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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The resolution creating this Committee placed greatest emphasis
on whether intelligence activities threaten the "rights of American
citizens." 1
The critICal question before the Committee was to determine how
the fundamental liberties of the people can be maintained in the
course of the Government's effort to protect their security. The delicate
balance between these basic goals of our system of government is
often difficult to strike, but it can, and mustl be achieved. ·We reject
the view that the traditional American principles of justice and fair
play have no place in our struggle against the enemies of freedom.
Moreover, our investigation has established that the targets of intelligence
activity have ranged far beyond persons who could properly
be characterized as enemies of freedom and have extended to a wide
array of citizens engaging in lawful activity.
Americans have rIghtfully been concerned since before World
War II about the dangers of hostile foreign agents likely to commit
acts of espionage. Similarly, the violent acts of political terrorists can
seriously endanger the rights of Americans. Carefully focused intelligence
investigations can help prevent such acts.
But too often intelligence has lost this focus and domestic intelligence
activities have invaded individual privacy and violated the rights
of lawful assembly and political expression. Unless new and tighter
controls are established by legislationl domestic intelligence activities
threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally alter
its nature.
We have examined three types of "intelligence" activities affecting
the rights of American citizens. The first is intelligence collectionsuch
as infiltrating groups with informants, wiretapping, or opening
letters. The second is dissemination of material which has been col~
lected. The third is covert action designed to disrupt and discredit
the activities of groups and individuals deemed a threat to the social
order. These three types of "intelligence" activity are closely related
in the practical world. Information which is disseminated by the intelligence
community 2 or used in disruptive programs has usually
been obtained through surveillance. Nevertheless, a division between
collection, dissemination and covert action is analytically useful both
in understanding why excesses have occurred in the past and in devising
remedies to prevent those excesses from recurring.
1 S. Res. 21, sec. 2(12). The Senate specifically charged this Committee with
investigating "the conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence operations
against United States citizens." (Sec. 2(2») The resolution added
several examples of specific charg-es of possihle "illl'gal, improJj{'r or unl'thical"
g-overnml'ntal intellig-ence aetiyiti('s as mattl'rs to be fully investigated (Sec. (2)
(l)-CIA domestic activities; Sf'c. (2) (il)-Huston Plan; Sec. (2) (lO)-surreptitolls
entrieR. electronic Rurveillance, mail opening.)
2.Tust as the term "intelligpllce actiyity" encompasseR activities that go far
beyond thp collection and analYRis of information. th(' term "intelligence community"
includps personR ranging from the President to the lowest field operatives
of the intelligence agencies.
(1)
68-786 0 - 76 - 2
2
A.Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Powel' to Impail'
Oitizells1 Nights
A tension between order and liberty is inevitable in any society. A
Government must protect its citizens 'from t hose bent on engaging in
violence and criminal behavior. or in espionage and other hostile
foreign intelligence activity. ~Iany of the intelligence progran~s
reyiewed in this report were established for those purposes. IntellIgence
work has, at times, successfully prevented dangerous and abhorrent
acts, such as bombings and foreign spying, and aided in the
prosecution of those responsible for such acts.
But, intelligence activity in the past decades has, all too often,
exceeded the restraints on the exercise of governmental power which
are imposed by our country's Constitution, laws, and traditions.
Excesses in the name of protecting security are not a recent development
in our nation's history. In 17D8, for example, shortly after the
Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution, the Alien and Sedition
Acts ,vere passed. These Acts, passed in response to fear of proFrench
"subversion", made it a crime to criticize the Government.3
During the Civil ·War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the
writ of habeas corpus. Hundreds of American citizens were prosecuted
for anti-war statements during 'Vorld 'Val' I, and thousands of
"radical" aliens were seized for deportation during the 1D20 Palmer
Raids. During the Second ",YorId ",Val', over the opposition of J. Edgar
Hoover and military intelligence,4 1:20,000 .Japanese-Americans were
apprehended and incarcerated in detention camps.
Those actions1 however, were fundamentally different from the
intelligence activities examined by this Committee. They were generally
executed overtly under the authority of a statute or a public
executive order. The victims knew what was being done to them and
could challenge the Government in the courts and other forums. Intelligence
actidty, on the other hancL is generally covert. It is concealed
from its victims 5 and is seldom described in statutes or explicit execu-
3 The Alien Act provided for the deportation of all aliens judged "dangerous
to the ppace and safety" of the nation. (1 Stat. 570, June 25, 17(8) The Sedition
Act made it a federal crime to lJUbli~h "false, scandalou;;; and malicious
writing" against the United States govprnment, the Congress, or the President
with the intent to "excite against them" the "hatred of the good people of the
"Unitpd Statps" or to "encourage or abet any ho~tile de~igns of any foreign
nation against the Unitpd States." (1 Stat. 596, July 14, 17(8) 'l'hpre wpre at
least 25 arrpsts, 15 indictments, and 10 convictions under the Spdition Act.
(See James M. Smith, Freedom's Fettcr.~: The A.lien and Sedition Laws and
A.mcrican Civil LibCl'tic8 (Ithaca: Cornpll n. Prp~s, 19;:)G).)
4 Francis Biddle, In Brief A.uthority (Garden City: Doublpday. 10(2), p. 224;
ROg'er Daniels. Conccntration Camps ['·SA; Japanesc A1Ilcrican.~ alld World
War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), p. 66.
, )!any victims of intelligence activities have claimed in the past that tllPy
were being subjpcted to hostilp action hy their g'O\·ernlllpnt. Prior to this investigation,
most Americans would have dismis~ed these allpgations. Spnator Philip
Hart aptly described this phenompnon in the course of the Committee's public
hearing'S on domestic intelligence acth'ities:
"As I'm sure others have, I havp bppn told for ypars by, among others, some
of my own family, that this is exactly what the Burpau was doing' all of thp
timf', and in my great wisdom and hig'h olficp, I assurf'd thpm that ther wpre
[wrong]-it just wasn't trup, it couldn't happpn. They wouldn't do it.' What
you have described is a series of illegal actions intended squarely to deny
3
tive orders. The victim may never suspect that his misfortunes are the
intended result of activities lmdcrtakcn by his government, and accordingly
may have no opportunity to challenge the actions taken against
him.
It is. of course, proper in many circumstances-such as developing
a criminal prosecution-for the Goyernment to gather information
about a citizen and use it to achieye legitimate ends, some of which
might be detrimental to the citizen. But in criminal prosecutions, the
courts have struck a balance between protecting the rights of the
accused citizen and protecting the society which suffers the consequences
of crime. Essential to the balancing process are the rules of
criminal law which circumscribe the techniques for gathering evidence,"
the kinds of evidence that may be collected, and the uses to
,,-hich that evidence may be put. In addition, the criminal defendant
is giyen an opportunity to discover and then challenge the legality of
how the Government collected information about him and the use
which the Government intends to make of that information.
This Committee has examined a realm of governmental information
collection which has not been governed by restraints comparable
to those in criminal proceedings. 'Ve have examined the collection
of intelligence about the political advocacy and actions and the private
lives of American citizens. That information has been used covertly to
discredit the ideas advocated and to "neutralize" the actions of their
proponents. As Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone warned in 1924,
when he sought to keep federal agencies from investigating "political
or other opilllons" as opposed to "conduct ... forbidden by the laws":
When a police system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous
to the proper administration of justice and to human
liberty, which it should be our first concern to cherish.
