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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

E. POLITICAL ABUSE OF INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION
MAJOR FINDING
The Committee finds that inf~rmation has been collected and disseminated
in order to serve the purely political interests of an intelligence
agency or the administration, and to influence social policy
and political action.
Subfindings
(a) White House officials have requested and obtained politically
useful information from the FBI, including information on the activities
of political opponents or critics.
(b) In some cases, political or personal information was not specifically
requested, but was nevertheless collected and disseminated to administration
officials as part of investigations they had requested.
Neither the FBI nor the recipients differentiated in these cases between
national security or law enforcement information and purely
political intelligence.
(c) The FBI has also volunteered information to Presidents and
their staffs, without having been asked for it, sometimes apparently to
curry favor with the current administration. Similarly, the FBI has
assembled intelligence on its critics and on political figures it believed
might influence public attitudes or Congressional support.
(d) The FBI has also used intelligence as a vehicle for covert efforts
to influence social policy and political action.
Elaboration of Findings
The FBI's ability to gather information without effective restraints
gave it enormous power. That power was inevitably attractive to politicians,
who could use information on opponents and critics for their
own advantage, and was also an asset to the Bureau, which depended
on politicians for support. In the political arena, as in other facets of
American life touched by the intelligence community, the existence of
unchecked power led to its abuse.
By providing politically useful information to the White House
and congressional supporters, sometimes on demand and sometimes
gratuitously, the Bureau buttressed its own position in the
politiral structure. At the same time, the widespread-and accuratebelief
in Congress and the administration that the Bureau had available
to it, derogatory information on politicians and critics created
what the late Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, Hale
Boggs, called a "fear" of the Bureau:
Freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of action for
men in public life can be compromised quite as effectively by
the fear of surveillance as by the fact of surveillance.1
1 Remarks by Rep. Hale Boggs, 4/22/71, Congressional Record, Vol. 117, Part
9, p. 11565.
(225 )
66-766 0 - 76 - 16
226
Information gathered and disseminated to the 'White House ranged
from purely political intelligence~ such as lobbying efforts on bills an
administration oppose<l and the strategy of a delegate challenge at a
national political convention, to "tidbits" about the activities of politicians
and public figures ,vhich the Bureau believed "of interest" to
the recipients.
Such participation in political machinations by an intelligence
agency is totally improper. Responsibility for ,,-hat amounted to a
betrayal of the public trust in the integrity of the FBI must be shared
bet,wen the officials who requested such information and those who
prm'ided it.
The Bureau's collection and dissemination of politically useful information
,,'as not colored by partisan considerations; rather its effect
was to entrench the Bureau's o,,'n position in the political structnre,
regardless of which party was in power at the time. IImvever, the
Bureau also used its powers to serve ideological purposes, attempting
cOI'crtly to intluentc social policy and political action.
In its efforts to "protect society," the FBI engaged in activities
which necessarily affected the processes by which American citizens
make decisions. In doing so, it distorted and exaggerated facts, made
use of the mass media, and attacked the leadership of groups which
it considered threats to the social order.
Law enforcement officers are, of course, entitled to state their opinions
about what choices the. people should make on contemporary social
and political issues. The First Amendment guarantees their right to
enter the marketplace of ideas and persuade their fellow citizens of
the correctness of those opinions by making speeches. writing books,
and, within certain statutory limits. supporting political candidates.
The problem lies not in the open expression of vie,,'s~ hut in the covert
use of power or position of trust to influence others. This abuse is
aggravated by the agency's control over information on which the
public and its elected representatiYCs rely to make decisions.
The essence of democracy is the belief that the people must be free
to make decisions about matters of public policy. The FBI's actions
interfered with the democratic process. because attitudes within
the Bureau toward social change led to the belief that such intenention
formed apart of its obligation to protect society. 'When a governmental
agency clandestinely tries to impose its views of what is right
upon the American people~ then the democratic process is underminec1.
Sub(illdill(J (a)
'Vhite House officials have requested and obtained politically useful
information from the FBI. including personal life information
on the activities of political opponents or critics.
