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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

XIII. THE CIA'S INTERNAI.. CONTROLS: THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL AND THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
Both the General Counsel and the Inspector General have played,
and will continue to play, vital roles in the internal management of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Both report directly to, and provide
guidance to, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. As the
principal legal officer of the Agency, the General Coun!'el provides
legal advice to the Director of Central Intelligence; he also provides
counsel and guidance to employees at all levels within the Agency on
legal issues connected with the conduct of the CIA's mission. The Inspector
General serves as the investigative arm of the Director and,
when necessary, of the General Counsel, as well as assisting the Director
and Deputy Directors in improving the performance of CIA offices
and personnel.
Under the mandate of Senate Resolution 21, the Senate Select Committee
studied both offices with particular attention given to the role of
each in assuring that CIA activities are consistent with the Constitution
and lavvs of the United States.l A number of current and
former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency were interviewed or
deposed. A far greater number were asked to, and did, respond in writing
to a detailed questionnaire on the work of these offices.2 On the
basis of this investigation, the Committee is convinced of the importance
of these offices and the need to maintain and strengthen them.
1 Several provisions in the Resolution seem particularly applicable to a review
of the Offices of the General Counsel and the Inspector General. Among them are:
1) Section Four which mandates examination of the extent to which Federal law
enforcement or intelligence agencies coordinate their activities and the extent
to which a lack of coordination has contributed to illegal, improper, or inefficient
actions; 2) Section Five which mandates examination of the extent to
which the operation of any activities in the United States by the Central Intelligence
Agency conforms to the legislative charter of that agency and to the
intent of Congress; 3) Section Six which mandates an examination of the
relationship between the Director of Central Intelligence's responsibility to protect
"intelligence sources and methods" and the prohibition on the Agency's
exercise of police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions;
4) Section Eight which mandates an examination of the nature and extent
to which Federal agencies cooperate in exchanging intelligence information and
the, adequacy of any regulations or statutes which govern such cooperation; 5)
Section Nine which mandates an examination of the extent to which the
intelligence agencies are governed hy executive orders, rules or reglliations, and
the extent to which these regulations contradict the intent of Congress; 6)
Section Ten whieh mandates an examination of the violation or suspected violation
of stMe or Federal statutes; 7) Seetion Eleven whieh mandates an examination
of the need for imprm'l'd, strengthened or consolidated oversight of the
United States inteIligenee activities hy the ('ongress; and R) Section Twelve
whieh mandates an examination of whether any of the existing laws of the
United States are inadequate either in their provisions or in enforcement to
safelnlard the rights of Amerieun citizens.
• Some 24 questionnaires were sent out. There were 15 responses ranging from
3 pages to 14 pages.
(279)
280
A. THE GENERA:b COUNS5L
The General Coonsel1s work and responsibilities have changed over
time, re&cting changes in CIA activities and the needs and desires of
different Directors. The General Counsel's Otlice had originally, a staff
of ten to twelve attorneys which was concel'lled with enactment of the
Agency charter and enabling legislation, and with creation of regulations
and administratiYe and financial procedures under "'hich the
Agency would operate. In the 19i)Os and 1960s, the Office was largely
directed toward assisting clandestine activities oyerseas. Currently the
Office of the General COllnsel, with a staff of roughlv ;)0 attorneys, is
primarily concerned with "proposals for lpgislation, execnti"e orders
and other directi yes gOYel'lling Agency activities; leg-a1 inpllt into
planning and approval of operations, stricter management and financial
controls: litigation, Freedom of Information .Ad and Privacy Act
matters; and response to requirements of SeIed and standing committees
of the Congress." 2a
1. The Or.qanization of the Office of Oeneml Counsel
Between January 19, 1951, and April 1, 1962, the General Counsel
was technically a part 01 the Directorate of Administration, but
in fact the General Counsel reported directly to the Director of Central
Intelligence on most matters. In 1962 the Office was moved to the
Office of the Director.3
The organization of the Office of General Counsel remained basically
unchanged from the inception of the Agency until October 1975.
The Office was then ~'eorganized internally into four specialized divisions
in order to permit more effective handling of the legal problems
of the Agency. The four divisions are: General Law division, Operations
and ~fanagement Law division, Freedom of Information and
Privacy Law division, and Procurement and Contracts Law division.
Two attorneys are presently assigned as Special Assistants to the
General Counsel. One of these has been assigned to the Deputy Director
for Operations to proyide more timely and effective counsel in
the earliest stages of sensitive operational matters. The other has been
assigned to the Office of Logistics, which requires continuous legal
assistance in its responsihility for managing most CIA contracts.
The Agency is considering assigning attorneys to the other directoratrs
and independent offices.
Until this year most of the lawyers in the Office of General Counsel
had been recruited from within the Agency. Although some of these
attorneys had had lrgal experience outside the CIA, the Rockefeller
Commission recommended, and the CIA has spent considerahle effort
in recruiting lawyers from out~ide the Agencv.5
Lawrence Houston, the Grneral Connsel of the Central Intelli-
'""The Role and Functions of the General Counsel." CIA paper prepared for
the Renate RE'lect CommitteE'. 12/71). p. 2.
3 Ibid. 12/71). p. 2. With thE' excpJjtion of onp ypar in thp If)I)Os, the Gpnpral
Counsel was also responsible for suTlt'rvision of thp CIA's liaison with Congrpss.
In 100f1. a sE'paratE' Office of Leigslatiw Counsel was created. TIlE' Leigslative
Counsel is resnonsihle for the CIA's liaison with Congress, and reports to the
Dirpctor of Central Intelligence.
5According to the CIA, as of April 1976. over half of the attorneys employed in
the Office of General Counsel will have come from outside the CIA.
281
gence Agency from H)±7 untillI.l7.f, agreed with the Rockefeller Commission
recommendation, noting that legal experience, particularly in
private practice, would help Agency attorneys exerCIse independent
ludgment.
Mr. .Houston also recommended that attorneys be rotated from the
Office of General Counsel to other government agencies.6 Such rotation
would lessen the possibility that these attorneys would become
part of a culture which assumes that, for reasons of national security,
the CIA is not governed by the normal processes of the law.
Just prior to his leaving the CIA, then Director Colby elevated the
Inspector General to an executive rank equal to that of the Deputy
Directors of the CIA. He agreed that the General Counsel should be
similarly promoted but no action was taken, leaving the General Counsel
below the Deputy Directors and the Inspector General in rank.
2. The Functiolls of the Ot/ice of General Counsel
The General Counsel has a \vide range of responsibilities. As noted
above, his primary responsibility is to advise the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, although he also pro\'ides legal advice
and guidance to employees at all le\'els. Dnder CIA regulations,
he is also responsible for reviewing all new projects and activities
unless they are clearly established as legal; insuring the legality
of the expenditure of confidential funds;7 reported possible violations
o:fthe U.S. criminal code by CIA employees to the Department of Jus~
tice; passing upon all regulatory issuances; coordinating legal issues
involved in CIA relations with non-Agency individuals and institutions;
determining legal standards for all requests made to the CIA by,
01' made by the CIA to, other govemment agencies; and establishing
proprietaries and cover mechanisms for operations. Under Executive
Order 11905 he is also required to report to the Intelligence Oversight
Board any activities which raise questions of legality or propriety.
3. The General Oounsel's Role in Determining the J.egality or Propriety
of 01A Activities
As the Director's chief legal adviser, the General Counsel is responsible
for determining the legality or propriety of CIA activities. CIA
regulations recognize this and provide that "to ensure that CIA activities
are in compliance with the law, Deputy Directors and Heads of
• The CIA has endorsed the idea hut has told the Committee that or~anizationally
it would he difficult to implement. (Letter from William Colhy to the
Select Committee, 1/27/70. p. 7.)
7 Redion R(b) of the CIA Act of 1941}, as amendf'd, !"iO U.KC. 403j (b) provides:
"The sums made available to the A~ency may be expended without regard
to the provisions of law and rl'gulations relatin~ to the expenditure of Government
funds: and for ohjects of a coufidential, extraordinary, or emergency nahue,
such expenditures to be accounted for soleIv on the certificate of the Director
and every such cl'rtificate shall he deemed a sufficient voucher for the
amount therein certified." Normally the General Counsel of the General Ac("
ountin~ Office would rule on the leg-ality of the l'xpenditure of government
funds, hut ~iven 50 U.S.C. 403j (b) and thl' decision by the General Accounting
OfficI' to <>easl' e"en the partial aunits of CIA eXlll'nditures whieh hl' had connuctpd
un nntil thl' early l!lOOs. the CIA's Genl'ral Counsel has the responsihility
for detl'rminin~ thl' lp~alitv of nnvouchprl'd expenditures. "The Role and Functions
of the General Counsel," 12/75, pp. 3-4.
