CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

97
EXHIBIT 3
P ..... NI( CHUIIC", 10 0,C..... , ..... ,,'"
JOHN Q. T\JW[", T'U ', VICIE: e""'''''01'''''
WiLli ...... G. M'LLE.. , STAr,. (:""'-1;10"
"UDUtICM". O. ICHW,,''1, J",. Ctil'." COUNSQ"
CVJI(T/.", ....OTH"..', MINO""" c(}U.. ~u.
"HiLl" .... H"wr. ""'H,
W"'LTU.", ,",o.. O"UE. M".....
""ALT[lt D. "UDDLlSTOt1. MY.
"'OllE"" MOllO...... N.C.
a..... ,. H,A"'L COLO
><0.........0 N. o"""r .. , JOt., TENN, l!I,,'''''' <#OLC.W"T(". "'Hl.
C .. A.. L[S ...ce n".. s. J .... MD•
.. IC......O II. I&C Wl:II'l ......",.
SELECT COMM ITTEE TO
STUDY GQVEJ:.!NMENTAL OP£RATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELl"lGENCE ACTIVITIE9
(PU",SVANl" TO •• "1:1, II, InH CONO"E,n)
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
October 20, 19/5
The Honorable
Edward M. Korry
351 Elm Road
Briarcliff Monor
New York
Dear Mr ..Ambas sador :
I am pleased that you will be able to testify before
the Committee about Chile. As I mentioned, the hearings
will take place November 4, beginning at 10:00 a.m. It
is planned as an open session; the ground rules still have
not been agreed upon, but I will be in touch with you as
soon as they are.
I thought it useful to send you suggested issues around
which to organize a ten- to fifteen-minute opening statement,
even in the absence of agreed ground rules. No doubt you
will want to make a number of the specific points you mnde
in our interview: the '1964 :antecedents, your view of the
1':170 elections, your ignorance of what we now call "Track II,"
your understanding of the limits of "Track I" and of any attempt
to affect the outcome of the Congressional vote, your
perception of Allende and of his government's attitude toward
the copper negotiations.
ln addition, you might address the following more general
issues in your statement:
1. What was there in the Chilean situation after 1967-and
especially in 1970--that made other than overt, acknowledged
action by the U.S. necessary or advisaDleY That might
incluae both the adVisability of general programs and ot any
specific involvements ~n tne 1~69 Congressional elections
and the 1970 Presidential elections.

~, i
~>\
J~J',/"' r \I
../~"
98
-2-
2. uid your assessment differ from that of the Department
in Washington? From CIA Headquarters? From the Chief
of Station?
3. What was the nature of consultation between yeu and
members of the mission regarding the advisability of covert
action? Did the sensitivity of the subject preclude consultation
with officers whose knowledge anu judgment would have
been he lp ful ?
4. What was the nature of consultation between you and
Washington on the same question? Did the sensitivity of the
subject preclude consultation with, for example, ItlR, DOl/CIA.
or the Country Director?
)
5. Were you kept closely informed of any consuLtations
between the Chief of Station and CIA Headquarters regarding
Agency capabilities and the advisability of covert operations?
What was your understanding of those consultations at critical
junctures?
6. Did you seek to assess those capabilities yourself
before recommending or concurring in covert action?
7. To what extent did you seek to supervise and/or keep
informed of the details of covert operations? What procedures
were used? Was there full cooperation by the Chief of Station?
8. What ground rules did you set down for Agency activity?
Did you, for instance, prohibit certain kinds of activity, certain
tactics or approaches to specific individuals? Are you
confident your guidelines and prohibitions were complied with?
9. Did you review ongoing operations periodically to
determine whether they should be terminated or expanded?
Obviously, these are suggestlons, neither exhaustive nor
binding. The focus of this portion of the Committee's inquiry
is covert action as an element of American foreign policy.
You should, of course, make whatever comments on specific issues
or events that seem important to you; but the major subjects
of the testimony ought to be your assessments of the
situation in Chile, your sense of Washington's perception and
your sense of your controL of covert operations in the field.

99
-3-
If I can answer any questions or provide any additional
material, please let me know. I'll await your letter. '
Yours sincerely,
Gregory F. Treverton

100
EXHIBIT 4
EDWARD M. KORRY
351 ELM ROAD
BRIARCLIFF to4ANOR, NEW YORK to!510
Uctober 23, 1975
The Honorable
Frank Church
United Statas Senete
Waehington, D.C. 20510
Dear Sene tor Church:
have, as you know, confirmed my desire to testify before the 5enBtB
Select Committee at its pleas~re. Since I requested a CIA program end
since that program has been llnked both to the tragedy that wracked Chile
and to the abuse of Executive power in this country, my appearance before
your Committee is a moral imperative and a civic necessity.
As Ambassador to Chile four full years (October 12, 1967 to October
12, 1971) I wrote mora cables and dispatches than any of my rank in that
period, deliberately accounting, as best I could, to current consumers
throughout the govE,rnment, and to future poli tical, economi c and social
historians, the motives, the atmospherics, the hopes and ·disappaintment.s
that enveloped my decisions and actions. For reasons of ignoranca, of selfinterest,
of conflicting loyalties, of cleshing principles and of percussive
pressures of various types, not everything salient or sentient could be
recorded even if comprehended then. Hence, new facts and fresh insights
still can be contributed to an illuminating case atudy of the dizzying Interaction
nf national security actions abroad, partisan competition for votea
Rt home, covert act~vity, economic interests, espionage, Ideological rivalries,
!lodal factors and indlvlduRl wills, of how, In sum, tha Unl ted Stata,,--nut
Just th" blhita Hou"e, and/or the CIA, the Embassy, anLl other lXBcutivll
<lgencie", but the, nation as a dynamic enti ty--stroda, atumbled or sneaked
to find its proper footing in the massive tides .af hiatory.
Thll Committee, as I undcretl!nd it, has judicial powers. In effect,lt
si ts as a court, ·15 court of tha people, one might say. As such, then, its
function Is to expose and to explore, without pr~judice, the relevant facts,
to sift their impllcQtions and to reach conclusions an past performl!nce which
will, in turn, permit jUdgments an future lines of conduct. Your direction
as presiding offiCer of the proceedings have demonstrated that the Committee

101
-2-
is not interpreting its mandate narrowly; it is examining an Executive
branch decision-making-and-action process as it was affected by the intelligence
agencies. It is, I submit, inventigating one manifestAtion of
Authurity nt a timA ulhfJn all frlrms of it RT8 tn, or nI1Br,cri~i~l.
The U~-in-Chile cAse is a thicket of ironio •. Good and bad lie AD
claou togHthar, as Acton said, that to Bask arti6tlc unity of ch~rBct8r,
Dr plJrpOSe, or performance, Is, In this instance, an Hnlle ~b~urdjty.
Your own role, no lees than CIA'~,illu"tr"tcs the point. You would be
judge and jury when justice and decency suggest that it would be mora
appropriate for you to be witness and defendant.
An outrageous proposition, you wili doubtless retort, one that might,
a8 I recognize from past experiance with anuther of your investigative
committees, provoke a prOdigiously hostile and costly reaction. No matter.
lIMy heart has followed all my days,11 the poet writes, "Something I cannot
name." Mine cannot and will not live or die quiescently while you and others
fashion a bedlam of humbug and a blaze of unwarranted national guilt. If
we have entered the new era of ultra-brite, klieg-lighted honesty and
openness, of "letting it all hang out" as you and your admirers advertise,
then your wash must be pinned on the same Bunlit line with mine. By that,
mean this appaaing, disqualifying record:
1. You were Chairman of the Subcommittee responsible for Inter- .
American affairs of the Senate Foreign Rel~tions Committee in 1969 ann 1970
when I inquired of i.ts staffman on three separate occasions, In W3shington
and in Santiego, if a Subcommittee meeting could be arrangen. Each timB,
Mr. Pet Holt repl1ed, with some embaressment, that the Chairmen did not wish
t1earinge. He gav8 me to understend that Latin American affairs did not
arourm sufficient Intp.r8Bt or promiss l!nClulJtl ht-~i..HHln9s to murit Bvem Dnn
8xecutl ve rump S8S.S Ion. Your successor U9 :JuucfJmmi t tee Chai rlnafl Wil~ ~iullgeQuently
briefed on CIA op"ratione in ellil", J am reliably lnformp.d, long
l1"for8 the leaks to the media by Congre5nm'lI1 Harrington (end yOUl" staff) in
1974 of Mr. Colby's secret testimony earlier that year to e House Committee.
Is it unfeir to compar" your looking-the-other-way In 1969-70 to A
eentry asleep on duty on the eve of battle7 Is it not right to inquire
how such a negligent guard turns up as presiding judge in the resultant
court mart1al? Ie It not 10glcal to speculate that you did not wish to

102
-3-
know too much, did not want to be saddled with any responsibility for the
agonizing decisions or recommendations that the best of pUhlic servants
willingly confront, must confront, if our system is to avoid a demoralizing
paralysis? Or wes it disinterest In e ta~payar investment, authorized
step by atop by the Congress, of epproximntolv S2,OOO,OOO,OOO (billions)-dollare
of 1964-69 vlntngee and valuos?
2. You were, next, Chelrm>!n of the ~uhcull1m1ttne on Multinational
Corporations of the Senete Fnreign R,,)otiuns Committee, having trensfllrrlld
to that l1mellghtnd role in mid-1972 when Jock A"d"rson published the
sensetional and grotesque ITT memos. Uecause my name appeared in severnl
of those papere, I was, quite rightly, soon contacted (the summer of 1972)
by Mr. Jack Blum, Subcommittee deputy Counsel. In his second utterance on
the telephone, he said "ITf is trying to make you the fell guy, you know"
(r didn't) and added that if I did not cooperate with the Subcommittee to
"get" ITT and the White House people behind the corporation, the Subcommittee
would "let" me be e scapegoat. My employera' attorney contacted Mr. Ulum
straighteway and in November, 1972,accompanied me a9 e silent inhibitor to
my one pre-hearing interrogation with ilium and his superior, Mr. Jerry
Le~mson, the Counsel; we insisted they tape the multi-hour session. Events
have justified your staff's zeal to expose and to rid the country of the
then abusers of Executive authority although, I might add parenthetically,
their lack of pursuit in cortain arees is intriguing.
r ask, in this connection, however, if the Senata eml,owera its SuOcommi
ttees to ebwle ~ authori tv wi th the seme "enemies list" tactIc!] of
its targets? Would you say that the en~9 justIfy the meens?
3. Vour Couns/Il, Mr. Levinson, and) participated soon efter In a
OU~i!teldorf. Germany, Conference on fo\Jltinational Corporation:,. ~?InLJarv 5-7,
1973 (two months, before your Subcommittee began "earings). Levi..snn recounted
to several participants one Bvening, in mv presence, that the U5
government In 1963-G4 had sp"nt "U2, DUn ,OOn--even more" to defeat Allenda.
Ha elaborated' briefly on th" effort an~ purpose. When I a5ked him, in
privacy latar, how ha could Justify such past InterventlQn ml~ yet be so
outraged bV a very muted US "ostili ty in 1970 egainst the same man and the
same forces---a CIA progre1n, in fact, whose reach and cost were tiny frar.tions
of the earlier one---ha replied that Ilwe had a democratic alternBtiv~ worth

