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Title
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Contents
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I. Introduction
- A. The Mandate of the
Committee's Inquiry
- B. The Purpose of the
Committee's Findings and Recommendations
- C. The Focus and Scope of the
Committee's Inquiry and Obstacles Encountered
- D. The Historical Context of
the Inquiry
- E. The Dilemma of Secrecy and
Open Constitutional Government
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II. The Foreign and Military Intelligence Operations of the United
States: An Overview
- A. The Basic Issues: Secrecy
and Democracy
- B. The Scope of the Select
Committee's Inquiry into Foreign and...
- C. The Intelligence Process:
Theory and Reality
- D. The Evolution of the United
States Intelligence Community
- E. The Origins of the Postwar
Intelligence Community
- F. The Response to the Soviet
Threat
- G. Korea: The Turning Point
- H. The "Protracted Conflict"
- I. Third World Competition and
Nuclear Crisis
- J. Technology and Tragedy
- K. The 1970s
- L. The Task Ahead
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III. The Constitutional Framework for Intelligence Activities
- A. The Joint Responsibilities
of the Legislative and Executive Branches...
- B. The Historical Practice
- C. The Constitutional Power of
Congress to Regulate the Conduct...
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IV. The President's Office
- A. The National Security
Council
- B. Authorization and Control
of Covert Activities
- C. Providing the Intelligence
Required by Policymakers
- D. Advising the President on
Intelligence Issues
- E. Allocating Intelligence
Resources
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V. The Director of Central Intelligence
- A. The Producer of National
Intelligence
- B. Coordinator of Intelligence
Activities
- C. Director of the CIA
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VI. History of the Central Intelligence Agency
- A. The Central Intelligence
Group and the Central Intelligence Agency: 1946--1952
- B. The Dulles Era: 1953-1961
- C. Change and Routinization:
1961-1970
- D. The Recent Past: 1971--1975
- E. Conclusion
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VII. The Central Intelligence Agency: Statutory Authority
- A. Clandestine Collection of
Intelligence
- B. Covert Action
- C. Domestic Activities
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VIII. Covert Action
- A. Evolution of Covert Action
- B. Congressional Oversight
- C. Findings and Conclusions
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IX. CIA Counterintelligence
- A. Counterintelligence: An
Introduction
- B. Current Issues in
Counterintelligence
- C. Conclusions
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X. The Domestic Impact of Foreign Clandestine Operations...
- A. Covert Use of Academic and
Voluntary Organizations
- B. Covert Relationships With
the United States Media
- C. Covert Use of U.S.
Religious Groups
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XI. Proprietaries
- A. Overview
- B. Structure
- C. Operation of Proprietaries
- D. The Disposal of
Proprietaries
- E. Financial Aspects
- F. Some General Considerations
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XII. CIA Production of Finished Intelligence
- A. Evolution of the CIA's
Intelligence Directorate
- B. The Intelligence
Directorate Today
- C. The Relationship Between
Intelligence and Policy
- D. The Limits of Intelligence
- E. The Personnel System
- F. Recruitment and Training of
Analysts
- G. The Intelligence Culture
and Analytical Bias
- H. The Nature of the
Production Process: Consensus Versus Competition
- I. The "Current Events"
Syndrome
- J. Innovation
- K. Overload on Analysts and
Consumers
- L. Quality Control
- M. Consumer Guidance and
Evaluation
- N. The Congressional Role
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XIII. The CIA's Internal Controls: The Inspector General...
- A. The General Counsel
- B. The Office of the Inspector
General
- C. Internal and External
Review of the Office of the Inspector General
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XIV. The Department of State
- A. Origins of the State
Department Intelligence Function
- B. Command and Control
- C. Support: Communications
- D. Production of Intelligence
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XV. Department of Defense
- A. Objectives and Organization
of the Defense Intelligence Community
- B. The Defense Intelligence
Budget
- C. Management Problems of the
Defense Intelligence Community
- D. Agencies and Activities of
Special Interest
- E. Military
Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities
- F. Chemical and Biological
Activities
- G. Meeting Future Needs in
Defense Intelligence
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XVI. Disclosure of Budget Information on the Intelligence Community
- A. The Present Budgetary
Process for Intelligence...
- B. The Constitutional
Requirement
- C. Alternatives to Concealing
Intelligence Budgets From Congress and the Public
- D. The Effect Upon National
Security of Varying Levels of Budget Disclosure
- E. The Argument That
Publication of Any Information Will...
- F. The Argument That the
United States Should Not Publish...
- G. Summary and Conclusion
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XVII. Testing and Use of Chemical and Biological Agents...
- A. The Programs Investigated
- B. CIA Drug Testing Programs
- C. Covert Testing on Human
Subjects by Military Intelligence Groups...
- D. Cooperation and Competition
Among the Intelligence Community Agencies...
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XVIII. Summary: Findings and Recommendations
- A. Introduction
- B. General Findings
- C. The 1947 National Security
Act and Related Legislation
- D. The National Security
Council and the Office of the President
- E. The Director of Central
Intelligence
- F. The Central Intelligence
Agency
- G. Reorganization of he
Intelligence Community
- H. Relations with United
States Institutions and Private Citizens
- I. Proprietaries and Cover
- J. Intelligence Liaison
- K. The General Counsel and
Inspector General
- L. The Department of Defense
- M. The Department of State and
Ambassadors
- N. Oversight and the
Intelligence Budget
- O. Chemical and Biological
Agents and the Intelligence Community
- P. General Recommendations
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Appendix I: Congressional Authorization for the CIA to Conduct
Covert Action
- A. The National Security Act
of 1947
- B. The CIA Act of 1949
- C. The Provision of Funds to
the CIA by Congress
- D. The Holtzman and Abourezk
Amendment of 1974
- E. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment
- F. Conclusion
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Appendix II: Additional Covert Action Recommendations
- A. Statement of Clark M.
Clifford
- B. Statement of Cyrus Vance
- C. Statement of David A.
Phillips
- D. Prepared Statement of
Morton H. Halperin
- E. Recommendations of the
Harvard University Institute of Politics...
- F. Recommendations of the
House Select Committee on Intelligence Concerning Covert Action
- G. Article from Foreign
Affairs by Harry Rositake: America's Secret Operations: A Perspective
- H. Article from Saturday
Review by Tom Braden: What's Wrong With the CIA?
- I. Recommendations of the
Commission on the Organization of the Government...
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Appendix III: Soviet Intelligence Collection and Operations Against
the United States
- A. Introduction
- B. Organization and Structure
- C. The GRU
- D. The Scope and Methods of
Anti-United States Operations...
- E. Eastern European Security
and Intelligence Services
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Additional Views of Senator Frank Church Concerning Covert Action
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Additional Views of Senators
Walter F. Mondale...
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Introduction to Separate Views of
Senators John G, Tower...
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Separate Views of Senator John G.
Tower, Vice Chairman
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Individual Views of Senator Barry
Goldwater
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Separate Views of Senator Howard
H. Baker, Jr.
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Supplemental Views of Senator
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
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Additional Views of Senator
Richard S. Schweiker
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Glossary of Selected Intelligence
Terms and List of Abbreviations
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National Intelligence Charts
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Senate Resolution 21
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Staff List
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