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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

144
ApPENDIX A
94th congress}
1st Session CO~ITTEE PRINT
COVERT ACTION IN CHILE
1963-1973
STAFF REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
DECE~!BER 18, 1973
Printed for the L'se of the Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
63-372
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1975
NOTE: Since the December 4,1975 hearing the Select Committee
has, in the course of its continuing investigation received new
information which supplements the following sections of the Staff
Report on Covert Action in Chile: Section III.A.4, the Role of
Multinational Corporations; Section IV.B.1.e, Intelligence Estimates
and Covert Action; and Section IV.C, Congressional Oversight.
All pertinent information on the above will be reflected in
the Select Committee's Final Report to the Senate.
145
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chai1"man
JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky
ROBERT MORGAN, North Carollna
GARY BART, Colorado
HOWARD B. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
CBARLEf!l McC.MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland
RICHARI1 SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, Jr., Chief Counscl
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Counael to the Minoritll
AUDRIlY RATaY, Clerk o! the Committee
(U)
146
PREFACE
The statements 01 facts contained in this report are true to the best 01
the Committee staff's ability to determine them. The report and any
judgment expressed in it are tentative. Several areas are merely
touched on; investigation in these areas is continuing. The purpose of
the report is to layout the basic facts of covert action in Chile to
enable the Committee to hold public hearings.
This report is based on an extensive review of documents of the Cen·
tral Intelligence Agency, the Departments of State and Defense, and
the National Security Council; andon testimonyby officials and former
officials. With few exceptions, names of Chileans and of Ohilean
institutions have been omitted in order to avoid revealing intelligence
sources and methods and to limit needless harm to individual
Chileans who cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency. The
report does, however, convey an accurate picture of the scope, purposes
and magnitude of United States covert action in Chile.
(m)
147
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. Overview and Background________________________________________ 1
AB.. OIsvseurevsiew: Covert Action in Chile______________________________ 31
C. Historical Background in Recent United States-Chilean Relations_ 3
II. Th0 Ringe of Covert Action in Chile______________________________ 6
A. Covert Action and other Clandestine Activities-_______________ 6
B. Covert Action in Chile: Tecbniques____________________________ 7
C. Covert Action and Multinational COrporatiOllS__________________ 11
III. Major Covert Action Programs and Their Effects__________________ 14 A. The 1964 Presidentiat Election__~ ~__~___________________ 14
B. Covert Action: 1964-1969_____________________________________ 17
C. The 1970 Election: A "Spoiling" Campaign____________________ 19
D. Covert Action Between SeptemQer 4 and OCtober 24, 1970______ 23
EF.. PCoosvt-e1r9t 7A3ction During the Allende Years, 197~1978..:___________ 2369
IV. Chile: Authorization, Assessment, and OversigbL_______________ 41
A. 40 Committee Authorization and Control: .-Chile ~1973______ 41
BC.. CInotnegllriegsesniocenaEl sOtimveartseisghatnd Covert Action______________________ 4493
V. PreUUninary Conclusions 51
A. Covert Action and U.S. Foreign ?,olicy________________________ In
B. Executive Command and Control of Major Covert Actioll..______ Ci2
C. The Itole of COngress-________________________________________ 53
D. Intelligence Judgments and Covert Operations__________________ 54
E. Major Covert Action Programs________________________________ 54
!ppendix. Chronology: Chile 1962-1975________________________________ 57
(V)
148
COVERT ACTION IN CHILE: 1963-1973
I. Overview and Background'
A. OVERVIEW: COVERT ACTION IN CHILE
Covert United States involvement in Chile in the decade between
1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous. The Central Intelligence
Agency spent three million dollars in an effort to influence the outcome
of the 1964 Chilean presidential elections. Eight million dollars
was spent, covertly, in the three years between 1970 and the military
coup in September 1973, with over three million dollars expended in
fiscal year 1972 alone.1
It is not easy to draw a neat box around what was "covert action."
The range of clandestine activities undertaken by the CIA includes
covert action, clandestine intelligence collection, liaison with local
police and intelligence services, and counterintelligence. The distinctions
among the types of activities are mirrored in organizational
arrangements, both at Headquarters and in the field. Yet it is not
alwlLYs so easy to distinguish the effects of various activities. If the
CIA provides financial support to a political l?arty, this is called
"covert action"; if the Agency develops a paid asset" in that party
for the purpose of information gathering, the project is "clandestine
intelligence collection."
The goal of covert action is political impact. At the same time secret
relationships developed for the clandestine collection of intelligence
may also have political effects, even though no attempt is made by
American officials to manipulate the relationship for short-run politIcal
gain. For example, in Chile between 1970 and 1973, CIA and American
military attache contacts with the Chilean military for the purpose
of gathering intelligence enabled the United States to sustain
communlCation WIth the group most likely to take power from President
Salvador Allende.
. What did covert CIA money buy in Chile? It financed activities
covering a broad spectrum, from simple propaganda manipulation
of the press to large-scale support for Chilean political parties, from
public opinion polls to direct attempts to foment a military coup. The
scope of "normal" activities of the CIA Station in Saritiago included
placement of Station-dictated material in the Chilean media through
propaganda assets, direct support of publications, and efforts to oppose
communist and left-wing influence in student, peasant and labor
organizations.
In addition to these "routine" activities, the CIA Station in Santiago
was several times called upon to undertake large, specific projects.
1 Moreover, the bare figures are more Ukely to understate than to exaggerate the extent
of U,S. covert action. In the years before the 1973 coup, especially CIA dollars could be
channeled through the Chilean black market where the unofficl~l exchange rate tnto
Chilean e8cudo8 often reached live times the official rate.
(1)
149
2
'Vhen senior officials in Washington perceived special dangers, or
opportunities, in Chile, special CIA projects were developed, often as
part of a larger package of U.S. actions. For instance, the CIA spent
over three million dollars in an election program in 1964.
Half a decade later, in 1970, the CIA engaged in another special
effort, this time at the express request of President Nixon and upder
the injunction not to inform the Departments of State or Defense or
the Ambassador of the project. Nor was the 40 Committee 2 ever informed.
The CIA attempted, directly, to foment a military coup in
Chile. It passed three weapons to a group of Chilean officers who
plotted a coup. Beginning with the kidnaping of Chilean Army Commander-
in-Chief Rene Schneider. However, those guns were returned.
The group which staged the abortive kidnap of Schneider, which resulted
in his death, apparently was not the same as the group which
received CIA weapons.3 .
When the coup attempt failed and Allende was inaugurated President,
the CIA was authorized by the 40 Committee to fund groups in
opflosition to Allende in Chile. The effort was massive.· Ei~lit million
dollars was spent in the three years between the 1970 electton and the
military coup in September 1973. Money was furnished to media
organizations, to opposition political parties and, in limited amounts,
to private sector organizations.
Numerous allegations have. been made about U.S. covert activities
in Chile during 1970-73. Several of these are false; others are halftrue.
Xu most instances, the response to the allegation must be qualified:
Was the United States directl1l involVed, covertly, in the 1973 coup in Chile?
The Committee has found no evidence that it was; However, the United States
sought in 1970 to foment a military coup in Chile; after 1970 it adQpted a policy
both overt and covert, of opposition to Allende; and it remained. in intelligence
contact with the Chilean military, inclUding officers who were participating in
coup plotting.
Did the U.S. provide covert support to striking truck-owners or other strikers
during 1971-73? The 40 Committee did not approve any such support. However,
the U.S. passed money to private sector groups which supported the strikers. And
in at least one case, a small amount of CIA money was passed to the strikers by
a private sector organization, contrary to CIA ground rules.
Did the U.S. provide covert support to right-Wing terrorist organizations during
1970-73? The CIA gave support in 1970 to one group whose tactics became
more violent over time. Through 1971 that group received small sums of American
money throngh third parties for specific purposes. And it is pOssible that
money was passed to these groups on the extreme right from CIA-supported o~
position political parties.
The pattern of United States covert action in Chile is striking but
not. umque. It arose in the CO?text not on}y of America~ for:ei~
polIcy, but also of covert U.S. illvolvement ill other countrIes wlthill
and outside Latin America. The scale of CIA involvement in Chile
was unusual but by no means unp·recedented.
• The 4Q Committee Is a lIUb-Cablnet level body of the Executive Bruch whose mandate
Is to review proposed major covert actions. The Committee has existed In similar form
since the 1950's under a variety of names: 5412 Panel. Special Group (until 1964). 303
Committee (to 1969). and 40 Committee (since 1969). Currently chaired by the President's
Assistant for National Sel!llrlty Affalrs the Commltteelncludes the Undersecretary of
State for Political AII'all'8, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Stall'. and the DIrector of Central Intelligence.
• This matter Is discussed extensively In the Committee's Interim report entitled. AUeged
A••a.alnaHon Plot. [tWolring Foreign Leaden, 94 Cong., 1 SellS. (November 1975), pp.
225-254.
150
3
B. IsSUES
The Chilean case raises most of the issues connected with covert
action as an instrument of American foreign policy. It consisted of
long, ,frequently heavy involvement in Chilean politics; it involved
the gamut of covert action methods, save only covert military operations;
and it revealed a variety of different authorization procedures,
with different amplications for oversight and control. As one case
of U.S. covert action, the judgments of past actions are framed not
for their own sake; rather they are intended to serve fiS bases for
formulating recommendations for the future.
The basic questions are easily stated:
(1) Why did the United States mount such an extensive covert
action pro~am in Chile ~ Why was that program continued and then
expanded ill the early 1970's 9
(2) How was this major covert action program authorized and
directed 1What roles were played by the President, the 40 Committee,
the CIA, the Ambassadors, and the Congress 1
(3) Did U.S. policy-makers take into account the judgments of
the intelligence analysts on Chile when they formulated and approved
U.S. covert o~rations1 Does the Chilean experience illustrate an
inherent conflict between the role of the Director of Central Intelligence
as a producer of intelligence and his role as manager ofco\Tert
operations¥
(4) Did the perceived threat in Chile justify the level of U.S.
response 9 What was the effect 0,£ such large concentrated programs
of covert political action in Chile¥What were the effects, both abroad
and at home, of the relationships which dEweloped between the intelligence
agencies and American based multinational corporations1
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO RECENT UNITED STATES-CHILEAN
RELATIONS
1. Ohilean Politica arul Society; An Ove1'View
Chile has historically attracted far more interest in Latin America
and, more recently, throughout the world, than its remote geographic
position and scant eleven-million population would at first suggest.
Chile's history has been one of remarkable continuity in civilian,
democratic rule. From independence in 1818 until the military coop
d'etat of September 1973, Chile underwent only three brief interruptions
of its democratic tradition. From 1932 until the overthrow of
Allende in 1973, constitutional rule in Chile was unbroken.
c.hile defies simplistic North American stereotypes of Latin America.
With more than two-thirds of its population living in cities, and
a 1970 J?er capita GNP of $760, Chile is one of the most urbanized and
industrIalized countries in Latin America. Nearly all of the Chilean
population is literate. Chile has an advanced social welfare program,
although its activities did .not reach the majority of the poor until
popular participation began to be exerted in the early 1960's. Chileans
"are a largely integrated mixture of indigenous American with European
immigrant stock. Until September 1973, Chileans brokered their
demands in a bicameral parliament through a multi-party system and
through a broad array of economic, trade union, and, more recently,
managerial and professional associations.
151
4
13. U.S. Policy Toward Chile
The history of United States policy toward Chile followed the patterns
of United States diplomatIc and economic interests in the hemisphere.
In the same year that the United States recognized Chilean
independence, 1823, it also proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine. This unilateral
policy pronouncement of the United States was directed as a
warning toward rival European powers not to interfere in the internal
political affairs of this hemisphere.
The U.S. reaction to Fidel Castro's rise to power sug-gested that
while the Monroe Doctrine had been abandoned, the principles which
prompted it were still alive. Castro's presence spurred a new United
States hemispheric policy with special sig-nificance for Chile-the Alliance
for Progress. There was little disagreement among- policymakers
either at the end of the Eisenhower Administration or at the beg'inningof
the Kennedy Administration that something had to be done about
the alarming threat that Castro was seen to represent to the stability
of the hemisphere.
The U.S. reaction to the new hemispheric dang-er-communist revolution-
evolved into a dual policy response. Widespread malnutrition,
illiteracy, hopeless housing conditions and hunger for the vast majority
of Latin Americans who were poor; these were seen a!? communism's
allies. Consequently, the U.S. undertook loans to natIonal development
programs and supported civilian reformist reg-imes, all with an
eye to preventing the appearance of another Fidel Castro in our
hemisphere.
But there waS another (',omponent in U.S. policy toward Latin America.
Counterinsurgency techniques were developed to combat urban
or rural guerrilla insurgencies often encouraged or supported by Castro's
regime. Development could not cure overni~ht the social ills
which were seen as the breeding groimd of commumsm. New loans for
Latin American countries' internal national development programs
would take time to bear fruit. In the meantime, the communist threat
would continue. The vicious circle plaguing' the log'ic of the Alliance
for Progress soon became apparent. In order to eliminate the shortterm
dang'er of communist subversion, it was often seen as necessary to
support Latin American armed forces, yet frequently it was those
same armed forces who were helping to freeze the status quo which the
Alliance sought to alter.
Of all the countries in the hemisphere, Chile was chosen to become
the showcase for the new Alliance for Prowess. Chile had the extensive
bureaucratic infrastructure to plan and administer a national
development program; moreover, its history of popular support for
SocialIst, Communist and other leftist parties was perceived in Washington
as flirtation with communism. In the years between 1962.and
1969, Chile received well over a billion dollars in direct, overt United
States aid, loans and grants both included. Chile received more aid per
capita than any country in the hemisphere. Between 1964 and 1970,
$200 to $300 million in short-term lines of credit was continuously
available to Chile from private American banks.
3. Chilean Political Parties: 1958-1970
The 1970 elections marked the fourth time Salvador Allende had
been the presidential candidate of the Chilean left. His personality and
his program were familiar to Chilean voters. His platform was simi152
5
lar in all three elections: efforts to redistribute income and reshape the
Chilean economy, beginning with t~e nationalization of major .industries,
especially the copper compames; greatly expanded agrarIan reform'
and expanded relations with socialist and communist countries.
All~nde was one of four candidates in the 1958 elections. His principal
opponents. were Jorge Alessandri, a co~se.rvative, and ~duardo
Frei. the candIdate of the newly formed ChrIstIan DemocratIc Party,
which contended against the traditionally centrist Radical Party. Allende's
coalition was an uneasy alliance, composed principally of the
Socialist and Communist Parties, labeled the Popular Action Front
(FRAP). Allende himself, a self-avowed Marxist, was considered a
moderate within his Socialist Party, which ranged from the extreme
left to moderate social democrats. The Socialists, however, were more
militant than the pro-Soviet, bureaucratic-though higWy organized
and disciplined-Communist Party.
Allende finished second to Alessandri in the 1958 election by less
than three p'ercent of the vote. Neither candidate received a majority,
and the ChIlean Con~ess voted Alessandri into office. If Allende had
received the votes WhICh went to a leftist priest-who received 3.3 percent
of the votes-he would have won the election.
The Alessandri government lost popularity during its tenure. Dissatisfaction
with it was registered in tne 1961 congressional and 1963
municipal elections. The FRAP parties made significant gains, and
the Christian Democratic Party steadily increased its share of the
electorate until, ~n the 1963 elections: it became the lar~stsingle party.
The 1964 electIOn shaped up as a tnree-wayrace. Frel was once agam
the Christian Democratic candidate, and the parties of the left once
again selected Allende as their standard-bearer. The governing coalition,
the Democratic Front, chose Radical Julio Duran as their candidate.
Due in part to. an adverse election result in a March 1964
by-election in a previously conservative province, the Democratic Front
collapsed. The Conservatives and Liberals, reacting to the prospect of
an Allende victory, threw their support to Frei, leaving Duran as the
standard-bearer of only the Radical Party.
After Frei's decisive majority victory, in which he received 57
.percent of the vote, he began to implement what he called a "revolution
in liberty." That included agrarian, tax, and housing reform. To deal
with the American copper companies, Frei proposed "Chileanization,"
by which the state would purchase majority ownership in order to exercise
control and stimulate output.
Frei's reforms, while impressive, fell far short of what he had promised.
Lacking a majority in Congress, fie was caught between the
FRAP parties, which demanded extreme measures, and the rightists,
who withheld support from Frei in order to force a compromise on
the agrarian reform issue. Like its predecessor, the Frei government
lost popularity during its tenure; the Christian Democrats' portion of
the vote in congressional elections fell from 43 percent in 1965 to 31
percent in 1969. During the Frei years the internal strains of the
Party became more evident, culminating in the 1968 defection of the
Party's left-wing elements.
Frei's relations with the United States were cordial, although he
pursued an independent foreign policy. His government established
diplomatic relations with the SOVIet Union immediately after taking
power and in 1969 reestablished trade relations with Cuba.
153
II. The Range of Covert Action in Chile
A. COVERT ACTION AND OTHER CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES
This study is primarily concerned with what is labeled "covert action"
by the United States government. Covert action projects are
considered a distinct category and are authorized and managed accordingly.
But it is important to bear in mind what the category excludes
as well as what it includes. The Committee's purpose is to
evaluate the intent and effect of clandestine American activities in
Chile. Some secret activities by the United States not labeled "covert
action" may have important political impacts and should be considered.
The CIA conducts several kinds of clandestine activity in foreign
countries: clandestine collection of positive foreign Intelligence;
counterintelligence (or liaison with local services); and covert
action. Those different activities are handled somewhat differently in
Washington; they are usually the responsibility of different CIA
officers in the field. Yet all three kinds of projects may have effects on
foreipt politics. All three rely on the establishment of clandestine
relatIOnships with foreign nationals.
In the clandestine collection of intelligence, the purpose of the relationship
is the gathering' of information. A CIA officer establishes
a relationship with a foreIgn "asset"-paid or unpaid-in a party or
government institution in order to find out what is going on inside
that party or institution. There is typicalll no attempt made by the
CIA officer to influence the actions of the' asset." Yet even that kind
of covert relationship may have political significance. Witness the
maintenance of CIA's and military attaches' contacts with the Chilean
military after the inauguration of Salvador Allende: although the
purpose was information-gathering, the United States maintained
links to the group most likely to overthrow the new president. To do·
so was to walk a tightrope; the distinction between collecting information
and exercising influence was inherently hard to maintain. Since
the Chilean military perceived its actions to be contingent to some
degree on the attitude of. the U.S. government, those possibilities
for exercising influence scarcely would have had to be consciously
manipulated. •
Liaison relationships with local police or intelligence services pose
a similar issue. The CIA established such relationships in Chile with
the primary purpose of securing assistance in gathering intelli~nce
on external targets. But the link also provided the Station with information
on internal subversives and opposition elements within
Chile. That raised the difficulty of ensuring that American officials did
not stray into influencing the actions of Chileans with whom they were
in contact. And it meant that the CIA was identified. to some degree,
with the internal activities of Chilean police and int~lligence services,
(6)
154
7
whether or not the U.S. government supported those actions. That
became a matter for great concern in 1973 with the advent of the
Pinochet regime.
The purpose of this case study is to describe and assess the range
of covert U.S. activities which influenced the course of political events
in Chile. Most of the discussion which follows is limited to activities
labeled and run as "covert action" projects. That category is itself
broad. But it excludes other clandestine activities with possible
political effects.
B. COVERT ACTION IN CmLE: TECHNIQUES
Even if the set of activities labeled "covert action" does not include
all clandestine American efforts with possible political effects, that
set is nonetheless broad. U.S. covert action in Chile encompassed a
range of techniques and affected a wide variety of Chilean institutions.
It included projects which were regarded as the framework
necessary for covert operations, as well as major efforts called forth by
special circumstances. The following paragraphs will give a flavor of
that range.
1. Propaganda
The most extensive covert action activity in Chile was propaganda.
It was relatively cheap. In Chile, it contmued at a. low level during
"normal" times, then was cranked up to meet particular threats or to
countE11" particular dangers.
The most common form of a propaganda project is simply the development
of "assets" in media organizations who can place articles or
be asked to write them. The Agency provided to its field Stations several
kinds of guidance about what sorts of propaganda were desired.
For example, one CIA project in Chile supported from one to five
media. assets during the seven years it operated (1965-1971). Most of
those assets worked for a major Santiago daily which was the key tb
CIA propaganda efforts. Those assets wrote articles or editorials favorable
to U.S. interests in the world (for examplel criticizing the Soviet
Union in the wake of the Czechoslovakian invasIOn); suppressed news
items harmful to the United States (for instance about Vietnam); and
authored articles critical of Chilean leftists. . .
The covert propaganda efforts in Chile alS() included "black" propaganda-
material falsely purporting to be the product of a partIcular
individual or group. In the 1970 election, for mstance, the CIA used
"black" propaganda to sow discord between the Communists and the
Socialists and between the national labor confederation and the Chilean
Communist Party.
Tab~e [-Techniques ot (Joverl Action-Ea:pend.itures in Ohi~e, 1963-73 1
T/lChnlquea Amount
Propaganda for elections and other support for political parties $8, 000, QO()
Producing and disseminating propaganda and supporting mass
media ----------- 4,300,000
Inlluenclng Chilean institutions (labor, students, peasants, women)
and supporting private sector organlzations ~________ 900,000
Promoting military coup d'etat__________________________________ <200, ()()()
I Flgurel rounded to Dearest '100.000.
155
8
In some cases, the form of propaganda was still more direct. The
Station financed Chilean groups who erected wall posters, passed out
political leaflets (at times prepared by the Station) and engaged in
other street activities. Most often these activities formed part of larger
projects intended to influence the outcomes of Chilean elections (see
below), but in at least one instance the activities took place in the
absence of an election campaign.
Of thirty-odd covert action projects undertaken by Chile by the CIA
between 1961 and 1974, approximately a half dozen had propa~anda
as their principal activity. Propaganda was an important subsIdia!7
element of many others, particularly election projects. (See Table I.)
Press placements were attractive because each placement might produce
a multiplier effect, being picked up and replayed by media outlets
other than the one in which It origina:lly came out.
~. Support For Media
In addition to buying propa~da piecemeal, the Station often l?urchased
it wholesale by subsl<lizing Chilean media organizatIons
friendly to the United States. Doing so was ~ropaganda writ large.
Instead of placing individual items, the CIA supported-or even
founded-frIendly media. outlets which might not have existed in, the
absence of Agency support.
From 1953 through 1970 in Chile"the Station subsidized wire services,
magazines written for intellectual circles, and a ri~ht-wing weekly
newspaper. According to the testimony of former offiCIals, suppbrt for
the newspaper was terminated because it became so inflexibly rightist
as to alienate responsible conservatives.
By far, the largest-and probably the most significant-instance
of support for a media organization was the money provided to El
MercurW, the major Santiago daily, under pressure durmg the Allende
tegime. That support grew out of an eXIsting propaganda project.
In 1971 the StatIOn judged that El Me1'curW, the most important opposition
publication, could not survive pressure from the Allende
government, including intervention in the newsprint market and
the withdrawal of government advertising. The 40 Committee authorired
$700,000 for El MercurW on September 9, 1971, snd added another
$965,000 to that authorization on April 11, 1972. A CIA project renewal
memorandum concluded that El Merm.trW and other media outlets
supported by the Agency had played an important role in setting the
stage for the September 11, 1973, military coup which overthrew
Allende.
3. GainiJng I nfl;uence in Ohilean I nstitution8 and Group8
Through its covert activities in Chile, the U.S. government sought
to influence the actions of a wide variety of institutions and groups in
Chilean society. The specific intent of those activities ran the gamut
from attempting to influence directly the making of government policy
to trying to counter communist or leftist influence among organized
groups in the society. That most of these projects included a propaganda
component is obvious.
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9
From 1964 through 1968, the CIA developed contacts within the
Chilean Socialist Party and at the Cabinet level of the Chilean
government.
Projects aimed at organized groups in Chilean society had more
diffuse purposes than efforts aimed at government institutions. But
the aim was similar: influencing the direction of political events in
Chile.
Projects were directed, for example, toward:
·Wresting control of Chilean university student organizations
from the communists;
Supporting a women's group active in Chilean political and
intelleetuallife;
Combating the communist-dominated Oentr()}, Uniea de Trahajadore8
0 hilenos (CUTCh) and supporting democratic labor
groups; and
Exploiting a civic action front group to combat communist influence
within cultural and intellectual circles.
4. jJfajor Efforts To Influence Ohilean Elections
Covert American activity was a factor in almost every major election
in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973. In several instances
the United States intervention was'massive.
The 1964 presidential election was the most prominent example
of a large-scale election project. The Central Intelligence Agency spent
more than $2.6 million in support of the election of the Christian
Democratic candidate, in part to prevent the accession to the presidency
of Marxist Salvador Allende. More than half of the ChrIstian
Democratic candidate's campaign was financed by the United States,
although he was not infonned of this assistance. In addition, the Station
furnished support to an array of pro-Christian Democratic
student, women's, professional and peasant groups. Two other political
parties were funded as well in an attempt to spread the vote.
In Washington, an inter-agency election committee was established,
composed of State Department, White House and CIA officials. That
committee was paralleled by a group in the embassy in Santiago. No
special task force was established WIthin the CIA, but the Station in
Santiago was reinforced. 'The Station assisted the Christian Democrats
in running an American-style campaign, which included polling, voter
registration and get-out-the-vote drives, in addition to covert
propaganda.
The United States was also involved in the 1970 presidential campaign.
That effort, however, was smaller and did not include support
for any specific candidate. It was directed more at preventing Allende's
election than at insuring another candidate's victory.
Nor have U.S. involvements been limited to presidential campaigns.
In the 1965 Chilean congressional elections, for instance, the Station
was authorized by the 303 Committee to spend up to $175,000. Covert
support was provided to a number of candidates selected by the Ambassador
and Station. A CIA election memorandum suggested that the
project did have some impact, including the elimination of a number
of FRAP (leftist coalition) candidates who might otherwise have won
congressional seats.
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6. Support For Private Sector Organizations
As part of its program of support for opposition elements during
the Allende government, the CIA provided money to several trade
organizations of the Chilean private sector. In September 1972, for
instance, the 40 Committee authorized $24,000 in emergency support
for an anti-Allende businessmen's organization. At that time, supporting
other private sector organizations was considered but rejected
because of the fear that those organizations might be involved
in anti-government strikes.
The 40 Committee authorized $100,000 for private sector organizations
in October 1972, as part of the March 1973 election project.
According to the CIA, that money was spent only on election activities,
such as voter registration drives and get-out-the-vote drives. In August
1973, the Committee authorized support for private sector groups,
but with disbursement contingent on the agreement of the Ambassador
and State Department. That agreement was not forthcoming.
5. Support For Chilean Political Parties
Most covert American support to Chilean political parties was furnished
as part of specific efforts to influence election outcomes. However,
in several instances the CIA provided subsidies to parties for
more general purposes, when elections were not imminent. .Most such
support was furnished during the Allende years, 1970-1973, when
the U.S. government judged that without its support parties of the
center and right might not survive either as opposition elements or as
contestants in elections several years away.