. . . There is always a possibility that a secret police may
become a menace to free government and free institutions because
it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power
which are not always quickly apprehended or understood.7
Our investigation has confirmed that warning. 'Ve have seen segments
of our Government, in their attitudes and action, adopt tactics
unworthy of a democracy, and occasionally reminiscent of the tactics
of totalitarian regimes. We have seen a consistent pattern in which
programs initiated with limited goals, such as preventing criminal
First Amendment rights to some Americans. That is what my children have
told me was going on. Now I did not believe it.
"The trick now, as I see it, Mr. Chairman, is for this committee to be able
to figure out how to persuade the people of this country that indeed it did
go on. And how shall we insure that it will never happen again? But it will
happen repeatedly unless we can bring ourselves to understand and accept
that it did go on." Senator Philip Hart, 11/18/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 41.
• As the Supreme Court noted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483. 486
(1966), even before the Court required law officers to advise criminal suspects
of their constitutional rights before custodial interrogation, the FBI had "an
exemplary record" in this area-a practice which the Court said should be
"emulated by state and local law enforcement agencies." This commendable FBI
tradition in the general field of law enforcement presents a sharp contrast to the
widespread disregard of individual rights in FBI domestic intelligence operations
examined in the balance of this Report.
7 New York Times, 5/13/24.
4
yiolencc or identifying foreign "pies, ,vere expanded to what witnesses
characterized as "yaCUUlll clcaners'',B sweeping in information
about hndul actiyitics of ~\merican citizens.
The tendency of intclligrnce actiyitics to expand beyoncl their
initial scope is a theme which runs through eyery aspect of our inyestigatin>
findings. Intelligence collection programs naturally generate
cwr-in(Teasing demands for new data, And once intelligence has been
collected, there are stron~ pressmes to use it against the target.
The pattern of intelligence agencies expanding the scope of their
aetiyities ,vas ,veIl described by one witness, who in 1970 had coordinated
an effort by most of the intelligence community to obtain
authority to undertake more illegal domestic activity:
The risk was that you would get people who would be susceptible
to political considerations as opposed to national
security considerations, or would construe political considerations
to be national secmity considerations, to move from
the kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from
the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper
sticker of the opposing candidate. And you just keep going
down the line.9
In Hl40, Attorney General Robert Jackson saw the same risk. He
rpcognized that using broad labels like "national spcurity" or "subnrsion"
to inyoke the vast power of the government is dangerous
because there are "no definite standards to determine what constitutes
a 'subyersive activity', such as we have for murder or larceny." Jackson
added:
Acti,-ities which seem benevolent or helpful to wage earners,
persons on relief, or those who are disadvantaged in the struggle
for existence may be regarded as 'subversive' by those
whose property interests might be burdened thereby. Those
who are in office are apt to regard as 'subversive' the activities
of any of those who would bring a'bout a change of administration.
Some of om soundest constitutional doctrines
,wre once punished as subversive. ",Ve must not forget that it
was not so long ago that both the term 'Republican' and the
term 'Democrat' ,wre epithets with sinister meaning to denote
persons of radical tendencies that were 'subversive' of
the order of things then dominant.1o
This wise warning ,vas not heeded in the conduct of intelligence
actiYity, ,,-here the "eternal vigilance" which is the "price of liberty"
has been forgotten.
B. The Questions
",Ve have directed am investigation toward answering the following
questions:
'Which governmental agencies have engaged in domestic spying?
How many citizens haye been targets of Governmental intelligence
activity?
8 ~[ary Jo Cook testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 111; James B. Adams
testimony. 12/2/75. Hearings. Vol. 6, p. 135.
9 Tom Charles Huston te~tilllony, 9/2S/i5, Hearings, 1'01. 2, p. 45.
10 "The Federal Prosecutor", Journal of the .-tmericall .Judicature Society
(June, 1940), p. 18.
5
What standards have governed the opening of intelligence investigations
and when have intelligence investigations been terminated?
"Where have the targets fit on the spectrum between those who commit
violent criminal acts and those who seBk only to disSBnt peacefully
from Government policy?
To what extent has the information collected included intimate
details of the targets' personal lives or their political views, and has
such information beBn disseminated and used to injure individuals?
·What actions beyond surveillance have intelligence agencies taken,
such as attempting to disrupt, discredit, or destroy persons or groups
who have been the targets of surveillance?
Have intelligence agencies been used to serve the political aims of
Presidents, other high officials, or the agencies themselves?
How have the agencies responded either to proper orders or to excessive
pressures from their superiors? To what extent have intelligence
agencies disclosed, or concealed them from, outside bodies charged
with overseeing them?
Have intelligtnce agencies acted outside the law? What has been
the attitude of the intelligence community toward the rule of law?
To what extent has the Executive branch and the Congress controlled
intelligence agencies and held them accountable?
Generally, how well has the Federal system of checks and balances
between the branches worked to control intelligence activity?
O. Summary of th(: Main Problem8
The answer to each of these questions is disturbing. Too many people
have been spied upon by too many Government agencies and to much
information has beeen collected. The Government has often undertaken
the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs,
even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on
behalf of a hostile foreign power. The Government, operating primarily
through secret informants, but also using other intrusive
techmques such as wiretaps, microphone "bugs", surreptitious mail
opening, and break-ins, has swept in vast amounts of information
about the personal lives, vimvs, and associations of American citizens.
Investigations of groups deemed potentially dangerous-and even
of groups suspected of associating with potentially dangerous organizations-
have continued for decades, despite the fact that those
groups did not engage in unlawful activity. Groups and individuals
have been harasSBd and disrupted because of their political views and
their lifestyles. Investigations have been based upon vague standards
whose breadth made excessive collection inevitable. Unsavory and
vicious tactics have been employed-including anonymous attempts
to break up marriages, disrupt meetings, ostracize persons from their
professions, and provoke target groups into rivalries that might
result in deaths. Intelligence agencies have served the political and
personal objectives of presidents and other high officials. While the
agencies oftBn committed excesses in response to pressure from high
officials in the Executive branch and Congress, they also occasionally
initiated improper activities and then concealed them from
officials whom they had a duty to inform.
Governmental officials-including thoSB whose principal duty is to
enforce the law-have violated or ignored the law over long periods
of time and have advocated and defended their right to break the law.
6
The Constitutional system of checks and balances has not adequately
controlled intelligence activities. Dntil recently the Executive branch
has neither delineated the scope of permissible activities nor established
procedures for supervising intelligence agencies. Congress has
failed to exercise sufficient oversight, seldom questioning the use to
'which its apropriations ,vere being put. Most domestic intelligence
issues have not reached the courts, and in those cases when they have
reached the courts, the judiciary has been reluctant to grapple with
them.
Each of these points is briefly illustrated oelow, and covered in substantially
greater detail in the following sections of the report.
1. The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intellige'fI,(Je
Activity
United States intelligence agencies have investigated a vast number
of American citizens and domestic organizations. FBI headquarters
alone has developed over 500,000 domestic intelligence files,ll
and these have been augmented by additional files at FBI Field Offices.
The FBI opened 65,000 of these domestic intelligence files in 1972
alone.12 In fact, substantially more individuals and groups are subject
to intelligence scrutiny than the number of files would appeal' to
indicate, since typically, each domestic intelligence file contains information
on more than one individual or group, and this information
is readily retrievable through the FBI General Name Jndex.
