CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

Article 21 of the OAS Charter, akin to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
provides for the use of forcB for purposes of self-defense, but this
could hardly be construed as a justification for the covert activities
undertaken in Chile, since the intelligence estimates of the U.S. Government
concluded that the Allende government posed no threat to
vital U.S. interests or U.S. national security.
On October 31, 1969, President Nixon delivered an address on his
Action for Progress for the Americas program. His first principle
was as follows:
A firm commitment to the inter-American system, to the compacts which bind
us in that system, as exemplified by the Organization of America'n States and by
the principles so nobly set forth in its charter.
In his State of the World Address delivered on February 25, 1971,
to the Congress, President Nixon said:
The United States has a strong political interest in maintaining cooperation
with our neighbors regardless of their domestic viewpoints. We have a clear preference
for free and democratic processes. We hope that governments will evolve
toward constitutional procedures. But it is not our mission to try to provideexcept
by example-the answers to such questions for other nations. We deal
with governments as they are. Our relations depend not on their internal structure
or social systems, but on actions which affect us and the inter-American
system. The new government in Chile is a clear case in point. The 1970 election
of a Socialist President may have profound implications not only for its people
but for the inter-American system as well. The government's legitimacy is not in
question, but its ideology is likely to influence its actions. Chile's decision to
establish ties with Communist CUba, contrary to the collective policy of OAS, was
a challenge to the inter-American system. We and our partners in the OAS will
therefore observe closely the evolution of Chilean foreign policy.
Our bilateral policy is to keep open lines of communication. We will not be the
ones to upset traditional relations. We assume that international rights and
obligations will be observed. We also recognize that the Chilean Government's
actions will be determined primarily by its own purposes, and that these will not
be deflected simply by the tone of our policy. In short, we are prepared to have
the kind of relationship with the Chilean Government that it is prepared to have
with us.
At the very time this speech was delivered, the United States was
already embarked on a Presidentially approved covert action program
designed to control the outcome of the elections in Chile.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I want to turn to Mr. Bader who will
describe the pattern of covert action as it was used in Chile.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Bader is recognized.
Mr. BADER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM B. BADER, PROFESSIONAL STAFF
MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
Mr. BADER. The staff study on Chile focuses on what is labeled
"covert action" by the Central Intelligence Agency. Covert action, as
defined by the Central Intelligence Agency, describes a policy tool
for all seasons and purposes. To the Agency the term "covert action"
means, as Mr. Miller has already stated, "any clandestine operation
or activity designed to influence foreign governments, organizations,
persons, or events in support of the U.S. foreign policy objectives."
8
The definition of "covert action" was not always so embracing,
and indeed the term itself was only coined in recent years. This question
of defining "covert action" is important as the committee addresses
the C{'ntral questi.on~: The central questions are, as an instmment of
foreign policy, what can covert action do and under what circumstances?
What are costs? We need to answer these questions in order
to address the more fundamental issue of whether or not covert action
should be permitted. If so, under what mles and constraints?
Therefore, our interest in Chile, and in this report, is not only what
happened there but what the Chilean experience tells us about covert
action as a foreign policy operation of a democratic society.
It is important to note that the objectives, the techniques, and the
political control of covert operations have changed rather fundamentally
over the years.
It was only in late 1947-2% years after the end of World War IIthat
the United States formally decided that clandestine intelligence
collection activities had to be supplemented by what was described
at the time as covert psychological operations. These were described
as propaganda and manipulation of the press, and the like.
By the late spring of 1948, the Soviet threat was held to be of such
seriousness that "covert operations" were expanded to include countering
Soviet propaganda and Soviet support of labor unions, student
groups, support pohtical parties, economic warfare, sabotage, assistance
of refugee liberation groups, and support of anti-Communists
groups in occupied or even in threatened areas.
Gradually, covert action was extended to include countries all around
the world. Burgeoning from the experience of countering the Soviet
Union and its satellites in this early period of 1947 and 1948, the CIA
had major covert operations underway in roughly 50 countries by
1953; this represented a commitment of over 50 percent of the Agency's
budget during the fifties and sixties.
In broad terms-and in the language of the trade-covert activities
since the so-called CGming of age in 1948 have been grouped around
three major categories: propaganda, political action, and paramilitary
activities. In the experience with Chile, the largest covert activities
were those in the general categories of propaganda and political ac~
ion such as has been described in this chart [exhibit 1 1], disseminatlUg
propaganda, supporting media, influencing institutions, influencing
elections, supporting political parties, supporting private sector
organizations, and the like.
Now as far as paramilitary activities are concerned, the last category
is covert and military operations. They were not employed
to a significant degree in Chile with the possible exception of the Track
II operation and the Schneider kidnaping.
As far as propaganda is concerned, as revealed in the staff paper,
the largest covert action activity in Chile in the decade 1963-73 was
propaganda. The CIA station in Santiago placed materials in the
Chilean media, maintained a number of assets or agents on major
Chilean newspapers, radio, and television stations, and manufactured
1 see p. 95.