103
-4-
backing in 1964". Nat for a second did he, your representative, argue that
the United States had no moral right to intervene or that the CIA had no
legal basis to engage in covert political Bction oversaBS or that international
traaties forbade such intervention or that Allende end hIs farces
had chonged stripes. Quite the contrary. His was a partisan, an ideological,
distinction. He contended, entirely erroneously, that the US in 1970
had supported a conservetivB candidate, Jorge AlessandrI, when, in truth,
my positIon, and therefore the EmbBssy'S, WAS strongly biased (much to the
annoyance of all of the CIA) in favor of Presid~nt Eduardo Frai and his
Bhrlstlen Democratic psrtv---ths "DemocrHtlc Left" force that Mr. Levinson
extols in his book ~ Alliance ~ ~ ll! ~ (Quadrangle, 1970); I
had even argued in writing to the Nixon Administration that if the Democratic
Christian cendidate in 1970, lomic, were,by the most unlikely miracle, to
fashion and to lead a coalition with the Communists, as he proclsimed he
would, it should not trigger US hostility. Even more relevant to thB US
Committee's inquiry, one powerful incentive for the structu.re r recommp.nded
of anti-Allende covert propaganda action in the 1970 campalgn---no funds to
any candidata or party---was my detarmination to guard agaInst an IndIrect
commitment by the US to a discredited Right that was so clearly In a minorIty
and with whose tactIcs and objectives I was in profound disagreement.
My question to you hers, Sir. 1s wheth~r YOu 10ere no 1899 aware than
Levinson 1n JanuarV 1973, 8nd before, of thl! p2rVi~givB US intorv~ntion in
the Chilean electoral campaign of 19b3-b~? Is It not a fuet that you deliberately
auppres8ed thIs chapter of U~ actlvitills in ChlIIl In yULJI' 1973
hORrings and lat8f, because of lt2 partlaan cmbafH9sment, bucuu8e 1t lnvolvnd
a President we bath cherished? Is it not true, therefore, that you expunded
public funds to convert a public Investigation into a private,Internecine
vendetta? Did .you not gra"p, by the way, that the 1963-54 covert operations
involved the de facto overthrow of an existing government---that the program
conceived by the Kennedy Administration and executed by the JOhnSDn team
to elect Christian Democracy dependen Dn the prior repudiatIon by the
Chlle"n electorHtA of thll consorvati VO? pall tlc~I coall t1 on 1n po,,,er I and that
the US government, in many ways, worked to this end? hIt notl th"reforej
correct to assert that your en.rgetlc cumpaign tho past three yeer8 to
perauild" the medIA and the world of the CIA's alleged "DvfJrthrDw of a104
- 5-
t.l~mocratic govetnment'l in 1973 was, among other things, an effort to draw
8 false distinction between a past you labored to cov~r lJp anr1 B present
you willfully distorted for partisan and por.onnl advantage7
4. Twics during our European etay il1 JCll1u~ry, 19'Il, Mr. Lovil1uon
p18~dBd with me to help "get 'l PrBs1dant Nixon, Dr. Kiss1rlgBT and othel'U
involv~d in the 19'10 decisions affecting Ch1lB. HB sHkm1 how I, a l1f810ng
"liberal" and e Kennedy admirer end appointee, could "dofend" NiKon and
Kissinger end company. told Levinson, as 1 had otherH over the years,
had never voted for Nixon ano had never contributed a p,mny or anything
else to any of his campaigns; nor wes Kissinger a friend, as I, nO less
than Lev~nson, was painFully aware. The issues for me, I told Levinson,
were of another order:
A. had been so opposed to the MarKist-Leninist forces represented
by Dr. Ailende, it would be craven dishonesty to seek disp~naation
by accusing others of actions based on shared perceptions;
8. It would entail the dredging of secret decisions and activities
in a country where the Konnedy end Johnson Administrations had placed
their highest hopes and the greatest per capita American investments,
morel end material, in the hemisphsre; such muck-re~~ng, I ssid, might bury
living Chilean politicians, and ,"auld muddy two dead 'US Presidents. The
costs, I hsld, would he very high to this country's standing snd to Chile's
stebility.
C. The Allende goverl~ent hed untsrsd its third critical yeor
snd tho US taxpayar utili hsd in the balanco hundreds of millions of dollars
of US- Trea"ury-lJOcked guOrantBc" of AmBrI can corpora to i nVA8tllrs pills mor"
then one and a quurter billion <Jollars of ut.I'"r ~ubl1c mon!ob; although I
hAd nu douht that the AIIBndo QrJvl1rnment IJ(I~ r1ut~rmlnud to luvy thlu charge
on tho U5 tnxpeyer~ I did not wi9h to give any further pretext.
D. Tns sum of theDe constraint9, uubJectiv" ond obJectivu, nnd
of the unending complexities flowing From th,"m, were too ovurwhelming For'
mo to play tho dummy For him and For you.
My qU8:Jtlon here, Senator, 19 who duthorl11~rl your ::..iubcamml ttl~e tu
concentrate on I'gettlng", to U5t1 the recurrent parlanc~ of your staff, Dr.
Kissinger, and to rewrite history, if necAssary, to achieve that end7 Why
did you and Mr. Le~nson, For e,ample, manipulate the subsequent hearings

105
-6-
and the background briefings to selected journelists---before, during Bnd
after thos8 e8ssion8---to propaoata the demagogic, specious 6uspicion that
US actiDns in Chila, in my time, were mDtivated importently becaus8 of
feelty to, or concern fo~ the monetary interests Df, th8 multlnationel
cor~JOrotlDno ttlsre7 (What was true 1s that 1 had 8rguud thnt tho IIAllnn{18
doctrlno" of non-noqotluble, unl1atafi.ll qri3b~l of US propurty. 1f unoPPu!J[311.
would un emulnted by miJny Dthors, in onl! fHulllon or unother; I hen 9ail1 that
the CDneequences Df Allende's uncDmprDmising behaviDur wDuld alsD reduce aid
end investment, blleteral end multilateral, by a mDre iSDlatiDnist US in
those areas of the world that needed it most; had aVDwed my fiduciary
responsibility for the haavy texpayer exposure through guarenties and the
tied risks of other US government funds.) Did YDU not believe whet SenDr
Raul Prabisch, the first Sacretary General Df UNCTAD (the third wDrld
grDuping) end en Argentine eCDnDmist end sDcialist Df internatiDnel repute
had gratuitDusly declared, in LevinsDn's presence, to the Dusssidorf CDnferonco,
as the published recorn (In~tute for International end Foreign
Trede Law, GeDrgatown University, and Praeger, 1974) states:
"Ambassador KDrry has given Dnly part Df the InfDrmation
Dn this matter (the eVDlutiDn of reletiDnships between
multinetional cDrpDratiDns and less develDped countries)
and I will cDmplete it. The truth is that he was Dne
of the first---pnrhaps the first---tD devDlop this idea
(Df foreign corporate fade-out from ebsolute to shared
or minDrity Dwnership in LDCs) but Dnly within e narrow
circle of friends. Indoed I hAn tha privilege in 19G7
to Hsten to his ir.lea" allOut tIJI3 m~tter presented wi th
hiG customury lucldi ty. have "mple prDDf Amlmssador
l",orrYt While Ambass<ldor to Chilo, ILl8:-5 in!itrumental 1n
shaping new idnas in this matt~r of investment."
(He was, as YDU ~ill 580 belDw, speaking of bDth the Allende and the Frei
years.) Did Mr. LevinsDn nDt tell you, as he had written in his bDOk, that
my defiance of the Anaconda CDmpany in 1969 enabled'the Chilean gDvernment
tD gain immediate majDrity interost and cDntrol of that giant cDrpDration's
mines in what was tho largest-ever peaceful transfer of resources in an LDC?

106
-7-
Had you not been briefed on my persistent meneuverings in 1971 to prevent
ITT from exploiting its Chilean difficulties at the US texpeyers' expense7
Did you end Levlnaon not msnage events to avoid any public airing of this
or of additionel reasons for ITT's hostility to me because it woul,l not
fit the single-minded partiean script you had drafted? Where wes the moral
compulsion to "get" at the truth es the pUblic expected end indeed paid
for?
5. Mr. Levtnaon's interrogation of me in public Subcommittee heoring"
brought out, Inter" alia, my confirmation of a CIA electoral progrem In
Chile in 1970 aa the New York Times reported prominently in n two column story
March 28, 1973,---a Full yeer and 8 helf, no le08, before the disclosures
by Congressman Harrington (and Mr. Levinson) thst led to ths formation of
the Select Committee. 1 denied then, as 1 do now, that we had ever attempted
to bribe Chi~ean Congressman. I asserted then, as I do again now, that I
had imposed the most extraordinary precautions to prevent any U. S. complicity
in a Chilean military insurraction against the Chilean government, either
rrei'e or Allende's, end thet between 1969 and 1971, I had personally taken
unusual---some todey might say~high-risk~--measuresto guard against such an
aventuality. I maintainad then, as I do now, that the United States had
dealt wLth the Allenda government, from the moment of his Inauguration to
the day of my departure sleven months snd one week later more genarouely
than enyone could have Imagined or enticipated.
Tha United States waB Following, in Fact, a sophlstlcstsd throe-tIer
policy: diplomatically doing its utmost to nsgotlate a solution acceptable
to the majority of Congrsss end to most Americans sa fsir snd just by the
moet liberal measura; pUblicly adhering to s cool but correct posture;
covsrtly providing Funds that did, In fect, permit newepspers (and their
labor unions), othar media outlets and two major pollticsl psrtles to fulrill
their dsmocratic functions.
Is It not true that you and your steff were aware in 1972-3 of the
hundreds of ceblss sent from Embassy Senti ago between November 1970 and
Octobar 1971 reporting to Washington in swamping detail the genuine, the
strsnuous Bnd the innovstlve sfforts to resch sn accomodatlon with the
Allende regime? Is it not true that you decided to muffle this Bspect

107
-8-
of the US-in-CHILE case? Is it not true that you and your counsel conscientiously
stifled any public ventilation of an offer that Mayor Baams,
Governor Caray end the people of New York, might have been intrigued by-my
offer to the Allende govarnment, Merxist-Leninlst In comnoBltion end
thruat, to have the US guar"nty its slmost worthlss" bonpa as priTt of a
felr, non-dogmstic and Inexpensive eettlement of its conflicts with tha
US? Hed I not provided on tepe in 1972 the precise detaile to Lev.neon
end 8lum? Hed I not informed four mejor Western powere of thsm'intimely
feshion? Waa not Lev, neon aluo cognizant that even within the Allende
governmant,not to mantlon severel Santiago residents of IntarnaUonlll
,T tie,el \oJon aupport for
standing, such ae PrebiSc,y tIlls unusual propoeition7
Why ehouldn't the public conclude thet your deliberate coverup of e
msjor initiative was indispensable to your concoction of a aimplistic and
monstrous black-white mythology---a legend in which the American bullyboys
kicked and cuffed smsll and innocsnt social democrets beceuse they only
wanted control of their resources, and because they only wished to implement
some progreesive soclo-economic progrems"and besides, weren't they democratically
elacted? Why woulrl B Senator of your moral rapute and standing
lend himself to, let alone leud and orchestrate, a campaign of auch halftruths,
outright lies or distortions to discredit not merely the Nixon
Administration but an American SOCiety which had, in so many varied ways,
participated in the government's covert operatio~
Why was euppreasion sO unavoidable or so essential wMen the truth,
damning in some of its other Implicatione, would have parmltted a selutory
and intelligent debate and appraisal uf the perplexing iesues Involved in
Chile7 If Dr. Allende could, to my ellrpriue, write a lottnr to the US
Prueldant lifter my dnporture tu pralee mV I1ffnrtn, I f hie ul trll-SoclfJllot
Foraign Minister Mr. AlmeyuB, could extol my andallvore to negotlato,
e8ttloment9 before e multi-perty ferewell gathering for me in Santiago--·-·
even though both man were ewere of elmw,t 011 CIA actlyltles betwuen 1263
and 1970-----.'hy ahould a US junetor uoek to el'ase so much of the tapo of
history?
Why, to take anothar example, dirt you and your steff lat stand the
impreasion in your finsl raport that the US had nbt, In fact, ceaeed all
further economic losning to Chile In October 196B-----two years before ~hu
election of Allende and that In 1969, I had protested explosively this Nixon108
-9-
Admini9tration decision? [jill Mr. Levlnson,( himself _ e high A.1.D.
ofrici~l in Guatemala and Orazil, both r~preesive military regimes by
the way, bafora hia bureaucretic carenr was anded by Nixon's electi§~
not demystify the misleeding AID etatistical teblee included in youri
Subcommitt~e's record? Why, too, did you bar from the finel report end
from the public the no less cruciel information concerning the US offers,
through ma, of loans and credits to tha AIlsnda government, again and
again in 1971, if it would only ceaae reneging on President Allondu'o
explicit prom~sea to U.S. officials, rsiterated often in Washington by
its Ambassador? Did you anu he not wish these ruscuing facte, plnl"
And provAbla, to kill your morality ftlble of tha U.S. cutti"g off further
aconomic aid to Chlle bucauaa of Allsnde'e "uocielism" or »Marxism"?
Haven't your selectivD outragas and excisions tha past three yoars
been akin to a conductor performing Beethoven only with kettles and trumpets,
reducing incredible complexity to the drum-end-bugle thumping of a political
conventi on?
6. The State Department's Foreign Service observer at. the.-
1973 haarings of your Subcommittee repfJL'tp.11 on the extraordinary
daily working relationships between your staff and a Chilean [mbessy
diplomat. I witnessad it during my one day there. D'oubtless, the State
Department had not shared the coincidental intelligence thet this Chilesn
had been nicknamed by fellow Embassy officials, also loyal to Allendo,
liS the"Commisear~ Nor would 1 ouggest hera that you perceived the threat!
of logic that led fro. Mr. Lev,nson's endorsement uf this Chilusn to
the Chilosn EMbasuy's reinforced influonce with several very wellplaced
journalists in Washington, and how that success) in turn, amplified
Allende's authority in Chile, in this country end in the world, at the
price of moderation in Chile and of U. S. standing everywhere.
It is pertinent, though, to ask ynu why yOll uhould prllfer such sources
nf information, guidance enn judgmente to tha affirmation of not just- one
i ndupendRllt-minrlllrl Ambassadur tlut thll documllnted raporto and anely!,ia
over many yesrs of many, highly-rogerded Foruign Service DfficRrs7 Why
would you not eVlln exploro the 'lntacadanto of tho Socialist P"rty sf Chile
~f of its bRst known membur, Dr. Allendo? Was It becsuse'the immutsble imprint
I tho officiol Party histories would strlkp. at the heart of eo Msny or your

