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APPENDIX III. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES A. INTRODUCTION The U.S.S.R. conducts espionage and "active measures" or covert action operations on a large scale against its main enemy-the United States.1 These activities are carried out in the U.S. and abroad by the Soviet intelligence and security services-the KGB and the GRU-and by the intelligence and security services of Soviet-influenced Eastern European countries, via their officers and agents in the United States and in other countries. The main targets are U.S. Government officials, members of the business, scientific and political communities with access to the U.S. Government, and other influential entities such as youth, journalist and trade organizations. According to the CIA, the United States is still the major target of the Soviet Union, Soviet intelligence and security services regard the greater degree of contact between the United States and the U.S.S.R. resulting from detente both as an incr.eased counterintelligence threat and as an opportunity for recruitment of more intelligence sources. 1. General St1"lWture and Oommand The intelligence and security structure of the Soviet Union today consists of two main elements. The first is the Committee of State Security- known in the U.S.S.R. and abroad by its initials-KGB. The second element is the lesser-known military intelligence organizationthe Chief Directorate of Intelligence of the General Staff-whose initials are GRU. Both of these organizations operate on a world-wide basis. There is no Soviet embassy abroad which does not have its contingent of KGB officers, and it is doubtful whether there are more than one or two without GRU officers. Furthermore, the diplomatically-accredited personnel in Soviet Embassies are generally from 40 percent to 60 percent GRU and KGB officers. However, while there are many similarities between the operations of these two organizations overseas, there is one basic difference between them. The GRU engages only in foreign intelligence collection and has no domestic functions. The KGB, however, exists to safeguard national security. It interprets this mandate in the broadest sense, and therefore both its foreign activities and its domestic mission are multi-faceted. The KGB and GRU are nominally controlled by the Soviet Government but are actually commanded' by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Officially, both intelligence services report to the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Government: the KGB reports 1 The People's Republic of China is now almost as important a target to the Soviet Union as is the United States. (557) 558 dir-ectly and the ORC throllgh the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. It ap~ars that HlP role of th!~ Coullcil of Jrinisters in overseeing thf'se organizations is limited to administrative control, while the actnal rontral of operation:- is a Party function. Both organizations report indirectly and directly to the CPSl: leadership through their resper-tin ('hif'1'-': T11Tii Vladimiroyich AndropoL Chairman of the KGB; and ~{arshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko, Jlinister of Defense. Both are full v0tj ng '"'1PTll hpr<: of the Politburo, the highest ruling body ofthf' CPSl'. £. Budget Accurate estimates of Soviet pxpenditures on intellig-ence Rre difficult to arrive at. because of rigid security and because of the peculiarities of Soviet accounting practices. The available evidence indicates that both the KGB and GRTT receive high priority in the allocation of funds and other resources. :1. The 801'7et Intelligence and Secur-ity Services-The KGB As noted above, the KGB has both domestic and foreign functions. Abroad, the KGB is responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence; for the control of all official Soviet installations and personnel; for th,~ penetration of all hostile intelligence and security servi'~es; and fOl ;:;ollcluding covert and "executive action" programs. However, it concentrates a- far greater share of its attention on its internal functiolls, which include: uncovering espionage, subversion and dis~idence; censorship of all international, and selected internal communieutiolls; invcstiguting crimes against the st.ate and presenting evidence for prosecution; protecting the borders of the country; providing physical protection for the leaders and important installations of the Party and state, and for visiting foreig-n dignitaries; disrupting and neutralizing the activity of hostile intelligence services and emigre organizations by aggre€Sive counterintelligence operations; supervising t.he development and installation of secure ~ommunications systems, and providing maintenance and security for those systems. The number of KGB personnel engaged in clandestine activity directed against foreign cour:!ril'i- is estimated by the CIA at 10,000 while the counterintelligence and security components Qperating insioe the Soviet Cniou are nlnch larger. \Vith the inclusion of a sizeable administrati.