9
"black propaganda"-that is, material falsely purporting to be the
product of a particular group.
Let me give you an illustrative range of the kinds of propaganda
projects that were undertaken in Chile during the years under discussion,
1963 to 1973: subsidization of two news services to influence
Chilean public opinion; operation of press placement service; support
of the establishment of a commercial television service in Chile; support
of anti-Communist propaganda activity through wall posters,
leaflets, and other street actions; use of a CIA-controlled news agency
to counter Communist influence in Chile and Latin America; placement
of anti-Soviet propaganda on eight radio news stations and five
provincial newspapers.
By far the largest-and probably the most significant in this area of
propaganda~ was the money provided to El Mercurio, the major
Santiago daily during the Allende regime.
The second category is that of political action. In the intelligence
trade, covert political action a.ims to influence political events in a
foreign country without attribution to the United States. Political
action can ran~ from recmiting an agent from within a foreign
government for the purpose of influencing that government, to subsidizing
political parties friendly to U.S. interests. Starkly put,
political action is the covert manipulation of political power abroad.
In Chile the CIA undertook a wide range of projects aimed at influencing
political events in Chile, and here are some of them: wresting
control of Chilean university student organizations from the Communists;
supporting a women's group active in Chilean political and
intellectual life and hostile to the Allende government; combating the
principal Communist-dominated labor union in Chile.
The most impressive political action in Chile was the massive efforts
made over the decade from 1964 to 1974 to influence the elections. The
Central Intelligence Agency in 1964, for example, spent over $3 million
in election programs, financing in this process over half of the
Christian Democratic campaign.
The figures give you some idea of the measure and extent of the support
that I have been talking about: propaganda, $8 million; producing
and disseminating propaganda and supporting mass media,
roughly $4 million [exhibit 1 1
].
These are the various techniques of covert actions and the expenditures
from 1963 to 1973 to the nearest $100,000 that we have been able
to determine in the staff's work on the techniques of covert action in
Chile.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, in all the cases I have described, the major
objective of U.S. covert policy in Chile was to influence, control, contain,
and manipulate political power in the country.
Mr. Chairman, against this background on the meaning and varieties,
and in certain respects, the funding of covert action in Chile,
I want to turn to Mr. Inderfurth, who will discuss the major covert
activities taken in Chile in specific detail.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1 See p. 95.
10
The CHAmMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bader. What is the population of
Chile ~ How many voters ~
Hold that chart for a moment.
Mr. BADER. The total population is about 10 million; there are
roughly 3 million voters.
The CHAffiMAN. Roughly 3 million. And the total we spent in attempting
to influence the political process in Chile came to what?
Mr. BADER. In the 1964 election it came to roughly $3 million, $2.6
million, or $2.7 million.
The CHAIRMAN. The total on this chart comes to what?
Mr. BADER. $14 million, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. $14 million. Have you worked that out on a per
cap~ta basis?
Mr. BADER. I believe Mr. Inderfurth has.
The CHAIRMAN. The $3 million represents just a little less than $1
per voter in direct contributions to the political party.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, to get it into perspective, I might
say that I spent $2.7 million to run for election in 1972 in a State
with a population of 11 million.
The CHAIRMAN. If we look at that in terms of all population, national
population of 200 million, that would be comparable to almost
$60 million of forei~ funds. If a foreign government were given to
interfere directly WIth the American politIcal process in comparable
terms, that $3 million would equate roughly with almost $60 million
of foreign government money pumped into our process, wouldn't it?
Mr. BADER. That's right. That's correct, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Based on comparable per capita population.
Mr. BADER. In 1964, for example, it would be comparable in the
American political scene of $60 million of outside foreign funds coming
to the American election, the Presidential election of 1964.
Mr. INDERFURTH. As a comparison in the 1964 election, President
Johnson and Senator Goldwater combined spent $25 million. So there
would have been a $35 million difference there.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you please restate that?
Mr. INDERFURTH. The $3 million spent by the CIA in Chile in 1964
represents about 30 cents for every man, woman, and child in Chile.
Now if a foreign government had spent an equivalent amount per
capita in. our 1964 election, that government would have spent about
$60 million, as Mr. Bader indicated. President Johnson and Senator
Goldwater spent $25 million combined, so this would have been about
$35 million more.
The CHAffiMAN. More than twice as much as the two American
Presidential candidates combined actually spent.
Mr. INDERFURTH. That's right.
The CHAmMAN. All right. Mr. Inderfurth, would you continue?
Mr. INDERFURTH. Yes.
STATEMENT OF KARL F. INDERFURTH, PROFESSIONAL STAFF
MEM'BER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
Mr. INDERFURTH. This portion of the staff presentation will outline
the major programs of covert action undertaken by the United States

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