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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1975
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :10 a.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower presiding.
Present: Senators Tower, Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston,
Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Goldwater, and Schweiker.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O.
Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the
minority.
Senator TOWER. The committee will come to order.
Senator Church, is unavoidably detained today, and therefore I
will preside.
Today and tomorrow we shall continue our examination of domestic
intelligence activities. Our focus should continue to be the activities
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation because of the Bureau's :preeminent
role in domestic law enforcement and intelligence gathenng.
Again I must emphasize the limited scope of the committee's charter,
and therefore, today's inquiry insofar as its impact upon the Bureau.
For exam:ple, in previous sessions we examined the Bureau's use of
mail openmgs, electronic, and other means of surveillance, surreptitious
entry, individual and organizational bank records, income tax
returns, and other sources of intelligence information. .
It is dear that under proper judicial scrutiny, as mandated by the
Congress and the courts, limited invasions of individual privacy involving
any or all of the foregoing could be properly undertaken in
aiding the Bureau's law enforcement commission.
The focus of our inquiry has been and will continue to be the use
of these and other techniques without the sanction of judicial authority,
and for purposes often unrelated to law enforcement, as it has been
traditionally defined in our country. I stress that the mandate of this
committee is to examine the intelligence-gathering activities of governmental
agencies and does not in any way encompass an assessment
of the overall FBI law enforcement effort. We make no attempt
at overall assessment.
\Vith respect to those FBI activities that have come to be known
as domestic intelligence, our inquiry has revealed a further bifurcation
of the Bureau's areas of concern. As previously discussed by the committee's
counsel in our last session, approximately 20 percent of the
Bureau's budget is devoted to intelligence activities. This is divided
between so-called domestic intelligence and counterespionage activities:
( 107)
108
1-Ye have accepted and we support the Bureau's position that a further
budgetary breakdown, detailing precise expenditures for each
category, might adversely affect the national interest by revealing
the exact amount of expenditures for counterespionage. Therefore,
while the nature and extent of these activities is less than precise
from a budgetary standpoint, this inquiry nevertheless represents
a critical area of our investigation.
Testimony and other evidence received by the committee to date
indicate that a variety of techniques, not limited to those just cited,
were employed against individuals and organizations without even
the cover of legislative or judicial authority. The impact of these
abuses on individuals and on legitimate political, social, religious, and
philosophical interests represents a dangerous corrosion of our constitutional
guamntees.
In counsels' survey of this issue during our last session, we examined
a range of activities extending from information ~athering to
disruption of the lives of individuals and organizations. We witnessed
intelligence functions at their admitted worst, and a few of the socalled
Counterintelligence Pro~rams against Dr. Martin Luther Kin~.
Today we turn to an in-depth review of intelligence methods,
through an examination of the Bureau's most widely used technique,
informants. The concept of informing is usually distasteful. However,
the informant technique is a valid and recognized one in the
intelligence field, and often leads to very solid results. Additionally,
the Bureau's use and employment of this technique and its abuse, is
partially due to the absence of clear guidelines concerning intelligence
informants, and the lack of appropriate constitutional guarantees.
The legitimate concern of the FBI in investigating criminal conduct
and preventing criminal activities can never justify an informant's
or law enforcement agent's operating outside of the law,
without regard to the rights of others. When an informant is used to
penetrate an organization to provide intelligence information, the
possible impact of this influence, or his influence on that organization,
cannot be ignored. Surely the infiltration of informants into groups
and organizations who seek to bring about political, socio-economic, or
other changes in our society represents, at the very least, a chilling
effect upon the freedom of citizens to gather and to debate and to
work for such changes.
The fact that an informant, in carrying out his role, may hinder or
alter the advancement of legitimate objectives sought by members of
organizations, is a matter WIth which we must all be concerned.
. F?rthermore, the Bureau's use of informants in large numbers and
I~ CIrcumstances where the propriety of having .an informant is dubIOUS
in the first place. poses an additional item of concern. As I have
already noted, the Bureau's use of the informant is part of the FBI's
catalogue of techniques for carrying out its work.
O~r hearing today will. focus first on the roles actally played by
two mformants, one who mfiltrated the Ku Klux Klan another who
infiltrated Vietnam Veterans Against the War. The other witnesses
from the Bureau are ~ere to discuss the policy considerations pre~
ented by the need for mformants and the proper role of informants
m the FBI's mandated investigative and intelligence functions.
109
The first witnesses today, and will the staff bring them forward,
please and have them seated at the witness table-the first witnes~es
today will be Mary J 0 Cook and Gary Thom~ Ro~e. M~. Rowe wIll
be wearing a hood so that he cannot be physIcally IdentIfied. He believes
that physical identification will be inimical to his personal
safety. He now resides at a location not to be disclosed, under an alias,
which has been given to him by the government. It was at his requ~t
that we allow him to testify today hooded so that he cannot be phySIcally
identified.
Now for some preliminary matters to be entered into the record.
I recognize the chief counsel of the committee, Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Chairman, just before the witnesses, I would
like to put in some general facts. First the chart, which is exhibit 8,1
indicates statistically how absolutely essential the use of informants is
to the Bureau's intelligence activities. Based upon a representative
sample of cases collected this spring by the General Accounting Office,
it was found that in 83 percent of the cases, intelligence cases, informants
were a prime source of information. You can contrast that
with the findings that in only 5 percent of the cases was any form of
electronic surveillance used, and in only 1 percent of the cases were
surreptitious entry or mail openings used. That contrast demonstrates
how absolutely vital to the Bureau's intelligence activities the informant
program is.
The second group of statistics I would like to enter into the record
relates to the number of informants, first, today, and through time
in the past. As of June 30,1975, there were 1,040 domestic intelligence
informants. That is not to include persons who are informants in
connection with criminal matters. That 1,040 can 'be further subdivided
into so-called subversive informants and so-called extremist
informants, the definitions of which were discussed before. In essence,
extremists are persons in the racial area, blacks, Klan, American Indian,
and subversives are everybody else who are pursued in the intelligence
field.
In addition to actual informants, of whom there are 1,040, there
are today 554 potential informants.
In the past these figures have been higher. For example, in 1971
there were, instead of today's 1,040, 1,731 actual informants, and of
course, as we brought out in the hearing 2 weeks ago, there were in the
early seventies up to 7,000 so-called ghetto informants.
The final clarification before hearing from the witnesses is that
in addition to informants, there are, in Bureau terminology, confidential
sources. The difference, as I understand it, between an inf?
rmant and a confidential source is that an informant is paid and
dIrected by the Bureau, whereas a confidential source is not paid and
is either not directed, or directed to a lesser extent.
Some examples in the Bureau manual of confidential sources, specific
examples, are bank officers and telephone company employees.
Obviously there are others, and the numbers of those are great.
I have no further opening statistics, Mr. Chairman.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Schwarz.
1 See p. 367.
110
Ms. Cook and Mr. Rowe, will you rise and be sworn, please?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to give before
this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. ROWE. I do.
Ms. COOK. I do.
Senator TOWER. The witnesses are represented by counsel today.
Would counsels please identify themselves for the record?
Mr. GEERDES. Franklin Geerdes for Mr. Rowe.
Mr. LENCHEK. Allen Lenchek for Ms. Cook. Ms. Cook is also represented
by Ms. Ann Garfinkel.
Senator TOWER. The Chair now recognizes the counsel to the minority
of the committee to pursue a line of questioning.
TESTIMONY OF MARY JO COOK, INFORMANT AGAINST VIETNAM
VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR IN BUFFALO, 1973-74; ACCOMPANIED
BY ALLEN LENCHEK, COUNSEL, AND ANN GARFINKEL,
COUNSEL; AND TESTIMONY OF GARY THOMAS ROWE, INFOR·
MANT AGAINST KU KLUX KLAN IN BIRMINGHAM, ALA., 196065,
ACCOMPANIED BY FRANKLIN GEERDES, COUNSEL
Mr. SMOTHERS. Thank vou.
