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D. USING COVERT ACTION TO DISRUPT AND DISCREDIT DOMESTIC GROUPS MAJOR FINDING The Committee finds that covert action programs have been used to disrupt the lawful political activities of individual Americans and groups and to discredit them, using dangerous and degrading tactics which are abhorrent in a free and decent society. 8ubfindings (a) Although the claimed purposes of these action programs were to protect the national security and to prevent violence, many of the victims were concededly nonviolent, were not controlled by a foreign power, and posed no threat to the national security. (b) The acts taken interfered with the First Amendment rights of citizens. They were explicitly intended to deter citizens from joining groups, "neutralize" those who were already members, and prevent or inhibit the expression of ideas. (c) The tactics used against Americans often risked l1nd sometimes caused serious emotional, economic, or physical damage. Actions were taken which were designed to break up marriages, terminate funding or employment, and encourage gang warfare between violent rival groups. Due process of law forbids the use of such covert tactics, whether the victims are innocent law-abiding citizens or members of groups suspected of involvement in violence. . (d) The sustained use of such tactics by the FBI in an attempt to destroy Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., violated the law and fundamental human decency. Elaboration of the Findings For fifteen years from 1956 until 1971, the FBI carried out a series of covert action programs directed against American citizens.l These "counterintelligence programs" (shortened to the acronym COINTELPRO) resulted in part from frustration with Supreme Court rulings limiting the Government's power to proceed overtly against dissident groups.2 1 Before 1956 the FBI engaged in acti,ities to disrupt and discredit Communists and (before World War II) Fascists. but not as part of a formal program. The Bureau is the only agency which carried on a sustainE'd effort to "nE'utralize" domE'stic groups. althou!!h othE'r agE'ncies madE' sporadic attE'mpts to disrupt dissidE'nt groups. (SE'e Military Sur,E'ilIancE' RE'port ; IRS Report.) • The Bureau personnel in,ol,ed in COINTELPRO link the first formal counterintelligencE' program. against thp Communist Party. USA. to the SuprE'me Court re,ersal of the Smith Act con'ictions. which "made it impossihle to prosecute Communist Party memhers at the timE'''. (COTKTELPRO unit chief. 10/16/75, p. 14.) It should be noted. hmw,er, that thE' Court's re,ersal occurred in 191)7. the yE'ar after the program wa~ instituted. This helief in the deficiencies of the law was a major factor in the four subsequE'nt programs as well: "ThE' othE'r COT:"ITELPRO programs WE'rE' opE'nPd as thE' thrE'at arosE' in arE'as of extrE'mism and suh,E'rsion and thE'rE' WE'rE' not aOE'quatE' statutE's to prOCf'E'd against thE' organization or to pre,ent their acti'itiE's." (COINTELPRO Unit Chief, 10/16/75, p. 15.) (211 ) 212 They ended formally in 1971 with the threat of public exposure.s Some of the findings discussed herein are related to the findings on lawlessness, overbreadth, and intrusive techniques previously set forth. Some of the most offensive actions in the FBI's COT~TEL PRO programs (anonymous letters intended to break up marriages, or efforts to deprive people of their jobs, for example) were based upon the covert use of information obtained through owrly-broad investigations and intrusin techniques.4 Similarly, as noted abm-e, COINTELPRO involnd specific violations of law. and the law and the Constitution were "not [given] a thought" under the FBI's policies.5 But COIKTELPRO ,vas more than simply violating the law or the Constitution. In COINTELPRO the Bureau secretly G took the law into its own hands, going beyond the collection of inte'lligence and beyond its law enforcement function to act outside the legal process altogether and to covertly disrupt, discredit and harass groups and individuals. A law enforcement agency must not secretly usurp the functions of judge and jury, even when the investigation reveals criminal activity. But in COINTELPRO, the Bureau imposed summary punishment, not only on the allegedly violent, but also on the nonviolent advocates of change. Such action is the hallmark of the vigilante and has no place in a democratic society. Under COINTELPRO, certain techniques the Bureau had used against hostile foreign agents were adopted for use against perceived domestic threats to the established political and social order.7 Some of the targets of COINTELPRO were law-abiding citizens merely advocating change in our society. Other targets were members 3 For further information on the termination of each of the programs, see The Accountability and Control Findings, p. 265 and the detailed reports on the Black Panther Party and COINTELPRO. Although the programs have been formally terminated, Bureau witnesses agree that there is a "grey area" between "counter-intelligence" and investigative activities which are inherently disruptive. These investi!!:ative activities continue. (See COI~TELPROReport: "Command and Control-The Problems of Oversight.") • Information gained from electronic surveillance. informant coverage, burglaries, and confidential financial records was used in COI~TELPRO. p.275.) • Moore, 11/3/75, p. 83. e Field offices were instructed that no one outside the Bureau was to know that COINTELPRO existed, although certain persons in the executive branch and in Congress were told about-and did not objert t()----('fforts to disrupt the CPlTSA and the Klan. However. no one was told about the other COIXTELPRO pro!!:rams, or about the more dangerous and degrading techniques employed. (See p. 275.) 