207-932 0 - 76 - 19
282
Independent Offices shall consult with the Office of General Counsel
on all activities whose legality is not clearly established." B
While responsible for making determinations about the legality or
propriety of CIA activities, the General Counsel also has an obligation
to assist in the accomplishment of the Agency's missions. As the
Rockefeller Commission Report put it, "he is subject to pressures to
find legal techniques to facilitate proposed activities." 9 This dual
responsibility with its potential for conflict is not in itself uniquealmost
any "inside" counsel is in a similar position-but the secret and
often sensitive nature of CIA activities does make protection of the independence
of his judgment particularly important.
As can be seen from the regulation, the role of the Office of the General
Counsel is essentially passive.1o He does not initiate inquiries, but
rather consults upon request.
In the past, the General Counsel has not been asked for his opinion
on certain sensitive Agency programs. During the 20-year course of
the CIA's mail opening program, the General Counsel was never
asked for an opinion on its legality or propriety. When the Director
of Central Intelligence had doubts about whether Operation
CHAOS violated the Agency charter, he did not turn to the General
Counsel. As former DCI Helms stated, "Sometimes we did [consult
the General Counsel]; sometimes we did not. I think the record on
that is rather spotty, quite frankly." 11
When the General Counsel was asked for an opinion about CIA
activities which were "questionable" his advice was heeded. For example,
when the CIA participated in an NSA program to monitor telephone
calls to and from Latin America, the General Counsel was asked
for an opinion. The opinion he issued described the telephone intercept
program as illegal, with the result that the program was immediately
terminated.Us
The principle reason for the lack of consultation was that a review
by the General Counsel was not required for the initiation of Agency
activities. As James Angleton has testified, "... [Ilt is my impression
that one of our weaknesses is that we did not have the General
Counsel work into the planning phases of operations. Usually we went
to the General Counsel when something was going wrong, but not in
the inception of operations." 12
8 CIA Headquarters Regulation, "Restrictions on CIA Activities Within the
rnited States or Related to U.S. Citizens and Organizations," 11/28/75, 7-1a (3).
p.l.
o Report of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, 6/6/75,
p.87.
10 As LawrelH'e Honston wrote, "[t]he role eould be fllmost completely passive
but as a matter of practice it is and should be active in the sense of keeping informed
as far as possible and feeling free to raise possihle problems at whatever
level seems appropriate." (Letter from Lawrence Houston to the Senate
Select Committee, 1/76, p. 1.)
The presl'nt Deputy General Counsel has noted that gh-en the General Counsel's
new responsibilities under Executiw' Order 11905 and changes in attitudes
at the Agency the role will be anything but passive.
11 Richllrd Helms testimony. 9/10/75, p. 51l.
11. ReI' the Committee's detailed report on NSA ~fonitoring for a detailed discussion
of this activity and its termination.
12 .Tames Angleton testimony, 9/17/75. p. 48.
283
The CIA has explained that:
Because of the infinite variety of matters arIsmg which
would be susceptible to or might benefit from legal advice,
there has been no established mechanism requiring or permitting
the General Counsel to advise or rule in all cases.
Some of his responsibilities are set forth in regulations or
other procedures or are well known, whereas others depend on
the initiative of the individual office seeking advice. Each Director
of Central Intelligence has had his own preferences
in methods of operating the Agency and seeking advice from
the various components of the Agency. Because of the extremely
sensitive nature of some acth'ities, there' ha1}e been
times 1.ohen Directors have chosen to carry them out directly
rather than through the normally responsible components of
the Ag~ncy, in order to involve as few people as possible. In
some cases a Director may not think to seek legal advice or
may choose not to do so. In choosing to operate in this manner,
the Director is carrying out to a degree he deems necessary
his charter responsibility to protect intelligence sources
and methods from 1lnauthorized disclosure. On the other
hand, he must then make his OlOn determination as to lOhether
this respon.~ibilityjustifies some aspect of the operation lOhich
might otherlOise be questionable 1tnder law. [Emphasis
added.] 13
Under this view, the Director can still withhold from his counsel the
very existence of a particular activity. The DCI could be in the position
of deciding, without advice from his counsel, whether the DCI's
legal responsibility to "protect intelligence sources" jusWied activities
which would be "questionable under law."
Even under the present regulation requiring consultation with the
General Counsel "on all activities whose legality is not clearly established"
it is possible that the General Counsel would not be llsked for
an opinion about the legality or propriety of a major CIA 'activity. The
Director could waive the regulation and instruct the appropriate official
not to consult with the General Counsel. In addition, the standards
in the regulation itself may C!<'tuse certain difficulties.
The regubti.on leaves the determination of whether an activity has
been clearly established as legal to the deputy directors and the h{'ads
of independent offices. Thus, these officers must interpret past decisions
by the General Counsel and decide their appliC!<'lbility to new
activities. They must interpret the regulation itself and in particular
the phrase which reads "whose legality is not clearly established" in
order to deteI1nine whether consultation is required. Because the regulations
are prospective, activities which were legal in the past, but
which have become illegal due to changes in the law, might not be the
subject of consultation.
,. "Th{' Ro]{' and Functions of til{' G{'ll{'ra] C'OUllS{'], 12/7:;. p. 6.
284
It would certainly be possible to require consultation with the Geneml
Counsel on all "significant" acti\'ities.14 The Geneml Counsel
would be given a description of the acti\'ity. The referring office's
reasons for believing the activity is legal might be included to enable
the General Counsel to avoid a de 1I0/'0 review.
Certain acts undertaken by the CIA which may not appear significant
because they do not require the expenditure of a great deal of
money or the efforts of large numbers of personnel are nonetheless
"significant" due to their potential for abuse. Consultation with the
General Counsel should be required before the initiation of any such
act.
For instrance, under present regulations, the Director may approve
inn>~tig-ations of allegations of unauthorized disclosure of classified
information by individuals presently or formerly affiliated with the
CIA, if he determines that intelligence sources and methods may be
jeopardized by the disclosure,I5
There have been a number of such investigations in the past which
resulted in the extensive surveillance of newsmen, as well as a "breaking
and entering" by CIA with the assistance of local police officials.
Thus even though the CIA recognized that such investigations required
special procedures thl'l'e is no requirement that the chief legal
officer of the Agency be consulted.16
The CIA has taken the position that the General Counsel's approval
is not required for each such act. The General Counsel's approval of
the regulations governing such acts is considered sufficient. This underestimates
the difficulties deputy directors or heads of independent
offices might have in interpreting regulations, and creates the possibility
that actions not consonant with regulations could be approved
and undertaken.
Requests for assistance made by the CIA to other governmental
agencies and requests to the CIA from other agencies raise similar
H While the Deputy Directors and heads of independent offices would have to
interpret the meaning of "significant," they are in a better position to do this
than to make judgment!" about the applicalJility of past opinions of the General
Counsel. Some threshold is required in order that the General Coun~el's Office
not he swamped hy a requirement to reYiew eyery action by every employee.
"The inyestigation must be coordinated with the FBI, when substantial evidence
suggests espionage or other violation of a federal statute. CIA
7-1c(2) (b) (1).
,. As the CIA's former General Counsel has noted, the Office of General Counsel
"should he consulted in connection with inycstigations of disclosure of classified
information, or for any RIll'veillance within the U.S." (HouRton letter, 1/76, p. 1.)
Present regulations prm'ide that the Office of General Counsel must be consulted
when equipment for monitoring conyersations is being tested in the
Fnited States. (CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/2R/iiJ, H.R. 7-1d5.) As that
testing raises many of the same issues as does an inyestigation of unauthorized
disclosure of clasflified information, there seems to be no reaon for excluding the
Office of General Counsel from the approyal process for an investigation.
285
issues. l1 'Vhile the General Counsel must concur with the Deputy
Director for Operations on the provision of tpchnical equipment to
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for overspas operations,
J8 and must approve CIA requests for federal income tax information,'
9 he is not involYed in the approval process for seeking assistance
from st·ate and local police organizations.2o It should be remembered
that such assistance has been provided in circumstances which
were highly questionable.21 The General Counsel is not involved in
the approval process for providing technical guidance, training,
equipment, and other assistance to the Department of Defense for
intelligence activities within the United States.22 Such equipment
might be used by the Defense Department for illegal surveillance of
citizens. In each of these situations, the Central Intelligence Agency
has established special procedures for approval and monitoring; where
such procedures .vere imposed because of the sensitivity of the operations,
the procedures should specifically include consultation with the
General Counsel.
4. The General Counsel's Role 11'ith Regard to Reports of Activities
that Raise Question8 of Legality or Propriety
a. The General Oounsel's Responsibilities.-Present regulations
provide that "... any activities or proposed activities that may raise
questions of compliance with the law or CIA regulations or that
otherwise appear improper will be brought directly to the attention
of the Director by any of the command or staff components or by
the IG and ,.....ill be subject to the Director's decision." 23 In the past,
questionable activities which came to the attention of the Director
or the Inspector General were not always referred to the General
Counsel. For example, during a survey of the Technical Services
17 Under present regulations, the Inspector General is required to obtain a
written opinion from the General Counsel on requests for "continuation or
initiation of activities in support of or in cooperation with state, local, or other
federal agencies whose legality and propriety have not been previously established."