I will begin the inquIry with examination of Ms. Cook; and Ms.
Cook, if you will, I would like to begin by starting with your first
affiliation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
It is my understn,nding that your contaot began in the summer of
1973. If you could just briefly, for the committee, explain how that
contact came about.
Ms. COOK. Yes. I was living with a man who was working for the
Bureau and had been working for the Bureau for about a couple of
months as an informant. He asked me-I observed his activities, we
discussed his activities, and then he subsequently asked me if I would
consider becoming an informant.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Which group was he informing for?
Ms. COOK. He was informing for the FBI.
Mr. SMOTHERS. And on whom was he informing?
Ms. COOK. The Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Winter Soldiers
Organization (VVAW- WSO).
He took me to a meeting. After we returned from the mooting, we
discussed in more detail how he felt about being an informant, what
he did, why he did it; and when I said that I would be open to talking
about being an informant with the FBI, he set up a meeting, and then
the FBI came to my house to discuss it with me.
Mr. SMOTHERS. An agent came to visit you to discuss your becoming
an informant?
M~. COOK. Yes.
Mr. SMOTHERS. What was the nature of that discussion?
What were you asked to do, if anything?
Ms. COOK. The major understanding that I got from the meeting
was that VVA1V-1VSO was an organization primarily of veterans
who were possible victims of manipulation. They had been through
the Vietnam war. They had legitimate readjustment needs, and the
III
Bureau was afraid that they could become violent or could become
manipulated in a cause or social concern, and they wanted me to go in
there and participate in the organization and make sure that the veterans
didn't get ripped off.
So I ~was to be, you know-they used ,vords like, "be a voice of
reason, be a big sister, be sort of a guiding force in the organization
and keep things calm, cool, and collected." That sounded like a
legitimate thing to do, so I agreed to work for the FBI.
Mr. SMOTHERS. In addition to maintaining reason and keeping things
calm and cool, what other functions were you assigned by the FBI?
Ms. COOK. Well this whole scenario that was presented was called
being an informant, so I was to go to meetings, write up reports or
phone in reports on what happened, who was there, in some way to
try to totally identify the background of every person there, what
their relationships were, who they were living with, who they were
sleeping with, to try to get some sense of the local structure and the
local relationships among the people in the organization.
So I'd go to a meeting, identify the people who were present and
identify them as indi viduals, and then identify the substance of the
meeting.
Mr. SMOTHERS. You identified the attendees by name?
Ms. COOK. Yes; or by physical description if I didn't know the name.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you identify friends of persons who were associated
with the organization?
Ms. COOK. Yes; I did.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you provide information on these persons'
places of employment?
Ms. CoOK. Yes; I did.
Mr. SMOTHERS. And you said you provided information on their
personal relationships.
Ms. COOK. Yes; I did.
Mr. SMOTHERS. How did you come to gain this kind of information'~
Ms. COOK. Much of it would be initially, it would be gathered at a
meeting. People would joke and in personal conversations they would
drop information about themselves. As I got to know them as personal
friends later, then much more information-I had access to much
more information.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you report back to the Bureau all the information
gained '?
Ms. COOK. No; I did not report back to the Bureau all information
gained. Initially when I worked for the Bureau, I did. I had little
say; I was alien to the situation. They said "go into this," so I had no
way of really knowing what was important and what wasn't important,
so in a sense I was a vacuum cleaner :for information, just
gathering it. And as I became more familiar with the context within
which I was working, I was able to make decisions about what was important
information and what was not.
Mr. SMOTHERS. vVas this on your initiative, or were you given guidance
as to what to exclude?
Ms. COOK. This was on my own initiative.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you report information on the political views of
these persons?
Ms. COOK. Yes; I did.
112
Mr. SMOTHERS. Ms. Cook, how many people were involved in this
reporting process? How many people did you report on ~
Ms. COOK. I figured that there were about 50 core people in the organization
in the local chapter in Buffalo, and if you look at it in concentric
circles, there were perhaps 250 people in the Buffalo community
whose names I identified as being leadership one way 01' the
other in the social issues that they were active in, and then perhaps
400 people nationally when you take a look at the national VVAW'
VSO and all the organizations that I came into contact with, and
then when you add to that the mailing lists that I turned over and the
names that came into my hands as being active or interested members
of VVAW- WSO, that may be as many as 1,000 names.
Mr. SMOTHERS. With respect to the value of what you have given
the Bureau, was there any formal process of identifying what was
important, as opposed to the trivia or end result of your communications?
Ms. COOK. Could you repeat the question?
Mr. SMOTHERS. What I'm really asking is what system, if any, was
communicated to you regarding the importance of certain kinds of
information? Was it determined on the basis of some guidance by the
Bureau? Was it determined based on the amount of information you
got ~ Was there any way that was described to you as to what was
Important ~
Ms. COOK. OK. Beyond the general guidelines, identifying people
who were present and being aware of people with a propens~ty for
violence, there were no guidelines as to what information was Important
or wasn't important. My financial arrangement with them was
on the basis that I would turn over all information gathered. They
would think it over; they would decide what was of value to them
and what wasn't of value to them and pay me accordingly, but not
necessarily identifying what they considered essential. They rarely
gave me information. They didn't define my context and then ask me
to go into it. They just said, "We want you to go in there. We're not
going to tell you anything about it. You figure it out."
I figured that was fair.
Mr. SMOTHERS. And your pay was based on the Bureau's assessment
of the value of the information which you turned over?
Ms. CooK. Yes.
Mr, SMOTHERS. How long were you involved in the effort of informing
against the Veterans Against the War?
Ms. COOK. From June 1973 through November 1974. That's approximately
11;2 years.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Did there come a time when you were either dissatisfied
with or raised questions about your 'activities as an informant?
Ms. COOK. Yes.
Mr. SMOTHERS. When did this occur?
Ms. COOK. This occurred very, very much 80 after July of 1974. I
had come here to Washington, attended the only large demonstration
I've ever been in. The Bureau had asked me not to go. It advised me
not to go. I came and I saw people, people I had met in the course of
my activities. with blood running down their heads.
I came back from ·Washington nrv upset and I started talking with
the FBI about all of the contradictions that I was starting to see. I
" .
113
didn't understand what my involvement was any more. So I started
asking them: "I don't see the reason for my continuance. It seems to
me that you don't understand what I'm telling you. These people
don't need me functioning in their midst, and if you can't give me assurances
that the information that I'm giving you which you seem
to strip the context away from isn't going to be used against these
people, then I cannot continue." And they couldn't. They tried to give
me assurances. They brought someone from Washington to talk to
me and he talked to me in humanist philosophical terms about why
I should continue and about how everything was fine and good, but I
was very dissatisfied with those conversations and I insisted on quitting.
I gave them a month's notice and I quit.
~1r. S::\-IOTHERS. This person from Washington who talked to you
in philosophical terms, do yon recall the substance of that conversation?
In his efforts to get you to remain as an informant, what kinds
of reasons were advanced ~
Ms. COOK. Mostly they were trying to assure me that the FBI was
part of-our conversations were really far-ranging. 'Ve discussed all
sorts of social issues, from poverty to the space program to ecology.
They tried to assure me that things were going fine, that the status quo
was really fine.
I was Involved with a group of people who had really bad, really
desperate needs as veterans, who didn't have social programs that were
sufficient for them. I was also involved in welfare rights and I was constantly
meeting people who lived with a degree of poverty that provoked
them and irritated and frustrated them, and they turned to sel£help
programs.
So here I have on one hand a man telling me that things are fine and
that my work for the Bureau is part of making sure that dissidentsthey
had no sympathy for the poverty and the consequences of that
poverty that I was viewing firsthand and living with day to day.
So that we were really very much miles apart in our discussions
about what was fine and what was not fine in America. And they could
not give me any assurances that this information ·would not be used
against people. I could no longer trust that their interest in these people-
they were just not sensitlve to what the real needs of these people
were.
