet I don't have any doubt
about the good faith of people recognizing the danger, feeling they
had a responsibility, no matter whose fault it was, our's internally or
because we weren't given the supervision we should have been given,
and taking what thev considered to be appropriate action.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart.
Senator HART of Michigan. I should apologize both to witnesses
and my colleagues on the committee for scrambling around loosely,
hut in explanation to the witnpsses, I have not been able to give attention
to the evolution of the files that are now at hand until the last
couple of days, and I am not sure what is in the files for the public
73
record, and which of the materials I haye been shown in the last couple
of days are still under ~eal. So just out of memory I am going to summarize
certain actiYities which have been acknowledged that the
Bureau undertook. but without being specific with respect to location
and names. I do it for this reason: it is right that the committee
and the press be ""orriecl about the treatment of a Nobel Prize winJler~
Dr. King; but there are an awful lot of people who never got
close to a Xobel Prize whose names are .Jones and Smith~ that my
re,-iew of the files show hnd yiolence done to their first amendment
rights. Nobel Prize winners will always get protection. but Joe
Potatoes doesn't. and the Committee should focus on him, too.
Included in these COINTELPRO activities were, anonymous
letters. drafted by Bureau offices in the field, sent to headquarters in
'Yashington, approved. and then put in the mail. intended to break
up marriages. not of Dr. King but of :Mary and .John Jones because
one or the other was thought to be a dissenter, might have dressed
strangely or showed up at meetings in company of others who dressed
strangely. Anonymous letters were sent to university officials and to
the several newspapers in that city to prevent university facilities from
being made available to a speaker of whom the Bureau disapproved~
and it was not a topflight. bigname speaker.
In that case, an anonymous letter was sent to me making protest.
Being an anonymous letter. it nHer occurred to me that it came from
the Federal Bureau of Innstigation. The series of anonymous letters.
one with the spelling very poor. the grammar sloppy, and another more
sophisticated; protesting the employment of a man by a city, alleging
that he was a Communist or came from a Communist family~ and
there are loyal Americans out of work. ,,-hat are you doing. mayor.
And to the press. isn't this an outrage. And again the letter, the
anonymous letter sent to me saying what are you going to do about this.
There are loyal Democrats in this town ,,-ho need work. And in that
case I happened to haw known the man about ,dlOm the protest was
made, and the Bureau's facts were 'nong as hell on that man's
loyalty. He was as loyal as you or I. Now. yes or no, are those actions
regarded now by the Bureau as within bounds ~
Mr. ADAMS. No. sir.
Senator HART of ~{ichigan. 'Vhy were they regarded as within
bounds when they were anproved by the Bureau ~
:Mr. ADXl\lS. '·Vell. I think even under the guideE'les of COINTEL
PRO. as established. the programs were not designed for the purpose
of harassment of an individual. The memorandums indicate they were
designed to disrupt the organizations. Some of the turndowns were
turned down on this specific worrling. This is mere harassment.
The rationale ,vould hare been-and of course. here. I say some of
these you mentioned wouldn't eYen appear to me to meet the criteria of
the program and should have been rlisa,-mved. e,'en under the existence
of thE' program. Hmverer. in the total context of the program, activities
were to be directerl tmvard the organization itself. but ,ve do not
rlo that at the present time.
Senator HART of :\Iichigan. Yes. But everything I have summarized
rather poor1~·. ,,-as apprO\"ed by the Bureau at the time by headquarters,
not by the field office agents.
74
Mr. ADAMS. I do not think that there were improper actions taken
under the program. eyen under the program as it existed. )11'. Kelley
has so stated his recognition of that fact. The Attorney General certainly
has. Yet the majority of the actions taken. e\-en the Department
concluded were la,,-ful and legal, proper investigation activities, but
are--
Senator HART of )fichigan. You see. my feeling is that it isn't a question
of techniques that are bad. The concept of the program seems to
do violence to the first amendment because enrything you did sought
to silence someone or threaten someone to silence. or denv someone a
platform, or create an atmosphere in which people were i~ fact afraid
to assemble. Kow. sometimes law enforcement. legitimate law enforcement,
has what we call this chilling effect. when it is legitimate law
enforcement. Oftentimes that chilling effect is a necessary, though
regretable, side effect. But what I am talking about, and what these
files are full of, are actions the only purpose of \vhich is to chill. It
isn't in pursuit of any crime at all. Indeed. when a court of general
jurisdiction approved the use of that university premise by the
speaker, the Bureau had stirred so much controversy with its
anonymous letters, when that judge wrote an order. after the sponsoring
group went to court. what \vas the Bureau's reaction from headluarlers?
Investigate the judge.
Mr. ADAMS. I'm not familiar with that fact
Senator HART of ~fichigan.,Yell. neither ,,:as I until last night.
Mr. ADA~IS. The instruction ,,-as to innstigate the judge?
Senator HART of )Iichigan. This is the sort of thing that I cam.e out
vf the hospital to find, and it is the sort of thing. as I said yesterday.
that my children ha,-e been telling me for years you were busy doing,
and I simply didn't believe them. And they were right and I was
wrong.
Mr. ADA~IS. Well. there were about 3.200 activities. and about 2.300 I
believe or so were approved under the COINTELPRO, and over 59
percent were addressed to the Communist Party. That leaves 1,000.
And out of 1,000, perhaps, I don't know what the actual figure was
of ones that just clearly stand out as improprietous under the program.
even as it existed at the time, but I do feel that-well, it is a
very difficult area.
Senator HART of )fichigan. ){v time is up. too. I am sure, but
regarding the Communist Party, if your theory continues to be that
any socially actiYe group of citizens who organize. whether women's
libbers or fight the bomb or anything else. might be a target for
infiltration bv the Communist Partv and therefore vou can moye
in YOUI' agent's. That means, almost not as an overstatement, that any
and eyery citizen's actiyity could be made the target of the kind of
actiyity that I haye just described. because eyery individual is apt.
during his lifetime, to engage in yiolence. If that is justification. then
you are justified in running suryeillance on eyerybody.
Mr. ADxm;. 'Yell. that \vas not--
Senator HART of Michigan. Everybody has that privilege, and that
clearly is a police-state concept.
Mr. ARDIS. That is not our criteria.
Senator H.\RT of )Iichigan. All right. but if the criteria is three or
four of us get together and we have a sort of nutty idea, just the
kind of thing the Communists would like to exploit, and therefore you
75
seek to justify shutting off the forum for that group or to survey it,
the potential for Communist infiltration, then, if that continues to be
your theory, then I say you are going to pursue the same wretched
road that these files show you have been pursuing before. If that is
the predicate. the fact that a Soviet or Marxist or Maoist Hottentot is
liable to think there is an idea that ,ve can exploit, then you people are
going to be spending how many man-hours, how many tax dollars
doing the kind of things that I summarized so briefly here? That, in
my book, is the 20th century version of what the Founding Fathers
intended to prevent when they wrote the first amendment. Is it the
position of the Bun'au when a Communist participates, associates with,
and promotes an idea, that this justifies you trying to figure out if
you can bust up a marriage if two of the people are in the group?
Mr. ADAMS. It does not, and it is not our criteria; no, sir.
Senator HART of Michigan. What does it justify?
Mr. ADAMS It justifies our doing nothing in the way of COIN
TELPRO activities. I still feel it has a justification, that you awee
with. to investigate the Communist Party. It is when you get into
the disruptive areas. where the program does beyond investigation,
that we have no statutory authority.
Senator HART of Michigan. Well. we have been emphasizing
COINTELPRO. Would it justify tailing these people ~
Mr. ADAMS. 'Vhat, just a--
Senator HART of Michigan. Or putting an informant into the group?
Mr. ADnfs. If it is a Communist group?
Senator HART of Michigan. No, if it's me and somebody else that
thinks we oughtn't to have something that a majority of people think
we ~hould. 'Ve organize and you people say, "Well, there is something
the Communists can take and run with."
Mr. ADAMS. No. sir.
Senator HART of Michigan. Does that justify a surveillance of them?
Mr. ADA,(So It does not. and we would not. Before we would even
open a preliminary inquiry. we should have an indication that the
Communist Party has attempted to infiltrate or is infiltrating. In
other words, where you have some evidence of a subversive group
participating in the functions of that organization, and there are grey
areas here. in the spectrum of anything where I am sure we have opened
investigations where we should not because there has been scant evidence
of such infiltration. And this is a supervisory problem. It is a
criteria problem. And it is also an oversight problem which we are
responding to.
Senator HART of Michigan. My time is up and I haven't gotten into
some of the other material.
The CHAIRMAX. Well. Senator. you have not been with us-Senator
HART of Michigan. No, no, I just---
The CHAIRMAX. If you want more time. vou have a lot of time stored
up. If you want to use it now, go right ah'ead.
Senator HART of Michigan. 'Yell. let me ask the justification for
this sort of husiness. I have heen talking ahout the things I have seen
in the files that hear on direct denial of first amendment rights, and
again. this does not deal with the treatment of a distinguished American.
Indeed, it involves groups that are generally viewed with very
76
sharp disapproval. The ground rules for the treatment should be
precisely the same, whether he is a good, popular guy, or a dirty,
smelly guy. "What was the purpose of the Bureau in trying to stir up
strife-perhaps I shouldn't say what was the purpose-what possible
justification for the Bureau trying to sic the Black Panthers on that
outfit out in California, or between the Black Panthers and the Blackstone
Rangers in Chicago? 'Vas it with the hope that by fomenting it
they would kill each other off?
Mr. AD.HIS. Absolutely not, and I think the committee staff can
inform you that during their review of all of these matters they
haven't come up with one instance, of violence resulting from any of
these actions. In that particular case there was a communication in
the same file, which I believe the staff had access to, which showed that
we did get information that one of these groups was going to put out a
contract on one of the others, and we notified the police and the individual
of the fact that their life was in danger. None of our programs
have contemplated violence, and the instructions prohibited it, and
the record of turndowns of recommended actions in some instances
specifically say that we do not approve this action because if we take it,
it could result in harm to the individual. So, I think this is one
charge-and the staff did not make such a charge, I might add, when
they presented the picture-but I think any inference that we were
trying to result in violence is wrong.
Senator HART of Michigan. Let me explain for the record why I
reached the conclusion I did.
Mr. ADAMS. The wording of that memorandum--
Senator HART of Michigan. And why I continue to hold to that
conclusion.
On .January 30, 1969, the Bureau headquarters in Washin~on
approved sending an anonymous letter to the leader of the Blackstone
Rangers, Jeff Fort, which indicated that the Black Panthers had put
a contract out on his life as a result of conflicts between the two
organizations [exhibit 28 11, Now, you say that was to warn him.