(CIA Headquarters Regultion, 11/28/7;;, 7-1b(1).) This language has
the same sh0rtcomings noted above: the deputy director or the head of the
indl'pendent office must interpret the regulation and previous dl'cisions of the
Office of General Coulisel; the re~ulation ignores the possibility of a change in
leg-al standards.
Written opinions of the General Counsel are g-enerally not required by regulation
or statute. The absence of a written opinion does not mean that the
Gelwral Couns~l did not provide advice. In many situations oral opinions
have been offered. Given proper security restr1etions, however, an increase in
the number of situations in which written opinions are required might be
desirable. as it might tend to increase the level of scrutiny by the Office of
Gpneral Coum·el.
"CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/75, 7-1b(5) (c).
'" CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/2S/75, 7-1c (9).
20 CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/75, 7-1b(3) (b).
Z1 In OIH' instance, local police assisted the CIA in a "breaking and entering."
2:l CIA Headquarters Rpgulation, 11/28/75, 7-1b (4).
23 CIA Headquarters Rpgulation, 11/2S/75, 7-1a (4).
Similar regulations require that any employee "who has knowledge of past,
current or proposed CIA activities that might be construed to bp illpgal, improper,
or outside CIA's Ipgislative charter, or who lJelieves that he or she has
received instructions that in any way appear illegal, improper, or outsidp CIA's
legislati\'e charter, is instructed to inform the Director or Inspl'ctor General
immediately." (CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/75, 7-Ia (6).)
286
Division in 1957, the Inspector General discovered activities which
he labeled "unethical and illicit," but he did not notify the General
Counsel. Nor was the General Counsel informed about the surreptitious
administration of LSD to unwitting human subjects, discovered
by the Inspector General in 19f13.24
Under the recently issued Executive Order 2", the General Counsel
is personally responsible for reporting to the Intelligence Oversight
Board any activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.26
However, CIA regulations do not explicitly require the Director or
the Inspector General to notify the General Counsel of questionable
activities reported to them. The Director may waive the regulation
and may instruct the Inspector General not to inform the General
Counsel.z< 'While the Inspector General is required by regulation
to refer to the General Counsel "all matters involving legal
questions that come to the attention of the Inspector General" 28 an
additional, more specific, regulation onlv requires that the Inspector
General refer to the General Counsel "information, allegations, or
complaints of ,-iolations of the criminal provisions of the United
States Code by CIA officers and employees, or relating to CIA affairs...."
b. Im'c8tigation8 by the Office of the Gct1Cral Coul1sel.-If the
General Counsel does learn of questionable activities, he must rely
on the Office of the Inspector General to investigate. Fnlike the
Inspector Gl'neral who, as tIlt' Del's investigative arm, is authorized
to review all CIA acti,-itil's, the General Counsel does not have
general investigatory authority.
The Office of Gl'neral Counsel can initiate an investigation, with the
specific authorization of the Director. This requireml'nt might prevent
the Genl'ral Counsel investigation of an activity about which the
Director sought to restrict knowledge.
If the Director refusl'd to authorize an invl'stigation by the General
Counsel, thl' Gl'neral Counsl'l could resign and notify the "anpropriate
authorities." 29 Alternately the Director could be required to provide
an immediate rxplanation in writing to the appropriate commit-
.. A former IG explained that his reaf;on for withholdin~ from the Agency's
Gpneral Counsel information on CIA's mail openin~, \Yhich he heliewd to be
"iIle~al." \Yas that the General Counsel has already been excluded by other
senior officials.
"An operation of this sort in the CIA is run-if it is closely held, it is run
hy those people immrdiately concerned, and to the rxtrnt that it is rrally
possible, accordin~ to the practi('es that we had in the fifties and sixties. th~r
persons not immediately con('erned \Yere supposrd to be ignorant of it." (Gordon
~tp\Yart dpposition, 9/30/7;;, p. 29.)
2., F,xecutivl' Ordl'r 1190;;.
.. The Insppctor General has an identical rpsponsibility to that of the General
Counsel, umlpr the terms of the F,xe('uti"e Order.
lJ1 Thr In~pector General would still haVI' to report th(' qUl'stionable activity
to thp Intel!igf'nce O\'ersight Board. If thf' Director instructs him not to, he
mnst inform the lOB of that instruction.
os CIA Headquarters R('j!;ulation, "Office of the lnf\pector Genl'ral,"1-3a.
29 These could includf' the lOB or its suecessor and the appropriate congressional
committees.
287
tees of the Congress and tlw Executi,"e branch of tlw reasons for denial
of investigatory authority.30
The GellE'ral Counsel coulel be provided by regulation \vith general
investigatory authority within the CIA, but this would han certain
drawbacks. It could strain the General Counsel's relationship with the
DCI. Lawrence Houston argued that "to give OGC innstigative authority
similar to that of the IG would ... pelTert its counseling
role anel tllPrebv inhibit 01' destrov its prime usefulness." 31
Houston note(l that enn if the General Counsel has the support of
the Del he will not be a"'are of everything going on at the Agency.
"Innstigative authority would not gi\"e him much more and would
... inhibit his relations with his clients." 32
Provision of general investigative authority to the Office of General
Connsel might also involve duplication of "'ork now done by the Inspector
Gf>neraI. Dl1plication of effort in detecting and preventing
abuses might be helpful rath€'r than hal'mfuI. In all lik€'lihood, how('\
·er. in the nSllal course of e\"ents the G€'neral Counsel would ask the
Inspector General to inn'stigate rather than relying on his own
reson rces.
c. The OellCral Coul1sr1's ArreS8 to 1I1fornwtiol1.-E\·en if the General
Counsel is consulted about all significant activities and if he is
notified of all reports of qllPstionable activities, it remains to ensure
that the General Connsel will han access to necessary information.
The fonner General Counsel does not recall ewr being denied informat;
rn. The r('co]'(1. ho\\"('ve1". is clear that a good deal of information
bearing directly on the legality 01' propriety of Agency operations was
never given him.
According to the Central Intelligence Agency. "If an Office should
'f(uestion' the request of the General Counsel for access to any particnlar
information, any limitations would be imposed by the Director."
Thus, even today, the Director remains able to deny information to
the General Connsel bearing on the legality 01' propriety of CIA activities.
Execntive Order IHl05, however. requires that the Director
ensnre that the General Connsel has "access to any information necessary"
to perform his dllties nnder the Order.
Lawrence Houston has suggested that the General Connsel could
resign if denied acces" to information. The Director might be reouired
to provide an immediate exnlanation, to the appropriate bodies of
the reflsons for such a denia1.33
d. Reporting p08si7)le Yiolrdiolls of thr TT.S. CI'iminrr7 Code to the
AUOlI1Pl/ Oel1pra7.-Finally. it should be noteo that in the past the
General Counsel did notal\Yavs r(>J)ort nossible violations of the U.S.
('riminal Code to the Denartment of .Tu"tice. Under the terms of a
1954 agreement \vith the Department of .Justice. the Central Intelli-
"" A report to the Jntelli!!ence OYersight Roaro may alreaov he reouireo.
F"ecuti\'e Oroer 1HlO;') requires the Gpneral Counspl to report to the JOR any
orrasion on which he was oirerted by the D('J not to rpport any activity to the
JOR
S1 Houston letter, 1/76, p. l.
32 Thi"., p. 1.
33 Thid .. p. 2. The General ('ounspl mi!!ht he required unoer the tprms of Exerutime
Order 1190;') to report the refusal of access to the JOR.
288
gency Agency was essentially delegated the Department of Justice's
power to determine whether criminal prosecution should be initiated
against individuals who violated federal law. This delegation was
and is unacceptable. The agreement has now been terminated.
Under present regulations, the Inspector General must inform the
General Counsel of "information, allegations, or complaints of violations
of the criminal provisions of the United States Code by CIA
officers and employees, or relating to CIA affairs ..." 34 The Inspector
General must also report to the General Counsel results of the Inspector
General's investigation which is aimed at developing "sufficient
facts to determine if a crime has been committed, and whether prosecution
may compromise international relations, national security, or
foreign intelligence sources and methods." 35 The General Counsel
will refer those cases where sufficient information has been developed
to determine that a crime has been committed, as well as the Inspector
General's report on the effect of prosecution, to the Department of
Justice.36
Under Executive Order 11905. the General Counsel is not required
to report to the Attorney General, but rather must report to the Intelligence
Oversight Board.37
Because of the suspicions aroused by the disclosure of the CIADepartment
of .rustice agreement and the need to renew public confidence,
it may be necessary to require that the appropriate congressional
committees be gin'n notire of CIA referrals of possible criminal
violations to the Department of .rustice. If this were to be done, great
care would have to be taken to avoid any possibility of prejudicing
the investigation or prosecution.
