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10 The CHAmMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bader. What is the population of Chile ~ How many voters ~ Hold that chart for a moment. Mr. BADER. The total population is about 10 million; there are roughly 3 million voters. The CHAffiMAN. Roughly 3 million. And the total we spent in attempting to influence the political process in Chile came to what? Mr. BADER. In the 1964 election it came to roughly $3 million, $2.6 million, or $2.7 million. The CHAIRMAN. The total on this chart comes to what? Mr. BADER. $14 million, Senator. The CHAIRMAN. $14 million. Have you worked that out on a per cap~ta basis? Mr. BADER. I believe Mr. Inderfurth has. The CHAIRMAN. The $3 million represents just a little less than $1 per voter in direct contributions to the political party. Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, to get it into perspective, I might say that I spent $2.7 million to run for election in 1972 in a State with a population of 11 million. The CHAIRMAN. If we look at that in terms of all population, national population of 200 million, that would be comparable to almost $60 million of forei~ funds. If a foreign government were given to interfere directly WIth the American politIcal process in comparable terms, that $3 million would equate roughly with almost $60 million of foreign government money pumped into our process, wouldn't it? Mr. BADER. That's right. That's correct, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Based on comparable per capita population. Mr. BADER. In 1964, for example, it would be comparable in the American political scene of $60 million of outside foreign funds coming to the American election, the Presidential election of 1964. Mr. INDERFURTH. As a comparison in the 1964 election, President Johnson and Senator Goldwater combined spent $25 million. So there would have been a $35 million difference there. The CHAIRMAN. Would you please restate that? Mr. INDERFURTH. The $3 million spent by the CIA in Chile in 1964 represents about 30 cents for every man, woman, and child in Chile. Now if a foreign government had spent an equivalent amount per capita in. our 1964 election, that government would have spent about $60 million, as Mr. Bader indicated. President Johnson and Senator Goldwater spent $25 million combined, so this would have been about $35 million more. The CHAffiMAN. More than twice as much as the two American Presidential candidates combined actually spent. Mr. INDERFURTH. That's right. The CHAmMAN. All right. Mr. Inderfurth, would you continue? Mr. INDERFURTH. Yes. STATEMENT OF KARL F. INDERFURTH, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEM'BER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE Mr. INDERFURTH. This portion of the staff presentation will outline the major programs of covert action undertaken by the United States 11 in Chile from the early sixties through 1973. In every instance, covert action was an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, decided upon at the highest levels of the Government. We will begin, with the first major U.S. covert action in Chile, which was the 1964 Presidential election. The 1964 Chilean election was viewed with great concern in Washington. The New York Times reported: Officials Said they could recall no other foreign election since the Italian elections in 1948 that had caused as much anxiety in Washington as the one in Chile. The United States was involved in the 1964 election on a massive scale. The Special Group, which ,vas the predecessor of today's 40 Committee, authorized over $3 million between 1962 and 1964 to prevent the election of a Socialist or Communist candidate. In all, a total of nearlX $4: million was spent by the CIA on some 15 covert action projects. These projects ranged from organizing slum dwellers to passing funds to political parties. The groundwork for the election, or the plumbing as it is sometimes called, was laid early in 1961. The CIA established relationships with key political parties, as well as propaganda and organizational mechanisms, to influence key sectors of the population. Projects that had been conducted since the fifties among peasants, slum dwellers, organized labor, students, and the media provided a basis for much of this pre-election covert action. Covert action during the 1964 campaign was composed of two major elements. The first was direct financial support to the Christian Democratic Party. The Christian Democrats spent about $6 million to get their candidate. Eduardo Frei, elected. The CIA's contribution was slightly more than half of this sum, or $3 million. In addition to snpport for the Christian Democratic party, the CIA monnted a massive anti-Communist propaganda campaign. That campaign was enormons. Extensive use was made of the press, radio, films, pamphlets, posters, direct mailings. and wall paintings. To give some feel for this campaign. a few statistics might be helpful. During the first week of intensive activity, a CIA-funded propaganda group in Chile produced 20 radio spots per day in Santiago and on 44 provincial stations. Twelve-minute news broadcasts were produced five times daily On three Santiago stations and on 24 provincial outlets. By the end of June. the group ,vas producing 24 daily newscasts nationwide and 26 weekly cummentary programs. In addition, 3,000 posters were distributed daily. The propaganda campaign ,vas, in fact, a scare campaign. It relied heavily on images of Soviet tanks and Cuban firing squads and was pitched especially tD women. Misinformation and black propaganda were used as weI!. The CIA regards this anti-Communist scare campaign as its most effective activity undertaken on behalf of Eduardo Frei. In addition to support for the Christian Democratic Party and the propaganda campaign, the CIA ran a number of political action operations aimed at important Chilean voter blocs, including slum dwellers, peasants. organized labor, and dissident socialists. This effort made extensiw use of public opinion polls and grassroots organizing. In other ,vords. it was political campaigning American style. 