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94TH CONGRESS } 2d Session SENATE { REPORT 1'\0. 94-755 INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS BOOK II FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNITED STATES SENATE TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE VIEWS APRIL 26 (legislative day, APRIL 14),1976 68-7860 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1976 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.8. Government Printing Office Washington. D.C. 20402 - Price $3.60 SENATE SELECT COMMITl'EE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Ohairman JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Ohairman PHILIP A. HART, Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona WAurER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania GARY HART, Colorado WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, Jr., Chief OOrlnael CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, COrlnael to the Minority AUDREY HATR"!, Clerk o! the Committee (n) LETTER OF TRAXS~IITTAL On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Shulv Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Aeti "itips, lind pursuant to the mandate of Senate Hesolution 21, I am transmitting herewith to the Senate the volume of the Committee's Final Heport which presents the results of the Committee's inH'stigation into Fedpral domestic intelligence acti\'ities. The Committee's fim]ings and conclusions concel'lling almsps in intelligence activity ancl wraknesses in the system of accountability anI] control are amply docllllH'nted. I belirn> tlwy makp a comprlling case for substantial reform. The rpcomnwnc1ations spdion of this \'olumr sets forth in detail the Committer's proposals for reforms necessary to protect the right of Americans. The facts r.pvealed by the Committee's inquiry into the development of (lomestic intelligence acti\'ity arr outlined in the balance of the volume. I \vould add one principal comment on the results of the Committe, e's inquiry: The root cause of the excesses whieh our reeord amply demonstrates has been failUl'e to apply the \visdom of the constitutiona] system of checks and balances to intelligence activities. OUl' ('xlwrienrr as a nation has taught us that we must place our trust in la\vs, and not solely in IllPn. The founding fathers foresaw eXCeA''> as the inpyitable consequenre of granting any part of government unchrckrfl power. This has bern drlllonstratrd in the intelligence field where, too often, constitutional principles \vere subordinated to a pragmatic course of perlllittinl! desirrll el1<18 to dictate and justify improper nwans. Our rrcommrndations arr (]esil!ne(l to place intrlligence activities \vithin the constitutional scheme for controlling gon>rnment po\\'er. The members of this CommitteI' haY<' SPl'\"pd \\"ith utmost diligence and ,lrdieation. ",\'p haw had 12() Full COll\lllittre mrptin§..rs, scores of othrl' sessions at which Senators presidpd at depositions foJ' the taking of testimony, awl ovrJ' .J-() sll]JCommittep medings (le\'ote(l to (lmiting the t\\'O volmnes of ollr final rppmt. I thank rarh and en'ry one of my collraglles for their hard work and for their ddermination that the job br done flilly alHl fairly. ,John Tower's srlTicr as Yirp Chairman was essential to our eft'ectin> ness from start to finish. This inquiry rould han> been distracte(] by partisan argument on.'r allocating the blalllP f()]" intelligrnee rxcesses. Instead, \Y{' han> unanimously eoncluded that intelliW>IH'r problems are far morr fumlanH'ntaJ. They are not thp }lro(luct of any single administration, party. or man. At thp OlitSet. of this partieular \'olullH'. slJPcial IllPntion is also dl1r to Senator ""alter F. ~[ondalp for his chairmanship of the subcommittee rhargpf] with dra it inl! the fi naI repOlt on domestie intPl ligencp aeti\'ity. Dliring 0111' hearings, Srnator ~[()ndale helped to bring into foeus the threats posed to thp rights of AlllPriean ritizens. He awl his (nIl IV domestic subcommittee colleagues-Senator Howard Baker, as ranking Minority member, and Senators Philip Hart, Robert Morgan and Richard Schweiker-deserve great credit for the complete and com~ lling draft which they presented to the Full Committee. The staff of the Committee has "'orked long, hard and well. ·Without their work over the past year-and during many long nights and weekends-the Committee could not have come close to coping with its massive job. I commend and thank them all. The staff member.:; whose work was particularly associated with this volume and its supplementary detailed reports are listed in Appendix C. FRAXK CHURCH, Chairman. PREFACE In .Tanuary 1975. tIlE' Senate resoln'd to establish a Committee to: eonduC't an investigation aud study of gO\'el'umeuta] operations with respect to intelligence aetivitips