- e and support apparatus, the total number of all-Union or natiollal-Ievel persollnel ha" been estimated at a total of 410,000. Of this t.otal, the Border Troops have been credited with over 175,000 employees; the Kremlin Guards ano possibly other uniformed components, while not individually reported, may number over 65,000. In addition to the 410,000 national-level personne1 estimate, each Republic and autonomous region has its own KGB structure, and there are KGB offices, in every town of any size across the entire Soviet Union. . . B. ORC'\XJZATI()~ AXD STRGCTLRE ,. Exer:utire Le1.:el The Chairman of the KGR 11l1·ii Ylncliminwi(1) All(lr0l)O\-, i:: as~ isteo 3r the expcllt,iw l('velll:- 'wr"p] il(,pllties and by a senior policy559 making board known as the "coiiegiulll:' Thi" body meets at least once 11 month to discuss KGB activities. Other offieials :--([(It us various specialists and the ,_hairlllo'll uJ' (lit' Hl'llllblic-le\"e1 KGB organization::, participate in collegium discussions when speeific problem:; are di::;cussed, 2. Ohief Directorate Le~)el The KGB has a highly-complex organizational structure, but it is generally correct to say that the First Chief Directorate is concerned with foreign operations and that the Second Chief Directorate has primary responsibility fOI intern,ll 3c('urity and eounterintelligence. a. The Fil'st Ohief DiJectOrllCc-TIlL' First Chief Directorate of the KGB is orgalliz(~ll on botJl geog1'aphi,'al and fUllctionallines. The geographic departments are numbered, and the First Department operates against the l~Jlited ~tatl'" and Car;ada. Trarlitionally, the numerical llesignation "First" has been lIssigned to the department that operate,; against the "main "Hemy" llf tItp LS.S.R The Fnited States has ueen that enemy since 'Y"lId 'fai rf; !.ut tlw Peoplr's Hppublic of China ha~ since been dClated aitnl)"t to thi,., "tatn" hy current attitudes i'f not by formal orgunizat ion. " The Second Deopartment is responsible for Latin America, induding Mexico. The Third Department concentrates on the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Scandinayia; the Fourth Department on 'Vest Germany, Austria and Switzerland, and so on for the thirteen additional departments. The functional or specialized components of the KGB First Chief Directorate cunct>l'll themselves ",ith part icular Jjongeographical targE'ts, types of operations and types of information on a world-wide basis. TIlPl'e are sel'eral impurLlnt Clllll[l"W'llts ill this category: -Tlw Oounterintelligence Di:'lctomle wmks directly against foreign intelligence and security 8·1'\,ic\,,,. ---The "'-c'ient'ific rind Terknical lh'rN'torate 1'I1llS clandest.ine operati() n~ to collect iJJfc,rllia,iOl; Oll fI"lJlJOJu"6cal ((lhanees and analYzes tllPir application to r11ilitan and jndu~trinll1Sf's. . ---Depal'tniCllt ":1" (Co\crt .\.., Liull awl D'.I ~l,rjotl) plans, coordinates awl supports those acti,-itics which are known as "active measnrE's"- a naul£' which apIJI'OXi!datec' ;'C!JI ert ilction." I"This group was formerly called Department "D"--disinformation and received extensive publicity in the Wesl ill tIle HIGOs under that WlIIlP,] -Department ,; 17", formerly known as thl Thirteenth DepartmE'nt.. conducts assassinations, alJductioIl. :dld other typE'S of ;'executi ve acti~ n." It is known to have carrietl out assassinations abroatl. Currently, thIS DE'partnwnl is l~rilllarily ('oIlcpmecl with contingency planning for sabo·tage awl partIsan \I'arfa1'e operations. --The Int6Zligcl/c,; L;(/i801; Depul'tllu':d lllaintnins liaIson with th" st.atc security or intdligenc,· sen'ices of the East European Commllllbt countries :llld of ot1lpr pro-S()\ id-tatf'0. It ~,l'rrl':-; as;j, dWlmel for le\')'i~~ reqt~iI:f'm~nts on those sp;rvices and f~r coordinating their ac1l1: ltll'::;, .n lll]l~ l!l l'l'CCIlt year,; lIlcl'l'a"ecl efficlency and diplomatic conSIderatIOns hft n' led to variatiolls in tlJf' degree of Soviet control of the East Europf'an intf'lligenc(' and sernrity 5er"i('f'8, the CIA considers the services of these countries to be an effective extension 560 of the KGB. The CIA also considers the Cuban intelligence service (the DGI) to be effectively controlled by the KGB. b. The Second Ohief Directorate.-The primary responsibility of this group is internal security and counterintelligence, including penetration, detection and frustra60n of externally and internally supported anti-Soviet activities. All 'Soviet citizens, all foreign embassies and consulates, and the growing number of foreigners who visit and live in the U.S.S.R. each year are under its purview. The Second Chief Directorate is broken down into several functional departments, including: -The American Department, which conducts all operational activity directed at the official representatives of the United States, Canadian and Latin American governments in the Soviet Union. Its mission is two-fold: first, to minimize associations between diplomats and the Soviet citizenry and to monitor contacts that do take place; second, to attempt recruitment of American officials. One department is responsible for identifying, investigating, questioning and maintaining records on all Soviet citizens in 'authorized and unauthorized contact with United States officials in ,the U.S.S.R., including any 'Soviet citizen who wants to visit the U.S. Embassy for any reason. Another section arranges controlled contacts for U.S. Embassy officers during trips outside Moscow. -The Foreign Tourists Department controls and attempts recruitment of tourists who visit the U.S.S.R. through a large informant network within all tourist services, including hotels, restaurants, campsites, service stations, etc. C. THE GRU The GRU has a