In a sequence of decisions in 1971 through 1973, the 40 Committee
authorized nearly $4 million for opposition political parties in Chile.
Most of this money went to the Christian Democratic Party (PDC),
but a substantial portion was earmarked for the National Party (PN),
a conservative grouping more stridently opposed to the Allende government
than was the PDC. An effort was also made to split the ruling
Popular Unity coalition by inducing elements to break away.
The funding of political parties on a large scale in 1970-73 was
not, however, without antecedents, albeit more modest in scale. In
1962 the Special Group (predecessor to the 40 Committee) authorized
several hundred thousand dollars for an effort to build up the PDC
in anticipation of the 1964 elections. Small authorizations were made,
in 1963 and 1967, for support to moderate elements within the Radical
Party.
7. Direct Efforts To Promote A Military Coup
United States covert efforts to affect the course of Chilean politics
reached a peak in 1970: the CIA was directed to undertake an effort
to promote a military coup in Chile to prevent the accession to power of
Salvador Allende. That attempt, the so-called "Track II," is the subiect
of a separate Committee report and will be discussed in section
III below. A brief summary here will demonstrate the extreme in
American covert intervention in Chilean politics.
On September 15, 1970-aIter Allende finished first in the election
but before the Chilean Congress had chosen between him and the
67-146 0 - 76 - 11
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runner-up, Alessandri,l-President Nixon met with Richard Helms,
the Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Attorney General
John Mitchell. Helms was directed to prevent Allende from taking
power. This effort was to be conducted without the knowledge of
the Departments of State and Defense or the Ambassador. Track
II was never discussed at a 40 Committee meeting.
It quickly became apparent to both White House and CIA officials
that a military coup was the only way to prevent. Allende's accession
to power. To achieve that end, the CIA established contact with
several groups of military plotters and eventually passed three weapons
and tear gas to one group. The weapons were subsequently returned,
apparently unused. The CIA knew that the plans of all groups
of plotters began with the abduction of the constitutionalist Chief of
Staff of the Chilean Army, General Rene Schneider. The Committee
has received conflicting testimony about the extent of CIAjWhite
House communication and of White House officials' awareness of
specific coup plans, but there is no doubt that the U.S. government
sought a military coup in Chile.
On October 22, one group of plotters attempted to kidnap Schneider.
Schneider resisted, was shot, and subsequently died. The CIA had
been in touch with that group of plotters but a week earlier had withdrawn
its support for the group's specific plans.
The coup plotting collapsed and Allende was inaugurated President.
After his election, the CIA and U.S. military attaches maintained
contacts with the Chilean military for the purpose of collecting intelligence.
Whether those contacts strayed into encouraging the Chilean
military to move against Allende; or whether the Chilean militaryhaving
been goaded toward a coup during Track II-took encouragement
to act against the President from those contacts even though
U.S. officials did not intend to provide it: these are major questions
which are inherent in U.S. covert activities in the period of the Allende
government.
C. COVERT ACTION AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
In addition to providing information and cover to the CIA, multinational
corporatlOns also participated in covert attempts to influence
Chilean politics. The following is a brief description of the CIA's relationship
with one such corporation in Chile in the period 1963-1973International
Telephone and Telegraph, Inc. (ITT). Not only is ITT
t?e most prominent and public example, but a great deal of informa!
lOn has been developed on the CIA/ITT relationship. This summary
IS based on new information provided to this Committee and on material
previously made public by the Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
1. 1964 Ohizean Elections
. During the 1?64 presidential campaign, representatives of multinatlOnal
corporatIOns approached the CIA with a proposal to provide
1 Allende receIved 30.3 percent of the vote, Alessandrl 34.9 percent. Radomlro Tomlc,
the PDe candidate, finished third with 27.8 percent.
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12
campaign funds to the Christian Democratic Party. The qIA deci~ion
not to accept such funds, as well as other CIA contacts wIth multmational
corporations during that campaign, are fully described in Part
III.
12. 1970 Ohilean Electi<Jw: Pha8e I
In 1970, the U.S. government and several multinational corpor~tions
were linked in opposition to the candidacy and later the preSIdencyof
Salvador Allende. This CIA-multinational corporation connectIOn
can be divided into two phases. Phase I comprised actions taken
by either the CIA or U.S.-based multinational companies at a time
when it was official U.S. policy not to support, even covertly, any candidate
or party in Chile. Durmg this phase the Agency was, however,
authorized to engage in a covert "spoiling" operation designed to defeat
Salvador Allende. Phase II encompassed the relationship between
intelligence agencies and multinational corporations after the September
1970 general election. During Phase II, the U.S. government
opposed Allende and supported opposition elements. The government
sought the cooperation of multinational corporations in this effort.
A number of multinational corporations were apprehensive about
the possibility that Allende would be elected President of Chile.
Allende's public announcements indicated his intention, if elected, to
nationalize basic industries and to bring under Chilean ownership
service industries such as the national telephone company, which was
at that time a subsidiary of ITT.
In 1964 Allende had been defeated, and it was widely known both
in Chile and among American multinational corporations with significant
interests in Chile that his opponents had been supported by
the United States government. John McCone, a former CIA Director
and a member of ITT's Board of Directors in 1970, knew of the significant
American government involvement in 1964 and of the offer
of assistance made at that time by American companies. Agency documents
indicate that McCone informed Harold Geneen, ITT's Board
Chairman, of these facts.
In 1970 leaders of American multinational corporations with substantial
interests in Chile, together with other American citizens concerned
about what might happen to Chile in the event of an Allende
victory, contacted U.S. government officials in order to make their
views known.
In July 1970, a CIA representative in Santiago met with representatives
of ITT and, in a discussion of the upcoming election, indicated
that Alessandri could use financial assistance. The Station suggegted
the name of an individual who could be used as a secure channel for
getting these funds to the Alessandri campaign.
Shortly thereafter .John McCone telephoned CIA Director Richard.
Helms. As a result of this call, a meeting was arranged between the
Chairman of the Board 0;£ ,1'1'.'1' and,tl,1e...Chie~ of the Western Hemisphere
Division of the CIA.. 'Geneen offered fo make available to the
CIA a substantial amount of money to be used in support of the
Alessandri campaign: In subsequent meetings ITT offered to make $1
million available to the CIA. The CIA rejected the offer. The memorandum
indicated further that CIA's advice was sought with respect
to an individual who might serve as a conduit of IT!' funds to the
Alessandri campaign.
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The CIA confirmed that the individual in question was a reliable
channel which could be used for getting funds to Alessandri. A second
channel of funds from ITT to a political party opposing Allende, the
National Party, was developed following CIA advice as to a secure
funding mechanism utilizing two CIA assets in Chile. These assets
were also receiving Agency funds in connection with the "spoiling"
operation.
During the period prior to the September election, ITT representatives
met frequently with CIA representatives both in ChIle and
in the United States and CIA advised ITT as to ways in which it
might safely channel funds both to the Alessandri campaign and to
the National Party. CIA was kept informed of the extent and the
mechanism of the funding. Eventually at least $350,000 was passed
by ITT to this campaign. A roughly equal amount was passed by
other U.S. companies; the CIA learned of this funding but did not
assist in it.
3. Followinq the 1970 Chilean Electio1l8: PhmJe II
Following the September 4 elections, the United States government
ad?pted a p?licy of economic pressure. directed against Chile and in
this connection sought to enlIst the influence of 'Geneen on other
American businessmen. Specifically, the State Department was directed
by the 40 Committ~ to contact American businesses having
interests in Chile to see if they could be induced to take actions in
accord with the American government's policy of economic pressure
on Chile. On September 29, the Chief of the Western Hemisphere
Division of the CIA met with a representative of ITT. The CIA
official sought to have ITT involved in a more active way in Chile.
According to CIA documents, ITT took note of the CIA presentation
on economic warfare but did not actively respond to it.
One institution in Chile which was used in a general anti-Allende
effort was the newspaper chain El Mercurio. Both the United States
government and ITT were funneling money into the hands of in,
dividuals associated with the paper. That funding continued after
Allende was in office.
A great deal of testimony has been taken on the above matters,
initially before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. The
degree of cooperation between the CIA and ITT in the period prior
to the September 1970 election raises an important question: while
the U.S. government was not supporting ,Particular candidates or
parties, even covertly, was the CIA authonzed to act on its own in
advising or assisting ITT in its covert financial support of the
Alessandri campaign 1
161
III. Major Covert Action Programs and Their Effects
This section outlines the major programs of covert action undertaken
by the United States in Chile, period by period. In every instance,
covert action was an instrument of United States foreign
policy, decided upon at the highest levels of the government. Each
subsection to follow sets forth that policy context. Without it, it is
impossible to understand the covert actions which were undertaken.
After a discussion of policy, each subsection elaborates the covert action
tactics employed in each case. Finally, the effect of each major
program is assessed.
The section begins with the first major United States covert action
in Chile-the 1964 presidential elections.
A. THE 1964 PREsIDENTIAL ELECTION
1. United Statu Policy
The United States was involved on a massive scale in the 1964
presidential election in Chile. The Special Group authorized over
three million dollars during the 1962-64 period to prevent the election
of a Socialist or Communist candidate. A total of nearly four
million dollars was spent on some fifteen covert action projects, ranging
from organizing slum dwellers to passing funds to political
parties.
The goal, broadly, was to prevent or minimize the influence of
Chilean Communists or Marxists in the government that would
emerge from the 1964 election. Consequently, the U.S. sought the most
effectIve way of oppOsing FRAP (Popular Action Front) , an alliance
of Chilean Socialists, Communists, and several miniscule non-Marxist
parties of the left which backed the candidacy of Salvador Allende.
Specifically, the policy called for support of the Christian Democratic
Party, the Democratic Front (a coalition of rightist parties), and a
variety of anti-communist propaganda and organizing activities.
The groundwork for the election was laid early in 1961 by establishing
operational relationships with key political parties and by
creating propaganda and organizational mechanisms capable of influencing
key sectors of the population. Projects that had been conducted
since the 1950's among peasants, slum dwellers, organized
labor, students, and the media provided a basis for much of the preelection
covert action.
The main problem facing the United States two years before the
election was the selection of a party and/or candidate to support
against the leftist alliance. The CIA presented two papers to the
Special Group on 'April 2, 1962. One of these papers proposed support
for the Christian Democratic Party, while the other recommended support
of the Radical Party, a group to the right of the Christian
Democrats. The Special Group approved both proposals. Although
(14)
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this strategy appears to have begun as an effort to hedge bets and
support two candidates for President, it evolved into a strategy designed
to support the Christian Democratic candidate.
On August 27, 1962, the Special Group approved the use of a thirdcountry
funding channel and authorized $180,000 in fiscal year 1963
for the Chilean Christian Democrats. The Kennedy Administration
. had preferred a center-right government in Chile, consisting of the
Radicals on the right and the Christian Democrats in the center.
However, political events in Chile in 1962-1963-princirally the
creation of a right-wing alliance that included the Radica Partyprecluded
such a coalition. Consequently, throughout 1963, the United
States funded both the Christian Democrats and the right-wing
coalition, the Democratic Front.
After a by-election defeat in May 1964 destroyed the Democratic
Front, the U.S. threw its support fully behind the Christian Democratic
candidate. However, CIA funds continued to subsidize the Radical
Party candidate in order to enhance the Christian Democrats'
image as a moderate progressive party being attacked from the right
as well as the left.
fl. 001Jert Action Techniques
Covert action during the 1964 campaign was composed of two major
elements. One was direct financial support of the Christian Democratic
campaign. The CIA underwrote slightly more than half of the total
cost of that campaign. After debate, the Special Group decided not
to inform the ChrIstian Democratic candidate, Eduardo Frei, of
American covert support of his campaign. A number of intermediaries
were therefore mobilized to pass the money to the Christian Democrats.
In addition to the subsidies for the Christian Democratic Party,
the Special Group allocated funds to the Radical Party and to private
citizens' groups.
In addition to support for political parties, the CIA mounted a
massive anti-communist propaganda campaign. Extensive use was
made of the press, radio, films, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, direct mailings,
paper streamers, and wall painting. It was a "scare campaign,"
which relied heavily on images of Soviet tanks and Cuban firing
squads and was directed espeCIally to women. Hundreds of thousands
of copies of the anti-communist pastoral letter of Pope Pius XI were
distributed by Christian Democratic organizations. They carried the
designation, "printed privately by citizens without political affiliation,
in order more broadly to disseminate its content." "Disinformation"
and "black propaganda"-material which purported to originate from
another source, such as the Chilean Communist Party-were used as
well. .
The propaganda campaign was enormous. During the first week of
intensive propaganda activity (the third week of June 1964), a CIAfunded
propaganda group produced twenty radio spots per day in
Santiago and on 44 provincial stations; twelve-minute news broadcasts
five time daily on three Santiago stations and 24 provincial outlets;
thousands of cartoons, and much paid press advertising. By the end
of June, the group produced 24 daily newscasts in Santiago and the
provinces, 26 wookly "commentary" programs, and distributed 3,000
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posters daily. The CIA regards the anti-communist scare campaign
as the most effective activity undertaken by the U.S. on behalf of
the Christian Democratic candIdate.
The :propaganda campaign was conducted internationally as well,
and artIcles from abroad were "replayed" in Chile. Chilean newspapers
reported: an endorsement of Frei by the sister of a Latin American
leader, a public letter from a former president in exile in the U.S., a
"message from the women of Venezuela," and dire warnings about an
Allende victory from various figures in military governmerlts in Latin
America.
The CIA ran political action operations independent of the Christian
Democrats' campaign in a number of important voter blocks, including
slum dwellers, peasants, organized labor. and dissident Socialists.
Support was given to "anti-communist" members of the Radical Party
in their efforts to achieve positions of influence in the party hierarchy,
and to prevent the party from throwing its support behind Allende.
3. V.S. Government Organization for the 1964 Chilean Election
To manage the election effort. an electoral committee was established
in Washington, consisting of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, TllOmas Mann; the 'Western Hemisphere Division
Chief of the CIA, Desmond Fitzgerald; Ralph Dungan and
McGeorge Bundy from the White House; and the Chief of the Western
Hemisphere Division Branch Four, the branch that has jurisdiction
over Chile. This group "lvas in close touch with the State Department
Office of Bolivian and Chilean Affairs. In Santiago there was a parallel
Election Committee that coordinated U.S. efforts. It included
the Deputy Chief of Mission, the CIA Chief of Station, and the heads
of the Political and Economic Sections, as well as the Ambassador.
The Election Committee in 'Washington coordinated lines to higher
authority and to the field and other agencies. No special task force was
established, and the CIA Station in Santiago was temporarily increased
by only three officers.
4. Role of Multinational Corporations
A group of American businessmen in Chile offered to provide one
and a half million dollars to be administered and disbursed covertly
by the U.S. Government to prevent Allende from winning the 1964
presidential election. This otTer went to the 303 Committee (the name
of the Special Group after June 1964) which decided not to accept the
offer. It decided that offers from AInerican business could not be
accepted, that they were neither a secure way nor an honorable way
of doing business. This decision was a cleclaration of policy which
set the precedent for refusing to accept such collaboration between
CIA and private business. Hmvever, CIA money, represented as private
mOlle~', "lvas passed to the Christian Democrats through a priyate
businessman.
5. Role of the Chilean Military
On July If), 196-t the Chilean Defense Council. which is the equivalent
of the l).S..Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to President Alessandri
to propose a coup d'etat if Allende won. This offer was transmitted to
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the CIA Chief of Station, who told the Chilean Defense Council
through an intermediary that the United States was absolutely opposed
to a coup. On July 20, the Deputy Chief of ]\fission at the U.S.
Embassy was approached by a Chilean Air Force geJ.leral who thr~atened
a coup if Allende won. The DCM reproached 111m for proposmg
a coup d'etat and there was no further mention of it. Earlier, the CIA
learned that the Radical candidate for election, several other Chileans,
and an ex-politician from another Latin American country had met
on June 2 to organize a rightist group called the Legion of Libert~·.
They said this group would stage a coup d'etat if Allende won, or If
Frei won and sought a coalition government with the Communist
Party. Two of the Chileans at the meeting reported that some military
officers wanted to stage a coup d'etat before the election if the United
States Government would promise to support it. Those approaches
were rebuffed by the CIA.
6. Effects of Oovert Action
.A CIA study concludes that U.S. intervention enabled Eduardo
Frei to win a clear majority in the 1964 election, instead of merely a
plurality. What U.S. Government documents do not make clear is why
It was necessary to assure a majority, instead of accepting the victory
a plurality would have assured. CIA assistance enabled the Christian
Democratic Party to establish an extensive organization at the neigllborhood
and village level. That may have lent grassroots support for
reformist efforts that the Frei government undertook over the next
several years.
Some of the propaganda and polling mechanisms developed for use
in 1964 were used repeatedly thereafter, in local and congressional
campaigns, during the 1970 presidential campaign, and throughout
the 1970-1973 Allende presidency. Allegations of CIA involvement in
the campaign, and press allegations of CIA funding of the International
Development Foundation contributed to the U.S. reluctance
in 1970 to undertake another massive pre-election effort.
B. COVERT ACTION: 1964-1969
During the years between the election of Christian Democratic
President Eduardo Frei in 1964 and the presidential election campaign
of 1970, the CIA conducted a variety of covert activities in Chile.
Operating within different sectors of society, these activities were all
intended to strengthen groups which supported President Frei and
opposed Marxist influences.
The CIA spent a total of almost $2 million on covert action in Chile
during this period, of which one-fourth was covered by 40 Committee
authorizations for specific major political action efforts. The CIA
conducted twenty covert action projects in Chile during these years.
1. Oovert Action Methods
In February 1965 the 303 Committee approved $175,000 for a shortterm
political action project to provide covert support to selected
candidates in the March 1965 congressional elections in Chile. According
to the CIA,twenty-two candidates were selected by the Sta165
18
tion and the Ambassador; nine were elected. The operation helped
defeat up to 13 FRAP candidates who would otherwise have won
congressional seats.
Another election effort was authorized in July 1968, in preparation
for the March 1969 congressional election. The 40 Committee authorized
$350,000 for this effort, with the objective of strengthening moderate
political forces before the 1970 presidential election. The program
consisted of providing financial support to candidates, supporting
a splinter Socialist Party in order to attract votes away from
Allende's socialist party, propaganda activities, and assisting independent
groups. The CIA regarded the election effort as successful
III meeting its limited objective; ten of the twelve candidates selected
for support won their races, including one very unexpected victory.
The support provided to the dissident socialist group deprived the
Socialist Party of a minimum of seven congressional seats.
The 303 Committee also approved $30,000 in 1967 to strengthen the
right wing of the Radical Party.
A number of other political actions not requiring 303 Comm,ittee
approval were conducted. The project to increase the effectiveness and
appeal of the Christian Democratic Party and to subsidize the party
during the 1964 elections continued into late 1965 or 1966, as did a
project to influence key members of the Socialist Party toward orthodox
European socialism and away from communism. During this
period, the CIA dealt with a Chilean official at the cabinet level,
though with scant result.
Covert action efforts were conducted during this period to influence
the political development of various sectors of Chilean society. One
project, conducted prior to the 1964 elections to stren~hen Christian
Democratic support among peasants and slum dwellers, continued to
help train and organize "anti-communists" in these and other sectors
until public exposure of CIA funding in 1967 forced its termination.
A project to compete organizationally with the Marxists among the
urban poor of Santiago was initiated shortly after the 1964 election,
and was terminated in mid-1969 because the principal agent was unwilling
to prejudice the independent posture of the organization by
using it on a large scale to deliver votes in the 1969 and 1970 presi- .
dential elections. In the mid-1960's, the CIA supported an anti-communist
women's group active in Chilean political and intellectual life.
Two projects worked within organized labor in Chile. One, which
began during the 1964 election period, was a labor action project to
combat the communist-dominated Oentral Unica de Trabajadores OhileMs
(CUTCh) and to support democratic labor groups. Another
pr()ject was conducted in the Catholic labor field.
Various CIA projects during this period supported media efforts.
One, begun in the early 1950's, operated wire services. Another, which
was an important part of the 1964 election effort, supported anti-communist
propaganda activities through wall posters attributed to fictitious
groups, leaflet campaigns, and public heckling.
A thIrd project supported a right-win~ weekly newspaper; which
was an instrument of the anti-Allende campaign during and for a time
after the 1970 election campaign. Another project funded an asset
who produced regular radio political commentary shows attacking
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the political parties on the left and supporting- CIA-selected candidates.
After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia~ this asset organized
a march on the Soviet Embassy which led to major police action
and mass media coverage. Other assets funded under this project
placed CIA-inspired editorials almost daily in El Mercurio, Chile's
major newspaper and, after H)68, exerted substantial control over the
content of that paper's international news section.
The CIA also maintained covert liaison relations with Chile's
internal security and intelligence services, civilian and military. The
primary purpose of these arrangements was to enable the Chilean
services to assist CIA in information collection about foreig'll targets.
A subsidiary purpose of these relationships was to collect information
and meet the threat posed by communists and other groups of the far
left within Chile.
£. Effect8 of Oovert Action
The CIA's evaluations of the 1965 and 1969 election projects suggest
that those efforts were relatively successful in achieving their
Immediate ~als. On the other hand, the labor and "community development"
projects were deemed rather unsuccessful in countering the
growth of strong leftist sentiment and organization among workers,
peasants and slum dwellers. For instance, neither of the labor projects
was able to find a nucleus of legitimate Chilean labor leaders to compete
effectively with the communist-dominated CUTCh.
The propaganda projects probably had a substantial cumulative
effect over these years, both in helping to polarize public opinion concerning
the nature of the threat posed by communists and other leftists,
and in maintaining an extensive propaganda capability. Propaganda
mechanisms developed during the 1960's were ready to be used ill the
1970 election campaign. At the same time, however, in a country where
nationalism, "economic independence" and "anti-imperialism" claimed
almost universal support, the persistent allegations that the Christian
Democrats and other parties of the center and right were linked to the
CIA may have played a part in undercutting popular support for
them.
C. THE 1970 ELECTION: A "SPOILING" CAMPAIGN
1. United States Policy and Oovert Action
Early in 1969, President Nixon announced a new policy toward
Latin America, labelled by him "Action for Progress." it was to
replace the Alliance for Progress which the President characterized
as paternalistic and unrealistic. Instead, the United States was to seek
"mature partnership" with Latin American countries, emphasizing
trade and not aid. The reformist trappin~ of the Alliance were to be
dropped; the United States announced Itself prepared to deal with
foreign governments pragmatically.
The Unit€d States program of covert action in the 1970 Chilean
elections reflected this less activist stance. Nevertheless, that covert
involvement was substantial. In March 1970, the 40 Committee decided
that the United States should not support any single candidate in the
election but should instead wage ":.::poiling" operations against the
Popular Unity coalition which supported the :Marxist candidate,
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Salvador Allende. In all, the CIA spent from $800,000 to $1,000,000
on covert action to affect the outcome of the 1970 Presidential election.
Of this amount, about haH was for major efforts approved
by the 40 Committee. By qIA es~imates, th~ Cuba~s provide~ ~bout
$350,000 to Allende's campaIgn, WIth the SovIets addmg an addItIOnal,
undetermined amount. The large-scale propaganda campaign which
was undertaken by the U.S. was similar to that of 1964: an Allende
victory was equated with violence and repression.
12. Policy DeciAsiom
Discussions within the United States Government about the 1970
elections began in the wake of the March 1969 Chilean congressional
elections. The CIA's involvement in those elections was regarded by
'Washington as relatively successful, even thou~h the Christian Democrats'
portion of the vote fell from 43 per cent III 1965 to 31 per cent in
1969. In June 1968 the 40 Committee had authorized $350,000 for that
effort, of which $200,000 actually was spent. Ten of the twelve CIAsupported
candidates were elected.
The 1970 election was discussed at a 40 Committee meeting on April
17,1969. It was suggested that something be done, and the CIA representative
noted that an election operation would not be effective
unless it were started early. But no action was taken at that time.
The 1970 Presidential race quickly turned into a three-way contest.
The conservative National Party, buoyed by the 1969 congressional
election results, supported 74-year-old, ex-President Jorge Alessandri.
Radomiro Tomic became the Christian Democratic nominee. Tomic,
to the left of President Frei, was unhappy about campaigning on the
Frei government's record and at one point made overtures to
the Marxist left. Salvador Allende was once again the candidate of the
left, this time formed into a Popular Unity coalition which included
both Marxist and non-Marxist parties. Allende's platform included
nationalization of the copper mines, accelerated agrarian reform,
socialization of major sectors of the economy, wage increases, and
improved relations with socialist and communist countries.
In December 1969, the Embassy and Station in Santiago forwarded
a proposal for an anti-Allende campaign. That proposal, however, was
withdrawn because of the State Department's qualms about whether
or not the United States should become involved at all. The CIA felt
it was not in a position to support Tomic actively because ambassadorial
"ground rules" of the previous few years had prevented the CIA
from deflling with the Christian Democrats. The Agency believed that
Alessandri, the apparent front runner, needed more than money; he
needed help in managing his campaign.
On March 25, 1970, the 40 Committee approved a joint Embassy/
CIA proposal recommending that "spoiling" operations-propagancla
and other activities-be undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent
an election victory by Allende. Direct support was not furnished to
either of his opponents. This first authorization was for $135,000, with
the possibility of more later.
On June 18, 1970. the Ambassador, Edward Korry, submitted a twophase
proposal to the Department of State and the CIA for review.
The first phase involved an increase in support for the anti-Allende
campaign. The second was a $500,000 contingency plan to influence the
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congressional vote in the event of a vote between the candidates finishing
first and second. In response to State Department reluctance, the
Ambassador responded by querying: if Allende were to "gain power,
how would the U.S. respond to those who asked what actions it had
taken to prevent it?
On June 27, the 40 Committee approved the increase in funding for
the anti-Allende "spoiling" operation by $300,000. State Department
officials at the meeting voted "yes" only relunctantly. They spoke
against the contingency plan, and a decision on it was deferred pending
the results of the September 4 election.
CIA officials met several times with officials from ITT during July.
The CIA turned down ITT's proposal to make funds available for
CIA transmission to Alessandri but did provide the company advice
on how to pass money to Alessandri. Some $350,000 of ITT money was
passed to Alessandri during the campaign-$250,000 to his campaign
and $100,000 to the National Party. About another $350,000 came
from other U.S. businesses. According to CIA documents, the Station
Chief informed the Ambassador that the CIA was advising ITT in
funding t~e Alessandri campaign, but not that the Station was aiding
ITT in passing money to the National Party.
. The 40 Committee met again on August 7 but did not give further
consideration to supporting either Alessandri or Tomic. As the antiAllende
campaign m Chile intensified, senior policy makers turned to
the issue of U.S. policy in the event of an Allende victory. A study done
in response to National Security Study Memorandum 97 was approved
by the Interdepartmental Group (IG) on August 18. The approved
paper 1 set forth four options, one in the form of a covert annex. The
consensus of the Interdepartmental Group favored maintaining minimal
relations with Allende, but the Senior Review Group deferred decision
until after the elections. Similarly, a paper with alternatives was
circulated to 40 Committee members on August 13, but no action
resulted.