anl] the extpnt, if any, to which illegal. impropeL or unethical acti\-ities \yere engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government.' This Committee ,,'as organized shortly thereafter aUlI has conducted fl year-long im'estigation into thl' intE'lligencl' activities of the Fnited States Government. the first substantial inquiry into the intelligence community since 'Yorhl 'Yar TI. The inquiry arose out of allegations of substantial wrongdoing by intelligence agencies on behalf of the administrations which they sened. A deeper concern underlying tlw inwstigation was whether this Ciow.rnmenfs intelligencl' aeii vities \\"('rl' gowrIlPd and controlled consistently \\'ith the fundamental principles of American constitutional gO\'ernment-that power must be ehecked and balaneed and that the presen'ation of liberty requires thl' restraint of laws, and not simply the good intentions of men. Our investigation has confirmed that prolwrly controlled and lawful intelligl'nee is vital to the nation's intl'rest. A strong and effective intelligence system sern's, for example. to monitor potential military threats from the Soviet l'nion aIHI its allies, to verify compliance with international agreements such as SALT. anll to combat espionage and international terrorism. These. and many other necessary and proper functions are performed by dedicatl'd and hard working employees of tlw intelligence community, The Committee's im'estigation has. hmwyer. also confirmed substmltial wrongdoing. And it has demonstrated that intelligence activities han' not generally b('en governed and controllell in accord with the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of govemment. The task faced by this Committee was to propose effective measures to prevent intelligence excessl's.and at the same time to propose sound guidelines and oversight procellnres \yith \yhich to gO\'em and control legitimate activities. Having concluded its investigation, the COlllmittee issues its reports 2 for the purpos('s of: providing a fair factnal basis for informed Congressional and pnblic debate on Ct'itil'al issues affecting the role of gO\'ernmental intelligence activities in a free society; anel 1 Senate Resolution 21. January 27. 1975. Sec. 1. The full text of S. Res. 21 is printed at Appendix A. , The Committee's final report is divided into two main volumes. The !Jalance of this volume covers dome;;tic activities of intelIig;ence ag;l'ncil's and tlll'ir activities m'prseus to the extent that they afl'eet tIll" eonstitutional rig;hts of AIIlerieans. The othl'r vO]lIn1P eOVl'rs a1l othl'r aetivities of l"nitl'd Stat"s foreign and military intl"1ligencp ag;pneips. The COIllmittee has previously issued the reports and hearing records set forth in Appendix B. (V) VI recommending such legislati"e and executive action as, in the judgment of the Committee, is appropriate to prnent recurrence of past abuses and to insure adequate coordination, control and oversight of the nation's intelligence resourcps, capabilities, and activities. A. THE CO)DIITTEE'S ~IAXDATE In elaboration of the broad mandate set forth at the outset of this Report, the Senate charged the Committee with investigating fourteen specific "matters or questions" and with reporting the "full facts" on them. The fourteen enumerated matters and questions concern: (i) what kind of activitips han been-and should be-undertaken by intelligence agencies; (ii) whether those activities conform to law and the Constitution; and (iii) how intelligence agencies have beenand should be-coordinated, controlled and m·erseen.3 In addition to im'estigating the "full facts" with respect to such matters, the Committee ,vas instructed to determine: ·Whether any of the existing laws of the United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of "Cnited States intelligence and related agencies. [Id., Sec. 2 (12) ] B. THE MAJOR QUESTIO~'S Our investigation addressed the structure, history, activities and policies of America's most important intelligence agencies. The Committee looked beyond the operation of individual agencies to examine common themes and patterns inherent in intelligence operations. In the course of its investigation, the Committee has sought to answer three broad qnestions: First, whether domestic intelligence activities have been consistent with law and with the individual liberties guaranteed to American citizens by the Constitution. Second, whether America's foreign intelligence activities have sen'ed the national interest in a manner consistent with the nation's ideals and with national purposes. 