Mr. SMOTHERS. And wasn't it shortly after this that your role as an
informant was terminated, that you indicated that you no longer
desired to work in this capacity?
Ms. COOK. Yes.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Let me just raise one final area of inquiry with you.
In our previous discussion. you indicated that there came a time
when you had become involved in the Attica Defense Project, representing
the Vietnam Veterans Against the 'Val'. And as a part of that
you had become involved in things like the jury survey effort. My
question is, did you communicate to the Bureau any of your efforts in
this regard as they related to the Attica Defense Effort ?
Ms. COOK. Yes, I did. I was put in the position, I was told not to
bring to the FBI's attention any information that legally they
shouldn't have. But I'm not a lawyer and most average citizens cannot
~ak~ decisions about what is legally significant and what is not legally
SIgnIficant. There are many instances where I passed information
114
thinking that I could legitimately pass that information, and I now
understand that that information-legally the FBI should not have
had that information, and I feel badly about that, but I also know that
I was put in the kind of position where I was required to make professional
decisions and I could not make a professional decision.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Ms. Cook, did the information passed include corre·
spondence between you and Attica defendants?
Ms. COOK. Yes.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my examination of
the witness at this point. I would like tQ put into the record at the
witness' request, the ,vitness' statement, four pages, dated today's date,
and that will be a part of the record of these proceedings.
Senator TOWER. 'Vithout objection, it is so ordered.
[The statement of ~Iary Jo Cook follows:]
STATEMENT OF ~IARY Jo COOK
In June 1973, I agreed to work in a program for veterans. A flexible apprenticeship
in social work developed that finally paid, from month to month, as much
as my 1972 State University teaching fellowship. As the first-born in a family of
fourteen people, a "big sister" program appealed to me. The outline of the job
included evaluating emotional stabi\ilty, rationally defusing hair-brained
schemes, and protecting potential victims of manipulation. ~Iy assignment was
Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization (YVAW/
WSO), the Buffalo chapter.
I became an informer not fully realizing what that meant. In 1975, I feel
bitterly the mockery that has been made of my values and the idealistic oommitment
I made. A 1984 female Big Brother is a monstrous violation of my
identity as a sister.
Being an informant was a serious exploitation of my familial identity. I grew
up in a very large and very Catholic family. I am a big sister to my eight brothers
and three sisters. A big sister sets an example, assumes adult responsibility at an
early age, and is allowed the freedom and duty of constructive criticism. I was
trained to 'be a leader >both in my community and in my home. This was a colleetive
decision which met the needs of my family and tried not to 'be insensitive to
my needs as a person. In my family, being a sister is a serious'and loving commitment
to other human beings. I made this commitment to VVAW/WSO unaware
that the FBI had no intentions of honoring it.
The more I understood 'and defined VVAW/WSO as a process, the more I became
aware that the FBI's response to this process was inimical. The picture
painted for me by the FBI of a group of "crazies" was replaced by my experience
of VVAWjWSO as an extended family, a community of people engaged demo·
cratically in a self-help program. I became confused and then alarmed that a
real involvement in the democratic process was not regarded as a positive thing.
I resigned from the FBI in November 1974 certain that VVAW/WSO was a
legitimate and valid organization. This resignation was a matter of moral prinCiples
and patriotic duty.
Perhaps the most exciting thing about VVA,,-/WSO as an organization was
that it gave people a real feel for democracy. It was a pl'ace where people developed
their ideas by putting them into practice. Your voice, your vote and
your hands made a difference as you sought with others to find new and better
ways of solving problems. 'I'his process was a bulwark against violence, the
legacy to which the nation in its silence has abandoned veterans.
Veterans have always been a group with special needs; for those needs there
should be programs. If the self-interest of the individual and the mutual interest
of a community have a meeting point, then a program is both possible and necessary.
A pmgram is a volunteer acotivity ; only input fmm ve'terans can determine
the exact nature of the readjustment needs at this time. The speel'al program
that I worked in did not concern itself with the consent of the participants; it
was a secret program for their own good. But the fact that Big Brother was
keeping a eye on things did not result in more cOTI{~rete programs based on reoal
needs. 'rhe program was itself a rpcognition of special needs and a refusal to
search for answers, because real programs are too costly an investment in some115
thing as unpredictable and fragile as a human being. The idea was to contain
the problem, not solve it.
Containment is certainly less embarrassing than programs which would become
an open forum on military conduct in Vietnam, If such programs do not
take place, then both the American people and the veterans that have served them
will suffer, one from ignorance, and the other from isolation.
The Vietnam \'eterans that I know are interested in changes in the militur)',
changes in their communities, and special programs for those among themselves
who need help in rebUilding a life that is honestly worth living. )Iy father's readjustment
as a veteran who had not seen combat, but had lived through tIle
depression hand-to-mouth, was accomplished because he believed that his hard
work in the pursuit of happiness would be fruitful. My father's vision and
experience of America was exciting, and his children grew up believing that
America was a magic land in which all good things were possible, For Vietnam
veterans, vision and experience have also united; the nightmare that began for
them halfway around the world is found deeply rooted at home.
The nightmare that many veterans weave of the American Dream is aver)'
intense part of their experience as Americans. In a ~enocidal war which
deprived them of heroism with honor, they came to grips with the inherent
fascism of a war of containment which would subject a civilian populace of
color to years of death and terror-all in the name of democracy. It is our
national dishonor that democracy can inspire death, but not the average citizen
to vote with an educated interest.
Senator TOWER. Gentlemen, I would remind you that we operate
under the 5-minute rule for questioning of these two witnesses and
the Chair recognizes Senator Hart. If you will suspend, Senator Hart,
I think we will go ahead and hear from Mr. Rowe, and then proceed
with the Senator's questions.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Rowe, were you an informant in the Klan?
Mr. ROWE. Yes; I was.
Mr. SCHWARZ. From when to when?
Mr. ROWE. From approximately 1959 to 1965.
)11'. SCHWARZ. In 1955 did you surface in connection with a murdercase?
Mr. ROWE. Yes; I did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. "Vhose murder and what role did you play in that
~ase?
Mr. ROWE. I was in the automobile the evening that Mrs. Viola
1.iuzzo was killed by a Klansman.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And this was the situation in connection with the
Selma march where a woman from Detroit was killed while she was
riding in a car after the march?
Mr. ROWE. Correct.
Mr. SCIIWARZ. And you surfaced and testified at pretrial which
ultimately resulted in the conviction of the persons who had committed
that murder.
Is that right?
)11'. ROWE. That is correct, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now I want to go back, ~Ir. Rowe, to how you came
to that point and what you did as an informant before performing
that service. Had you ser·w.d in the Government prior to being a Klan
informer, in military service ~
)Ir. ROWE. Yes. •
Mr. SCHWARZ. You had been a marine?
Mr. ROWE. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Howald were vou when YOU became a marine?
~lr. ROWE. I joined the ~ral'in(' Reserves at 141'2 years of age.
116
Mr. SCHWARZ. And the FBI recruited you to infiltrate the Klan?
Is that right '?
Mr. ROWE. That is correct, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. \Vhat kind of information did you report back to
the FBI about the Klan?
. Mr. ROWE. Any and everything that I observed or heard pertainmg
to any Klansmen.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now did that include information relating to Klan
planned violence or actual violence?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did it also include information relating to political
matters?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. What is an example of that?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, an example of that is that we had a former FBI
agent running for mayor of Birmingham. I was instructed to attend
meetings, observe who was there, whether the people were Republicans
or Democrats, as I could best describe them and give their names,
and if they were in fact acti ve political people.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now in addition to reporting back political information
relating to violence, did you report back information relating to
the social life of the members of the Klan?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, I did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Including the most intimate details of their social
life, their personal life ?