Presidents and 'Vhite House aides have asked the FBI to provide
political or personal information on opponents and critics. including
"name checks" of Bureau files. 2 They han) also asked tIl(' Bureau to
2 A "name check" is not an investigation, but a search of existing FBI files
throllgh the use of the Bureau's comprehensive g-eneral name indl'x. Rl'flUests
for FBI "name checks" were peculiarly damaging hecam;l' no TIew investigation
was done to verify allegations stored away for years in Bureau files. A forml'r
FBI official responsible for compliance with such rNjUests said that the Bureau
"answered ... b, furnishing thl' Whitl' Housp pvpry piecp of information
in our files on thl' individuals rPfluestpd." Deposition of Thomas E. Bishop,
former Assistant Director, Crime Records Division, 12/2/75, p. 144.)
227
conduct electronic suneillance or more limited im'estigations of such
])('rsons. The FBI appears to han complied unquestioningly ,,,ith
thesp requests, despite occasional intel'llal doubts about their propriety.
3
Precedents for certain political abuses go hack to the ycry outset
of thp (lonwstic intelligence program. In Ul40 the FBI complied with
President Hoosen']t's rNjUest to file the names of people sending
critical telegrams to the Wrhite House" There is eyidence of improper
plpctronie surn-illanee for the 'White House in the 1940s.'> And fln aide
to President Eisenhower asked the FBI to conduct a questionable
name check." In 1$)62. the FBI complied unqurstioningly with a request
from Attol'llry General J(rnnedy to intenie,y a steel executive
and senral reportrrs ,,,ho had writtrn stories about a statement by
the ('xccnti,·c.' As part of an im'estigation of fOI'eign lobbying CffOl·ts
Oil sugar quota legislation in Hl61 and 1fl62. Attorney General Kennedy
requested ,,,iretaps on a Congressional aide. three executive
officials, and two American lobbyists. including a Washington law
firm. S
Ken>ltheless. the political misuse of the FBI under the .Tohnson
and Nixon administrations appears to haye been more extensive
than in preyious years.
Under the .Tohnson administration. the FBI ,,,as used to gather
and rpport political intelligence on the administration's partisan opponents
in the last days of the 1964 and 1968 Presidential election
3 Former FBI executive Cartha DeLoach, who was FBI liaison with the White
House during part of the ,Johnson administration, has stated, "I simply followed
Mr. Hoover's instructions in complying with White House requests and I never
asked any questions of the White Housp as to what thpy did with the material
afterwards." (DeLoach deposition, 11/2;:;/75, p. 28.) On at lpa~t one occasion,
whpn a Whitp House aide indicated that Presidpnt ,Tohnson did not want any
record made by the FBI of a rE'quest for a "run-down" on the links between
RollPrt Kpnnpdy and officials involved in the Robhy RakE'f inyp~ti~ation, the
Rureau disrE'garded the order. DE'Loach ~tated that hp "ig-norpd the specific
instructions" in this instance hecause he "felt that any instructions we rpceived
fro]11 thE' 'Yhite House should be a matter of record." (DeLoach deposition,
11/25/75, p. 89.)
FOflllPr Assistant Director Bishop sta'ted, "Who am I to ask the President of
the United States what statntory basis he has if he wants to know what information
i~ in thE' fi!ps of the FBI?" It was a "proppr disspmination" because
it was "not a dissemination outside the executive branch" and bpcause there was
"no la,,,, no policy of thE' Department of Justice, ... no statute of the United
Statps that snys that was not pf'rmissihle." But Hen if there had heen a statute
laying- down Mandards, Rishop said "it wouldn't have made a bit of difference
... wllPn tIw Attorney Genpral or the PresidE'nt asks for it."
Ri"hop recalled from his "own knowledge" in~taneps where Pre~idpnt Kennedy,
,John~on, nnd Xixon had "called oypr and a~ked Mr. Hom'er for a memo on
cprtnin peoplp." (Bishop dpposition, 12/2/75, pp. 153-154.)
, :\Ipmornnda from Stephen Early, Secretary to the President. to Hoover, 5/21/40
nnd 6/17/40.
, FBI memorandum to Spnate Select Committep, 3/26/76: See pp. 36-37.
6 :\[pmorandum from J. Edgar Hoovpr to Thomns E. Stephens. Secretary to the
Prpsidpnt. 4/13/54.
7 ('ourtnp..- F,vnns dpposition, 12/1/7;;. p. 3!l.
R Sep pp. 64-65. Tlw tap authorizPd hy Attornp, General Kennpdy on another
high pxpcutivp official ,,,as not rplated to politicnl considprations, nor appar('
nt l .\" ,,'as thp tap anthorizpd h, AttoflW'y Gpnpral Katzpnhach in 1965 on the
poit"r of an anti·communist newsletter who had published a book alleging
impJ"Opript."l hy Rohert Kpnnedy a VE'ar purlipr.