3 S. Res. 21, Sec. 2. Examples of the "matters or questions" include: "The conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens" by t.he FBI or other agencies. [Sec. 2 (2)] ; "The violation or suspected ,iolation of law" by intelligence agencies [Sec. 2(10)] ; Alleg'ations of CIA "domestic" activity, and the l'elationship between CIA responsibility to protect sources and methods and the prohibition of its exercising' law enforcement powers or internal security functions [Sec. 2(1), (6)]; "The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan" [Sec. 2 (7) (9)] ; "The extent and necessity' of "covert intelligence activities abroad [Sec. 2(14)]; Whether thpre is excessive duplication or inadequate coordination among intellig-ence agencies [Sec. 2 (4) (13)] and The "nature and extent" of t>xecutive oversig'ht [Sec. 2 (7) (9)] and tht> "nt>ed for improved, strengtht>ned or consolidated' Congressional oversight [Sec. 2(7) (I)) (11)]. VII Third, whether the institutional procedures for directing and controlling intelligence agencies haw adequately ensured their compliance with policy and law, and whether those procedures haye been based upon the system of checks and balances among the branches of gon~rnment required by our Constitution. " The Committee fully subscribes to the premise that intelligence agencies perform a necessary and proper function. The Preamble to the Constitution states that our goyernment was created, in part, to "insure domestic tranquility [and] provide for tlw common defense." Accurate and timely intelligence can and does help meet those goals. The Committee is also mindful, howe\-('1', of the danger which intelligence collection, and intelligence operations, may pose for a society grounded in democratic principles. The Preamble to our Constitution also declares that our government was created to "secure the lJlessings of liberti' and to "estalJlish justice? If domestic intelligence agencies ignore those principles, tlwy may threaten the very yalnes that form the foundation of our society. Similarly, if the gOYernment conducts foreign intelligence operations oyerseas which are inconsistent with our national idpals, our reputation, goals, and influence abroad may be undercut. C. THE XATFRE OF THE COl\DlITTEE'S I:'\TESTIGATIOX 1. SELECTIOX OF AGEXCIES, PROGRX~IS AXD CAS}~S TO E:\IPIL\SIZE Xecessarily, the Committee had to be selective. To investigate everything relennt to intelligence-and en'n everything relevant to the fundamental issues on which WE' had decided to focus-would take forever. Our job ,,-as to discoycr-alHl suggrst solutions for-the major problems "at the earliest practical date"! Accordingly, the Committee hall to choose the particular Governmental entities upon which we would concentrate aIH] then further had to choose particular cases to im'estigate in depth. )Iany agencies, departments or bureaus of the Federal Goycrnment haye an intrlligence function. Of thesr, the Committee spent thr overwhelming preponderance of its energies on five : The Federal Bnrpau of Inn·stigation; The Central Intelligence Agency; The Katiollal Spcurity Agpncy; The national intelligence components of the Defense Departnwnt (other than XSA) ; and The Xational Security Council and its component parts." The agencies upon \yhi('h the COlllmitt('(, concentrated are those whose powers are so grrat and \y1l0sr practices werp so extpnsiye that they must hr llndrrstood in order fairly to j1Hlgr ,,-ll('tll('r the intellig- p]}cr systrm of the rnitrd States ]}rpds reform and changr. Haying- selp('tpcl the agencips to pllIjlhasize, the Committer also had to sp]pct ]'('prespntatiyp programs and policirs Oll \yhich to concentrate. Thrrr wrre mallY more possihlr iSSllrs and alh'gations to im'rstigate 4 S. Res. 21 ; SP('. G. o Suhshlntial \York was also done on intE'l1i~pn('E' actiyitiE's of the Tlltprnal Rpyenne Spr\"iee and the State Department. VIII than could be covered fully and fairly. The principles which guided our choices were: (1) More is learned by inYestigating tens of programs and incidents in depth rather than hundreds superficially. Our goal was to understand causes and, where appropriate, to suggest solutions. (2) Cases most likely to produce gen('ral lessons should receive the most attention. (3) Programs were examined from each administration beginning with Franklin RooseYelt's. This assured understanding of the historical context within which intelligence activities have developed. Fundamental issues concerning the conduct and character of the nation deserw nonpartisan treatment. It has become clear from our inquiry, moreover, that intelligence excesses,at home and abroad, have been found in every administration. They are not the product of any single party, administration, or man. 2. LIMITATIOXS AXD STREXGTHS (a) The Focus on Problem Arcas The intelligence community has had broad responsibilitv for activities beyond those which we investigated as possibly "illegal, improper, or unethical". Our reports primarily lldclress problem areas ancl the command and control question generallv. Howewr, the intelligence community performs vital tasks outside the areas on which our investigation concentrated. This point must be kept in mind in fairness to the agencies, and to their employees who han' devoted their careers to the nation's service. Moreover, one of many reasons for checkin.