109
-10-
plJstulatlons, preconceptions, slId projudlcBs? SurBly it wBsn't nacBssul'Y
to Bgr~e with my recommondationL or ection~ fur yuu tu let 90m~ light
shine on the primordiel phenamenon:---thdt the Socialist Party of Chile
had unremittingly and vehemently opposed social democracy for a quarter
of a cantury, that It was pledged against refurm, end ~verythlng rational
containad not only in the founding procl ..metluns uf Chile (elld the U,;) but
in thuee of the Britieh, SWedish;., or Germdn Socialist perties? Why,tul'n
the blnma uniquely on tl1e u.S. '.hen Dr. Allando'e Jlurty had unh'Bverlnyly,
for decadee, napou~ed viulent r~volution for Chile and throughout Lntln
Am..rlcB---when it had gone on record in overy national party conclava AnI
in every maeting of its Central Committee for decadee as extreme intorpreters
of Merxist - Leninist dogme who ruled out any~:e~~~~'I.,ith the U.S.?
Why hide the fact that the majorlty of this party's ruling Committee (by A
vota of 11 for, li..~"tn'9'~;;i slx absant) had refused to endorse Allende as
thu partV'8 candldiJte for Presidrmt 1n 1910 lJecau9B of his 18 years of close
'colleboration with tha less viol"nt, but stronger and totally subservient-toHo"
cow Communist Party of ChUe? Why shouldn't there be e .ober study of ths
implications of Allende having Dilan ths campromisffd recipient of largo amounts
of funds over many yeera from val'ious Communist capItals end orgenizetluns?
Or that his firet foreign poli tical sct on the very day of his inauguration
wen to promise covert support to the Puerto Ricsn Independence movement?
Why not explore the reasons for the US Embassy,in advance of his election,
reporting the step by step proce"s by which US influence--cultural, economic,
commercial, political, and military---w8s to be extirpated? Or why we
concluded before the elections ttl.. Communist and Socinlist parties planned
to use the default of their debts to tl1e American taxpayer as .. mesns to
impos8 their political w111 on Chile and the U.S.
Most important query, can yOLl grssp lhat your refuHsl to flarm1 t any
seriouB cons1Llerotlan by tho Congl'ess, am1 therefore, the public, allowed you
and thereby the Senate to be exploited within and without Chile in a disas~
rou", In e catestrophic, manner---thlll you unwittingly bacamn a powerful
IIgollt, as /tn Allendo apologist, fur ths pularizatlon wI ttlin ChUe, and fur the
rei'1n of terror that ensued? No Ilmarican. not even Mr. Nixon, l1ad marc
devastating effsct in Chila, as I have goo<1 ronson to,'",sert, thmi you, Sir.
No one [,roved the adage thot "whal Is earnest Is not always true; on the
contrary error is orten more earn"st then truth".
? Your men, Lev'nsan, next acted es one of the two channels for
Congressman Harrington, eccording to pnblished raports, to divulge, to leak,
61-14:6 0 - 16 - S

110
-11-
in September, 1974, Mr. Colby' e aecret testimony on Chile. (Congressmen
Harrington's other channel wss Mr. Laurenc" Stern of the WBshi~v,~on Poet,
a confidante of Levi·naon snd of the eforen.sntioned "Commiesar",. publishsd
dllrinl) the March, 1973, hearings of your SubcommittsB B front-pege atory
stating that the United States government had funnelled up to 120,000,000
through official agenclus in 1964 to sleet Eduardo Frei. By deaign or
aCCident, that etory was timed to obliterate Frei, the strongest single
democratic, moral snd intellectual obstacle to tho Morxist-Leninist revolution
then entering ite runaway phase.) Mr. Levinson, still your' ongoing
Subcommittee Counsel, was the anonymous source for the publication of the
Harrington leak in the New York Times by Seymour Hersh on September 8, 1974.
-The Hersh storiss of the week dissaminated the impression that I was Ambassedor
to Chile for the two Allende yeers following my depsrture in 1971, that the
CIA programs in Chile bsgan ~ with the Johnson Administretion in 1964, rathsr
than with Kennedy, (just as Mr. Stern's above-mentioned story had), t"st
the US government had snught to bribe, through 010, Chilean Congresemen at'
the tims of Allsnde's election, thet I had donied to you and your Subcommittee
any CIA Involvement In the 1970 campaign in Chile, that J had invoked
eXBcutive privilege to evade responses, that J hsd lied under oeth and would
be subject to immediate investigation for perjury. In hie telephone calls
to ma soma dave later ~mRM-.M..xe~~~ Hareh identified Lav~nsDn as his
eourco for the comments concerning me, ss J !!tatad in a lattar to the EdItor
of tIm Tims!! on S"ptember 13, 19'/4, He did 00 1n the contaxt of "now ""' Il.re
golng to neil Kissingor" and "this time we have Kiseingor" and appeale to ma
to halp "gilt" KiBsingl1r (os I informsd tho Timas in my lettlir). Then, on
5eptembllr 1'/, 1974, Hllruh roportud in the T1m..a to the effact that Lavanaon
hod presented you with II staff ""port urging stronlJ Iletion sgainst ~ecretnry
Kissinger olong with rscommandetlona fOl' p"rjury and contempt chorlJeu agflinst
flvo othor former and activo US "fflcislu inclUding mu.
Do you not find thsse accue"tlons by your staff, leaked In sneAky
anonymi ty loll thout eny prior notiflca'tion, wi thout 'any communicstion to me,
of sny kind, without any opportunity to this data to axamine the chargos or
to robut them, a callous, avon crimInal, abuse of US jUdicial process? Where
is fairnass7 Where in decency? Where Is morality? Whare is the essontlal
differonca betwaan your Levanson snd illum Ilnd Senator Joseph HcCsthy's Cohn

111
-12-
and'inIna? Or Mr. Nixon's ,l1rty trIcks nepartmunt7 How noas it coma about
that 6 Senate employee paid by public Funds can impuRe on the cuuntry, by
tronIn\l gecrete for ep8ce in til" media on your IJHh,dF, hia tdllOlnlJY, hla
politic". hIs doublo-tltan,lol'l1u of justIc", ,.urull ty, pp,rcoptlon oml Bction?
Ie It strotching the uvinence to ask you why enyone In publIc liFe should
not emulate thie performence---to exploi t tim protection ofFered by B
pOI..1Drrul nnli approving patrlln,l.o Innlat on hln crltoria, to canVHl't 9vlIry
fluillic intura"t mflttar Into BBv(J(lO poll Ll c" of 6mbl tiU", tu abunu h1:l
',uthori ty? Ie th19 not the fls,;ence of tt,,, W"terlJ"te case? Ia th" laa,wn
you would have the public draw that euch abuue Is tol"reble aa long a9 you
agre8 wIth the abuasr?
-d-
I recite these details to prdve tho "xlstencn From 1972 to thu preeont
ur a wob of connectod uvonts in lhB new i!ra of opunnt:t9s you proc!ulm lUI of tun
that nuithlll' tho pUblic ur thll Congr88u "uumt}tl t.ll hll privvy to. A1fllJ, I
I,duhod to lay a foundatIon of rnct to ''''flport thlJ olwurvatllme containud In
thla document. not tho leoet or which j" my lnitlul questioning ae to whether
you have not dlsqu"l1fIad yaur",,!f ss JIJlJgu LInd Jury in anything ralating
to thll US-in-CHILE cage. They also provl/ln /In Intruduction to tho funddOIental
U9suns on which the Congress muat "till decide.
Vou atntad on notlonel t£lJevlaion this n"et summar (sntl on lOnny othsr
ncca9ion9 In 197~) that you dn not In any way criticize thn aFforto by the
~;o<;lul Democratic parties In Europa to alII tholr el8t"r party and to nava
liberty and democratic process in Portu\lHI. Vou added that If the US wers
to bl! involved in that offort, It would unly nmLJarofw Ann wllakan tho (urolleuns'
~ndaavors and damAge the SocialIst Party of Portu\lol. Vou uxplAlnun that
your ineiotunce on thu CIA baing tetharad '"U9 bUHUd on the risk of expoaurs
In Portugal. And then you amptta"lZIH1 wi th righllOUane<lB Qulvaring FrOl. overy
~ore thet PnrtugAl 10113" quite tile oppoeitu of (;hile bucau"e in the Form"r
fl mili tary dictatorship had be"n ovarthl'o·wn 4,hile in Chile tho US llngagad
In overthrowing a democrotlcully elected govnrnment.

113
influence in Chile. (ven after your ri8gu~ 1fT h~.ring", AllAnde sent
in mid-19'13 to me(a privstu citizen in Nl'w Yor~ " high officlol of 11i9
govornmf:Jnt to inquire if my 1971 offerg cDu!(1 fH-Jfnt.'ltlUld un u~L1ated and revived.
(1 lmmmllf-ltl!ly oppri:H::r1 ltl1~ :.jt!itr.~ Oepdrtrnf1nt. A:i WlUl Hl! Allundli dtJnllnJLI,
lind us ho of tun bOBstHrJ 1n ~rivdtfJ, dlJpl!iJl'UnCl! lillW much moru importnrlt than
I'uullty; hu could not, would nut, OP~lJgll thu vutu ur t.tUJ Socll]ll~t f:lctl'ty
leArt~r9hlp which Insl~ted on the 9~nle all-or-nolhln~l tHrms, according tu
t.hnt !..Jnmn official, nnw IlvlnfJ In OKt LH.) 111 PortulJill 1 t.Bulf, thu :inmlJ
point Hpplil!!l. No Bouner din th" NHw Y,"'k I lin",., publbt, lilst mont\l tht!
fuports of large-scula CIA Involvemunt thun the Lluuun yavornmenl cnncluLJHlJ
it9 flrAt muJor negotlatlnn with Washington.
Whot might .,ell be hYl'othl!l11Bn, un the other hand, 1B thet your ,Illclaratlon!
l Bmboldannd tho Hnti-d"mocratlc forc"s within Portugal to nmulute their
inl!uloglcel cousins In Chile, to 19norl! the "'Hjority will ond tn hurl thu
country into civil WHr if ner.HS~ii.1ry to hl.3vU thrdr WHy. If ono accl]rJ"s the
IJnarguabJ" "videncl! that tho fjncial1st Party of ChilB was, in fact, n Left
Communist party (sine., it hllrl Hcorn",l ami splJrnllll tohlJ Thlrrl Tnt'lfnatlo'1iI1
for decadBs) and that the Christian Demncrotlc porty .,os, in: fact, t.h"
nemocratic socialist party of Chile, by w~sturn European political stal1lJords,
then you will comprehend kihy every event in PortlJgal since the overthrow of
the Salazar dictatorship has n~eatl!d n Chilean 8xperience---even the'
mannnr in which the non-democratic Left n"als wi th the military.
Yuu tnlkllr1 of thll rlurflw:rf.ltlc oloctilJnn bV which Allenrlu becamB PrHn1dBllt.
If WIJ WU1"l1 Lo Conuidlll' Lhu mUbt. f1XiJljtjt-Jl'ut.IHf InuLmll:ll. thu ,fllIDllcrnllc SlI!uctllJll
In prl;!wur liurmuny of Hllhtr, alii I tu urllll!l'ut.i1nd t.hat you ldllUlll h;IVU 111'llforrLHI
thll hulucl1u:Jt flrnt. ruthur thnll Lnunch It C':OVflJ't ncttUf1 prugrum tu PI'(Jv~Jnl
lIXCC:.HJlJll you koalA! Wertl bet"l] plllnnod Uv 1l"(1omoCriJtlciJllV-lllSL:tltlJ ~)lJvflJ'IUlutnt"7
Ubvluu:Jly nut. Wo art-J, 111 A1It'IUlU' 9 Cil~U, not. tijJllak 1ng of d1aboll eLI! pnrversi
ties of th~ Iii tlerlan dlm"noion, 110r ur~ '"0 t/]lklny?~8~~ tt",n R mo/Jost',
covert US effort to dissuade illlmolJeratlun end to prevont it frum runnIng wild,
as It did. The point 15 only that a human Judgment basad on thu real world
cannot be evaded by recourse to hollow slauons. Tn Chile, thrue succe~slva
US Amb"95nnor9~--oBCh oriylr,ally "ppoint",] to guv8!,"m"nt by the Kennerly
I1dmlni"trflt1on~--f.IlI1" the F"relgn SIIrvlc", not to lII11ntlon the CIA or John
F. and Hohort Kunnal1v. or an £il'fTlV of libl'r;jl Alnurlcan iJcm1um1c1arls. chllrchmun.