3. "Spoiling" Ope1'ationB
The "spoiling" operations had two objectives: (1) undermining
communist efforts to bring about a coalition of leftist forces which
could gain control of the presidency in 1970; and (2) strengthening
non-Marxist political leaders and forces in Chile to order to develop
an effective alternative to the Popular Unity coalition in preparation
for the 1970 presidential election.
In ,vorking toward these objectives, the CIA made use of hal£-adozen
covert action projects. Those projects were focused into an
intensive propaganda campaign which made use of virtually all media
within Chile and which placed and replayed items in the international
press as well. Propaganda placements were achieved through
subsidizing right-wing women's and "civic action" groups. A "scare
campaign," using many of the same themes as the 1964 presidential
election program, equated an Allende victory with violence and Stalinist
repression. Unlike 1964, however, the 1970 operation did not involve
extensive public opinion polling, grass-roots organizing, or "community
development" efforts, nor, as mentioned, direct funding of any
candidate.
1 The mlnntes of the Interdepartmental Group and SenIor Review Group deliberations
have not as yet been provIded to the CommIttee.
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In addition to the massive propaganda campaign, the CIA's effort
prior to the election included political action aimed at splintering the
non-Marxist Radical Party and reducing the number of votes which
it could deliver to the Popular Unity coalition's candidate. Also, "black
propaganda"-material purporting to be the product of another
woup-was used in 1970 to sow dissent between Communists and
Socialists, and between the national labor confederation and the
Chilean Community Party.
The CIA's propaganda operation for the 1970 elections made use
of mechanisms that had been developed earlier. One mechanism had
been used extensively by the CIA durmg the March 1969 congressional
elections. During the 1970 campaign it produced hundreds of thousands
of high-quality printed pieces, ranging; from posters and leaflets
to picture books, and carried out an extensIve propaganda program
through many radio and press outlets. Other propaganda mechanisms
that were in place prior to the 1970 campaign included an editorial
support group thatlrovided political features, editorials, and news
articles for radio an press placement; a service for placing anti-communist
press and radio items; and three different news services.
There was a wide variety of propaganda products: a newsletter
mailed to approximately two thousand journabsts, academicians, politicians,
and other opinion makers; a booklet showing what life would
be like if Allende won the presidential election; translation and distribution
of chronicles of opposition to the Soviet regime; poster
distribution and sign-painting teams. The sign-painting teams had
instructions to paint the slogan "su pared6n" (your wall) on 2,000
walls, evoking an image of communist firing squads. The "scare campaign"
(campmfia de terror) exploited the violence of the invasion of
Czechoslovakia with large photographs of Prague and of tanks in
downtown Santiago. Other posters, resembling those used in 1964,
portrayed Cuban political prisoners before the firing squad, and
warned that an Allende victory would mean the end of religion and
family life in Chile. ,'.
Still another project funded individual press assets. One, who produced
regular radio commentary shows on a nationwide hookup, had
been CIA funded since 1965 and continued to wage propaganda for
CIA during the Allende presidency. Other assets, all employees of
El Merr:uno, enabled the Station to generate more than one editorial
per day based on CIA guidance. Access to El Me1'r:urW had a multiplier
effect, since its editorials were read throughout the country on
various national radio networks. Moreover, ElMerr:urW was one of the
most influential Latin American newspapers, particularly in business
circles abroad. A project which placed anti-communist press and radio
items was reported in 1970 to reach an audience of well over fivemillion
listeners. .
The CIA funded only one political group during the 1970 campaign,
in an effort to reduce the number of Radical Party votes for Allende.
4. Effects
The covert action "spoiling" efforts by the United States during
the 1970 campaign did not succeed: Allende won a plurality in the
September 4 election. Nevertheless, the "spoiling" campaign had
several important effects;
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First, the "scare campaign" contributed to the political polarization
and financial panic of the period. Themes developed during the
campaign were exploited even more intensely during the weeks following
September 4, in an effort to cause enough financial panic and political
instability to goad President Frei or the Chilean military into
action.
Second, many of the assets involved in the anti-Allende campaign
became so visible that their usefulness was limited thereafter. Several
of them left Chile. When Allende took office, little was left of the CIAfunded
propaganda apparatus. Nevertheless, there remained a nucleus
sufficient to permit a vocal anti-Allende opposition to function effectively
even before the new President was maugurated.
D. COVERT ACTION BETWEEN 'SEPrE:MBER 4 AND OCTOBER 24, 1970 Il
On September 4, 1970, Allende won a plurality in Chile's presidential
election. Since no candidate had received a majority of the popular
vote, the Chilean Constitution required that a joint session of Its Congress
decide between the first- and second-place finishers. The date set
for the congressional session was October 24, 1970.
The reaction in Washington to Allende's plurality victory was
immediate. The 40 Committee met on September 8 and 14 to discuss
what action should be taken t>rior to the October 24 congressional
vote. On September 15, PresIdent Nixon informed CIA Director
Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable
to the United States and instructed the CIA to playa direct role
in organizing a military (JOUp d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's
accession to the Presidency.
Following the September 14 meeting of the 40 Committee and President
Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government
efforts to prevent Allende from' assuminJ{ office proceeded on two
tracks.3 Track I comprised all covert actIvities approved by the 40
Committee, including political, economic and propaganda activities.
These activities were designed to induce Allende's opponents in Chile
to prevent his assumption of power, either through political or military
means. Track II activities in Chile were undertaken in response
to President Nixon's September 15 order and were directed toward
actively promoting and encouraging the Chilean military to move
against Allende.
1. Track I
A. POLITICAL ACTION
Initially, both the 40 Committee and the CIA fastened on the socalled
Frei re-election gambit as a means of preventing Allende's
assumption of office. This gambit, which was considered a constitutional
solution to the Allende problem, consisted of inducing enough
congressional votes to elect Alessandri over Allende with the understanding
that Alessandri would immediately resign, thus paving the
way for a special election in which Frei would legally become a candidate.
At the September 14 meeting of the 40 Committee, the Frei gam-
• This period, and particularly Track n, are dealt with In detail In an Interim Committee
Report. Alleged. ABBaBBination Plots Involving Foreign LeaderB, 94 Cong.. 1st Sess.
November 1975, pp. 225-254.
• The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House ot!iclaw
who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order to the CIA.
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24
bit was discussed, and the Committee authorized a conting-ency fund
of $250,000 for covert support of projects which Frei or his associates
deemed important. The funds were to be handled by Ambassador
Korry and used if it appeared that they would be needed by the moderate
faction of the Christian Democratic Party to swing congressional
Yotes to Alessandri. The only proposal for the funds which was
discussed was an attempt to bribe Chilean Congressmen to ,Tote for
Alessandri. That quickly was seen to be unworkable, and the $250,000
was never spent.
CIA's Track I aimed at bringing about conditions in which the
Frei gambit could take place. To do this, the CIA, at the direction of
the 40 Committee, mobilized on interlocking political action, economic,
and propaganda campaign. As part of its political action program, the
CIA attempted indirectly to induce President Frei at least to consent
to the gambit or, better yet, assist in its implementation. The Agency
felt that pressures from those whose opinion and views he valuedin
combination with certain propaganda activities-represented the
only hope of converting Frei. In Europe and Latin America, influential
members of the Christian Democratic movement and the Catholic
Church were prompted either to visit or contact Frei. In spite of these
efforts, Frei refused to interfere with the constitutional process, and
the re-election gambit died.
B. PROPAGANDA CA1\fPAlGX
On September 14, the 40 Committee agreed that a propaganda
campaign should be undertaken by the CIA to focus on the damage
that would befall Chile under an Allende government. The campaign
was to include support for the Frei re-election gambit. According- to
a CIA memorandum, the campaign sought to create concerns about
Chile's future if Allende were elected by the Cong-ress; the propag-anda
was designed to influence Frei, the Chilean elite, and the Chilean
military.
The propaganda campaign included several components. Predictions
of economic collapse under Allende were replayed in CIA-generated
articles in European and Latin American newspapers. In response to
criticisms.of El Jlercun'o by candidate Allende, the CIA, through its
covert actIOn resources, orchestrated cables of support and protest from
foreign newspapers, a protest statement from an international press
association, and world press coverage of the association's protest.
In addition, journalists-agents and otherwise-traveled to Chile for
on-the-scene reporting. By September 28, the CIA had agents who
were journalists from ten different countries in or en route to Chile.
This group was supplemented by eight more journalists from five
countries under the direction of high-level agents who were, for the
most part, in managerial capacities in the media field.
Second, the CIA relied upon its own resources to generate antiAllende
propaganda in Chile. These efforts included: support for an
undergronnd press; placement of individual news items throug-h
agents: finaneing a small newspaper; indirect subsidy of Patria y Libertrrd,
a gronp fervently opposed to Allende, and its radio programs.
political advertisements. and political rallies; and the direct mailinO' of
foreign news articles to Frei, his wife, selected leaders, and the
Chilean domestic press.
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25
Third, special intelligence and "inside" briefings were given t? U.S.
journalists, at their request. One Time cover story was consIdered
particularly noteworthy. According to CIA documents, the Time correspondent
in Chile apparently had accepted Allende's protestations
of moderation and constitutionality at face value. Briefings requested
by Time and provided by the CIA in Washington resulted in a
change in the basic thrust 0'£ the Time story on Allende's September 4
victory and in the timing of that story.
A few statistics convey the magnitude of the CIA's propaganda
campaign mounted during the six-week interim period in the Latin
American and European media. According- to the CIA, partial returns
showed that 726 articles, broadcasts, editorials, and similar items
directly resulted from Agency activity. The Agency had no way to
measure the scope of the multiplier effect-i.e., how much its "induced"
news focused media interest on the Chilean issues and stimulated additional
coverage-but concluded that its contribution was both
substantial and SIgnificant.
C. ECONOMIC PRESSURES
On September 29, 1970, the 40 Committee met. It was agreed that
the Frei gambit had been overtaken by events and was dead. The
"second-best option"-the cabinet resigning and being replaced with
a military cabmet-was also deemed dead•.The :{>oint. was then made
that there would probably be no military actIOn unless economic
pressures could be brought to bear on Chile. It was agreed that an
attempt would be made to have American business take steps in line
with the U.S. government's desire for immediate economic action.
The economic offensive against Chile, undertaken as a part of Track
I, was intended to demonstrate the foreign economic reaction to Allende's
accession to power, as well as to preview the future consequences
of his regime. Generally, the 40 Committee approved cutting off all
credits, pressuring firms to curtail investment in Chile and approaching
other nations to cooperate in this venture.
These actions of the 40 Committee, and the establishment of an
interagency working group to coordinate overt economic activities
towards Chile (composed of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division
Chief and representatives from State, the NSC, and Treasury), adversely
affected the Chilean economy; a major financial panic ensued.
However, U.S. efforts to generate an economic crisis did not have the
desired impact on the October 24 vote, nor did they stimulate a military
intervention to prevent Allende's accession.
12. Track II
As previously noted, U.S. efforts to prevent Allende's assumption
of office operated on two tracks between September 4 and October 24.
Track II was initiated by President Nixon on September 15 when he
instructed the CIA to playa direct role in organizing a military coup
d'etat in Chile. The Agency was to take this action without coordination
with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing
the U.S. Ambassador. ·While coup possibilities in general and other
means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession to power were explored
by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40 Committee
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26
never discussed this direct CIA role. In practice, the Agency was to
report, both for infonnational and approval purposes, W the White
House.
Between October 5 and October 20 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts
with key military and Oarabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those
Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of
strong support at the highest levels of .the U.S. Government both
before and after a coup.
Tracks I and II did, in fact, move together in the month after
September 15. Ambassador Korry, who was formally excluded from
Track II, was authorized to encourage a military coup, provided
Frei concurred in that solution. At the 40 Committee meeting on
September 14, he and other "appropriate members of the Embassy
mission" were authorized to intenSIfy their contacts with Chilean
military officers to assess their willingness to support the "Frei gambit."
The Ambassador was also authorized W make his contacts in the
Chilean military aware that if Allende were seated, the military
could expect no further military assistance '(MAP) from the United
States. Later, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean military
that all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending
the outcome of the congressional' election on October 24.
The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by
instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that
Track II was collp-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective
in mind. There were two differences between the two tracks:
Track I was contingent on at least the acquiescence of Frei; and the
CIA's Track II direct contacts with the Chilean military, and its
active promotion and support for a coup, were to be known only to a
small group of individuals in the White House and the CIA.
Despite these efforts, Track II proved to be no more successful than
Track I in preventing Allende's assumption of office. Although certain
clements within the Chilean army were actively involved in coup
plotting, the plans of the dissident Chileans never got off the ground.
A rather disorganized coup attempt did begin on October 22, but
aborted following the shooting of General Schneider.
On October 24, 1970, Salvador Allende was confirmed as President
by Chilean Congress. On November 3, he was inaugurated. U.S. efforts.
both overt and covert, to prevent his assumption of office had
failed.
E. COVERT ACTION DURING THE ALLENDE YEARS, 1970-1973
1. United States Policy and Oovert Action
In his 1971 State of the World Message, released February 25, 1971,
President Nixon announced: "We are prepared to have the kind of
relationship with the Chilean government that it is prepared to have
with us." This public articulation of American policy fonowed internal
discussions during the NSSM 97 exercise. Charles Meyer, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, elaborated that "correct
but minimal" line in his 1973 testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations:
Mr. MEYER. The policy of the Government, Mr. Chairman, was that there would
be no intervention in the political affairs of Chile. We were consistent in that WI'
fj'i-146 0 - 76 - 12
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27
financed no candidates, no political parties before or after September 8, or
September 4.... The policy of the United States was that Chile's problem was
a Cbilean problem, to be settled by Cbile. As the President stated in October
of 1969, "We will deal with governments as they are." (Multinational Corporation8
and United State8 Foreign Policy, Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, Washington: GPO, 1973, Part 1, p. 402)
Yet, public pronauncements notwithstanding, after Allende's inaulfuration
the 40 Committee approved a total of over seven million dollars
in covert support to opposition groups in Chile. That money also
funded an extensive anti-Allende propaganda campaign. Of the total
anthorized by the 40 Committee, 'over six million dollars was spent
during the Allende presidency and $84,000 was expended shortly
thereafter for commitments made before the coup. The total amount
spent on covert action in Chile during 1970-73 was approximately
$7 million, including project funds not requiring 40 Committee
approval.
Broadly speaking, U.S. policy sought to maximize pressures on the
Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability
to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests. That
objective was stated clearly in National Security Decision Memorandum
(NSDM) 93, issued in early November 1970. Other governments
,yere encouraged to adopt similar policies, and the U.S. increased efforts
to maintain close relations with friendly military leaders in the
hemisphere. The "cool but correct" overt posture denied the Allende
government a handy foreign enemy to use as a domestic and international
rallying point. At the same time, covert action was one reflection
of the concerns felt in Washington: the desire to frustrate
Allende's experiment in the Western Hemisphere and thus limit its
attractiveness as a model: the fear that a Chile under Allende might
harbor subversives from other Latin American countries; and the determination
to sustain the principle of compensation for U.S. firms
nationalized by the Allende government.
Henry Kissinger outlined several of these concerns in a background
briefing to the press on September 16, 1I"liO, in the wake of Allende's
election plurality:
Now it is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende wins, there is a good
chance that he will establish over a period of years some sort of Communist
government. In that case you would have one not on an island off the coast whIch
has not a traditional relationship and impact on Latin America. but in a major
Latin American country you would hllYe a Communist government, joining. for
('sample, Argentina, wilich is already def'ply diVided, along a long frontier;
joining Peru, which has already been heading" in directions that have been difficult
to deal with, and joining Bolivia, wilich has also gone in a more leftist, antiCS.
direction, even without any of these developments.
So I don't think we should delude ourselves that an Allende takeover in
Chile would not present massive problems for us, and for democratic forcel\
an(} for pro-U.S. forces in Latin America, and indeed to the whole Western
Hemisphere. What would happen to the Western Hemisphere Defense Board,
or to the Organization of American States, and so forth, in extremely problematical.
... It is one of those situations which Is not too happy for American
interests. (Multinational Corporation.q and United States Foreign Policy,
Hearings before the Subcommittee 011 Multinational Corporations of the Committee
on Foreign Relations. United Stntps Senate, Ninety-Third Congress.
Washington: GPO; 1973, Part 2, PP. 542-3)
c\s the discussion of National Intelligence Estimates in Section IV
of this paper makes clear the more extreme fears about the effeds of
Allend.e's election were ill-fonnded: there nevpr was a significant
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threat of a Soviet military presence; the "export" of Allende's revolution
was limited, and its value as a model more restricted still; and
Allende was little more hospitable to activist exiles from other Latin
American countries than his predecessor had been. Nevertheless, those
fears. often exaggerated, appear to have activated officials in
'Vashington.
The "cool but cOl-rect" public posture and extensive clandestine activities
formed two-thirds of a triad of official actions. The third was
economic pressure, both overt and covert, intended to exacerbate the
difficulties felt by Chile's economy. The United States cut off economic
aid, denied credits, and made efforts-partially successful-to enlist
the cooperation of international financial institutions and private firms
in tightening the economic "squeeze" on Chile. That international
":squeeze" intensified the effect of the economic measures taken by oppositIOn
groups within Chile, particularly the crippling strikes in the
mining and transportation sectors. For instance, the combined effect
of the foreign credit squeeze and domestic copper strikes on Chile's
foreign exchange position was devastating. .
Throughout the Allende years, the U.S. maintained close contact
with the Chilean armed forces, both through the CIA and through
U.S. military attaches. The basic purpose of these contacts was the
gathering of intelligence, to detect any inclination within the Chilean
armed forces to intervene. But U.S. officials also were instructed to
seek influence within the Chilean military and to be generally supportive
of its activities without appearing to promise U.S~ support for
military efforts which might be premature. For instance, in November
1971, the Station was instructed to put the U.S. government in a position
to take future advantage of either a political or a military solution
to the Chilean dilemma, depending on developments within the country
and the latter's impact on the military themselves.
There is no hard evidence of direct U.S. assistance to the coup,
despite frequent allegations of such aid. Rather the United Statesby
its previous actions during Track II, its existing general posture of
opposition to Allende, and the nature of its contacts with the Chilean
military-probably gave the impression that it would not look with
disfavor on a military coup. And U.S. officials in the years before 1973
may not always have succeeded in ',alking the thin line between monitorIng
indigenous coup plotting and actually stimulating it.
B. Techniques of Oovert Action
A. SDPPORT FOR OPPOSITIO~ POLITICAL PARTIES
More than half of the 40 Committee-approved funds supported the
opposition political parties: the Christian Democratic Party (PDC),
the Kational Party (PN), and several splinter groups. Nearly half-amillion
dollars was channeled to splinter groups during the Allende
years. Early in 1971 CIA funds enabled the PDC and PN to purchase
their own radio stations and newspapers. "All opposition parties were
passed money prior to the April 1971 municipal elections and a conwessional
by-election in July. In November 1971 funds were approved
to strengthen the PDC, PN, and splinter groups. An effort was also
made to induce a breakup of the UP coalition. CIA funds supported
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the opposition parties in three by-elections in 1972, and ~H the March
1973 congressional election. Money provided to political parties not
only supported opposition candidates in the various elections, lmt
enabled the parties to maintain an anti-government campaign throughout
the Allende years, urging citizens to demonstrate their opposition
in a variety of ways.
Throughout the Allende years, the CIA worked to forge a united
opposition. The significance of this effort can be gauged by noting that
the two main elements opposing the Popular Unity government were
the National Party, which was conservative, and the reformist Christian
Democratic Party, many of whose members had supported the
major policies of the new government.
B. PROPAGANDA AND SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION MEDIA
Besides funding political parties, the 40 Committee approved large
amounts to sustain opposition media and thus to maintain a hard-hitting
propaganda campaign. The CIA spent $1.5 million in support of
El Mercurio, the country's largest newspaper and the most important
channel for anti-Allende )?ropaganda. According to CIA documents,
these efforts played a signIficant role in setting the stage for the military
coup of September 11, 1973.
The 40 Committee approvals in 1971 and early 1972 for subsidizing
El Mercurio were based on reports that the Chilean government ,,·us
trying to close the El Mercurio chain. In fact, the press remained free
throughout the Allende period, despite attempts to harass and financially
damage opposition media. The alarming field reports on which
the 40 Committee decisions to support El Mercurio were based are at
some variance with intelligence community analyses. For example,
an August 1971 National Intelligence EstImate-nine months after
Allende took power-maintained that the government was attempting
to dominate the press but commented that El Mercurio had managed
to retain its independence. Yet one month later the 40 Committee voted
$700,000 to keep El Mercurio afloat. And CIA documents in 1973
acknowledge that El Mercurio and, to a lesser extent, the papers
belonging to opposition political parties, were the only publications
under pressure from the government.
The freedom of the press issue was the single most important theme
in the international propaganda campaign against Allende. Among
the books and pamphlets produced by the major opposition research
organization was one which appeared in October 1972 at the time of
the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) meeting in Santiago.
As in the 1970 period, the IAPA listed Chile as a country in which
freedom of the press was threatened.
The CIA's major propaO'anda project funded a wide range of propaganda
activities. It produced several magazines with national circulations
and a large number of books and special studies. It developed
material for placement in the El Mercurio chain (amounting to a total
daily circulation of over 300,000) ; opposition party newspapers; two
weekly newspapers; all radio stations controlled by 'opposition parties;
and on several regular television shows on three channels. El Mercurio
was a major propaganda channel during 1970-73, as it had been during
the 1970 elections and pre-inauguration period.
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The CIA also funded progressively a greater pOl'tion--over 75 percel,
t in ID7;;--of an opposition research organization. A steady flow of
economic and technical material went to opposition parties and private
sector groups. Many of the bills prepared by opposition parliamentarians
were actually drafted by personnel of the research organization.
C. SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS
The Committee has taken testimony that 40 Committee-approved
funds were used to help maintain and strengtnen the democratic opposition
in Chile. It has been stressed that CIA had nothing to do with
the truck owners' strike and the disorders that led to the coup. The
question of CIA support to Chilean private sector groups is a matter
of considerable concern because of the violent tactics used by several
of these groups in their efforts to bring about military intervention.
The issue of whether to support private groups was debated within
the Embassy and the 40 Committee throughout late 1972 and 1973.
In September 1972, the 40 Committee authorized $24,000 for "emergency
snpport" of a powerful businessmen's organization, but decided
against financial support to other private sector organizations because
of their possible involvement in anti-government strikes. In October
1972, the Committee approved $100,000 for three private sector organizations--
the businessmen's organization, associations of large and
small businessmen and an umbrella organization of opposition
e;TOUps-as part of a $1.5 million approval for support to opposition
groups. According to CIA testimony, this limited financial support
to the private sector was confined to specific activities in support oHhe
opposition electoral campaign, such as voter registration drives and a
get-out-the-vote campaign.
After the March 1973 elections, in which opposition forces failed to
achieve the two-thirds majority in the Senate that might have permitted
them to impeach Allende and hold new elections, the U.S.
Government re-assessed its objectives. There seemed little likelihood
of a successful military coup, but there did al?pear to be a possibility
that increasing unrest in the entire country mIght induce the military
to re-enter the Allende government in order to restore order. Various
proposals for supporting private sector groups were examined in the
context, but the Ambassador and the Department of State remained
opposed to any such support because of the increasingly high level of
tension in Chile, and because the groups were known to hope for militnry
intervention.
Nevertheless, on August 20, the 40 Committee approved a proposal
granting $1 million to opposition parties and private sector groups,
with passage of the funds contingent on the concurrence of the Ambassndor,
Nathaniel Davis, and the Department of State. None of these
funds were passed to private sector groups before the military coup
three weeks later.
While these deliberations were taking place, the CIA Station asked
Headquarters to take soundings to determine whether maximum support
could be provided to the opposition, including groups like the
truck owners. The Ambassador agreed that these soundings should be
tnken but opposed a specific proposal for $25,000 of support to the
strikers. There was a CIA recommendation for support to the truck
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owners, but it is unclear whether or not that proposal came before
the 40 Committee. On August 2·5-16 days before the coup-Headquarters
advised the Station that soundings were being taken, but the CIA
Station's proposal was never approved.
The pattern of U.S. deliberations suggests a careful distinction between
supporting the opposition parties and funding private sector
groups trying to brin~ about a military coup. However, given turbulent
conditions in Chile, the interconnections among the CIA-supported
political parties, the various militant trade associations
(f/remws) and paramilitary groups prone to terrorism and violent
dIsruption were many. The CIA was aware that links between these
groups and the politICal parties made clear distinctions difficult.
. The most prominent of the right-wing paramilitary groups was
Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty), which formed following
Allende's September 4 election, during so-called Track II. The
CIA provided Patria y Libertad with $38,500 through a third
party during the Track II period, in an effort to create tension and
a possible pretext for intervention by the Chilean military. After
Allende took office, the CIA occasionally provided the group small
sums through third parties for demonstrations or specific propaganda
activity. Those disbursements, about seven thousand dollars in total,
ended in 1971. It is possible that CIA funds given to political parties
reached Patria y Libertad and a similar group, the Rolando Matus
Brigade, given the close ties between the parties and these
organizations.
Throughout the Allende presidency, Patria y Libertad was the most
strident voice opposing all compromise efforts by Christian Democrats,
calling for resistance to government measures, and urging insurrection
in the armed forces. Its tactics came to parallel those of the Movement
of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) at the opposite end of the political
spectrum. Patria y Libertad forces marched at opposition rallies
dressed in full riot gear. Durin~ the October 1972 national truckers'
strike, Patria y Libertad was reported to strew "miguelitos" (threepronged
steel tacks) on highways in order to help bring the country's
transportation system to a halt. On July 13, 1973, Patria y Libertad
placed a statement in a Santiago newspaper claiming responsibility
for an abortive coup on June 29, and on .Tuly 17, Patria y Libertad
leader Roberto Thieme announced that his groups would unleash a
total armed offensive to overthrow the government.
With regard to the truckers' strike, two facts are undisputed. First,
the 40 Committee did not approve any funds to be given directly' to
the strikers. Second, all observers agree that the two lengthy strIkes
(the second lasted from July 13, 1973, until the September 11 coup)
could not have been maintained on the basis of union funds. It remains
unclear whether or to what extent CIA funds passed to opposition
parties may have been siphoned off to support strikes. It is clear that
anti-government strikers were actively supported by several of the
private sector groups which received CIA funds. There were extensive
links between these private sector organizations and the groups which
coordinated and implemented the strikes. In November 1972 the CIA
learned that one private sector group had passed $2,800 directly to
strikers, contrary to the Agency's ground rules. The CIA rebuked the
group but nevertheless passed It additional money the next month.
179
32
3. United StateB Economic Policie8 Toward Ohile: 1970-1973
A. COVERT ACTION AND .ECONOMIC PRESSURE
The policy response of the U.S. Government to the Allende regime
consisted of an interweaving of diplomatic, covert, military, and economic
strands. Economic pressure exerted by the United States formed
an important part of the mix. It is impossible to understand the effect
of covert action without knowing the economic pressure which accompanied
it.