228
campaigns. In the closing days of the 1£)64 campaign, Pn'sidential
aide Bill }Iovers asked the Bureau to comluet "name checks" on all
persons employed in Senator Goldwater's Senate office. and information
on two staff members was reported to the ,Yhite House.9 Similarly.
in the last two weeks of the 1868 campaign, the .Johnson "Thite
House requested an investigation (including indirect electronic surveillance
and direct physical suneillance) of Mrs. Anna Chennal,llt, a
prorninent Republican leader, and her relationships with certain South
Vietnamese officials.!O This inwstigation also included an FBI check
of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew's long distance telephone
call records, apparently at the personal request of President
.Johnson.11
Another investigation for the .Johnson 'Yhite House involved executive
branch officials who took part in the criminal im-estigation
of former .Johnson Senate aide Bobby Baker. ,Yhen Baker's trial
began in 1967, it ,vas revealf'c1 that on~ of the g-m-ernmf'nt witnf'sses
had been ",,-ired" to record his conversations ,vith Baker. Presidential
aide ~rarvin ,Vatson told the FBI that .Johnson was quite "exercised,"
and the Bureau was ordered to conduct a discreet "run-down" on the
former head of the .Justice Department's Criminal Division and four
Treasury Department officials who had been responsible for "wiring"
o Memorandum from Hoover to Moyers, 10/27/64, cited in FBI summary
memorandum. 1/31/75.
10 Bureau flIes indicate that the apparent "reason" for the "White House
interest" was to determine "whether the South Vietnamese had secretly been
in touch with supporters of Presidential candidate Nixon, possibly through
Mrs. Chennault, as President Johnson was apparently suspicious that the South
Vietnamese were trying to sabotage his peace negotiations in the hope that
Nixon would win the election and then take a harder line towards North
Vietnam." (FBI memorandum, subject: Mrs. Anna Chennault. 2/1/75.) The
FBI has claimed that its investigation of ~Irs. Chennault was "consistent with
FBI responsibilitips to determine if her activities were in violation of certain
provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and of the Neutrality Act."
Direct electronic surveillance of :Mrs. Chennault was rejected. accordinl{ to a
contemporaneous FBI memorandum, because FBI executive Cartha DpLoach
pointed out that "it was widely known that she was involved in Republican
political circles and, if it became known that the FBI was surveilling her this
would put us in a most untenable and embarrassing position." (Memorandum
from DeLoach to Tolson, 10/30/68.)
Electronic surveillance was. however. directed at the South Vietnamese officials
and was approved by Attorney General Ramsey Clark. Clark has testified
that he did not know of the physical survt'iIIance aspect of the FBI's im'estigation,
but that he did authorizp the electronic surveillanct' of the South Vietnamese
officials. (Clark testimony. 12/3/75, Hearings. Vol. 6, p. 252.)
11 FBI executive Cartha DeLoach has stated that a White House aide made
the initial request for the check of telephone company rt'cords lnte one night.
According to DeLoach, the request was "to find out who. either :\fr. Agnew or
Mr. Nixon, when they had heen in AlbuQuerQut' (New Mexico) sevpral davs prior
to that. had called from AlhuQuerQut' while they were there." When DeLoach
rt'fused to contact tht' telephonp company "late in the ewning." President .Tohnson
"cnme on tIll' phone and procepded to rpmind me that he was Commander in
Chicf and IJP should ,e:t't "'!Hlt IJP '\"fwted. ana he wantpo mt' to do it immediately."
DeLoach then talked with Director Hoover. who told him to "stand
your grouno." The next day. however, HoO',-er ordpred that the recoros be
checkpd. but the only calls iopntified were "made by Mr. Agnew's staff." Thpse
were re]1orteo to the White Honse. (DeLoach Deposition. 11/2:'/7fi. pp. 74-71).)
Agnew's arriral and dt'parture times in and ont of AlhuQuerQut' Wt're also
"rerifled at the request of the "'hite House." (FBI summary memoramlum.
subject: Mrs. Anna Chennault, 2/1/75).