I ask, wasn't the principal purpose of the letter to encourage the
Rangers to shoot some or all of the leadership of the Panthers~
Otherwise, what does this quote mean, and I will read it. It is from
a memorandum from the Chicago office of the FBI asking approval
to undertake this. Here is the way it reads: "It is believed that the
above" this anonymous tip that a contract is out on you. "It is believed
that the above may intensify the degree of animosity between the
two groups and occasion Fort to take retaliatory actions which could
disrupt the BBP," the Black Panthers "or lead to reprisals against
its leadership. Consideration has been given to a similar letter to the
Panthers alleging a Ranger plot against Panther leadership. However,
it is not felt that this will be productive, principally because the
Panthers at present is not believed as violence prone at the Rangers,
to whom violent type activity, shooting and the like, are second
nature." [Exhibit 29.2J
Now, how can you reach any conclusion other than a purpose was to
generate the kind of friction that would induce the killing--
1 See p, 430,
• See p. 432.
77
Mr. ADAMS. 'VeIl, if that purpose was for that rather than generating
factionalism, disagreements, disrupting it, it would be contrary to
the communication I referred to in the other file, the Black Panthers
versus Ellis, where we notified the police of the 'contract, we notified
the individuals of the contract and took every action at our command
to prevent direct violence, and also the fact that the files showed that
we turned down these situations where violence was involved.
Senator HART of Michigan. 'VeIl, we have differing views with respect
to motives and the purpose of the Panther situtaion in Chicago.
I still do not understand why we sought to set the Panthers and this
US group in California against each other as they were. Also, I don't
know whether it is in the record, open or not, what purpose other than
to occasion violence moved the Bureau to approve of forged signatures
of Communist Party personnel on letters addressed to Mafiaowned
businesses attacking the employment practices of those businesses?
vVhy would the Bureau think there was any value to be served
in concocting- a forged letter? Let us assume Phil Hart is a local Communist
in this city. The Bureau forges Phil Hart's name to a racketowned
business, notorious for using muscle, protesting that fellow's
business practices. Certainly it was not intended to improve the employment
practices. .
Mr. ADAMS. I think if the full communication were available, it did
show a purpose unrelated to violence. I don't recall the exact wording
now, but I think it was to create a lack of support or something like
that. This was part of that HOOD'VINK program, I believe, that
was one of four actions that ,,,ere involved in HOODWINK, and I
think there have been some public descriptions of that program that
indicate that it was not the greatest thing coming down the pike.
Senator HART of Michigan. Well, that is the sort of thing I found
that persuaded me to say very openly that I do not buy the idea that
the American people ultimately are respomible for that kind of nonsense
because I am certain that virtually every familv in the country
would have screamed in protest no matter liow much they disliked
Dr. King or the Panthers or the Communists.
Mr. ADAMS. Sir--
Senator HART of Michigan. If they had known that tax money and
Federal personnel were busy around the country, notwithstanding
bank robberies that were going on at the same time, pounding out that
kind of correspondence and inciting that kind of conflict and curbing
speech.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Hart.
Senator Mondale is next.
Senator MmmALE. Mr. Adams. I realize that you were not a part of
this particular event. But being an experienced FBI hand, I wonder if
you could help us understand the psychology that led to this kind of
memorandum.
Mr. ADAMS. I feel it coming, but go ahead.
Senator MONDAI.E. This is a memorandum to the Director. It has
been referred to before. It calls for removing King from his pedestal
and replacing him by someone else. The memo is dated .Tanuary 8,
1964, and was written a week following the time that King was named
man of the year by Time Magazine. [See footnote p. 21.]
78
This memo, as you know, received the following comment from Mr.
Hoover: "I am glad to see that light, though it has been delayed, has
come to the Domestic Intelligence Division," and so on. I wou~d just
quote part of the language and maybe you can help us understand
the psychology that led to it. The first part of the memo says: "We
have got to remove King from his pedestaV' Then it says:
The Negroes will be left without a national leader of sufficiently compelling
personality to steer it in a proper direction. This is what could happen but need
not happen if the right kind of national negro leader could at this time be gradually
developed so as to overthrow Dr. King and be in the position to as~ume the
role of leadership of the Negro people when King has been completely discredited.
For some months I have been thinking about this matter. One day I had an
opportunity to explore this from a philosophical and sociological standpoint with
X [the name of the leader] whom I have known fur some years. As I previously
reported, he is a very able fellow and one on whom I can rely. I asked him to
give the matter some attention, and if he knew any Negro of outstanding intelligence
or ability, let me know and we would have a discussion.
He has submitted to me the name of the above-named person. Enclosed with
this memorandum is an outline of X's biography, which is truly remarkable. In
scanning this biography, it will be seen that X does have all of the qualifications
of the kind of a Negro I have in mind to advance to positions of national
leadership.
And skipping:
I want to make it clear at once that I don't propose that the FBI in any way
become involved openly as the sponsor of a Negro leader to overshadow Martin
Luther King. If this thing can be set up properly without the Bureau in any way
becoming directly involved, I think it would be not only a great help to the FBI,
but would be a fine thing for the country at large.
While I'm not specifying at this moment, there are various ways in which the
FBI could give this entire matter the proper direction and development. There
are highly placed contacts at the FBI who it might be very helpful to further such
a step. This can be discussed at a later date when I have probed more fully into
the possibilities and this recommendation is that approval be given for me to
explore the whole matter as set forth above.
And to that Mr. Hoover says:
I'm glad to see the light has finally come. I have struggled for months to get
over the fact that the communists were taking over the racial movements but
our experts here couldn't or wouldn't see it.
Now I think you testified earlier that you do not accept this as
proper FBI activity, but can you help us understand how at one point
in American history someone thought it was proper, apparently including
the Directod
Mr. ADAMS. I would have to say for one thing that this gets into the
real motive of the discrediting of Martin Luther King, which I don't
feel can be fully explored. I think that the people most directly involved
in that are not available, because I don't know from my experience
what they had in mind in this regard. I have no doubt from this
memorandum and other memorandums that the two individuals involved
felt very strongly that Martin Luther King was a threat to the
SUCCeSs of the Negro movement and that steps should be taken to get
him out of that-what the reason for it was or the motivation, I am
just not in a position to say. I do say it is improper to inject yourself
into that type of activity. but I don't know what the real motive was.
Senator MOXDALE. Dr. King was investigated. as I think you testified
earlier, because of fears of Communist influence upon him?
Mr. ,..'\..DAMS. Yes.
79
Senator ),IOXDALE. Is that a proper basis for investigating Dr. King
or anyone else ~
)'fr. ADA)IS. It is, where you have information indicating that the
Communist Party is and has made efforts to try to influence an individual.
I would say that that ,vould normally he considered within
the current criteria.
Senator ),IoXDALE. Yon would consider that to be a valid basis for
investigating today?
),11'. AD.DIS. The mowment itself, but not the individual.
Senator )10XDALE. How do yon investigate a mm'ement without investigating
individuals?
)'Ir. ADA)IS. You do get into a gray area. The main thing would be
if we had an organization today that we saw the Communist Party
gravitating to, trying to work in positions of leadership, ,ye would be
interested in opening an investigation on Communist infiltration of
that organization to see if it was affecting it.
Senator ),IoXDALE. All ri~ht, now let's go back specifically. I gather
there ne\'er was any questIOn raised about whether Dr. King was a
Communist. That was never charged.
Mr. ADA){S. :Not as a Communist Party member, no, sir.
Senator MONDALE. That's right. Or that he was about to commit, or
had committ€d acts of violence ?
Mr. ADAMS. No.
Senator )'10XDALE. But the reason for investigating him apparently
was that he was subject to Communist influence. Now what makes that
a justified reason for investigating him? Is it a crime to be approached
bv someone who is a Communist?
, Mr. ADAMS. Xo.
Senator )'10NDALE. 'What is the legal basis for that investigation?
)'fr. ADA)IS. The basis would be the Communist influence on him and
the effect it would ha\'e on the organization. It would be in connection
with our basic investigation of the Communist Party.
Senator )'10XDALE. 'VeIl, as I understand the law to read, it is not a
crime to be a member of the Communist Party.
Mr. AO.UIS. That is correct.
Senator MOXDALE. How can it be a crime to know someone who is a
member of the Communist Party?
Mr. ADAMS. It is not.
Senator MONDALE. How do you investigate something as tenuous as
that? What is the basis for it legally?
Mr. ADA)IS. 'Yell, it falls into the area of, one, the intelligence jurisdiction
of the activities of the Communist Party to have a situation
where an indi,'idual in an organization, a leader of an organization,
efforts are being made to influence him and to achieve control over the
organization, and it is part of the overall investigation of the party
trying to exert this influence as to are they successful, are they taking
O"er the black movement or the civil rights movement. It is just like
we tried to make clear in investigations that were more prevalent years
ago but still occur on the Communist influence in labor unions. 'Ve
tried to tell everybody we interview we are not interested in labor matt('
rs. 1Ye are not trying to inquire into that. We are interested in the
effect of the Communist Party on this union.
80
Senator )10XDALE. Mr. Adams, I am trying to get at the legal basis
in this particular case for investigating Dr. King on the grounds that
he might be subject to Communist influence. Can you cite any legal
basis for that, or is it based entirely upon a generalized authority
thought to exist in the FBI to investigate internal security matters?
)11'. AD.urs. It would fall also in the Presidential directives of inwstigating
subversive activities.
Senator )loxDALE. Then the question \yould return to what authority
the President had.
)11'. ADAMS. That's right.
Senator ~IoxDALE. Xow Dr. King was investigated, among other
things, for matters of, I think you call it delicacv. "~ould that be a
basis for investigating an American citizen by the FBI?
Mr. ADAMS. No.
Senator MmmALE. 'Vould you say then that those inves6gations
were improper?
)11'. ADAMS. I don't believe that there is an allegation that we investigated
him for that. I think there were certain by-products of information
that developed and I think at a point you had a situation where
the tail was wagging the dog, perhaps, but I don't see any basis for
such investigation. And I find it very difficult to get into H, discussion
of this in view of the prohibitions that I think--
Senator )10XDALE. You answered my question. That by itself would
not be a basis for investigation.
Mr. ADAMS. Xo, sir.
Senator MONDALE. "Vould you agree with me, Mr. Adams, that this
area of the assignment that the FBI had been tasked, which they
thought they possessed or could use to inwstigate Americans; is an
exceedingly \"ague, difficult, if not impossible, area to define? It is not
an area where there were allegations of crime or suspicion that crimes
were about to be committed, or thaJt violence was about to be committed,
hut rather this whole generalized area, to investigate Americans in
tk>rms of ideas that they have or might be persuaded to have, ideas
that might hold potential for danger to this country. This vague area
has got the FBI into an awful lot of trouble, including today's
hearings.
Mr. AD,Drs. Yes, sir.
Senator )fOXDALE. And beeause of that, there is a very important
need to sit down and redefine the guidelines, and have those guidelines
known specifically by alL so that the FBI can know precisely \yhat
it can do and what it cannot do.