B. CHILEAN ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE
The demise of the brief Allende experiment in 1970-73 came as the
cumulative result of many factorB---external and internal. The aca-·
demic debate as to whether the external or the internal factors weighed
more heavily is endless. This is not the place to repeat it. A brief
description of the Chilean economy will suffice to suggest the probable
effect on Chile of U.S. economic actions and the possible interactions
between economic and political factors in causing Allende's downfall.
Chile's export-oriented economy remained, in 1970, dependent for
foreign exchange earnings on a single produc~opper-Lmuch as it
had depended on nitrate in the 19th century. However, the Allende
Administration consciously adopted a policy of beginning to diversify
Chile's trade by expanding ties with Great Britainl the rest of the
Western European countrIes, and Japan, and by mitiating minor
trade agreements with the Eastern Bloc countries.
Nevertheless, Chilean economic dependence on the United States
remained a significant factor during the period of the Allende government.
In 1970, U.S. direct private investment in Chile stood at
$1.1 billion, out of an estimated total foreign investment of $1.672
billion. U.S. and foreign corporations played a large part in almost
all of the critical areas of the Chilean economy. Furthermore, United
States corporations controlled the production of 80 percent of Chile's
copper, which in 1970 accounted for four-fifths of Chile's foreign
exchange earnings. Hence, the Allende government faced a situation
in which decisions of foreign corporations had significant ramifications
throughout the Chilean economy.
Chile had accumulated a large foreign debt during the Frei government,
much of it contracted with international and private banks.
Chile was able, through the Paris Club, to re-negotiate $800 million in
debts to foreign governments and medium-term debt to major U.S.
banks in early 1972. It also obtained in 1972 some $600 mIllion in
credits and loans from socialist bloc countries and Western sources;
however, a study done by the Illter-American Committee on the Alliance
for Progress concluded that these credits were "tied to specific
development projects and [could] be used only gradually."
Even with a conscious policy of diversifying its foreign trading
patterns, in 1970 Chile continued to depend on the import of essential
replacement parts from United States firms. The availability of
short-term United States commercial credits dropped !rom around
$300 million during the Frei years to around $30 million in 1972. The
drop, a result of combined economic and political factors, seriously af:
fected the Allende government's ability to purchase replacement parts
and machinery for the most critical sectors of the economy: copper,
steel, electricity, petroleum, and transport.
180
33
By late 1972, the Chilean Ministry of the Economy estimated that
almost one-third of the diesel trucks at Chuquicamata Copper Mine,
30 percent of the privately owned city buses, 21 percent of all taxis,
and 33 percent of state-owned buses in Chile could not operate because
of the lack of spare parts or tires. In overall terms, the value of United
States machinery and transport equipment exported to Chile by U.S.
firms declined from $152.6 million in 1970 to $110 million in 1971.
C. THE IXSTRUMEKTS OF UXlTED STATES FOREIGX ECOXOMIC POLICY
TOWARD ALLENDE
United States foreign economic policy toward Allende's government
was articulated at the highest levels of the U.S. government, and
coordinated by interagency task forces. The policy was clearly framed
during the Track II period. Richard Helms' notes from his September
15, 1970, meeting with President Nixon, the meeting which initiated
Track II, contain the indication: "Make the economy scream."
A week later Ambassador Korry reported telling' Frei, through his
Defense Minister, that "not a nut or bolt would be allowed to reach
Chile under Allende."
While the Chilean economy was vulnerable to U.S. pressures over
a period of a few years, it was not in the short run. That judgment
was clearly made by intelligence analysts in the government, but
its implications seem not to have affected policy-making in September
and October of 1970. A February 1971 Intelligence Memorandum
noted that Chile was not immediately vulnerable to investment, trade
or monetary sanctions imp-osed by the United States. In fact, the imposition
of sanctions, whIle it would hurt Chile eventually, was seen
to carry one possible short-run benefit-it would have given Chile a
justification for renouncing nearly a billion dollars of debt to the
United States.
The policy of economic pressure-articulated in NSDM 93 of
November 1970-was to be implemented through several means. All
new bilateral foreign assistance was to be stopped, although disbursements
would continue under loans made preVIously. The U.S. would
use its predominant position in international financial institutions to
dry up the flow of new multilateral credit or other financial assistance.
To the extent possible, financial assistance or guarantees to U.S.
private investment in Chile would be ended, and U.S. businesses would
be made aware of the government's concern and its restrictive J?olicies.
The bare figures tell the story. U.S. bilateral aid, $35 million m 1969,
was $1.5 million in 1971. (See Table II.) U.S. Export-Import Bank
credits, which had totalled $234 million in 1967 and $29 million in
1969, dropped to zero in 1971. Loans from the multilateral InterAmerican
Development Bank (IDB), in which the U.S. held what
amounted to a veto, had totalled $46 million in 1970; they fell to $2
million in 1972 (United States A.I.D. figures). The only new IDB
loans made to Chile during the Allende period were two small loans
to Chilean universities made in January 1971,< Similarly, the World
Bank made no new loans to Chile between 1970 and 1973. However,
the International Monetary Fund extended Chile approximately
$90 million during 1971 and 1972 to assist with foreign exchange
difficulties.
• As with bilateral aid, disbursements were eontlnued under previous eommltments.
~54 mllJlon was disbursed between Deeember 1970 and Deeember 1972. (IDB ligures)
TABLE II.-FOREIGN AID TO CHILE FROM U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS-TOTAL OF LOANS AND GRANTS
[In millions 01 dollars]
Fiscal year 1953-61 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Total U.S. economic aid••.....••••....••••• 339.7 169.8 85.3 127.1 130.4 1ll.9 260.4 97.1 BO.8 29.6 8.6 7.4 3.8 9.8
U.S. AID ...••.....•••...•••....•••••• 76.4 142.7 41.3 78.9 99.5 93.2 15.5 57.9 35.4 18.0 1.5 1.0 .8 5.3
U.S. Food lor Peace•••...•••••.•••••.•• 94.2 6.6 22.0 26.9 14.2 14.4 7.9 23.0 15.0 7. Z 6.3 5.9 2.5 3. Z
U.S. Export·lmport 8ank•••••••.••••••_ 169.0 .8 16.2 15.3 8. Z .1 234.6 14.2 28.7 3.3 •••• _....• 1.6 3.1 198.1 ......
Total U.S. Military aid ..••••._•••••. __•••••_ 41. 8 17.8 30.6 9.0 9.9 10.1 4.1 7.8 11.8 .8 5.7 1Z.3 15.0 15.9 C"-' (yJ
Total U.S. economic and military aid __ .•••• _. 381. 5 187.6 115.9 136.1 140.3 1ZZ.0 264.5 104.9 91.8 30.4 14.3 'Zl. 3 I ZI. 9 I 1Z3. 8 ~ ......
Total international or~nization. ' •••••.••••• 135.4 18.7 31.2 41.4 12.4 72.0 93.8 19.4 49.0 76.4 15.4 18.2 9.4 111.2
IBRD (World Ban )•.••••••.•••••..•.•• 95.2 .•••......•••. _.••• _ 22.6 4.4 2.7 60.0 ••••.. _••• ll.6 19.3 •.•••.....•••.... ___ .•..• ___ .. 13.5
Inter-American Development Bank (108). 5.7 15.1 24.4 16.6 4.9 62.2 31.0 16.5 31.9 45.6 12.0 2.1 5.2 97.3
1 Include. Ex·lm: 57.0 and ather: 41.1.
, Total per chart plus Export·lmport 8ank.
'U.S. contributions to 1.0.'. included above; therelore U.S. aid and international aid should nat be added together.
Source: U.S. Oversea. Loan. and Grant., Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July I, 1945 to June 30, 1971, PP. 40,179; and July I, 1945 to June 30,1974, pp. 39, 175. Prepared by Statistics and Re·
parts Division, Office 01 Financial Management, Agency lor International Development. .
182
35
Reaction to events in Chile accounted for much of the momentum in
the United States Government for the development of a policy on expropriation.
In what came to be known as the Allende Doctrine, Chile
proposed to deduct a calculation of "excess profits" (over and above
reinvestments and a 10-12 percent profit margin) from any compensation
paid to nationalized firms in the copper sector. By this calculation,
U.S. copper companies were in fact told they owed money. The
reaction of the U.S. Government was strong. In January 1972, President
Nixon announced that, when confronted with such situations, the
U.S. would cut off bilateral aid and "withhold its support from loans
under consideration in multilateral development banks."
While the State Department, the CIA, and the Department of Commerce
all participated in the United States economic policy toward
Chile, a central point in the execution of this policy was the Department
of the Treasury. The Department instructs U.S. representatives
on multilateral lending institutions, In the IDB, for instance, the U.S.
controlled 40 percent of the votes, sufficient to veto any "soft" IDB
loans. Loan proposals submitted to the IDB were held under study,
nen'r coming up for a vote by the IDE Board. Whether U.S. actions,
and those of the multilateral institutions, were motivated by political
interests or economic judgments of Chile's "credit worthiness" is a debate
not yet definitively settled. However, it seems clear from the patt"
rn of U.S. economic actions and from the nature of debates within the
Executive Branch that American economic policy was driven more by
political opposition to an Allende regime than by purely technical
judgments about Chile's finances.
The posture of the Export-Import Bank, a United States public
institution, reflected the tone of U.S. economic policy toward Chile
during the Allende period. In the fall of 1970, the Bank dropped
Chile's credit rating from "B," the second category, to "D," the last
category. Insofar as the rating contributed to similar evaluations by
private U.S. banks, corporations, and international private investors,
it aggravated Chile's problem of attracting and retaining needed capital
inflow through private foreign investment. In mid-August 1971
the Bank decided that a $21 million credit for Boeing passenger jets
would 00 deferred pending a resolution of the controversy over compensation
for nationalized U.S. copper companies. That Bank decision
came one month after thfl nationalization and two months oofore the
final decision on compensation. In fact, the Boeing decision had wen
first announced in May, before the nationalization occurred.
The United States linked the question of indemnization for U.S. copper
companies "ith Chile's multilateral foreign debt. That foreign
debt, an inheritance from the obligations incurred by the Alessandri
and Frei governments, was the second highest foreign debt per capita
of an.v country in the world. Yet, in the 1972 and1D73 Paris Club foreign
debt negotiations with Chile's principal foreign creditor nations,
the "Cnited States alone refused to consider rescheduling Chile's foreign
debt payments until there was movement toward indemnization
for the U.S. copper companies. The United States also exerted pressure
on each of the other foreign creditor nations not to renegotiate
Chile's foreign debt as a group.
183
36
4. U.S. Relations with the Okilean Military
United States relations with the Chilean military during- 1970-1973
must be viewed against the backdrop not only of the tradition of close
cooperation between the American and Chilean military services and
of continuing intelligence collection efforts, but also in the context of
Track II-an attempt to foment a military coup. Track II marked a
break in the nature of relations between U.S. officials and the Chilean
military.
Close personal and professsional cooperation between Chilean and
U.S. officers was a tradition of long standing. The American military
presence in Chile was substantial, consisting both of military attaches,
the Embassy, and members of the Military Group who proVIded training
and assistance to the Chilean armed services. In the late 1960's the
Military Group numbered over fifty; by the Allende J?eriod, it was
reduced to a dozen or so, for reasons which had primarIly to do with
U.S. budget-cutting.
A. PRE-TRACK II
In July 1969 the CIA Station in Santiago requested and received
Headq,uarters approval for a covert program to establish intelligence
assets In the Chilean armed services for the purpose of monitoring coup plotting.
The program lasted for four years: it involved assets drawn
from all three branches of the Chilean military and included command-
level officers, field- and company-grade officers, retired general
staff officers and enlisted men. From 1969 to August 1970, the project
adhered closely to its stated objective of monitoring and reporting
coup-oriented activity within the Chilean military.
During August, September and October of 1969, it became increasingly
clear from the agents' reports that the growing dissatisfaction
and unrest within the armed forces was leading to an unstable military
situation. These events culminated in the abortive military revolt of
October 1969-the 1'acnazo, named after the Tacna regiment in Santiago.
How close thr amateurish Tacnazo came to success was a lesson
to remember, particularly in light of the upcoming Presidential election
of 1fi70 and the strong possibility that Salvador Allende would
emerge victorious.
B. TRACK II
Tl10 Track II cOYrrt action effort to org"unize a military coup to deny
Allende the Presidency cmlg"ht the Santiag"O Station nnprepared. Its
two assets in the Chilean military were not in a position to spark a
COHIl. To accomplish the mission directed by ·Washington, the Station
had to n:"e a U.S. military attache and other hastily developed contacts
with the two main coup plotting groups in the Chilean military. These
contacts not only reported the plans of the groups but also relayed the
Station's a(lvice about mechanics and timing, and passed on indications
of U.S. Government support following a successful coup. ·With
the death of Schneider, the plotters' effort collapsed in disarray, leaving
the Station with only its initial assets in the military. It took the
Station another ten months to rebuild a network of agents among the
cautious Chilean military.
184
37
As part of its attmept to induce the Chilean military to intervene
before the October 24 congressional vote, the United States had
threaumed to cut off militar,Y aid if the military refused to act. That
was accompanied by a promIse of support in the aftermath of a coup.
However, military assistance was not cut off at the time of Allende's
confirmation (see Table III). Military sales jumped sharply from
1972 to 1973 and even more sharply from 1973 to, 1974 after the coup
(see Table IV). Training of Chilean military personnel in Panama
also rose during the Allende years (see Table V).
C. 1970-73
After the failure of Track II, the CIA rebuilt its network of contacts
and remained close to Chilean military officers in order to monitor
developments within the armed forces. For their part, Chilean officers
who were aware that the United States once had sought a coup to prevent
Allende from becoming president must have been sensitive to
indications of continuing U.S. support for a coup.
By September 1971 a new network of agents was in place and the'
Station was receiving almost daily reports of new coup plotting. The
Station and Headquarters began to explore ways to use this network.
At the same time, and in parallel, the Station and Headquarters discussed
a "deception operation" designed to alert Chilean officers to real
or rurported Cuban involvement in the Chilean army. Throughout the
fal of 1971, the Station and Headquarters carried on a dialogue about
both the general question of what to do with the intelligence network
and the objectives of the specific operation.
TABLE III.-MllITARY ASSISTANCE.
Fiscal year
1966•••.•.••..••. _...••...•.• _....••_•....••. _•.•..••.•...•.•••....••••
1967••_.•.•.....•_ _...•. __ _•...... __ ..•... __ ....•..•.•.....••
1968•••... __ .....•....•_•.• .•...._•••.... _••• _... __ ._._•.. _._ ..... _.
1969•.••....••....••.•..• _•.. __ ..... _._ •. _.._.••_•...•• _._ •.....• _•.. _.
1970•...••....••....•... _.••....••••.•.._•.•..•. __ _.••••..... __ •.
1971.. __ ..•.••....•_•.•.••.. __ ._ ..._.•.•.... _... _._ .•.••_.•...•••....••
1972_.._.•...._..•..• _....•. _..• __ ••••..• _•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
fm:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Programed
$8,806,000
4,143,000
1,801,000
734,000
852,000
698,000
870,000
941,000
912,000
Delivered
$8,366,000
4,766,000
7,507,000
2,662,000
1,966,000
1,033,000
2,227,000
918,000
619,000
I Figures are Irom a Department 01 Delense response to a Senate Select Committee document request and are
unclaSSified.
TABLE IY.-MILITARY SAlES I
Fiscal year
1966.•••..•.•_....••....•..... _._ ..... _._ .......••_ _••.....•• _ .
1967•. _...••..••••.....•.... __ ......• __ ....• _•..... __ ._ _._._ _
~~L::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
mL::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
m~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :
1974•••••••• _••••••••••••••••••••••...••••••....••.....•••...... ....
Orders
$1,057,000
2,559,000
4,077,000
1,676,000
7,503,000
2,886,000
6,238,000
14,972,000
76,120,000
Delivered
$1,490,000
1,690,000
2,100,000
2,147,000
9,145,000
2,958,000
4,583,000
2,242,00l)
4,860,000
'Figures are from I Department of Defense response to a Senate Select Committee document request"and are
unclassified.
185
38
TABLE V.-TRAINING IN PANAMA \
Fiscal year
Number of
people fiscal year
Number of
people
1966••. __ •• ••••••.••• __ • __ ••• ••••
1967. • ••• •• • __ .
1968 , • ••••. __ .
1969 .••. __ ••• __ .... __ ..• __ ••• .• __ .••
1970.•.•• .••• __ __ ..• ••••
68 1971 .•••••• __ .••• __ .••• __ .••••• •••••
57 1972.••••••.. __ .• •• .. .. •
169 1973..•• __ . .. __ .. __ .
107 1974__ • . __ .• __ •
181
146
197
257
260
I Figures are from a Department of Detense response to a Senate Select Committee document request and are
unclassified.
The Station proposed, in September, to provid.~ informationsome
of it fabricated by the CIA-which would convince senior Chilean
Army officers that the Carabineros' Investigaciones unit, with the
approval of Allende was acting in concert with Cuban intelligence
(DGI) to gather intelligence prejudicial to the Army high command.
It was hoped that the effort would arouse the military against Allende's
involvement with the Cubans, inducing the armed services to press
the government to alter its orientation and to move against it if necessary.
A month later CIA Headquarters su?-,gested that the deception
operation be shelved, in favor of passing' verifiable" information to
the leader of the coup group which Headquarters and the Station.perceived
as having the highest probability of success.
After a further Station request, Headquarters agreed to the operation,
with the objective of educating senior Chilean officers and keeping
them on alert. In December 1971 a. packet of material, including
a fabricated letter, was passed to a Chilean officer outside Chile. The
CIA did not receive any subsequent reports on the effect, if any, this
"information" had on the Chilean military. While the initial conception
of the operation had included a series of such passages, no further
packets were passed.
The Station/Headquarters dialogue over the use of the intelligence
network paralleled the discussion of the deception operation. In November
the Station suggested that the ultimate objective of the military
penetration program was a military coup. Headquarters responded
by rejecting that formulation of the objective, cautioning that the CIA
did not have 40 Committee approval to become involved in a coup.
However, Headquarters acknowledged the difficulty of drawing a firm
line between monitoring coup plotting and becoming involved in it.
It also realized that the U.S. government's desire to be in clandestine
contract with military plotters, for whatever purpose, might well
imply to them U.S. support for their future plans.
During 1970-73, the Station collected operational intelligence necessary
in the event of a coup-arrest lists, key civilian installations and
personnel that needed protection, key government installations which
need to be taken over, and government contingency plans which would
be used in case of a military uprising. According to the CIA, the data
was collected only against the contingency of future Headquarters
requests and was never passed to the Chilean military.
The intelligence network continued to report throughout 1972 and
1973 on coup plotting activities. During 1972 the Station continued to
monitor the group which might mount a successful coup, and it spent
a significantly greater amount of time and effort penetrating this
F. POST-1973
186
39
group than it had on previous groups. This group had originally come
to the Station's attention in October 1971. By January 1972 the Station
had successfully penetrated it and was in contact through an
intermediary with its leader. .
Durin~ late 1971 and early 1972, the CIA adopted a more active
stance V~8 avis its military penetration program, including a shortlived
effort to subsidize a small anti-government news pamphlet directed
at the armed services, its compilation of arrest lists and other
operational data, and its deception operation.
Intelligence reporting on coup plotting reached two peak periods, one
in the last week of June 1973 and the other during the end of August
and the first two weeks in September. It is clear the CIA receIved
intelligence reports on the coup planning of the group which carried
out the successful September 11 coup throughout the months of July,
August, and September 1973. .
The CIA's information-gathering efforts with regard to the Chilean
military included activity which went beyond the mere collection of
information. More generally, those efforts must be viewed in the context
of United States opposition, overt and covert, to the Allende
government. They put the United States Government in contact with
those Chileans who sought a military alternative to the Allende
presidency.
1. Ohile Since the Ooup
Following the September 11, 1973, coup, the military Junta, led by
General Augusto Pinochet, moved quickly to consolIdate its newly
acquired power. Political parties were banned, Congress was put in
indefinite recess, press censorship was instituted, supporters of Allende
and others deemed opponents of the new regime were jailed, and elections
were put off indefinitely.
The prospects for the reVIval of democracy in Chile have improved
little over the last two years. A 1975 National Intelligence Estimate
stated that the Chilean armed forces were determined to oversee a
prolonged political moratorium and to revamp the Chilean political
system. The NIE stated that the Junta had established ti~ht, authoritarian
controls over political life in Chile which ~nerany continued
in effect. It had outlawed Marxist parties in Chile as well as other
parties which had comprised Allende's coalition. In addition, the
Christian Democratic and National parties had heen placed in involuntary
recess. These two parties :were forbidden from engaging in
political activity and restricted to purely housekeeping functions.
In addition, charges concerning the violation of human rights in
Chile continue to be directed at the Junta. Most recently, a United
Nations report on Chile charged that "torture centers" are being operated
in Santiago and other parts of the country. The lengthy document,
issued October 14, 1975, listed 11 centers where it says prisoners
are being questioned ~'by methods amounting to torture." The Pinochet
government had originally offered full cooperation to the U.N. group,
including complete freedom of movement III Chile. However~ six days
before the group's arrival in Santiago, the government reversed itself
and notified the group that the visit was cancelled.
187
40
12. OIA Post-Ooup Activities in Ohile
The covert action budget for Chile was cut back sharply after the
coup and all the anti-Allende projects except for one, a major propaganda
project, were terminated. C<>vert activities in Chile following
the coup were either continuations or adaptations of earlier projects,
rather than major new initiatives.
The goal of covert action immediately following the coup was to
assist the Junta in gaining a more positive image, both at home and
abroad, and to maintain access to the command levels of the Chilean
government. Another goal, achieved in part through work done at the
opposition research organization before the coup, was to help the new
government organize and implement new policies. Project files record
that CIA collaborators were involved in preparing an initial overall
economic plan which has served as the basis for the Junta's most important
economic decisions.
With regard to the continuing propaganda project, a number of
activities, including the production of books, a mailing effort, a military
collection program, and the media coordination effort were terminated.
However, access to certain Chilean media outlets was retained
in order to enable the CIA Station in Santiago to help build Chilean
public support for the new government as well as to influence the direction
of the government, through pressures exerted by the mass media.
These media outlets attempted to present the Junta in the most
positive light for the Chilean public and to assist foreign journalists
III Chile to obtain facts about the local situation. Further, two CIA collaborators
assisted the Junta in preparing a White Book of the Ohange
of Governrt/¥!,nt in Ohile. The White Book, published by the Junta
shortly after the coup, was written to justify the overthrow of Allende.
It was distributed widely both in Washington and in other
foreign capitals. .
After the coup, the CIA renewed liaison relations with the Chilean
government's security and intelligence forces, relations which had been
disrupted during the Allende period. Concern was expressed within
the CIA that liaison with such organizations would lay the Agency
open to charges of aiding"political repression; officials acknowledged
that, while most of CIA's support to the various Chilean forces would
be designed to assist them in controlling subversion from abroad, the
support could be adaptable to the control of internal subversion as
well. However, the CIA made it clear to the Chileans at the outset
that no CIA support would be provided for use in internal political
repression. Furthermore, the CIA attempted to influence the Junta
to maintain the norms the Junta had set in its "Instructions for
Handling of Detainees" which closely followed the standards on
human rights set by the 1949 Geneva Convention. .
188
IV. Chile: Authorization, Assessment, and Oversight
A. 40 COJ\unTTEE AUTHORIZATION AND CONTROL: CUILE, 1969-1973
1. 40 Oommittee FunctUm8 and Procedures
Throughout its history, the 40 Committee and its direct predecessors-
the 303 Committee and the Special Group-have had one overriding
purpose; to exercise political control over covert operations
abroad. The 40 Committee is charged with considering the objectives
of any proposed activity, whether or not it would accomplish these
aims, and in general whether or not it would be "proper" and in the
American interest. Minutes and summaries of 40 Committee meetings
on Chile indicate that, by and large, these considerations were discussed
and occasionally debated by 40 Committee members.
In addition to exercising political control, the 40 Committee has
been responsible for framing covert operations in such a way that they
could later be "disavO',ed" or "plausibly denied" by the United
States government-or at least by the President. In the case of Chile,
of course, this proved to be an impossible task. Not only was CIA
involvement in Chile "blown," but in September 1974, President Ford
publicly acknowledged at a press conference U.S. covert involvement
in Chile.
Before covert action proposals are presented to the Director for
submission to the 40 Committee, an internal CIA instruction states
that they shO'Uld be coordinated with the Department of State and
that, ordinarily, concurrence by the ambassador to the country concerned
is required. "Should," and "ordinarily" were underscored for
an important reason-major covert action proposals are not always coordinated
among the various agencies. Nor, for that matter, are they
always discussed and/or approved by the 40 Committee. The Chile
case demonstrates that in at least one instance, the so-called Track
II activity, the President instructed the CIA not to inform nor coordinate
this activity with the Departments of State or Defense or the
ambassador in the field. Nor was the 40 Committee ever informed.
Not all covert activities are approved by the 40 Committee. Projects
not deemed politically risky or involving large sums of money can be
approved within the CIA. By CIA statistics, only about one-fourth
of all covert action projects are considered bv the 40 Committee. The
Committee has not been able to determine what percentage of covert
action projects conducted by the CIA in Chile were approved within
the CIA or required 40 Committee authoriz-ation. Despite this fact, the
Committee has found evi<;leI).ce of projects not considered by the 40
Committee, thus conformin~ to this general authorization rule. This
is not to imply that the CIA undertook activities in Chile behind the
back of the 40 Committee or without its approval. The Agency was
(41)
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simply following the authorization procedures for covert projects
that then existed. These same procedures exist today.
There have been numerous criticisms of 40 Committee procedures,
some of which follow:
The criteria by which covert op2rations are brought before the
40 Committee appear to be fuzzy. The re/ll degree of accountability
for covert actions remains to be determined.
There is a basic conflict between sufficient consultation to insure
accountability and sound decisions on the one hand, and secure
operations on the other. The risk of inadequate consultation may
be aggrav!lted by the more informal procedure of telephone clearances,
which has been used by the 40 Committee for the last few
years.
The review of covert actions by the 40 Committee does not
appear to be searching or thorough. There still appears to be a
serious risk that operations will end only when they come to grief.
fa. J,1J Oommittee Approvals
According to a chronology of 40 Committee meetings, the Committee
met on 23 separate occasions between March 1970 and October 1973
to authorize funds for covert activities in Chile.! During this period,
the Committee authorized a total of $8.8 million for CIA covert activities
in Chile. Of this amount, $6.5 million was spent.
The range of CIA activities in Chile approved by the 40 Committee
included "spoiling" operations against Allende prior to the September
4th election, assistance to Chilean political partIes, a contingency fund
for Ambassador Korry's use to influence the October 24 congressional
vote, purchase of a Chilean radio station to be used as a political
opposition instrument against Allende, assistance to specific political
candidates, emergency aid to keep the Santiago paper, El MercurW,
afloat, and support for an anti-Allende businessmen's association.