significantly smaller number of personnel in Moscow than the KGB since it has only one function-the collection of foreign strategic intelligence. Its headquarters is reported to have 2,000 officers. The GRU Chief, General of the Army Petr Ivashutin, is assisted by several deputies, as is the Chief of the KGB. Also, like the KGB, the GRU has a collegium which examines current problems and proposed activities. The GRU is broken down into geographic components, although fewer than the KGB. Of the four geographical components, one is responsible for collection of strategic information about the United States, the United Kingdom and Latin America. Of the GRU's functional components, two deserve mention. One directorate is responsible for signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection. The primary intercept targets of this directorate are the strategic air and ground forces of the United States, Western European countries, Japan, and the People's Republic of China. SIGINT units in the U.S.S.R., East European countries, and covert units in Soviet embassies and trade missions abroad intercept and analyze all types of electronic communications, including encrypted and clear-text official messages, and telephone calls. Another fuc60nal directorate trains Africans, Arabs, Asians and Latin Americans in organizing underground nets lLnd insurgent movements in their countries. The training is done at camps and bases in 561 the U.S.S.R., and this directorate works closely with the CPSU Central Committee which is responsible for selecting the individual students or political groups to be trained. D. THE SCOPE AKD METHODS OF ANTI-UNITED STATES OPERATIONS BY THE KGB AND GRU KGB and GRU officers total approximately one-third of the 10,000 Soviets currently assigned to official Soviet installations abroad (excluding military and economic aid missions). Government control of all Soviet trade, business and media services provides an additional type of cover for KGB find GRU officers. Additionally, Soviet intelligence officers occupy many posts in the United Nations administrative structure and in the U.N.'s auxiliary organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Telecommunications Union. The number of Soviet intelligence and operations officers is a misleading indicator of the scope of Soviet operations. Many Soviet officers are responsible for many informants or assets who provide intelligence, or carry out operations for the KGB and GRU. A main objective of Soviet intelligence officers both in the United States and in countries in which U.S. installations exist and U.S. citizens live, is recruitment of Americans as intelligence assets. A 1959 Soviet directive which was reaffirmed as recently as 1975 states that "great attention" should be given to the recruitment of U.S. agents who have "access to encrypted and other secret correspondence, such as code clerks, secretaries and typists." Another objective is the recruitment and cultivation of "agents of influence," or agents who can influence political events or decisions. Soviet intelligence also mounts technical operations against U.S. installations and personnel. Planting of microphones and installation of telephone "taps" is done on a massive scale in the U.S.S.R. and Soviet-oriented countries. The Soviets are more selective in the West but they do conduct such operations. The primary targets are the officers and residences of U.S. ambassadors, senior foreign service personnel, CIA officers, and defense attaches. E. E.\STERX ErRoPEAx SECrRITY AND INTELLIGEXCE SERVIC~S According to the CIA, counterparts of the KGB and GRU in Eastern European countries serve in varying degrees as extensions of Soviet anti-United States intelligence collection and covert action operations. Of the eight Communist countries in Eastern Europe. five (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria. and the German Democratic Republic) adhere closely to the Soviet line and their intelligence and security services are strongly influenced and. to a large extent, controlled by the KGB and the GRU. Soviet intelligence advisors are permanently assigned to their headquarters and the advisors have total access to all information collected bv these services as well as to their "sources and methods" data. The U:S.S.R. is able to impose collection requirements on these Eastern European services for information not 562 nepded by the country itself. The CIA knows of operations against U.S. citir.ens and installations carried out by Eastern European intelligence scniees under Soriet guidance. The other three Communist countries in Eastern Europe ,Romania, Yugo~lavia) and Alh:lllia) have attained varying degrees of inderendencr from th,: U.S,S.IL as is reflected by the absence of any significant liaison rrlationship between their security services and the KGBandGRU. All Eastern European intelligence services concentrate heavily on the American target at home and abroad, frequently under direct Soviet guidance. W'hile these services, by American or Soviet standards, are not large, in aggregatp. the number of officers they hu,"e assigned abroad approaches that of the Soviet intelligence services and they thns represent n significnnt enhancement of the already formidable capabilities of thr KGB and GRU. They continue to exerr. ise tight politiral control within their borders.
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