The number of Americans and domestic groups caught in the domestic
intelligence net is further illustrated by the following statistics:
-Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were
opened and photographed in the United States by the CIA
between 1953-1973, producing a CIA computerized index of
nearly one and one-half million names.13
-At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and photographed
by the FBI between 1940-1966 in eight U.S. cities.14
-Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer
system and separate files were created on approximately
7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic groups during the
course of CIA's Operation CHAOS (1967-1973) .15
-Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or through
the United States were obtained by the National Security
Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret arrangement with
three United States telegraph companies.1G
-An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of
United States Army intelligence files created between the
mid-1960's and 1971,1'
-Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and
groups were created by the Internal Revenue SeHice between
11 :\Iemorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee. 10/6/75.
" :\Il'morandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/6/75.
13 .James Angleton testimony. 9/17/75, p. 28.
11 Sl'e :\Iail Opening Report: Section IY, "FBI :\Iail Openings."
15 Chief, International Terrorist Group testimony, Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States, 3/10/75. pp. 1485-1489.
16 Statement by the Chairman, 11/6/75; re: SHA:\IROCK, Hearings, Vol. 5,
pp.57-60.
17 Sel' ~Iilitary SluYl'illance Report: Sl'Ction II. "Thp Collection of Information
a,bout the Political Activities of Private Citizens and Private Organizations,"
7
1969 ,and 1973 and tax investigations were started on the basis
of political rather than tax criteria. IS .
-At least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued
on an FBI list of persons to be rounded up in the event of a
"national emergency"."9
;2. Too Mu.ch Injo'f'7fI/Ltion Is Collected For Too Long
Intelligence agencies have collected vast amounts of information
about the intimate details of citizens' lives and about their participation
in legal and peaceful political activities. The targets of intelligence
activity have included political adherents of the right and the
left, ranging from activitist to casual supporters. Investigations have
been directed against proponents of racial causes and women's rights,
outspoken apostles of nonviolence and racial harmony; establishment
politicians; religious groups; and advocates of new life styles. The
widespread targeting of citizens and domestic groups, and the excessive
scope of the coI1ection of information, is illustrated by the following
examples:
(a) The "Women's Liberation Movement" was infiltrated by informants
who collected material about the movement's policies, leaders,
and individual members. One report included the name of every
woman who attended meetings,20 and another stated that each woman
at a meeting had described "how she felt oppressed, sexually or otherwise".
21 Another report C{)ncluded that the movement's purpose was
to "free women from the humdrum existence of being only a wife and
mother", but still recommended that the intelligence investigation
should be continued.22
(b) A prominent civil rights leader and advisor to Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., was investigated on the suspicion that he might be
a Communist "sympathizer". The FBI field office concluded he was
not.23 Bureau headquarters directed that the investigation continueusing
a theory of "guilty until proven innocent:"
The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the
field office that 24 is not sympathetic to the
Party cause. While there may not be any evidence that
____________ is a Communist neither is there any substantial
evidence that he is anti-Communist.25
(c) FBI sources reported on the formation of the Conservative
American Christian Action Council in 1971.26 In the 1950's, the Bureau
collected information about the John Birch Society and passed
18 See IRS Report: Section II, "Selective Enforcement for Nontax Purposes."
19 Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 12/8/54. Many of the
memoranda cited in this report were actually written by FBI personnel other
than those whose names were indicated at the foot of the document as the author.
Citation in this report of specific memoranda by using the names of FBI personnel
which so appear is for documentation purposes only and is not intended to presume
authorship or even knowledge in all cases.
.. Memorandum from Kansas City Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/20/70.
(Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 54-3)
21 :\femorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69,
p.2. (Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 54-1)
22 Memorandum from Baltimore Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/11/70,
p,2.
23 :\fE'morandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/64.
2. Name deleted by Committee to protect privacy.
"'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office 4/24/64, re
CPUSA, Negro question.
2f James Adams testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 137.
8
it to the 'White House because of the Society's "scurillous attack" on
President Eisenhower and other high Government 01ficials."'
(d) :::lome ill\'estigations of the lawlUl acti vitles of peacc:iul groups
have continued for decades. For example, the NAACP was investigated
to determine whether it "had connections with" the Communist
Party. The investigation lasted for over twenty-five years, although
nothing was found to reout a report during the first year of the investigation
that the NAACP had a "strong tendency" to "steer clear of
Communist activities." "8 Similarly, the FBI has admitted that the
Socialist 'Yorkers Party has committed no criminal acts. Yet the
Bureau has investigated the Socialist vVorkers Party for more than
three decades on the basis of its revolutionary rhetoric-which the
FBI concedes falls short of incitement to violence-and its claimed
international links. The Bureau is currently using its informants to
collect information about SWP members' political views, including
those on "U.S. involvement in Angola," "food prices," "racial matters,"
the "Vietnam 'Val'," and about any of their efforts to support
non-SvVP candidates for political office. 29
(e ) National political leaders fell within the broad reach of intelligence
im'estigations. For example, Army Intelligence maintainecl
files on Senator Adlai Sten~nson and Congressman Abner Mikva
because of their participation in peaceful political meetings under surveillance
by Army agents.30 A letter to Hichard Nixon, while he was a.
candidate for President in 1968, was intercepted under CIA's mail
opening program.31 In the 1960's President Johnson asked the FBI to
compare various Senators' statements on Vietnam with the Communist
Party line 32 and to conduct name checks on leading antiwar Senators.
33
(f) As part of their effort to collect information which "related
even remotely" to people or groups "active" in communities which had
"the potential" for civil disorder, Army intelligence agencies took
such steps as: sending agents to a Halloween party for elementary
school children in "Washington, D.C., because they suspected a local
"dissident" might be present; monitoring protests of welfare mothers'
organizations in :Milwaukee: infiltrating a coalition of church youth
groups in Colorado; flnd sending fl gents to a priests' conference in
'Vashington, D.C'.. he1(1 to discuss hirth control measures.34
(g) In the late 1060's and early 1970'". student groups were subjected
to intense s('rutinv. In 1070' the FBI oroereo investirrations of
C'wrv memher of the Students for a Democratic So('ietv ano of "everv
mack Student rnion and similar group regardlrss of their past or
27 ~'[emorandum from F ..T. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan. 5/29/63.
"" ~Iemorandum from Oklahoma City Firld OffiN' to FBT Hf'adquartf'r~. 9/1l}/41.
See Development of FBI Domr~tic Tntelligence Im'estigations: Section IV, "FBI
Targ'rt Lists."
20 Chirf Robrrt Shacklrford trstimonv. 2/6/76. p. 91.
:JO Sf'natr .Tlldkiary Sllhcommittrf' on Constitutional RiiTht~. Rf'Port. 1973. p. 57.
:n Srnatr Select Committee Staff summary of HTLINGUAL File Review,
9/5175.
32 FBT Summary Mrmorandllm. 1/31/7;'). re: ('ovf'rag-e of T.V. Presentation.
33 Lf'tter from .T. Edgar Hoon'r to :\Iarvin Wat~on. 7/15/66.
•• See sfilitary Report: Sec. II, "The Collection of Information About the Political
Activities of Private Citizens and Private Organizations."