229
the witness. The Bureau was specificallv insisted to include anv associations
between those persons and Robert Kennedy."2 •
Sen'ral .Johnson "White House requests were directed at critics of
the war in Yietnam. at ne"'smen, and at other opponents. According
to a Bnreau memorandum, "'hite House aide Marvin ",Yatson attempted
to disguise his. and the President's interest in such requests
by asking the FBI to channel its replies through a Imver level "White
House staff member." 3
In 1966. ",Yatson asked the FBI to monitor the televised hearings
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam policy and
prepare a memorandum comparing statements of the President's Senate
critics with "the Communist Party line." 11 Similarly, in Igo7 when
seven Senators made statements criticizing the bombing of North
Vietnam. ",Yatson requested (and the Bureau delivered) a "blind memorandmn"
setting fol'th infonnation from FBI files on each of the
Senators. Among the data supplied were the following items:
Senator Clark "'as quoted in the press as stating that the
three major threats to America are the military-industrial
complex, the Federal Bureau of InH'stigation, and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Senator )IcGovei'n spoke at a rally sponsored by the Chicago
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, a pacifist group.
Senator McGovern stated that the "United States was making
too much of the communist take-owl' of Cuba." rAnother Senator now deceased] has. on many occasions,
publicly criticized United States policy toward Vietnam. He
frequent1y speaks hefore groups throughout the United States
on this mbject. He has been reported as intentionally entering
into contronrsial areas so that his services as a speaker
for which he receives a fee, will he in demandY
The ,Johnson administration also requested information on contacts
between members of Congress and certain foreign officials known to
oppose the lJnited States presence in Vietnam. According to FBI
12 FBI Director Hoover brought thp mattpr to the attention of the White
Hou'p in a Iptter de,crihing why the FBI had refmlE'd to "wire" the witness
(tllE'rp wa' not adequatp "spcurity") and holY thp Criminal Division had thpn
u'NI tIlE' Burpau of Xarcotics to do so. (:\Ipmorandum from Hoovpr to Wat~on,
1/12/07.) This was thp instance whpre FBI pxpcutive Cartha DeLoach made
a rpcord. after "Watson told him that "the Presidpnt does nO't want any record
madp." (:\Iemorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/17/67; spe also FBI summary
mpmorandum. 2/3/75.)
" According to this nlE'morandum. Watson told Cartha DeLoach in 1967 that
"he and tilE' Presidpnt" wanted all "communications addressed to him by the
Dirpctor" to IJP addrpsspd in,tpad to a lower Ipvel 'Vhitp House staff member.
'Vatson told DeLoach that tilE' "rpason for this change" was that thp staff
mpmher "did not ha vp thp dirpct connpction with tIlE' Prpsidpnt that hp had and,
cons('(luentl~·. ppople who saw ,uch communication;; would not suspicion (sic)
that 'Vat,on or the Prp,ident had requested such information. nor were interpsterl
in ,uch information." (l\Ipmorandum from De Loach to Tolson. 3/17/07.)
H FBI sunllnary memorandum. sUbject: Coverage of Television Prpsentation.
Spnate Forpign Relations Committee. 1/31/75. Former FBI executive Cartha
DeLoach has stated. ref{ardin~ this incident. "We felt that it was beyond the
juris(1ir>tion of the FBI. but obviously l\Ir. Hoowr felt that this was a request
h~' thp President amI he desired it to be done." (DeLoach deposition, 1l/25/7iJ,
p. iJR.)
15 Blind FBI memorandum, 2/10/67.
23U
records, President .Johnson believed these foreign officials had generated
"much of the protest concerning his Vietnam policy, particularly
the hearings in the Senate." 16
",Vhite House requests ,wre not limited to critical Congressmen.