5. Oversi,ght of the Office of Gerlera? Co-unsel
Because the General Counsel's principal rluty is to provirle legal advice
and guidance to the Director of Central IntpJ1igence. the Director
must be primarily responsible for evaluating his work. Unlike other
CIA offices, however. the Office of the General Counsel has never been
the subject of inspection by the Office of the Inspector General.
The General Counsel's work has not gone totally unreviewed. In
1951 a New York law firm conducted a brief review of the Office of
General Counsel. 'Within the last year the Department of Justice
conducted a managemrnt suney of the Office at the request of the
Director. Given the importance of the General Counsel's Office, the
absence of regular formal reviews is to be regretted.
6. Executi1Je Erarlch Oversi,ght of the Office of General Counsel
At present the General Counsel is requirerl to "transmit to the
Oversight Board reports of any activities that come to [his] attention
that raise questions of legality or propriety." 38 He is also re-
.. CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/2RI75. 7-1a (7), p. 1.
.. CIA HeadQuarter~Regulation, 11/2RI7!'\, 1-3a (2) (e).
311 Ibid. The regl1lation~ further provide that "reporting of the faC't of a crime
will not be delayP<1 for an evaluation of whether the prosecution will rai~e questions
of national security."
37 The General Counsel may already be required to report to the Attorney Generlll
I1ndl'r provisions of the U.S. Code.
• 8 Executive Order 11905.
289
quired to report to the Department of Justice all incidents involving
possible violations of the G.S. Criminal Code as \yell as the results
of investigations by the Inspector General. There are no requirements,
however, that he prm'ide General Counsel opinions or regular reports
on the work of the Office to anyone outside the CIA.
According to the Central Intelligence Agency, regular provision of
General Counsel opinions outside the Agency might raise serious
problems. "To plac.e such requirement would be violative of command
relationships and lawyer-client privilege ... [T]he Director, at his
option, could make such reports available as he deemed necessary." 39
It has also been argued that because many of the opinions are on
technical matters, regularly supplying them to those outside the CIA
would not be useful. '
Walter Pforzheimer, formerly the Legislative Counsel of the CIA,
suggested that "a general report, oral or in writing, on major legal
problems facing the Agency, or the need for additional statutory
support" 40 could be provided to such groups as the National Security
Council. The lOB or other such groups could be supplied legal
opinions in especially sensitive areas, such as those dealing with activities
that might infringe on the right of Americans.
7. Congressional Oversight of the Office of General Counsel
The same chain of command and lawyer-client privilege problems
might arise if General Counsel's opinions were reg'ularly provided to
congressional oversight committees. Yet similar solutions which
would greatly aid congressional oversight-regular, more general reports,
41 and the provision of particular opinions or all opinions in
specific sensitive areas---conld be devised.4~
The SerIate has another means by which to oversee the General
Counsel, the confirmation process. Congress could require that the
General Counsel be nominated by the President snbiect to confirmation
by the Senate. This might increase the inrlependf>nce and
stature 43 of the General Counsel; it would parallel provisions for
Presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation of the General
Counsels of executive branch departments and independent regulatory
bodies. But eliminating appointllwnt by the DCI might reduce
the confidence which the Director has in his chief legal advisor.
B. THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
The Inspector General reports to the Director and assists him in
his attempts to assure that CIA activities are consistent with
the Agency's charter regulations and the Com:titution and laws of
.. Letter from William Colby to the Senate SelE'ct Committee. 1/27/76. p. 7.
.. Letter from Walter Pforzheimer to the Senate Select Committee, 1/26/76,
p.9.
<1 In order not to short-circuit the chain of command. such reports could be
made to Congress by the DCI.
.. The properly charged ,con~ressional oyersight committees must haye access
to the decisions of the General Counsel, but it may be that not all the General
Counsel's opinions n/'ed be sent to them.
.. At present the General Counsel ranks below the Inspector General and the
Agency's Deput:y Diredors.
290
the United States. In addition, the Office of the Inspector General has
a wide range of responsibilities designed to improve the performance
of CIA offices and personnel. The Inspector General now holds rank
equal to that of the Deputy Directors of the CIA.
1. Organizational History
.The Office of the Inspector General had its origin in the establishment
of an Executive for Inspections and Security (EIS) in the
Central Intelligence Group (CIG) on July 1, 1947. EIS was charged
to provide "overall inspection, audit, and security for CIG." By 1951,
audit and inspection functions had been separated; an Audit Office
was established under the Deputy Director for Administration.
In November 1951, a Special Assistant to the Director assumed the
inspection function. He was appointed to the newly established po~ition
of Inspector General on January 1, 1952. In March 1953, the mISsion
and functions of the Inspector Geneml 'were formally defined.44
In 1953, the DCI appointed Lyman B. Kirkpatrick as Inspector
General.45 Mr. Kirkpatrick obtained approV'al from the Director III
April 1953 for an inspection program which included planned, periodic
inspection of Agency components (component inspections). Several
inspectors were added to the IG's staff to perform this function;
however, the Inspection and Review Staff in the Directorate of Plans
remined responsibility for reviewing DDP components. By mid-1954,
the IG's staff had expanded to fifteen, and a program of component
inspections was under way. In January 1955, the DCI authorized the
IG to conduct independent inspections of DDP components, separate
from the DDP's Inspection 'and Review Staff inspections. By December
1959, the Office of the Inspector General had completed the first
cycle of component inspections.
On April 1, 1962, the Audit Staff was transferred from the Directorate
of Support (DDS) to the Office of the Inspector General, and
.. The issuance read:
"Mission:
"The Inspector General is charged wirth conducting investigations throughout
the Agency on behalf of the Director and with inspecting throughout the Agency
the performance of missions and exercise of functions of all CIA offices and
personnel.
"Functions :
"The Inspector General shall :
"a. Make recommendations with respect to the missions prescribed for the
several Offices of the Agency and with respect to such procedures and methods
as may assist the Offices of the Agency more fully to perform their respective
functions.
"b. Make recommendations with respect to the proper assignment of missions
and functions in the overall interests of the Agency.
'·c. Provide a forum where Agency persollllel may, on a highly confidential
basis, confide sugge8ltions or complaints which have not received satisfactory
considerations through regular channels of command or through the procedures
provided for in CIA Regulation No. 20-8.
"d. Perform such other functions as may be determined by the Director."
.. In December of 1961, upon Kirkpatrick's transfer, Deputy Inspector General
David R. McLean was named Acting Inspector General; John Earman was
appointed Inspector General in May 1962. In March 1968, John Earman retired
and Gordon M. Stewart was appointed Inspector General. He, in turn, retired
in Januan' 1972, and was replaced by William V. Broe. In June 1973, on William
Broe's retirement, Donald F. Chamberlain, the incumbenJt, was appointed
Inspector General.
291
the Inspector General was given responsibility for coordinating and
directing the activities of the Audit Staff. The Audit Staff then had
about 40 positions-its present 'authorized strength.
In May of 1962, the positions of Chief of the Inspection Staff
and Chief of the Audit Staff were established within the Office of
the Inspector General. At the same time the DCI approved an increase
in the Inspection Staff from 15 to 29 positions so that all Agency
components could be inspected on a two to three year cycle, and all
foreign field installations could be visited at least once a year. In December
1963, in response to a call for economy measures, the Inspector
General reduced inspector positions from 18 to 14.
In 1964, the Inspector General became concerned that the office
lacked continui,ty because inspector positions were always filled by
rotational assignment. He obtained approval from the Executive DIrector
to establish two Executive Career Service permanent positions
in the Office.
In June 1973, the Director 'abolished the component inspection program
46 and reduced the Inspection Staff to five positions, including
two positions to work on Equal Employment Opportunity
matters. The Inspector General's role was limited to conducting
special investigations and studies, investigating charges of misfeasance,
malfeasance, and nonfeasance, and handling grievance cases.
In November 1974, the Audit Staff's functions were expanded to include
independent program audits 47 of Agency operations which included
"some of the same things that the inspection staff had done
previously ..." 48
In July 1975, following the Rockefeller Commission recommendations,
the component inspection program was reinstituted. The EEO
function positions were transferred to a new staff in the Office of the
Director. As of April 1976, the staff of the Inspector General was authorized
to include approximately twenty inspectors and a new series
of component inspections had been initiated.
2. The Functions of the Office of the In8pector General
The responsibilities of the Office of the Inspector Genera,l are quite
broad. Under CIA regulations the Inspector General is charged with:
-[d]irecting and coordinating the activities of the Inspection
Staff and the Audit Staff in conducting special investiga-
.. According to the present Deputy Inspector General, the program was ended
beeause Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Colhy'believed ''that a gQOd deal of the kind of
information Ithat we had produced in the preceding years was not recurrent, that
we had had most of the serious problems in the Agency and that Mr. Colby
more specifically felt that he had new management approaches that he felt
would match what the inspection staff' had provided in the past." (Scott Breckinridge
testimony. 3/1/76, pp. 4-5.)