3. Policy Splits Within the 40 Oommittee
Unanimity was not a hallmark of 40 Committee meetings on Chile,
at least during the period April 1969 to October 1970. Stated simply,
the State Department was generally skeptical about intervening in the
Chilean electoral process, whereas the CIA, the U.S. Ambassador to
Chile, the Defense Department, and the White House favored
intervention.
The question of whether anything should be done with regard to
the September 1970 presidential election in Chile was first raised at a
meeting of the 303 Committee on April 15, 1969. It was not until
Decem.her 1969, however, that a joint Embassy-CIA proposal for a
campaIgn directed against Allende was submitted to the Committee.
At this December meeting, two State Department officials questioned
1 The use of the term "40 Committee meetings" must not be taken In a literal sense.
At the outset of the Nixon AdminIstration, the 40 CommIttee dId meet frequently to discuss
and approve. as well as review, U.S. covert activities, However. within a relatively short
period of time, these formal meetings of the 40 Committee were replaced by less frequent
meetings and a system of telephone clearances. Today the 40 Committee rarely meets. Covert
action proposals, prepared by the DCI. are dIstributed to the various 40 Committee principals
and approvals or disapprovals are obtaIned over the phone by the 40 Committee
Special Group officer, a CIA officer on loan to the NSC staff.
67-146 0 - 76 - 13
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43
the need for U.S. involvement in the election. One State official commented
that an Allende victory would not be the same as a Communist
victory. The U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, who had been
recalled for consultation, disagreed. He stated that operationally one
must treat an Allende victory as the same thing as a Communist victory.
Korry went on to state that, in his view, an Allende government
would be worse than a Castro government.
On March 25 1970, the 40 Committee approved a "spoiling operation"
against Allende and approved $125,000 for this purpose. Again}
however, the State Department, represented by Under Secretary ot
State U. Alexis Johnson, indicated that the Department remarned
lukewarm to any involvement in the election and informed the 40 Committee
that the Department would be quite cool to a more positive
approach.
One further example of policy disagreement within the 40 Committee
was evidenced in a summary of a September 29, 1970, 40 Committee
meeting. This meeting occurred a little more than three weeks
after Allende had won his plurality victory on September 4. The question
of applying economic pressure to Chile was raised, with the hope
that this pressure would create the conditions which would lead to a
military coup. After a run-through of possible economicpressures that
could be brought to bear on Chile, provided by the CIA's Deputy
Director for Plans Thomas Karamessines, Under Secretary of State
Johnson noted that to swerve from 40 Committee-type actIon to economic
warfare was tantamount to a change in foreign policy. Despite
this concern, the 40 Committee did decide to increase economic pressures
in Chile. The State Department was not happy with this turn of
events. Assistant Secretary of State Charles Meyer remarked that
should Allende be confirmed, the U.S. could place the burden on
Allende for all that he did, and, after all, he would not be around forever.
This view was not accep-ted by the CIA. Director Helms remarked
at the meeting that Allende s Marxist pronouncements should be taken
at face value while Karamessines added that a hands-off policy in
Chile at this time would be read as the U.S. throwing in the sponge.
As evidenced. by later 40 Committee authorizations, the sponge was
not thrown in.
B. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND COVERT ACTION
The intelligence community produces several kinds of assessments
for policy makers. Of these, the most important are National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs)-joint, agreed assessment of foreign
politics and capabilities-produced by the U.S. intelligence community.
This section, based on a review of NIEs and other rntelligence
memoranda 2 regarding Chile written during 1969-1973 will trace the
intelligence community's best estimates of what an Allende government
SIgnified for U.S. interests. .
KIEs are approved by the United States Intelligence Board
(USIB); dissenting agencies can register footnotes. Prior to 1973,
a formal Board of National Estimates supervised the production of
• These Include InteI1lgenee Memoranda produced by the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence
(OCI) and Intelligence Notes produced by the State Department's Bureau or
InteI1lgence and Research (INR). •
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44
drafts by a special Office of National Estimates. In 1973, that structure
was replaced by a system of National Intelligence Officers
(NIO~), senior analysts drawn from the CIA and other intelligence
agencIes.
There have been persistent criticisms of NIEs and many of these
remain with the new structure: the documents are least-common-denominator
compromises and thus are of little value to policy makers;
they are oriented toward short-range predictions rather than longrun
assessments. Another criticism deals not with the NIEs themselves
but with their use or abuse. It is charged that policy makers
ignore NIEs or consult them only when estimates confirm their preexisting
policy preferences.
1. The Chile Estimates
Between 1969 and 1973, five Chile NIEs were produced, one in each
year. In addition, several Intelligence Memoranda and Intelligence
Notes relating to Chile were prepared by CIA and State. The lIkely
policies and goals of an Allende administration, as predicted by the
mtelligence community, follow.
A. CHILE UNDER ALLE~DE
A July 1970 Chile NIE, prepared a little over a month before the
September eleytion, raised the question of what an Allende victory
would mean to Chile and the United States. The NIE occasioned considerable
disagreenient within the Washington community. The disagreement
reflected a division betwe.en the Department of State on one
side and the U.S. Ambassador and the CIA Station on the other. The
latter position was that an Allende victory would mean the gradual
imposition of a classic Marxist-Leninist regime in Chile. This position
was reflected, with some qualifying remarks, in the NIE.
The 1970 NIE stated, in strong terms, that an Allende administration
would proceed as rapidly as possible toward the establishment
of a Marxist-Socialist state. It would be a Chilean version of a Sovietstyle
East European Communist state. The intelligence community predicted
that although democracy was likely to survive in Chile over
the next two or three years, Allende could take Chile a long way down
the Marxist-Soeialist road during the six years of his administration.
To do this, however, he would have to surmount some very important
obstacles, such as Chile's security forces, the Christian Democratic
Party, some elements of organized labor, the Congress, and the Catholic
Church. The NIE noted that Allende undoubtedly expected progress
on basic bread and butter issues which would afford him an opportunity
to secure control of the Congress in the 1973 election and
thereby enable him to impose a socialist state of the Marxist variety by
the via padfica ("peaceful road").
The next NIE Issued on Chile, in August 1971, was less shrill on
the threat which Allende represented to Chilean democracy. He had
been in office nine months. The NIE stated that the consolidation
of Marxist political leadership in Chile was not inevitable and that
Allende had a long, hard way to go to achieve this. The NIE warned,
however, that although Allende would almost certainly prefer to ad192
45
here to constitutional means, he was likely to be impelled to use political
~chniques of increasingly dubious legality to perpetua~ his coalition
and power. Up to that point, the NIE observed, Allende had taken
great care to observe constItutional forms and was enjoying considerable
popularity in Chile.
The next NIE came out in June 1972. The prospects for the continuation
of democracy in Chile appeared to be better than at any time
since Allende's inauguration. The NIE stated that the traditional
political system in Chile continued to demonstrate remarkable resiliency.
Legislative, student, and trade union elections continued to
take place in normal fashion, with pro-government forces accepting
the results when they were adverse. The NIE noted that the Christian
Democratic Party and the National Party had used their combined
control of both Houses of Congress to stall government initiatives and
to pass legislation designed to curtail Allende's powers. In addition,
the opposition news media had been able to resist government intimidation
and persisted in denouncing the government. The NIE concluded
that the most likely course of events in Chile for the next year or so
would be moves by Allende toward slowing the pace of his revolution
in order to accommodate the opposition and to preser~e the gains he
had already made. .
One final NIE on Chile was issued prior to Allende's overthrow in
September 1973. That NIE focused on the prospects for the consolidation
of power by Allen~e's regime. It concluded that at that juncture
It political standoff seemed to be the most likely course of events in
Chile.. The NIE stated that Allende had not consolidated the power·
of his Marxist regime; the bulk of low-income Chileans believed that
he had improved their conditions and represented their interests; and
the. growth in support for his coalition reflec~d his political ability
as well as the popularity of his measures. The NIE did warn, however,
that the growing pOlarization of the Chilean society was wearing
away the Chilean predilection for political compromise. Nevertheless,
the analysts predicted that there was only an outside chance that the
military would move to force Allende from office.
B. U.S.-CHILEAN RELATIONS
Almost two years before Allende was elected, the intelligence community
predicted that future U.S.-Chilean relations would be under
repeated strains, regardless of which party won the 1970 presidential
election. A 1969 NIE stated that whoever succeeded Frei in the presidency
was likely to continue to stress Chilean independence, to be less
cooperative with the U.S. than Frei had been, and to explore somewhat
broader relations with communist countries. This NIE noted that were
Allende to win, his administration would almost certainly take steps
aimed at moving Chile away from the U.S. The NIE also observed that
s~J?s toward either government participation in or outright nationalizatIOn
of U.S. copper holdings in Chile were inevitable.
A 1970 NIE, Issued one month before Allende's September victory,
was quite pessimistic about future U.S.-Chilean relations. It stated
that if Allende were to win the election, he would almost certainly take
harsh measures against U.S. business interests in Chile and challenge
U.S. policies in the hemisphere. The NIE cited several foreign policy
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46
problems an Allende regime would fOse for the U.S., including recognition
of Cuba, possiblewithdrawa from the OAS, the deterIOration
of relations with Argentina, and anti-U.S. votes in the United Nations.
The NIE predicted, however, that Allende would probably not seek a
break with the United States over the next two years.
A 1971 NIE, issued ten months into Allende's term in office, stated
that U.S.-Chilean relations were dominated by the problems of nationalization,
although Allende himself seemed to wish to avoid a
confrontation. A 1972 Chile NIE noted that Allende, to date, had
sought to avoid irreparable damage to his relations with Washington.
Although the major problem concerning U.S.-Chilean relations
continued to be that of compensation for the nationalization of U.S.
companies, the 1972 NIE stated that Allende had taken pains to publicly
stress his desire for amicable relations. A 1973 NIE concluded
that Allende had kept lines open to 'Vashington on possible Chilean
compensation for expropriated U.S. copper companies.
C. ALLENDE'S RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
The 1969 Chile NIE predicted that any new administration would
explore somewhat broader relations with communist and socialist
countries. The NIE noted that Allende, in particular, would take
such steps but that even he would be deterred from moving too far
in this direction due to a Chilean nationalism which would as strongly
oppose subordinating Chile to the tutelage of Moscow or Havana as
to Washin~n. Allende did, over the years, expand Chile's relations
with sociaTist and communist countries. However, Allende was, as
a 1971 NIE stated, careful not to subordinate Chilean interests to any
communist or socialist power or to break existing ties with non-communist
nations on whom he continued to rely for aid. Chile NIEs in
1971 and 1972 emphasized that Allende was charting an independent,
nationalistic course, both within the hemisphere and internationally.
Allende was, in short, committed to a pohcy of non-alignment.
D. ALLENDE'S TIES WITH CUBA
The 1970 NIE on Chile predicted that Allende would recognize
Cuba. He did so, shortly after he was inaugurated. However, the pattern
of Chilean-Cuban relations was described in a 1971 NIE as one
of ideological distance and closer economic ties. The NIE stated that
despite Allende's long-standing personal relationship with Castro, he
had refrained from excessive overtures to him. A 1972 NIE noted
that Havana had been circumspect about trying to use Chile as a base
for promoting revolution throughout Latin America.
E. SOVIET INFLUENCE IN CHILE
Concern about the expansion of Soviet influence in Chile under
Allende and the possible establislunent of a major Soviet military
presence was expressed in 1970. A 1971 NIE predicted that although
the Soviet Union would continue to cultivate channels of influence into
Allende's government through the Chilean Communist Party, it would
probably be unsure of its ability to make a decisive impact on key
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issues given Allende's desire for an independent posture. The same
NIE noted that neither Allende nor the Chilean military establishment
would probably tolerate a permanent Soviet military presence
in Chile. A 1972 Chile NIE focused on the Soviet attitude to the
Allende regime and noted that Soviet overtures to Allende had thus
far been characterized by caution and restraint. This was, in part,
due to Soviet reluctance to anta~onize the U.S. and, more importantly,
a Soviet desire to avoid with Allende the type of open-ended commitment
for aid that they had entered into with Castro. A 1972 Intelligence.
Note, prel?ared by the State Department, stated that a SovietChilean
commumque, issued following- Allende's December visit to the
USSR, reflected Moscow's decision to continue a cautious policy toward
Chile and to avoid a major open-ended commitment of aId to
Allende. According to the Intelligence Note, the Soviets apparently advised
Allende to negotiate his differences with the U.S.
F. CHILE AS A BASE FOR LATIN Al\IERICAN SUBVERSION
Prior to Allende's election, concern was expressed about Chilean
subversion in other countries. An Intellig-ence Memorandum, prepared
by the CIA and issued shortly after Allende's September 4 plurality
VIctOry, stated that Chile had long been a relatively open country for
extreme leftists and would become even more so under Allende. The
Memorandum noted, however, that Allende would be cautious in providing
assistance to extremists for fear of provoking a military reaction
in his own country. The Memorandum went on to observe that the
degree to which reVOlutionary groups would be allowed to use Chile
as a base of operations would be limited to some extent by the orthodox
Communist Party in Chile which opposed violence-prone groups. A
State Department Intelligence Note, prepared in June 1971, stated
that, contrary to some earlier indications that Allende might provide
clandestine assistance to neighboring insurgency movements, evidence
to date suggested that he had been sensitive to the concerns of neighboring
~overnments and had sought to avoid action which would
strain bIlateral relations. The Intelligence Note stated that Chile had
warned Argentine and Mexican expatriates that they could reside in
Chile only if they did not engage in political activities and that some
of the more politically active Brazilian exiles had been encouragoed to
depart Chile. The Note concluded by predicting that it was unlikely
that Allende would provide financial support or training to facilitate
the export of insurgency. A 1972 NIE stated that Allende had gone
to great lengths to convince his Latin American neighbors that he did
not share Castro's revolutionary goals; although some revolutionaries
in Chile had received arms and funds from extremists in Allende's
political coalition, this had probably not occurred at his behest.
G. THREAT ASSESSl\IENT
The most direct statement concerning the threat an Allende regime
would pose to the United States was contained in a CIA Intelligence
Memorandum, issued shortly after Allende's September 4 election victory.
The Memorandum summarized the views of the Interdepartmental
Group for Inter-American Affairs, which prepared the re195
48
sponse to National Security Study Memorandum 97. The Group, made
up of officials representing CIA, State, Defense, and the White House,
concluded that the United States had no vital interests within Chile,
the world military balance of power would not be significantly altered
by an Allende regime, and an Allende victory in Chile would not pose
any likely threat to the peace of the region. The Group noted, however,
that an Allende victory would threaten hemispheric cohesion and
would represent a psychological setback to the U.S. as well as a definite
advance for the Marxist idea.
13. Estirruztes and Oovert Action
As a result of this look at the Chile estimates, a number of comments
can be made concerning them and their relation to decisions about
covert action:
(a) Despite the view expressed by the Interdepartmental Group,
and reported in a CIA Intelligence Memorandum, that the U.S. had
no vital national interest in Chile, the decision was made by the Executive
Branch to intervene in that nation's internal political and economic
affairs, before the election, between it and the congressional vote and
during Allende's tenure in office.
It appears that the Chile NIEs were either, at best, selectively used
or, at worst, disregarded by policy makers when the time came to make
decisions regarding U.S. covert involvement in Chile. 40 Committee
decisions regarding Chile reflected greater concern about the internal
and international consequences of an Allende government than was reflected
in the intelligence estimates. At the same time as the Chile
NIEs were becomin~ less shrill, the 40 Committee authorized greater
amounts of money for covert operations in Chile. The amounts authorized
by the 40 Committee rose from $1.5 million in 1970 to $3.6 million
in 1971, $2.5 million in 1972, and, during the first eight months of 1973,
$1.2 million. Covert action decisions were not, in short, entirely consistent
with intelligence estimates.
(b) As noted, NIEs are designed to provide economic and political
assessments and an analysis of trends. As such, they are vulnerable
to being interpreted by policymakers to support whatever conclusions
the pohcymakers wish to draw from them. The estimates do, however,
serve to narrow the range of uncertainty about future events in Chile,
and ~hus narrow the range of justifiable U.S. policies. But a range
remamed.
For example, a 1971 estimate stated that, on the one hand, Allende
was moving skillfully and confidently toward his declared goal of
b.uilding a reVOlutionary nationalistic, socialist society on Marxist prinCIples,
but, on the other hand, the consolidation of the Marxist political
leadership in Chile was not inevitable, and Allende had a long,
hard way to go to achieve,this. As a further example, a 1973 NIE which
addressed the possibility of enhanced Soviet influence in Chile stated
that the Soviets were interested both in increasing their influence in
South America and in Allende's successful coalition of leftist parties
as a model for a Marxist revolution through election. Yet, the estimate
went on to say that the Soviets did not want another Cuba on their
bands and they were reluctant to antagonize the U.S.
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(c) The Committee has determined that the analysts responsible
for drawing up the Chile NIEs were not privy to information concerning
covert operations approved by the 40 Committee and being
implemented in Chile by the CIA operators. The explanation for this
is CIA compartmentation. Analysts and operators often exist in separate
worlds. Information available to the Operations Directorate is
not always available to the Intelligence Directorate. As a result, those
who were responsible for preparing NIEs on Chile appear not to have
had access to certain information which could have added to, or substantially
revised, their assessments and predictions. That flaw was
telling. It meant, for example, that the 1972 assessment of the durability
of opposition sectors was written without knowledge of covert American
funding of precisely those sectors. Thus, there Was no estimate of
"'hether those sectors would survive absent U.S. money.
C. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
With regard to covert action in Chile between April 1964 and December
1974, CIA's consultation with its Congressional oversight committees--
and thus Congress' exercise of its oversight function-was
inadequate. The CIA did not volunteer detailed information; Congress
most often did not seek it.
Beginning in 1973, numerous public allegations were made concerning
activities undertaken by the CIA in Chile. In response, Congress
began to assume greater control in the exercise of its oversight function-
which it had badly neglected in the past-both in the number
and depth of consultations with the Central Intelligence Agency. Prior
to 1973 there were twenty meetings between Congressional committees
and the CIA regarding Chile; these meetings were held with the
House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriation Committees
in their Intelligence Subcommittees. From March 1973 to December
1974 there were thirteen meetings held not only with these Committees,
but also before the Senate Foreign RelatIons Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs.
Based on CIA records, there were a total of fifty-three CIA Congressional
briefings on Chile between 1964: and 1974. At thirty-one
of these meetings, there was some discussion of covert action; special
releases of funds for covert action were discussed at twenty-three of
them. After January 1973 these briefings were concerned with past
CIA covert activity. From information currently in the possession
of the Committee and public sources, several tentative conclusions
emerge: on several important occasions the CIA did not report on
covert action until quite long after the fact; and in one case-Track
II-it omitted discussion of an important, closely held operation,
but one whose outcome reverberated on the foreIgn policy of the
United States and carried implications for domestic affairs as well.
Of the thirty-three covert action projects undertaken in Chile with
40 Committee approval during the period 1963-1974, Congress was
b:r;iefed in some fashion on eight.3 Presumbly the twenty-five others
were undertaken without Congressional consultation. These twenty-
• Under section 622 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, the Director of Central
Intelligence Is required to notify six Congressional oversight committees of every 40
Committee approval once tbe President bas Issued a finding tbat tbe project Is necessary
for the national security of the United States.
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50
five projects included: the $1.2 million authorization in 1971, half of
which was spent to purchase radio stations and newspapers while the
other half went to support municiyal candidates and anti-Allende
political parties; and the additiona expenditure of $815,000 in late
1971 to provide support to opposition parties.
Of the total of over thirteen million dollars actually spent by the
CIA on covert action operations in Chile between 1963 and 1974, Congress
received some kind of briefing (sometimes before, sometimes
after the fact) on projects totaling about 7.1 million dollars. Further,
Congressional oversight committees were not consulted about projects
which were not reviewed by the full 40 Committee. One of these was
the Track II attempt to foment a military coup in 1970. The othera
later CIA project involving contacts with Chilean military officerswas
an intelligencB collection project and thus did not come before the
40 Committee, even though in this instance the political importance of
the project was clear.
198
v. Preliminary Conclusions
Underlying all discussion of American interference in the internal
affairs of Chile is the basic question of why the United States initially
mounted such an extensive covert action program in Chile-and
why it continued, and even expanded, in the early 1970s.
Covert action has been a key element of U.S. foreign policy toward
Chile. Tho link between covert action and foreign policy was obvious
. throughout the decade between 1964 and 1974. In 1964, the United
States commitment to democratic reform via the Alliance for Progress
and overt foreign aid was buttressed via covert support for the election
of the candidate of the Christian Democratic party, a candidate
and a party for which the Alliance seemed tailor made. During 1970
the U.S. Government tried, covertly, to prevent Allende from becoming
President of Chile. When that failed, covert support to his oppositlOn
formed one of a triad of official actions: covert aid to oppositlOn
forces, "cool but correct" diplomatic posture, and economic pressure.
From support of what the United States considered to be democratic
and progressive forces in Chile we had moved finally to advocating
and encouraging the overthrow of a democratically elected government.
A. COVERT ACTION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
In 1964, the United States became massively involved in covert
activity in Chile. This involvement was seen by U.S. policy-makers as
consistent with overall American foreign policy and the goals of the
Alliance for Progress. The election of a moderate left candidate in
Chile was a cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Latin America.
n is unclear from the record whether the 1964 election project was
intrnded to be a one-time intervention in support of a good cause. It
is clear that the scale of the involvement generated commitments and
expectations on both sides. For the United States, it created assets
and channels of funding which could be used again. For the Chilean
groups receiving CIA funds, that funding became an expectation,
counted upon. Thus, when opposition to Allende became the primary
objective of covert action in 1970, the structure for covert action developed
through covert assistance to political parties in 1964 was well
establisheu.
!\. fundamental question raised by the pattern of U.S. covert activities
persists: Did the 6hreat to vital U.S. national security interests
posed by the Presidency of Sall'ador Allende ju.stify the several major
C()l'ert attempts to prevent his a{)cession to power.'? Three American
Presidents and their senior advisors evidently thought so.
One rationale for covert intervention in Chilean politics was spelled
ont by Henry Kissinger in his background briefing to the press on
September Hi, 1970, the day after NIxon's meeting with Helms. He
argned that an Allende victory would be irreversible within Chile,
might affect neighboring nations and would pose "massive problems"
for the U.S. in Latin America:
(51)
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I have yet to meet somebody who firmly believes that if Allende
wins, there is likely to be another free election in Chile.... Now it
is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende wins, there is a good
chance that he will establish over a period of years some sort of
communist government. In that case, we would have one not on an
island off the coast (Cuba) which has not a traditional relationship
and impact on Latin America, but in a major Latin American
country you would have a communist government, joining, for
example, Argentine ... Peru ... and Bolivia.... So I don't think
we should delude ourselves on anAllende takeover and Chile would
not present massive problems for us, and for democratic forces
and for pro-U.S. forces in Latin America, and indeed to the whole
Western Hemisphere.
Another rationale for U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of
Chile was offered by a high-ranking official who testified before the
Committee. He spoke of Chile's position ina worldwide strategic chess
game in 1970. In this analogy, Portugal might be a bishop, Chile a
couple of pawns, perhaps more. In the worldwide strategic chess
game, once a position was lost, a series of consequences followed. U.S.
enemies would proceed to exploit the new opportunity, and our ability
to cope with the challenge would be limited by any American loss.
B. EXECUTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MAJOR CoVERT ACTION
In pursuing the Chilean chess game, particularly the efforts to prevent
Allende's accession to power· or his maintaining power once
elected, Executive command and control of major covert action was
tight and well directed. Procedures within the CIA for controlling
the programs were well defined and the procedures made Station officials
accountable to their supervisors in Washington. Unilateral actions
on the part of the Station were virtually impossible.
But the central issue of command and control is accountability:
procedures for insuring that covert actions are and remain accountable
both to the senior political and foreign policy officials of the Executive
Branch and to the Congress.
The record of covert activities in Chile suggests that, although es·
tablished executive processes of authorization and control were generally
adhered to, there were-and remain-genuine shortcomings to
these processes:
Decisions about which covert action projects are submitted to the 40
Committee were and are made within the CIA on the basis of the
Agency's determination of the political sensitivity of a project.
The form in which covert action projects were cleared with Ambassadors
and other State Department officials varied. It depended-and
still depends-on how interested Ambassadors are and how forthcoming
their Station Chiefs are.
Once major projects are approved by the 40 Committee, they often
continue without searching re-examination by the Committee. The
Agency conducts annual reviews of on-going projects, but the 40 Committee
uoes not undertake a review unless a project is recommended
for renewal, or there is some important change in content or amount.
There is also the problem of controlling clandestine projects not
labeled "covert action." Clandestine collection of human intelligence
200
53
is not the subject of 40 Committee review. But those projects may be
just as politically sensitive as a "covert action"; witness U.S. contacts
with the Chilean military during 1970-73. Similarly, for security
reasons, ambassadors generally know CIA assets only by general description,
not by name. That practice may be acceptable, provided
the description is detailed enough to inform the ambassador of the
risk posed by the development of a particular assets and to allow
the ambassador to decide whether or not that asset should be used.
There remains the question of the dangers which arise when the
very mechanisms established by the Executive Branch for insuring
internal accountability are circumvented or frustrated.
By Presidential instruction, Track II was to be operated without
informing the U.S. Ambassador in Santiago, the State Department,
or any 40 Committee member save Henry Kissinger. The President
and his senior advisors thus denied themselves the Government's major
sources of counsel about Chilean politics. And the Ambassador in
Santiago was left in the position of having to deal with any adverse
political spill-over from a project of which he was not informed.
The danger was greater still. Whatever the troth about communication
between the CIA and the White House after October 15, 1970an
issue which is the subject of conflicting testimony-all participants
agreed that Track II constituted a broad mandate to the CIA. The
Agency was given to believe it had virtual carte blanche authority;
moreover, it felt under extreme pressure to prevent Allende from coming
to power, by military coup if necessary. It was given little guidance
about what subsequent clearances It needed to obtain from
the White House. Under these conditions, CIA consultation with the
White House in advance of specific actions was less than meticulous.
C. THE ROLE OF CoNGRESS
In the hands of Congress rests the responsibility for insuring that
the E'Xecutive Branch is held to full politIcal accountability for covert
activities. The record on Chile is mixed and muted by its incompleteness.
CIA records note a number of briefings of Congressional committees
about covert action in Ohile. Those records, however, do not reveal
the timeliness or the level of detail of these briefings. Indeed, the
record suggests that the briefings were often after the fact and incomplete.
The situation improved after 1973, apparently as Congressional
committees became more persistent in the exercise of their oversight
function. Furthermore, Sec. 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act
should make it impossible for major projects to be operated without
the appropriate Congressional committees being informed.
The record leaves unanswered a number of questions. These pertain
both to how forthcoming the Agency was and how interested
and persistent the Congressional committees were. Were members
of Congress, for instance, given the opportunity to object to specific
projects before the projects were implemented? Did they want to?