7 As the Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section put it : "You can trace [the origins of COINTELPROJ up and hack to foreign intel· ligence, particularly penetration of the group by the individual informant. Before yOIl can engage in counterintelligenre you must have intelligence.... If you have good intelligence and know what it's going to do. you can seed distrust, sow misinformation. The same technique is used, misinformation. disruption. is used in the domestic groups, although in the domestic groups you are dealing in '67 and '68 with many, many more across the country ... than you had ever dealt "'ith as far as your foreign groups." (Moore, 11/3/7;-;. pp. 32-33.) Former Assistant Director 'William C. Sullivan also testified that the "rough, tough, dirty business" of forei!!:ll counterintelligence was "hrought home against any organization against which we were targeted. 'Ve did not differentiate." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 97-98.) 213 of groups that had been involved in violence, such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Black Panther Party. Some victims did nothing more than associate with targets.8 The Committee does not condone acts of violence, but the response of Government to allegations of illegal conduct must comply with the due process of law demanded by the Constitution. Lawlessness by citizens does not justify lawlessness by GOYernment. The tactics which were employed by the Bureau are therefore unacceptable, even against the alleged criminal. The imprecision of the targeting compounded the abuse. Once the Gm-ernnwnt decided to take the law into its own hands, those unacceptable tactics came almost inevitably to be used not only against the "kid with the bomb" but also against the "kid with the bumper sticker." 9 8ubfiruling (a) Although the claimed purposes or these action programs were to protect the "national security" and to prevent violence, many of the victims were concededly nonviolent, were not c.ontrolled by a foreign power, 'and posed no threat to the "national security." The Bureau conducted five "counterintelligence programs" aimed against domestic groups: the "Communist Party, USA" program (1956-71); the "Socialist Workers Party" program (1961-69); the "White Hate" program (1964-1971); the "Black Nationalist-Hate Group" program (1967-71); and the "New Left" program (1968-71). "While the declared purposes of these programs were to protect the "national security" or prevent violence, Bureau witnesses admit that many of the targets were nonviolent and most had no connections with a foreign power. Indeed, nonviolent organizations and individuals were targeted because the Bureau believed they represented a "potential" for violence 10 and nonviolent citizens who were against the war in Vietnam were targeted because they gave "aid and comfort" to violent demonstrators by lending respectability to their causeY The imprecision of the targeting is demonstrated by the inability of the Bureau to define the subjects of the programs. The Black Nationalist program, according to its supervisor, included "a great number of organizations that you might not today characterize as black nationalist but which were in fact primarily black." 12 Thus, the nonviolent Southern Christian Leadership Conference was labeled as a Black Nationalist-"Hate Group." Furthermore, the actual targets were chosen from a far broader group than the titles of the programs would imply. The CPUSA program targeted not only Communist Party members but also sponsors of the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American 8 For example, parents and spouse, of targets received letters containing accuf'ationf' of immoral conduct hy the target. (:\I€'morandum from St. Louis Fi€'ld Office to FBI Headquarters. 1/30/70; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to ~IinneapolisField Office. 11/4/68.) • Huston. 9/23/75. Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 45. 10 Moore, 11/8/75, p. 37. 11 New Lpft supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 69. " Black Nationalist Supervisor, 10/17/75, p.12. 214 Activities Committee 14 and civil rights leaders allegedly under Communist influence or not deemed to be "anti-Communist".15 The Socialist ,Vorkers Party program included non-SWP sponsors of antiwar demonstrations which were cosponsored by the S,VP or the Young Socialist Alliance, its youth group.16 The Black :Nationalist program targeted a range of organizations from the Panthers to SKCC to the peaceful Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and included every Black Student Union and many other black student grollpsY Xew Left targets ranged from the SDS 18 to the InterUniversity Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy,19 from Antioch College ("vanguard of the New Left") 20 to the New :Mexico Free University and other "alternate" schools,21 and from underground newspapers 22 to students protesting unh'ersity censorship of a student publication by carrying signs with four-letter words on them.2l Subfinding (b) The acts taken interfered with the First Amendment rights of citizens. They were explicitly intended to deter citizens from joining H For example, the entire Unitarian Society of Cleveland was targeted because the minister and some members circulated a petition calling- for the abolition of HUAC. and because the Church gave office space to the "Citizens for Constitutional Rights". (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64.) 15 See Finding on "Overbreadth" p. 181. 13 For instance, the Bureau targeted two non-member students who participated in an anti-war "hunger strike" at Oberlin. which was "guided and directed" by the Young Socialists Alliance. The students' parents received anonymous letters, purportedly from a friend of their sons. One letter expressed concern that a group of "left wing students" were "cynically using" the boy, which would lead to "injury" to his health and "damage to his academic standing". The other letter also stated that it was motivated by concern for "damage" to the student's "health and personal future" and "the belief that you may not be aware of John's current involvement in left-wing activities." (Memorandum from FBI headquarters to CleYeland Field Office, 11/29/68.) 