~ intelligence excesses is to restore the confidence, good name, and effectiveness of intelligence agencies so that they may better sene the nation in the future.6 (b) Caution on Questions of Individual "Guilt" 01' "InrlOcence" A Senate Committee is not a prosecutor, a grand jury or a court. It is far better suited to determine how things went wrong and what can be done to prevent their going wrong again, than to resolve disputed questions of individual "guilt" or "innocence". For the resolution of those questions we properly rely on the courts. Of course, to understand the past in order to bettex propose guidance for the future, the Committee had to inYestigate the facts underlying charges of wrongdoing. Facts involve people. Therefore, the Committee has necessarily had to determine what particular individuals appear to have done and, on occasion, to make judgments on their responsibility. ",Ve haw, howewr, recognized our limitations and attempted to be cautious in reaching those judgments; the reader should be similarly cautious in evaluating our judgments. The Committee's hope is that this report will provoke a national debate not on "",",Tho did it ?", but on "How did it happen and what can be done to keep it from happening again?" 6 Indeed, it is likely that in some eases the high priority giYen to actiyities that appear queRtionable has rednced the attention giwn to other yital matterR. Thul', the FBI. for example, has placed more emphaRiR on domeRtic diRRent than on organized crime and, according to some. let HR effortR againRt foreign RpieR Ruffer because of the amount of time spent checking up on American proteRt groupR. IX (c) Ability to See the Full Scope of the Problem .This Commit~ee examined a very broad range of issues and complIed a hughe factual record' which covers: (i) the origins and development of intelligence programs over seven administrations; (ii) intel1igence activities both at home and abroad; and (iii) the programs and practices of the, several most important intelligence agencies. ~hus, for the first time, based upon the Committee's investigation, it 1S possible to examine the patterns of intelligence activity and nof merely isolated incidents. The, issues for the country to resolve, are best posed by looking, as we have done, at the, aggregate, rather than at particular incidents in isolation, Neither the dangers, nor the causes, nor the possible, solutions can be fairly evaluated without considering both the broad patterns of intel1igence activity ,vhich emerge from examining particular cases over the past several decades, and the cumulative effect of activities of different agencies. For example, individual cases or programs of governmental suneillance may constitute interference with constitutionally protected rights of privacy and dissent. But only by examining the cumulatiYe impact of many such programs can the danger of "Big Brother Gm-ernment" be realistically assessed. Only by understanding the full breadth of goycrnmental efforts against dissenters can one weigh the extent to which those efforts may chill lawful assembly and free exprpssion. D. TIlE PURPOSE OF THE CO:\DII'I'rEE's FIXDIXGS A~D RECOMMENDATIONS The central goal of the Committpe is to make inforIlH'd recommendations- based upon a detailpd and balanced factual investigation- about : (1) ",hich intelligpnce activities ought to be permitted, and ",hich should be restricted or prohibited; and (2) what controls and organihational structure are needed to keep intelligence operations both effective and consistent with this countrv's most basic values and fundamental interests. . 7 Some 800 witnesses were examined, approximately 2;->0 under oath in executive sessions, 50 in puhlic sessions, and the halaIH'e in interviews. The aggrpgate number of transcript pages is almost 30.000. Approximately 110,000 document pag-es were ohtained from the various intellig-encp ag-encies (still more were preliminarily reYiewed at the agencief;), af; well as from- the 'Vhite House, prpf;idpntiallihrarief;. and othpr sourcps. Over the course of its investigation tJIP Committee has had generallr good cooperation in obtaining information from the intelligpncp agpncies and the Adminif; tration. Of courf;p, there were problpms, particularl~' at the outset~ompliance took too long; hurpaucra tic rulps such as the "third agpncr rule" (which required ag-encies other than thp custodian of the document to rpview it if thpr wpre mpntionpd) werp frustrating. But our exppriencp suggestf; that those problemf; can he worked out. The most important lesson