Mr. AD.urs. I 'think this is why the country is fortunate in this
particular time to have an Attorney General who is a legal scholar and
a lawyer of unquestioned repute who has indicated a willingness to
address the,<;e problems, whieh, as the staff has determined, was not
always the case over the years. But we have an Attorney General, we
have a Director, who has offered his complete cooperation, just as
he has to the committee in this inquiry, that we are not trying to avoid
embarrassment. The only thing we are trying to hold back are identities
of informants and sensitive, ongoing operations that we have, a
concern on the part of Congress that not only recognizes there
han he('n ahuses. hut recognizes that there still alwavs has to be some
(lpg-rep of flexibility. ' .
81
",Ve are going to have ~·ituations where you have a "",Veatherman"
working for tlH' watenYorks~ and in college he was a scientific student,
and he makes a comment to a fel1mv employee that there is going to
be sonH', spectacular event that is going to bring the attention of the
world on t.his citv.
Senator )Ioxn:\LE. ""~ouldn~t you have probable cause then to investigate
the commission of a crime?
.:\11'. ADXUI'. ",Ve might have to im'estigate, but to disrupt, we have
the authority to tell the supervisor of the waterworks, you had better
get him out of there before the city water is poisoned and 100~OOO people
die, and I think the committee is going to find the same problems we
rIo in coping with that situation, and even the Attorney General in
his speech in Ottawa pointed out that there is stiJl possibly a necessity
for some flexibility to take appropriate action under extreme conditions.
But it should be controlled. It is like Mr. Kelley says, go to
the Attorney General. explore the legal issues, lay the problem up
there. It should not be handled internally in the FBI.
Senator .:\fONDALE. But do you also agrps that the Congress ought to
redefine the rules legislatively?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes; because the problem I have with it is we talk about
oversight, and Mr. Kelley and the Attorney General and I believe
this committee agrees that 'Ye should have joint oversight which would
ayoid the proliferation of hearings and the sensitive knowledge among
many people which always poses the risk of an inadvertent leak of
information. But yet ryen ,,·ith oversight, under the plan you discussed
vestpl'dav. 01' somr of thr obseITations that ,wre discussed vesh'l'da~"'
I1aving iwoplp, eonspnatin', liberal, black, and the other <]lialincations
you put in. can a cOIll/llittre speak for tIlE' will of Congress?
.\t one tinw we had Congresslllen making' speechrs all over the country.
if 'Ye don't stop tlwse bombings, if somebody doesn't do something
about it this countrv is in troubl{>. Is that. the will of Congress?
Until it is embodied in legislation where the whole will of Congress
is expressed. wr are going to have problems.
Senator MONDALE. I am glad to hear that, beCc'tuse there is a way
Congres'> sp{'aks. It is not through the buddy system or a person. It
speaks through the law.
Mr. ADAMS. That's right.
Senator ~foxnALE. And now for the first time we have this whole
issue; it is not denied by the FBI. The elements are known. 'Vhat I
hear you saying is that' you ,muld like the Congress now to define.
and redefine specifi{'all~' and carrfnlly, what it is we expect the FBI
to do, and what it is we wish to pre"ent the FBI and will prohibit the
FBI from doing.
Mr. ADxMs. Right. What is anI' role in society? After World War II.
if you'll remember, a congressional committoo met and raised all sorts
of storm OWl' the fact that there was not enough in the wav of intelligence
innstigations. Xr,'rr again should it -happen in the Fnited
Statrs that we be caught \"ith our pants down. After the Kennedy
assassination, if JOU recall. thr FBI was properly criticized for having
too restrieti,'C dissrrnination policirs in connection with Secret
Service be.cause they depend upon us for the intelligence necessary to
prrwido protection for the President against extremist groups. We did
that, but just lwfore the Iwcnt incidrnts in California. there was going
82
to be committee concern, not this committee, over has there been too
much dissemination.
So the FBI is in the position of, at different times in our history,
being damned for doing too much and damned for doing too little.
And it is because of reacting to what we try to judge is what they want
us to do. and this is what we are not in a position to do. 'V"e need the
will of Congress expressed in some definitive measure, yet providing
the latitude, because as you have seen from these problems, there are
many that theJ'e are no hlack and white ans\YeJ's to. There have to be
occasions where, when you are confronted with an extreme emergency,
someone can act, and I don't think you or anyone else wants to tie the
hands of law enforcement when todav we have over 10 million serious
crimes in the United States. We have'1 million crimp.s a yearinvolving
violence, and there has to be a capability to react. But. we need to know
in better terms 'what is our role in this, especially in domestic
intelligence.
Senator M'ONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator TOWER [presiding]. Senator Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Adams, in 1966
a letter written by the Bureau to Marvin Watson, Special Assistant
to the President at the 'V"llite House, and the gist of this letter was,
in reference to his request, and I want to make it clear it was his
request, not the Bureau's, authors of books that were critical of the
Warren Commission report on the assassination of President Kennedy,
were requested to file any pertinent personal data information,
dossiers, et cetera, on seven individuals whose names I will not discuss.
Do you have any knowledge as to why the 'V"hite House requested
this kind of material on the Warren Commission critics?
Mr. ADAMS. I don't recall. I am familiar with the material. I did
review it some time ago when \ve were testifying before the House
Committee in February, but I don't recall that I saw in there any
specific motivation on the part of the mite House group re,questing
this information.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Now, in the same letter it also says a copy of
this communication has not been sent to the Acting Attorney General.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Number one, is that a normal procedure, when
you get requests of this kind that the Acting Attorney General is bypassed,
and 'why was the Attorney General bypassed in this instance?
11r. ADAMS. This is not a normal procedure. It is not the procedure
followed today. There was a period of time where, at the President's
directions, Mr. Hoover reported more directly to him in certain areas,
and it \yas apparently a feeling that he did not want the Attorney
General to know certain things.
Senator SCHWEIKER. One of the dossiers specifically included photographs
of sexual activities.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And my question is, how is that relevant to
being a critic of the 'V"arren Commission? 'V"hat standard do we use
when we just pass photographs of sexual activities to the White
Honse? Is this a normal proceeding \yhen a dossier is requested? Is
this normally included, or did they specifically request photographs
of this kind, or what light can you shed on this?
83
Mr. ADAMS. I can't shed much. I know they requested information
on him. I think there was other material concerning that individual of
a security nature that was included. 'Why the information in that respect
was submitted I am unable to answer. I do know at the time
there was a lot of concern following the 'Varren Commission report.
Had all the answers been explored? 'Was the Soviet Union involved?
'Vas Cuba involved? And who were the critics who now are attacking
this? But I have seen nothing which would explain the rationale for
requesting the material.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I think what concerns the committee is. that
whenever you get to the nitty-gritty of investigations-and it doesn't
relate to the Warren Commission, I will leave that alone-we
get back to something like a photograph or a tape recording or some
letter referring to some kind of human weakness or failing that is
really very irrelevant to the investigation, is sandwiched in here.
It just seems to me that it was a tactic. This just happens to be the
Warren Commission I singled out, but it was a tactic that was used
rather frequently as a lever, or for reasons which I am trying to discover,
as an instrument of investigative policy. Would you differ with
that or dispute that? mat rationale would you use? Do we use
sexual activities as a standard criterion for investigations?
Mr. ADAMS. We do not use sexual activities as a criterion, but during
the course of our investigation-we did have an investigation on that
individual at one time-and during the course of the investigation,
in checking the records of a local police department or a district
attorney's office, they had conducted an investigation for a criminal
act involving these photographs. and they made that available to us.
So it went into our files. Now, the request of the President, he is the
Chief Executive of the United States. He in effect has custody of
everything. There are problems involved when the man who is in
charge of everything requests information. I would like to add, howeveT.
that following the cleansing effect of Watergate that I don't
know of any such requests coming over to the FBI anymore. There is
a direct line between the Attorney General and the Director, and the
Director certainly recognizes that in a case of extreme disagreement
he would have the alternative to tell the Attorney General, I need to
IrO directly to the President. or feel I should, but we, do not have this
line of communicatio~1 at the present time.
Senator SCHWEIKER. It seems that if they had just listed what
was alleged in the other investigation. that certainly would have
sufficed for whatever purpose. But it seems to me that when you
enclose living photographs, you are really attempting to discredit
these critics. mat other purpose would a photo/ZTaph of this nature
have, other than to discredit critics?
Mr. ADAMS. I can't answer that.
Senator SCHWEIKER. One area that I think this gets into, which we
reallY touched on in the assassination probe Mr. Adams, is where
the Bureau stops when they fret some of these requests. You touched
on it a moment afro. The President a<;ked for something. I don't
kno'" in this ('ase ~'hether or not the President asked to 'see photoIYranhs
of this nnture. but the point is. nobody said no and he frot them.
So the C1uestion is. where do you s<>e th(' Bureau's responsibility, and
84
what can this committee do to insure that there is some kind of a
test, that we either put in the law or that the FBI applies, that prevents
the White House from using police power in this way?
Mr. ADAMS. I don't think Congress can ever fill the responsibility
of trying to draw up guidelines, even in conjunction with the executive
branch, to guarantee that all abuses won't take place. The organization
is made up of human beings, and these things occur. Certain corrective
actions are self-initiated, such as this. The President, for instance, you
know we had an incident a few years ago about investigating a newSman,
where we were requested, and if I recall from our information, we
thought he was being considered for an appointed position which
would have been a logical basis. As facts turned out, that was not the
purpose that the information was requested. To stem or stop abuses
like that, the President, the current administration, has issued instructions
that any requests for investigations under the special inquiry
or White House investigation such as for appointment must clear
through the office of his counsel, in other words, not let the lower line
people come over and say we need this information or we need this
request. They come through the office of Phil Buchen through an
employee that is assigned to that office with responsibility.
Now, we do still make certain name check requests for the White
House, and those, too, have to clear through his office. So we do have
that. Then we have the responsibility, if we get something which on
its face appears political or improper, then our responsibIlity under
that would be to go to the Attorney General and ask him to intercede
by finding out is this a proper request on the Bureau. And I can assure
you, that as Mr. Kelley has testified and has made it perfectly cleaT,
he has not had any such improper requests and he would go right
to the Attorney General if it was ne~essary. Otherwise he would reject
the request.
Senator SCHWEIKER. What steps are you taking to make sure that
we catch some of these things in the present that maybe we either overlooked
or did not catch or somehow got sidetracked in the past?
.Mr. ADAMS. We have been working with the Attorney General and
hIS staff. It started even when Attorney General Saxbe was there, to
look at all of our procedures, all of our investigative operations. Are
they proper? Do they fit criteria? Do we have a legal basis for them?
And we have guidelines, committees which have been established in the
Department, that meet every day on questions of the overwhelming
problem of collection and maintenance of information. What do we
get? Why do we get it? What should we do with it?
I feel there is a very active program going on in that regard, and
I feel certain that it will continue to make sure that we are aware of
everything and take appropriate action.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I wonder if you might share some of these with
the staff so that we may have the advantage of taking a look at those,
too.