114
-15-
labor observers had over a period of eight or nine years stated that a
government led by Allende and dominated by the Communist and Socialist
perties intended to constrict very markedly, at the least, the two freedoms
on which our form of democrecy is bssert---of press and of association,
particulsrly labor unions. In 1970, aH in 1963, we knaw bayond a shadow of
reaaonable doubt thot an Allende government intended to uee the processus
nnd laws of what it callsd "formal democracy" to eliminate ~" and ruplaca it
l~lth what it cBlled "popular democrecy"---Hrl accurate dBBcrl~tlon WhUBB
meaning i~ known to every m~mbBr of tho Conyr""B. From 1961 to 1970, lh"
EmbBss~ liks the mejority of Congres~ agreed that such B development would
do seriou8 harm to US intereats and influence-for-good in the world.
As far as interference in internal political affaira ia concarned,
the US Congress has bean knowingly engaged in it for years. At very high
COGt. Not elways with candor either. The voting or withholding of funda
for food, for erms, for loens, had political eim,as often as not,although
cloaked in the pretext of "development". Is it not fair to Bay that when
the Nixon Administration ignored my explosive protests snd danied further
economic aid to the Frei Government in early 1969, it was caating'massiva
Bnd deliberate political vote---with CIA connivance---for the Right, and
ironically, for Allende? It could do so with impunity,incidentally, because
groups such as your subcommittee on latin American affairs had no interest.
Who, thon, hsd to deal with the consequenceA?
Or considsr the same problem from another angla. The majority of
Congress and of the American Bl~ctorat8 have 13xpresseO.one way or anothnr.
tho suspicion, or tha finding, that tho events surrounding tha Watergata
affeir thraatened ~emocratic procasa in the US. Vet nothing Richerd Nixon
and his ossociele5 did, or even contamplatllu, hogan to approximate th"
actions of a Chilean Prasident you persist to this day in labeling "rJemocrtltic!'.
Rock-hard information shows that Allende:
A. Arranged for the cavort importation and distribution of
illegal arms in.. hi~ country.
B. Sought by bribery, coercion and covort political action to
guin ownership or control of all media not conforming to
guvernment's desires.
C. Blackmailed, literally, ths two major opposition parties
(the Christian Democrats and the Nationals) and many of

115
-16-
their indlvidual Senators end Congressem, by threeteneng
to exposa incriminating, albeit ganarailled ~nd customary,
misuse of tha loaning mechAnism of the privsta benking
systam.
O. Approved and shared vary larga.bribee from foroign corporlltione.
E. flouted the will of lin independunt Congrsoe by invoking
dozons of tlmee tho rarely-used, ultimste constitutionsl
·duvicD. of "a degree of insistence" to 1<Jnoru VII toea IIndlor
loglnlation.
r. Ignored mejor judiciel decieions and denied the authority
of the courts.
G. Approved end exploited the altering of union ballots to
win determinant control uf the centralized labor union
confederetion and to become tha first government in the
hemiephere whose Minister of Labor ,"es elso head of the
labor confederatlon (a9 was onco the cae" In the Sovlet
Union) •
Much mare could be Bald. I would only inquire here by whet elaetic
yardstick do you gaugo "democratic". Is it tho double stendard thet 90me
apply to race? Is it ~ot Let.in America is somehow inferior, as your lack
of interest in the lete 196Ds might indicate, and that "democracy" hes
a diluted definition for Chilo? If so, I stAte hare categorically thet
under frei, Chile was ono of tho most politically freB ploceo on earth,
freer, in fact, than the US. I assort, too, that hed the United Stetes
not puraued my euggestion to provide covert old to tho media and to key
politiclane committed, I bellnvnrJ. to democratic Hnd .. conetitutional
1rl'OVlJ "!I1tiIll th8
proceAoea, Allande wUllln hovn unqu"Atiom,LJly wen/control 'If, h n-conforming
mallie thet matter,"l, nf thll lubor hlerarch.lu!l. an,l of 1I Congrnas trunsformen
into A "Pllopl"" IIHHnmLJly". How 10nlJ, l,y tim way, do you think thu
ind"pllndunca of Ilome n(.wepapers <lflr1 aoma radio Ilt"UllnB who~e viger Be
impruoBed you In, 1972 and '73 woulll have unllurud If 1 had furnished the
detaile Hr. Le~son was so anxiouH to pressure out of m,,?
I don't know wheth"r the disappearance of democracy in Chile merited
a 12,000,000 insurance policy in covert action, e5 I proposed in 1970,
on the two billion dollars voted by Congress in the previous decade to
sefeguard democracy in Chile and to make it e model for the rest of Letin

116
-17-
America. J know only thet I had said at tha baginning of 1968 and in
tha 1969 ennual Embassy Policy Stataments that the only vital interest
the US had in Chile wae that It remain a democracy and that If wa wera to
become indifferent to the fate of demucrecy In e country of Chile's caliber,
we wouln inevitably become indifferent to how we practiced democrecy et
home, 8 forOcBst that t balalv8 was borne out.
By mld-1970, e number uf other motlvetlons---strBtegiC and tactical,
international and rogional, weighed so heavily thet ~ened my previous
iron determination, often expreseed, to havo thH US Htay on the sidelinee,
to follolJ a strictly non-intervention1nr polir~! ~6 r euggeete,J a
mudast elactoral propagan~~dp~~g~am~n8YO~rm~~notC~is~Cto ~ava all my
reasons diecussed in public but I am prepared to do eo. ~, r offer
hare the full catalogua for public,pBX'usel:
1. Tha evowed aims oR the Marxist-Leninist Socialist end Communist
parties, and of their governmental leader, Salvador Allende, tb eliminate
"formalistic· damocracy---t1m kind thet the United Statee, Cenede, 5weeden
and Britain hava---and to replace it with ·populer democracy·---the kind
th~t Cube, East Germuny and CZ8choelovukia have.
2. The daclrlred aims of tha two ~artlus to extirpete US influence
the US,
In Chile and in LaUn America---to treetl In Aillmde'a pre-election words,
as "public enemy number oneIl In the hemisphere.
3. Tha Allende Government'e intention, e8 reported ~ainstakingly
for~n reeme of foreign Servica Officer cablee end dispetchea, in
thousands of CIA me~sagea from clendestine sources, in the'asseeements of
the three euccessiva Ambessedors in Senti ego, from 1961 to 1970, eech
H~1101nted to government originally by John f. 1'I0nntldy, to a11gn it!leH
with tho Caetro governmant In Cuba In e homiopharic effort to wipe out
US influences, end to become, in the worde of John F. Kennedy "e sRcnnd
IJridl}ohead" for thu Snvlut Union 1n thFJ huml~jJhliru ..
4. The knowlerJge thot lin Allenda government would Beek to maneuver
tho United Statee Into a ecepagoat role so es to avoid repayment ofl'elllount
approaching one billion dollars in loens originating with the US taxpeyer
end to justify the unpeid--the uncompen!lBted--nationalizetlon of US citizens
" .
property guerantees by the US taxpAyer under Congressional legisletion in
the emount of hundreds of millions of dollars.
5. The certain knowledge that tile Soviet Union end other Communist
governmants end organizations had provided for meny yeare and were providing

117
-16-
vary aubstantlal sums for covart political action to ths Communiat
party, to the Socialist Party and to Allenda himsslf. Thersfore we
anticipated (as quickly proved to be the CBSS in 1971) that ths USSR Rnd
Cuba would exploit fully these reletionshipe and that the USSR might (as
promptly occurrad in 1971) exert strong pressurss on ths Chilasn armed
forcss with the active aupport of Allende, to accept it ee the main
military suppliar and 1..11itary advieory group.
6. The certain knowledge that tha Christian Damocratic Party (poe),
the largest aingla political grouping in Chila and tha rsprssentstive of
the Democretic left, would be the main internsl targst of the MarxiatLeninist
govornment. I had vary, very, good raasons to anticipete that
tho party would not hava the matarial means or the morel or brganizetional
impetus to sustain itsalf as e vital party in Chile for very long without
outside help in advance of its certaIn criais. Tha PDC owed large amounts
of money to banks the Allende government would qUiCkly nationalize; we
reckoned that the Allende government would exploit bank nationelization to
blaCkmail, to coerce end to starve financially (as proved to be the case
starting quickly in 1971) numerous and influsntial members of the psrty.
The Allen~~~j~~~~'wera to silence political opposition, to compel the
Congress to accapt ita bills, and moat important, to dastroy the PDC by sowing
Internel diasension et every level. The PDC owned no netionel newspaper,
hod no TV outlet end influenced few of Santiago'a many redia stations at
the time of Allende'a alsction although it had besn ths govBrrnl~ for eix
yeers.
7. The certain knowladge thet the Allende government plenned to
gain quick control by coercion, bribery and monopoly euthority (ovsr all
credit, importa and pricea) of tha major indapandant media outlots_ The
CIA pereuaded ma-7-and I beleive today their assessment wee probably eorract--that
the affluent proprietors could not alone suatein for long the huga
deficits ths Allende Government would .(end did) rig or would be willin~
to underteke auch rlaky and costly non-conformity on their own---without
some material menlfeetation of e shared US concarn for a frae praaa.
6. Tha certein knowledge that the Allande government planned to
use bribery, coercion and its monopoly powers to echieve .monopoly control
of organized labor. (The Allends governmant did, in fact, resort to large118
-19-
of
~ae stuffing/bellot boxes eccording to non-CIA, US government evidence
to prevent Christian Democrats from diluting the Marxist-Leninist hold
on Chile'e one ConfedersHon of Trsde Unions. Under Allende, Chile beceme
the only country in the hemisphere over to imitate a Soviet example by
heving the Miniater of Labor, a Communist, aleo head the trade Unions.
9. The certain knowledga that the Kennedy Administretion had
perceived the threat no differently than I end that it and tha Johnaon
Administration had acted covertly on the aamo premiees 8e I recommonded,
but in a far more perveeiva, riekier And costly manner than levor contemplatad
and that the inertia of the meeeive commitments, both covert Bnd
overt of President Kannedy end Preaident Jphneoll, in snd to Chils)could
not be ignored. saw my true rule as not saying "whether" but llhow" and
tlwhen l1 the US would intervene.
10. The conviction that were the US to act indifferently to the fete
of a system ae represanted by a government (Frei'e) it hed most fevored in
t~e hemisphere becauee of its ettechmant to political democracy and to
dynamic social justice, the affncts would be davBotating in other countrioa
where a communist party had meaningful political influence or where ultraMarxiet-
Leniniets might pley e significant role. I had in mind not only,
or even primarily, Letin AmeriCa. Chile appeared to shafa Westarn EUfopean
political structure and outlook, so I spoke then to Washtngton of France,
Itely, Spain--even Jepan. It was e time, you may recall, when de Gaulle WaB
t11rnost ehJOpt from pllwef by a Mafxist-Leninist revolution.
11. ThA prob>lbll1ty that the govnrnmantA in Moacow and PukIng "Ol,ul<1
misread US indifferllnce in Chill!. I speak not of rhatoric but of action
sincA neithur of thu govurnmontu in thogo pillee9 afe Impre990d vllry much
by word9 alona. The very highest levels of thll Soviet Party dealt personally
with Chile and the Chileen Communist party, before and after Allende's
elaction. The Soviet Union sent as its Ambassador to Santiago, after Allande's
election, one of only three members of the Central Committee of the Communiet
Party it stationed in non-Communist capitals--the other two being Washington
snd Paris. Many other evidencee ara available to support my beliaf that
the Allende experience was saHn in Moecow 89 0 prscursor for other placua.
At the time of tha Chilaan electoral campaign, tha U~ engeged in thu reordering
of its reletions with the USSR Hnd the PRC. speculatsd to end In Washington
that if the US did nothing to sustain a democracy of the caliber of Chile--119
-Z[Ja
country which the US uovernment han told the Congress repeatedly
would be the model for ", progressive democracy--then al the I' or both
tho two major Communist powers might conclude that tho US disasters in
Indochina, the sUbBequent demoralizetion within the US and abandonment
in Chile---ln our own hemisphere---taken together with the evident crises
in West"rn Europe ilt that timo, signified a generAl Western coUnpae in
tha offing. ThflY might, I Aaid, anopt tha onolyuh of tha lunnurnhlp
or Allllndn'!'\ Ohm ~illr.\ull!Jt PLlrty--thUl thu US loIn:. 111I:lIpnlJlfl of t1urtllldlf1lj
tl!J lrlLoro~ntlnI1. IPi lhll lUHdul' uf thu Sucll111ul IJII I' ty , St. Altl\mtrHfltI,
kept ump'",,;lzing In Chile, th" cnlluf"'" of thu US ,.ouln bu hAstennu lty
kicklnq It hard flntl oFtlln.
12. Tha pel',,"nol conviction that i1 "do nothing" policy would
bfl il deliberate ami cowardly IIi50lmdiencA of the intent of the Congress
00 repe"tedly expre",md in thn legislative history of the Alliance for
Progress, the Foreign Assistance Acts ann National Security legislation.
Morllovor, In th!! particular ClISP. of Chil", the Executive IJranch, from 1961
to 1960 had justifiud its masslva involvemant, both covert and ovart, on
the groundn that WF-! waro supporting a prol]ressivp. 8nl1 stable democrAcy,
unique in laUn Amedca. Boid, and I say again today, that somoa''''
had to assume the fiduciary rt!sponsibill ty for COllllT\ltmunts marle by tho
Congress ,in the texpayers 0 name, moral alll! F1nfmcial. My responsiblll ty
1~~9 to l~y out the choicp-s, to glve my hnnnst Bsseusm~ntr to orgue lines
of nctlon, ratherthiln aw"it or hide the e1uivalent of a certain bankruptcy
exploding in tho f;Jl:t! of policy-milkers, taxpayers, "nd thuir uluctp.rl
rupresenti'll1ves.
13. The conviction that a personal representative of a Prosident
has An inoscapable unllgation--morel, intellectual, and bure"ucratlc--
to llAy to thB llIhi te HOUSB what he honeotly belie ves. Threo successi VA
Preuldonts he" cle"rly enunciet.lld to ttm public thllir vehemont opposition
to taJhat KonmJL1y C811urt the lI:=:Jtohllshmellt of "a seconrt brldgehlJDljl' 1n ttm
humls,.,h"ra. EverV "rB9il1ent, like every Congr9ss, h"a complained that
rlallberate disregar,l of their rlUliCIBB/~~lf-llervingbureaucracios undIJrminen
good government; in some cases, this Washington predilection encouraged
paranoia.
14. The awareness that the US wes overtly quite impotent. I had
watched for three yoars how the lKtreme Left (the Communists and Socialists)