17 One proposal sought to expose Black Student Union Chapters as "breeding grounds for racial militancy" by an anonymous mailing to "all institutions where there are BSU chapters or incipient chapters". (Memorandum from Portland Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/68.) 18 For example Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 10/31/68. ,. An anonymous letter was sent to "influE'ntial" ~nchigan political figures, the mass media, UnivE'rsity of ~Iichigan administrators, and the Board of RE'gents, in an attempt to "discredit and nE'utralize" the "communist actiyities" of the IUCDl<'P. The letter decried the "undue publicity" given anti-war protest activities which "undoubtedly give 'aid and comfort· to the E'nemy" and encourage the Vietcong- and the Korth Vietnamese in "refusing to come to the bargaining table". The letter continued, "I wonder if the strateg-y is to bleed the United StateR white hy prolonging the war in Vietnam and pave the way for a takeover by Russia?" (~Iemorandumfrom Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 10/11/ 66: Memorandum from FBI Headquarters. to Detroit Field Office 10/26/66.) 20 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office. 6/18/68. 01 The New Mexico Free l'niYersity was targeted because it taught such courses as "confrontation politics" and "draft counselling". (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to AllJUquerquE' Field OfficE'. 3/19/69.) In another case, an "alternatE''' Rchool for studE'nts "aged five and he~-ond", which was cO-Rponsored by the ACLU, was targ-eted becauRe "from the staff being assembled, it appears that the school will be a :'\ew Left venture and of a radical revolutionan' nature". The Burenu contacted n confidential source in the bank financing the school HO that he could "take stepR to dise-ourag-e its deYelopments". (:\Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Olfie-e. 7/23/69. 22 See e,g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 11/14/69. .. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to )finneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68. 215 groups~ "neutralize~' those who were already members, and prevent or inhibit the expression of ideas. In achieving its purported goals of protecting the national security and preventing violence. the Bureau attempted to deter membership in the target groups. As the supenisor of the "Black Nationalist" CO IXTELPRO stated, "Obviously~you are going to prevent violence or a greater amount of violence if you have smaller groups." 24 The chief of the COIXTELPRO unit agreed: ",Ye also made an effort ... to deter recruitment where we could. This was done with the view that if ,ve could curb the organization. we could curb the action or the violence within the organization." 20 As noted above~ many of the organizations "curbed" were not violent, and covert attacks on group membership contravened the First Amendment~sguarantee of freedom to associate. Nor ,vas this the only First Amendment right violated by the Bureau. In addition to attempting to prevent people from joining or continuing to be members in target organizations, the Bureau tried to "deter or counteract" what it called "propaganda" 26-the expression of ideas which it considered dangerous. Thus, the originating document for the "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO noted that "consideration should be given to techniques to preclude" leaders of the target organizations "from spreading their philosophy publicly or through various mass communication media." 21 Instructions to "preclude" free speech were not limited to "black nationalists;" they occurred ill every program. In the New Left program, for instance, approximately thirty-nine percent of all actions attempted to keep targets from speaking, teaching, writing, or publishing.28 The cases included attempts (sometimes successful) to prompt the firing of university and high school teachers; 29 to prevent targets from speaking on campus; 30 to stop chapters of target groups from 2< Black Nationalist supervisor, 10/17/75, p. 24. .. COINTELPRO unit chief, 10/12/75, p. 54. 2lI ('OIXTELPRO unit chief, 10/12/75, p. 54. 27 :\IE'morandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/25/67. .. The FBI was not the only intelligence agency to attempt to prevent the propagation of ideas with which it disagreed, but it was the only one to do so in any organizE'd way. The IRS responded to Congressional and Administration pressure by targeting political organizations and dissidents for audit. The CIA improperly obtained the tax returns of Ramparts magazine after it learned that thE' mngazinE' intended to puhlish an article revenling- Agency support of the NationnlStudE'nt Association. The CIA saw the article as "an attack on CIA in pnrticular and thE' Adminii'tration in gE'neral." (CIA memorandum re: "IRS BriE'fing on Ramparti'," 2/2/67.) ,. For ini'tanC'e. a high i'C'hool English tE'aC'hE'r wai' targetE'd for inviting two POE'ts to attend a cIai'i' at hii' schoo!. ThE' poets were noted for their efforts in the (haft rE'i'istancE' movE'mE'nt. The BurE'au sent anonymous IE'tters to two local nE'WRpapen;, the Bonrd of FJducation, anrl thE' school hoard. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pitti'burgh Fipld OfficE'. 6/19/00.) 30 In onE' case, thE' BnrE'an attE'mptE'd to stop a "Communist" spE'aker from appparing on campns. The f<poni'oring organization wE'nt to court and won an ordpr nE'rmitting- the lE'eturE' to procE'ed as schE'duled: the BnrE'au then in,estigatE'd thE' jndgE' who ii'i'lWd thE' orrlE'r. (:\[E'morandnm from DE'troit FiE'ld OfficE' to FBI HE'ndqnartE'rs. 10/:?6/flO: 1IE'morandnm from FBI HE'arlQuartE'rs to Detroit FiE'lrl Offif'E', 10/2i/60. 10/21'/. 10/31/60; :\[l'morandum from F. J. Bnum!!:ardner to A. H. Belmont, 10/26/60.) 