Ordinary citizens who sent telegrams protesting the Vietnam war
to the ",Yhite House were also the subject of ",Yatson requests for FBI
name check reportsY Presidential aide .Take .Tacobsen asked for name
checks on persons whose names appeared in the Congressional Record
as signers of a letter to Senator ",Vayne Morse expressing support for
his criticism of U.S. Vietnam policy.'8 On at least one occasion, a
request was channeled through Attorney General Ramsey Clark, ,vho
supplied 'Watson (at the latter's request) with a summary of information
on the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.'9
Other individuals who were the subject of such name check requests
under the .Tohnson Administration included NBC Commentator David
Brinkley,20 Associated Press reporter Peter Arnett,21 columnist
.Toseph Kraft.22 Life magazine ",Vashington bureau chief Richard
Stolley,23 Chiago Daily News ",Vashington bureau chief Peter
Lisagor,24 and Ben W. Gilbert of the Washington POSt.25 The Johnson
",Yhite House also requested (and received) name check reports on
the authors of books critical of the ",Varren Commission report; some
of these reports included derogatory information about the personal
lives of the individuals.26
The Nixon administration continued the practice of using the FBI
to produce political information. In 1969 John Ehrlichman, counsel
to President Nixon, asked the FBI to conduct a "name check" on
.Toseph Duffy, chairman of Americans for Democratic Action. Data
in Bureau files covered Duffy's "handling arrangemellts" for an antiWHf
tPHch-in in 1965, his position as State Coordinator of the group
16 President Johnson's request also went beyond "legislators," and included
contacts by any "prominent U.S. citizens." (FBI summary memorandum. subject:
Information Concerning Contacts Between [Certain Foreign offidals] and
Members or Staff of the United States Congress Furnished to the White House
at the Request of the President, 2/3/75.) The FBI's reports indicated that its
information came "through coverage" of the foreign officials and that the Bureau,
in this case, had "conducted no investigation of members of Congress." (FBI
summary memorandum, 2/3/75.) FBI "coverage" apparently included electronic
surveillance.
President Nixon also requested information on contacts between foreign offiC'ials
and Congressmen, but his request does not appear to have related to Presidential
critiC's. Rather, the Nixon request grew out of C'oncern about "an increase in
[foreign] intE'rest on Capitol Hill" which had been expressed to President Nixon
by at least one Senator; and the FBI's report "included two examples of
[foreign] intelligence initiatives directed against Capiltol Hill without identifying
the [foreigners] or American involved." (FBI summary memorandum. 2/3/75.)
17 Memoranda from Hoover to Watson, 6/4/65 and 7/30/65.
18 Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 7/15/66. citing Jacobsen request.
,. :\Iemorandum from Clark to Vi'atson. 4/R/67. em'losing memorandum from
Dir{'('tor, FBI to the Attorney General. 4/7/67. (LB.J Library.)
20 ~Iemoranda from Hoover to Watson, 2/15/6.'5 and 5/29/65.
!l1.l\1emorandum from Hoover to 'Yat~on. 7/22/6.'),
22 Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/27/67.
22 :\femorandum from Hoover to Wat~on. 4/6/66.
"Memorfllldum from Homoer to Watson, 2/24/66.
25 Memorandum from Hoover to Watson. 4/6/66.
26 Mf'morandllm from Hoover to "Tatson, 11/8/66; DeLoach. 12/3/75. Hearings,
Vol. 6, pp. 180-182.
231
"Negotiation Now" in 1967, and his activity as chairman of Connecticut
Citizens for McCarthy in 1968.2Ga
Presidential aide H. R. Haldeman requested a name check on CBS
reporter Daniel Schorr. In this instance, the FBI mistakenly considered
the request to be for a full background investigation and began
to conduct interviews. These interviews made the inquiry public. Subsequently,
'White House officials stated (falsely) that Schorr was
under consideration for an executive appointment.27 In another case,
a Bureau memorandum states that Vice President Agnew asked the
FBI for information about Rev. Ralph David Abernathy, then head
of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, for use in "destroying
Abernathy's credibility." 28 (Agnew has denied that he made
such a request, but agrees that he received the information.) 29
Several 'White House requests involved the initiation of electronic
surveillance. Apparently on the instructions of President Nixon's aide
John Ehrlichman and Director Hoover, FBI Assistant Director 'Villiam
C. Sullivan arranged for the microphone surveillance of the hotel
room of columnist Joseph Kraft while he was visiting a foreign
country.30 Kraft was also the target of physical suneillance by the
FBI.a> There is no record of any specific "national security" rationale
for the surveillance.
Similarly, although the "17" wiretaps were authorized ostensibly to
investigate national securitv "leaks," there is no record in three of the
cases of any national secui'ity claim having been advanced in their
support. Two of the targets were domestic aff·airs advisers at the White
House, with no foreign affairs duties and no access to foreign policy
materials.32 A third was a 'Yhite House speerlnniter who had been
overheard on an existing tap agreeing to prm-ide a reporter with background
on a presidential speech concerning, not foreign policy, but
revenue sharing and welfare re£orm.33
20. I"ettpr from J. Edgar Hoover to John D. Ehrlichman, 10/6/69; letter from
Clarence ~L Kelly to Joseph Duffy, 7/14/75, enclosing I<'BI records transmitted
undpr Freedom of Information Act.