120
-21-
had joined the Right to thwart the ma"sive investments and hopes of the
US taxpayer and CongreGs. The Socialists and Rightists syst8matically
sowed unrest in the military and combined to encourage Gen. Viaux in 1969
(as they would again with him and other Generals in 1970) to rebal against
the Frei [iovernmant. Tha Communists dustroyed tha major party of the centsr.
thY Radicals, by wanton bribary and blackmail from 196G to 1970; thsy also
plnntud iilJents At kuy levols in the Christian Democratic Pa"rty to ~ahJ
divlaiveneDs at critical momento. The CommunlstG. Socialists and Rightist"
cumbined to encourage lnflation, to black land reform and ather cruci~l Frui
mH,,,,urp,s that miqht permi t Chil8 to enjoy democracy find social
ju"tlce In continu~d stability.
My views were thoruughly ruported. They were eired. argued. weighed et
every appropriate level in the Stete Depertment (in "everal offices th8raof)
a" well as the CIA and) on very rare pre-election occasion, tha Whl tR Houge.
I dis8greed vAhemantly with the CIA in [968., 19G9, and 1970 and so stuted
on the wires, or orally to responsible State Department officials. I ~now
of no instance when I did not ~hara my information or opinions with th~
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America (including my privats conversations
in the White House) or when he, in turn, did not ehare my reports
with his Foreign Service deputy and with his superiors. I ~now of no
important instanca when the Foreign Service Officers in Santi go most knowledgable
of the political situation were not consulted or did not share in
the programming of US covert action. The US military was never consult"d
uy me on covert programs.
I arguRd strenunuoly a<jainst eny Inrtnpllndent action by th" ChUaan
military throughout my four yunrs in Chile (san balow for full detail");
I am told I "lost my cradlbility" in thu Whitu IlOUSH because of my "tubborn
Insistence In Supt.-Uct. 1970 on this point nnrt thBt therafore the Prusldent
used the CIA bahlnrt my back to deal diructly with plotting Chilean generals
to aee~ to prevent the Inauguration of Allende. The bizarre eplsodu ha,1
zero sum effect nn either Chilean or US policies hut it illustrates thu
dangllrs that were implicit in Whi te House-CIA programs inl lieted in Chile
by the Kennedy Administration without the knowledge of the then Amba~sador.
argued diractly with President Nixon for a policy of attempted
accomodation with Allende. I stressad the rola had played 65 a private
citizen in the successful efforts in 191.9-1950 to arrive at a modus vivendi
with the flto government; I s"id the US hall to avoid a aelf-fulfilllng
prophesy however currHct my r"porting Dnd "ndyel" might ba, by sHe~lnlJ

121
-22-
genulnely, an understanding with Allende. Starting a fortnight after
Allende's inauguration, in mid-November 1970, the US, through me, with
the support of the Stste Department, made an unremitting, strenuous,
innovative affort to re~ch e modus vivendi with Allende, the culmination
of which wae the offor to hevu the US Trso3ury yuarc"ty the ~lmoHt
worthless long-term bonds of the ChllsHn government.
Allende chase nat to. Th~ ultras in the leadorship of tha SociHlist
Party VHtOHd compromise in any way with "imperialism"; they elso rulod
out any cooperation with "bourgHoie reformers" in tho Chrietian D"mocratic
leodorehip. They insistod on an ell~or-nothing policy even though by
1973 the Soviat Union, China, and othere had rafusad to ancou~age such a
self-destructive egocentricity.
At no time did I suggest or did Washington instruct me to work for tha
overthrow of the Allonde regime. At no time did enyone give me "a greHn
light" or any instruction not firmly predicated on the prior action of the
Frai government. At no time, until [ read it ·four yeers leter in the New
York Times, did I heer or see thll word "destllbil1zll" in connection with US polle.
towards thll Allende government. At no time did I recommend or did I receive
instructions from Washington to follow with the Allende government any
poli~y other than the one I launched (against Presidential preference) and
pursued to reach understanding with it. (I have never been permitted,
should add here, to see the Colby testi~ony to the Hause Committee which
the Messers Harrington and Levenson disseminated to the Washington Post end
the New York Times. Nor in four subllequent years of suatained effort to
root out the truth about whet the Nixon Adminietretion did in Septcmber-
Uctober 1970---8nd later---with the Chilean military, did anyone in Stete,
CIA, NSC, or the military, verify my euspiclons, articulatad in timaly and
unmistokabla alarms, by repeated cable bafore the events, until the staff
of this Select Committoe ociefl!ll me, sketchily too, this past summsr.)
The sale policy to which I edhererl throughout my four full yeers In
Chilp was to protect and strengthen llberel and progressive democracy in one
of the shrinking circls of nations that practiced that form of government.
Much has been ~ade by the staff of the Select ~ommittee, and by others,
of th~ "two tracks" US policy followed in Chile in September-October 1970;
some would stitch a new myth to suit their consciences or their politics or
t~eir institutions; they would like the Committee to believe that no real
difference existed between the "diplomatic" Trick I I followed and the

122
-23-
'covert militery' Track II the White Houae launched.
Hogwashl
Track I followed Mr. Frei, still the Presidsnt of Chi Is snd its
Constitutional leader; it adopted cartain minimal and cosmetic auggestione
put forward by one purportedly in Frai's confidence; Track I led npwhere
becauee President Frei would notencourege or lead any Chilean military
action and becauae I would neither have the US, through the CI~or anyona
elee, even in the private community, aseume a responeibility thet had to
be Chilean. Trank II, on the oth~r hand, did not daal with Frei, did not
saek hie concurrence, did not follow his lead, did not pretend to be within
the Constitutional framework of Chile. Trao~ II slid into a trap to which
I had oft alludad in my cablss sincs 1969:---thst the extrems Left had
infiltrated ths militsry plotters to encourage eedition and that it also
actad, or would sct, ss sgsnta-provocatsurs. In ths incidsnt which ended
with the murder of Generel Schneider, a msn I raspected greatly, tha
extreme Left was vsry much involved. Indeed, the Allende ,government was
remerkably lenient in ite punishment of General Schneider'a killers and of
thoee incrimineted beceuse, among other coneideratione, the military
investigatore who tracked and nemed the murderere and their accomplices
discovered the links to extreme Left activists who were intimetes of, and
supportere of, Allende.
Becauee of your propenoity for rewriting history, I l(st herp In
comprahunaive form .the actions I took to follow e policy totally different"
in dirsction then Traok II snd to protsct tha US from eny compliCity in
Chileen militsry edventures:
A. I barred, from 1969 on, any US Embasay or US military contact with
the circle eround General Viaux. renawsd this ban in ths strongast terms
again and again in 1970 and thareafter. checked periodically by direct
questioning of ths CIA snd of the military attach~ and by corroborativa
investigation, to sstiafy mysalf that this order was being carried out~
B. I barrad the CIA, in lats 1968 or aarly 1969, from sny oparationsl
contact with tha Chilean military without my pri~r knowledge and approval.
(I csn rscall no psrmissive instance), from any physicsl contact with a
colona 1 or higher rank, from any contact with Frei or any Minister or
deputy Minister, from any contact with sny major political figure without my
prior approvsl (rarely givsn) or 'ny contact with ths head of, or a leading

123
-2 1.-
fillLJP! if1 ;} gOVI!rrl":'ll-~nt a~(~nr.v ,-J:..:.iljr: rro1n thL~ ;]Pi)r.:Jv(~(J li~ir.,'Jn wi tl, tIlL:
Ctlile<:m palice~ I ctln.r.:ken in I?vcry conceivd~]l[! lJay. rt?QuLlrly.
C. I lmrred From Ctlilp..FollohJing thu Vi~ux uprising in 1%9, thf! visit
of ~ny Qeneral officer of the IJS ~l'med forc~5 llnless all ~AC~Qtional ~rlrJ
pl!I'!luasivp. C8!J~ Wl!rf~ maGQ ttl Id'l~;/linr]tQn i:lnrj to me; [ llarreLl the visi ts of
:llLJst US military pr~r';onrJ!'-"!l for ;'lny rP.tlSj~11 oUwr than () :.trictly ~Jrorcs~jiunal
um.]. r·Hliti.lry vi~,itor;j 1H-;!carnp so fare the Chilei3n government. dnn Armed
F~rce~i l:omnlJine[! to ~8.
D. (reducr.d in 1'J6:J ~n:j 1'J69 over 5tronu oppo:dtion in ttl'? LJlJtJ:W';y,
in the Canal lOfoie t in the Pentagon aneJ elsellJhefC in Wi1~hingtnn, t.h~ number
of mil i t~ry 810ts in the 1-i.1AG from 68 to a muximum of I'.; [ g~v" the Frp.\
C]ovp.rnmsr.t .the chaicp. of :loy numb~r from 14 to znro 8nd told them r prl1fcrrcrl
zero---as I al~o Lold the Allende governmrmt i:'lS soon H!3 it w3S inst;.lllnr1.
E. I reduced th" j·lilit.ary iittaclm ·strength in 1957-59 to rOlJ9hly .tlalf
by elimin~tion of the Air Attacha'8 pl~n". the deputy Air and Naval Attaches'
pasitionn dn~ corrAspon~iny rAductian5.
F. was thp. riel.I:I lC'ar1,~r in the hernif);J!lore, ::;Li'lrting ill 19GD tJllrJ
contilluintJ until ,1'.y rh,>piJrture in lr:J71, of M campni::j;'1 to pliminilte thl2 Southern
r:ornmanr1 in the Canal LonA and trJ transfer to the conl.innnt:Jj Uni t",1 ~t"tlJn
r~5ponsibility fur a stripped-dawn military preSl.:!nr.~! in ttln tH:rniGpheru.
G. I rebuffed, peremptorily, a very. vary influential Chilean In
lkt.ohur, 1970, (f];111 OI~(jin in 19','1) l,.. h~n hE (and oth!?rg) urlJf-'rJ rna to .pay
~ome ~ttnntion Lo the militill"Y.
H. I con<ji~:tpntl\o' l.mrnt~:J the ('1i)(ul1 ,11:~minisl.rilt.ion UEJt th::! i:hi 1!!I:.m
mili tary ""'5 not a fourth u:1d CDvart pulley nlt"rn;nive in Ctlile. :/:
I. I infol'l1unJ the Fr~i governmont, t1!.iJJ.lOUt. rJ,l.-ll1 r : tn jnfnrm i1;rj~j~linQton,(J
in the ~'uptP.ln1.Jp.r l:i-uctohcr lC; puriod of th8 MI1~t likf~l'J u:;:.,;Js!:iin of ~fi~r=;;Je--d
rrtilitarv In;]rl t.hr~1I in\!nlvr~rl jn pnJvocntivc <Jets 1.hrolJ1hmJt. ~';iJntialJo. Itf!
bJL.J~; urrl!stt-!d soon t.tU!L'prlftl!1', tdoll bl!for(! thn ;p;sd~-;~~ir:-lt;ion r.-.t" G!!fH~j';)t
Schneider.
J. c1issuaded US p.rivatl~ citizens who were ClLJnuL t.o ~;~ ~:1".h1l1 intu the
mrichinalions of Chilean milit8ry opponents of Allende in the S2pter.lbl!rOctober
]970 p8riod; I oteered them clear on pain of hRin9 rcport8d to th~ir
hnmr! offir.f~G~
I'l. ~jrJUfJllt VJ ,~li~~~;.Jjl.-lr ('I'I'I,.lil1 lJt'll-~JIL:L:r,l iJ1L1r:i'll, f:Lt..i.len': lulln u.J~r(:
,11y rrif~nrJ!j f'fllm c:untinlJinq t.hr-:ir ,0 ;~--'Ocidti(1n~; lJlit.!l :~Ill]l':!n :nilil,I-:'/ O~liJ[jn,~ntr;;