.., This function, as pUblished in Agency regulations on May 30, 1970, is
described as follows:
"Conduct supplementary, independent progoom audits of Agency operations
pursuant tQ the audit standards established by the Comptroller General. Such
audits will cover Agency-wide subject matter selected in coordination with the
Comptroller or directQrate programs selected in coordination with the Deputy
Director concerned. For purposes of coordinating independent program audits,
substantially qualified officers will be detailed to the Audit Staff'." (CIA memorandum,
"Organizati(\nal History of the Office of InspectQr General, 12/75,
p.3.)
.. Breckinridge, 3/1176, p. 5.
292
tions, inspections of organizational components, and audits on
behalf of the Director throughout the Agency, both at headquarters
and in the field, and performing such other functions
as may be prescribed by the Director.
Under the same regulations, the Chief of the Inspection Staff will:
-Conduct periodic inspections of all CIA offices for compliance
with CIA authority and regulations, as well as for
effectiveness of their programs in implementing policy objectives;
conduct unannounced inspections of any organizational
component of CIA when it appears necessary.
-Survey and evaluate any problem area or subject called
to his attention ... reporting his findings and conclusions as
appropriate.
-Provide a forum wherein CIA personnel may, on a highly
confidential basis, confide grievances or complaints that have
not receiv()d satisfactory consideration through normal channels
of command. . . .
-Investigate all reports from employees or other sources
of possible violations of CI.A's statutory authority.
-Investigate charges and reports of fraud, misuse of funds,
conflicts of interest, and other matters involving misfeasance,
malfeasance, nonfeasance, or violation of trust. In all cases
involving possible violations of the U.S. criminal code, the
investigation will be limited to developing sufficient facts to
determine if a crime has been committed, and whether prosecution
may compromise international relations, national
security, or foreign intelligence sources and methods. The results
of such investigations will be reported to the General
Counsel for further reporting to the Department of
Justice. '"
-Refer to the General Counsel all matters involving legal
questions that come to the attention of the Inspector General.
-Coordinate with the CIA Director of Equal Employment
Opportunity concerning grievance cases....
-Review with the General Counsel proposals for support of
other government departments or agencies....49
Over the years, the principal activities of the Inspector General's
Office have remained relatively constant. They have been component
inspections, investigations into activities which might be construed as
"illegal, improper, or outside CIA's legislative charter," 50 and the
review of employee grievances.
Component Inspecti0'f!8
Component inspections are studies conducted by the Inspector General's
staff of offices within the Agency. They have ranged from
specific surveys focusing, for example, on the Technical Services Division
in the Deputy Directorate of Plans, to broader surveys such as
those conducted on the Agency's major proprietaries. They include
•• CIA Headquarters Regulation.
""CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/75, 7-1a(6).
examinations of documents located at Headquarters, field visits overseas
by members of the Inspector General's staff, and interviews of
personnel within the component.51
As one former member of the Inspector General's staff noted, a component
survey should include;
a review of existing policy, effectiveness and economy of
operations, security, compliance with regulations and procedures,
adequacy of personnel as to qualifications and numbers,
morale, and any specific problem areas identified by the component
itself, individuals within it, or ... external SOUl'cesY
According to the CIA, the present schedule of component inspections
"will cover both field and headquarters activities ... [T]hey
should cover all Agency components every two to four years with more
frequent attention given to sensitive activities.53
The precise schedule for the component surveys is determined by
the Inspector General in consultation with the Director.54 According
to Lawrence Houston, even the scheduling of the inspection is "salutary."
55 As one former Inspector noted ;
what the component does in anticipation of the survey and
during the course of the survey as problems are surfaced is
often (if not usually) of more significance than are the actions
taken in response to the report's recommendations. In fact,
.1 In the past all, or almost all, of the personnel in the component were interviewed.
According to the Deputy Inspector General, this was because "there were
a lot of unresolved problems in the Agency that were hangovers from its early
days of growth and development ... and the feeling then was that a very detailed
review of everything was required." (Breckinridge, 3/1/76, p. 6.) Although
several former Inspectors remarked on the usefulness of this tecbnique, particularly
as it improved the morale of lower ranking employees (see e.g., Letter
from John O. Lawrence to the Senate Select Committee, 2/18/76, p. 1) it has now
been halted because of 'the "tremendous amount of repetitiveness," and because
the interviews were no longer finding things that were "startling," but rather
"the sort of problems that would probably turn up" anyway. (Breckenridge,
3/1/76, p. 6.)
During future component inspection&, there will be selective interviews focusing
on "management and policy issues"; larger numbers of personnel will be
sampled in overseas stations because the Inspectors will be "looking not only
for "management and policy questions", but also "for operational conduct."
(Ibid., p. 7.)
In the past the Inspector General also interviewed randomly selected returning
field personnel. According to one former Inspector, this "was useful in alerting
the Inspector General to rO'Utine problems." (Lawrence letter, 2/18/76, p. 2.)
The Deputy Inspector General told the Committee that the Agency had dropped
this program but was now reinstituting it. He noted that it had provided useful
information but the information had to be used as "leads," as one person usually
did not have the whole story, (Breckinridge, 3/1/76, p. 47.)
62 Letter from Christian Freer to the Senate Select Committee, 1/22/76, p. 2.
53 If this schedule were maintained, it would compare favorably to the pre-1978
schedule under which the CIA attempted, unsuccessfully, to review each component
every three to five years.
'" One former Inspector has sug~ested that the schedule be fixed by the Inspector
General, an Execut'iYe Branch oversight committee such as PFIAB, and the COIlgressional
oversight committees, after consultation with the Director of the CIA.
(Letter from Thomas Holmes to the Select Committee, 1/19/76, p. 3.) Another
former Inspector noted that the tendency was to follow a fixed schedule
'·slavishly·' instead of keeping "generally informed" of developments i.n all
components on a continuing basis." (Lawrence letter, 2/18/76, p. 1.)
t>5 Letter from Lawrence Houston to the Senate Select Committee, 1/76, p. 1.
294
if the inspectors do their work properly, and if the component
is cooperative, there should be little to put into the report
of survey.56
On the whole it appears that past component surveys increased the
effectiveness of the Agency. A former Inspector described their results
as follows:
Close scrutiny of any element of the Agency by the Office of
the Inspector General, preceded by anticipatory review and
self-examination within that element, stimulated m:eful reconsideration
of goals, objectives, and procedures. By providing
occasions for all employees in the component to talk freely
and in confidence with one or more inspectors, and thus to
voice securely any comments, criticism or complaints they
might have, these surveys constituted a valuable morale factor,
while accomplishing the primary task of bringing to the
Director's attention the overall performance and possible deficiencies
of a given component as well as chronic or developing
problem areas within or related to it.57
However, the Senate Select Committee'~ investigation of the Office
of the Inspector General found several problems. They include:
a. Acce88 to Information.-On certain occasions in the past, the
Office of the Inspector General was denied access to material about particularly
sensitive Agency activities. In the most striking example, the
Inspector General was precluded from even reviewing Operation
CHAOS files. 58
At present, CIA regulations provide that the Inspector General
"shall have access to any information in CIA necessary to perform his
assigned duties." 59 The CIA has informed the Senate Select Committee
that only the Director can refuse the Inspector General access
and such refusal must be in writing.60
Thus, even under present regulations, particular Agency activities
could be exempted from IG review by the Director.
If denied access to information, the Inspector General could, of
.. Letter from Kenneth Greer to the Senate Select Committee, 1/20/76, p. 1.
One former Deputy DCI, however, has suggested that the office to be inspected
should not be informed. (Letter from Vice Admiral Rufus C. Taylor to the 'Senate
Select Committee, 1/13/76, p. 1.) This would however, eliminate any "anticipatory"
changes due simply to the scheduling. A former Inspector has written
suggesting consultation with the Deputy Director involved as he would know of
factors "relevant to the timing of the inspection, not known to the Inspector
Genera!." (Lawrence letter, 2/18/76, p. 1.)
'" Freer letter, 1/22/76, p. 1.
.. The substance of the program, gleaned from overseas inspections by the
Office, was the subject of a paper by the Inspector General: consequently
Operation OHAOS was reviewed by the Agency's Executive Director-Comptroller.
A second exclusion noted b:r Scott BreckinridgE' involved access to materials
on an Agency proprietary. (Letter from Scott Breckinridge to the Senate
Select Committee, 1/12/76, p. 4.)
.. HR 1-3. Executive Order 11905 requires the Director to ensure that the
Inspector General will have access to material needed to perform his duties
under the Order.
'" CIA memorandum, "Comml'nts on the Office of Inspector General in the OIA",
l/25/76. p. 2. One former Inspector sug-g-eS'ted that if the Director did choose to
deny access to the Inspector General, it should be communicated by the DCI
to the Inspector General in person. (Freer Letter, 1/22/76, p. 4.)