Mr. ROWE. That's what I was instructed to do, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You were instructed to do that by the Bureau and
you did that?
Mr. ROWE. That is correct, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you also go to meetings of civil rights organizations
and report back what was being said at those meetings?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, I did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you report the same information to the Bureau
and to the Klan about the civil rights organizations?
Mr. ROWE. Basically the same information, yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You were a member of something called the KBI,
or the Klan Bureau of Investigation. Is that right?
Mr. ROWE. That's correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. So you were, in effect, informing on the civil rights
organizations to both the Bureau and the Klan?
Mr. ROWE. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Turning to the subject of violence, what instructions,
if any, were you given at the outset of your employment by the FBI
with respect to participation in violent activity?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, I was instruoted under no conditions should I participate
in any violence whatsoever.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now did those instructions subsequently chan~e ?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, they did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Describe the change, will you, please?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, I was contacted by my contact a~ent and he stated
to me, he says, "I know there's a lot of crap going on that you aren't
reportin~." He says, "I know what's happening. I don't understand
why you don't see it." I said, "'Well, it isn't happening in the open
117
meetings. I can tell you that. I give you every night It written report
of our meetings." And I said, "There's absolutely nothing pertaining
to violence discussed in these open meetings. However, I see a group
that stayed after the meeting's over. I see a certain group remaming,
and they don't come out when we do."
The agent stated that I should try to get closer to members of this
certain group and find out who they were and try to get closer to
them.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you do that?
Mr. ROWE. Yes; I did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And then did you begin to participate yourself in
the violent acts?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, I did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And did you tell the FBI that you would participate
in violent acts ?
Mr. ROWE. Before I participated in the acts, yes; I did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. What were some of the acts that you participated
in, the violent acts ?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, the major one was the Birmingham Freedom Ride.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I'll come to that in a moment, but did you also
paI'ticipate in acts of beating people with chains at a county fair?
Mr. ROWE. Yes. There was a county fair in Alabama and I personally
gave the FBI several days' notice,a good week notice, that
this was going to occur. My instructions were to hang in, to go and
see what happened.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did the FBI ever tell you when you went to these
violent events that you should stand back and not participate, or
did they say you were on your own and do whatever you think is
necessary?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, they said, "We have to by law instruct you that you
are not to participate in any violence. However, I know you have to
do this. vVe know it's something that you have to do and we understand
it, and we need the information. That's the important thing:
get the information."
Mr. SCHWARZ. To get the information was it necessary, in your
judgment, to participate in the violent acts themselves?
Mr. ROWE. Some of the information, I think, yes, and some of it I
would say, no, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. In connection with the Freedom Riders incident
that you mentioned, did you inform the FBI about planned violence
prior to that incident?
Mr. ROWE. I gave the FBI information pertaining to the Freedom
Riders approximately 3 weeks before it happened.
Mr. SCHWARZ. What did you tell them '?
Mr. ROWE. I stated to him I had been contacted by a Birmingham
city detective who in turn wanted me to meet with a high ranking
officer of the Birmingham Police Department to have a reception for
the Freedom Riders.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You mean the Birmingham policemen set up the
meeting- of the Freedom Riders and you told the FBI that?
Mr. ROWE. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And then they were beaten?
Mr. ROWE. They were beaten very badly, yes.
118
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did the Birmingham police give you the time that
they promised to give you, to perform the beating?
Mr. ROWE. We were promised 15 minutes with absolutely no intervention
from any police officer whatsoever. The information was
passed on to the Bureau. 1Ve had our 15 minutes. Approximately H;
minutes after the Freedom Riders were attacked, a police officer ran
over to me and stated, "Godammit, godammit, get out of there. Get
'em out of here. Your 15 minutes are up and we're sending the crew."
Mr. SCHAWRZ. In that fight did you have your neck cut?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir, my throat was cut very severely.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Were any arrests made?
Mr. ROWE. Absolutely none, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you ever ask the Bureau why no arrest was
made?
Mr. ROWE. Yes. As a matter of fact, I quit very shortly after working
of the Freedom Riders, right up and own city hall. You could
wasn't something done?" There were 1,000 men at least on that morning
of the Freedom Riders, right up and down city hall. You would
look over from the bus station and see city hall and· you would see
as many as 100 police officers walking. They couldn't help but see us.
We had baseball bats, we had clubs, we had chains, we had pistols
sticking out of our belts. It was just unbelievable. Not one officer in
the Birmingham Police Department asked us what was going on.
Mr. SCHWARZ. But that was the problem with the Birmingham
Police Department. What about the FBI? Did you ever discuss with
them why they didn't do anything?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir. I was told by the FBI-they said: "Well, who
the hell are we going to report it to? The police department was involved
in it. The police department helped set it up. We are an investigating
agency, not an enforcement agency. All we do is gather information."
Thas was my answer.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now sometime after that were you told that the FBI
had declared war on the Klan, and given the name of something called
COINTELPRO.
Mr. ROWE. That is corred, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And what were you told to do under the COINTEL
PRO?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, under COINTELPRO I had been instructed to disrupt,
discredit, or disorganize that organization, to the best of my
knowledge.
Mr. SCHWARZ. What did you do in that connection?
Mr. ROWE. I was instructed to give information if I found out who
was sleeping with who, if someone was sleeping with another Klansman's
wife. I was trying to pass the word around to the different people
so as to cause dissension in their homes, try to break up their
homes. I was also instructed to attend church services in the regular
church services and see if any political activities were going on, or
mention the church services as opposed to the Klan meetings. Many
Klan meetings were held in ehurches.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You were also instructed personally yourself to attempt
to break up marriages by sleeping with wives of members of
the Klan?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, I was. My instructions were to try to sleep with as
many wives as I could. That's probably the best information we could
gather.
119
Mr. SCHWARZ. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman, except that thereafter
you did help solve the Liuzzo murder by providing information
to the FBI as to the solution of that crime?
Mr. RowE. Yes; I did pass information.
Senator TOWER. Senator Hart?
Senator HART of Michigan. I'd better confess that when you were
inside the Klan, I was one among many who had praise of Mr. Hoover
and the Bureau because they seemed to know every Communist ?ell
and half a dozen agents, and why weren't they doing the same thmg
about the Klan?
Now in their defense, my notion was that they would have somebody
in a crowd in order to be able to report planned violence, and
as a result, prevent the violence which was occurring. I was too dumb
to realize that your presence in there did not prevent violence, and
indeed, maybe contributed to it.
Ms. Cook, as I get it, you concluded that the aims of this Buffalo
chapter of Vietnam Veterans Against the War had as its aim the ending
of our involvement in Vietnam?
Ms. COOK. Yes.
Senator HART of Michigan. Amnesty for resistors, upgrading cer·
tain military discharges, and getting better health care and drug treatment
for Vietnam veterans. Is that right?
Ms. COOK. Yes, that's right.
Senator HART of Michigan. Did you ever see, and if you did, did
you ever report to the Bureau, any activities or efforts by that chapter
or other Vietnam veterans to overthrow or destroy our Government
by force or violence?
Ms. COOK. No, sir.
Senator HART of Michigan. And you said that as a lay person you
were not ina position to judge what information appropriately could
be passed on to the FBI, and as a result you passed on whatever and
all that you got, leaving it up to the Bureau to make the judgment as
to what was and wasn't appropriate?
Ms. COOK. Yes, sir.
Senator HART of Michigan. Did anyone ever indicate that they only
wanted information about violence, or the threat of violence ?
Ms. COOK. Did anyone ever indicate that they only wanted information
-about violence?
Senator HART of Michigan. Yes.
Ms. COOK. No. Violence was definitely the priority, but they would
never say, "only gather information about violence."
Senator HART of Michigan. And in the period of a year, or a year
and a half in your service as an informant, you provided the Bureau
with about 1,000 names of various members?
Ms. COOK. That's my estimate.