124
-25-
of Allende.
L. I informed ths Frei Qovernmsnt unequivocally in September and
October 1970 on esv,bal occdsions that the Unitud Statas had not support ad
or sncouragad,and would not, any action by the Chilean militery taken
independently of Prasident Frei, and without his prior knowlsdgs and con~ent.
M. I replied to a Query by a Chilaan Genora1 to our Army Attache
in September 1970 as to the US ettitude towards a military much concerned
over Allende's intentions thst I was plaased to know they ahared somo of
our own concerns but that I wae confident the military would find a
democretic way to protact the constitution of Chile. (The ore1 measage
was draftad by my deputy, a FSO.) I never heard again from the Chilaan
military on that subject.
N. I was pressed in September and October by Waahington to devalop
possible scenarios for independent Chilean military intervention in Chile.
Without sxception, my responsse excluded all possibilities. Indeed r warned
gratuitously and very etrongly on two occasions, I believe, that if anyone
were considering such schemes, it would be disaet/rous for US intersste.
o. I requested my deputy (now the US Ambeesador to Venezuele) in
esrly October 1970, to investigate my suspicion that the CIA was "up to
eomething behind my back". I questioned him closely end repeetedly as to
whather he had discovered anything corroboretive; aleo e~iffed Braund the
Embesey on my own. The DCM told me there wes no basie for my suspicion.
P. Tha Nixon Administretion end the CIA went to such paine to hida
from me the 50-called TrBck~ II---ite covert deelings with the Chilean
militory---thet my independent queetioning the past five yeers failed to
uncover an iota of proof. One former high US government official in mid1975
told me only thet ! had "loet mv credibility" in tho White House when
opposed US ectione to encourege or incite the Chileen militery.
Q. The one occeeion I loet my temper with enother Amerlcen in the
presence of a witness was in Saptember 1970 (eae below) when the CIA station
chief balabored me in the OCM's office for not applying preesure on Frei to
move to stop Allende. replied that either he renounce any euch idee
immedietely or leeve the country within 24 houre~ No such pressures were
ever applied es President Frei can ettest end has attested.
-0-

125
-2h-
Track II had legitimacy because the CIA told the President what he
wished to heBr and what I had rejected:---that the Chilean mill tory was a
possible 3lt8rnAtiv8 to tho thr~fl other policies we In the EmbAssv. State,
~$P,!>£""'_J we
enr1 c:thsr[x[!cutivH.....,!f·mtl r.[)n~Jir18rnr1 HmJ. in 8fr~H.:t, /<:tdopt~d:---(l) to I.olork
nut H mul1un vivendi, en to folllH" a cuol lllJt r:orrrJct flprHDfJch, (3) to
e.:::.n.d u-'I n...,...- .'/1 ~.- .
hRrO:PI and tlln(1Hr~:vt ldll~;l t.hn 8r1f111j kind of' 11!f1ittrnacy provlduLl by Ull!
Nationnl IntalllgancD fgtimate or 19GB which hed .0 denigrated the Frel
govern'llnnt's efforts, which Bchm!d ttl(! V!BW9 of only one minority 9p.gmt:=mt
of Chilean opinion (and, the Station Chief) and which lod to the cutting-off
of further aid to Frl~lls gnv8rnment~
The CIA Is amoral. It was authorized by Congress to be so. It was
paid to be. Its true power, I believe, originates not with Its perceptions
of the Soviet Union, or ths Cold War, or sven ths dehumanizing nature of
soms of its operational assignments. It could operate behind my baCk, not
merely with the President of the Unitad States, but with Chileans, and
private Americans, because the whole process of eeplonage snd intelli'lnnce,
like knowledge, confers immense power, and, because the CIA war. the one
permanent institution to tie the past to the present In the influential and
pervasive "rena of clandestine political activity. Neither the Kennedys or
the Johnsons anticipated that their private, unrecorded, dealings with the
CIA---and through the CIA with galaxies of foreign and domestic configurations---
would inflate the independent powHr of the CIA; the Agency becamH
thy only repository of pregnant secrets once the Pr8.I~Bnt" end their
reRnpctlvH ~{1v188rs. left the ~lcen8. The CIA ~urviv8r1 thl~m. Tn Chl1A, the
CIA coulrl a~I!·HJrt [li~ln!lnnou:Jly tn mn that it t,1,)~ not. Invalvurl til cUl'tnin
rBlflt\un8hlIJ~ becnuse it WB~ capltall11ng on I,J8b:i of ]'~lotlonst'tp~ spun by
thy Kennudy A~mlnistratlon and unknown to me. In pldln english, the CIA
could deal ",1th one person and calculate unerringly that the same person could
deal with others, as they had In IY61 and Ig64. In that sense, the CIA
cDuld be an IItnvlsible ll gaverntnent.
Thu men and women of the CIA In Chile did a superb prafesslonal Job for
the most pert; they were motivaten by what thuy understood to be their
rightful responsibilities and by precedents legitimatized by successive
presidents and Congresses. No lew of the US was ever contravened, by letter
or spirit, to my knowledge by anyona in Chile. (The one questionable
67-H6 0 - 76 - 9

126
-27-
arose
ocoasioi\JWhen I was informed by the CIA that a CBS correspondont had been
overheard in enother country recounting, in en extremely provocative manner,
to e Communist leader a background briafing I had provided the Americen
preBs; I thenked the CIA for its eolicitude end edvisad it to do ebsolutely
nothing about it.)
-0-
I heve written the detaile for the first time for the public record
because it is e sort of lest testament, because I em outreged by what this
generation of the American public---and Swedes and Germans end Japanese and
Chileans and everyone---has been led to accept by contemptible penderers
of false fables, and because it is elBO e reaffirmation of my faith in our
system---in thosa in the Congress or the press· or government who have a
respect for objectiVity and for history. I am Wholeheartedly for public
debate to define the role, if any, of a CIA. I am prepared to anawer any
Questione, to etay in Washington as long se i9 nsceassry, to apask for the
record and to back anything a~id herein or to tha Committee by any verifying
devi ce.
But if the public is once again to be cheated, if it ie to have dart
guns pulled from e dusty shelf to weve for lurid titillation and headlines--and
not be told openly and adultlythat the same gun had been displayed
years earlisr to an spproving Congrsssional committse---then I fesr the
ultimate result will be s still lower ssteem for politicisns and politics.
And that, Mr. Cheirman, is what the e.treme Left of Chile cultivated throughout
the Frei years with ths aims of eliminating Chilean democrecy and of
imposing their morel ebsolutism.
This letter is my public statement to the Select Committee. It ia not,
cannot be, all-inclueive. However, I raQuest ite prompt distribution to
the Committee's members. I send it in tima for your and their carsful
and privats, unpublicized consideratlun. do so without any prior

127
-28-
consultation with anyone. I have lived in almost toel seclusion for many
months. I heve no connections (nor contacts) with any person In governmant,
in the press, in the lew, in commert:j;£;, benking or industry; I have no
pansions, no obligatione or favors or debts to eny pareon or institution
to influence my testimony other than my debt to this country and to history.
I ask only that thie etatement, thie letter, be included in the public
record whenever the Committee publishee its first report on any aspect of
tho Chilean affair. My orel, prepered statement in public eession will
draw briefly on the foregoing and will deal impereonally with those mattera
the Committee etaff has indicated the Senators wish to explore.
Sincerely,
v'rl2-r,
Edward M. Korry

128
EXHIBIT 5
254
of Stelte
292352Z
8865
DejJartlllClli
OCT-01
&2
ACTION SSueS
INFO
PAGE 01
o R 292240Z SFP 71
FH AHEM0ASSy SANTIAGO
TO SECSTA~E "ASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AME~BASSY BRASIL!~
AHE~BASSY LrM~ 'c
o
'
AHE"6ASSY C.~.CAS
AMC"'BASSY MEXICO
AMEM6A5;:Y R~ME
A:1E~BASSY BONN
AMf;'"BA5SY PARIS
AME~BASSY BRUSSELS
AME~BASSY '.~NDON
AMEMBA5SY MOSCDW
PASS OPIC
SUBJECT. COpPER CRUNCH I PART I; J
I Or 2
REF. SANT:A~G 4975
1~ T~l~ CRUNCH OVER COPPER IS ~ CELTS RA!E ?OLITICA~. D~CIS:C~
0',' .ALL7.NOEg F~AGl'lAr;C AL:'Et<,"":A:-::V[S '.... R[ OF"FcR:::J '..~:...; '",'(l~tl.D
NE:THER HAVE CAMAGED CHILE'S [CONOMi POSliIC\ N=~ 'FF~UN;F)
:TS GOVERNMENT'S IOEOLGG!CAL PRETENS!CNSQ TH£Y ~~E~~
SPUQN£O !N'r~VOR C~ A CONScrJUS CH:"'LLENS~ TO InE ~~Auli~O~
O~ 0S DErENSE O~ rrs MAJOR AUs!r~ESS !N?ERES;; !~ .. trT~
AHEqICA AND IN PURSUIT' OF AVOWED "R£:'/OLU'''IIICN'':'~Y:1 !DC/.,LS
AND AIMS,
2~ ~NY CONS~~ER OF TH!S [M3ASS~'S M~SSAG~S C~~ YE~n {GO
WJ!.L RECALl. THAT ~E REGARDED ftS hN iRR~VOCAUL~ rr~~"iy~~rL:-Y
THAT THE GOC WOULD IMPOSE U~ILATER'L~Y A SEVE~E ~.DG~ENT
(~ \..1
N TTO
"~()~"'I'""C~-'··"·\~. __
BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT IHc AU~!tORmTTeJN""OfTH: EXECUTIVE SEGETAR~'
1 ThiN exblblt, with l1l'CIIlHslllcation stamp Ilnd dl!letions, was given to the Select CoD).
mltt..e by Ambn.lllldor Korry.