9
present involvement in disorders." 3;; Files were opened on thousands of
young men and ,vomen so that, as the former head of FBI intelligence
explained, the information could be used if they ever applied tor a
government job.36
In the 1960's Bureau agents were instructed to increase their efforts
to discredit ".Kew LeW' student demonstrators by tactics including
publishing photographs ("naturally the most obnoxious picture
should be used") ,37 using "misinformation" to falsely notify members
events had been cancelled:8and writing "tell-tale" letters to students'
parents.39
(h) The FBI Intelligence Division commonly investigated any indication
that "subversive" groups already under investigation were
seeking to influence or control other groups!O One example of the extreme
breadth of this "infiltration" theory was an FBI instruction in
the mid-1960's to all Field Offices to investigate every "free university"
because some of them had come under "subversive influence." 41
(i) Each administration from Franklin D. Roosevelt's to Richard
Nixon's permitted, and sometimes encouraged, government agencies to
handle essentially political intelligence. For example:
-President Roosevelt asked the FBI to put in its files the names of
citizens sending telegrams to the White House opposing his "national
defense" policy and supporting Col. Charles Lindoorgh.42
-President Truman received inside information on a former
Roosevelt aide's efforts to influence his appointments,43 labor union
negotiating plans,H and the publishing plans of journalistsY
-President Eisenhmver receind reports on purely political and
social contacts with foreign officials by Bernard Baruch,46 Mrs. Eleanor
Roosevelt,47 and Supreme Court .Justice "\Villiam O. Douglas.47a
-The Kennedy Administration had the FBI wiretap a Congressional
staff member,48 three executive officials,49 a lobbyist,50 and a
"\Vashington law firm. 51 Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy received
the fruits of a FBI "tap" on Martin Luther King, .Tr.,52 and a "bug"
on a Congressman both of which yielded information of a political
nature.53
85 :\femorandum from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 11/4/70.
3d Charles Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, vol. 2 p. 117.
'7 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 7/5/68.
38 Abstraets of New Left Documents #161. 115,43. Memorandum from Washington
Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/21/69.
"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/29/68.
40 FBI Manual of Instructions, Sec. 87, B (2-f).
41 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 7/23/69.
"Memorandum from Stpphen Early to .r. Edgar Hoover, 5/21/40; 6/17/40.
43 Letter from J. Ed,!mr HOO\'cr to George Allen, 12/3/46.
.. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to :\Iaj. Gen. Harry Vaughn, 2/15/47.
45 Letter from .J. Edgar Hoover to lIf. J. Connelly. 1/27/50.
.. I,etter from .J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, 11/7/55.
'7 Letter from .r. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, 2/13/5R.
'7. Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, 4/21/1)3-4/27/53.
.. :\Iemorandum from .J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General. 2/16/61.
.. Memorandnm from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General. 2/14/61.
M Mpmorandum from .J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61.
lit :\Iemorandum from .J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/26/62.
""Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 12/19/66.
53 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/18/61.
10
-President Johnson asked the FBI to conduct "name checks" of
his critics and of members of the staff of his 19M opponent, Senator
Barry Goldwater.5
" He also requested purely political intelligence on
his critics in the Senate, and received extensive intelligence reports on
political activity at the 1964 Democratic Convention from FBI electronic
surveillance.55
-President Kixon authorized a program of wiretaps which produced
for the 'Vhite House purely political or personal information
unrelated to national security, including information about a Supreme
Court justice.56
3. OoveTt Action and thc Use of 171egal 01' Improper Means
(a) Oovert Action.-Apart from uncovering excesses in the collection
of intelligence, our investigation has disclosed covert actions directed
against Americans, and the use of illegal and improper surveillance
techniques to gather information. For example:
(i) The FBI's COINTELPRO-counterintelligence program-was
designed to "disrupt" groups and "neutralize" individuals deemed to
be threats to domestic security. The FBI resorted to counterintelligence
tactics in part because its chief officials believed that the existing
law could not control the activities of certain dissident groups, and
that court decisions had tied the hands of the intelligence community.
'Vhatever opinion one holds about the policies of the targeted groups,
many of the tactics employed by the FBI were indisputably degrading
to a free society. COINTELPRO tactics included:
-Anonymously attacking the political beliefs of targets in order
to induce their employers to fire them;
-Anonymously mailing letters to the spouses of intelligence targets
for the purpose of destroying their marriages; 57
-Obtaining from IRS the tax returns of a target and then attempting
to provoke an IRS investigation for the express purpose of deterring
a protest leader from attending the Democratic National
Convention; 58
-Falselv and anonymouslv labeling as Government informants
members of groups kncHm to 'be violent. thereby exposing the falsely
labelled member to expulsion or physicial attack; 59
-Pursuant to instructions to use "misinformation" to clisnlpt
demonstrations. rmploying such Ilwans as bl'Oadrasting fake orders
on the same citizens band radio frequency used by demonstration
marshalls to attempt to control demonstrations.60 and duplicating amI
falsely filling out forms soliciting housing for persons coming to a
demonstration. thereby causing "long and useless journeys to locate
these addresses"; 61
5' ~rl'mOrunrlllm froni .T. Erlg-ur HooH'r to Bm ~foyer'" 10/27/64.
.., ~rl'mOrunrlllm from C. D. DpLouch to .Tohn ~rohr, 8/29/64.
50 Lettl'r from .T. Erlg-ar Hom'er to H.R. Hahlpman. 6/25/70.
&1 ~rf'mOrandllm from FBI H('adquartpr~, to Ran Francisco Fipld Offlrf',
11/26/68.
os ~rpmorandum from [~[jdwp~t City] Fipld Office to FBI Hpadquartpr~.
8/1/68; memorandum from FBI Headquartprs to [~!idwpst City] Field Officp,
8/6/68.
'9 ~rpmoranrlum from Columbia Field Office to FBI Hearlquarters, 11/4/70, rp:
COTXTELPRO·New Left.
"" ~If'morandum from Charlf's Brl'nnan to William Sullivan. 8/1,,/6.".
'" ~Iemorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68.
11
-Sending an anonymous letter to the leader of a Chicago street
gang (described as "violence-prone") stating that the Black Panthers
were supposed to han "a hit out for you". The letter was suggested
because it "may intensify ... animosity" and cause the street gang
leader to "take retaliatorv action".62
(ii) From "late 1963" \mtil his death in 1968, Martin Luther King,
.Jr.. was the target of an intensive campaign by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to "neutralize" him as an effective civil rights leader.
In the words of the man in charge of the FBI's "war" against Dr.
King, "No holds were barred." 63
The FBI gathered information about Dr. King~s plans and activities
through an extensive surveillance program, employing nearly
every intelligence-gathering technique at the Bureau's disposal in
order to obtain information about the "private activities of Dr. King
and his advisors" to use to "completely discredit" them.64
The program to destroy Dr. King as the leader of the civil rights
movement included efforts to discredit him with Executive branch
officials, Congressional leaders. foreign heads of state, American ambassadors.
rhurches. universities. and the press.65
The FBI mailed Dr. King a tape recording made from microphones
hidden in his hotel rooms which one agent testified was an attempt
to destroy Dr. King's marriage.66 The tape recording was accompanied
by a note which Dr. King and his advisors interpreted as threatening
to release the tape recording unless Dr. King committed suicide.67
The extraordinary nature of the campaign to discredit Dr. King is
evident from two documents:
-At the August 1963 March on Washington, Dr. King told the
country of his "dream" that:
all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and
Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands
and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, "Free
at last, free at last~ thank God Almightly, I'm free at last."