Mr. ADAMS. I would have to secure the approval of the Attorney
General on the guidelines. He did tell the House committee which
originally raised the question on maintenance of information, that
once we get something and they are nea,ring completion in the Department,
that he does intend to take it up with Congress. So I am
sure there would be no problem at that point in bringing it to this
committee as well.
85
Senator SCHWEIKER. It seems to me that the problems in the past
have arisen, in not having clearly defined standards. I think this is
the crux of it.
Mr. ADAMS. That is true.
Senator SCHWEIKER. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Adams, what use does the Bureau presently
make of its intelligence informants, and have they ever been used as
provocateurs or as magnets for action?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir.
Well, you asked two questions.
Senator TOWER. Yes.
Mr. ADAMS. Let me take the last one first, provocateurs. Our policy
has not-or our policy has been to discourage any activities which
in any way might involve an informant doing something that an agent
cannot do, which would be in the area of bemg a provocateur, which
basically is entrapment. And we have had some allegations of entrapment
come up. We feel we have satisfactorily answered them. This is a
very technical legal field which boils down, of course, to the fact that
if a person is willing to do something, and the Government merely
provides the opportunity, that is not legally entrapment. So if a
person comes to us and says, "I have been asked to participate in a
break-in of a Federal building, I would like to help you," then the law
basically would indicate we have the authority to continue to let him
operate. The question comes up if he assumes the whole direction
and causes people to do something which they would not otherwise have
done. That is the entrapment issue. So we are very alert to this. We
have instructions, clear guidelines, instructions to our field offices
that they are not to use an informant for anything that an agent
cannot legally do. I don't say there haven't been some mistakes in
that regard, but I don't know of any at the present time.
Senator TOWER. Senator Huddleston?
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I think to keep this activity in proper perspective, it might
be well to remember that even though a great deal of the testimony
and the questioning has been relating to the question of Dr. King, this
is by no means an isolated situation. Dr. King-'s case is indeed a
classic example, utilizing all of the various techniques of the Bureau.
both in intelligence gathering, and action against an individual in
order to discredit him or embarrass him, and indeed destroy him. But
the record is replete, and indeed. here is an entire sheaf of similar
targets who are certainly not as well known. Some of them are high
school students, some of them are high school teachers, college students.
college teachers, broadcasters and journalists, people whose names
would be almost totally unfamiliar to the vast majority of Americans.
So the activity was not confined to those that are immediately recognizable
public figures.
I '\vant to just proceed along the question of informants that Senator
Tower just raised for just a moment or two. You sa,y that your informants
are not expected to do anything that an agent himself could
not do. In the gathering of information do you have any safeguard
at aJI. any rule as to how the informant proceeds in order to gather
the information you a,re looking for?
~Ir. ADAMS. Onl:v that he proceed through legal means.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Is that specifically stated to him when he is
employed?
86
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Are most informers paid on the basis of a
regular fee or regular salary, or are they paid on the basis of the information
they gather?
Mr. ADAMS. Even those who are paid on what you could say a salary,
that salary is determined on a COD basis as to the value of the information
furnished. In other words, in a criminal case for instance,
you could have a person come in and give you the identity of three
individuals who just robbed a bank. You might pay him a lump
sum amount, and never go back to him. In the security field where
informants do ,finally manage to work into a revolutionary type
organization, their continued activities on our behalf do set up more
of a program for payment.
Senator HUDDLESTON. If information that may be supplied to you
happens to be of a sensational nature or of a surprising nature, do
you ever question the informer on how he obtained it?
Mr. ADAMS. I am sure this takes place. In any handling of an informant
over a sustained period of time, you do have a rapport which
they don't just come in and say Joe Blow said this, Joe Blow did that.
There is a conversation that goes through, which I feel certain would,
if it looked like he had something that came from some improper
source, I think the agent would say, "·Where did you get this?"
Senator HUDDLESTON. If you found it had been taken improperly
or if some improper action had been taken, would it be put in the
files?
Mr. ADAMS. If he violated the law, we would have an open investigation
if it were within our jurisdiction.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Now the Bureau disseminates this information
on individuals that is collected in various ways. How many other
agencies can request, for instance, an individual check that would
result in your supplying to it information from these personal intelligence
files?
Mr. ADAMS. Every agent in the Federal Government under the employee
security program has an obligation to check with the FBI;
doing name check search ()f ou·c files to see if there is any subversive.
derogatory information which might militate against appointing that
individual to a Federal position.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you take any precautions as to how they
will use that information once it is supplied to them by your agents?
Mr. ADAMS. All we do is indicate to them on the report that it is the
property of the FBI and is not to be disseminated outside their agency.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You have no way of knowing whether or
not indeed it is?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir, we do not.
Senator HUDDLESTON. What internal precautions do you have against
the Bureau itself misusing information that it gains from other
agencies?
Mr. ADAMS. Strong prohibitions. First, we don't allow access to
files except on a need-to-know basis. Any employee of the FBI knows
that if he improperly divulges information or leaks information out
of the files, he will be subject to administrative action. We had a
case where an agent obtained an identification record and made it out
87
improperly, and I think that agent was separated from the rolls. But
we had asked, and of course we share in CIA's request to this extent,
that there be a criminal penalty attached to misuse of information
and leaking it or making it available outside of an agency. This is
another issue before Congress.
Senator HUDDLESTON. There is also an instance that the committee
has evidence of, where the Bureau at least proposed taking information
gained from the Internal Revenue Service and drafting a letter,
a fraudulent letter, over a forged signature of a civil rights leader,
mailing it to the contributors of that organization indicating that there
was some tax problem and hoping to discourage further contributions.
Did this in fact happen, to your knowledge?
Mr. ADAMS. I am not familiar with that case. I can easily say it
would not be proper.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But you don't know whether it happened or
whether the act was carried out?
Mr. ADAMS. I do not know.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Adams, getting on to another subject,
one of the techniques used very frequently by the Bureau in its
attempt to discredit individuals was to utilize the press. It was customary
to send anonymous letters on many occasions to editors, broadcaster::"
commentators, and columnists around the country containing
information, or suggesting information, about an individual that the
Bureau wanted to discredit in some way. There is also some evidence
that the Bureau utilized within the press itself, on a regular contact
basis, certain columnists or broadcasters for the purpose of disseminating
information that the FBI wanted to get out about individuals.
How extensively was this utilized?
Mr. ADAMS. I don't believe it was very extensive. In fact, I think
there were probably very few incidents where untrue information
was put out. That is my recollection. On disseminating public source
information there were a number of instances of that which is still
proper to date under our guidelines. I just don't know of many instances
where untrue information was used, and I do not know of too
many instances overall where that was done.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know of any instances-how many
actual journalists or practitioners were regular disseminators of FBI
information?
Mr. ADAMS. I don't know of any today that are, in that regard.
I know there have been situations where it happened and people still
do. They come to us and say, we would like to do an article on organized
crime. Can you be of assistance? And if we can be of assistance
within the guidelines established by the Attorney General, we do
assist. We have a pull and a tug over privacy acts and freedom of
information and also the need to know, but we try to satisfy.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know of any at the present time or in
the past who have been paid by the FBI for their services?
~fr. ADAMS. Not personally. I don't know of any.
Senator HCDDLESTOX. Not personally? Do you know of any evidence
that indicates that?
Mr. ADAMS. That's what I mean. I don't have any evidence that
indicates that.
66-077 0 - 76 - 7
88
Senator HUDDLESTON. I think it would be helpful to our inquiry if
we could review, or you would review, the files and make a determination
as to whether or not it might be the case, that the FBI has paid
journalists who are amenable to disseminating information supplied
by the FBI.
Mr. ADAMS. I am told we have. I don't know what files we have reviewed,
but we have reviewed them and we haven't found any.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You haven't found any. 'What is the mass
media program of the FBI?
Mr. ADAMS. To try to get the truth out, to get a proper picture of
the FBI's jurisdiction, its activities.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Is it also to suppress other publications or
other commentators or journalists who might be disseminating other
views?
Mr. ADAMS. No.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Did the FBI not take some action against a
number of newspapers, most of them student newspapers that they
thought should be suppressed?
Mr. ADAMS. We may have in the past. I don't recall any specific casl'.
You are talking about some of the "Weatherman" support papers or
Black Panther paper. I don't know of any in that regard, but I'm
not saying that such action was not taken.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Are you familiar with the special correspondence
list?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes,
Senator HUDDLESTON. What is this list?
Mr. ADAMS. My recollection is that the special correspondence list
was a list of individuals that had requested from time to time various
Bureau publications and were kept on a continuing list and such communicatlOns
were mailed to them.
Senator HUDDLESTON. It was a list that was considered to be friendly
towards the FBI view?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes. I would say anyone on that list would normally be
friendly.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you have knowledge of a number of instances
in which the Bureau carrying out its COINTELPRO activities
utilized the existing press iIi order to attempt to discredit some
individual?
Mr. AD.UIS. I don't haTe an idea of the number, but I don't think
there 'Yere very many. .., .
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you have a hst of the ll1stances III ,,,Inch
the Bureau attempted to discredit other publications?
Mr. AD.\:~IS. No; I don't know.
Senator HrDDI"EsTON. Do you know that thev did occur?
Mr. ADAMS. I can ask. I get. "No," as far as any knowledge in that
regard.
Senator HUDDLESTON. As far as knmvledge.
Mr. AD.\:~IS. That means knowledge of ,,-hat we have come up with
in our current re\-iew, I would assume.
Senator HrDDLEsTOX. It seems to me that this is an area in which
we are particularly troubled and rightly should be. If there is any
right that is specifically caHed for )1.1 OUr Constitution" a:nd l~as. been
upheld and l'raffirmed in court deCISIOn after court deCISIon, It IS the
89
right to publish in this country. The first amendment speaks not nnly
of freedom of speech, but also' freedom of the press. .And yet it seenis
that \H' han' a pattprn hpre of the chief la\" enforcement agency of the
country attempting to suppress that wry right. •
::\Ir. AD,\?IS. I havpn't seen-I think any effort to manipulate the
pre,s of tIllS country, I just don't see any possibility in that regard.
and. I don't see the logic of anyone e\'en attempting such. -
~enator HnmLEsTox. But it did happen.
~Ir. AD.DIS. It may have happened in--
~enatorHrDDLEsTOX. In a rather extensive field.
JIr. AD,Drs. I disagree with that rather extensive field. I just don't
know the extent that you are talking to here.
Senator HrDDLEsTOX. 'Ye are talking about the cases where--
Jlr. ADxHs. Are you lumping in cases where we disseminated public
source information ( Are you lumping in a case where we may have
gone to a--
Senator HrDDLEsTOX. I think disseminating public source information
is somewhat different from furnishing a TV commentator with
derrogatol'y information about a specific individual. who has been
targeted as one that apparently the Bureau thinks is dangerous or
that his ideas ought to be suppressed.