There is also an issue of jurisdiction. CIA and State Department
officials have taken the position that they are authorized to reveal
Agency operations only to the appropriate oversight committees.
201
54
D. INTELLIGE~CE JUDGMENTS AND COVERT OPERATIONS
A review of the intelligence judgments on Chile offered by U.S.
analysts during the critical period from 1970-1973 has not established
whether these Judgments were taken into account when U.S. policymakers
formulated and approved U.S. covert operations. This
examination of the relevant intelligence estimates and memoranda
has established that the judgments of the analysts suggested caution
and restraint while the political imperatives demanded action.
Even within the Central Intelligence Agency, processes for bringing
considered judgments of intelligence analysts to bear on proposed
covert actions were haphazard-and generally ineffective. This situation
has improved; covert action proposals now regularly come before
the Deputy Director for Intelligence and the appropriate National
Intelligence Officer; but the operators still are' separated from the
intelligence analysts, those whose exclusive business It is to understand
and predict foreIgn politics. For instance, the analysts who drafted the
government's most prestigious intelligence analyses-NIEs-may not
even have known of U.S. covert actions in Chile.
The Chilean experience does suggest that the Committee give serious
consideration to the possibility that lodging the. responsibility
for national estimates and conduct of operational activities with the
same person-the Director of Central Intelligence-creates an inherent
conflict of interest and judgment.
E. EFFECTS OF MAJOR CoVERT ACTION PROGRAMS
Covert Action programs as costly and as complex as several mOunted
by the United States in Chile are unlikely to remain covert. In Chile
in 1964, there was simply too much unexplained money, too many
leaflets, too many broadcasts. That the United Stateswas involved in
the election has been taken for granted in Latin America for many
years.
The involvement in 1964 created a presumption in Chile and elsewhere
in Latin America that the Umted States Government would
again be involved in 1970. This made secrecy still harder to maitain,
even though the CIA involvement was much smaller in 1970 than
it had been in 1964.
When covert actions in Chile became public knowledge, the costs
were obvious. The United States was seen, by its covert actions, to
hll:ve contradicted not only its official declaratIOns but its treaty commItments
and principles of long standing. At the same time it was
proclaiming a "low profile" in Latin American relations, the U.S.
Government was seeking to foment a coup in Chile.
The costs of major covert ventures which are "blown" are clear
enough. But there may be costs to pay even if the operations could
remain secret for long periods of time. Some of these costs may
accrue even within the calculus of covert operations: successes may
turn to failures. Several officials from whom the Committee took
testimony s!1ggested tha~ the poor showing of the Chilean Christian
Democrats III 1970 was, In some part, attributable to previous American
covert support. Of course there were many causes of that poor
showing, but in 1964 the PDC had been spared the need of develop-
67-146 0 - 76 - 14
202
55
ing some of its own grass roots organization. The CIA did much of
that for it. In 1970, with less CIA activity on behalf of the Christian
Democratic Party, the PDC faltered.
Of course, the more important costs, even of covert actions which
remain secret, are those to American ideals of relations among nations
and of constitutional government. In the case of Chile, some of those
costs were far from abstract: witness the involvement of United
States military officers in the Track II attempt to overthrow a constitutionally-
elected civilian government.
There are also long-term effects of covert actions. Many of those
may be adverse. They touch American as well as foreign institutions.
The Chilean institutions that the United States most favored may
have been discredited within their own societies by the fact of their
covert support. In Latin America particularly, even the suspicion of
CIA support may be the kiss of death. It would be the final irony of
a decade of covert action in Chile if that action destroyed the credibility
of the Chilean Christian Democrats.
The effects on American institutions are less obvious but no less important.
U.S. private and governmental institutions with overt, legitimate
purposes of their own may have been discredited by the
pervasiveness of covert action. Even if particular institutions were not
involved in covert action, they may have been corrupted in the perception
of Latin Americans because of the pervasiveness of clandestine
U.S. activity.
In the end, the whole of U.S. policy making may be affected. The
availability of an "extra" means may alter officials' assessment of the
costs and rationales of overt policies. It may postpone the day when
outmoded policies are abandoned and new ones adopted. ArguablY1 the
1964 election project was part of a "progressive" approach to Chile.
The project was justified, if perhaps not actually sustained, by the desire
to elect democratic reformers. By 1970, covert action had become
completely defensive in character: to prevent the election of Allende.
The United States professed a "low profile" but at the same time acted
covertly to ensure that the Chilean elections came out right, "low profile"
notwithstanding.
A special case for concern is the relationship between intelligence
ag-enCIes and multinational corporations.
In 1970, U.S. Government policy prohibited covert CIA support to
a single party or candidate. At the same time, the CIA prOVIded advice
to an American-based multinational corporation on how to furnish
just such direct support. That raised all of the dangers of exposure,
and eliminated many of the safeg-uards and controls normally
present in exclusively CIA covert operations. There was the appearance
of an improperly close relationship between the CIA and multinational
companies when former Director John McCone used contacts
and information gained while at the CIA to advise a corporation on
whose Board of Directors he sat. This appearance was heig-htened because
the contacts between the Agency and the corporation in 1970
extended to discussing and even planning corporate intervention in
the Chilean electoral process.
The problem of cooperation is exacerbated when a cooperating company-
such as ITT-is called to give testimony before an appropriate
Congressional Committee. The Agency may then be confronted with
203
56
the question of whether to come forward to set the record straight
when it believes that testimony given on behalf of a cooperating company
is untrue. The situation is difficult, for in coming forward the
Agehcy may reveal sensitive sources and methods by which it learned
the facts or, may make public the existence of ongoing covert
operations. '
This report does not attempt to offer a final judgment on the political
propriety, the morality, or even the effectiveness of American
covert activity III Chile. Did the threat posed by an Allende presidency
justify covert American involvement in Chile ~ Did it justify the specific
and unusual attempt to foment a military coup to deny Allende
the presidency~ In 1970, the U.S. sought to foster a military coup
in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to power; yet after 1970 the
government-according to the testimony of its officials-did not engage
in coup plotting. Was 1970 a mistake, an aberration ~ Or was the
threat posed to the national security interests of the United States so
grave that the government was remiss in not seeking his downfall directly
during 1970-73 ~ What responsibility does the United States
bear for the cruelty and political suppressIOn that have become the
hallmark of the present regime in Chile ~
On these questions Committee members may differ. So may American
citizens. Yet the Committee's mandate is less to judge the past
than to recommend for the future. Moving from past cases to future
guidelines, what is important to note is that covert action has been
perceived as a middle ground between diplomatic representation and
the overt use of military force. In the case of Chile, that middle ground
may have been far too broad. Given the costs of covert action, it should
be resorted to only to counter severe threats to the national security of
the United States. It is far from clear that that was the case in Chile.
204
Appendix
April 8
April
Ma1/
September 4
October 2
March 7
November 15
June 16
July 12
March 1
April 15
CHROXOLOGY: CHILE 1962-1975 i
1962
SpeciaZ Group approves $50,000 to Btrengthfm Christia,.
Democratic Parly (PDO),. subsequently approves an
additionaZ $180,000 to strengthen PD~ and its leader,
Eduardo Frei.
1963
Speoial Group approves $20,000 for a ZCader ott the Radical
Party (PR),. zater approves an addititmal $80,000
to support PR candidates in April munioipaZ electwfl,/l.
Municipal election results show PDC has replaced PR
as Chile's largest party.
1964
Speoial Group approves $3,000,000 to CfI,/Iure eZCction of
PDO candidate Eduardo Frei.
Speoial Group approves $160,000 to support PDO slum
dwelZCrs and peasant organizations.
Eduardo Frei elected President with 55.7 percent of
the vote.
Ralph A. Dungan appointed U.S. AmbassadOr to ChiZC.
1965
303 Oommittee approves $175,000 to asBist selected candidates
i,. Con.gresBional elections.
PDC wins absolute majority in Chamber of Deputies;
becomes largest party in Senate.
Salvador Allende, in an interview reported in the New
''York Time" ·'811gge8ts the U.S. was among certain
"outside forces" that 'had caused his defeat in the
1964 presidential election.
1967
Edward M. Korrv replaces Ralph A. Dungan as U.S.
Ambassador to Ohile.
303 Oommittee approoes $30,000 to strengthen a faction
of the RadicaZ Party.
1968
303 Oommittee approves $350,000 to asBid seZCcted candidates
in March 1969 congressional electiofl,ll.
1969
Congressional elections reflect an increase in support for
the National Party and a resulting loss in Christian
Democratic strength.
At a meeting of the 303 Oommittee the question is raised
as to whether anything shoo.W be done with regard to
the September 1970 Presidential election in ChiZC. The
OIA representative pointed out that an election operation
would not be effective unless an early enough
start was made.
i U.S. actions are Italicized throughout.
(57)
October 21
March 25
June
June 27
July 16
AuguBt 18
September 4
September 8,14
September 9
September 15
September 16
September 29
205
58
1969-Continued
Tacna and Yungay army regiments revolt, ostensibly
for the purposes of dramatizing the military's demand
for higher pay. The revolt, engineered by General
Roberto Viaux, is widely interpreted as an abortive
coup.
1970
40 Committee appr01JeB $125,000 for a "spoiling operation"
against Allende's Popular Unity coalition (UP).
The possibility of an Allende victory in Chile is raised at
an ITT Board of Directors meeting. John McCone,
former CIA Director and, at the time, a consultant to
the Agency and a Director of ITT, 8ubsequently holds
a number of conversations rega.rding Chile with Richard
Helms, the current CIA Director.
40 Committee approves $900,000 for additional antiAllende
propaganda operations.
John McCone arrange8 for William Brae (CIA) to talk
with Harold Geneen (ITT). Brae tells Geneen that
CIA cannot di8bur8e ITT fund8 but promises to ade
viBe ITT on how to channel its own fund8. ITT later
pasBe8 $950,000 to the Ale8sandri campaign through
an intermediary.
National Security StUdy Memorandum (NSSM) 97 iB
reviewed by the Interdepartmental Group" the Group
considers options ranging from efforts to forge amicable
relatiom with Allende to opposition to him.
Salvador Allende wins 36.3 percent of the vote in the
Presidential election. Final outcome is dependent on
October 24 vote in Congress between Allende and the
runner-up, Jorge Alessandr!, who received 35.3 percent
of the vote. Allende's margin of victory was
39,000 yotes out of a total of 3,000,000 Yotes cast in
the election.
40 Committee di8CUsses Chilean situation. The Committee
approves $250,000 for the use of Ambassador
Korry to influence the October 24 Congressional vote.
Harold Geneen, ITT's Ohie! EilJecutive Officer, tells John
McCone at an ITT Board of Directors meeting in]few
York that he is prepared to put up as much as $1 million
for the purpose Of assisting any government plan
designed to form a coalition in the Chilean Congress to
stoP Allende. McCone agrees to communicate this
proposal 'to high Washington officials and meets several
days later with Henry Kissinller and Richard
Helms. McOone does not receive a response from either
man. ,
President Nixon instructs CIA Director Helms to prevent
Allende's accession to office. The CIA is to playa
direct roIe in Ilrllanizinll a military coup d'etat. This
involvement comes to be known as Track II.
At an off-the-record White House press briefinll, Henry
Kissinger warns that the election of Allende would be
irreversible, might affect neillhboring nations, and
would pose "massive problems" for the U.S. and Latin
America.
A OIA official, at the instruction of Richard Helms, meets
with a representative of ITT. The CIA officer proposes
a plan to accelerate economic disorder in Chile. ITT
rejects the fjroposal.
October
October 1"
October 22
October 24
November 3
November 13
November 19
December 21
January 1e8
February !5
March 21e
April 4
MI11J 10
May leO
May 26
July 6
July 11
August 11
September 9
September 28
206
59
1970-Continued
CIA Contactll Chilean mtlitary conllpu-atorl!; folZo1DUt.I1
a WMte HWBe 'l'neeting, CIA attemptll to defulle plot by
rettred General Viau"" but IItill to ge1\.erate mMtmum
pre88ure to OfJerthro1O AZle1l.de by coup; OIA providell
teM' gall urena4e8 and three 8ubmachiM gun8 to 001\.6f/
f.rafor,.
.f0 Oommittee approve8 $60,000 for Amba88ador Korry',
prop08al to purcha8e a radio 8tation. The money t8
never 8fle1\.t.
After two unsuccessful abduction attempts on October 19
and 20, a third attempt to kidnap Chilean Army
General Rene Schneider results in his being fatally
shot.
The Chilean Congress votes 153 to 35 in favor of Allende
over Alessandri.
Allende is formally inaugurated President of Chile.
.f0 Committee appro1Je1l $1e5,OOO for 8upport of Ohri8ttan
Democratic candidate8•
.f0 Committee approve8 $71e5,OOO for a covert action program
in Chile. Approval ill later IlUperseded by January
28, 1971, authorizatton.
President Allende proposes a constitutional amendment
establishing state control of the large mines and authorizing
expropriation of all foreign firms working
them.
1971
.f0 Oommittee approve, $l,2.f0,000 for the purchalle of
radio 8tationsand 1\.e108papers and to 8upport municipal
candidate8 and other political activitiell of antiAllende
partie8:
In hi8 annual State of the World me88age, Prellide1\.t
Nia:on 8tates, "We are prepared to have the kind of
relationship with the Ohilean governme1\.t that it i8
prepared to have with U8."
.f0 Oommittee approve8 $185,000 additional 8upport for
the Chri8tian Democratic Party (PDC).
Allende's Popular Unity (UP) coalition garners 49.7 percent
of the vote in 280 municipal elections.
.f0 Oommittee approve8 $77,000 for purcha8e of a preS8
for the Christian Democratic Party n6108paper. The
press is not obtained and the fund8 are used to l/Upport
the paper.
40 Oommittee approve8 $100,000 for emerge1\.cy atd to the
Chri8tian Democratic Party to meet short-term debt8.
40 Oommittee approves $150,000 for additional aid to
Ohristian Democratic Party to meet debts•
.f0 Oommittee approve8 $150,000 for support Of opp08ition
candidate8 in a Ohilean by-election.
In a joint session of the Chilean Congress, a constitutional
amendment is unanimously approved permittin~
the nationalization of the copper industry. The amendment
provides for compensation to copper companies
within 30 years at not less than 3 percent interest.
The Export-Import Bank denie, a Chilean reque8t for
$21 million in loans and loan gU'arantee8 needed to
purcha8e three jets for the national LAN-Ohile airUM.
.f0 Oommittee approve8 $700,000 for 8UPport to the major
SOlntiago newspaper, EI Mercurio.
President Allende announces that "excess profits" will
be deducted from compensation to be paid to nationalized
copper companies.
September 29
September 29
October
November 5
December 1
December 15
Jamuary 19
April 11
April 24
May 12
June16
August 21
September 21
October 10
October26
December 4
February 12
March 4
March 22
207
60
1971-Continued
The Chilean government assumes operation of the
Chilean telephone company (CHITELCO). ITT had
owned 70 percent interest in the company since 1930.
Nathaniel Davis replaces Edward Korry as U.S. Ambassador
to Chile.
ITT submits to White House an 1S-point plan designed
to assure that Allende "does not get throUf/h the
cruCial nea;t sia; months." The ITT proposal is
rejected.
40 Committee approves $815,000 support to opposition
parties and to induce a split in the Popular Unity
coalition.
The Christian Democratic and National Parties orgamize
the "March of the Empty Pots" by women to
protest food shortages.
40 Committee approves $160,000 to support two opposition
candidates in Januar1l1972 by-elections.
1972
President NiillDn issues a statement to clarify U.S. policy
tOlvard foreign ea;propriation of American interests.
The President states that the United States eilJpects
compensation to be "prompt, adequate, and effective."
The President warns that should compensation not
be reasonable, new bilateral economic aid to the expropriating
country might be terminated and the U.S.
would withhold its support from loans under consideration
in multilateral development banks.
40 Committee approves $965,000 for additional support
to EI Mercurio.
40 Committee approves $50,000 for an effort to splinter
the Popular Unity coalition.
President Allende submits a constitutional amendment
to the Chilean Congress for the expropriation of ITT's
holdings in the Chilean telephone company.
40 Committee approves $46,500 to support a candidate
in a Chilean by-election.
Allende declares a state of emergency in Santiago province
after violence grows out of a one-day strike by
most of the capital's shopkeepers.
40 Committee approves $2'4,000 to support an antiAllende
busincssmen's wganization.
The Confederation of Truck Owners calls a nationwide
strike.
40 Committee approves $1,427,666 to support opposition
political parties and private sector organizations in
antiCipation of March 1973 Congressional elections.
Speaking before the General Assembly of the United
Nations, President Allende charges that Chile has been
the "victim of serious aggression" and adds, "we
have felt the effects of a large-scale external pressure
against us."
197'3
40 Committec approvcs $200,000 to support opposition
political partics in the Congressional elections.
In the Congressional elections, Allende's Popular Unity
coalition wins 43.4 percent of the vote.
Talks between the U.S. and Chile on political and tinandal
problems end in an impasse.
June 5
June 20
June 21
June 29
July 26
August 2
Augusl20
August 23
August 27
September 4
September If
September 13
SeptemberOctober
October 15
June 24
September 16
October 25
December 30
208
61
19'1'3-Continued
Chile suspends its foreign shipments of copper as miners'
strikes continue.
Thousands of physicians, teachers, and students go on
strike to protest Allende's handling of the 63-day
copper workers' strike.
Gunfire, bombings, and fighting erupt as governmE'nt opponents
and supporters carry out a massive strike.
The opposition newspaper, El Met'curio, is closed by
court order for six days following a government
charge that it had incited subversion. The following
day an appeals court invalidates the closure order.
Rebel forces seize control of the downtown area of Santiago
and attack the Defense Ministry and the Presidential
Palace before troops loyal to the government
surround them and force them to surrender. This is
the first military attempt to overthrow an elected
Chilean government in 42 years.
Truck owners throughout Chile go on strike.
The owners of more than 110,000 buses and taxis go on
strike.
40 Committee approves $1 million to support opposition
political parties and private sector organizations. This
money is not spent.
General Carlos Prats Gonzalez resigns as Allende's Defense
Minister and Army Commander. General Pinochet
Ugarte is named Army Commander on August 24.
Prats' resignation is interpreted as a severe blow to
Allende.
Chile's shop owners call another anti-government strike.
An estimated 100,000 supporters of Allende's government
march in the streets of Santiago to celebrate the third
anniversary of his election.
The Confederation of Professional Employees begins an
indefinite work stoppage.
The Chilean military overthrows the government of Salvador
Allende. Allende dies during the takeover, reportedly
by suicide.
The new military government names Army Commander
Pinochet President and dissolves Congress.
The Junta declares all Marxist political parties illegal
and places all other parties in indefinite recess. Press
censorship is established, as are detention facilities
for opponents of the new regime. Thousands of
casualties are reported, inclUding summary executions.
40 Committee approves $34,000 fM an anti-Allende radio
station and travel costs of pro-Junta spokesmen.
1974
40 Committee approves $50,000 fM political oommitments
made to the Christian Democratic Party befMC
the coup.
President Ford acknowledges oovert operations in
Chile.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of
the O.A.S. reports "grievous violations of human
rights" in Chile.
U.S. military aid is cut off.
July 4
June 20
October 7
209
62
1975
Pinochet declares there "will be no elections in Chile
during my lifetime nor in the lifetime of my
successor."
Chile refuses to allow the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights to enter the country.
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights reports "with
profound disgust" the use of torture as a matter
of policy and other serious violations of human
rights in Chile.
Portions of the above chronology of events in Chile were extracted from
chronologies prepared by the Congressional Research Service ("Chile, 1960-70:
A Chronology"; "Chile Since the Election of Salvador Allende: A Chronology";
"Developments in Chile, March 1973 to the Overthrow of the Allende Government")
and from material contained in the June 21, 1973, report of the Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations entitled "ITT and
Chile."
210
ApPENDIX B
[CHAPTER 343J
AN ACT
To promote the nalional security by providing for lL Secrctary of Defcnse; for a
Nationnl Military Estnhlishment; for lL Department of the Army, a Department
of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the
aetivitic" of the National Milltnry Estahlishment with other departments and
agcncies of the Government cnncerned with the national security.
Be it enacted by the Se'Tl4te and HOWie of Representaeives of the
United States 01 America in Congress Cl.lsembled,
SHOIlT TITLE
That this Act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947".
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaratlon ot polley.
TiTLE I-COORDINATION fOB NATlONAL BEClJIl1TY
, f;l'c. J01. Nntionnl f;('('urlty COl/ndl.
Sec. J02. Ccntral Intclli~pneeAgency.
Sec. 103. National Security He"ources Bonrd.
TrrJ.>: II-TuE NATIONAL IIhLlTART E8TABLI8HMltNT
Scc.201. National IIlilitnry Establishment.
Sec. :!O:!. 8''I'retary of Defense.
~cc. ~tJ3. IIlilita ..y A",i~tnnts to the Secretary.
S\~c. :.!(}L Civilian pt~rsonneI.
Sec. 20;;. Department ot the Army.
SPC. ~OG. D('partm~nt of the Nav)'.
i/cc. 2U7. Department of the Air Force.
See.208. United States Air Force.
Sec. :WO. E1l'cetive date of transters.
1uly:le.1947
18.158J
IPublloL... ~I
Pool, p.•lIiI,
496
211
['UIlLIf: LAWS-CII. 343-JIJ(,Y 20. 1041
Rl'C'. ~1 n. 'Vn r CfJunrll.
Sl'(', :.!11. .JIlin! CIll1'fs of Starr.
:-ipl'. ~l ~ ,Jnlllt ~lnrr.
Sec. ~1:1: l\ll1llltllllls llnnrl1.
See. 214. 1l,'s"utTh ltllff Lll'vp\opmcnt noard.
[01 STAT.
Po,l, p. YJ7. 1'ITU: I [1-)llsn:T.L.O\NEOUS
~('r. :101. ('lllllpt'n~ntl()n ot S('('rl'fnrlf'~.
Sec. :lIJ2. lJndn S,'Crl'tnrlo" anti Asslstnnt Secretaries.
~pc. :~\I:L Advisory t'olll11\ltt~·I':-\ Hmi J)(>r!-'onnel.
lil'c. :lIJ4. StntllS or transferred clvlliun personnel.
H,'c. :W:t. ~n\"I,,~ pro\'IRioll~.
Sl'('. :IIHI. '1'1'11 IL"l fl' I' or (1lI1f1R,
N4'i'. :107. "lIllIol'lzlIlloJl fill' 1I1'1ifollrinflonft,
~'I"', :10.'( I h'Ulllf 11111'1,
N.",. :11111, NI'I",,·nlollll~'.
:-If"" :llO. 1,:n',,{'llvp dill I'.
l:lec. 3J 1. :,julepssloll to lite Prt'sldl'ncy.
Ilt:CLAltATION OF POI,TCY
St·:C. 2. In cnacting this lcgislation, it is the intcnt of CongresR to
provide II COIlllll,,,ltt'llsive /)\'()grnlll for tho futurc Recurity of the United
;:;tates; to provide for t 10 estavlishment of illtcgratetl policies Ilnu
procedures for the dcpartments, agencies, llnd functions of the GovernlIlellt
rclatillg to tlte natioll:!l security; to provide three military uepartIllCllts
for the operation Ilnd administl'lltion of the Army, the Navy
(including navaillviation and the United States Marino Corps), and
the Ail' Force, with their Ilssigned combat and service components;
to provide for their lluthoritatlVe coordination llnd unified direction
under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective
strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under
unificd control and for their intcgration into an cfficient tellm of land,
naval, and air forces.
TITLE I':"-COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
NATIONAL SF:CURITY COUNClL
Function.
Composilion.
PO!Jt.p.•~.
Po", p. 501.
POJt. p. 602.
Po,t, p. 4W.
Po,t. p. 505.
Pod, p. 606.
SEC. 101. (a) There-is hereby established a council to be known
as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred
to as the "Council").
The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the
Council: Provided, '111at in his absence he may designate a member
of the Council to preside in his plnce.
The function of the Council sha1l be to advise the Prpsident with
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, Ilnd military policies
relating to the national security so as to enable the military services Ilnd
the other departmellts and agencies of the Government to cooperate
Illore elFcctively in matters involving the national secnrity.
Thc Council shall be composed of the President; the Secretary of
State; the Secretary of Defense, appointed ullder section 202; the
Secretary of tho Army, referred to in section 21l5; the Secretary of
tho Navy; the Secretary of the Air Fqree, appointed under spction
207; the Chairman of tho NIltionul Security Resonrces Board,
appointed uncleI' spction 10:1; llJl(l such of the followin~ named O!1iCPI"S
as the Pl'esitlent may designate fl'om time to time.: The. Secreturies
of the executive departments, the Chairmlln of the Munitions Board
:Ippointed under section 21:1,.und the Chainnan of tho Hesearch and
Development Board appoinwd under section 214; but no such additional
member shall be designated until the advico Ilnd consent of
the Senate has been given to his appointment to the office the holding
of which authorizes his designation as a member of the Council,
\.1 f'TAT.]
212
S01'1I CO:\(; .• l'T f'Jo:SS.-Cll. 313-.Jl·LY 20, 1041 497
(b) In addition to Iwrforming sucb other functions as the Presi,!(\nt
Illay direct, for the 1'11'"1""1" of 11101'1" efTl"dively coonlinating the poli.
cie" and fllllel iOlls of the del'" rl ment s and agencies of the (;()Verlllllent
relatillg t,) the national sl"('urily, it shall, subject to the direction of
tho Prl'si,Jput, be the (Iuty of the Couneil-
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and
risks of the United Slates in relation to our actllal and potential
Illilitary power, in the interest of nationn] secnrity, for the pllrpose
of IIlllking )"("·OIllIIlCIl<I"tions to the President in connection
tlll'\"l'with; an,l
(;l) to consi(ler policies on matters of common intercA~t to the
,!Pparlments and agelll:ies of the Government eoncerne,] with the
II'll ional security, and to make n'comlllenl1ations to the President
in (·olllll'ction therewith.
(c) The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian
ex('cutil'e secretary who shall be appointed by the President, and
who shall receive compensation at the rute of $10,000 a year. The
eXl'cut ive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is hereby
authorizpd, subject to the civil-servicc laws and the Classification
Act of jD23, as amended, to appoint and fix the cpmpensation of such
personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be
r,rescribed by the Council in connection with the performance oi its
functions. .
(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations,
and such other rl'ports 10 the President as it deems appropriate
or as the President may require. .
CF.XTR.\L INTEI.LIOENCE AGEKCY
Sw.102, (u) There is hereby established under thl' National Security
Council a Centrnl Intelligcnce Agency with a Director of Central
Intelligcnce, who shall be the head thereof. The Director shall be
appointed by the Presjdent, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, fwm amon; the commissioned officers of the armed services or
from among jmlivlduals in civilian life. The Director shall receive
compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year.