The Bureau's Domestic Intelligence Division concluded that this
"demagogic speech" established Dr. King as the "most dangerous
and effective Negro leader in the country." 68 Shortly afterwards, and
within days after Dr. King was named "Man of the Year" by Time
magazine, the FBI decided to "takE' him off his pedestal," reduce him
completely in influence," and select and promote its own candidate
to "assume the role of the leadership of the Negro people." 69
-In early 1968, Bnreau headquarters explained to the field that Dr.
King must be destroyed because he was seen as a potential "messiah"
who could "unify and electrify" the "black nationalist movement".
Indeed~ to the FBI he was a potential threat because he might "abane,
:\Iemorlmdum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69 re:
COINTELPRO. Black Nationalist-Hate Groups.
""' "'illiam C. Sulli,an testimony. 11/1/75, p. 49.
.. :\!pmoranrlum from Baum,lwrdner to Sulli,an, 2/4/64.
ll.3 :\!pmorandum from Chi('ago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/16/68;
memoranrlum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69, re:
COTNTELPRO. Black Nationalist-Hate Groups.
00 William C. Sullivan. 11/1/75. pp. 104-105.
.., Andrew Young testimony. 2/19/76, p. 8.
.. Memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont. 8/30/63.
.. Memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont, 1/8/64.
12
don his supposed 'obedience' to white liberal doctrines (non-violence)
." 70 In short, a non-violent man was to be secretly attacked and
destroyed as insurance against his abandoning non-violence.
(b) 177egal OJ' Improper Neans.-The surnillance which we investigated
,vas not only vastly excessive in breadth and a basis for
degmding counterintelligence actions, but was also often conducted
by illegal or improper means. For example:
(1) For approximately 20 years the CIA carried out a program
of indiscriminately opening citizens' first class mail.
The Bureau also had a mail opening program, but cancelled it
in 1966. The Bureau continued. however. to receive the
illegal fruits of CIA's program. In 1970, the heads of both
agencies signed a document for President Nixon, which correctly
stated that mail opening was illegal, falsely stated that
it had been discontinued, and proposed that the illegal opening
of mail should be resumed because it would provide useful
results. The President approved the program, but withdrew
his approval five days later. The illegal opening continued
nonetheless. Throughout this period CIA officials knew
that mail opening was illegal, but expressed concern about the
"flap potential" of exposure. not about the illegality of their
activity.71 .
(2) 'From 1947 until May 1975. NSA received from internrrtional
cable companies millions of cables which had been
sent by American citizens in the reasonable expectation that
they would be kept private.72
(3) Since the early 19BO's, intelligence agencies have
frequently wiretapped and bugged American citizens without
the benefit of judicial warrant. Recent court decisions
have curtailed the use of these techniques against domestic
targets. But past subjects of these surveillances have included
a United States Congressman, a Congressional staff member,
journalists and newsmen. and numerous individuals and
groups who engaged in no criminal activity and who posed
no genuine threat to the national security, such as two White
House domestic affairs advisers and an anti-Vietnam War
protest group, ·While the prior written approval of the Attorney
General has been required. for all warrantless wiretaps
since 1940, the record is replete with instances where this
requirement was ignored and the Attorney General gave only
after-the-fact authorization.
Fntil 1965. microphone surveillance by intelligence agencies
was wholly unregulated in certain classes of cases. Within
weeks after a'1954 Supreme Court decision denouncing the
FBI's installation of a microphone in a defendant's bedroom,
the Attornev General informed the Bureau that he did not
believe the 'deeision applied to national security cases and
70 Memorandum from FBI Headljuarter,; to all SACs, 3/4/68.
71 See ::\Iail Opening Report: Section II, "Legal Consideration,; and the 'Flap'
Potential."
7.1 See XSA Report: Section I, "Introduction and Summary."
13
permitted the FBI to continue to install microphones subject
only to its own "intelligent restraint".73
(4) In several cases, purely political information (such
as the reaction of Congress to an Administration's legislative
proposal) and purely personal information (such as coverage
of the extra-marital social activities of a high-level Executive
official under surveillance) was obtained from electronic
surveillance and disseminated to the highest levels of
the federal government.14
(5) ""Varrantless break-ins have been conducted by intelligence
agencies since WorId War II. During the 1960's alone,
the FBI and CIA conducted hundreds of break-ins, many
against American citizens and domestic organizations. In
some cases, these break-ins were to install microphones; in
other eases, they were to steal such items as membership lists
from organizations considered "subversive" by the Bureau.75
(6) The most pervasive surveillance technique has been
the informant. In a random sample of domestic intelligence
cases, 83% involved informants and 5% involved electronic
surveiHance.76 Informants have been used against peaceful,
law-abiding groups; they have collected information about
personal and political views and activities.77 To maintain
their credentials in violence-prone groups, informants have
involved themselves in violent activity. This phenomenon is
well illustrated by an informant in the Klan. He was present
at the murder of a civil rights worker in Mississippi and subsequently
helped to solve the crime and convict the perpetrators.
Earlier, however, while performing duties paid for by
the Government, he had previously "beaten people severely,
had boarded buses and kicked people, had [gone] into restaurants
and beaten them [blacks] with blackjacks, chains,
pistols." 78 Although the FBI requires agents to instruct informants
that they cannot be involved in violence, it was
understood that in the Klan, "he couldn't be an angel and
be a good informant." 79
4. Ignoring the Law
Officials of the intelligence agencies occasionally recognized that
cert'ain adivities were illegal, but expressed concern only for "floap
potential." Even more disturbing was the frequent testimony that ,the
law, and the Constitution were simply ignored. For example, the
author of the so-called Huston plan testified:
Que8tion. ""Vas there any person who stated that the activity
recommended. which you have previously identified as being
7. :\Iemoraudum from Attornl'Y Gl'ueral Browul'll to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/20/54.
"Sl'e finding on Political AbIlRI'. To protect the privacy of the targeted
individual, the C..mmittel' hal' omitted the citation to the ml'morandum concerning-
the l'xampll' of pnrely pl'fRonal information.
7ll Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeL,oach, 7/19/66, p. 2.
1~ Gl'neral AC{'()unting Office Report on Domestic Intelligence Operations of the
FBT.9/75.
71 Mary .To Cook tffitimony. 12/2/75, Hl'arings. Vol. 6. p. 111.
1. Gary Rowe depooition. 10/17/75, p. 9.
,. Special Agent No.3 deposition, 11/21/75, p. 12.
14
illegal opening of thc mail and breaking and entry or burglary-
was there any single person who stated that suchactivity
should not be done because it was unconstitutional?
Answer. Ko.
Question. ",Vas there any single person who said such activity
should not be done because it was illegal?
Answer. Ko.80
Similarly, the man who for ten years headed FBI's Intelligence
Division testifed that:
... never oncc did I hear anybody. including myself, raise the
question: "Is this course of action \'.hich we have agreed upon
lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral." ",Ve never gave any
thought to this line of reasoning, because "'c \vere just naturally
pragmatic.8!
Although the statutory law and the Constitution were often not
"[ginn] a thought",82 there was 'a general attitude that intelligence
needs were responsive to a higher law. Thus, as one witness testified
in justifying the FBI's mail opening program:
It was mv assumption that what we were doing ,,"as justified
by what 'we had to do ... the greater good, the national
security.83
D. Deficiencies in Accountability and Oontrol
The overwhelming number of excesses continuing over a prolonged
period of time were due in }arge measure to the fact that the system
of checks and balances---{'reated in our Constitution to limit 'abuse of
Government'al power-was seldom applied to the intelligence community.