129
DejJart17lellt Of State
ON THE ANAC~NDA AND KENNeCOTT COPP~R COMPANIES, DESPITE
THIS AND OTHER GLOOMY FORECASTS, .E OPTED FOR A POLIcy OF
SEEKING TO o~OVE .RONG OUR O~N ANALYSIS AND TO AVO!O
SELF-FULFILLING PROPHESIES.
3,THUS, STAiniNG LAST NOVEM?ER, WE WORKED TO ESTAPI..!SH
PRAGMATIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ALLENDE GOVERN~ENT THAT
COU~D PERMIT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PRIVATE US
COMPANIES AND A SOCIALIST STATE, OUR F!RS7 SUC,-ESS[S wERE
QuIrE MUDEST, Wi'lNTERVENED DISCREETLY TO DE rUSE A NOISY
CONFRONTATr~~ BETWEEN NIECO AND THE GOC SO THA7 THE INDI6 N•
COM~ANY RECEivED COMPENSATION ~OR ITS INTER~ENEO PLANT AND
ITS AMERICA~ MANAGER STAY~D OUT OF JAIL. NEXT CAME THE
RALSTON-PURINA ESPISODE, ALSA A C~SE OF IMPETUOUS GOe INrE~VE~TIO~
1 ALMOST A YEAR LATER, A~ AMICABLE ACCORD IS NfAP. THA~KS :~
LARGE MEASU~E TO OUR GOOD OFFICES, IN JANUARY, BECAUS~
OPIC INSURANCE WAS I~VOLVEO, wE COULD PERSUADE 9ETH~E~EM
STEEL AND ,~RRO COPPER TO AVOID REFLEXIVE RC(OV~SS TO T~E
US TAXPAYER IVIA INSURANCE PAYMENTI OR TO 3IG SilC~
DIPLOMACY A~D TO PERSIST' wrTH OUR HeLP' TO CONVER'
TENrENTIOUSLY.WORDED ULTIMATA Fno~ i~S GOC INTO CONiP£CTS.
I GUIDED THESE NEGOTIATIONS OVER ~A~Y MONTHS TO SUCCESSFUL
ACC"ROS. THO FORMER FINALLY SrlNG SJG~ED A~D T~E LATTER
STILL IN ABEYA~CE DESPITE ALLENDE'S PERSONAL APPROVAL.
4, ~EPENDE:NG UPON THE DESIRE OF A COMPANY TO RETAIN A
FOOTHOLD IN CHILE
OR_TO SALVAGE ADEQUATE COMpENSATION UPON BEING ,ORcEDClUT
) -
WE U'iRc~1 I n I NG'_ 't
PURSUlOD pRAcTICAL SETTLEMENTS. DESPPE SOME UNPLA';~'cO
EPI~ODES THA~ BETRAYED MUTUAL O~F!CIAL OISTRusr !N !HE
RESPECTIVE CAPITALS AND THAT NQUR'S~ED HUNGRY TvPEwPITEqS.
PUR G009 DFFICES. THE GOOD SENSE OF THE CeMp~N!ES DR "seALS
O~ THE GOVT COINCIDED To AVOID IRRECQNCIU:;'_E O!SPl'T!:S IN
lABOR, PRODUCTION, FINANCIAL AND CCMPENSA~;ON MATTERS.
5. "EHINO T~IS 9ROAO.GAUGED, FATIGUIGING A~9 PERS:S~(N~
EFFORT, WELL DOCUMENTED IN THE CABLES, WERE THE IMPERATIVES
OF ~ESPONSI9LE BEHAVIOR IMPOSED UPON BIG DEMOCRATIC
POWERS, THERE WAS ALSO A LURKING LONG.SHOT POSSIBILITY·-
NO-1",O BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT H1E AUTHOlfllATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

130
DejJ cut III e111 UJ
J3 SANTIA 05020 01 OF ~2 292352Z
A RHYT~M OF CONCORD MIGHT CONJucT THE rlARXrSTS TO
'CILIAT"~Y VIE~ OF THE MOST VOLATILE AND WEIGHTY nF
NTIAL p~oaLEM~ -
IN PAR71CULAR, THE SUCCESS ACHIEVED IN TH~ BETHLEHEM
3nT1ATED NATIO~LrlAIION ANO THE ~£SSONS DERIVED ~no~ THE
TENTIALLY CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF OP!C INSURANCE IN SUCH
RSAINI~G STRENGTHENEO A FEELING THAT PERHAPS THE LONG SHO·
JULD PAY O~F. WHEN WE HAD A?OEARED TO HAVE WON ANOTH~R
,TERIM BE' •• THE ~6,Z0Z,000 DOLLA~ CE~RO corPER ~C(ORD IN
:O_MAYo_THE AGE OF AQu.RluS SEEMED TD BE DAWN!NG. BUT
HE'-! A:"LENDf: WAS TOLD HE COULD IWi S;GN THE AGREEM[N"' HE
:AD PERSONALLY APPROVED, WHEN HOW OWN SOCIA~!ST PARTy MAD£
THI- VETO STICK AND WHEN THEIR COM~U~:5T ~L~IES Wn~LO OR
CO, NOT ALTER THE LDGrCOF THIS MORE REVOLUTIONARY VIEW.
NOT EVEN A~LENDE'S REPEATED PQQMISES THAT A~L ~CULD END
wEL~ COULD UNCROSS OUR sTA~S IN CHiLE.
7. 'IONETH£LESS, IN MID"AUGUSTJ~
·IAN EXCEPT\ON',L
EFF('RT T,) DEFLEcT THE DyNAMiCS OF I-ilciQ1ly WAS UUNCfllD
I-iER£. I SOUGHT, FI~$T IN NE~ YORK, wiTH SUCCSSS, TO
ENLIST 7HE SU?POI~T' O~ THE COPPER COM?ANiES ~OR ~ MOR~
POSITIVE ATTITUDE. TO DANGLE CARROTS OF SUPPORT FO~
INT£RNATIONAL'ASSISTANCE TO THE CHILEAN CoprER EXPANSICN
PR08RAI1 !NS,TEAD OF MEREL \' ><pl1MERING ON TitlE
RETRIBUTIVE PDSSIDILITIES'L.
- UPON
RETuRN!NG TfJ SANTIAGO~ ON MY Oi-ltJ AUY~OR!T'{I r s,Ju:;il 70
INCITE THE INTEREST GF THE ALLENDE GCVT IN AN U~ORiH0DOX
BA~GA!N iHAT WOULD HAVE PE~MIT'EO SATISF~CT!ON OF THE
MINIMAL REQUISI,ES OF OUR T~O GOYTS ANO OF THREE cOMrANIES .. -
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WiTHOUT T~ONOF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

131
Department of State
. PAGE ~4 SANTIA 0502e 01 OF 02 292352Z
THE BIG TWO OF COPPER AND THE THEN'INrERVENTION.MENANCED
, KORRY
r'lOT fO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TilE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETA~Y

132
Department of State
82
AcTION SS-25
INEO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE·00 /026 W
o R 292240Z SEP 71
~M AMEMBASSy SANTIAGO
, TO 5ECSTATE WAS~DC iMMEDIATE R866
:NFo HIEMBASSY e,\JENOS AIRES
A"EMBASSY B~ASI~[A
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
A~E~'BASSY ~!f.X I CO
AMEMBASSY Rf)"'\E
AMEMBASSY BON"I
AME"BASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY B~USSELS
A~EMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOfl
014679
~ELEPHO'IE COMPA"IY OF ~TT IWITH ITS 105 MILLION DOLLARS
OF 'CTIVE OpIC EXPRGPnlATION INSURANCEJ. iF THE GOC
WOULO :NOIC,TE ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER MY
~ORMULAT!ON. I UNDERTOOK TO SEEK WASHINGTON'S AND THE
COMCANIES' SUPPORT-
'8. THE GOC WOULO, UNDER THIS FOAMULA OR SOME VARIATION.
HAVE NEGOTI,TEO COMDENSATION TO 8E PAID OVER 12 IITTI
TO 20 :COPPERI YEARS TO EACH CO~PANY_ PAYMENTS WOULD
, SE MADE IW qCNDS WITH A REASONABLE RATE OF INTEREST.
'e THE COMflAN:rS, IN "'URN, WOUl.D REQUEST OF':C 70 UT IL I ZE
':7S LEGAL FLEXIBILITY TO GUA~INrEE SOME OR ALL THE
COMPENSATIO~ BONDS EITHER ~IHEC1L~ OR HY 7H~NSFER
FRO~ EQUITY TO CE~T COVERAGE. H!TH SUCH USG
GUAQANTy, THE COMPANIFS COULU DISCOUNT AND TRANSFORM
!NT0 C~SH A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF THE ALMOST WORTHLESS
LONG-TERM CHILEAN OBLIGATIONS, THIS ATTRACTiON WOULD IN TURN
BE AN INCENTIVE TO THE COMPANIES TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF
.~OTIO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT Ttt{r.~~f,i'\:HONOF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

133
DejJart/lle/lt of State ii:~;\ rr:1~r?riJ;!i,:\
~ L,~J~0'1~\\!f'\~:I\}U
COMDENSAT1(1·)~ :rJUSiJ cr,MPE~;SA.r!OIJ viClU:"L) ::'~ ~;L'PSTt,N-;-:('\LLY
LOWERED AND lJ'I~LATERA~L_Y II~PJsE[) qy SC1C \'~T ACCF~TARLE
TO THE COMPAI~![S 8:::CAlJSE llF T~1E i1'.JCH FP,STt:r.; A~D ~IDKE
CERTAIN PAYOU'r~ THE USG; FOR I~S F1AqT, ~IOULD AV()I0 IMMEDIATE
op!r ~r\SURA"JCE LIASILITY TO T~E CCRPO:-.'Ai!~'\;Sj...-A~ULD ESCAPE
CONGRES§!ON'L BATTLES ovER THIS C~NTI~GENCY L -.-J' IWULD SUASTITlJTE vmG"TERI1 OBLIGt,TIU"S ,OR SHORT!
ER~ l.lABILITIES ANn WOULD HAVE ACHIEVE!) A WORKl~G RELATIONSHIP
WITH CHILE ":r~6u, ?LEDGING F,ESH RESOURCES,
9. IN THE AASENCE G~ ALLENDr 'ND FONNIN ALMEYDA. THEN ON
A r~uR o~ N~~T~:ER~ COUN7rIESJ ! FI~ST SOlJNUE0 FELIPE HERRERA)
THE EX.PRE510EN~ OF THE IDB .HDM CHILE HAS NOW FDRMALLY
PR8 D OSED AS SUCCESSOR TO U THANT, HIS REACTIO~ WAS
UNRo-SERVED'_Y o-AVORARLE, HE S~ TOLD THE AC-,jIJG P,ESIDE~TI
MINjNTERIOR TOHA, AND ARRANGED FOR ME TO B~IEF AL~[YOA
ON THE LATTER'S RETURN. ANOTHER CONTACT W~S CARLOS MATUS, THE
SOCIALIST P~ES:DENT OF THE PIGGEST ENTERPRISE IN CHILE' CAP,
THE STEEL A~O IR~N STATE CO~~~NY, WHO HAD ~EEN THE CHiEF
NE GnTI AT 0 R I ~ THE CERR 0 A'J 0 90- THLEHUl 0 EALS, HE. TOO; ~: AS
VERy POSITIvE OVEq WHAT HE DESCRI9ED AS AN EASY
ESC,PE FROM CONFRONTATION. LI_[ HFRRERA' He FllT THAT THE
PRO~OSAL wOULD LEAD TO AN EASING OF THE CReDIT SQUEEZE ON
CHILE, WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE EST OF THE WORLD AS A
SIG~ OF TOLERABLE RELATIONS AT LEAST BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRI~S
AND wOULD CJNTRIBUTE TO A pRoo-QUNO CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF
RELATIONS BETWEEN LATAH AND THE us. HE , IN TUR~, CONTACTED
HIS RELATIVE, THE INFLUENTIAL YOUNG ECONOMIST/JOqGE ARRATE,
WHO HAD JUST BEE~ APPOINTED BY ALLENDE TO 0E HIs CHIEF
COPPER TECHNICIAN. AqRATE, O~ ALLENDE'S INS-RUCTIONS, MET
WiTH MATUS AND ME SEPT !~ A~O WIT~IN AN HDJR RR!E.ED ALLENDE':
HE PRES I DE,'jT A,SKED ME TO BE i(~ADY FOi~ A ll"':~N~ T0 .. ~,"~11
-AL~ THAT TOOK PLACE SEPT 27 jSE?TELi. I B~DACHED THE SU~JECT
TOG WITH"THo- CHIEF NEGOTIAiD~ IN THE ITT CASE. SU]SECRETARy
OF ~CONOMY GAR~ETONI y!S I~TE~Esr WAS SlJrFICIE~TLY PI~UED
TO ~RIEF HIs MINISTER VUSKOVIC A~D TOHA,
,~NEXT I qESPONDED IN DETAIL FOR TWO HOURS TO A QIliGATION
1 .II' (j..'-",.j.-
~ \WHO WERE PRO~PiED TO CALL ON ~E SE?T ~.-f
~~'l:'K'""ft·"'AC',,,S~c:- TO -" ~ ~ U! REA '3 0UT THe STAT E 0F NeG C' TIATI 0~ s :-~I TO LD
THE- THERE WERE NO ~EGOTIATIJNS, ONLY A COUR~EOJS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TI'~I'II\:ti1to~Ol'<OFTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