to hI' dprivpd from our experiencp is that effective O\-ersight is impof;sih]p without regular access to the underlying working documents of the intelligpnce eommunitr. Top If'vpI hriefingf; do not adpquatplr descrihe the realitips. For that the documents are a necessary supplement and at timef; the only source. x The first step for this Committee, its successor oversight Committees and the Congress as a whole is to devise the legal framework within which intelligence agencies can, in the future, be guided, checked and operate both properly and efficiently. A basic la,,"-a charter of powers, duties, and limitations-does not presently exist for some of the most important intelligence activities (e.g., FBI's domestic intelligence or NSA) or, where it does exist, as \vith CIA, it is vague, conflicting and incomplete. The absence of laws and the lack of clarity in those that exist has had the effect, if not the intention, of keeping vital issues of national importance away from public debate. This Committee's job was to pose the issues that have been ignored for decades. The technique for doing so was to investigate and then to propose basic laws and other rules as to what can and cannot be done, and on the appropriate command and control structure for intelligence activities. There are many other questions, such as the efficiency, cost and quality of intelligence, \vhich are also of vital national importance. ·We have also examined these matters and consider them in this report. But, the main emphasis of our investigation was on what should be done and not on how it should be done. vVe seek in our recommendations to lay the underlying legal foundation, and the control and oversight structure for the intelligence community. If these are sound, then we have faith that the other questions will be answered correctly in the future. But if the foundation is unsound or remains unfinished-or if intl.'lligence agencies continue to operate under a structure in which executive power is not effectively checked and examined-then we will have neither quality intelligence nor a society which is free at home and respected abroad. CONTENTS Page Letter of Transmittal_ _____________________________________________ iii Preface -------________________________________________________ v 1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY_ 1 A. Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Power to Impair Citizens' Rights____ _________________________ 2 B. The Questions _________________________________________ 4 C. Summary of the Main Problems_________________________ 5 1. The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intelligence Activity ________________________________ 6 2. Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long_ _ 7 3. Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means_______________________________________ 10 a. Covert Action____________________________ 10 (1) The FBI's COINTELPRO_ _____ ____ 10 (2) Martin Luther King, Jr_____________ 11 b. Illegal or Improper Means_ ___ __________ 12 (1) Mail Opening______________________ 12 (2) NSA Monitoring_ _ ______________ 12 (3) Electronic Surveillance______________ 12 (4) Political Abuse_____________________ 13 (5) Surreptitious Entries_ ___ ________ 13 (6) Informants_ 13 4. Ignoring the Law________________________________ 13 5. Deficiencies in Accountability and ControL_ ________ 14 6. Th~ .Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence ActlVlty________________________________________ 15 a. General Efforts to DiscrediL_ ______________ 15 b. Media Manipulation_ _____________________ 15 c. Distorting Data to Influence Government Policy and Public Perceptions_ __ _________ 16 d. "Chilling" First Amendment Rights__ _______ 17 e. Preventing the Free Exchange of Ideas_ __ ___ 17 7. Cost and Value__________________________________ 18 II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE, 1936 to 1976: A. Summary_____________________________________________ 21 1. The Lesson: History Repeats Itself ________________ 21 2. The Pattern: Broadening Through Time____________ 21 3. Three Periods of Growth for Domestic Intelligence___ 22 B. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure: 1936-1945___________________________________________ 23 1. Background: The Stone Standard____ ______________ 23 2. Main Developments of the 1936-1945 Period________ 24 3. Domestic Intelligence Authority: Vague and Conflicting Executive Orders____ _______________________ 24 a. The Original Roosevelt Orders _____________ 25 b. Orders in 1938-39: The Vagueness of "Subversive Activities" and "Potential" Crimes_ 25 c. Orders 1940-43: The Confusion Continues_ __ 27 4. The Role of Congress ____________________________ 28 a. Executive Avoidance of Congress ___________ 28 b. Congress Declines to Confront the Issue_ ____ 29 (XI) II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE-Continued B. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence StructurE'- 1936-1945 Continued Page 5. Scope of Domestic Intelligence ____________________ 30 a. Beyond Criminal Investigations____________ 30 b. "Infiltration" Investigations_ ______________ 31 c. Partisan Use_____________________________ 33 d. Centralized Authority: FBI and Military Intelligence ____________________________ 33 6. Control by the Attorney General: Compliance and Resistance_ ___________________________________ 34 7. Intrusive Techniques: Questionable Authorization ___ 36 a. Wiretaps: A Strained Statutory Interpretation___________________________________ 36 b. Bugging, Mail Opening, and Surreptitious Entry_________________________________ 38 C. Domestic Intelligence in the Cold War Era: 1946-1963 ____ 38 1. Main Developments of the 1946-1963 Period________ 38 2. Domestic Intelligence Authority _ __________ __ 40 a. Anti-Communist Consensus ________________ 40 b. The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Program__________________________________ 42 (1) Origins of the Program . _______ 42 (2) Breadth of Investigations . ___ 43 (3) FBI Control of Loyalty-Security Investigations_ ____________________ 44 c. Executive Directives: Lack of Guidance and Controls___________________________________ 45 3. Scope of Domestic Intelligence_ ___________________ 46 a. "Subversive Activities" ____________________ 46 (1) The Number of Investigations______ 47 (2) Vague and Sweeping Standards __ ___ 47 (3) COMINFIL ._ _____ 48 (4) Exaggeration of Communist Influence_________________________ 49 b. "Racial Matters" and "Hate Groups" ______ 50 c. FBI Political Intelligence for the White House_________________________________ 51 d. IRS Investigation of Political Organizations_ _ 53 4. Accountability and ControL ______________________ 54 a. Emergency Detention Act- _____ ___________ 54 b. Withholding Information_ _________________ 55 c. CIA Domestic Activity____________________ 56 (1) Vague Controls on CIA____________ 56 (2) Drug Testing and Cover Programs_ _ 56 5. Intrusive Techniques_____ ___________ __ _____ __ ____ 58 a. Communication Interception: CIA and NSA_ 58 b. FBI Covert Techniques____________________ 60 (1) Electronic Surveillance_____________ 60 (2) "Black Bag" Jobs _________________ 61 (3) Mail Opening__ ___________________ 62 c. Use of FBI Wiretaps_ _____________________ 62 6. Domestic Covert Action.. ________________________ 65 a. COINTELPRO: Communist Party_________ 65 b. Early Expansion of COINTELPRO___ ______ 67 D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976_____________ 67 1. Main Points During the 1964-1976 Period_ _________ 67 2. Scope of Domestic Intelligence_ ___________________ 70 a. Domestic Protest and Dissent: FBL________ 70 (1) Racial Intelligence________________ 71 (2) "New Left" Intelligence___________ 72 b. FBI Informants__________________________ 74 (1) Infiltration of the Klan _____ _______ 74 xm II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE-Continued D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976-Continued 2. Scope of Domestic Intelligence-Continued b. FBI Informants-Continued (2) "Listening Posts" in the Black Com- Page munity __ __ 75 (3) Infiltration of the "New Left" _______ 76 c. Army Surveillance of Civilian Political Activity - - - _- ________ 77 d. Federal Encouragement of Local Police Intelligence ____________________________ 77 e. The Justice Department's Interdivision Information unit (IDIU)__________________ 78 f. COMINFIL Investigations: Overbreadth_ ___ 81 3. Domestic Intelligence Authority __________________ 82 a. FBI Intelligence__________________________ 82 b. Army Intelligence_ ________________________ 84 c. FBI Interagency Agreements_ ______________ 85 4. Domestic Covert Action _________________________ 86 a. COINTELPRO__________________________ 86 (1) Klan and "White Hate"___________ 86 (2) "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO_ 87 (3) "New Left" COINTELPRO_______ 88 b. FBI Target Lists__________________________ 89 (1) "Rabble Rouser/Agitator" Index_ ___ 89 (2) "Key Activist" Program ___________ 90 (3) "Key Black Extremist" Program_ ___ 91 (4) Security Index____________________ 91 c. Internal Revenue Service Programs_ ________ 93 (1) Misuse by FBI and CIA___________ 93 (2) The Special Service Staff: IRS Targeting of Ideological Groups_ _____ 94 5. Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent_________ 96 a. Origins of CIA Involvement in "Internal Security Functions" ______________________ 96 b. CIA Intelligence About Domestic Political Groups_______________________________ 98 (1) CIA Response to FBI Requests_ ____ 98 (2) Operation CHAOS________________ 99 c. CIA Security Operations Within the United States: Protecting "Sources" and "Methods" _ 102 d. NSA Monitoring_________________________ 104 6. Intrusive Techniques____________________________ 104 a. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance_ ________ 105 (1) Executive Branch Restrictions on Electronic Surveillance: 1965-68_. _ 105 (2) Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968_ 106 (3) Supreme Court Restrictions on National Security Electronic Surveillance: 1972 _____________________ 107 b. CIA Mail Opening_ _______________________ 107 c. Expansion of NSA Monitoring_ ____________ 108 d. FBI Cutbacks____________________________ 109 (1) The Long Subcommittee Investigation ___________________________ 109 (2) Director Hoover's Restrietions_ _____ 110 7. Accountability and ControL_____________________ 111 a. The Huston Plan: A Domestic Intelligence Network_______________________________ 111 (1) Intelligence Community Pressures_ __ 112 (2) The Interagency Committee Report-_ 113 (3) Implementation_ __________________ 115 XIV II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE-Cont.inued D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976-Continued 7. Accountability and C~mtrol-Continued Page b. Political Intelligence____ ___________________ 116 (1) Name Check Requests_ _ 116 (2) Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964_________________ 117 (3) By-Product of Foreign Intelligence Coverage_______________________ 119 (4) The Surveillance of Joseph Kraft (1969)_________________________ 121 (5) The"17"Wiretaps 122 c. The. J.u~tice Department's Internal Security DlvlslOn____ ____________________________ 122 (1) The "new" Internal Security Division_ 123 (2) The Sullivan-Mardian Relationship_ _ 124 d. The FBI's Secret "Administrative Index" 125 8. Reconsideration of FBI Authority _________________ 127 a. Developments in 1972-1974________________ 128 b. Recent Domestic Intelligence Authority _____ 131 III. FINDINGS_ _________________________________________________ 137 A. Major Finding: Violating and Ignoring the Law____________ 137 Subfindings : (a) Violating Statutory Law and Constitutional Rights__________________________________ 139 (b) Ignoring IllegalIssues_ ______________________ 140 (c) Continuing Legal Activities__________________ 141 (d) Tightening Security for Illegal Activities_ ____ _ 146 (e) Concealing Illegal Activities__________________ 149 (f) Weakness of Internal Inspection______________ 152 (g) Weakness of Oversight by Senior Administration Oflicials_________________________________ 157 B. Major Finding: The Overbreadth of Domestic Intelligence ActivUy____________________________________________ 165 Subfindings : (a) Broad Scope of Investigations_ __ _____________ 167 (b) Imprecise Standards for Investill;ations_ _______ 169 (c) Overinclusive Targeting_____________________ 172 (d) "Vacuum Cleaner" Approach________________ 178 (e) Excessively Long Investigations_ _____________ 179 C. Major Finding: Excessive Use of Intrusive Techniques______ 183 Subfindings: (a) Insufficient Legal Standards and Procedures_ __ 185 (b) Excessive Collection Coupled with Violent and Illegal Activities of Informants and Difficulty of Limiting Surveillance___________________ 192 (c) Imprecise Labels Lead to Abusive Use of Techniques______________________________ 205 D. Major Finding: Using Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups___ ____________________________ 211 Subfindings: (a) Targeting Law-Abiding Citizens______________ 213 (b) Interference With First Amendment Rights____ 214 (c) Dangerous Covert Tactics___________________ 216 (d) Actions Against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr__ _ 219 E. Major Finding: Political Abuse of Intelligence Information_ _ 225 Subfindings: (a) Political Intelligence for the White House_ ___ 226 (b) Dissemination of Incidental Political or Personal Information_ ____________________________ 232 (c) Volunteering Information to the White House and Targeting Critics and Political Figures_ _ 237 (d) Influencing Social Policy and Political Action_ _ 240 xv III. FINDINGS-Continued: 'Page F. Major Finding: Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention___________________________________________ 253 Subfindings : (a) Volunteering Irrelevant Information and responding Unquestioningly to Requests ______ 254 (b) Excessive Dissemination_ ___________________ 259 (c) Federal Employee Security Program_ _________ 261 (d) FBI Retention of Sensitive, Derogatory, and Illegally Obtained Information _____________ 262 G. Major Finding: Deficiencies in Control and Accountability __ 265 Subfindings : (a) Presidential Failure to Limit and Control Intelligence Activities_____________________ 267 (b) Attorneys General Failure to Limit and Control FBI Intelligence Activities_ ____________ 270 (c) Encouraging Political Intelligencc ____________ 274 (d) Executive Failures to Inquire________________ 