(b) (1) I f a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed
ILS Director then-
(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be
suhject to no supervision, control, restriction, 01' prohibition (military
or otherwise) other than would he operative with respect to
him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department
of the Army, the Departmcnt of the Navy, the Depal·tmC'nt of the
Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and
(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supel'Vision, control,
powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorizeu
or dil'ected to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed
services or any componpllt thel'eof, the Dcpartment. of tho Army,
t.he Dpp:lI·t men!. of the Navy, or the D"p:lI·'nwnt. of tho Air Force,
01' any lir:l111'h, IlIlr":ln, IInil or division thpl"('of, or with \'I'sp,','t to
anv 0 r1he pel·sonnpl (Inil itary or ci vi1inn) of any of the f(lI'P~(lin~.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), t.he appointment to tho
office of Director of n commissioned ollicer of the armed services, nnd
his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any
status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services,
or nny emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident
to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such
commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director,
receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case
D!lll...
42 Blat. 14AA. .
6U.B.C.IiO<lH17t.
Jteeommendatlotls
and report.!.
Appointment ot
eommlsslonfd omcer
as Director.
8tatul In armed
ICrvl0C3, etc.
408
213
PUBLIC LAWS-en. 343-JULY 26, 1947 [61 STAT.
.\lllhlidry til l"fllll·
1I 1111 "'II\pIO\'1I11'III, pIc,
"lJ.~. U. I G.\'.
('oordhH,tJon of Inlellihl'nrc
activitIes.
:PoliO', etc., powen.
Continuance of S~
liyilies by other agencies.
Proteotlon of
sourocs.
lOlclll,::enoo relaUng
to nationaJ security.
In!ormaUon of FBI.
mf\Y be) pay;tble to n commissioned officer of his ~rnde and hmglh of
sl'rvicc and sball bc paid, from any funds available 10 defray tbe
('xpcl\ses of Illl' A~ency, annual compensation ut a rate equul to the
lIIIIOIIII! hy wbi"h $11,()()O ('xeccds the umount of his nnnulll militury
pay IIllll a Ilo\l'IIII'·"~.
(c) N"I\I'ill"":llllli"l~ 1111, pl'Ovi"ioll~ of ~l'dioll (\ of 1111' Ad. of
;\lIgll"I. ~1, 1!11:.! (:17 :-;,,,1. I,:,!,), "I' tllIl 1'1'"vi~i,,"~ "f llllY "lhl'l' 11111',
tl,(, Dil'el'tor "f Cenlralllllelligt'ncc may, in his discl'l'\.ion, 1l'l'lliinalo
tho employmcnt of any "fiic"l' or empl~yeo of the Agcncy whcnever
be sll:lil deem snch tel'/llinalion neCCSSIIl'V or advisable in the interests
of the Unite,l States, bllt. slich terminntion shall n"t nITI'd tlH\ right
of Slleh "lli"I'I' ,,\' ('mployel' 10 s('ell ,,\, IIccept. elliployllll'nt. in IIny
othel' d"plll'llI"'II\. 01' II~"II<'Y of 11,,, (;oV"l'nlll,,"t if d"l'llll'l',1 ('ligihle
for sllell elllployllll'lll hy Illl' l!llil"d :-;1"I"s Civil ~ervic(\ COllllllission.
(u) Ful' t.he·pllrpo,,: o[ l'ool'dill:1l ing the intelligellce aclivities uf
the sever"l Go\'erIllllellL departllients and agencies in the int.crest of
natiollal scclll'it.y, it ~hall be the duty of the Agency, under the
direction of the ~ational Security Couneil-
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters con·
cernin~ such intelligeneo activities of the Government departments
and agencies as relate to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council
lor the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments
and agencies of the Government as relate to tho national
security;
(3) to correlato and evaluate intelligence relat.ing to the
national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination
of such intelligence Wlthin the Government using where nppropriate
existing agcncics and facilities: Provided, That the Agency
shall have no police, subpena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-
se{'urity functions: Provided further, That the departments
and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect,
e\'aluate, corrclate, and disseminate departmental intelligence:
.'171<1 provided further, That the Director of Central Intclligence
shall be re.sponsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized dIsclosure j
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence
agenciesi such additional services of common concern as the
Nrutionn Securit.y Council determines cun be more efficiently
accomplished centrally'
(5) to perform such other functions nnd duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security
Couucil may from time to time direct,
(e) T" the extent recommended by the National Security Council
allll approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments
and agencies of the Government, except as hereinaftcr provided,
relating to the nationnl security shall be open to the inspection of the
Director of Central Intclligence, alHl snch intelligence as relates to
tho national security alill is posscssed by such departments and other
agcncies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be
made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation,
evaluation, nml dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the
written request. of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the
Director of Central Intelligence such informat.ion for correlation,
evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the natiollal
security,
(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection
(a) has taken office- .
61 STAT.) •
214
Slim ('flN(:., l~T i'Jo;:';~.-CII. 3·'3-.JI1LY ~O, 1041
(l) llie NnliolluJ Illll'lligellee Autliority (11 FCII. IWI!. 1:\:17,
1:l:1!), F,·hrllary '" l!)f(j) ~liall I'l'as(\ (0 (,xist; 111111
(:.!) tllll pl'rsolllH'l, properly, 1I11l11'!'I'ords of (lie C(\u!.rn! Inl!'lIi·
g"IIl'!, (;r01lp Ill'" (I'n1lsf.. r'!'.." 10 tli(\ CI'1I11'IIJ Illtdligerwo Agl'llcy,
1111,1 ~lIdl Uroujl s111111 ,'I'asl' to I'xis!. AllY 1II1l'X!H'lllll'llI11111111l'es
of IIppl'opl'ilitloll~, nllo"111 ions, 01' 011i1'1' fllllds nvnil"hlo or
llutliorized t1l 1,1\ 1111I11(' nvailalilo for such OI'OUp shnlllll1 IIvnil·
uhle 1I11l! shull he 1I11thorize<l to bo mndonvailnblc in Iilm 1II1111I1er
for expenditure by the Agellcy.
NATIONAL SECUllITY RF.sOURCES BOARD
St;c. 103. (a) 'l'herc is hereby estnblished It National Security
Resources Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the
"I3oanl") to be composed of the Chairman of the Board a'nd such
hca,!s or representnti"es of the various executive del?artments and
inlll'\1Cnucnt ap;encil's as may from time to time be deslgnated by the
Prt'Slflcnt to be members of the noard. The Chairman of the Board
shall be appoillted from civilian life by the President, by and with the
advice ami ('nllsent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at tlie
rate'of $14,000 a ycar.
(b) The Chalrman of the Board, subjcct to the direction of the
President, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the
Classification Ad of 1!J23, as amelJ(led, to appoint and fix the compensation
of such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Board
m carrying- out its functions.
(c) It sha\I be the function of the Board to advise the President
concerning- the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian
mobilization, including-
(1) policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization
in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum
utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war;
(2) rrograms for the effective use in time of war of the
Nation s natural and industria) resources for military and civilian
needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy
III time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy
to war needs and conditions;
(3) policies for unifying, in time of war) the activities of Federal
agencies and departments engaged III or concerned with
production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military
or civilian supplies, materials, and products;
(4) the relationship bctween potential supplies of, and potential
requirements for, manpower, resources, and productive facilities
in ti mc of war;
(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic
and critical material, and for thc conservation of these reserves j
,(6) the strategic relocation of industries, services, government,
and cconomic activities, thc continuous operation of which is
essential to the Nation's secnrity.
(d) In performing its functions, the noard shall utilize to the
maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and
agencies of the Government.
TITLE II-THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
SEO. 201. (a.) There is hereby established the National Military
Establishment, and the Secretary of Defense shall be the head
thereof.
Tormlnltlon o(
NIA.
Trtrmlnatlnn of
~nntr,,1 Intt'IJIRnnce
OroUP,otCl.
CompOllllon.
CompenutioD 01
per30nncl.
42 8tal. 1488.
&U. S. C.lllllll-G74.
J'anolloD.
UlDltat!on 01 d..
partmental (acilities.
500
215
PUIlLIC LAWS-CII. 313-JULY 2r., 1017 [61 STAT.
Noncligihllity for
appointment.
Dutles.
Reports, etc" or
BeCff'tari('s of Army.
Navy. and Air Force.
Adminlstrallon of
Departments of
Armr. Navy, aDd
Alr }o'orce.
Reports to Proaldrill
wId ConifCs..'I.
SpccJalasslBtanta.
(b) The National Military Establishment shall consist of the
Departmcnt of the Army, the Drpartment of the Navy, llml tho
Del'arllIlrnt of the Air Force, together ",ith all other agencies created
under title II of this Act.
SECllETAltY OF DEFENSE
SEC. 202. (a) There shall be a Secretary of Defense, who shall
be appointed from civilian life by tho Presidr.nt, by and with the
a,lvice and consellt of the Senate: P1't.nJidcd, That a person who has
within ten years been on active duty as a commissioned officer in 11
Hegular componcnt of the armed services shall not be eligible for
appointment as Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense
~hall be the principal assIstant to the President in all matters relating
to the natiollal security. Under the direction of the President
and sIlbject to the pro\'isions of this Act he shall perform the
followill" dilties:
(1) I<:st:lhlish general policies and programs for the National
Military Establishment and for all of the departments and
agencies therein;
(2) Exercise ~eneral direction, authority, and control over such
departments ami agencies; ,
(a) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication
01' overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply,
transportation, storage, health, and research;
(4) Supervise and coordinate the prcparation of the budget
estimates of the departments and agencIes comprising the National'
Military Establishment; formillate and determine the budget
estimates for submit tal to the Bureau of the Budget; and sllpervise
the budll:et programs of such departments lind agencies under
the applicable appropriation Act:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the Secretary
of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air
Force from presenting to the President or to the Director of the
Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any report
or recommendation 1'l'lating to his department whieh he mny deem
necessal-y: And prt.nJidcd further, '111at the Department of the Army,
the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force
shall be administered as individual executive departments by their
respective Secretaries and all powers and duties relating to such
departments not specifically eonferred upon the Secretary of Defense
by this Act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries.
(b) The Spcretary of DdplIse shall submit annual written report~
to t Ii" 1'I'I'sidl'III. and IIll' COlIgrC'ss covC'I'ing l'xpl'lldillll'C'S, work, alHI
II(T.OllIl'lishlll"lil~ of 1111\ NnliOllll1 l\1ilitnry 1':slnbli"IIIIIl'lll,' togdhor
with sllC'h I'I'CUlllnlt1IHlal iOlls liS he ,,1 lid I dpelil appropriato,'
(l') The Sl'cretary of Defellsc slwll cause a seal of office to be mnde
for the National Military Estahlishment, of slIch nesign as the President
sllltllaPl'l'Ove, Ilnd jwli.. i,d notice shnll ho taken thoreo£.
MII.ITAIIY AHSIHTAN'I'S '1'0 Tim MI':CIlr.rAIIY
SEC, 203, Officers of the armell services may be detailed to duty
as assistants and persona I aides to the Secretary of Defense, but he
shall not establish 11 military staff, .
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
SEG, 204. (a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to appoint
from civilian life not to exceed three special assistants to advise and
GI f;TAT.]
216
SOTn CO:,\(;., 1ST SF,SS.-CH. 313-Jl"LY ~G, 1n47 501
assi"t. him in the performance of his clnties. Each such special assistant.
"hall receive comjwusation at the rate of $10,000 a year.
(b) The S,'nrlary of Drfense is authorized, subject to the civilservico
laws and the Classilicatjon Act of JD2:l, as allll'JIlled, to appoint
aml fix the compensation of such other civilian personnel liS may be
nccess;lry for IJiG performance of the functions of the National "Iilitary
EstablishnH'ut other thuu those of the Depurtments of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
DEPARTI1E:-iT OF THE ARMY
SEC. 20;'. (a) The Department of War shall hereafter be desig-nated
tl,e Departmcllt of the Army, and the title of the Secretary of 'War
shall be eh:l1Ige,l to Secret ary of the Army. Changes shall be made
ill the tith's of other ofJieers and activities of the Department of the
Army as the Secretary of the Army may determine.
(b) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions relating to tho
Department of War or to any oflicer or activity whose title is changed
under this section shall, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, be deemed to relate to the Department of tho
Army within the Nationallllilitary Establishment or to such ofJieer or
activity designatl',] by his or its Ilew title.
(c) The term "J),'partment of the Army" as used in this Act shall be
construed to mean the Departmcllt of the Army at the seat of government
and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components? installations,
llctivit ics, and functions under the control or superrislOn of the
Department of the Army.
(d) TllllSl'crdaryofthe Army shoJI cansea seal ofomee to bo made·
for th(\ ]kpllrlllll'nt of the Ann)', of slIch dl'sign liS the l'rcsilknt nlllY
1Iliprovl',lInd jndil'iaJnoliec ,,11ll111w tlllll'n thereof.
(e) In gelll'rat the United Stall'S Army, within the Department of
the Army, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation
and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be
organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained
comhat incident to operatlollS on land. It shall be responsible for the
preparation of lllnd forces necessary for the elfective I?rosecut ion of
wur except as otherwise assiglled alld, in accordunce With integrated
joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components
of the Army to meet the needs of war.
42 Stilt. 14M.
6 U. 8. 0.1i WHi71.
Ch8nte in desfgnalIoni
tltla. '
"DePartment 01 the
Army."
Bed.
U. 8. Arm,.
DEPARTIIlENT OF THE NAVY
SEC. 206. (a) The term "Department of the Navy" liS used in this N~~p,ortm"IOltb'
Act shall be constrned to melln the Department of the Navy at the seat
of ~overnment; the headqnarters, United Stotes Marine Corps; the
entire operating forces of the United States Navy, includin~ naval
aviation, and of the United States Marine Corps, includmg the
reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters,
forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control
or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States,
Coast Gnard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.
(b) In general the United States Navy, within the Department of U.8.N....'.
tho Navy, shall include naval combat and services forces and such
aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained,
and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained comuat incident to
operations at sea. It shall be responsible for the preparation of naval
forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise
assigned, and, in aceordunce with integrated joint mobilization
plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to
meot the needs of war.
502
Naval aviation.
Hcspoo31bllity of
Navy.
U. 8. MarloeCorps.
Additional duties.
RCSlrlcUon.
Secretary of the A.ir
Forco.
6 U. 8. C.II.
6 U. 8. C.II "'tv.
"Department of the
Air Force."
Un d e r Socretary;
Assl3talll Secretaries.
217
PUHLlC LAWS-CII. 343-JULY 20, IlJl1
All n:lval avi~tion s11:111 be integ-mted with the naval service as
part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation shall
consist of combat anll sl'rvice and t.raining forces, and shall include
lnll,l-based naval avial ion, ail' tl"llllsport essl'lltial for naval operations,
all air weapons and air techniques involved in tho operations and
activities of the United States Navy, and the entire remainller of the
acronanl iral org-~nizationof the United States Navy, together with the
personnel lleccss~ry therefor.
The Navy shall 'be generally responsible for naval reconnaissanco,
allti;;ubnlarine w~rfare, and protection of shipping,
The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactICS, technique, organization
and c'luipment of naval combat and service elements; matters
of joint concern as to these fUllctiolls shall bo coordinated bctween
the Army, the Air Force, an,1 the Navy.
(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of
the Navy, shall incltllle land combat. and service forces and such
aviation as may be organic therein. 'llle Marine Corps shall be
ol'ganized, trained, and ell-nipped to provide fleet marine forces of
combined anns, together With supporting air components, for service
with the flcet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and
for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the
prosecution of a naval campaign. It shal1 be the duty of the Marine
Corps to develop, in cOOl'dination with the Army and the Air Foree,
those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics,
techniqlle, ,uIII equiplllent employed by landing fon~es. In addition,
th\\ M,trinl'. Corps HI\\\II provi(lc .klllchmenis tlnd org"ltnizl\tions for
~ervi('(\ on arnll'd ve.'SeIH or Ihe Nllvy, ~ltall providc st'('urity l/totlu:hIIICllls
for the prolcction of naval properly al.llIlvlll sllllionH lind baSCH,
Iln,1 shall l""'fornl sneh otlll'r dillies as the l'n'sident mllY Ilircd:
j'/'ovirl"d, Thllt sllch addit iOlla! dllt ips shllll not det met f!'Om or intorfere
with the opera! ions fot· which the Marine Corps is prilllllrily
organized. The Marine Corps shllIl be l'esponsible, in accordance
with integrated joint lIlobilization plans, for the expllnsion of peacetime
components of the Marine Corps to nwet the needs of war.
DEl'AnTIIENT OF THE AIll FonCE
Sm. 207. (a) Within t1;e National Military Establishment there is
hereby estnbl ished au executive departmeut to be known as the DepartlIlent
of the Air Foree, and a Secretary of the Air Force, who shal1 be
t he head t hereof. The Secretary of the Air Force shall be appointed
from civilian lifo by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate.
(0) Section 158 of the Reviscd Statutes is amended to include the
Department of the Air Force and the provisions of so mueh of tit Ie IV
of the Revised Statntes as now or hereafter amended as is not inconsistent
with this Act shall be applicable to the Department of the
Air Foree.
(c) The term "Department of the Air Force" as used in this Act
shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the
scat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components,
installations, activities, and functions under tho control or
sUJlervision of the Department of the Air Force.
(el) There shall be in the DeJlartment of the Air Force an Under
Secretary of the Air Force and two Assistant Secretaries of the Air
FOl'CC, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(e) The several offieers of the Department of the Air Force shall
pcrfonn such functions liS the Secretary of the Air Force may
prescribe.
67-146 0 - 76 - 15
61 STAT.]
218
8(}ru CONG., 1ST SESS.-CII. 343-JULY 26,ln47 503
(f) So much of the funetions of the Secretary of the Ahny and
of the Depal'tment of the Army, including those of any ollicer of
sHeh Dl'pal'tnll'nt, ns nrc nssiglled to or under the control of the
('onlnl:lnding (;l'neral, Army .\ir Forces, or as arc deemed by the
~l'l'I'l'I:lry of Defense to be Ill'cl'ssary or desirable for the operations
of the Department of the l\ir Force or the Uniteu States Ail' Force,
~hall be transferrcd to ane! vest cd in the Secretary of the Air Force
llnd the Dl'partment of the Ail' Force: ProlJidcd, That the Natiollal
GilaI'd BlIl'eau shall, in addition to the fUllctions and uuties perforlllel!
by it for the Department of the Army, be chargeu with similn.r
fllnd ions and unties for the Department of the Air Force, lInu shall
be the channel of cOnlmunieatioll bet\Hen the Department of the Air
For('e and the scveral States on all matters pertaining to the Air
Nat iOlla! Guaru: And p/'ovidrd furthrr, That, in order to permit an
onlerly transfer, the Secretary of Defense may, during the transfer
periol! hercillrlfter prescribed, direct thrlt the Depnrtment of the Army
shrlll continue for approprirlte periods to exercise any of such functions,
insofar as they relate to the Depm·tment of the Air Force, or
the Unitcd Strltes Ail' Force or their property and personnel. Such
of the property, perwnnel, and records of the Department of the Army
useu in the exercise of functions transferred under this subsection liS
the. Secretary of Defense shall determine shnll be transferred or
assigned to the Department of the Air Force.
U;) The Secretary of the Air Force shall cause a sell] of office to
be maoe for the Department of the Air Force, of such device as the
President shall approve, lind judicial notice shall be taken thereof.
lfNTTI:1l STATER hIn FO!tCF.
SEC. 20ft (II) Tho Unitel! Stall'R Ai.· Foree is hereby oslllhlishPl!
lInder till' Del'llrllllelit of the Ail' Force. The Army Air Forces, the
Ail' Corps, Uniled States Army, and the Genera! Headquarters Air
Force (Air Force Combat Command), shall be transferrel! to the
United States Air Force.
(1)) Tllerc shall be a Chief of Stalf, United Stlltes Air Force, who
shall bc appoinled by lhe President, by anI] with the advice and
consent of the Se'IUlte, for !I tel'lll of four years from among the oflicers
of general rank who aro assigneel to or commissioned in the Unit('(!
Stall'S Air Force. Um!er the direction of the Secretllry of the Air
Force, thc Chief of StalT, Unitel! Statcs Air Forcc, shall exercise
command ovcr the Unitcd States Air Force an,! shall be charged with
the duty of carrying into execution all lawflll orders and dirertions
which may!", trausmitted to him. The fllnctions of the COllllnandincY
liencra], (]rneral Headquartcrs Air Force (Air Force Combat Con~
mandl, ane! of the Chief of the Air Corps and of the ComrnalH!in1?
General, Army Air Forces, shall be transferred to the Chief of Stall,
United States Air Force. 'Vhen sllch transfer becomes elTective, the
ollices of the Chief of the Ail' Corps, United States Army, and Assistants
to the Chief of the Air Corps, Unitel! States Army, provided for
by the Act of June 4,1920 as amended (H Stat. 7(8), and Commanding
General, Genera! Hea(lquarters Air Force, provided for by section
Ii of the Act of ,Tunc 16, 193G (.fD Stat. 1525), shall cease to exist.
'Vhile holding ollice as Chief of StalT, United States Ail' Force, the
incllmbent shall halo a grnde and receive allowances C<juivalent to
those prescribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United States Army.
The Chief of StalT, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Opel'lltions,
and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall take rank
amonl? themselves according to their relntive dates of appointment
as suell, and shull each take rank above all other officers on the active
Traudtr or function
•.
, National Guard Duroau.
Transfer of property,
etc.
8..1•.
Obl.r or 81all.
Tran5fer of funC)tions.
10 U. 8. o. 1291.
10 U. 8. O. 12020-2.
504
219
I'{jIlLIt: LA WS-CII, 343-J VLY 26, 1917
»
[01 STAT,
U. 8. Air Yoree.
Rank ot Chid or
Staff. A rmy. and
('hid of NO\"QI Over&
lions.
list of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: Provided, That nothing in
this Act ,hall have the e!fect of changing the'relative rank of tho
Jll'esenl Chief of Shlf, United States Army, and the present Chief of
Naval Opera! ions,
o.Iran'fer 01 person- (c) All commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men,
eommissionetl, holtling wanants, or enlisted, in the Air COl'pS, United
Stales Al'luy, Qt' the Al'IllY Air Forces, shall bn tra.nsfcned in brandl
to the United Stlltes Air Force, All olher cOlllmissioned ollicers, warrant
officers, and enlisted men, who are commissioned, hold Wal'l'tlnts,
01' arc enlisted, in tillY component of the Al'lny of the Unite,l States
:Ind who are umler the anthority or command of the Commanding
General, Army Air Fol'c(,s, shall be continued under the authority or
COlllllland of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and under
StBtUI or \l<l'SOWIel. the jurisdiction of the D('partment of the Air Force, Pel'sonnel whoso
status is alTected by this subsection shall retain their existing commissions,
warrants or en listed status in existing components of the armed
forces unless otherwise altered or terminated in accordancu with existing
law; and they shall not 1m deemed to have been appointed to a new
or different office 01' grade, or to have vacated theIr permanent or
temporary appointments in an existing component of the armed
forces, solely by virtue of any change in status under this subsection,
No such change in status shall alter or prejudice the status of any
individnal so assigned, so as to deprive him of any right, benefit, or
privilege to which he may be entit led under existing law,
(0) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretar,Y of the Air Force,
1I11 property, reeonls, instnlllltions, agencies, actiVities, projects, and
civilian personnel under the jurisdictIOn, eontr01 authority, or comlIIand
of the Commanding General, Army Air l'orces, shall be contiuued
to the same extent under the jurisdIction, control, authority, or
cOlllmand, respectively, of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force,
in t he Department of the Air Force,
tr~~~:dI~~lrp- (e) For a period of two years from the date of enactment of this
Act, per'sonne! (both military lind civilian), property, records,
installations, agencies, nctivities, and projects may be transferred
between the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air
Force by directIOn of the Secretary of Defense.
(f) In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation
fot'ces both combat and service not otherwise assigned, It shall bo
ol'ganized, trained; and equipped primarily for pl'ompt and sustainl'd
offensive and defensive air operatjons, The Air Force shall be
, responsible for the prcparation of the air forces necessary for tho
effective prosecution of "'lIl' except as otherwise assigned and, in
accordance with integrated joint mobilization plnns, for the expansion
of the peacetime components of the Ail' Force to meet the needs of
war.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSFERS
SEC. 209. Each transfer, assignment, or chanO'e in status under section
207 01' section 208 shall taJ{() effect upon such date or dates as may
be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.
W,\R COUNCIL
SEC. 210, There shall be within the National Military Establishment
a 'Val' Council composed of the Secretary of Defensc, as Chairman,
who shall have power of decision; the Secretary of the Army; tho
Secretary of the NRVy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chief of
Stnff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval OperRtions; llnd the
(;1 ~T.\T.]
220
80TH CO:,\(;., 1ST ~E~~.-CII. 3'13-JULY ~G, W41 505
Chid of SI~fT, United St~tes Air Force. The ·War Council shall advise
the Secrctary of Defense on mat leI's of broad policy relating to the
al'lllc,l forces, and shall cOllsidcr anu report on such other matters
us the Secretary of Defense may direct.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SH~. 211. (a) There is herehy e~tahlished within the National Miliilll)'
Eslablislllnent the Joint Chiefs of StafT, which shall consist of the
Chief of StafT, United States Al'IIlY; the Chief of Na\'al Operations;
the Chief of StafT, United States Air Force; anu the Chief of Staff to
the Commander in Chief, if there be one.
(b) Snbject. to the authority anu direction of the President and the Dutl...
Secretary of Defense, it shall he the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(
1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic
direction of the military forces;
(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military
services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;
Pl) to (~stablish unified commands in strategic areas when such
unificd commands are in the interest of national security;
(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military
forces;
([) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of
members of the military forces;
(6) to review major material and personnel requirements of
the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans;
and
(7) to provide United States representation on the Military
StaJT COJllmittee of tho United Nations in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of tho Unit~d Nations.
(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military Mililarrld,bcn.
advisel'R to tho President UlHI the S('cretary of Defense and shall perfOl'm
such 01 hoI' duLi(,,9 as tho 1'1't,~id(,IlL alld the Secretary of DefeIlHe
Illuy .\ireel 01' us Illay bOIH'('Hcrih"d by law.
JOIN'r HTA\"J.o'
SEC. 212. There shall be, under the .Joint Chiefs of StafT, a Joint
Sla IT to consist of not to exceell one hundred officers and to be composed
of al,lproximately equal numhers of officers from each of the three armed
servIces. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof
appoinwd by the Joint Chiefs of Stall', shall perform such duties as
may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director shall be
an ofJicer junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
1I1UN\TIONS nOARD
SEC. 213. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military
Establishment a Munitions noard (hereinafter in this section referred
to as the "noard").
(b) The Board shall be composed of a Chainnan, who shall be the Compo,ltloD.
head thereof, and an Under Secretary 01' Assistant Secretary from
each of the three military departments, to be designated in each case by
the Secretaries of their respective departments. The Chairman shall Chairman.
be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice
and consent. of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate
of,$14,OOO a year.
506
221
PUBLIC LA WS-CII. 343-JULY 20, IOn [61 STAT.