27 House Judiciary Committee Hearings, Book VII, 'White House Surveillance
Activities (1974), p. 1111.
28 According to Director Hoover's memorandum of the conversation, Agnew
asked Hoover for "some assistance" in obtaining information about Rev. Abernathy.
Hoover recorded: "The Vice President said he thought he was going to
have to start destroying Abernathy's credibility, so anything I can give him
would be appreciated. I told him I would be glad to." (~Iemorandumfrom Hoover
to Tolson. et aI, 5/18/70.) Subsequently. thp FBI Dirpctor sent Agnew a report
on Rpv. Abernathy containing not only the by-product of Bureau investigations,
hut also dprogatory public record information. (Letter from Hoover to Agnew,
5/]9/70.)
.. Staff summary of Spiro Agnew interview, 10/15/75.
30 ~Ipmorandafrom Sullivan to Hoover. 6/30/69 and 7/2/69.
3I Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 11/5/69. The Kraft surveillance is
also discussed in Part II, pp. 121-122.
32 Coverage in these two cases was requested by neither Henry Kissinger nor
Alexander Haig (as most of the "17" were), but by other White House officials,
Attornpy General Mitchell approved the first at the request of "higher authority."
(Mi>morandum from Hom'er to Mitchell, 7/23/69.) The second was specifically
reCillested by H. R. Haldeman. (Mpmorandum from Hoover to Mitchell. 12/14/70.
"" This tap was also apparently ri>quested by White House officials other than
Kissinger or Haig. OIemorandllm from Sullivan to DeLoach. 8/1/69.) The "17"
wiretaps are also discussed at p. 122.
232
Sllbfinding (b)
In some cases, political or personal information was not specifically
requested, but was ncyertheless collected and disseminated to administration
officials as part of investigations they had requested. Keither
the FBI nor the recipients differentiated in these cases behYeen national
security or law enforcement information and purely political
intelligence.
In some instances, the initial request for or dissemination of information
was premised upon law enforcement or national security purposes.
However, pursuant to such a request, information was .furnished
which obviously could serve only partisan or personal interests. As
one Bureau official summarized its attitude, the FBI "did not decide
'what was politieal or what represented potential strife and violence.
\Ve are an investigative agency and we passed on all data." 34
Examples from the Eisenhmver, Kennedy, .Johnson, and Nixon administrations
illustrate this failure to distinguish between politieal
and nonpolitical intelligence. They include the FBI's reports to the
1Vhite House in 1956 on NAACP lobbying activities, the intelligence
about the legislative process produced by the "sugar lobby" wiretaps in
1961-1962, the purely political data disseminated to the 'White House
on the credentials challenge in the 1964 Democratic Convention, and
dissemination of both political and personal information from the
"leak" wiretaps in 1969-1972.
(i) The NAACP
In early 1956 'Director Hoover sent the 1Vhite House a memorandum
describing the "potential for violence" in the current "raeial
situation".35 Later reports to the 1Vhite House, however, went far
beyond intelligence about possible violence; they included extensive
insi(k information about NAACP lobbying efforts, sueh as the following:
A report on "meetings held in Chicago" in conneetion with
a planned Leadership Conferenee on Civil Ril!hts to 1)(' held in
'Washington under the sponsorship of the NAACP.36
An extensi,-e report on the I.Radership Conference, based
on the Bureau's "reliable sources" and descrihing plans or
Conferenee delegations to visit Senators Paul DOllg1as, Herbert
Lehman, 1Vayne Morse, Hubert Humphrey, and .John
Bricker. The report also summarized a snpech bv Rov ",Vilkins,
other eonference proceedings, and 'the report of "an
informant" that the TTnited Auto 1Vorkers was a "predominant
organization" at the conference.37
Another report on the conrerence included an account of
""hat transpired at meetings between conference delegations
and Senators Paul Douglas and EYerctt Dirksen.38
"'DeLoach. 12/3/71). Hf>aring-s. Vol 6. p.1RO.
115 ]\fpmorandum from Hoover to Dillon AndE'rson. Special Assistant to the
Prpsiopnt. 1/3/1)(1. This rE'port was also nrovidf'd to thE' Attornf'Y Gf'nf'ral. thE'
Sp('retary of DpfE'nse. and militar:v intf>llil!'pnce.
36 :llpmrmmnum from Hoov('r to Andprson. !l/2/56.