275 (e) Congressional Failure to Oversee Intelligence Activity and Exert Legislative ControL _____ 277 (f) Intelligence Agencies Act with Insufficient Authorization_ ___________________________ 281 (g) Termination of Abusive Operations_ __________ 284 IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS________________ 289 A. Conclusions ___________________________________________ 289 B. Principles Applied in Framing Recommendations and the Scope of Recommendations_ ___________________________ 292 C. Recommendations_____ __________ ____________________ 296 1. Intelligence Agencies Are SUbject to the Rule of Law (Recommendations 1-3) ________________________ 296 2. United States Foreign and Military Agencies Should Be Precluded From Domestic Security Activities (Recommendations 4-27)___ __ __ _____ 297 a. Central Intelligence Agency (Recommendations 4-13) _____________________________ 297 b. National Security Agency (Recommendations 14-19)_________________________________ 308 c. Military Service and Defense Department Investigative Agencies (Recommendations 20-26)_________________________________ 310 3. Non-Intelligence Agencies Should Be Barred From Domestic Security Activity (Recommendations 27-37)_______________________________________ 313 a. Internal Revenue Service (Recommendations 27-35)_________________________________ 313 b. Post Office (U.S. Postal Service) (Recommendations 36-37)__________________________ 315 4. Federal Domestie Seeurity Activities Should Be Limited and Controlled to Prevent Abuses Without Hampering Criminal Investigations or Investigations of Foreign Espionage (Recommendations 38-69)________________________________________ 316 a. Centralize Supervision, Investigative Responsibility, and the Use of Covert Techniques (Recommendations 38-39) ________ 316 b. Prohibitions (Recommendations 40-41) ___ 317 c. Authorized Scope of Domestic Security Investigations (Recommendations 42-49) ____ 318 d. Authorized Investigative Techniques (Recommendations 50-63) ___________________ 324 e. ;Vlaintenance and Dissemination of Information (Recommendations 64-68) ___________ 330 f. Attorney General Oversight of the FBI, Including Termination of Investigations and Covert Teehniques (Recommendation 69)__ 332 XVI IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS-Continued Page C. Recommendations-Continued 5. The Responsibility and Authority of the Attorney General for Oversight for Federal Domestic Security Activities must be clarified and General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies Strengthened (Recommendations 70-86) ________ 332 a. Attorney General Responsibility and Relaship With Other Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations 70-74) ______________ _ 333 b. General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations 75-81)_________________________________ 333 c. Office of Professional Responsibility (Recommendation 82) __________ ___ ____ __ ____ 335 d. Director of the FBI and Assistant Directors of the FBI (Recommendations 83-85) ____ 335 6. Administrative Rulemaking and Increased Disclosure Should Be Required (Recommendations 86-89)_______________________________ 336 a. Administrative Rulemaking (Recommendations 86-88) ____________________________ 336 b. Disclosure (Recommendations 89-90) _______ 336 7. Civil Remedies Should Be Expanded (Recommendation 91)______________________________________ 336 8. Criminal Penalties Should Be Enacted (Recommendation 92) ___________________ _______ _ 338 9. The Smith Act and the Voorhis Act Should Either Be Repealed or Amended (Recommendation 93) _____ 339 10. The Espionage Statute Should Be Modernized (Recommendation 94)____ _____ ________________ _ 339 11. Broaden Access to Intelligence Agency Files Should Be Provided to GAO, as an Investigative Arm of the Congress (Recommendation 95)______________ 339 12. Congressional Oversight Should Be Intensified (Recommendation 96) _____________________ 339 13. Definitions_________ __ __ __ __ 339 Appendix A: Senate Resolution 21-__________________________________ 343 Appendix B: Previously Ismed Hearings and Reports of Senate Select Committee _________________________________________ 355 Appendix C: Staff Acknowledgments___ _____________________________ _ 357 Additional Views: Philip A. Hart_ _______________________________________________ 359 Robert Morgan_______________________________________________ 363 Introduction to Separate Views of Senators John G. Tower, Howard H. Baker, Jr., and Barry Goldwater___________________________ 367 John G. Tower________________________________________________ 369 Howard H. Baker, Jc_________________________________________ 373 Barry Goldwater______________________________________________ 389 Charles McC. Mathias, JL _____________________________________ 395
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