Senator HART of Michigan. During this period in which you were
an informant, did you also report on groups and individuals outside
the Vietnam Veterans, such as other peace groups or individuals-not
members of Veterans Against the "Val', but individuals who were
opposed to the war-with whom you came into contact because they
were cooperating with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War in
connection with protest demonstrations and petitions?
66-077 0 - 76 - 9
120
Ms. COOK. There were a lot of groups that were very sympathetic
to the aims of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Winter Soldier
Organization. So that I ended up reporting on groups like the United
Church of Christ, the American Civil Liberties Union, lawyers-the
National Lawyers Guild, and liberal church organizations. Many
groups went into coalition with Vietnam Veterans Against the War.
Those people were reported on as part of the normal course of my
v>'ark.
Senator HART of Michigan. So as the expression goes, you were
looking out, not just inward, at the veterans. You were looking outward,
and included in that estimate of 1,000 names were some of those
names, individuals associated with these outside groups who were
associated in concert with the effort to end the wad
Ms. COOK. Yes. If I understand the question correctly, yes.
Senator HART of Michigan. Let me make it clear. You mentioned
the ACLU and clergy groups and so on associated with the efforts to
end the war. 'Were some of the 1,000 names that you submitted to the
Bureau members of those other groups, the ACLU and clergymen ~
Ms. COOK. Yes.
Senator TOWER. Senator Goldwater ~
Senator GOLDWATER. Yes, Ms. Cook. I think the answer you gave to
Senator Hart's last question might be the answer I'm seeking. Yon
turned in information on about 1,000 names. How many of those did
you identify as actual veterans?
Ms. COOK. I had a running proportional estimate of how many
veterans there were per chapter or per meeting that I would go to.
It's easy to identify when the subject is veterans' concerns, how many
people are veterans. But as to estimating how many of those thousand,
that ballpark figure of veterans themselves, I would say probably under
50 percent. Perhaps 35 to 40 percent might be veterans, but that's
off the top of my head.
Senator GOLDWATER. During the meetings that you attended, was
there any discussion of how the group was financed ~
Ms. COOK. Yes. There would be financial reports given as the normal
course of the general membership meeting. All finances came as donations
from the individuals involved out of their paychecks, and that
information was something that the FBI wanted. They wanted to
know if there was any foreign money coming into the organization
and there was no evidence whatsoever of foreign money.
Senator GOLDWATER. No evidence of money coming from other organizations
like the ACLU and so forth ~
Ms. COOK. The only time I ever heard of any money coming into the
organization from an outside source was that I understood that back
before I joined the organization in 1973, that there were some liberal
movie stars or organizations that donated money for either discharge
and upgrading projects or something along that line. There was one
detail like that that I heard as part of a speech at an April 1974 meeting,
but the context of that remark was that all funding from other
American sources had ended because money was drying up rapidly,
so that the organization had to fund itself very definitely out of the
pockets of its membership.
Senator GOLDWATER. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator TOWER. Senator Mondale.
121
Senator MONDALE. }\Is. Cook, you indicated that you would be paid
by thB FBI based upon their evaluation of the value of the information
that you submitted.
Ms. COOK. Yes.
Senator MONDALE. Approximately how much money did you receive
from the FBI during that period in which you informed ~
Ms. COOK. Approximately $300 a month, which is the same amount
of money that I received from a teaching fellowship at the university.
I understood that that was-$300 was the limit for a category, for
my category of informant.
Senator MONDALE. ·What was your category ~
Ms. COOK. They told me I existed in a category but they never defined
what that was.
Senator MONDALE. Approximately how much did you receive totally
from the FBI?
Ms. COOK. I would think totally I received something like $5,000
during the time that I worked for them. I think that's a good approximate
figure.
Senator MONDALE. Can you tell from how you were paid what kinds
of information were preferred ~ .
Ms. COOK. I could tell sometimes. Like, for instance, when I was
attempting to become a full-time operator and only on 'a partial basis
for the FBI, I quickly learned that by moving away from the community
of VVAW- WSO, to do support work, that I would be paid less,
and that that information was considered less significant.
There was one point in the summer where I attempted to stay on
the committee that did political defense work to work ona local welfare
fraud case. That summer, that month, I got paid less money, so I
had to go back doing the 'active Attica work to in fact get the full
amount of money.
Senator MONDALE. So when ,they made this contact with you and
asked you to help guide the Vietnam Veterans Against the War into a
sort of peaceful way,as well as informing, when you did try to participate
in that way, you received very l~tt1e. When you informed, you
received up to your quota.
Ms. COOK. You can't really separate them off. There was no way
that-like one of the things I was supposed to do was go to as many
regional and national meetmgs as possible to be able to get a good sense
of how the local chapter fit into the national context of the national
organization. You went to such mootingsas an elected representative.
It was a very democratic process, so that there was no way that I could
go to the national meeting and fulfill the request of the FBI to go to
regional or national meetings without actually becoming part of the
elected leadership of the chapter.
Senator MaNDALE. But did they pay your expenses ~
Ms. COOK. They would pay my expenses.
Senator MONDALE. ·Was that over the $300 ~
Ms. COOK. I would think the actual limit was $325, so the expenses
would have to fit within the $325.
Senator ~fOXDALE. Did I hear you say that you were attempting at
one time to be taken on full-time?
Ms. COOK. At one time earlier when I was first approached I did.
Senator MONDALE. But you wanted to be full-time?
122
Ms. COOK. I preferred working-it was more exciting working as an
informant than working as a teller in a bank, yes. I was working as a
teller in a bank, and I found working as an informant a much more
satisfying lifestyle and involvement than working as a teller in a bank.
Senator MONDALE. But you couldn't do that on $300 a month?
Ms. COOK. I'm personally bankrupt, so no, you can't do it on $300
a month. I'm in debt up to my ears.
Senator MONDALE. But I thought you said earlier you were trying
to get into some kind of full-time, permanent status from the FBI.
Ms. COOK. I preferred working for them. I had a teaching fellowship
in 1972 with the State University of New York, and I taught
composition and attended graduate school there.
That was the amount they paid to graduate students, $300 a month.
You are expected to live on that. I thought I could live on that. As
inflation kept going, I found that I could not live on that. But most
graduate students are expected to live on $300 a month.
Senator MONDALE. Were there other informants whom you were
aware of?
Ms. COOK. The man that I had been living with was an informant.
Senator MONDALE. Did he inform on the veterans?
Ms. COOK. Partially. He had connections with the veterans club on
the campus who had many members of VVAW-WSO hut he gradually
moved into different areas.
Senator MONDALE. Were there other informants in this veterans
group of whom you were aware?
Ms. COOK. No.
Senator MONDALE. Were they aware at all or suspicious of you, that
you might be an informant at these meetings ?
Ms. COOK. They constantly talked about harassment, feeling that,
you know, some of their mail had been opened. They thought that
they were being followed, that their lines were being tapped.
The FBI occasionally would go to people and talk to them, talk
to their employer. One man that happened to work at a place where
the FBI met was fired 3 weeks after I told the FBI that he had to
change our meeting place because it wasn't secure.
Could you restate your question?
Senator MONDALE. I was just wondering to what extent they were
suspicious that there might be informers around, and what effect that
may have had on their activities.
Ms. COOK. They were generally suspicious, they were generally
worried. But they didn't ever indicate that they thought that I was an
informant, and I never told them I was an informant, and when I
finally did tell them I was an informant, they were almost in a state
of shock. There was a kind of confusion.
I was a trusted person. I was someone who had developed, you
know, pretty human relationships with them, and I was a friend. They
considered me a friend and I quit the FBI because I became a friend
and had come to like those people very much.
Senator TOWER. Senator Schweiked
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Cook, what kind of information did the FBI pay the most for?
In other words, since it was some kind of a scale of value, what was
worth the most to them, what kind of information?