DuOrs.
TfnninationotJoint
.~nny and Navy Munitious
lJOBrd.
Personnel and (adU·
tits.
ComPOS!U....
Chairman.
Purpose.
(c) It shall be the duty of the Board under the direction of the
Secretary of Defl'nse and in support of strall'gic nnd logistic plnns
preparl'd by tl,e Joint Chiefs of ~ta/T-
(I) io (""'rclilllll" II", 1I1'1'1'0l'rinle ndivities within th(l Nntional
),lililllry lo:,flll>li,IIIIII'11i will> \'I'~a\'d 10 illdll,ll'illlll\IIII<'\'~, i"I'III,l·
ill;~ II,,: I'l'llClIl'l""I'lIt, prcllilldi,,", 1111<1 disll'il,"liol I'IIIII~ "f Iho
d"/,a 1'l1lJ('1I1 ~ alid IIgl'llf''''S ('0111 [1ri,i ";':: t h(\ Est 1I1,lislllll('III.;
(i!) to plan for the military aspc('(s of industrinl mobi)hllllion;
(:1) 10 recommend assignment of proellrement responsibilities
nmong t he several military services nml to plnn for stanllardizat
iOIl of speeifi(,111 iOlls nlld for the goreatpst prnct.iellblo allocation
of PUI'I'I>Il~.(\ '1IlIhorily of tpehni(,111 equipmPllt IIIHI common uso
il('ill~ oil th.. ""sis" f si ngl'l 1'1'01'111'('1111'111 : .
(I) 1o pr('l'al''' esl iIllal PS "r \,011'111 ill I prOllllelioll, proelll'PII1Pllt,
nllll pCl'solllll'1 for lise in evallllltion of the logistic fellsihility of
stral p;.::ic operations;
(5) to determine relative priorities of the various segments
of the militar'y procurement programs;
(v) to supervise such subordinate lIgencies as are or may be
created to considel" the subjects falling within the scope of the
Board's responsibilities;
(7) to make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve
exist ing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procurement,
production, nnd distribution in such manner as to promote
('Oiciency alld pcouomYi
(8) to mnintnin lialson with other departments and agencies
for the proper correlation of military requirements with the
civilian economy, particularly in regard to the procurement or
disposition of strategic and critical mater'ial and the maintenance
of adequate reserves of such material, and to mnke recommendations
as to policies in connection therewith;
(ll) to assemble and review material and personnel requirements
presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those presented
by the production, procurement, and distribution agencies
assiglled to meet military needs, and to make recommendntions
thereon to the Secretary of Defense; and
(10) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense
may direct.
(d) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken.
office, the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board sha]] cease to
l'xist and all its records and personnel shall be trnnsferred to the
Munitions Board.
(e) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such
personnel nnd facilities as the Secrl'lnry may determine to be required
by the Board for the performance of its functions.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
SED. 214. (n) There is hereby established in the National Military
Establishment a Research and Development Board (hereinafter in
this section referred to as the "Board"). The Board shall be com·
posed of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and two representatives
from each of the Departments of tho Army, Navy, and
Air Force, to be designated by the Secretaries of their respective
Departments. The Chairman shall be nppointed from civilian life
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year. The
purpose of the Board shall be to advise the Secretary of Defense
as to the status of scientific research relative to the national security,
G1 STAT.]
222
80TH CONG., 1ST SESS.-CH. 343-JULY 26, 1047 507
anel to assist him in assnrin" adequllte provision for research and
development on scientific ]JroblPllls relating to the national security.
(b) It shall be the dnly of the Boanl, nnder the direction of the
Se<:relal'Y of D..rclIse-
(I) 101'1'1\1'111'0 II cOII'I'!clo IIn,1 illl"I""'llt(',lll1'ol"rllm or J'('i!l'llITh
""d <I"I'I'!"l'nl<'lIl fol' Illilillll'y plll'!"'S"H;
(~) to 1"lvi,,~ with r"~;'l'd 10 trends in scientific resenr<:11 I'elnt·
ing to national sc<:nrity alld thll measures necessary to nssure contiJI11Pd
:Iud jllcreasiJl~ pl'og-r(lS~;
(:q lo I'l'COIllIIIl'nd IIH'IISIlI'l'H of l'ool',linlliion of J'('~('nrl'h 1111,1
<I"vl·lol"''''''!. 1111"'111" II,,, Illilitlll'y d"I,,"'IIlI<'ntH, nlld IIllol'lIlion
"'''Oll~: 111<'11, of I'l"l'o,,,ihilil i"H fOI' slJPl'ifie ]Jl'ogl'lllllH of joillt
Jlltl'I'I'!-iI;
(,)) to fOl'lIllllate policy for thll National Military Establishn1l'n!.
in conn<:dion \vith resear<:h ami development matters involving
agencies olltside the National Military Establishment;
(!:.) to <:onsieler the interaction of r('search and development
and strategy, and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection
therewllh; and
(G) to perform snch other duti('s as the Secretary of Defense
may direct.
(c) \Vhen the Chairman of the BoaI'd first appointed has taken
office, the Joint Heseardl and Development Board shall cease to exist
and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Research
and Development Board.
(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such
personnel and faciJil ies as the Secretary may determine to be required
by the Board for the performance of its fnnctions.
TITLE III-MISCELLANEOUS
COMPENSATION OF SECRETARIES
SEC. 301. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall receive the compensation
prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.
(b) The Se<:retary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and
tho Secretary of the Air Force shall each receive the compensation
prescribed by Inw for heads of exe<:utive departments.
UNnER SECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES
SEC. 302. The Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the
ArIllY, the N:avy, and the Air Force shall each receive compensation
at the rate of $10,000 a year and shall perform such duties as the
Secretaries of their respective departments may prescribe.
ADVlSOHY COMMI1TEES AND PERSONN}:L
Dol....
Termination or
10lnt R.".,.rch and
Development Board.
Compensation;
duties. ,
SEC. 303. (a) The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of tho
National Security Hesourees Board, and the Director of Central
Intelli~ence are authorized to appoint such advisory committees and
to employ, consistent with other provisions of this Act, snch parttimll
advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out
their respective functions and thll functions of agencies under their
control. Persons holding other offices or positions under the United Compensation.
States for which they receive compensation while serving as members
of such committees shall receive no additional compensation for such
service. Other members of such committees and other part-time
advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensation or
50S
223
punLIC LAWS-CII. 343-JULY 2G, 1047 [Gl STAT,
S<'n:kn 0{ an in·
dl,,"iduBI.
J;, toll"l. 1107, 11l1U.
M\ p.\:lt.6f~.
U U. ij. C. lUg.
OrUm appllcoble t.
lr3.Q5/c~ hmct'oos, .'c.
NonabaUmeal d.
suits. etc.
[,.') Slat. <\39.
~,l) U. 8. C. app.
§10l).).
~.I) U. S. C. app.
t (,01 IHHe..
~) U. 8. C. app.
§Wl note.
s U. S. C.I~llDote.
JIlay receive compensation at II mte not to exceed $35 for ellch dlly of
service, as determined by the appointing authority.
(b) Service of an individual as a member of any snch advisory
COlulilitlcll, or ill allY other part.timll capacity for a dl'llIlrlJlll'nt or
"::"II"'y h"I'I'lllld,'I', !;1,"11 1111/, 10" I'III1"icll'l'l'd "" IHll'vi,'" I.1'illgilll~ HUl'h
iudividuill wilhinllw pl'IIvi"illllH of 111'1'1 ion (1111 01' 11:1 of II", Crilllinill
Clld" (U. H. C" )!Jlo ..dilillll, tilill lIJ, ~"CH, lUll 1I11,[:lOa), or ~,etioll
1\} (e) of the Contract ::;c1t1cment Ad of WH, unlcss the nct of such
individual, whieh by snch section is made unlnwful when performed
by an illllividlial referl'ed (0 ill such section, is with respect to nny
pal'Licultl1' Illalter which llircl'tly invulves n depnrlmmlt or llgency
which s(wh p"l'son i" aclvisillg 01' in which such deplu'lment 01' llgency
is directly intcrested.
ST,\TUS OF TIIANSFF.RRF-D OIVILIAN PEIlSONNt:L
SEo.304. All transfers of civilian personnel under this Act shllIl be
without change in classification or compenslltion, but the head of lLny
department or agency to which sllch a transfer is made is authorized
to make such changes in the titles and designations and prescribe such
changes in the duties of such personnel commensurate with their classification
as he may deem necessary and npproprillte.
SAVINO PROVISIONS
St:c.305. (a) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions applicable
with respect to any function, nctivity, personnel, property,
records, or other thing tmnsfcrred under this Act, or with I"espect to
any officer, department, or agency, from which such transfer is made,
shall, except to the extent rescinded, modified, superseded, terminatlld,
or made innpplicable bv 01' under authority of law, have the same effect,
as if such transfer harl not been made; but, after any such transfer,
any such law, order, regnlation, or other action which vested functions
in or otherwise related to llny officer, department, or agency from
which such transfer was mlldll shall, insofar as applicable with respect
to the fnnction, activity, personnel, property, records or other thing
tmnsferred and to the extent not inconsistent with other provisions of
this Act, be deemed to have vested such function in or relate to the
officer, department, 01' llgency to which the trnnsfer was made.
(b) No suit, llction, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or
ag-ainst the head of llny dl'partment or a~ency or other officer of the
United States, in his olfrcial capacity 01' 111 relation to thc dischllr~e
of his official duties, shall abate by reason of the taking ciTect of any
transfer 01' change in title undcr the provisions of this Act j and, in
the case of any such transfl'l', such suit, action, or other proceeding
may be maintained by or a~ainst the successor of snch head or other
omcer under the transfer, but. only if the court shall allow the same
to be maintained on motion or supplemental pet.ition filcd within
twclve months llfter such transfer takes elfect, showing a necessity for
the survival of such suit, action, or other proceeding to obtain settlement
of the questions involved.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of the second pllragraph of
section 5 of tille I of the First 'Val' Powers Act, 1041, the eXIsting
OI'ganization of thc 'Val' Department undcr the provisions of Exccutive
Ol'<ler Numbered 0082 of Fl'brnary 28, 1042, as modified by Executive
Order Kumbered 9722 of Mny 13, 1U46, and the existing organization
of the Department of the Navy under the provisions of Exccutive
Order Numbered 9635 of September 29,19451including the llssignment
of functions to organizational units within t Ie War Ilnd NllVY Depart.
ments, may, to the extent determined by the Secretary of Defense,
Cl >;TAT.]
224
SOm CO~(].• 1ST SE>;>;.-CII. 343-.1ULY 20, 1!H7 50!)
continne in force for two years folJo\\'in~ the date of ennctment of this
Act CXCI'pt to Ihe extent mOllified by the pro\'isions of this Act or under
tho anthority of IllW.
S':C. 30G. All unexpendcd ha ):lIH'eS of approprintions, nllocations,
1I0na p/lroprialel! fn1\l(,;, or o( 1\(,1' rnnds l\vailllUlc or hcrc:lrtcr llI,,<lo
av"ii" ,Ie for uso by 01' on behalf of the Army Air Forces or olliccrs
thereof, shall be transferred to tbc Department of the Air Forec for
use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Such other
unexJlended balances of approprlations, allocations, nonappropriated
fnnds, or other fnnds available or hel'eafter made available for lise
by the Department of \Var or the Department of the Army in exercise
or fllnctiuns transferrell to the Department of the Air Force under
this Act, as the Secretary of Defense shall lletermine, shall be transferred
to the Department of the Air Force for usc in connection with
the exercise of its fnnctions, UnexpelHled balances transferred under
this section may be used for the purposes for which the appropriations,
allocations, or other funds were originally made available, or for new
expenditures occasioned by the enactment of this Act. The transfers
herein authorized may be made with or without warrant action liS may
be appropriate from time to time from any appropriation covered by
this section to any other such appropriation or to sllch new accounts
established on the books of the Treasury as mny be determined t.o be
necessary to carry into effect provisions of this Act.
AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 307. There nre hereby nuthorized to be appropriated such
sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions
und purposes of this Act.
DEFINITIONB
SEC. 308. (a) As used in this Act, the term "function" includes
functions, powers, :md duties.
(b) As used in this Act, the term "budget program" refers to recommendations
as to th~ apportionment, to the allocation and to the review
of allotments of appropriated funds.
SEPARAlliLITY
SEC. 309. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or cIrcumstances is held invalid, the validity of the
rema1l1der of the Act and of the application of such provision to other
persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
EFFEC'I1VE DATE
SEC. 310. (a) The first sentence of section 202 (a) and sections 1,
2,307,3081 30ll, and 310 shall tnke effect immediately upon the enact-,
ment of thIS Act.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), the provisions of this Act
shall take effect on whichever of the following days is the earlier:
The day after the day upon which the Secretary of Defense first
appointed takes office, or the sixtieth day after the date of the enactment
of this Act.
SUCCESSION TO TIlE PRESIDENCY
SEC. 311. Paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of section 1 of the Act
entitled "An Act to provide for the performance of the duties of the
office of President in cuse of the removal, resignation, death, or inability
both of the President and Vice President",approved July 18,
"FUDetJon."
"Budget program."
ARt,. I'P.!IOOt ..g~
4lll1,
510
225
rUBLtO LAws-cns. 3·13, 314-JtJLY 2n, 1047 (Gt STAT.
Antt, p. 350. 1!).17, is amended by striJ{in~ ont "Secretary of \Vllr" and inserting in
lieu t lll'rl'of "Secretary of Defense", and by striking out "Secretary of
the Navy,".
Approved July ZO, 1947.
226
ApPENDIX C
Page 2149 TITLE 5Q.-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 1541
Chapter 33.-11',111 POII'EIlS ]IESOLl'TIO:\" [:\"EII']
Sec,
1541. Purpose <1.!ld polley.
(fl.) COllgr('~sl()naldrclaratiOll
(b) COlJgres.sional1egislative- power under necessary
and proper clause
(c) Presldentlal executive power as Commander-
in-Chief; limitation
1512 Consultation; Initial and regular consultations
1543. It-cportlng requirement
(fl.) \Vrltten report: time of submission: circumstances
necessitating sllbmlsslon;
lnformatl(ll1 reported.
(b) Other Information reported
(e) Periodic reports: semiannual requirement.
1544 Congressional action.
(fl.) Transmittal of report and referral to Congres..
slonal Committees; joint request
for convening COllgrc;;s.
(b) Termination of use of United States
Armed Forces; exceptions; extension
period.
(c) Concurrent resolution for removal by
President of United StatC"s Armed 1"orces.
1545 CongressIona.l prIority procedures for joint resolu_
tion or bill.
154G COllb:resslollal priority proced\ues for concurrent
resolutIon
1547 Interpretation of Joint resolutioll
ia) Inferenccs from any law or treaty.
(b) Joint hCrldqllurters operations of hlghle\"
el military commands
(el Introduction of Unlt('d States Armed
Forces.
(dl Constitutional authorities or existing
treatles uJl:lffertcd; COIl.struction against
grant of Pr{'sldclltial authorIty respectU'.('
of United States Armed Forces
§ 1;;11. I'llrp(j~(' and polin'",
(a) Ctlllg-f('!"~ionaldeclaration.
It is tile purpose of this joint resulution to fulfill
the int.ent of the framers of the Constitution of the
§ 15(2
227
Trn..E 50.-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 2150
United States and insure that the collective judgment
of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of United States Anned
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances, and to the continued use of
such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
(b) COnRrt-'ssional )(,~hflatiH· pow('c under necessary
and prop('r clause.
Under article r, section 8. of the Constitution. it
Is specifically provided that the Congress shall have
the power to make aU laws necessary and proper
for carrying into execution, not only its own powers
but also all other powers vested by the Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any
department or officer hereof.
(c) I}r('sidclltial (>x("culive pow("r as Commalldl'r-inChief;
limitatiol\.
The constitutional powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chicl to introduce United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations
where imminent involvement jn hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances. are exercised only
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war. (2) specific
statutory authorization. or (3) a national emergency
created by attack upon the United Stales, its territories
or posse.ssions, or its armed forces. (Pub. L.
93-148, § 2, Nov. 7,1973,87 Stat. 555'>
EFFECTJVE DATE
section 10 of Pub. L. 93-148 provIded that: "This 10lnt
resolutlon /i,hls chapter) shall take elTect on the date
or Its enactment INov. 1. 1973)."
SHORT TITLE
Section 1 of pub. L, 93-148 provided that: "This Joint
resolution fthls chapter) may be cited as the 'War Powers
Resolution',"
§ 15-t2. Con~uJtat ion; initial and r{'~ulal' ("on~uI13tion~.
The President in every possible inst..1.nce shall
consult with Congress before introducing United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostihtiE's i~
clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after
every sHch 1ntroduction shall consult reg-ularly wi~h
the Congress until United States Armed P'Jn.·c~ nrc
no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed
from such situations. (Pub. L. 93-148, § 3, Nov. 7,
1973,87 Stat. 555.)
EFFECfrvE DATE
Section elTective Nov. 7. 1973. see section 10 of Pub L
93-148. set out as a. note under section 1541 of thls title.
§ l:),i3. H('portin~ rl'Quir('m('llt.
(a) \\'ritl('n r('purt; lime uf suhmission; Cirf'llm ... {alll'l'''l
nl·('(·~sit,atinJ!: !oOuhmission; infQrmatiun n'jltlrt(·d.
In the absence of a declaration of war. in any case
in which United States Armed Forces are introduced-
(1) into ho~ti1ities or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory. airspace or waters of a
foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except
for deployments which relate solely to supply. re~
placement. repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge
lTnit.ed States Armed Forces equipped for combat
alrrady located in a foreign nation;
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the
Spt'~\ker of the House of Representatives and to the
Prbldent pro tempore of the senate a report, in
writing, setting forth-
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction
of United States Armed Forces;
(8) the constitutional and legislative authority
under which such introduction took place; and
. (C, the estimated scope and duration of the
hostilities or involvement,
(b) Oth('r infflrmation f('IJorh·d.
The President shall provide such other infonnation
as the Congress may request in the fulfillment
of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to
committing the Nation t" war and to the use of
United States Armed Forces abroad.
«(') Pc.'riodic rc.·porb; ~l'miallnual requirt'ment.
\Vhencver {;nited states Armed Forces are introduced
into hostilities or into a.ny situation described
in subsection (a) of this section. the President shall.
so .long as such armed forces continue to be engaged
in such hostilities or situation. report to the Congress
periodically on the r,tatus of such hostilities or situa~
tion as well as on the scope and duration of such
hostilities or situa.tion, but in no event shall he report
to the Congress less often than once every six
months. 'Pub. L. 93-148, § 4, Nov. 7, 1943, 87 Stat.
555.)
EFFECTIVE DATE
Section effective Nov. 7. 1973, sec !'ectlon 10 of Pub L.
93-148, set out Il:) R- note und.er section 154:1 of this title.
SECTIort REFERREO TO IN OTHER Sf:CTIQMS
This section 15 referred to in section 1544 ot this t\tle,
§ 1,,),11. ('t)II~r('s~iflllal <let ion.
(a) Tr<l'1!'.rnitt,,1 of l'l'IJort and rl"fprrClI to Con~rps.
siollal ('ommitt{'e~; joint requ("st for conyening
Con,g-ress.
Each report submitted pursuant to section 1543
(a) 'll of this title "hall be transmlUed to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the
President pro tempore of the Senate on the same
calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives and to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action.
If, when the report is transmitted, the Con~
gl'CSS has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for
any period in excess of three calendar days. the
Spcaker of the House of Representatives and the
President pro tempore of the Senate, if the)" deem It
advisable ror if petitioned by at least 30 percent of
the membership of their respective Houses} shall
jDintly request the President to convene Congress
in order that it may consider the report and t;ake
appropriate aetion pursuant to this section.
(b) T('l'minal ion of ll~C' of l'nit('c! ~t<lt('s Arm('d
Fol"{'('s: (',\c('ptiolls; (·:\t('n~ioll p{"riod.
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted
or is required to be submitted pursuant to
~cction 1543(a) (l) of this title, whichever is earlier,
the President shall terminate any use of United
Page 2151
228
TITLE 5Q.-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 1546
States Armed Forces with re~pect to \\'hich such report
was submitted (or required to be submitwd1,
unless the Congress (1) hils declared war or has
enacted a specific a.uthori?atLm for such use of
United Stutes Armed :Forces, (2) has extended by
law ~uch sixty-day period, or (31 is physically unable
to meet as a result of an armed attack upon
the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be
extended for not more than ail additional thirty days
if the President determines and certifies to the Congress
in writing that unavoidable military necessity
respecting the safety 01 United States Armed Forces
requires the continued use of such armed forces in
the course of bringing about a prompt removal of
such forces.
(c) Concurrent resoJuUon (or remo\'al hy Pre.sident
of t:nitt'd Stah':-; Armt'd Forces.
Notwithstanding sUbsection ib) of this section, at
any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged
in hostilities outside the territory of the United
States, Its possessions and territories without a
declaration of war or specific statutory authorization,
such forces shall be removed by the President
if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
(Pub. L. 93-148, l 5, Nov. 7, 1973. 87 Stat. 556.)
EFFECTIVE DATE
Section effective Nov. 7, 1973, see section 10 of Pub. L.
93-148, set mlt so:.; a note \.mrl~r section 1541 or thIs t.jtle
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This $cction Is referred to In sections 1545, 1546 of
thIs tItle.
§ 1545. Conl{rt'ssiol1al priority procedures for joint resolution
or bi]).
(a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant
to section 1544(bl of this title at least thirty
calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day
period specified in such section shall be referred to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate, as the case may be, and such
committee shall report one such joint resolution or
bill, together with its recommendations, not later
than twenty-four calendar days before the expiration
of the sixty-day period specified in such section,
unless such House fe,hall otherwise determine by the
yeas and nays.
(bl Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall
become the pending business of the House in question
(in the case of the Senate the time for debate
shall be equally divided between the proponents and
the opponents). and shall be voted on within three
calendar days thereafter. unless such House shall
otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one
House shaH be referred to the committee of the
other House named in subsection (al of this section
and shall be reported out not later than fourteen
calendar days before the expiration of Uw ::~xtyday
period specifIed in section 1544(b) of tl"1:' ~ Itle.
The joint re~~olution or bill so reported shall 11'" "me
the pending business of the House in quesl :Ind
shaH be voted on within three calendar days a: ,t..'l' it
has been reported. unless such House shall otherwise
determine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any dIsagreement between the
two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint reso~
lution or bill passed by both Houses. conferees shall
be promptly appointed and the committee of conference
shall make and file a report with respect to
.sUch resolution or bill not later than four calendar
days before the expiration of the sixty-day period
specified in section 1544( bJ of this title. In the event
the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours,
they Shall report back to their respective Houses in
disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either
House concerning the printing of conference reports
in the Record. or concerning any delay in the consideration
of such reports. such report shall be acted
on by both Houses not later than the expiration of
such sixty-day period. (Pub. L. 93-148, § 6, Nov. 7,
1973,87 Stat. 557.)
EFFECTIVE DATE
Section effective Nov. 7, 1973, see sectIon 10 or Pub. L.
83-148, set out as a note under section 1541 of this title.
§ J516. Conl{ressional priority procedures (or concurrent
resolution.
(a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant
to section 1544(c) of this title shall be referred
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such
concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such
committee together with its recommendations within
fifteen calendar days. unless such House shall otherwise
determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall
become the pending business of the House in question
(in the case of the Senate the time for debate
shall be equally divided between the proponents and
the opponents) and shall be voted on within three
calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall
otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one
House shall be referred to the committee of the other
House named in "ubsection (al of this sectlon and
shall be reported out by such committee together
with its recommendations Within fifteen calendar
days and shall thereupon become the pending business
of such House and shall be voted upon within
three calendar days, unless such House shall otherWise
determine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the
two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent
resolution passed by both Houses. conferees shall be
promptly .appointed and the committee of conference
!Shall make and file a report with respect to
such concurrent resolution within six calendar days
after the legislation is referred to the committee of
conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House
concerning the printing of conference reports in the
Record or concerning any delay in the consideration
of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both
Houses not later than six calendar days after the
conference report is filed. In the event the conferees
are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall
report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.(
Pub. L. 93-148, § 7, Nov. 7, 1973,87 Stat 557.)
§ 1547
229
TITLE 50.-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 2152
EFFECTIVE DATE
Sectlon effectlve Nov. 7, 1973. see section 10 or Pub L.
93-148, set out as '" note under sectlon 1541 ot this tItle.
§ 1547. Interpretation of joint resolution.
(a) InfeT('nrps from any law Or treaty.
Authority to introduce United states Armed Forces
Into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances
shall not be inferred-
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not
in effect before November 7. 1973). including
any provision contained in any appropriation
Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes
the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into such situations and states
that it is intended to constitute specific statutOry
authorization within the meaning of this joint
resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified
unless such treaty is Implemented by legislation
specifically authorizing the introduction of
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
such situations and stating that It is intended to
constitute specific statutory authorizatIon within
the meaning of this joint resolution.
(b) Joint headquarters operations or hiJrh-Ie"el mifi·
tary commands.
Nothing in this joint resolution shali be construed
to require any further specific statutory authorization
to permit members Of United States Armed
Forces to participate jointly with members of the
armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the
headquarters operations of high-level military commands
which were established prior to November 7,
1973. and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or
any treaty ratified by the United States prior to
such date.
(c) Introduction of rnited States Armed Forces.
For purposes of thIs joint resolution, the term "in..
troduction of United States Armed Forces" Includes
the assignment of members of such armed forces to
command. coordinate. participate in the movement
of, or accompany the regular or irregular m11itary
forces of any foreign country or government when
such military forces are engaged. or there exists an
imminent threat that such forces will become en~
~agcd, in hostilities. .
(d) Constitutional authorities or f'xistinJr treaties un·
afTt'c1ed; construction against gorant of Presiden.
tial authority respecting use of L"nited States
~'\rmpd Forces.
Nothing in this joint resolutlon-
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional au·
thority of the Congress or of the President. or the
provisions of existing treaties: or
(2) shal! be construed as granting any authority
to the President with respect to the introduction
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
into situations wherein involvement in hostiJitJes
is clearly indicated by the circumstances which
authority he would not have had in the absence of
this joiqt resolution.
(Pub. L. 93-148. § 8. Nov. 7.1973.87 Stat. 558'>
EFFECTIVE DATE
Section etrecttve Nov. 7. 1973. see seetfon 10 of Pub. L.
93-148, set out as a note und~r sectlon }541 of this tltle.
§ 154S. Separabilily clause.
If any provision of this joint resolution or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is
held Invalid. the remainder of the joint resolution
and the application of such provision to any other
person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
(Pub. L. 93-148. 19. Nov. 7. 1973. 87 Stat. 559'>
EFFECTIVI: DATE
section effective Nov. 7. 1973, see section 10 of Pub. L.
93-148. set out as a note under section 1541 of thLs title.
230
APPENDIX D
Public Law 93- 559
93rd Congress, S. 3394
December 30, 1974
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