216 being formed; 31 to prevent the distribution of books, newspapers, or periodicals; 32 to disrupt or cancel news conferences; 33 to interfere with peaceful demonstrations, including the SCLC's Poor People's Campaign and 'Washington Spring Project and most of the large anti-war marches; 34 and to deny facilities for meetings or conferences.35 As the above cases demonstrate, the FBI was not just "chilling" free speech, but squarely attacking it. The tactics used against Americans often risked and sometimes caused serious emotional, economic, or physical damage. Actions were taken which were designed to break up marriages, terminate funding or employment, and encourage gang warfare between violent rival groups. Due process of law forbids the use of such covert tactics whether the victims are innocent law-abiding citizens or members of groups suspected of involvement in violence. The former head of the Domestic Intelligence Division described counterintelligence as a "rough, tough, dirty, and dangerous" business. 36 His description was accurate. One technique used in COINTELPRO involved sending anonymous letters to spouses intended, in the words of one proposal, to "produce ill-feeling and possibly a lasting distrust" between husband and wife, so that "concern over what to do about it" would distract the target from "time spent in the plots and plans" of the organization. 3 ' The image of an agent of the United States Government scrawling a poison-pen letter to someone's wife in language usually reserved for bathroom walls is not a happy one. Nevertheless, anonymous let- S! The Bureau tried on several occasions to prevent the formation of campus chapters of SDS and the Young Socialist Alliance. (See, e.g., Memorandum from San Antonio Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/1/69; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 5/1/69.) .. For example, an anonymous letter to a state legislator protested the distribution on campus of an underground newspaper's "depravity", (Memorandum from Newark Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/23/69 ; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Newark Field Office, 6/4/69) and thhe Bureau anonymously contacted the landlady of premisps rented by two "New Left" n"wspapers in an attempt to have them evicted. (Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 9/23/68.) 13 For example, a confidential source in a radio station was contactpd in two successful attempts to cancel news conferences. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 10/1/65; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Officp 10/4/65; Memorandum from Boston Fil'ld Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/5/64 ; Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 6/25/64.) .. For instancp, the Burpau used the standard counterespionagp tpchnique of "disinformation" against demonstrators. In one case. the Chica~o FielO Office duplicatpd blank forms soliciting housing for demonstrators coming to Chicago for thl' Democratic National Convl'ntion, fiIll'd them out with fictitious namPfl and addresses and sent them to the organizers. Demonstratorfl reportpdly made "lilng anf! Uflpl/"sS journeys til locate thpse addresses." (l\!pillilrandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Hl'adquarters. 9/9/68.) The same program was carried out by the Washington Field Office when housing forms were distributed for demonstrators coming to the 1969 Presidential inaue-ural cpremonies. (Ml'morandum from FBI Headquarters til Washington Fil'ld Office. 1110/fl.<l.) Army intelljgpnce agents occasionally took similar. put wholly llnauthorizpd action, sel' Military Surveillance Report: Section III: "Domesttic Radio Monitoring by ASA: 19671970." .. Mpmorandllm from FBI Headquarters to San Diego field officp, 9/11/69. .. Sullivan. 11/1/75, pp. 97-98. '" Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/14/69. 217 tel'S werl?, sent to, among; others, a Klansman's wife, informing her that hrr husband had "taken the flesh of another unto himsel!," the other person being; a woman named Ruby, with her "lust filled eyes and smart alerk figur(';" 3S and to a "Black Nationalist's" wif(' sayinO' that her husband "been maken it here" with other women in his Ol~ ganization "and than he gives us this jivc bout their better in bed then you." 39 A husband who was concerned about his wife's activities in a biracial group received a letter which started, "Look man I guess your old lady doesn't get enough at home or she wouldn't be shucking and jiving with our Black Men" in the group.40 The Ficld Office re~ ported as a "tangible result" of this letter that the target and her husband separated,41 The Bureau also contacted employers and funding organizations in order to cause the firing of the targets or the termination of their support.42 For example, priests who allowed their churches to be used for the Black Panther breakfast programs were targeted, and anonymous letters were sent to their bishops; 43 a television commrntator who expressed admiration for a Black Nationalist leadi:'rand criticized heavy defensi:' spending was transferred after the Bureau contacted his employer; 44 and an employee of the Urban League was fired after the FBI approached a "confidential source" in a foundation which funded the League.45 The Bureau also encouraged "gang warfare" between violent groups. An FBI memorandum dated November 25, 1968 to certain Field Offices conducting investigations of the Black Panther Party ordered recipient offices to submit "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP." Proposals were to be received every two weeks. Particular attention was to be given to capitalizing npon differences bet\veen the Panthers and US, Inc. (an other "Black Nationalist" group), which had reached such proportions that "it is taking on the aura of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals." 45a Oil )lay 26, 1970, after U.S. organization members had killed four BPP members and members of each organization had been shot and beaten by members of the other, the Field Office reported: Information received from local sources indicate[s] that, in general, the membership of the Los Angeles TIPP is physically afraid of US members and take premeditated precautions to avoid confrontations. 