123
Ms. COOK. I can only make general conclusions about that. I know
that the work that I did in political defense earned me a full-time living,
and that that work in political defense was fully within my
participation in VVAW-WSO as an organization. But beyond trying
to pinpoint the exact information, it was more or less-all I can say
is it was political information and I would never be able to tell if
information given by the individuals was particularly significant to
them because they would never tell me something like that.
Senator SCHWEIKER. When you were working as an informant, and
would work with groups or people that interacted with the Vietnam
Veterans Against the War who weren't members of that specific
group, such as some of the church groups that you mentioned, were
you to report on their activities and political views as well as people
in the outside groups that interacted with the VVAW or not?
Ms. COOK. If they were agreeing to work with VVAW-WSO on a
common project, then the kind of positions and the way in which they
would vote on a particular issue would be very relevant.
Senator SCHWEIKER. So if the United Church of Christ were to
agree to a joint project of some kind or work with them, then they
would be fair game too ?
Ms. COOK. The United Church of Christ's position on unconditional
amnesty was of interest to the FBI, ;yes.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Mr. Rowe, III your job, were you to determine
and report on the positions on the issues of candidates for public
office? Was it part of your job or part of the information that you
supplied to include where candidates for political office stood on
issues ?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, that is correct. I was instructed to do this, and I
did do it.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Was this a matter of all the positions that
candidates took or just positions that relate to civil rights? :~
How would you define the kind of information that they were
interested in on political candidates?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, I was instructed to obtain information of any
description that I could report. I had no boundary line. I was
instructed to cover and monitor everything. .
Senator SCHWEIKER. On a political candidate? All of his views?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator SCHWEIKER. In previous questioning, you have cited one
or two cases where you had warned that violence was about to occur
and nothing was done, and you felt that something should have been
done. Were there other instances where you knew from what you
had heard or told the FBI that violence was about to occur, and
that you were trying to not only inform them, but warn them to seek
to prevent it in some way? Were there other instances besides the one
or two you mentioned?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir, there were several of them.
Senator SCHWEIKER. In view of that, what did you feel their purpose
was in terms of violence? In other words, what do you infer from
the fact they let the violence proceed anyway? What really was their
objective, as you saw it?
124
Mr. ROWE. Sir, that's a question that's very difficult for me to
answer because I really don't know at this time. I had that question
myself and I asked that question but all my reply was I was serving
my country well and it was information that had to be obtained or
they wouldn't be there.
That was my reply to that.
I think that myself, I have the greatest respect for the field agents
in the FBI. I think that the problems that you're trying to find out
and I'm trying to help you with come up from higher echelons.
I think that they were just telling me something that someone else
told them to do. I think they were SImply following instructions.
Senator SCHWEIKER. On the matter of intervening before violent
activities, did you feel that what you reported pretty well went on up
the chain of command, that it did not just stop with your contact officer?
Did you get the feeling that it went pretty well up into the
hierarchy in terms of that policy?
Mr. ROWE. Certainly. Up until yesterday I had no way of knowing.
I briefly saw several reports that I had turned in through the years
indicating that they did in fact get back here to Washington in ample
time to have these things stopped, and apparently nothing was done
about them.
Senator SCHWEIKER. So it raised the question, and I gathered this is
part of the reason that you decided to not continue your activities, of
what the real purpose of your activity was when you saw violence that
might have been prevented by some kind of action by someone in the
Department. When it wasn't done, you felt that actually violence and
stopping violence really wasn't part of the function that you were
engaged in, even though that's what you thought you were engaged
in. Is that about right?
Mr. ROWE. That's basically the answer, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you think that informants, if used properly,
can prevent violence, if people want to prevent violence? In other
words, given what you know now, would it be possible to prevent
violence if the policies of the FBI would be toward preventing
violence?
Mr. RowE. Sir, if I may explain to you, I obtained the name of a
preacher during my 5 years in the Klan organization because I would
see things that I felt they were fixing to go on and I would say, "come
on, it's not worth the hassle. We can do it another time. Don't get
involved because we're going to blow the damn thing open," and all
this type of information.
I was just simply trying to deter these things. I had met with some
of the higher echelons of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department,
the Birmmgham Police Department, and movements of violence with
2, 3, several days' notice, and I was just concerned. I would say, "look,
you really think this is the answed" And they would say, "this is what
we need to get done. We've gOlt to stop this right now. American pe0ple
have to keep these people out of here."
Senator SCHWEIKER. I just have one quick question. As I understand
it, because you were with the Klan and wanted to keep people in the
Klan, the Birmingham Police Department gave you complete access
to the intelligence files of the police department. You were pretty
well allowed to see what you needed to see to promote the Klan's
activities by the Birmingham Police Department. Is that corroot?
125
Mr. ROWE. That is correct, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Senator TOWER. Senator Huddleston.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Cook, what instructions were you given by the FBI relative to
the secrecy of your mission as to how you were supposed to keep from
the public or other individuals that you were in faot an informant ~
Ms. COOK. I think I 'was generally instructed that I was not to tell
anybody. I didn't take it that seriously because I went home and I told
my eleven brothers and sisters, I told my parents, and I told a few girl
friends. I did not tell anyone in the political organization that I
infiltrated.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But that would have been a violation of instructions
you received ~
Ms. CooK. I was told that the reason for me to remain in secret, the
reason why I was supposed to keep my work secret, was for my own
protootion. I didn't see that telling my family about the work that I
was doing for the FBI was going to be any violation of my protection
or any danger to me.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Would that same attitude have prevailed during
discussions between your friend and yourself about his involvement
as an informant, assuming that he had the same instructions ~
Ms. COOK. You mean did our instructions mean that we shouldn't
mutually discuss our work?
Senator HUDDLESTON. Right. Or his work prior to your becoming
an informant. You apparently discussed your friend's role, which led
you to become an informant.
Ms. COOK. I suppose he shouldn't have discussed it with me except
that he trained me. He constantly talked with me about the activity, the
work that I was doing, what his perspective was on it, and then we
came to really severely disagree wbout what we were supposed to be
doing.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, you indicated that you became quite disenchanted
with your role after your Washington experience. Prior to
that instance in Washington, had any of the information that you
had furnished the FBI been of such a nature that would have led
them to belie~that there would !be violence at that particular demonstration?
Ms. COOK. AIthoug-h I was finally disenchanted with the FBI, none
of the information that I proV'ided the FBI about the coming demonstrations
for universal unconditional amnesty or ending the war, none
of that inform'llltiOli suggested that there would be violence.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Did any of i't suggest that this organization
was in fact being manipulated by Communist influences?
Ms. COOK. No.
None of it suggested there was any manipulation of any kind.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Did any information suggest that they were
engaging in illegal or violent operations ?
Ms. COOK. No.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You indicated that part of your disenchantment,
too, was that information you furnished was being used against
these people.
What did you mean by that?
126
Ms. COOK. I mean going to someone's employer and telling them that
the person !that is working with them is a Communist and a dangerous
person and ought not to he employed, and people being fired. People
were very afraid that the FBI was watching them because the FBI d~d
not agree with their policies, and when the FBI would come to theIr
door to t:alk to them, they didn't want to talk wi'th the FBI. The fact.
that their employers were being talked to and that their political
views were being discussed with their employer with an eye toward
terminating their employment-that worried them, it upset them.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You did not feel it was justified on the basis of
their participation or activity in the Vietnam Veterans Against the
War?
Ms. COOK. Definitely not.
Senator HUDDLESTON. In your judgment, did the FBI have an
exaggerated concern ahout this organization as far as it being a threat
to the United States ~
Ms. COOK. Yes; and nothing I could say could change that.
Senator HUDDLESTON. They persisted in that attitude, despite the
fact that the information you had given them tended to lead in the
other direction.
Ms. COOK. Yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you have any idea what happened to the
information they collected on the 1,000 persons you estimate you supplied
to them? Was it set up in files? Is it still maintained?