Mr. ADAMS. Is that manipulating the press, though ~ Here you haw
a situation 'where an individual is going around the country advocating
off-the-pig or kill-the-police or something like that. And a newspaperman
was furnished, say some background information on him which
would have been in the area of public source material which he could
use in an article. Are \"e really, if the information is true. the final
decision, it would seem to me, would be the newspaperman as to
whether he would use any such information.
I think if we concealed our motives from the newspaperman, or
furnished false information, which I think we did in one anonymous
letter or something that I saw in all of this, I would say that was
improper.
Senator HLDDLESTOX. Or--
Mr. AD.UIS. I think newsmen have sources. I think--
Senator HrDDLESTOX. Or convincing a cartoonist, for instance, to
draw a derogatory cartoon about a college professor who certainly did
not constitute a threat to the violent overthrow of the Government.
Mr. ADA:\rs. If anyone accuses us of having any great success in trying
to infhwnce the press, I think that their objectivity stands very
high.
Senator Hl"DDLESTOX. I think the point is not whether there was
succ-ess or not, there was an effort made. I'm glad to hear you acknowledge
now that it is almost an impossibility. But more than that it
Sf'ems to l1l£' at the bf'ginning when these type of techniques were used,
it seemed to indicatl' it lack of confidence. or faith in the American
people to beliHe that they could not hear ideas that might be contrary
to their own without being seriously damaged. One of the great
freedoms \YP ha\"1' is the freedom of hearing other ideas, whether we
aa-rl'l' with thl'm or not. I think this is an area that we are concerned
\\~ith and one techniqne \"hich I hope is being discontinued and one
that will be, by the time these hearings conclude, and by the time
proper legislation is drawn.
90
Mr. ADAMS. 'VeIl, I think you can be assured that any such techniques
in that area died with COINTELPRO in 1971.
Senator HlJDDLESTOX. That is comforting.
Mr. ADA~fS. Yes.
The CHAIRMA":\ [presiding]. Thank you, Senator. I have been
forced in and out by virtue of votes and other committee business. I
am not sure which Senators have had their opportunity to question
and which have not.
Senator Goldwater. were you next?
Senator GOLDWATER. I wIn not take much time. I apologize for not
having been here in the last 2 days. It is going well, I have heard. We
have heard testimony regarding the volummous records, I believe
500,000, maintained by the Bureau. How in your view have these
re~ords come to be kept? For what purpose have they been kept, and
has the Bureau ever undertaken to destroy or prune down any of these
records?
Mr. ADAMS. We have a number of records. We are a businesslike
organization. We record our activities. And as the staff knows, they
had access to a lot of recorded material that is the product of what
the FBI has done over the years. When we conduct an investigation,
we maintain the results. "Ve do have destruction procedures where,
after the passage of certain time limits approved by the Archives
authority, we are allowed to destroy certain files. Other information
we are required to put on microfilm. There is a regular standard procedure
for the destruction of FBI files. This has been suspended, of
course, during the initiation of these hearings and our files probably
have increased considerably during this period because we are not allowed
to destroy anything since the committee commenced its hearings.
But we do have procedures for destruction of files. They are
approved by the Archives. A problem inherent in that is maintaining
information. What should we keep? What should we obtain during an
investigation? 'Vhat should we record? In the past we have been pretty
consistent in recording everything we thought was relevant to the
investigation. The passage of the Privacy Act put certain restrictions
in. We cannot collect or maintain anything unless it is relevant to an
ongoing matter of which we have investigative jurisdiction.
But beyond even the Privacy Act, the Attorney General instituted
a guidelines committee in this area that we have been meeting diligently
with every day and hopefully have tried to avoid this idea
that we are for no good reason maintaining gossip, scandal, unnecessary,
and irrelevant material. So once these guidelines are in some sort
of final form, not to be adopted. then the Attorney General has indicated
that he is going to take it up with the various congressional
committees to get their input into iC after which they will be
published.
Senator GOLDWATER. "VeIL now these dossiers, I think you can call
them that probably.
Mr. ADAMS. I prefer not to, but I accept the fact that that is how they
are referred to.
Senator GOLDWATER. 'Yhat do you call them?
Mr. ADAMS. I call them files, 'To me, I guess we all have our little
hang-ups, but to me that is usually used in some sinister connotation.
It is probably not to you. But I will use whatever terminology you
want to use on this.
91
Senator GOLDWATER. I hope what you have on me is not called a
dossier,
Mr. ADAMS. X0, sir: it's a collection of material.
[General laughter.]
Mr, ADA~IS. Of which you are aware.
Senator GOLDWATER, that's right. Xow let me ask you, the information
you have would probably be on computer tape?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir,
Senator GOLDWATER. It's not. Information that IRS would have,
is that computerized?
Mr. ADAMS, It mav be. I'm not familiar with the extent of theirs,
'Ve do have certain 'computer actiYities, such as the National Crime
Information Center, or we han>, I guess, 7 or R million records. This
is not the usual file material. This consists of individuals concerning
whom a ,Yarrant is outstanding, stolen property, material such as
this. and also some documented criminal history information in the
nature of prior arrest history. but not what I thInk you are referring
to in the way of file material, reports, intelligence. this type of
information.
Senator GOLDWATER. 'What I am trying to get at, is there a central
source of comput€rized material that would include your information.
the information that IRS may have gathered, information that had
been gathered off of personnel records of the Pentagon?
Mr. ADAMS, No. sir.
Senator GOLDWATER. There's no such list that you know of?
Mr. ADAMS. I don't know what other agencies have, but the FBI
does not have such a list, does not have such capability to interface
with such a 1ist, if such a 1ist exists.
Senator GOLDWATER, Do you feel rather safe in saying then that
no agency of GO\-ernment has put together such a computerized total
of all the information on the people that you have surveilled?
Mr. ADAMS. Oh, I think it is safe to say I don't know of any. Today
I am not saving ,,-hat does exist or doesn't exist elsewhere,
Senator GOLDWATER. In addition to the 500,000 records that you
han, ,Yould I be correct in saying that you have 50 million data cards
and that there's $R2 million spent on intelligence in the fiscal year
Hl75 to maintain this librarv?
Mr. ADAMS. No: I don't 'think that is correct. I think the figure of
$R2 million is what our budget people have drawn up as being the
total cost in a ginn year of our intelligence operations, security,
criminal. organized crime, the ,,-hole intelligence field, But I don't
relate it to the maintenance of anv data cards.
Senator GOLDWATER. Now one' other area, and I think it probably.
according to the records, goes back to 1970, How did the Bureau
come to place the, so-called ,Vomen's Lib mO\-ement under sun-eillanC€,
and r say so-called because I think we disconred that there was no
such organized moyement.
)11'. AD.nrs. There w('re a lot of moYements. It is my recollectionr
haye not revie'Yed the file in detaiL but it is my recollection that
the case was originally opened because of indications that certain
,o'1'OUpS were attpmpting to infiltrate or control the Women's Liberation
moYemrnt. The inyesticration was conducted and was terminated
seyeral years ago, as far as r know.
92
Senator GOLDWATER. Do you know of any actions that were taken
by the Bureau as to the ,yomen's liberation movement except to
monitor it ~
Mr. ADAMS. No. And the monitoring was for the purpose of determining
the infiltration, and I don't know of any actions taken
against them.
Senator GOLDWATER. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The CUAIRlIfAN. Thank you, Senator Goldwater.
Senator Hart, have you had an opportunity to question ~
Senator HART of Colorado. No; I have not.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart.
Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the
testimony yesterday developed by the staff concerning the last few
days of Martin Luther King's life, we learned that the Bureau in
March of 1968 developed information to be given to the press criticizing
Dr. King for staying in a white-owned and operated hotel, the
Holiday Inn in Memphis, instead of the Lorraine.
At some point during Dr. King's stay in Memphis, he moved from
the Holiday Inn to Lorraine. To your knowledge, Mr. Adams, was
that information ever giren to the press? [See footnote p. 21.]
Mr. AOAMS. I have been unable to determine that. This question was
raised to me by the Civil Rights Division of the Department. Apparently,
they had had some inquiry along the same lines several months
ago. Rut my recollection of it at the time, we saw that this action had
been proposed and the memorandum bore the initials, I believe it
was the initials, statement handled, and the initials of the agent in
the external affairs division who assumed the responsibility or saying
handle it and initiated it. They contacted him and he said that he
had no recollection of the matter' but the fact that he did say, "handled"
didn't mean that he ,,'as able to do anything with it. He was just
clearing that memorandum so it would shmy action was taken. and
he doesn't know if he gave it to anyone or not.
Senator HART of Colorado. 'Yell, suffice it to sav that the facts are
that subsequent to the time the Bureau developed this information
to pass on to the press. it did appear in the local papers in Memphis.
Mr. ADAMS. There was some statement in the local papers, not
according to the terminology of the proposed statement that was to
be given to him. There was some comment made. if I recall, that
Martin Luther King gave a press conference following the riots that
followed one of his appearanres. and that he gare that press conference
in a hotel, the Holidav Inn Hotel. Rut it didn't have any. at least the
newspaper article itself didn't have any dirE'ct relation 'to acts taken.
Senator HART of Colorado. 'Yell. acrording to somE' historians and
people who ha\'e commented on the rircnmstances. they were fairly
(>xp1icit in stating that the loral press was critical of him durin!! that
perioel of stavinQ' in th(' whit(' hotel. hnt I don't want to make a big
isslle out of thflt. 'Yhflt was the name of thE' agent that von talked to'?
Mr. An\)!R, T didn't talk to him personf1llv. People in thr Rnrean
that WE're ,\'orking on this elid flnd T be1i('\'E' his nflme WfiS Linhangh.
Senlltor HWT of C'olorado. If you ronld provide that name to us.
T\mn10 apnreriate it.
)11'. An,Drs. I wonld be g1no to.
93
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Adams, was any effort made during
this entire COIXTELPHO period to objectively define what the "New
Left~' meant! ,Yhat was your understanding of the "New Left."
.Mr...\J)A1I1S. They did ha"e a definition of the Xew Left distinguishing
it from the Old Left. It ,vas primarily to distinguish it in the
area that the .Kew Left was trying to separate itself from the old hidebound
policies of the Communist Party or some of its links to the
Communist Party. Perhaps ~Ir. 'Yannall has a better definition of
that.
Senator HART of Colorado. It '\Cry definitely included those who
were opposed to the war, organized groups that opposed the war and
felt strongly about racial injustice in this country, leaving the Communist
Party aside.
:.JIr. ADA~IS. People involved in the Xew Left movement were, of
course, also involved in the anti-Vietnam war effort.
Senator HART of Colorado. 'Yhat do you mean also? That's what I'm
trying to get out. 'What was the Xew Left? If you didn't oppose the
war and you weren't involved in civil rights groups, who else might
you have been '?