Guidance and regulation from outside the intelligence agencies--
where it has been imposed at all-has been vague. Presidents
and other senior Executive officials, particuIarly the Attorneys General,
have virtually abdicated their Constitutional responsibility to
oversee 'and set standards for intelligence activity. Senior government
officials generally gave the agencies broad, general mandates or
pressed for immediate results on pressing problems. In neither case
did they provide guidance to prevent cxcesses and their broad
mandates and pressures themsehes often resulted in excessive or
improper intelligence adiyity.
Congress has often declined to exercise meaningful oversight, and
on ocC'asion has passed laws or made statements which were taken by
intelligence agene-ies as supporting overly-broad investigations.
8' Huston tpstimony, 9/23/75. HP'aringos. Vol. 2, p. 4-1.
B1 William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 92-93.
B2 The quote is from a Burpau official who had supervised for the "Black
Nationalist Hatp Group" COINTELPRO.
'''Qltc.~tion.. Did ,anybody at any time that you remember during the course of
thp programs discuss the Oonstitutionality or the legal authority, or anything
else like that?
"Answer. No, we never g'llve it a thought. As far as I know. nohody pngagopd
or evpr had any idPa that they wpre doing anything other than what was thp
policy of the Burpau which had heen policy for a long time." (George Moore
dPTJosition, 11/3/75, p. 83.)
83 Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 41.
15
On the other hand, the record reveals instances when intelligence
agencies have concealed improper activities from their superiors in
the Executive branch and from the Congress, or have elected to disclose
only the less questionable aspects of their activities.
There has been, in short, a clear and sust'Uined failure by those
responsible to control the intelligence community and to ensure its
fwcountability. There has been an equally clear and sustained :failure
by intelligence agencies to fully inform the proper authorities of their
activities and to comply \\'ith directives from those authorities.
6. The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligerwe Activity
Many of the illegal or improper disruptive efforts directed against
American citizens and domestic organizations succeeded in injuring
their targets. Although it is sometimes difficult to prove that a target's
misfortunes were ca,used by a cOlUlter-intelligence program directed
against him, the possibility that an arm of the United States Government
intended to cause the harm and might have been responsible is
itself abhorrent.
The Committee has observed numerous examples of the impact of
intelligence operations. Sometimes the harm was readily apparentdestruction
of marriages, loss of friends or jobs. Sometimes the attitudes
of the public and of Government officials responsible for formulatin!!
policy and resolving vital issues were influenced by distorted
intelligence. But the most basic harm was to the values of privacy
and freedom which our Constitution seeks to protect and which
intelligence activity infringed on a broad scale.
(a) General Efforts to Discredit.-Several efforts against individuals
and groups appear to have achieved their stated aims. For example:
-A Bureau Field Office reported that the anonvmous letter it had
sent to an activist's husband accusing his wife of infidelity "contributed
very stronglv" to the subsequent breakup of the marriage.84
-Another Field Office reported that a dra4't counsellor deliberately,
and falsely, accused of being an FBI informant was "ostracized" by
his friends and associates,8S
-Two instrnctors were reportedly put on probation after the Bureau
sent an anonvmous letter to a university administrator about their
funding of an anti-administration student n·ewspaper.86
-The Bureau evaluated its attempts to "put a stop" to a contribution
to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as "quite
suceessfnL" 87
-An FBI document boasted that a "pretext" phone can to Stokeley
Carmichael's mother telling her that members of the Black Panther
Partv intended to kill her son left her "shocked". The memorandum intimated
that the Bureau believed it had been responsible for Carmichapl's
fli<rht to Africa the following day.88
(b) Media Manipula,tion.-The FBI has attemnted covertly to influence
the public's percention of persons and organizations by dis,:
eminatinl! rlerogatorv information to the press, either anonymously
or through "friendly" news contacts. The impact of those articles is
.. ~fpmorandumfrom S1. Louis Fipld Offiee to FBI Headquarters. 6/19/70.
'" Memorandum from San Diego Fipld Office to FBI Headquarters. 4/30/69.
.. ~femorandum from Mohile Fipld Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/70.
87 Memorandum from Wick to DeLoach. 11/9/66.
ssl\femorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68.
16
generally difficult to measure, although in some cases there are fairly
direct connections to injury to the target. The Bureau also attempted
to influence media reporting which would have any impact on the public
image of the FBI. Examples include:
-Planting a series of derogatory articles about ~fartin Luther
King, Jr., and the Poor People's Campaign.89
For example, in anticipation of the HHi8 "poor people's malTh on
",Vashington, D.C.," Bureau Headqualiers grantrd authority to
furnish "cooperative ne\vs media sources" an article "dpsigned to curtail
success of Martin Luther King's fund raising." 90 Another memorandum
illustrated how "photographs of demonstrators" could be used
in discrediting the civil rights monment. Six photographs of participants
in the poor people's campaign in Cleveland accompanied the
memorandum with the fo11owing note attached: "These [photographs]
show the militant aggn>ssive appearancr of thr participants
and might be of interrst to a cooperative ne\vs soul'cr." 91 Information
on the Poor People's Campaign 'was provided by the FBI to friendly
reporters on the condition that "the Bureau must not be revealed as
the source." 92
-Soliciting information from Field Offices "on a continuing basis"
for "prompt ... dissemination to the news media ... to discredit
the New Left movement and its adherents." The Headquarters directive
requested, among other things, that:
specific data should be furnished depicting the scurrilous and
depraved nature of many of the charaders. activities. habits
and living conditions representative of New Left adherents.
Field Offices were to be exhorted that: "Every avenue of possible embarrassment
must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored." 93
-Ordering Field Officr" to gather information \vhich waul,] disprove
a11egations bv the "lilwral press, the bleeding hearts. and the
forers on the left" that thr Chicago pol icr used undur force in draling
with demonstrators at the> 1008 Demorl'atic Con\"f>ntion.95
-Taking advantage of a rlose relationship with the Chairman of
the Board-described in an FBI memorandum as "our good friend"of
a magazine with national circulation to influence articles which related
to the FBI. For example. through this relationship the Bureau:
"squelched" an "unfavorable art.icle against the Bureau" written by a
free-lance writer about an FBI investigation: "postponed publication"
of an article on another FBI case: "foresta11ed publiration" of an article
by Dr. Martin Luther King-, .Tr.; and received information about
proposed editing of King's artic1es.96
(c) Di.c;torting Data to Influence Go'vernment Policy and Public
Percepti~
AccuraJte intelligence is a prerequisite to sound government policy.
However. as the past head of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division
reminded the Committee:
89 RpE' King RE'port: RE'ctionR V and VII.
.. Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Rullivan. 10/26/68.
" Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. RulJivan. 5/17/68.
"" ~rpmorandnm from FBI HE'adfl1lartprR to Miami Fiplrl OfficE', 7/!)/68.
03 "Ipmorandnm from C. D. Brf'nnan to W. C. Snl1ivan. 5/22/68.
os :ME'IDoranduID from FBI Hpad(juartE'rs to Chimgo Field OfficE', 8/28/68.
.. ~Iemorandumfrom W, H. Stapleton to DeLoach, 11/3/64.
17
The facts by themselves are not too meaningful. They are
something like stones cast into a heap.97
Oil certain crucial subjects the domestic intelligence agencies reported
the "facts" in ways that gave rise to misleading impressions.