38 Memornndum from Richmond Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 8/26/66. 39 The wife who received this letter was described in the Field Office proposal as "faithful ... an intelligent respectable young mother who is active in the A~IE ~Iethodist Church." (~Iemorandumfrom St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/14/69.) 40 ~Iemorandum from St. Loui" Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/30/70. 41 Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/19/70. '2 "'hen the target" were tf'achers, the intf'nt was to prevent the propagation of ideas. In the case of other employer contacts, the purpose was to stop a source of funds. '" ~Iemorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 11/12/69; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office. 9/9/69. .. ").Iemorand1llu from FBI Headquarter" to <:incinnati Fif'ld Office. 312Sj69. 45l\I('mornndnm from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 3/3/69. 45. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office, 11/25/68. 218 In view of their anxieties, it is not presently felt that the Los Angeles BPP can be prompted into what could result in an internecine struggle between the two organizations. . . . The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile feelings harbored between the organizations and the first opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized. It is intended that US Inc. will be appropriately and discreetly advised of the time and location of BPP activities in order'that the two organizations might be brought together and thus qrant nature the opportunity to take her due couTse.46 [Emphasis added.] A second Field Office noted: Shootings, boo,tings and a high degree of unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of Southeast San Diego. Although no specific counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this overall situation, it is felt that a substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributable to 'Ohis programY In another case, an anonymous letter was sent to the leader of the Blackstone Rangers (Ia group, according to the Field Offices' proposal, "to whom violent-type activity, shooting, and the like are second nature") advising him that "the brothers that run the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's supposed to be a hit out for you." The letter was intended to "intensify the degree of animosity between the two groups" and cause "retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership." 48 Another technique which risked serious harm to the target was falsely lab~ling a target an informant. This technique was used in all five domestic COINTELPRO. When a member of a nonviolent group was sU<X\eSSfuIIy mislabeled as an informant, the result :was alienrution from the group.49 When the target belonged to a group known to have killed suspected informants, the risk was substantially more serious. On several occasions, the Bureau used this technique against members of the Black Panther Party; it was used at least twice after FBI documents expressed concern over the possible consequences because two members of the RPP had been murdered as suspected informants.5o The Bureau recognized that some techniques used in COINTELPRO were more likely than others to cause serious physical, emotional, or economic damage to the targets.51 Any proposed use of such techniques- for example, encouraging enmity between violent rival •• Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI headquarters, 5/26/70, pp.1-2. <7 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI headquarters, 9/15/69. .. Memorandum from Chicago Field Office 1:0 FBI headquarters, 1/12/69; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69. •• See, e.g" Memorandum from ,San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/30/69. 00 One proposal to label a BPP member a "pig informer" was rejected because the Panthers had recently murdered two suspected informers. The victims had not bppn targpts of a Bureau effort to label them informants. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinn'aIti Field Office, 2/18/71.) Xeverfheless, two similar proposals were implemented a month later, (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Washington Field Office. 3/19/71; ~Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to CharllYtte Field Office, 3/31/71.) 61 At least four assaults~two of them on womPIl~were rpportpd as "rpslllts" of Bureau actions. (See COINTELPRO Report, Section IV: Wartimes Technique Brought Home.) 219 groups, falsely labeling group members as informants, and mailing anonymous letters to targets' spouses accusing the target of infidelitywas scrutinized carefully by headquarters supervisory personnel, in an attempt to balance the "greater good" to be achieved by the proposal against the lmmnl or risked harm to the target. If the "good" was sufficient, the proposal was approved. For instance, in discussing anonymous letters to spouses, the agent who supervised the New Left COINTELPRO stated: [Before recommending approval] I would want to know what you want to get out of this, who are these people. If it's somebody, and say they did split up. what would accrue from it as far as disrupting the New Left is concerned? Say they broke up, what then.... [The question would be] is it worth it? 52 Similarly, with regard to causing false sllspicions that an individual was an informant, the chief of the Racial Intelligence Section stated: You haYe to be able to make decisions and I am sure that labeling somebody as an informant, that you'd want to make certain that it sE'rved a good purpose before YOIl did it and not do it haphazardly.... It is a serious thing ... As far as I am aware, in the black extrE'lllist area, by using that