Ms. COOK. My information was that they say that most of the information
I gave them was going to be kept at the local level, except
that I got several telephone calls relayed to me through Gary from
Washington, based on the reports I waS turning in, so that I knew that
information wasn't just remaining at the local level. It was going
to Washington, and decisions were coming from Washington. Other
than that, I don't know where the information went.
Senator HUDLESTON. Mr. Rowe, certainly on the event of Mother's
Day, 1961, there was complicity with the Birmingham police officials
in the violent actions that occurred. Were there ever instances in your
experiences where police officials collaborated in or were accomplices
to violent and illegal acts?
Mr. ROWE. Absolutely, sir. We on several occasions rode around in
Birmingham police automobiles surveilling some of the churches.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Rode around in the automobiles ?
Mr. ROWE. In the automobiles; yes, sir. There were as many as three
to five Klansmen on the police department.
Senator HUDDLE8TON. Was the FBI made aware of this?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir, absolutely, on many occasions..
Senator HUDDLESTON. ':Vere there any instances where the FBI
reported that fact to the Attorney General or any other legal official
with the U.S. Government?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, I really wouldn't know. I wouldn't be in a position
to answer that. I really don't know. I was just involved with my contact
agent.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You didn't see the result of any action along
that line?
Mr. ROWE. Absolut€ly none.
127
Senator HUDDLESTON. Just one other question.
You switched from being a nonparticipant in violent actions in the
Klan, to a participant when the FBI changed to so-called COINTEL
PRO which involved disruption. During this phase of your participation,
were there serious efforts to prevent violent actions from
occurring?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, to the best of my personal knowledge, only in one
or possibly two instances. I know of one incident that they did prevent
violence, but that was the only one. There were many that they
could have prevented, but they did not.
Senator HUDDLESTON. In the May 21 incident, the FBI did send
additional agents into Birmingham prior to that march, did they
not?
Mr. ROWE. That is correct.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But as far as you know, none of them made
any efforts to prevent the violence from occurring?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, if I may, at the time of the incident itself, along
with the Birmingham incident I observed, I observed several FBI,
in fact, taking movies of the beatings at the bus station.
Senator HUDDLESTON. And they did nothing to stop it?
Mr. ROWE. No.
Senator TOWER. Senator Hart of Colorado.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Rowe, during the period we are
discussing here, you attended a number of civil rights rallies or meetings.
Is that correct?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.
Senator HART of Colorado. And at the time that you were gathering
information for the FBI about Klan activities, you were also in effect
gathering information for the Klan about civil rights activities; is
that correct?
Mr. ROWE. That is correct, sir.
Senator HART of Colorado. Were there ever occasions' in this double
agent capacity when information you gathered in your capacity as an
FBI informant, information that had to do with civil rights groups
or activities, was passed on to the Klan to the detriment of those
civil rights groups?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, I don't believe I understand the question, but if I
understand it correctly, I at no time used any information that I
knew of or was aware of and passed it on to the Klan; absolutely not.
Senator HART of Colorado. I'm sorry, I missed the last part of that.
You didn't use that information in what way?
Mr. ROWE. I passed on absolutely nothing to the Klan that I learned
or obtained from various agents in the Bureau. I'm not sure what you
are asking.
Senator HART of Colorado. I'm merely trying to find out if in covering
or attending the civil rights meetings on the one hand for the
FBI as a Klan informant, were you also gathering information about
the civil rights activities for the Klan in a way that would encourage
the Klan to act adversely to those civil rights groups?
Mr. ROWE. No, sir.
Senator HART of Colorado. One other question.
We've had considerable testimony in the last few weeks about the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in relationship to Dr. King. [See
128
footnote, p. 21.] Part of their animosity to Dr. King sprang originally
from late 1962 in which he gave an interview critical of the FBI,
and I think that interview appeared in the Atlanta Constitution in
November of 1962. He said, among other things, agents of the FBI
in Albany, Ga., are siding with segregationists. This apparently agitated
the Bureau considerably, and in early 1963, Bureau memorandums
indicate that at the direction of Mr. Hoover, Mr. DeLoach
and Mr. Sullivan tried to contact Dr. King to set him straight about
the fact that the Bureau is not siding with segregationists and so on.
In one memorandum, January 15, 1963, when their attention to
Dr. King first began, a DeLoach memorandum says, "It would appear
obvious"~afterDr. King refused to talk to him-"It would appear
obvious that Reverend King does not desire to be told the true facts.
He obviously uses deceit, lies, and treachery as propaganda to further
his own cause."
This memorandum and other memorandums go ahead to indicate
Dr. King didn't know what he was talking about, that he was lying
about the Bureau's involvement with the Klan and other groups.
Now, from that began the Bureau's harassment, if you will, of Dr.
King that continued for a number of years, ending only with his death.
It seems to me that from what you have told us here today and from
other information gathered by the staff, that in fact Dr. King was
right and the Bureau was either deceiving itself or just not telling
the truth internally when it indicated that Dr. King was lying about
the Bureau's own involvement with Klan activities. Is that correct ~
Mr. ROWE. Sir, that's very difficult to answer, but I believe that
you're on the right track; yes.
Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you very much.
Senator TOWER. I should inform my colleagues that there is a
record vote in progress on the Senate floor.
Ms. Cook, you have testified that the FBI urged you to remain as an
informant after you had informed them of your decision to terminate.
Did they at any subsequent time ask you to return to your role as an
informant?
Ms. COOK. I believe that the telephone call that I received in February
1974 was that kind of a telephone call. I had been working in a
plant for 3 months. I had been fired twice. Within 2 days of my second
firing at that plant, the FBI called and asked me a couple of questions
as to whether or not the local chapter would be leaving the national
organization, indicated that if the chapter would resign, that there
would be no longer any necessity for an informant, and I refused to
tell them the political position that I was going to take in relationship
to that, and I said, "I don't want to talk to you any more," and I hung
up.
It was my feeling that the coincidence of my losing my job and
their calling me was perhaps more than a coincidence.
Senator TOWER. Ms. Cook, in addition to the $300 or $400 a month
that the FBI paid you, did they provide you with any other financial
incentives to perform as an informant, any other kind of assistance,
job assistance or anything?
Ms. COOK. Well, they did get me a job. They got me the job at
M. & T. Bank. They also got the man that I was living with a job at a
gun supply store where the agents bought their guns. As part of work129
ing for M. & T. Bank, I went into teller training, and part of that
training taught me how to identify weapons, how to identify a person
who just walks in and leaves. I didn't see the significance of that
kind of training-I mean, I see the significance for a bank, but I would
assume that my getting. a teller's position when I went through that
kind of training also did not hurt the purposes of the Bureau in hiring
me also.
Senator TOWER. M1'. Rowe, how often did you report to the FBI?
Was it once or twice a week or daily or what?
Mr. ROWE. Certainly when I first entered the organization, I was
reporting on an average of one to three times a week. Just prior to
leaving the organization, I was reporting as many as seven times a
day.
Senator TOWER. Seven times a day?
Mr. ROWE. Yes; telephonically.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Rowe, in 1961, Dr. Martin Luther King charged
that the FBI was cooperating with violence-prone local police. Mr.
Hoover strongly challenged this allegation. In your view, did the
Freedom Riders incident represent an aberration, or was it indicative
of the general policy of refusing to prevent violence, even when the
FBI was warned or advised in advance of the occurrence?
Mr. ROWE. I believe my answer to that would be that there were a
couple of times that violence was prolonged. I can't say it was stopped,
it was prolonged, but in general, the Birmingham Police Department
and the sheriff's office of Jefferson County were definitely involved in
the violence. I was there and I was a witness to it, and nothing was
done about it.
Senator TOWER. Are you aware of any other similar instances in
which the local police were involved?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir; I am.
Senator TOWER. So this was indicative of something that occurred
fairly generally, then, and the Freedom Riders is not an isolated
incident?
Mr. ROWE. No, sir, it's definitely not isolated.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Rowe.