295
course, r~sign, The Director should be required, however, to notify the
approprIate congressional and Executive branch committees of the
denial immediately and to provide a written explanation for it.61
.b..Problems of Emphasis.-In the past, as the Rockefeller CommISSIOn
noted, "the focus of the Inspector General component reviews
was on operational effectiveness. Examination of the legality or propriety
of CIA activities was not normally a primary concern." 6Z
According to the current Inspector General, more attention is now
being paid to possible improper or illegal activities as well as to the
legal authority for any given activity. This change in emphasis should
be reinforced by the r.rovisions of Executive Order 11905 which
place personal responsIbility on the Inspector General for reporting
to the Intelligence Oversight Board any activities that raise questions
of legality or propriety.63
c. Discovering Potential Problem AreaB.-As the Rockefeller
Cummission noted, "even with complete access, not all aspects of an
office's activities could be examined".64 While this is clearly true given
the scale and complexity of CIA's activities, the Committee found that
certain questiona'ble practices which should have been uncovered did
not come to the Inspector General's attention during past inspections.
For instance, the CIA's project of surreptitious administration of
LSD to non-voluntary unwitting human subjects continued from the
early 1950s until 1963, but escaped the notice of the Inspector General
in 1957, when a broad survey of the Division responsible was conducted.
The project was discovered by the Inspector General in 1963;
the discovery led to its termination.
d. Referring Improper or Ille'l..al Activitie8 to the aGO awl the
DOI.-Even when improper or Illegal activities were discovered in
the course of a component inspection, these activities were not always
referred to the Office of General Counsel.
During a survey which included a review of the CIA's research program
to develop agents which could be used to control human behavior,
the Inspector General discovered activities which he labeled "unethical
a.nd illicit." 65 Although this language was in his report, he failed to
notify the Office of General Counsel and failed to call for the elimination
of the questionable practices. In surveys of the CIA's New York
mail opening program, the Inspector General reported on issues of
management and security, but failed to raise any question about the
program's legality with either the General Counselor the Director,
even though the Inspector General "knew" the program was
"illegal." 66
61 Under Executive Order 11905 the Inspector General is required to report to
the Intelligence Oversight Board on any occasion when the Director instructs
him not to report to the lOB on an activity.
.. Report of the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, 6/6/75,
p.89.
.. Executive Order No. 11905. Under the Order a similar responsibility is laid
upon the General Counsel.
.. Report of the Commission on CIA Activities withIn the United States,
6/6/75, p. 89.
65 CIA Inspector General's Report on the Technical Services Division, 1957.
.. The IG under whose auspices the survey was conducted believed it was "unnecessary"
to raise the matter of illegality with the Director "since everybody
knew that it was [illegal], ... and it didn't !Seem ... that I would be telling Mr.
Helms anything that he didn't know." (Gordon Stewart deposition, 9/30/75, p.
32. )
The present Inspector General kJld the Select Committee that "the
Inspector General does have to be certain that he leans over backward
to assure that all reports which might interest the General Counsel
are brought to his attention ... it is also important that ... legal
advice is sought before a report goes to the DCI or Deputy Director,
so that any legal advice becomes part of the Report." 67 Under present
CIA regulations, the Inspector General must refer to the General
Counsel all matters involving legal questions that come to the attention
of the Inspector General.68
e. Follow-up and Irnplementation of Recornrnendati0118 by the
Office of Inspector .General.~A former Inspector noted one phase of
the inspection process which he believed needed improvement. This
involved :
getting a decision when the component head nonconcurred
in a recommendation about which the Inspector
General felt strongly. If the recommendation was of
major importance, there was no problem, because the Director
would decide. However, on recommendations of lesser
importance-those not worth bringing to the attention of
the Director-there was no really effective mechanism for
deciding which view was to prevail.69
The present Deputy Director for Operations has suggested to the
Committee that the DCI should be required to inform the Inspector
General as to what action has been taken on his recommendations,7°
Problems apparently have existed not only in obtaining a decision
but in obtaining one consistent with the Inspector General's recommendation.
As a former Inspector Geneval wrote:
. . . [i]t is necessary that the DCI fully back the Inspector
General in his recommendations unless there are overwhelming
reasons to the contrary.71
67 Letter from Donald Chamberlain to the Senate Select Committee, 1/13/76,
p. 4. The CIA has written the Committee that "when there are legal issues involved
in an IG investigation, the formal opinion of the General Counsel is sought
and made part of the Inspector General's report to the Director. Comments on
the Office of the Inspector General of the CIA,1/25/76, p. 4-
It would be possible to require that all IG reports go to the Office of General
Counsel. As many of these reports deal with poor management, reorganization,
or grievances, this might prove more of a burden than a boon. (See e.g., letters
to the Senate Select Committee of Lyman Kirkpatrick, 1/13/76, p. 5 and Thomas
Holmes, 1/19/76, p. 7.)
.. CIA Headquarters Regulation 1-3. Under Executive Order 11905, the Inspector
General has a personal responsibility to report to the Intelligence Oversight
Board any activities that come to his attention that raise questions of legality
or propriety.
.. Greer letter, 1/20/76, p. 2. The IG's Office has now established new procedures
"designed to reinforce the final effect of the inspection report." (CIA
Memorandum, "CIA Inspector General Follow-Up Procedures," 1/29/76.)
.. Letter from William Nelson to the Senate Select Committee, 1/13/76, p. 2.
11 Kirkpatrick letter, 1/13/76, p. 2.
297
Yet another former Inspector General wrote:
I did not feel that the recommendations made in I.G.'s surveys
commanded the attention and support at the Director's
level that they merited.'2
A former Inspector wrote:
Too often have IG recommendations been either brushed
aside or emasculated as the result of negotiations or pleadings.
More unfortunate has been the growing tendency of IG
reports to adjust their recommendations to the IG's estimate
of what might be acceptable under the circumstances.73
The IG has now been promoted to the same rank as the Deputy Directors,
which may help the Inspector General obtain support for his
recommendations. The present Deputy Director for Operations has
suggested that if the DCI does not a~ce.pt a recommendation by the
IG, the IG be empowered to inform the Attorney General of the
United States on matters concerning U.S. la\v, and the Assistant to
the President for National Sec.urity Affairs on all other matters.H
Even where the recommendations of the Inspector General are
accepted, compliance has on occasion been an issue. The present Deputy
Inspector General told the Committee about "two inspection
reports in which the recommendations appear to have been accepted,
but the compliance was below expectation. In the first case the IG
subsequently headed a general investigation in the area, which had
3ubstantial results. In the second, the results of the first inspection
72 Letter from Gordon Stewart to the Senate Select Committee, 1/20/76, p. 1.
A former Inspector described the principal defect of the Inspector General's
Office as "the absence of IG clout." (Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 13.) Another
former Inspector wrote that if a survey were "controversial (I.e. if it encountered
opposition from the Deputy Directol'[s] affected) as a rule nothing came of the
survey report's recommendations." (Lawrence letter, 2/18/76, p. 2.) The present
Deputy Inspector General noted that after recommendations are drawn up, the
Directorates may come back with "new information or additional considerations
that will modify our understanding of the pfol,j",,, .. , ""lEY lila,' Y'J',<llade us in
their reply that they are right ..." I BreeldnrIdg-e. :l/l/~: h S0-31.)
He also noted that the "IG raises the issue,. i1'1(\ ];;;pn; hI-> ',.,.' :;:" it accurately
and clearly, but there may be other ("H1siderations t'13 t we 'ire not
aware of that make it impractical at least at that time." (JlJid., p, H8,)
73 Letter from Peter Heimann to the Senate Seled ('m''lnittee, 3/1iii'dt p, 4.
The Rockefeller Commission noted:
"The Inspector General frequently was aware of mallY of ri.l(> CL','", Q,'tiy,tH;"
discussed in this report, and brought them to the attention of PH' Din'{'1·1'· nr
other top management. The only program whieh was terminatE'd as ." 1'''"'"
was one in 1963-involving experiments with behavior-modifying dmz,· 0;1 n,lknowing
persons." (Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 89.)
It should be recalled that the Rockefeller Commission dealt only witb abw;<-> :
many IG recommendations have been accepted by the Director. Moreover, ".:'
termination of programs is not the only measure which can be taken. Programs
can be changed, and controls tightened.
7. Nelson letter, 1/13/76, p. 2. The Rockefeller Commission recommended that
the IG have the authority "when he deems it appropriate, after notifying the
Director of Central Intelligence, to consult with the executive oversight body on
any CIA activity." (Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 94.) Under Executive
Order 11905, the Inspector General has a personal responsibility to report to the
Intelligence Overight Board "any activities that come to [his] attention that
raise [s] questions of legality or propriety."