technique, no one was killed. I am sure of that.52a This official ,vas asked whether the fact that no one ,,'as killed was the result of "luck or planning." He answered: "Oh, it just happened that way, I am sure." 52b It is intolerable in a free society that an agency of the Government should adopt such tactics, whether or not the targets are involved in criminal -activity. The "greater good" of 'the country is in fact served by adherence to the rule of law mandated by the Constitution. Subfindi.ng (d) The sustained use of such tactics by the FBI in an attempt to destroy Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., violated the law and fundamental human decency. . The Committee devoted substantial attention to the FBI's covert action campaign against Dr. Martin Luther King because it demonstratE'S just how far the Government could go in a secret war against one citizen. In focusing upon Dr. King. hmvever, it should not be forgotten that the Bureau carried out disruptive activities against hundreds of lesser-known American citizens. It should also be borne in mind that positive action on the part of high Government officials outRide the FBI might have prevented what occurred in this case.53 The FBI's claimed justification for targeting Dr. King-alleged Communist influence on him and the civil rights movement-is examined elsewhere in this report.54 62 New Left supervisor 10/28/75, pp. 72, 74. '2. Moore, 11/3/75, p. 62. r<!b Moore, 11/3/75, p. 64. 53 Rep pp. 275-277 and 205-206 of this Rpport for a dptailpd discussion of which officials were awarp or should ha,p been aware of what 'the Burp'au was doing to Dr. King- and how their action or inaction might hayp contributed to what went on. &! See Marin Luther King Report, Section III, "Concern in the FBI and the Kennedy Administration Ovpr Allegations of Communist Influence in the Civil Rights :Yloypment Increases, and the Ji'BI Intensifies the Inyestigation: October 1962-0ctober 1963." See generally, Finding on Overbreadth, p. 175. 220 The FBI's campaign against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. began in December 1963, four months after the famous civil rights March on '\Vashington,55 "hen a nine-hour meeting was convened at FBI Headquarters to discuss various "avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as an effective Negro leader." 56 Following the meeting, agents in the field 'were instructed to "continue to gather information concerning King's personal activities ... in order that we may consider using this information at an opportune time in a counterintelligence move to discredit him." 57 About two weeks after that conference, FBI agents planted a microphone in Dr. King's bedroom at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C.58 During the next two years, the FBI installed at least fourteen more "bugs" in Dr. King's hotel rooms across the country.59 Physical and photographic surveillances accompanied some of the microphone coverage.60 The FBI also scrutinized Dr. King's tax returns, monitored his financial affairs, and even tried to determine whether he had a secret foreign bank account.61 In late 1964, a "sterilized" tape was prepared in a manner that would prevent attribution to the FBI and was "anonymously" mailed to Dr. King just before he received the Nobel Peace Prize.62 Enclosed in the package with the tape was an unsigned letter which warned Dr. King, '" The August 1963 march on Washington was the occasion of Dr. Kings "I Have a Dream" speech, on the steps of the Lincoln :\lemorial. (See memorandum from William C. SUllivan to Alan Belmont, 8/30/63, characterizing the speech as "demagogic". ) .. Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/24/63. Although FBI officials were making derogatory references to Dr. King and passing personal information about Dr. King to their superiors. (Memorandum from Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach, 8/13/63.) Prior to December 1963, the Committee had discovered no document reflecting a strategy to deliberately discredit him prior to the memorandum relating to the December 1963 meeting. 67 Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/24/63. 58 The microphone was installed on January 5, 196! (Memoranoum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/6/64.), just da:vs after Dr. King's picture appeared on the cover of Time magazine as "Man of the Year." (Time Magazine, January 3, 1964.) Reading of the Time magazine award, the Director had written, "They had to dig deep in the garbage to come up with this one." (Note on UP release, 12/29/63.) •• FBI memoranda make clear that microphones were one of the techniQuell being used in the effort to obtain information about Dr. Kinl\"s private life. (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to 'William C. Sullivan 1/28/64.) The microphones were installed at the following plaeE'\S: Wa.~hinnton: Willard Hotel (Jan. 1964); Milwaukee: Shroeder Hotel (Jan. 1964) ; Honolulu: Hilton Hawaiian Village (Feb. 1964); Detroit: Statler Hotel (March 1964); Sacramento: Senator Motel (Apr. 1964) ; New York Cit?!: Park Sheraton Hotel (Jan. 1965), Americana Hotel (Jan. ann Nov. 196i'l), Sheraton Atlantie Hotel (May 1965). Astor Hotel (Oct. 196;')), New York Hilton Hotel (Oct. 1965). 60 FBI summary memorandum, 10/3/75: memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/26/64; memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 2/22/64; and unsigned memorandum, 2/28/64. Oll\Iemorandum from F, J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/27/64; memoranoum from New York Fielo Offiee to FBI HeadQuarters, 6/2/64; memorandum from F. ,J. Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 7/14/60. 62 Sullivan 11/1/75, pp. 104-105, staff summary of a speeial al\'ent interview, 7/25/75. Three days before the tape was maileo. Direetor Hoover had publicly branded Dr. King "the most notorious liar in the country" ann Dr. King hao responded with a critieism of the Bureau. Dlemornndnm from Cnl't1lfl DeLoach to John :\Iohr, 11/18/64; telegram from Martin Luther King to J. Edgar Hoover 11/19/64.) 