Mr. ADA:US. ,VeIl, the New Left did involve a revolutionary philosophy.
It wasn't related solely to the anti-Vietnam effort.
Senator .fIART of Colorado. Thomas .Jefferson embodied a revolutionary
philosophy.
Mr. ADA1I1S. That's right. And the New Left activity exceeded. Thomas
.Jefferson's philosophy in that it did fit in with the basic Communist
philosophy.
Senator HART of Colorado. E,'ery group that was placed under the
efforts of the COIXTELPRO supported the violent overthrow of this
country?
~fr. ADAMS. The roncept of COIXTELPRO was clirected towarcl
those organizations. I woulcl han' to refresh my memory on each one
of the organizations that 'Yen' targets of it. but they were basically
Xew Left, Communist Party, Social 'Yorkers Party, black extremists,
white hate groups, those were the five basics.
Senator HART of Colorado. The Southern Christian Leadership
Conference?
Mr. ADA1I1S. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, I don't
know if it was invohwl specifically in COINTELPRO. Three minor
actions ,vere taken against the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
Senator HART of Colorado. 'YelL its leacler, I think you could say, for
8 years was subject to a lot more than three minor actions.
Mr. ADAMS. That's right, and that gets into the other area that the
activities tahn against him were primarilv COINTELPRO-type
activities but werpn't rpallv under the control o'f--
Senator HART of ('oloraclo. You're saying that basically every organization
and indi"idnal that was s\vept into the fiw COI~TELPRO
I1Pts sl1nport£'d the violent m'prthro,,' of this country?
~fr. ADAMS. 'Vell, not jnst the violent overthrow of the Government.
It \vould have been or!!anizations that were threatening and fomenting
violence. T don't helieYe it had to he related to the actual overthrow
of the Government.
Senator HART of Colorado. Is a 5trp£'t demonstration violent?
94
111'. ADA~IS. It depends on where you are in relation to what is taking
place. If there are a lot of acti,-ities in connection with street demonstrations
that are not violent, and there are a lot of street demonstrations
that have resulted in deaths, so it just depends on the activity
taking place and the circumstances. Our problem is we are given the
responsibility by the Attorney General to monitor demonstrations
which have the potential of Yiolence. The question is, how do you find
out, at what point do you get in any monitor demonstrations to determine
if that has a potential ,-iolence ~
Senator HART of Colorado. ·Well, obviously we haye received testimony
to the effect that the FBI went out of its way to foment violence
itself, to encourage disruptions internally, tD encourage hostilities and
conflict between and among these groups in the hope that violence
would occur. Therefore you could go back to the Director or the press
or whomever and say. look, this is a violent group.
Mr. ADAMS. I accept the allegation but I don't accept the fact. The
conclusion, from what I haw seen in reviewing these files in connection
with our inwstigations, is that we don't foment violence. ·We don't
permit as a matter of policy our informants to act as provocateurs to
engage in violence. I am not denying it may have happened, but the
FBI does not foment yiolence. and the FBI, yOll know, has no--
Senator HART of Colorado. You are using present tense wrbs.
~fr. AD.UIS. 1Ve didn't then. I r10n't agree that our actions in any
eyent were designed to foment violenet'.
Senator HART of Colorado. I think there is plenty of documentation
of the attempt to set the Black Panthers against the Blackstone
Rangers in Chicago.
~Ir. ADAMS. ·Well, I don't consider that plenty of evidence. I think
the eyidence to the contrary is that one of the organizations. when we
got word that the Black Panthers yersus Fnited Slayes. we notified
the local police that this actiyity was going to take place. and the
individual, so that we would pre,-ent the kiJJing. which had come to
our attt'ntion and was going to take p}aC'e, and then tll(' turndowns
of various COIXTELPRO actions. there ,yere specific statements
made, that this action 'Yill not be approyed because it might result in
harm to an individual. physical harm. aIHl ,ye ha,-e no indication from
any of theSE' actions under COIXTELPRO that any violent act
occurred. and I have not been presented with any by the staff from
their far more extensive inquiry.
Senator HART of Colorado.•Tune ;1. 1!H1R, a memorandum from the
special agent in charge of Cincinnati to the Director of the FBI.
eaptioned Counterintelligence Program. Disruption of the New
Left, a five-page memorandum having to do with Antioch College
in Ohio [exhibit ~O 1]. It is a long deser'iption of the college and
background. There is a reeommendation on page ;1: "Cincinatti
rpeornmends that eOllI1terintplligenee action be taken to exposp the
pseudointelledual image of AntioC'h.'· and it gives speC'ific ways of
doing that. then the next pagf'. page 4-. tlw desired result of action.
"forC'o AntioC'h to defend itsPlf as an eduC'ational institution." ·Where
in til(' laws of this country or the chartpr of the Federal Rnreau of
1 f';ee pp. 4:J4 thro\l;:h 4:JR.
95
Investigation does it say that that agency should be forcing any
educational institution to defend itself!
Mr. ADA;\IS. I know of none.
Senator H.\RT of Colorado. You would say this is stepping beyond
the bounds of your authority?
~lr. ADA;\IS. I would say-I'm not familiar with the total action
of what was there, but just on the surface I don't see any basis for it.
Senator HART of Colorado. It is my understanding that field
officers participating in COINTELPRO activities were required to
send results in status letters and in annual reports. Is that correct?
::\11'. ADA;\IS. Yes.
Senator HART of Colorado. "That kind of results generally were
you looking for? ,Vhat was considered success?
Mr. AD.DIS. 'VeIl, it would be considered success, if in one instance
an action was taken to create factionalism in the highest level of
the Communist Party. and the results were that we were advised
that the Communist j:>arty influence declined appreciably as a direct
result of factionalism created at that level. That to us was a concrete
result. 'Ve had other results that you get in various degrees. The above
is an extremely favorable degree. ,Ve had others, I think one was
alluded to yesterday or today where a letter went o~t se~ting up
marital strife on the part of someone. I don't see any baSIS or JustIfication
for that. I think that is the other extreme. I think in the middle
there were ones that fell into a different degree. The only thing that
I feel is we had 3.000 actions recommended. I don't know if the document
shows whether this Antioch one was approved or not. I doubt
that it was approved.
Senator HART of Colorado. I believe it was. 'Ve can document that.
Mr. ADAMS. OK. Because there would be one. I would say that the
judgment in approving is in question. But out of 3,000 recommended.
the fact that 2,000 approved shows that there was some concern to try
to keep these to a proper level, and I think the actual number of
grossly improper activities fortunately is rather small. I think there
are a lot in there. The whole program, we feel, should have been discontinued,
and we don't have a program like it now. and we wouldn't
institute a program like it now.
Senator HART of Colorado. It would be helpful to us if now or in
the future you could recommend what steps we should take, both as
the committee and this Congress, to make sure that doesn't happen,
aside from just the, assurances we are being given here.
Mr. ADAMS. Well, the main recommendation I make is that we don't
wind up on the point we have been on in the past years. that one time
in our history Congress is saying we ought to be doing something to
stop violence in the streets, murders, blowing up of buildings; and
at another time they are saying you shouldn't have done what you
<lid. and that ,,-e make a mistake \"hen we react and try to identify one
area and say that is the voice of the people. 'That we need is a legislative
mandate which is the will of Congress in order to tell us what
our role should be in this area. I think that the main thing that would
come out of all of this, I hope, is some more definitive guideline
where we all know \vhat the will of the people is as expressed by
Congress.
96
Senator HART of Colorado. I believe my time is up.
Senator TOWER [presiding]. Mr. Adams, to return to the business
of informants which I initiated and was interrupted by a vote, who
selects an informant ~
Mr. ADAMS. The basic responsibility is on our special agent personnel
who develop informants, the agent on the street.
Senator TOWER. Does the special agent in charge in a given area
have control over the activities of an informant or a veto on the use
of a particular informant ~
Mr. ADAMS. Not only the special agent in charge, but FBI headquarters.
We maintain the tightest possible control of the utilization
of informants. We require Bureau approval to utilize a person as an
informant.
Senator TOWER. The special agent in charge has the power to veto
the use of an informant ~
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator TOWER. Does headquarters know who all the informants are?
Mr. ADAMS. Absolutely. We do not allow hip-pocket informants. We
require-
Senator TOWER. You don't have the agents informed by their own
special informants ~
Mr. ADAMS. Absolutely not.
Senator TOWER. Are the criteria different for paid and for nonpaid
informers?
Mr. ADAMS. We have some informants over the years that have refused
to accept payment, but generally the criteria for both, I mean
for ones that are paid, is that it must be on a c.o.d. basis, evaluated
as to the value of the information.
Senator TOWER. What protections are afforded to informants?
Mr. ADAMS. Protections afforded them individually?
Senator TOWER. Yes.
Mr. ADAMS. The greatest protection in the world we can afford them
is to maintain the confidential relationship which they have adopted
with the FBI, and the fact that those citizens of the United States
who, for whatever reason, decide to cooperate with the FBI and
cooperate with their Government in the criminal and security field.
have that confidentialitv maintained. Beyond that confidentiality
we are unable to afford them any protection, any physical protection.
We have had informants murdered through disclosure. 'Ve have had
them subjected to other violence and criminal activities, and the only
protection beyond maintaining the confidentiality is once we have
used them or had to expose them for some purpose, we do have procedures
for relocation and maintenance of them. which is utilized
quite frequently in the top hoodlum and the Cosa Nostra-type investigations.
Senator TOWER. It is my understanding now that 83 percent of all
cases involve some use of informants. so that means that the use is
pretty widespread and apparently very essential. What kind of guidance
does the FBI give to these informants ~ Do you give them any
special training? Could you describe that kind of relationship in terms
of guidelines, control. authority that you have?
97
Mr. ADA;)rs. WelL when an individual is being developed as an informant.
our main concern is whether he provides reliable information
and that the information he collects is collected by legal means. We
don't permit an informant to engage in any activity that an agent
couldn't do lrgally himself. In other words, you can't have an extension
of the agent ont here engaging in illegal acts, and the agent saying I
abide by the law. This creates some problems, of course, in the criminal
field where you don't recruit informants from Sunday schools. You
recruit informants in areas where they do have knowledge of criminal
activiti-es. Hut ,w even had to oprn investigations and prosecute some
of our informants. because we do not bend from this, that they are
not going to enjoy fa vorite status as a result of their relationship with
us. So the agent COWl'S all of this with an informant during the
discussions.
",Ye secure backgrouncl information on the informants. We do this
to insure, as best as possible. ,ve are dealing with a reliable, stable individual
even though he may be engaged in an unstable activity.
'" e go through this {leriod and consider them more or less, in different
terminology. probatlonary, potentiaL verifying information that he
furnishes us, and everytime when they report on the status of an informant.
they have to tell us what percentage of his information has
been verified by other means. by other informants or sources. So we
do have a continuing indoctrination which is supervised at FBI
headquarters.