134
Department of Stetfe
.J
PAGE 03 SANTIA ~5020 02 OF 02 3D0044Z
AUDIENCE L:STENING TO A PROPOSAL THAT WAS PERSON~L~-- l'
,j'rHEY UNDERSTOOD, TOO, I ASSUME, '__,--::::-:
-THAT MY MO;''I\;E' J:~~ISHING A COMPLETE AND CANDID BRIEPING
WAS TO FASHION ~,STRONG US DEFENSE IN THE EVENT OF THE GOC
OPTING FOR t-....cRUNCH; AND TO ?,<OIfOKE THEM INTO SUPPORTING_
OUR EFFORTS t-- 51 '
:1- THE SAME DAY, J USED A CH,NCE ENCOUNTER WITH THE
COMMUNIST PARTY'S GENIUS' Sr.NAT8R TEITELBOIM. T8 TOUCH UPON
THEsE MATTE~S AND TO INQUIRE NHY HE HAD ADOPTED AS HIS THE ADVICE
HE HAD CAUTIONED ME LAST NOV 4 TO ADJURE. THAT OF BEING A
nCATASTROPHIST" iHIS WORDI IN PURSUIT OF WORSENING RELATIONS.
AGAIN THE BRIEF BRUSH ALLOWFD A SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE WHICH
HAS SOO~ FOLLOWED BY THE LONG-DELAYED COURTESY CALL OF THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR BASSOV. THE LATTER wAS PARTICULARLy
INTERESTED IN THE PROSPECTS JF OUR RELATIONS ~ITH CHILE AND
MY PREDICTION OF UNRELIEVED PCSSIMISM PROVOKED HIS PROLONGED
lALMOST TWO HOURS; INTEqROOATION REGARDING THE OPTIONS.
MY "AIN MESSAGE TO HIM WAS THAT IF THE SOVIETS HAD DECIDED
OR WOULD DECIDE TO KEEP THE CHILEAN ECONOMY AFLOAT IN 1972,
:7 WOULD COST APpnO'IMATELY 25~ TO 3se MILLION COLLARS IN
HAR0 CURRENCY OR THE EQUIVALENT IN CONSUME~ SUPPLY ITEMS.
(
, """" "'!'" "'''''' ""'"0''''' "" 'e, '""~
i ---~J
,/1/, II/I'" I' " I I \:
\
'...~ " \, \', \ I' ,I" '! I . I, I I I I II I ., I ,I I I I I ' I I I.' I 'l I j j tJ 'I j l' I J ~, ~ J {l J.,. ( ____!J
Ill. \ !' \,1 1\ \1. li'\f't I\"I~' \ 'I)' ,'\ ;} h
\~l'\\\\\\ t \ \,,~I \, \ ','" ',' ".lllA.IJI~\' ',:1,': :\'!.\ :- ,','~ ...
\t'\t"i\\, ' , I" ~,~\ ~\';;'\\.\;..\:, .:.... :: .... \' .. ~~'.5 -

135
Depct rt 1ll C11 t of 5t ct l e 1\-;;';::'.'
Ul.~
PAGE 04 . SANTIA 05020 02 OF ~2 300044Z
DETAILED RE~ORD WITHOUT SHAME e~FORE ANY KIND CF AUDIENCE,
EVEN THOSE EDITORIALISTS AT HOME WHO HAVE NEVER READ THE
ALLENDE PROGRAM, WHO KNOW NOTHING or THE COMMIT~[NTS Q~
THE SOCIALIsT AND CDMMUNIST P,RTIES HERE, WHO U~DERSTANJ
LITTLE OF THE DyNAMICS OFCOVTEMPOR&RY LATAM AN~ WHO
REVEL IN ASSUMING GUILT FOR THEIR OWN LAND AND GOVERNMENT •
. GP-3'
KORRY
t'.·
NOr,Q BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT .l.~Ui<9~~OFTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

COVERT ACTION EXPENDITURES AND
40 COMMITTEE APPROVALS IN CHILE, FY 1962 - 1974
(in thousands of dollars)
4r-------------------------------,
3
2
a
1962 '63 '64 '65 '66
III Actual Obligations
• 40 Committee Authorizations
(not all spent within the
same fiscal year)
'68 '69 '70 '71
3350
'72 '73 '74

137
EXHIBIT 7
PRESIDEXT KENNEDY TO CHIEFS OF MISSION, ~1Ay 29, 19GP
DEAR l\fR. AlIIBASSADOR: Please accept my best wishes for the successful
accomplishment of your mission. As the personal representative
of the President of the United States in .... you are part of a memorable
tradition which began with Benjamin Franklin and Thomas
Jefferson, and which has included many of our most distinguished
citizens.
\Ve are living in a critical moment in history. Powerful destructive
forces are challenging the universal values which, for centuries,
have inspired men of good will in all parts of the world.
If we are to make progress toward a prosperous community
of nations in a world of peace, the United States must exercise the
most affirmative and responsible leadership. Beyond our shores,
this leadership, in large measure, must be provided by our ambassadors
and their staffs.
I have asked you to represent our Government in .... because I
am confident that you have the ability, dedication, and experience.
The purpose of this letter is to define guidelines which I hope may
be helpful to you.
The practice of modern diplomacy requires a close und"r.:::tal,u;r,~
not only of govenunents but also of people, their cultures and institutions.
Therefore, I hope that you will plan your work so that you
may have the time to travel extensively outside the nation's capital.
Only in this way can you develop the close, personal associations
that go beyond official diplomatic circles and maintain a sympathetic
and accurate understanding of all segments of the country.
Moreover, the improved understanding which is so essential to a
more peaceful und mtionul world is u two-way street. It is our task
not only to understand what motivates others, but to give them a
better understanding of what motivates us.
Many persons in .... who have never visited the United States,
receive their principal impressions of our nation through their contact
with Americans who come to their country either as private citizens
or as government emJ?loyees.
Therefore, the manner In which you and your staff personally conduct
yourselves is of the utmost importance. This applies to the
way in which you carry out your official duties and to the attitudes
you and they bring to day-to-day contacts and associations.
It is an essential part of your task to create a climate of dignified,
dedicated understanding, cooperation, and service in and around the
Embassy.
In regard to your personal authority and responsibility, I shall
count on you to oversee and coordinate all the activities of the United
States Government in . . . .
I Paragraphs 16 and 11 were omitted from the letters sent to Ambsssadors In conntrles
In "hlch there were no United States military forces under an area military commander.
. 155

138
You are in charge of the entire UnitM States Diplomatic Mission,
and I shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The Mission
includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the
Foreign Service, but also the representatives of all other United
States agencies which have programs or activities in .... I shall
give you full support and backing in carrying out your assignment.
Needless to say, the representatives of other a~encies are expected
to communicate directly with their offices here in ~Vashington, and in
the event of a decision by you in which they do not concur, they
may ask to have the decision reviewed by a higher authority in
Washington.
However, it is their responsibility to keep you fully informed of
their vie,,'s and activities and to abide by your decisions unless in
some particular instance you and they are notified to the contrary.
If 1Il your jud~ent individual members of the Mission are not
functiomng effectively, you should take whatever action you feel
may be required, reporting the circumstances, of course, to the Department
of State. '
In case the departure from .... of any individual member of
the Mission is indicated in your judgment, I shall expect you to
make the decision and see that it is carried into effect. Such instances
I am confident will be rare.
Now one word about your relations to the military. As you know,
the United States Diplomatic Mission includes Service Attaches,
Military Assistance Advisory Groups and other Military components
attached to the :Mission. It does not, however, include United
States military forces operating in the field where such forces are
under the command of a United States area military commander.
The line of authority to these forces runs from me, to the Secretary
of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and to the
area commander in the field.
Althou,gh this means that the chief of the American Diplomatic
Mission IS not in the line of military command, nevertheless, as
Chief of Mission, you should work closely with the appropriate area
military commander to assure the full exchange of information.
If it is your opinion that activities by the United States military
forces may adversely affect our over-all relations with the people
or government of" .... , you should promptly discuss the matter
with. the militar,Y commander and, if necessary, request a decision
by higher authority. .
I have informed all heads of departments and agencies of the
Government of the responsibilities of the chiefs of American Diplo.
matic Missions for our combined operations abroad, and I have
asked them to instruct their representatives in the field accordingly.
As you .Imow, your own lines of communication as Chief of Mission
run through the Department of State.
Let me close with an expression of confidence in you personally
and .the eal;'llest hope that your efforts may help strengthen our
relatiOns With both the Government and the people of . . • • .
I am sure that you will make a major contribution to the cause
of world peace and understanding.
Good !uck and my warmest regards,
Smcerely,
(Signed) JOliN F. KENNEDY
Xotp: This lettpr Is rpprlntpd from thp Spnate CommittPe on GOYPMlIIlPnt
Operations ·l'lulJeonl1nittee Oil Xationl\l l'le<'urity Staffing and Operations report,
"The AllIlJassador and the l'rolJlem of Coordination," l'leptellllJer 3, 1963.

139
EXHIBIT 8
STF;RL.INQ 3-.5....
C~".r/mu/~ 41/r".
S'.IIk"~N"'YJ #'~nd6~'lJlJr//,r)J9 a/~u--/
12.1 -:/''/)""",: .A:",.iJ«'''JI
YI.;';J,,:f"!O".
October 25, 1961
Honorable John F. Kennedy
The White House
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. President:
In compliance with your request, I enclose an original
and two copies of a memorandum which you will wish to use
in your conference with the new Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency. This contains five points which I believe
to be of the most importance as the new Director assumes his
responslbniUes. The memorandum is in such form that you
can give a copy of it to the new Director, if you wish.
I know you will call upon me if I can be of any further
assistance.
..
Respectfully YD\\rs,
..) 0 ~'Q.vo.., O
. \:JLcVJit.. ¥-- • "" '" c.:..L
Clark M. Clifford

140
MEMORANDUM ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
For a new lDllA aS8U~ the responsib1l1ty of the directorship
of the Central Intel~ence Ae;ency, the following five items would appear
to be the most important subjects to which his attention should be
directed as he takes over the duties of Director.
1. Redeflning; the Role of the Director
of the Central Intell1gence Agency
The Director of tho Central Intell1e;ence Agency should
be designated by tho Pres!d'lnt as the chief Intelllj::ence offlcer
of the United States Government, having as his primary responsibUity
the copr~ of the total forelj::n intelligence
ettort. Although the new Director of Central IntelU2:ence
All.ency should conUnue to have over-all responsibility for the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Director should assign to
the Deputy Director the day by day operational direction of the
Agency. This is necGSsary because there is a cry1ne; need for
coordination:uid over-all direction of the various agoncies
operaUne; in the intelUgence field.
n would be advisable to have the new Director of Central
Intell4::ence housed in the Executive Offlce Bu1l~ in order to

141
be closcr to the President and to cmphas1%e his role as
chief Intellle:ence ofllcer of the United states.
In order that the President have the best lntellle:enco
information possIble, the Director of Central Intellle;ehce should
be responsible for assurIne; the Umely now of intell1gence to the
White House. He should oversee the preparaUon of the naUonal
intell.l2:enco esUmates and should provide the intellle:ence brleflne;
s required by the President and other White House o!!1c1a1s.
2. Internal Organhatlon of the
Central Intellle:ence Ae:ency
The new Diredor of Central Intellle:ence should undertaks
at once orc:anizational studies which would result in a strene:then~
of the Central Intell1e;ence Ae:ency. He should consider the
quesUon of the proper al1&;nments wIthin the organizaUon and the
proper staffine:. ParUcular attonUon should be (!;iven to the bude:et
and the number of personnel employed within the Ae:ency. It i8
possIble that benem would result from relocat1ne: clandestine
activitles and covert operaUo~s to points outslde of Washlne:ton
111 an eUort to achie ve deeper ~ovor for such acUvlUes. More
emphasis must be (!;iven to acquirlntt "hard" lnte~ence eBBenUal
to the naUonal security. In tWa connecUon, attenUon must be
directed toward the expansion of those ndvanced scienUflc and
67-146 0 - 76 - 10

142
technical projects which are provl!ll1: to ba sO valuable in thet
procur1n~ of "hard" lntel~ence.
3. nllstOrtng Public Confidence
in the Central Intelligence Agency
The new Director and the Pres1dent w1ll wish to work
e10eely together to effect the restoration of public conf1dence which
Is so badly needed. As top coordination and direction Is e:1ven to
the over-alllntelUe:ence effort, the product w1ll1mprove and the
operation wlll become more efficient. This can serve as a basis
for lmprov1!ll1: the reputation of the Ae:ency and the morale wilhln it.
4. Reducing Vlsib1llty of Inte1llgence OCC1c1als
The advent of a new Director of the Central Intell1e:ence
Aliency 1a an opportune time to take steps in the direction of roduclne:
the ,v1siblllty of all fore1e;n intel1le:ence activIties. In this
ree:ard, 1ntell~ence offlcWs wlll desire to refraln from makln2:
public speeches; alser, the Pres1dent and the new Director \"1111 , .
wish to work toe:other in an erideavor to reduce the number of
appearances of the Director of Central Intellie:ence, and other
lnlell1ience personnel, before cone:resslonal committees.

143
5. CO/lJrresslon'!l Jnvcstir::!.t1on of
Intell1P,ence IIctlvttlc!!
From time to time, eHortc are roMe in Con2:rp.ss to
institute invent1l:aUons of >nteUl~encc 3cUvlties or establish
a Joint congressional cOlumittea on forel~n intelUe;ence. Such
efforts must be 6toully and InteIl1aently resIsted for they could
Iierlously hamper the efficient and effective opersat1on of our
Intell1;rence activIties.

Go to Next Page