221 "your end is approaching ... you are finished." The letter intimated ~hat the tape might be publicly released, and closed with the followmg message: King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is. You have just 34 days in which to do (this exact number has been selected for a specific reason, it has definite practical significance) . You are done. There is but one way out for you ...63 Dr. King's associates have said he interpreted the message as an effort to induce him to commit suicide.64 At about the same time that it mailed the "sanitized': tape: the FBI was also apparently otlering tapes and transcripts to newsmen.65 Later when civil rights leaders Roy ·Wilkim and .James Farmer went to ·Washington to persuade Bureau officials to halt the FBI's discrediting efforts,GG they ,vere told that "if King wantrs] war we [are] prepared to give it to him." 67 Shortly thereafter, Dr. King went to Europe to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. The Bureau tried to undermine ambassadorial receptions in several of the countries he visited,G8 and when he returned to the 03 This paragraph appears in a document in the form of a letter which the FBI has supplied to the Committee and which the Bureau maintains was discovered in the files of former Assistant Director Sullivan. (FBI memorandum to the Select Committee, 9/18/75.) Sullivan stated that he did not recall the letter and suggested that it may have been "planted" in his files by his former colleagues. (Sullivan 11/1/75, p. 104.) Congressman Andrew Young has informed the Committee that an identical paragraph was contained in the letter which was actually received by Dr. King with the tape, and that the letter the committee had, supplied by the Bureau, appears to be an "early draft." (Young, 2/19/76, p.36.) Sullivan said that the purpose of sending the tape was "to blackmail King into silence ... to stop him from criticising Hoover; ... to diminish his stature. In other words, if it caused a break between Coretta and "Martin Luther King, that would diminish his stature. It would weaken him as a leader." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, 11/26/75, p. 152.) .. Young. 2/19/76, p. 37, Time magazine had reported earlier in the year that Dr. King had attempted suicide twice as a child. ['.rime magazine, Jan. 4, 1964.] .. Several newsmen have informed the Committee that they were offered this kind of material or that they were aware that such material was available. Some have refused to identify the individuals who made the offers and others bave said they could not recall their identities. Former FBI officials have denied that tapes or transcripts were offered to the press (e.g., DeLoach testimony, 11/28/75, p. 152) and the Bureau maintains that their files contain no documents reflecting that this occurred. •• Staff interviews of Roy Wilkins, 11/23/75, and ,Tames Farmer, 11/13/75. '7 Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 11/27/64; staff interview of James Farmer, 11/13/75. Three days after Wilkins' meeting wifh DeLoach, Dr. King asked to see the Director. telling the press "the time has come to bring this controversy to an end." (UPI release, 12/1/B4) Dr. King and Hoover met the following day; the meeting was described as "amicable." (Memoranda from Cartha DeLoach to .Tohn Mohr, 12/1/64 and 12/2/64.) Despite the "amicable" meeting. the Bureau's campaign against Dr. King continued. .. Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 11/30/64; memorandum from Legat to FBI Headquarters, 12/10/64. Steps were also taken to thwart a meeting which Dr. King was planning to haye with a foreig-n leader durin.1!: this same trip (Memorandum from F . .T. Baumgardner to William C. RulliYflll. 11/10/64; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Legat, 11/10/64), and to influence a pendin.1!: USIA derision to send Dr. King on a ten-day lecture trip in Africfl after rpceiving thp Nobel Prize. (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 11/12/64.) 222 United States, took steps to diminish support for a banquet and a special "day" being planned in his honor.G9 The Bureau's actions against Dr. King included attempts to preyent him from meeting with world leaders, receiying honors or fayorable publicity, and gaining financial support. 'When the Bureau learned of a possible meeting between Dr. King and the Pope in August 1964, the FBI asked Cardinal Spellman to try to arrange a cancellation of the audience,7° Discovering that two schools (Springfield College and Marquette University) were going to honor Dr. King with special degrees in the spring of 1964, Bureau agents tried to convince officials at the schools to rescind their plans.l1 And when the Bureau learned in October 1966 that the Ford Foundation might grant three million dollars to Dr. King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, they asked a former FBI agent who was a high official at the Ford Motor Company to try to block the award.a A magazine was asked not to publish favorable articles about him.73 Religious leaders and institutions were contacted to undermine their support of him.74 Press conference questions were prepared and dis- •• The Bureau was in touch with Atlanta Constitution publisher Ralph McGill, and tried to obtain the assistance of the Constitution's editor, Eugene Patterson, to undermine the banquet. (Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/21/64; staff summary of Eugene Patterson interview, 4/30/75.) A governor's assistance was sought in the effort to "water down" the "King day." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/2/65.} 70 The Bureau had decided it would be "astounding" for Dr. King to have an audience with the Pope and that plans for any such meeting should be "nipped in the bud." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 8/31/64.) When the Bureau failed to block the meeting and the press reported that the audience was about to occur, the Director noted that this was "astounding." (FBI Director's notation on UPI release, 9/18/64). FBI officials took immediate steps to determine "if there could possihly have been a slip-up." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 9/17/64.) 71 Tile Bureau had decided that it would be "shocking indeed that the possibility exists that King may receive an Honorary Degree from the same institution (Marquette) which honored the Director with such a Degree in ]950." With respect to Springfield College, where the Director had also been offered an honorary degree, the Bureau's decision about whom to contact included the observation that "it would not appear to be prudent to attempt to deal with" the President of the college because he "is very close to Sargent Shriver." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/4/64; and 4/2/64; memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 4/8/64.) 7lI Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 10/25/66 and 10/26/66. At about the same time. the Bureau leaked a story to the press about Dr. King's intention to seek financial assistance from Teamsters Union President .James R. Hoffa because "[d]iselosure would be mutually embarrassing to both men and probably cause King's quest for badly needed funds to fAil in this instance." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 10/28/66.) The Bureau also tried to block the National Scil'nel' Foundation (]\,RF) from dealing with the SCLC. "It is ineredible that an outfit Ruch aR the SCLC Rhould be utiliZl'd for thl' purposl' of rl'cruiting- Nl'grol's to takl' part in the NSF prog-ram. particularly where funds of the U.S. Government arl' involved." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 12/17/64.) 7' Memorandum from Special Agent to Cartha DeLoach, 11/3/64. 7' "It is Rhocking indeed that King continueR to be honored by religious groups." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan. 2/1/65.) Contacts were made with representatives of the National Council of Churches of Christ, the Baptist World Alliance. the American Church in Paris. and Catholie Church. (Memoranda from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 6/12/64. 12/15/64 And 2/16/64; memorandum from F . .T. Baumgardner to 'William C. Rullivan. 2/18/66: memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/24/66, and 223 tributed to "friendly" journalists.75 And plans were even discussed for sabotaging his political campaign in the eyent he decided to run for national office. 7G An SCLC employee ,vas "anonymously" informed that the SCLC was trying to get rid of hrr "so that the Bureau [would be] in a position to capitalize on [her] bittrrness." 78 Bureau officials contacted members of Congress/9 and special "off the record" testimony was prepared for the Director's usc before the House Appropriations Committee.8o The "neutralization" program continued until Dr. King's dE'ath. As late as :March 1968, FBI agents were being instructed to neutralize Dr. King because he might become a "messiah" who could "unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement" if he were to "abandon his supposed 'obedience' to 'white liberal cloctrines' (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism." 81 Steps were taken to subvert the "Poor People's Campaign" which Dr. King was planning to lead in the spring of 1968.82 Even after Dr. King's death, agents in the field 'Yere proposing methods for harassing his ,vidow,83 and Bureau officials were trying to prevent his birthday from becoming a national holiday.84 The actions taken against Dr. King are indefensible. They represent a sad episode in the dark history of covert actions directed against law abiding citizens by a la,v enforcement agency. memorandum from Legat, Paris, to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/66 and 5/9/66,) The Director did disapprove a suggestion that religious leaders bE' permitted "to listen to sources we have" (FBI Director's note on memorandum from Jones to Thomas Bishop, 12/8/64.) 75l\Iemorandum from Charles Brennan to William C. SUllivan, 3/8/67. The Bureau also disseminated to "friendly media sources" a newspaper article which was critical of Dr. King's position on the Vietnam war. The stated purposes were to "publicize King as a traitor to his country and his race," and to "reduce his income," (memorandum from George C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 10/18/67.) "Background information" was also given to at least one wire service (memorandum from Sizoo to William C. SUllivan, 5/24/65). 76l\Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Xew York Field Office 5/18/67. There has been rumors about a "peace ticket" headed by Dr. King and Benjamin Spock. 78 :\Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 4/13/64; mpmorandum from Xew York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/2/64. ":\Iemorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John :\Iohr, 8/14/65; memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 1/10/67. &J :\Ipmorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 1/22/64; mPlllorandum from :\'icholas Callahan to .Tohn ::\Iohr. 1/31/64. On one occasion t11f' testimony leaked to other members of Congress, prompting the Director to note. "Someone on Rooney's Committee certainly betrayed the secrecy of the 'off the record' testimony I ~aYe re: Kin~." (Director's note on memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 3/16/64.) 81 :\fpmorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 3/4/68. a2 Memorandum from George C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 3/26/68. '" :\[elllorandum from Atlanta Fipld Office to FBI Hpadquarters, 3/18/69. .. :\Ipmoranda: Frolll Gpor~p C. :\Ioore to William C. Slllliyan, 1/17/69: and from Jones to Thomas Bishop, 3/18/69. Steps were even taken to prevent the issuance of "comnlPmorative medals." (MemQrandum from Jones to Thomas Bishop, 5/22/68.)
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