Senator TOWER. You said you don't recruit your informants from
Sunday school class. Being an ex-Sunday school teacher, I resent that,
but--
Mr. ADAMS. I am talking in the criminal field. Many of our security
informants come from a very fine background.
Senator TOWER. But this leads me into this. Sometimes, then, you
might recruit people that you know have committed criminal acts.
Mr. ADAMS. That's true.
Senator TOWER. Do you promise him immunity from future prosecution
in many instances to secure their cooperation ~
Mr. ADAMS. No. Now, the only exception to that would be we may
have an ongoing. it is what you call an informant-I believe your
question is addressed to someone that we are actually considering in an
informant status.
Senator TOWER. Yes.
MI'. ADA;)IS. ",Ve do have situations where during an investigation
we tar~t on one indi"idual, the lower rung, and the U.S. Attorney
and the Department offer immunity. vVe don't. And say, you cooperate,
and we go up the ladder to the next level, and in some of these
cases we have gone up through successive stages until we get the main
honcho who we feel is the proper targ-et of our investigation.
Senator TOWER. Getting on another subject~ does the FBI still reqnest
bank audits?
~Ir. AOA:us. Bank audits? Do you mean do we still have access to
bank records?
Senator TOWER. Yes.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes. sir. we do.
Senator TOWER. And do you obtain access with or without warrants?
98
Mr. ADAMS. We obtain access without warrants.
Senator TOWEl{. 'Without warrants ~
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator TOWER. Is the subject notified in advance by the FBI when
you obtain one without a warrant ~
Mr. ADAl\fS. No, sir.
Senator TOWER. Are they notified by the bank, or is he notified subsequently
by the FBI ~
Mr. ADAMS. No. vVe do get subpenas in lllany cases, not warrants,
but we do get subpenas in many cases, but in some cases a bank will
make available to us records without subpena. 'When it comes time
for utilizing that information we do issue a subpena for the
information.
Senator TOWER. Do you have legal authority to gain access to these
records~
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir, we do.
Senator TOWER. Without a subpena, without a court document?
Mr. ADAMS. There is no law that I know of that forbids us access.
There have been several court decisions, including some circuit
courts that disagree with each other, but I think the current finding is
that the bank records are the records of the bank and this does not
violate any first amendment or other amendments in connection with it.
Senator TOWER. Do you make similar requests of S. & L.'s and others,
and credit unions and other financial institutions?
Mr. ADAMS. I would assume the same would provide there.
The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Tower.
I just have a question or two. 'Ve are going to try to conclude this
morning because the committee has a hearing, a business meeting at
2 o'clock this afternoon and for the information of the members, that
meeting will take place in room 3110 of the Dirksen Senate Office
Building. And while I am making announcements, I think I should
say that tomorrow between the hours of 9 o'clock in the morning and
1 o'clock in the afternoon, the committee will report its findings and
make its recommendations to the Senate in connection with our investigation
into alleged involvement of the United States in certain
assassination plots, and attempts directed against foreign leaders.
The committee, as you know. has made an exhaustive investigation
of this issue. It has taken some 6 months. 75 witnesses have been interrogated.
over 8.000 pages of testimony have been taken, mountains
of documents have been analyzed and digested, and the report will
be a detailed accounting to the American people of that evidence,
together with the findings and recommendations of the committee.
Initiallv these disclosures will be made to the Senate in secret session.
after which the renort will be made public as previously approved by
committee vote. Therefore. it is anticipated that at 2 :30 tomorrow
afternoon in this room. the caucus room. following that secret session
ofthe Senate. the committee will meet with the press for the purpose of
answering such questions HS the press may wish to address to the
('ommittee on the assassination report.
:'\o\v. the last few fJ1Iestions T "'01lld likP to put to you, Mr. Adams.
hHve to 00 \vith some ('onfusion in mv mind ('on('erning the purnose
of the FBI in monitoring the womeil'" liheration mo'rement. VVhat
was the purpose of that sllITPillU!we? 'Vhv wpre vou im'olved in
monitoring that movement? ..
99
Mr. ADAMS. It was basically, as I recall, I have not reviewed the
files, but from the information that I have acquired, it would indicate
there were groups that were believed to be infiltrating and at~mpting
to exert control over it. That investigation was based or initiated on
this fact.
The CHAIR)L\N. But you never found, did you, that the 'Vomen's
Liberation Movement was seriously infiltrated, influenced, or controlled
by Communists. .
Mr. AD.HIS. X0, and the case was closed. I would put them III the
position of comments we have made earlier about the press, that I
don't think anyone is going to dominate, or control. That is a very
independent group.
The CHAIR)L\N. ·Well, we are trying to keep the country that way.
~fr. AD~\)IS. That's right.
The CUAIR)IAN. And the kind of thing that disturbs me is what
the documents reveal. If vou will turn to exhibit 7.1
Mr. ~\.D.nIs. Yes. .
The CHAIR)IAX. Then, if you will turn to where you find the caption
"Origin, Aims. and Purposes," a description of the "romen's Liberation
Movement in Baltimore, Md. I call your attention to this because
it seems to typify the whole problem of this generalized kind of surveillance
over the activities of American citizens. Here is the report.
If you will read with me this paragraph:
The women's liberation movement in Baltimore, Md. began during the summer
of 1968. There was no structure or a parent organization. There were no rules
or plans to go by. It started out as a group therapy session with young women
who were either lonely or confined to the home with small children, getting
together to talk out their problems. Along with this they wanted a purpose
and that was to be free women from the humdrum existence of being only a wife
and mother. They wanted equal opportunities that men have in work and in
society. They wanted their husbands to share in the housework and in rearing
their children. They also wanted to go out and work in whatever kind of jobs
they wanted, and not be discriminated against as women.
Now, can you find anything in that report that in any way suggests
that these women were engaged in improper or unlawful activity?
Mr. ADAMS. Not in that one. I believe there was another report,
though, giving the origin of it. which went into a little more description
of what our basic interest was.
The CHAIR)!.\N. Can you tell me. because this is the report I
have.
Mr. ADA)IS. 'WeIL I am given here--
The CHAIR)IAX. "That other. if there was some sinister activity connected
with this group that isn't laid out in the document--
~fr. ADA)IS. I was given a workpaper here which read:
Women's Liberation Movement. Investigation of captioned movement was
initated by our Xe\v York Office in April 1969, as the Women's Libber movement
is descrihed as a loosely structured women's movement comprised of individuals
with varying ideologies from liberal to Kew Left persuasion. some of whom had
exhibited an affiliation with and/or sympathy for several organizations 01' investigath'e
interest to this Bureau; namely. the Students for a Democratic Society,
Rlack Panther Party, the Vietnam Peace Parade Committee, Yenceremos
Brigade, the Socialist Workers Party, with its youth group the Young Socialist
Alliance.
The CITAIR)IAN. May I stop you at this point?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes.
1 See p. 360.
100
The CHAIRMAN. You are reading from a paper which has to do
with the origination of an investigation coming out of New York, are
you not?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. I am reading from a document that relates to the
Women's Liberation Movement in Baltimore, and the findings concerning
it in the summer of 1968. My question hasn't to do with
whatever original purpose the FBI sought by initiating this kind of
surveillance in New York, but with a finding made concerning the
·Women's Liberation Movement in Baltimore which I have just read
to you. I think you would agree with me that women do have the
right to get together to talk about humdrum existence and equal
opportunities with men and equal opportunities for work in our society,
don't they? That is not a subversive aotivity.
Mr. ADAMS. Well, but what you have here is the set up of our investigative
activity. We had New York, which was the office of
origin of the investigation. You have other offices that were checking
to determine what influence there was. In addition, in New York-to
the New York office, lay the fact that interwoven with the Women'R
Liberation Movement goal for equal rights for women, there was an
advocacy certainly of militancy and violence in achieving their goals.
Now, Baltimore is one office, and I believe that even there in one of
the reports-
The CHAIRMAN. You keep taking me back to New York.
Mr. ADAMS. Right.
The CHAIRMAN. And I keep taking you back to Baltimore. And the
reason I do that is because if you turn 2 pages back from this particular
report, which has to do with the Baltimore organization, the question
is whether based upon that finding the investigation should continue
of the Baltimore group, and the decision is that you will continue
to follow and report on the activities of the group. And I just wondered
why?
Mr. ADAMS. This is a problem that we have, that we do have organizations
where sometimes the-the ·Women's Liberation group is not ::t
good example because that was washed out, but we do have organizations
where-
The CHAIRMAN. What was washed out? Not the ",Vomen's Liberation
Movement?
Mr. ADAMS. No, the investigation indicated there was no concern
or no reason to be concerned about it. But where you do have an organization
that has branches in many areas of the country, and you
start with one place and it looks like you have a subversive organization,
you do have to see, well, is this carried out throughout the organization
or is it just one chapter or one group? In other words, not
even an organizational problem.
The CHAIRlIAN. But you see, the trouble with that is in this Baltimore
organization you say in your own report that it was independent,
there was no structure or parent organization. no rules or plans, so it
isn't a part of a nationally controlled and directed organization by
your own admission.
. Mr. ADAMS. I believe this report had some subsequent pages that
aren't included in here that did show some additional activity or
influence.
101
The CHAIRMAN. I am told by the staff that this summary is accurate,
and the only other thing contained was that these women had affiliations
with an organization that had protested the war in Baltimore.
Mr. ADAMS. I think there were some other items.
The CHAIRMAX. That is the only other association that we have
been able to determine. Apparently the women's liberation movement
is no longer under suspicion by the FBI and the case has been
closed. 'Vhat happens when the case is closed? Are those women's
names still left in the files? Are they forevermore contained?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. In the system?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes.
The CHAIRMAX. Pretty soon you will have us all in the system. If
there is no way, even after surveillance has been terminated, to eliminate
the references of individuals through the files of the system,
you will one day have us all, won't you?
Mr. ADAMS. Well, I would say as part of a normal business record,
when we do make a judgment that an organization should be investigated
and we investigate it, and then we find activities but we make
a conclusion that there is no additional problem here, this is a record
of our official action. Now, if we destroy it, at what point do we get
into a situation of being accused of doing things and then destroying
things to keep from showing what we do? The critical thing is whether
we are able, and we do set up safeguards, where information in our
files is not misused at a later date, and that is what these guideline
committees are all about.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any idea of how many names of
Americans you keep in your files all as a result of the cumulative
effect of all these surveillances in all of these cases?
Mr. ADAMS. No; I don't.
The CHAIRMAN. It's in the millions, isn't it?
Mr. ADAMS. We have 6112 million files.
The CHAIRMAN. You have 6112 million files?
Mr. AnAMS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And there are surely names of more than one person
typically in a file, aren't there?
Mr. ADAMS. But it is a rather large country.
The CHAIRMAN. Thafs a large number of files to start with, and
if you have multiple names in them, you are quickly up into 20, 30,
40 million.