For example, the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division initially discounted
as an "ob\"ious failure" the alleged attempts of Communists
to influence the civil rights mOYenwnt."S 'Without any significant
change in the factual situation, the Bureau moved from the Division's
conclusion to Director Hoover's public congressional testimony characterizing
Communist influence on the civil rights movement as "vitally
important." 9Sa
FBI reporting on protests against the Vietnam 'Val' provides another
example of the manner in which the information provided to
decision-makers can be ske\Ye(1. Tn acquiescence \yith a judgment already
expressed by President .Johnson. the Bureau's reports on demonstrations
against the 'Yar in Yietnam emphasized Communist efforts
to influence the anti-war mOYement and underplayed the fact that the
vast majoritv of demonstrators \yere not Communist controlled.99
(d) "Ohillinq" First Amendment Riqhts.-The First Amendment
protects the Rights of American citizens to engage in free and open
discussions, and to associate \\"ith persons of their choosing. Intelligence
agencies have, on occasion. expressly attempted to interfere
with those rights. For example. one internal FBI memorandum
f'nlled for "more interviews" with Ne\y Left subjects "to enhnllee
the paranoia endemic in these circles" and "get the point across there
is nn FBI agent behind every mailbox." 100
More importantly. the government's surveiUance activities in the
aggregate-whether 01' not expn>ssly intrnded to do so-tends, as
the Committee cOllclmles at p. 200 to (leter the exercise of First
Amended rights bv l ...merican citizens \vho become aware of the government's
domrstic intelligencr program.
(e) Preventinfl the Free E:rchunqe of Ideas. Speakers. teachers,
\\Titers. anel publications themselves were targets of the FBI's counterinteJJigencr.
program. The FBI's efforts to interfere with the free exchange
of ideas inc1ueled:
-Anonymously attempting to prevent an alleged "Communistfront"
group from holding' a forum on a midwest campus. and then
inwstirrating the judg-e who ordered that the meeting- be allowed to
proceN1.101
-Usin[!' anothrr "confidpntial source" in a fOlmdation which eontrilmted
to a local college to apply pressure on the school to fire an
activist professor.
-Anonymollsly contaeting a llniversity official to urge him to "persuaop"
two professors to ston fllllfling a student newspaper, in order
to "eliminate what voice the Xew Left has" in the area.
97 ~nJlivlln. 1111/7". p. 4R.
98 :\Iemorllnrlum from Bllumgllrrlner to Sullivan. R/26/63 p. 1. Hoover him~elf
f'Onfct"rllro thp initial Di\"i~ion pstimate to mean that Communist influence was
"infinitPJ"imll1."
OBo ~Pf' Fnicling' on Po1itif'nl Ahnsp. p. 22.'5.
'" ~"e Finding' on I'olitif'nl Ahu~e. p. 22;).
100 "Xl',," Lpn Notf's-Philnoplnhin." ~/16170. Eoition #1.
101,rpmorllndnm f""m nptr"it Fipld Offi"p to FBI HNlilqllllrtprs 10/26/60:
:\Ipmorllnollm from FRI Hpllilqullrtf'r~ to Dptroit Field Office 10/27, 28, 31/60;
Memorandum from Baumgardner to Belmont, 10/26/60.
18
-Targeting the New Mexico Free University for teaching "confrontation
politics" and "draft counseling training".,o2
7. Oost and Value
Domestic intelligence is expensive. lYe have already indicated the
cost of illegal and improper intelligence activities in terms of the
harm to victims. the injury to constitutional values. and the damage
to the democratic process itself. The cost in dollars is also significant.
For example, the FBI has budgeted for fiscal year 1976 over $7
million for its domestic security informant program, more than twice
the amount it spends on informants against organized crime.,o3 The
aggregate budget for FBI domestic security intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence is at least $80 miIlion.104 In the late 1960s and early
1970s, when the Bureau was joined by the CIA. the military. and
NSA in collecting information about the anti-war movement and
black activists, the cost was substantially greater.
Apart from the excesses described above, the usefulness of many
domestic intelligence activities in serving the legitimate goal of protecting
society has been questionable. Properly directed intelligence
inYestigations concentrating upon hostile foreign agents and violent
terrorists can produce valuable results. The Committee has examined
cases where the FBI uncovered "illegal" agents of a foreign power
engaged in clandestine intelligence activities in violation of federal
law. Information leading to the prevention of serious violence has
been acquired by the FBI through its informant penetration of terrorist
groups and through the inclusion in Bureau files of the names
of persons actively involved with such groups.'05 Xevertheless, the most
sweeping domestic intelligence surveillance programs have produced
surprisingly few useful returns in view of their extent. For example:
102 See COIKTELPRO Report: Section III. "The Goals of COINTELPRO:
Preventing or disrupting the exercise of First Amendment Rights."
103 The budget for FBI informant programs includes not only the payments to
informants for their services and expenses, but also the expenses of FBI personnel
who supervise informants, their support costs. and administrative overhead.
(Justice Department letter to Senate Select Committee, 3/2/76).
10< The Committpe is withholding the portion of this figure spent on domestic
security intelligence (informants and other inrestigations combined) to prevent
hostile foreign intelligence sen'ices from deducing thp amount spent on
counterespionage. The $80 million figure does not include all costs of separate
FBI actirities which may be drawn upon for dompstic security intellig-ence purpo~
es. Among- these are the Identification Di,ision (maintaining fingerprint
record~), the Files and Communications Division (managing the storage and
retripyal of im-cstiglltivc and intelli~ence files). and the FBI Laboratory.
lOU Examples of valuable informant reports include the following: one
informant ri'ported a plan to ambu.,h police offi('ers and the location of a cache
of weapon~ and dynamiti'; another informant reported plans to transport
illegally ohtaini'd weapons to Washing-ton. D.C. : two informants at one meeting
disco,pred plans to dynamiti' two city blocks. All of these plan~ were frustrated
by further im'estigation and prote('ti,e mi'asuri's or arrest. (FRI mi'morandnm
to Si'li'ct Committi'e, 12/10/75: Sennte Si'lect Committee Staff memorandum:
Intelligi'nce Cases in Which the FRI Pri'wntpd Violence, undnted.)
One exampli' of the use of information in Burpau fill'S im'olyed a "name
ch~k" at Rpcret Sen'ice rpqnest on certain persons applyin~ for press credentials
to cowr the ,-isit of a forpign lwad of statp. The discm-er"l' of data in FBI files
im!i('ating that one sn('h pprson hac!. hepn a('th"ely in,ol,';1 with ,iolent g-ronps
lpd to fnrthpr inypstigation amI nltimatply the issuan"p of a spar('h warrant. The
i'parch produced (',idpn('p. inclnding ,,-eapons. of a plot to assassinatp the forei~n
head of state. (FBI memorandum to Senate Si'lect Committee, 2/23/76)
19
-Between 1960 and 1974, the FBI conducted over 500,000 separate
investigations of persons and groups under the "subversive" category,
predicated on the possibility that they might be likely to overthrow
the government of the United States.lOO Yet not a single individual or
group has been prosecuted since 1957 under the laws which prohibit
planning or achocating action to overthr0''' the gOYernment and "'hich
are the main alleged statutory basis for such FBI investigations.107
-A recent study by the General AccOlmting Office has estimated
that of some 17,528 FBI domestic intelligence investigations of inclividuals
in 1974, only 1.3 percent resulted in prosecution and conviction,
and in only "about 2 percent" of the cases was advance knowledge
of any activity-legal or illegal-obtained.l08
-One of the main reasons advanced for expanded collection of
intelligence about urban unrest and anti-war protest was to help responsible
officials cope with possible violence. However, a former
'White House official with major duties in this area under the .Johnson
administration has concluded, in retrospect, that "in none of these
situations ... would advance intelligence about dissident groups
[have] been of much help," that what was needed was "physical intelligence"
about the geography of major cities, and that the attempt to
"predict violence" was not a "successful undertaking." 109
-Domestic intelligence reports have sometimes even been counterproductive.