207-932 0 - 76 - 20
298
were minimal and the staff which had been reviewed eventually was
totally reorganized.75 f. The Scope of the Cornp01wnt 11lspection.-In the past component
inspections have, in general, been directed at organizational units
within the CIA, with much less time and attention being focused on
programs or issues that cut across organizational boundaries. For
example, the CIA's mail opening program was analyzed in part during
the Inspector General's survey of the Office of Security, and in
part during the Inspector General's survey of the Counterintelligence
~taff, but it was never reviewed as a program. Consequently, the
issues which the program raised were never fully explored and
presented to the Agency's management.76
There are other programs cutting across component lines as well as
issues which affect the Agency as a whole. These deserve attention from
the IG. Although surveys of these have been done in the past, the
surveys have not been done on a "systematic basis as were component
inspections." 77
g. Detailed Reporting Versus Issue Highlighting.-Past compollent
inspections have been detailed and quite thorough. However, the
very breadth of the surveys might have made them less useful than
more selective reporting. The present Deputy Director for Intelligence,
Edward Proctor, noted that:
In the past IG component surveys have been extremely
detailed and involved every aspect of the component being
surveyed and interviews with almost every person assigned
to the component. As a result the reports resulting from these
surveys contained a lot of detailed information which was of
only marginal utility to the managers of the component or
the Director. If IG component surveys of the future are to
be focused on the important issues and activities of the more
sensitive components, I would endorse them fully because they
have surfaced some problems for management attention ...78
h. The Composition of the IG Survey Team.-The bulk of the
Inspector General's staff has always been rotated to that Office from
the various CIA Directorates for two or three year tours. In order
to have the most qualified personnel, it was, and is, necessary to ensure
that the stint with the Inspector Genera,l did not damage the individ-
\'1i Breckinridge letters, 3/1/76, pp. 23--25. In order to measure compliance the
IG now requires the component to report on its progress in implementing agreedupon
recommendations.
7· Domestic Report on Mail Opening.
• Lawrence Letter, 2/18/76, p. 2.
.. Letter from Edward Proctor to the Senate Select Oommittee, 1/15/76, p. 1.
One former Inspector noted that "Some surveys, especially surveys of DDO
components, have tended to deteriorate into recitations of unit-by-unit organizational
and administrative detail instead of providing programmatic overviews
and evaluations and giving incisive descriptions of problem areas with specific
recommendations." (Heimann letter, 1/18/76, p. 6.)
299
ual's chance for promotion,79 It is also important that the survey team
be unprejudiced. As a response to these needs, according to one former
Inspector, there was:
an unwritten rule that if you came from a particular Directorate,
you would not be asked to work on a team that was
doing a survey of any component in that Directorate . . .
[a]nd that was a hell of a good rule ... so that if you were a
youngster-or not a youngster but somewhere in the middle of
your career, with a clear intention that you were going back
to your parent Directorate after your two-year tour of duty
or your three-year tour of duty, what the hell do you care if
you come from the DDI [Directorate for Intelligence] and
you call them as you see them in CI [Counterintelligence]
Staff.8o
This rule was apparently not always followed. The same Inspector
said that he believed that an agreement had been worked out between
the Inspector General and the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff,
under which every member of the team inspecting the CI Staff had
a background in the then Directorate for Plans before coming to the
Inspector General's office.81 One member of that team had actually
served as Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff.
Another way to preserve the impartiality of the Inspector General's
staff would be to, as one fanner Inspector suggested, make appointments
to the Inspector General's staff "career culminations" with no
officer assigned to the Inspector General's staff being permitted to
return to another Agency post.82 While the need for "career culminating"
appointments and more permanent positions in the Inspector
General's office were repeatedly suggested,83 eliminating the rotation
system would bar talented younger officers from serving in the
Office.84
Another former Inspector has suggested that in some cases the composition
of the teams did not reflect the expertise needed to analyze
7Il One former Inspector has written that the IG had "insufficient authority
in staff selection and promotion" and suggested that he should "have the authority
to coopt, subject to approval by the Deputy Director concerned, any officer"
for assignment to the IG Staff. (Lawrence letter, 2/18/76, pp. 6-7.) The present
Deputy Inspector General argued against this "shopping around the building"
stating that "rather than using my subjective and personal preferences, which
are subject to some errors, I would prefer to have people nominated that I can
reject forcing the Deputy Director to put up new people." (Breckinridge letter,
3/1/76, p. 16.)
80 Staff summary of Joseph Seltzer interview, 1/75, pp. 14-15, See also letter
from Thomas Holmes at 10.
81 Seltzer (staff summary), 1/75, p. 14. Present Agency policy would not allow
an individual to take part in an inspection of his parent office because his
"objectivity" might be affected by his being "imbued with its practices," but
would allow him to be used in inspections of other offices within his parent
Directorate. (Breckinridge, 3/1/76, pp. 18-19.)
8. Heimann letter, 1/18/76, p. 2. Since Lyman Kirkpatrick, all the Inspectors
General have taken that office as their last post with the CIA.
83 See e.g., Letters from Gordon Stewart 1/20/76, p. 2, and John O. Lawrence
2/18/76, p. 6.
.. A permanent staff might also mean, as the Deputy Inspector General noted,
that the IG's staff would have "less and less firsthand experience with what is
current in the Agency." (Breckinridge, 3/1/76, p. 12.)
potential problem areas. As an example, he noted that inspection teams
in the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology were composed
of engineers and general scientists, and thus might not be qualified
to dea.l with certain questions, such as those involving conflict of
interest, which might arise.85
3. Investigations into Acti~'ities That Raise Questions of Legality or
Propriety
The Office of Inspector General has traditionally examined allegations
of questionable activities. Under the terms of Executive Order
11905, the Inspector General shall :
(1) Transmit to the Oversight Board reports of any activities
that come to their attention that raise questions of legality
or propriety.
(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the Oversight
Board on its findings concerning questionable activities, if
any.
(3) Provide to the Oversight Board all information requested
about activities within [the CIA].
(4) Report to the Oversight Board any occasion on which
[he was] directed not to report any activIty to the Oversight
Board by [the Director].
(5) Formulate practices and procedures designed to discover
and report to the Oversig-ht Board activities that raise
questions of legality or propriety.
At present CIA regulations provide that:
any employee who has knowledge of past, current or proposed
CIA actiVIties that might be construed to be illegal, improper,
or outside CIA's legislative charter, or who believes that he or
she has received instructions that in any way appear illegal,
improper, or outside CIA's legislative charter, is instructed to
inform the Director or Inspector General immediately.88
Thus, all CIA employees are now on notice that they are required to
provide either to the Director or to the Inspector General any information
which they possess about questionable activitiesY
.. Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 2. However the inspection teams are presently con·
stituted, the Inspector General can also request assistance from the Audit StatI,
which reports through him to the Director. As the auditors check components,
including overseas installations, much more frequently than does the inspection
statI, they can be asked to assist the inspection staff in the course of their audits.
(Letter from William Broe to the Senate Select Committee, 1/17/76, p. 4.)
.. CIA Headquarter Regulation, 1;'28/75, 1-7a (b). In the past, employees were
only asked to provide information about activities in which they were directly
involved which might be construed to be illegal, improper, or outside the CIA's
legislative charter.
87 Under Executive Order 11905 activities which raise questions of legality or
propriety must be reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board. In March 1976,
George Bush, Director of the CIA, called on CIA employees to report questionable
uctivities directly to him or to the IG.
One former Inspector suggested that the reporting of such acts would be facilitated
by having a particular Inspector designated as a contact point for each
major element in the Agency. (Freer letter, 1/22/76, p. 12.) The Deputy Inspector
General told the Committee that art one time Inspectors were assigned to "different
components, and this didn't work. They got no business...." (Breckinridge,
3/1/76, p. 56. )
301
As previously notBd, the Inspector General's discovery of questionable
activities has not always led to their referral to the Office of General
Counsel. There can be little disagreement with the recommendation
of Lawrence Houston that any question of violation of law or legal
authority should be referred immediatBly by the Inspector General
to the Office of General COlUlse1.88 CIA regulations now provide
that all matters involving legal questions that come to the attention
of the Inspector General shall be referred to the General
Counsel.89
There is one aspect of the Inspector General's role in investigating
questionable activities which may cause controversy. The present regulations
provide that the Inspector General is authorized to:
Investigate charges and reports of fraud, misuse of funds,
conflicts of interest, and other matters involving misfeasance,
malfeasance, nonfeasance, or violation of trust. In all cases involving
possible violations of the U.S. criminal code, the investigation
will be limited to developing sufficient facts to determine
if a crime has been committed, and whether prosecution
may compromise international relations, national
security, or foreign intelligence sources and methods. The
results of such investigations will be reported to the General
Counsel for further reporting to the Department of Justice.
Reporting of the fact of a crime will not be delayed for an
evaluation of whether prosecution will raise questions of national
security, as outlined above. If both reports can be made
at the same time without delay, they may be so reported.90
There is an obvious need to insure that a prosecution does not jeopardize
important United States interests. The IG appears to be wellsuited
to evaluate its effect. It should be remembered that con.fidence
in the judicial system is important and it can be undermined if people
believe that individuals are exempted from prosecution solely
because of their connection with the intelligence community.