Senator Hart?
Senator HART of Michigan. On this business, I'm still not sure what
benefit could accrue to the FBI, with its informants contributing to
violence. There were instances where you advised the FBI in advance
of planned violent activity by the Klan, right?
Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.
Senator HART of Michigan. How many times would that advance
information prevent the anticipated violence? Anytime?
Mr. RoWE. Yes, sir. Actually-Senator
HART of Michigan. Usually?
Mr. ROWE. Not normally, but on several occasions it did, yes, sir.
But not as often as they could have, in my belief. I believe that each
and every instance that I reported to the Bureau, with the advance
knowledge that they had, someone in this country could have been
there to prevent that. I believe that. That's all I can say.
Senator HART of Michigan. Can you give us an estimate as to how
many such reports of anticipated violence you gave the Bureau?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, well in the high dozens.
130
Senator HART of Michigan. In the high dozens. How many times
were those planned violent activities prevented ~
Mr. ROWE. Two to my knowledge that I can actually testify to, and
I understand from another agent, one other time. But I can testify
as to two times.
Senator HART of Michigan. Was there any difference in the type of
report that you made in those two cases and the several dozen other
cases?
Mr. ROWE. K0, sir; absolutely not.
Senator HART of Michigan. And were the two cases where your
report did result in the prevention of violence toward the end of your
association with the Bureau ~
Mr. ROWE. No, sir. I would have to say along the middle, almost inthe
middle of the time.
Senator TOWER. You have testified thllit there were several instances
in which local police were cooperating with the Klan in acts of
violence.
Mr. ROWE. Thafs correct, sir.
Senator TOWER. And the FBI had boon forewarned of some of these
instances that this violence would occur, and that they would occur
at a certain time.
Mr. RoWE. In every instance that I was aware of, yes.
Senator TOWER. To your knowledge, did the FBI do anything to
circumvent the local police in an effort to prevent this violence from
occurring?
Mr. ROWE. Sir, I think maybe I should just state it briefly and see
if I can answer the question. On one occasion, the Klan was on the
way to Tuscaloosa, to the university, at a time when Governor Wallace
was going to have his stand in the doorway to prevent integration
of the university, I along with several other Klansmen were
arrested outside of Tuscaloosa, Ala. by the highway patrol and elements
of the FBI. They seized various types of weapons from us. We
were incarcerated that afternoon in the Tuscaloosa County Jail. We
remained in jail throughout the evening until Bobby Shelton came
down and arranged the release for approximately 35 of us. The weapons
were confiscated, and the release was on our own recognizance,
but we would have to have a hearing on it. The next morning I received
a call from Robert Thomas who was the Exalted Cyclops, like the
president of the Klan, and he said to me that he wanted me to go to
Tuscaloosa with him. I went to Tuscaloosa, went to the courthouse.
We spoke with the judge. The judge took us over to the district attorney.
The district attorney says, "is it all right if we release the boys'
weapons to them now," and the judge says yeah. He slapped me on
the shoulder personally, and then he turned around and shook my
hand, and he said, "I want to congratulate you for being an outstanding
goddam American. We need some more people down here like
that. But I want you to be careful because somewhere in your group
you have a goddam snitch." That's exactly what the judge said to me,
he said, "because I had to put you boys in jail last night. If I didn't the
troops would probably come into Alabama, and I don't want that." He
says, "take your weapons and use them well." He returned our weapons
to us. I then returned to Birmingham, advised the agents what had
131
transpired, that I had the weapons back in my possession, and the
agents were aghast. They said, you can't have \these weapons hack in
your possession. They are locked in our vault. And I said, "well, you'd
better come down and look because in the trunk of my automobile-"
the agents came out, took the serial numbers of the weapons to confirm
the fact that we had been given our weapons back, and that's the last
of the incident I ever heard.
Senator TOWER. So the FBI then apparently went to the State police
to try to prevent this violence.
Mr. ROWE. That's what I believe, yes.
Senator TOWER. So there was a level of cooperation there.
Mr. ROWE. Limited, yes, sir.
Senator TOWER. And what other instances were there of local police
cooperation ~ What others specifically can you name that you know of ~
Mr. ROWE. Sir, on the Same occasion when we were incarcerated in
Tuscaloosa, there was a State investigator. A couple of Klansmen were
very upset, very nervous, highly nervous during interrogation, and
they gave us a quick interrogation as to why we were coming up to
Tuscaloosa with all these weapons. A State investigator called me
outside the room and said, "go back in there and tell that goddamn
Klansman to keep his mouth shut, that something may come up about
the bombing and you tell him to shut up. I may have to ask him some
questions." I related this information to the Bureau the same night.
On another occasion, the chief deputy of the Jefferson County Sheriff's
Department contacted me, and I in turn, on each occasion, contacted
higher authorities of the Klan when they wanted something
done. I at no time left this to my discretion. I left it to the higher
echelon of the Klan. The agreement was set up with the cooperation
of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department. There was a country
club on the outskirts of Birmingham called the Sand Ridge Country
Club. This country club was set up where the Klansmen were-there
were approximately 35 Klansmen involved, alon~ with approximately
20 county deputies, and the chief deputy. We went out to this club
on Saturday night. We were supplied evidence to place in this club.
They told us, all you do ata quarter to midnight, you get this stuff in
the various places, and they described where the various places were.
We left the merchandise. At 12 o'clock the prearranged awe~mentwas
that they had two female deputies there also. When the female deputy
got up to dance with her escort, that was the si~al for the raid. At that
point, everybody participated in the raid. They arrested several people
that night, took them away, and subsequently padlocked the country
club. That is the last time we heard of this. This was reported to
the FBI approximately a week and a half, two weeks prior to its taking
place.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Rowe. I believe there are no further
questions.
I want to thank you, Ms. Cook. and you, Mr. Rowe, for your coope~
ation with the committee, and your very significant and helpful
testlmony.
Thank you very much.
The committee will stand in recess for 3 minutes while we brin~
forth the other witness.
[A brief recess was taken.]
132
Senator TOWER. The next witnesses to appear before the committee
are Mr. James Adams, Assistant to the Director-Deputy Associate Director
(Investigation), responsible for all investigative operations;
Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division,
responsible for internal security and foreign counterintelligence
investigations; Mr. John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel
Division; Joseph G. Deegan, section chief, extremist investigations;
Mr. Robert L. Shackelford, section chief, subversive investigations;
Mr. Homer A. Newman, Jr., assistant to section chief, supervises
extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigalus, unit chief, supervises
subversive informants; Joseph G. Kelley, assistant section chief, civil
rights section, General Investigative Division.
Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before
this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God? .
Mr. ADAMS. I do.
Mr. WANNALL. I do.
Mr. MINTZ. I do.
Mr. DEEGAN. I do.
Mr. SCHACKELFORD. I do.
Mr. NEWMAN. I do.
Mr. GRIGALUS. I do.
Mr. KELLEY. I do.
Senator TOWER. It is intended that Mr. Wannall will be the principal
witness, and we will call on others as questioning might require, and
I would direct each of you when you do respond, to identify yourselves,
please, for the record.
I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow the members
of the committee to return from the floor.
[A brief recess was taken.]
Senator TOWER. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Wannall, acc,ording to data, informants provide 83 percent of
your intelligence information. Now, will you provide the committee
with some information on the criteria for the selection of informants ~
TESTIMONY OF JAMES B. ADAMS, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTORDEPUTY
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION) FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; W. RAYMOND WANNALL, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION; ACCOMPANIED BY
10HN A. MINTZ, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL DM.
SION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT L. SHACKLEFORD,
SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR., ASSISTANT TO
SECTION CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT CHIEF; AND
JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEF, CIVIL RIGHTS
SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
Mr. WANNALL. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you have
quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting Office.
Senator TOWER. That is GAO.
Mr. WANNALL. Based on a sampling of about 900 cases.

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