A local police chief, for example, described FBI reports
which led to the positioning of federal troops near his city as:
... almost completely composed of unsorted and unevaluated
stories, threats, and rumors that had crossed my desk in
New Haven. Many of these had long before been discounted
by our Intelligence Division. But they had made their way
from New Haven to 'Washington. had gained completely unwarranted
credibility, and had been submitted by the Director
of the FBI to the President of the United States.
They seemed to present a convincing picture of impending
holocaust.110
In considering its recommendations. the Committee undertook an
evaluation of the FBI's claims that domestic intelligence was necessary
to combat terrorism, civil disorders, "subversion," and hostile
106 This fi~ure is the number of "investigatiw matters" handled by the FBI
in this area. induding as separate items the im'estigative leads in particular
casf'S "'hich arf' followf'd up by various field officf's. (FBI memorandum to
Sf>]f'C't Committee. 10/6/75,)
107 Schackf']ford 2/13/76. p. 32. This official doeR not recall any targets of "subvf>
orsin'" investi~ations having been even referred to a Grand Jury under these
statutf's sincf' the 1950s,
108 "FBI Domestic Intf'lligence Opf'rations-Their Purpose and Scope: Issues
That Need To Be Resol,'ed." Report by the Comptroller General to the House
,Judiciary Committee. 2/24/76. pp. 138-147. The FBI eontends that thf'sf' statistics
ma.. he unfair in that the;> concentrate on investig-ationR of individuals
rathf'r than ~roupR. (Ihid .. Appendix V) In response. GAO states that its
"sample of org-anization and control filf'R was Rufficient to determine that generally
the FBI (lid not rf'p'lrt advance knowled~e of planned violf'nce." In most of the
fonrtef'n im,tances whf're such advance knowledg-e was ohtained. it related to
"s11ch a"th'itips as spppches. demonstrations or meetiugs-all essentially nonviolpnt."
!Ihid.. p, 144)
100 Joseph Califano tf'stimon;>. 1/27/76. pp. 7-8.
110 .James Ahern testimony. 1/20/76. pp. 16. 17.
20
foreign intelligence activity. The Committee reviewed voluminous
materials bearing on this issue and questioned Bureau officials, local
police officials, and present and former federal executive officials.
'\'e ha \'e found that ,,'e an' in fundamental agreenwnt "'ith the
,,'isdom of _Htol'lley General Stone's initial warning that intelligence
ageneies must not be "cOl1('ern('(l ",ith politieal or other opinions of
indivi(luals" an(l lllUSt be limited to inwstigating essentially only
"stICh con(lucf as is forbi(lden by the la,,'s of tlw Unitrd States." The
Committre's l'l'cord delllonstrat(:s that domestic intrlligence which departs
from this standard raises grave risks of undermining the democratic
1)1'ocess and harming tlw intprrsts of individual citizens. This
danger m'ighs Il('a \'i ly against the sprculative or }lPgligible benefits of
tIll' ill-(lefined and owrbroa(l i]l\"estigations authorized in the past.
Thus. tlw basic purposr of tIl(' re('omlllendations contained in Part IV
of this rcport is to lilllit the FBI to inn'stigating conduct rather than
id('as or associations.
'I'll(' excesses of the past do not, howevrr. justify dE'priving the
rnitp(l StatE'S of a clearlv defined and ett'ectiwlv ('ontrol]('(l domestic
intelligE'ncc capability. The intelligence sen'ices 'of this nation's international
adversaries continue to attempt to conduct clandestine espionage
operations \\'ithin the {-nited Statps.!l1 Our recommendations
provide for intelligence investigations of hostile foreigl] intelligence
activity.
)Ior~'on'r. terrorists han' engaged in serious acts of violence which
han' In'ought death and injury to Anwrieans awl threaten further such
acts. Tll('s(~ acts. not the politics or helids of those who would cOJIIlllit
tllPm. are the proper focus for innstigations to anticipate terrorist
violP!1ce. "'eeor(lingly, the COlllmittee ,vouM permit properly contl'OlJed
intelligE'nce inYestigations in those nalTOw circumstances. lIZ
Concentration on imminent violrnce can avoi(l thr wastrful dis1)('
rsion of reSO\11"('ps which has characterizp(l tIl(' sWPp]lino: (and fl'11itless)
domestic intelligence investigations of the past. But the most
important reason for the fundanwntal change in the domestic intrlJigence
operations which our H('('olllll1enclations propose is the
nePQ to protect the constitutional rights o~ Americans.
III licrht. of the rrrord of ahuse rewalr(l hy Oll!' inlfuiry, the ComIllittpe
is not satisfied "'ith tIl(' position that JlJr]'e expOSllrr of "'hat
has occurred in the past will prrvE'nt its recurrence. Clear legal
stan<1anls and effpctiH' oH'rsin-ht and eontrols al'(' 11('~':'sal'V (0 en iI '('
that domrstic intrJligence a~,tivitv does not itsplf nndrrminr the
<1Plllocratie systelll it i~ intelHled to in'oted.
111 An indiC'ation of the scopp of tllP prohlpm is thp inC'rpasing' nnmher of oflkial
rpprpspntath'ps of C'omlllnnist goyprnments in the l'nitpd Rtatps, For exnmple.
thp nlllnhpr of Royipt offieia]s in this conntn- has inC'rpaspd froIII 333 in 1961 to
1.07\} hy par];> 1975. Thpl'p wprp 2.('>1<3 F.ast-W:pst pxeham:-p yisitors and V\OO ('()Illmprf'ial
yisitors in 1974. (FBI !\Ipmornndnm. "IntplligenC'e Actiyities Within the
Pnitpd Rtatps h;> Forpign Govprnmpnts." 3/20/71\.)
112 AC'C'ording to the FBI. tllPre Werp i'9 homhings attrihlltnh]p to tprrorist
nC'th'ity in 197;'). as pOlllpared ,,'ith 4;) in 1974 am] 24 in 19n. f;ix pprsnns died in
terrnrist-"]nim"d hornhings nnd 71l persons werp injnrpd in ]971\, Fi,'p otlH'r dpnths
,,'er<> rpportpd in otllPr t~'pps of tprrorist inC'i(]pnts. !\Ionptnr, dnmagp rpport('(] in
t<'ITori,,1 hnmIJings pxC'ppdpd 2,7 million do]]nrs, It ShOllld hI' notpd. ho,,'pypr, thnt
tprrm'i"t homhilurs nrp on], n fradion of thp total nnmllPr of homhings in thi"
{'onntn', TIms. tlw i'9 tprrori"t homhings in 197;; ,,'prp amOllP' n tota1 nf m'pl'
1.900 homhings, most of whiC'h ,,'prp not. nC'C'ording to thp FBI. nttrihntah]p
de"r]y to terrorist actiyity. (FBI memorandum to Senate Sp!pct Committee.
2/23/76,)

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