Mr. ADAMS. Right. But many of these files are applicant files. They
are not all subyersive files. They are not all criminal files. We have
a million crimes of violence each year. There is a million people.
The CHAIRMAN. I "'ish you had more time to spend on those crimes
of violence.
Mr. ADAMS. I do, too.
The CHAIRMAN. There we agree.
Mr. ADAMS. Right.
The CHAIRMAN. What I worry about is this. You say there's no way
to know when to close a file. These were surveillance files, originally
opened to determine "'hether organizations might have subversive
connections. There are names in these files, so some demagogue comes
along and says that the name of some public figure is contained in a
102
certain file to be fmmd in the subversive files of the FBI, and there
it is. He has not made a misstatement at all. But to the American
people that man's name and reputation have been scarred.
Mr. ADAMS. And I hope this committee recognizes that and fOC0mmends
legislation that would enforce strong punitive or crimin~l
violations against misuse of information in the files. We feel thIS
way, CIA fee.1s this 'way. We recognize we have a lot of sensitive information
in it. We fire our employees if we find them misusing information.
1Ve feel we need additional sanctions in this area. I don't think
we can ever stop the accumulation of information. I don't know an
investigative agency in the world, a law enforcement agency, that
does not have to accumulate information. And we are working on
guidelines as to how to get rid of the irrelevant information, how to
eliminate material that really does not need to be kept. We hope we
will be able to come to Congress with these guidelines before too long,
which will help address itself to just some of these problems.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, you may be assured that the committee
shares your objective in thIS regard and we will be working with you
and the Department of Justice and others to try and change the laws
to give a greater measure of protection to the first amendment rights
of the American people.
I have no further questions. Are there any other questions?
Senator Mondale?
Senator MONDALE. Mr. Adams, earlier, in inquiring about the basis
for investigating Dr. King, I thought I heard two basic justifications.
One was suspicion and fear of Communist influence or infiltration.
The second was, "that he constituted a threat to the success of the
Negro movement." Did I understand that second basis?
Mr. ADAMS. No. The first I was talking about was not suspicion but
information indicating Communist influence. The second was on this
question of motivation that you have raised. I don't know what their
motive was to get to some of these other activities in order to discredit
and remove him, but it was a question. Apparently they must have
felt that he was a threat to either, as shown in the files the President
and Attorney General expressed concern about the civil rights movement
and his continued affiliation with some of these people.
Senator MONDALE. Would you agree that it would not be a proper
basis for an investigation for the FBI or any other Government official
to be concerned about the success of the negro movement?
Mr. ADAMS. I have no problem.
Senator MONDALE. All right. So let us take the one ground that
appears to have justified the investigation of Dr. King and' the
investigation of the women's liberation movement-the fear that
~'dang-erous influence might infiltrate these organizations." Suppose it
1S true. Suppose that a Communist did have influence over Dr. King,
or suppose an SDS member infiltrated and became a dominant influence
in a chapter of the women's liberation movement and you
established it as a fact. What would you do? Assuming that we can't
get into this harassing and so on, you agree that that no longer has any
validity. What do you have?
Mr. ADAMS. We have potential violations which might arise, which
rarely come to fruition and haven't for many years, but we do have
an intelligence responsibility under the directives from the President
103
and the Attorney General. That is, when a revolutionary group, like
the Communist Party, has taken over control of a domestic group and
the Communist Party is operated by the Soviet Union. -VVe would
furnish that information as we do. Every copy of our reports goes
to the Department of Justice.
Senator MOXDALE. Right; but I just want to use the King case
because, as I understood, he was being investigated for the reason that
it was feared that a Communist or those who were suspected of being
Communists, or known to be Communists, were gaining influence
over him. Suppose you established that. What present use or need is
there for that information?
Mr. ADAMS. I feel that the President, the Attorney General, the
executive branch, needs to know the extent of a foreign-directed
Communist organization, its influence and effect on the United States
of America.
Senator MmmALE. All right; so if such information is valid, and an
investigation to seek it is necessary, is there any limit on the investigative
authority of the FBI?
We have just heard about the women's liberation movement where
we were fearful that New Left, SDS types might have an influence.
That justified that investigation. We now have your statement that
we were fearful that some Communists might have influence over Dr.
King, and therefore, he was thoroughly investigated. Are there any
limits then on who can be investigated?
Mr. ADAMS. Well, the only limits are that we must relate it to a
statutory basis of one of the Presidential guidelines we have or the
criteria we have, which criteria are receiving scrutiny at the present
time by Congress. They have in the past by the Department of Justice,
and this is the area of guidelines. This whole area of domestic scrutiny
is what we need guidelines in.
Senator MONDALE. Right; and you would agree, we talked about this
earlier, that being a Communist is not a crime.
Mr. ADAMS. No, it has not been a crime.
Senator MONDALE. So that the whole basis for this has to apparently
stem from a Presidential directive which you think has tasked you
to do this.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes.
Senator MONDALE. Just a few other points. In 1970, November 6,
1970, a telegram from Newark to the Director went forth proposing
that the following telegram be sent: [Exhibit 31.1J
Word received food donated to party by anti-liberation white pigs contains
poison. Symptoms cramps, diarrhea, severe stomach pains. Destroy all food
donated for convention suspected of poison, however, still required to meet
quota. Signed, Ministry of Information.
This was a telegram that was to be sent from Oakland, Calif., to the
Jersey City, N.J., headquarters. The telegram went on further.
It is suggested that the Bureau then consider having the laboratory treat fruit,
such as oranges with mild laxative-type drug by hypodermic needle or other
appropriate method, and ship fruit as a donation from a fictitious person in
Miami to the Jersey City headquarters.
The answer then from the Director of the FBI-
1 See pp. 440 through 442.
66-077 0 - 76 - 8
104
The Bureau cannot authorize the treating of fruit to be shipped to Jersey City
because of lack of control over the treated fruit in transit. However, Newark's
proposed telegram regarding food collected for the Revolutionary People's Constitutional
Convention llas merit.
How did you ever get to a point like that?
Mr. ADAMS. I don't know. ""Vhat wa::> the response from Newark and
then the final answer taken?
Senator MONDALE. It was turned down because they couldn't control
transit, but they thought it was a good idea. Do you think that's a good
idea?
Mr. ADAMS. No; I don't. I think that--
Senator MONDALE. How did we ever get to the point that this kind of
insane suggestion was considered, a suggestion which violated everyone's
civil liberties and was based on Government-sponsored fraud?
How does anyone ever consider something like that?
Mr. ADAMS. I don't know.
Senator MONDALE. One final point. vYhen we interviewed one of your
former employees, he referred to something I never heard of before
called a no-contact list. He did it jokingly, because he said, when the
Pope agreed to see Martin Luther King, he was sure he would be put on
the no-contact list thereafter. Can you tell me what this list is?
Mr. ADAMS. Not in any specific detail. I know that at one time there
was a, there would be a list that if an agent interviewed an individua!
and this individual created a storm or a ruckus and we didn't want
some other agent stumbling out there and interviewing the same person,
that we would make sure that they were aware of the fact that
further contacts of this individual would result in a problem.
Senator MONDALE. All right. Now in a memo to Clyde Tolson, it
refers to a conference on August 26, 1971, with certain-it looks like
about 10 members of the FBI. And this is what it says: [Exhibit 32.1
]
Pursuant to your instruction, members of the cOlIlference were briefed concerning
recent attempts by various newspapers and reporters to obtain information
about or from FBI personnel. Members were specifically advised that there would
be absolutely no conversations with or answerS' from any of the representatives
of the Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, CBS and NBC.
The only acceptable answer to such inquiries is no comment.
Now Senator Huddleston earlier asked about efforts to influence
newspapers and media outlet. Does a decision not to answer questions
from certain selected media outlets trouble you?
Mr. ADAMS. It is not the policy today. I think this has been aired in
the past. There was a period of time wherein Mr. Hoover, in reacting
to criticism from some of these newspaper men, where he felt he hadn't
been given a fair shake, or for some other reason, that he felt that they
should be told no comment, and he instructed they be told no comment.
The motivations I am not in a position to discuss, but I can tell you
that there has been no such policy in the last several years that
I know of.
Senator MONDALE. If you could submit the no-contact list for us, if
you can find it, I would appreciate it. .
I have some other questions I will submit for the record, Mr.
Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I just have one final follow-up question
on Senator Mondale's interrogation. I continue to be somewhat fas-
1 See p. 443.
105
cinated by how long these investigations go, and "'hen, if ever, they
are stopped. Apparently they never come out of the files, whatever is
found. But Senator Mondale raised the point of a suspicion that in
the Martin Luther King case. that he was getting advice from a person
who had or was thought to have Communist leanings. And so
without using the name, because we are trying to protect privacy as
we conduct this investigation--
~1r. AD,DIS. I think we have a little more problem than that: too,
Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. I am using a Mister X in place of the name. What
I am trying to get at is what the criteria is for pursuing an investigation,
and this is the kind of a statement that leaves me so perplexed.
This has to do with a reply to the New York office by headquarters
here in Washington. The part I read to you is as follows:
The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the Kew York office
that Mr. X is not sympathetic to the party cause. While there may not be any
direct evidence that ~lr. X is a CDmmunist, neither is there any substantial
evidence that he is anti-Communist.
And so the directions are to continue the investigation of this
matter. In cases of this kind, do you pursue the investigation until
you prove the negative?
Mr. ADA~IS. No. I believe in that particular case, if it is the one
I am thinking about. that there was evidence that at one time he had
been a Communist and that there was a question of whether the
office felt-well, it's like we have had some situations where a person
comes out and publicly disavows their former leanings. Do you take
them at words right away after they have been engaged in violent
activities, or do you wait until you determine that they really have
carried through the disavo,ved practice? That's a gray area. This one
seems that on the wording itsel f, would seem like an extreme philosophy,
leaning toward everyone has to prove in the United States they
are not a Communist, and I can assure that is not a policy of the
Bureau and does not fit into the criteria of our general investigative
matters.
I just feel that there is more to it than just that brief paragraph.
The CHAIRMAN. That particular kind of philosophy has come up
in our life from time to time. I remember during the days of McCarthyism
in this country, we carrie very close to the point where
people had to prove that they were not now nor ever been a Communist
in order to establish themselves as patriotic citizens.
Mr. ADAMS. That's right. That's true.
The CHAIRMAN. And when I see standards of this kind or criteria
of this kind emerging, it worries me very much.
I have no further questions. I want to thank you both. If there are
no further questions, I want to thank you both for your testimony
this morning. It bas been very helpful to the committee, and the
committee mIl stand adjourned until 2 p.m.
vVe will stand adjourned in public session. Our next public session
will be 2 :00 tomorrow afternoon for purposes of press questioning on
the assassination report.
nVhereupon, at 1:Oi p.m.. the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 2 :30 p.m.. Thursday, XOYember 20, 19i5.]

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