Conducting preliminary investigations to determine if a crime has
been committed may however, raise difficult issues. Great care must be
taken so that later imd fuller investigations will not be hampered. The
level of care must be such that there can be no suspicion that Agency
officials have failed to impartially investigate allegations of wrongsa
Houston letter, 1/76, p. 2.
8' CIA Headquarters Regulation, 1/28/75, 7-1a (7), p. 1. The Agency regulations
dealing with the reporting of questionable activities only require the IG to refer
such reports to the General Counsel when allegations of violations of Title 18 of
the U.S. O>de are received. While the regulations may reflect a desire not to have
to refer disciplirmry matters to the General Counsel (e.g., see Breckinridge,
3/1/76, p. 43), the importance of preventing future violations of the law by the
CIA compels General Counsel pal'ticipation in the process of reviewing reports
of qnestionable activities.
.. CIA Headquarters Regulation, 1-3. In certain instances in the past, the
Office of Security has investigated individual allegations. (Breckinridge letter,
1/12/76, p. 3.)
Prior to the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) the Inspector
General conducted complete investigations of alleged violations of law by Agency
employees. After the decision in order to protect individual rights and to avoid
compromising future prosecution the Inspector General limited his investigations
to the determination of whether a crime had been committed.
302
doing by their colleagues.91 To prevent suspicion it might be desirable
for the Inspector General to maintain a list of allegatIOns and the results
of the IG~s preliminary investigations for periodic inspection by
the Department of Justice and the appropriate congressional committees.
~. Investigation of Grievances
CIA regulations provide for the airing of grievances through the
normal chain of command to the Director of Personnel and finally to
the Director of Central Intelligence Agency through the Inspector
General. In addition, the regulations direct the Inspector General to
provide a forum for grievances which have not received satisfactory
consideration through the normal channels and empower him to accept
direct 'appeals when appropriate.\l3 In certain circumstances this grievance
machinery may facilitate the detection of illegal or improper
activities by Agency officials.H
It is Agency polIcy that "relief first be sought in the chain of command,"
95 but direct recourse to the Inspector General is available
"where an employee feels he cannot go through normal channels without
jeopardy to his career, or other rare exce.ptional circumstances." 96
This direct channel for the airing of gnevances should be maintained
with the IG being provided the "authority to counter the possibility
of reprisal against the employee." 97 The mechanism might be
more heavily publicized.9B Because of the importance of havmg a
mechanism outside the CIA, employees should be aware that they can
go to the appropriate congressional oversight committees.
01 It would be possible for any "information, allegations, or complaints of violations"
to be referred to the Departmelllt of Justice immediately, without a prt'liminary
investigation by the Office of the Inspector General. This might, however,
result in a substantial number of unfounded complaints being referred to
the Department of Justice. As the present Deputy Director for Operations wrote
the Committee:
"[t]here are in any organization individuals who are quick 00 allege misconduct
or improper activity on the part of their superiors or peers. The question as
to whether these allegations have any substance can best be initially determined
by the Inspector General. l'mmedi~l:te referral ,to another lJody will result in
harassment-type investigations, will ln certain cases broaden the security damage
and even eventually resulit in poor foHow-up on real charges when enough
other cases have proven to be unsubstantiated." (Nelson letter, 1/13/76, p. 1.)
.. CIA Headquarters Regulation, 20-7.
.. CIA Headquarters Regulation, 1-3.
.. Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 11.
.. Memorandum from Scott Breckinridge to Chief, Review Staff, 3/17/76, p. 2.
r1 Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 11.
.. The present Deputy Director for Intelligence has recommended that the
normal chain of command grievance procedures be publicized, and the In$pector
General instructed to "resist the temptation to get involved prematurely in
grievances." (Proctor letter, 1/15/76, p. 7.)
One former Inspector has noted that:
"[w]henever an employee challenges the Agency itself, as contrasted to a component
or an Agency official, he is also challenging the Inspector General, since
the latter is necessarily a representative of the Agency. Thus, the Inspector General
can not be an impartial arbiter between the Agency and the employee. This
was a source of frustration to employees who brought such cases to the Inspector
General. Such employees should have an external administrative appeal available
either in addition to or as a bypass of the Office of Inspector General." (Lawrence
looter, 2/18/76, p. 7.)
303
C. INTERXAL AXD EXTERNAL REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF THE! INSPECTOR
GEKERAL
The Inspector General reports to the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Director has the primary responsibility for
evaluating this office. The Office has not, however, been regularly or
formally reviewed. Some mechanism for internal inspection of the
Office of the Inspector General should be devised.
The Inspector General was aware of questionable activities, some of
which continued for many years with the approval of the Agency's
top management. This underscores the importance of outside reviews
of the Agency. To be effective, the reviewing bodies must have access
to the Inspector General's work.
A number of individuals familiar with the work of the Office of the
Inspector General have argued against the Inspector General's having
a direct reporting responsibility outside of the CIA. Lawrence Houston
noted that if the Inspector General reported directly to anyone
other than the Director, two crucial elements would be lost: "first
the absolute candor that should exist in his relations with the Director
and second the ability to protect the integrity of his files and the confidentiality
of his findings and recommendations." 99 The Committee
has also been told that "any arrangement which would separate the
Inspector General from his present relationship to Agency management
would tend to result in a lack of candor and a resistance to revealing
sensitive details in investigations and this would inevitably result
in diluting the authority and effectiveness of the Inspector General,1°o
A start in outside reporting has been made. Under Executive Order
11905 the Inspector General must report to the Intelligence Oversight
Board any activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.101
But Executive Branch oversight of the CIA or the CIA's Inspector
General is not sufficient. The Inspector General should be available
to the appropriate congressional oversight committees.102 And some
form of reporting on the work of the Office of the Inspector General
should be made, with appropriate safeguards, to the appropriate
congressional committees.
The present Inspector General believes that:
[t]he LG. could and perhaps should provide our oversight
committees with the following: (1) a summary of our findings
on each component survey, one which would reveal prob-
.. Houston letter, 1/76, p. 1.
100 Comments on the Office of the Inspector General. 1/25/76, pp. 2-3. However.
Scott Breckinridge wrote that "If so directed by the DCI, elemeilits being inspected
will continue 'to be as forthcoming as in the past. There is no reason to
expect that this will not be the case." (Breckinridge letter, 1/12/76, p. 5.) Mr.
Breckinridge noted, however, that if reports were to be made available to outside
bodies, less detail might be provided "in support of conclusions and recommendations."
101 Ibid. Prior to the issuance of the Executive Order. CIA regUlations, amended
to conform to the recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission, required
reports to be sent to the NSC and PFIAB.
102 Letter from John McCone to the Senate Select Committee, 1/30/76, p. 2.
Former DCI ~fcCone wrote that the IG should not report to anyone outside the
Agency such as the PFIAB, the NSC or congressional oversight committees. The
IG, should be however, "aV'ailaible to all of these groups." (Ibid., p. 2.)
304
lems and recommended solutions but not give operational
details; (2) a semi-annual summary of all other cases, emphasizin~
trends, general problems, etc., but not giving names
of indivIduals or sensitive details which might identify
individuals.103
Such reports, coupled with access, where necessary, to the results
of particular inspections or reviews by the Inspector General, would
greatly aid congressional oversight of the CIA.l04 Congressional
evaluation of the work of the Office of the Inspector General might be
facilitated by requiring the Inspector General to provide the oversight
committee with a plan of action setting out "priority surveys to
he done and why, the schedule to he followed, the dates reports would
be completed, [and] the actions taken on reports (or the non-actions)
and why." 105
A second means for Congress to oversee the work of the Inspector
General would be to make the Inspector General subject to presidential
nomination and senatorial confirmation. Presidential appointment,
however, might inadevertently give position of Inspector General a
political coloration which would diminish the effectiveness of the
Office.
1QO Cbam'berlain letter, 1/13/76, p. 4. In order to reinforce the chain of command
such reporting could be done via DOl's reports to the oversight committees.
10< One former Inspector argued against congressional access without the DCI's
concurrence as leading to "congressional involvement .in Agency minutiae," the
erosion of security, and the reduction of the candor of Agency employees vis a
vis the IG. (Heimann letter, 1/18/76, p. 2.) Another former Inspector wrote that
if aU IG's reports were to be sent to Congress they would "become less candid
and more conservative." (Lawrence letter, 2/lS/76,p. 5.) Another former Inspector
suggested that "an active and strong congressional oversight committee
would be my first choice" as an "outside authority" whicli would correct problems
that the IG discovers. (Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 6.)
1"" Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 12. The submission of such a plan would allow the
IG to be evaluated on the basis of his own plan, which would be approved by
the IG and the committees. The committee "would be assured that the IG was
planning to do whflJt the committee expected them to do." Ibid.
The IG is required, under Executive Order 11905 to report to the Intelligence
Oversight Board the "practices and procedures" formulated to discover questionable
activities by the CIA.

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