12 Eduardo Frei won an impressive victory in the 1964 election. He received 56 percent of the vote. Now let's turn to CIA activities in Chile between Presidential elections. During the 1964 to 1970 period, the CIA spent almost $2 million on 12 covert action projects in Chile. One-fourth of this amount was authorized by the 40 Committee. Various sectors of the Chilean society were affected. All of these activities were intended to strengthen groups which supported President Frei and opposed Marxist influences. Two of the projects during this period were directed toward congressional campaigns, one in 1965 and one in 1968. The 1965 election project is representative. The 303 Committee approved $175,000 for this effort. Twenty-two candidates were selected by the CIA station and the U.S. Ambassador to receive funds. Nine of these candidates were elected. Thirteen candidates of the Socialist-Marxist coalition, known then as FRAP, were defeated. Election efforts were not the only projects conducted hy the CIA during this period. Covert action efforts were also undertake:n to influence the political development of various sectors of the ChIlean society. One project helped train and organize anti-Communists among peasants and slum dwellers. Two projects worked within organized labor. One was designed to combat a Communist-dominated labor union; another was conducted in the Catholic labor field. The media received particular attention during this period. One project supported and operated wire services, equivalent to our AP and UPI. Another supported a right-wing weekly newspaper. The CIA also developed "assets" within the Chilean press. Assets are foreign nationals who are either on the CIA payroll or are subject to CIA guidance. One of these assets produced radio political commentary shows attacking the political parties on the left and supporting CIAselected candidates. Other assets placed CIA-inspired editorials p Imost daily in EI Mercurio and, after 1968, exerted substantial control over the content of that paper's international news section. Now let's turn to the period immediately preceding the 1970 Presidential election. The 303 Committee first discussed the upcoming election in April 1969. According to a report of that meeting, Director Helms commented that an election effort would not be effective unless an early enough start was made. However, a year passed before any action was taken. In March 1970, the committee decided that the United States would not support anyone candidate, as it had in the 1964 election, but that it would instead wage a spoiling operation against Allende's PopUlar Unity coalition. In all, the CIA spent about ~1 million for this activity. Half was approved by the 40 CommIttee. The CIA's spoiling operation had two objectives: first, to undermine Communist efforts to bring about a coalition of leftist forces; and second, to strengthen non-Marxist political leaders and forces in Chile. In working towards these objectives, the CIA made use of a halfdozen covert action projects. An extensive propaganda campaign • 13 was begun. It made use 0:£ virtually all the media within Chile and placed and replayed items in the international press as well. Propaganda placements were achieved through subsidizing rightwmg women's and civic action groups. Previously developed assets in the Chilean press were used as well. As in 1964, propaganda was used in a scare campaign. An Allende victory was equated with violence and Stalinist repression. Sign-painting teams were instructed to paint slogans on walls evoking images of Communist firing squads. Posters warned that an Allende victory in Chile would mean thE' end of religion and family life. Unlike 1964, however, the 1970 operation did not involve extensive public opinion polling, grass roots organizing, or, as previously mentioned, direct funding of any candidate. The CIA fundpd only one political group during the 1970 campaign. This was an effort to reduce the number of Radical Party votes for Allende. The CIA's spoiling operation did not succeed. On September 4, Allende won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election. He received 36 percent of the vote; the runner-up, Jorge Alessandri, received 35 J?ercent of the vote. Since no candidate had received a majority, a Joint session of the Chilean Congress was required to decide between the first- and second-place finishers. The date set for the joint session was October 24. Now we will turn to the period between Allende's plurality victory and the congressional election. Mr. Treverton will go into thIS period. STATEMENT OF GREGORY F. TREVERTON, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE Mr. Tm:VERTON. Thank you. The reaction in Washinghm to Allende's victory was immediate. The 40 Committee met on September 8 and 14, to discuss what action should be taken. On September 15, President Nixon met with Richard Helms, Henry Kissinger, and John Mitchell at the White House. U.S. Government actions proceeding along two separate but related tracks. Track I, as it came to be called, aimed to induce President Frei to act to prevent Allende from being seated. Track I included an anti-Allende propaganda campaign, economic pressures and a $2.50,000 contingency fund to be used at the Ambassador's discretic,n in support of projects which Frei and his associates deemed important in attempting to influence the outcome of the October 24 congressional vote. However, the idea of bribing Chilean Congressmen to vote for Alessandri-the only idea for use of this contingency fund which arose-was immediately seen to be unworkable. The $250,000 fund was never spent. Track II, as it was called by those inside the U.S. Government who knew of its existence, was touched off by the President's September 15 instruction to the CIA. It is the subject of the Schneider portion of the committ{,R's recent Report on Alleg-ed Assassinations. I will merely summarize Track II here. Track II was to be run without the knowledge of the Ambassador, or the Departments of State and Defense. Richard Helms' handwritten 67-116 () - 7fi • 2
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