37 :I{E'moranoum from HoovE'r to AndE'rson. 3/fi/fi6.
38 Memorannum from Hoover to Anderson. 3/6/56.
233
A report including the information that two New Jersey
congressmen would sign a petition to the Attorney Genera1.39
A presidential aide suggested that Hoover brief the Cabinet on
"developments in the South." 40 Director Hoover's Cabinet briefing
also included political intelligence. He covered not only the NAACP
conference, but also the speeches and political activities of Southern
Senators and Governors and the formation of the Federation for Constitutional
Government with Southern Congressmen and Governors on
its advisory board.41
(ii) The Su.qar Lobby
The electronic surveillance of persons involved in a foreign country's
lobbying acti\'ities on sugar quota legislation in 1961-1962, authorized
by ,,\ttorney General Robert Kennedy for the 'White House, also produced
substantial political intelligence unrelated to the activities of
foreign officialsY Such information came from wiretaps both on foreign
officials and on American citizens, as well as from the microphone
surveillance of the chairman of the House Agriculture Committee
when he met with foreign officials in a New York hotel room.43 The
following are examples of the purely political (and personal) byproduct:
A particular lobbyist "mentioned he is working on the Senate
and has the Republicans an lined up." 44
The same lobbyist said that "he had seen two additional
representatives on the House Agriculture Committee, one of
39 Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/7/56. A National Security Council
staff member responsible for intern.al security matters summlirized these reports
as providing information "regarding attempts being made by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People to send instructed
delegations to high-ranking Government officials 'to tactfully draw out their
positions concerning civil rights.''' (Memorandum from J. Patrick Coyne to
Anderson, 3/6/56.)
«> After consulting the Attorney General, this aide advised the Secretary to the
Cabinet that the FBI had "reported developments in recent weeks in several
southern States, indicating a marked deterioration in relationships between the
races, and in some instances fomented by communist or communist-front organizations."
(Memorandum from Anderson to Maxwell Rabb, 1/16/56.) The Secretary
to the Cabinet, who had "experience in handling minority matters" for the
White House, agreed that "each Cabinet Member should be equipped with the
plain facts." (Memorandum from Rabb to Anderson, 1/17/56.) A National Security
Council staff member who handled internal security matters reported shortly
thereafter that the FBI Director was "prepared to brief the Cabinet along the
g-enerallines" of his written communications to the 'Vhite House. (Memorandum
from .J. Patrick Coyne to Anderson, 2/1/56.)
., Memorandum from Director, FBI, to the Executive Assistant to the Attorney
General, 3/9/56, enclosing- FBI memorandum described as the "basic statement"
used by the Director "in the Cabinet Briefing- this morning on Racial Tension and
Civil RiC'hts." For a further discussion of the exaggeration of Communist influence
on the NAACP in this briefing, see pp. 250-2157, note 151a.
." The electronic surveillances were generally related to foreign affairs concerns.
See PD. 64-6.'5.
"Thl' Americans incl11de three Ag-rlculture Department officials, the secretary
to the Chairm~n of the House AgricllJtllrl' Committl'l', and two rl'JOstl'rl'd lobbying
agents for foreign interests. For Attorney General Kennedy's relationship
to thp mkrophonl' survl'illanC'e of thl' ('ongrl'ssman, see p. 61. note 233. One
of the wiretaps directed at a registered lobbying agent was placed on the office
tl'll'nbolll' of n Wnshingtol1 IInv firm. (See p. 201)
.. FBI memorandum, 6/15/62.
234
whom was 'dead set against us' and who may reconsider, and
the other ,vas neutral and 'may vote for us.' " 45
The Agriculture Committee chairman believed "he had accomplished
nothing" and that "he had been fighting over the
Rules Committee and this had interfered ,,-ith his attempt
to organize." 40
The "friend" of a foreign official "was uneler strong pressure
from the present administration, anel since the 'friend' is
a Democrat, it would be very difficult for him to present a
strong front to a Democratic Administration." 47
A lobbyist stated that Secretary of State Rusk "hael received
a friendly reception by the Committee and there appeared to
be no problem with regard to the sugar bill." 48
A foreign official was reported to be in contact with two Congressmen's
secretaries "for reasons other than business." The
official askeel one of the secretaries to tell the otlwl' that he
"would not be able to call her that e,-ening" and that one of
his associates "was planning to take [the two secretaries and
another Congressional aide] to Bermuela." 49
The FBI's own evaluation of these wiretaps indicates that they "undoubtedly
... contributed heavily to the Administration's success" in
passing the legislation it desired.50
(iii) The 1964 Democra.tic Convention
Political reports were disseminated by the FBI to the White House
from the 1964 Democratic convention in Atlantic City. These reports,
from the FBI's "special squad" at the convention, apparently resulted
from a civil disorders intelligence investigation which got out of hand
because no one was willing to shut off the partisan by-product.51 They
centered on the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's credentials
challenge. Examples of the political intelligence which flowed from
FBI surveillance at the 1964 convention include the following: 52
<S FBI memorandum, 6/15/62.
,. Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 2/18/61. This informa
tion came from the Bureau's "coverage" (by microphone surveillance) of
the Congressman'a hotel room meeting.
47 FBI memorandum. 2/15/62.
.. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 3/13/61.
.9 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 3/13/61.
GO Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66. According to
a Bureau memorandum of a meeting between Attorney General Kennedy and
FBI Assistant Director C<lurtney Evans, Kennedy stated in April 1961 that "now
the law has passed he did not feel there was justification for continuing this
extensive investigation." (Memorandum from Evans to Parsons, 4/15/61.)
51 There is no clear evidence as to what President Johnson had in mind when,
as a contemporaneous FBI memorandum indicates, he directed "the assignment
of the Rpedal squad to Atlantic City." (DeLoach to Mohr, 8/29/64) Cartha DeLoach
has teRtified that Presidential aide Walter Jenkins mflde the original requeRt
to him. but that he said it Rhould be diRcussed with Director Hoover and
that "Mr. ,Tenkins or the President, to the best of my recollection. later called
Mr. Hoover and asked that this be done." DeLoach claimed that the purpose was
to gather "intelligence concerning mfltters of strife. violence. etc." which mi,e:ht
arise ont of the credentiflls challenge. (DeLo1ch, 12/3/75. hearings. Vol. 6, p. 175.)
52 The operations of the FBI in Atlantic City are described in greater detail in
Section II, pp. 117-119.
235
Dr. Martin Luther King and an associate "were drafting
a telegram to President Johnson . . . to register a mild
protest. According to King, the President pledged complete
neutrality regarding the selecting of the proper Mississippi
delegation to be seated at the conycntion. King feels that
the Credentials Committee will turn down the ~fississippi
Freedom Party and that they are doing this because the
President exerted pressure on the committee along this
line." 53
Another associate of Dr. King contacted a member of the
MFDP who "said she thought King should see Goyernor
Endicott Peabody of Massachusetts, Mayor Robert 'Wagner
of New York City, Goyernor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown of
California, Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, and Governor
John W". King of New Hampshire." The purpose was "to
urge them to call the 'White House directly and put pressure
on the "White House in behalf of the MFDP." 54
"MFDP leaders have asked Reverend King to call Governor
Egan of Alaska and Governor Burns of Hawaii in an attempt
to enlist their support. According tothe MFDP spokesman,
the Negro Mississippi Party needs these two states plus
California and New York for the roll call tonight." 55
An SCLC staff member told a representative of the MFDP :
"Off the record, of course, you know we will accept the
Green compromise proposed." This referred to "the proposal
of Congresswoman Edith Green of Oregon." 56
In a discussion behwen Dr. King and another civil rights
lrader, the question of "a Vire-Presidential nominee rame
up and King askrd what rthe other leader] thought of Hugh
[sic] Humphrey, and [the other leader] said Hugh Humphrev
is not goint:r to get it, that .Johnson needs a Catholic ...
and therefore the Vice-President will be Muskie of Maine." 57
An unsigned 'Vhite House memorandum disclosing Dr. King's
strategy in connection with a meeting to be attended by President
.Johnson suggests that there was political use of these FBI reports.58
(11') The "17" Wiretaps.
The Nixon 'Vhite Honse learned a substantial amount of purely political
intelligence from wiretaps to invpstigate "leaks" of classified
information placpd on three npwsmen and fourteen executive officials
during 19G9-1971.59 The following illustrate the range of data
supplied:
One of the targets "recently stated that he was to spend an
hour with Senator Kennedy's Virtnam man, as Senator
Kennedy is giying a speech on the 15th." 60
&, Mf'morandum from Df'Loach to Jenkins. R/24/64.
"'l\If'morandum from DpLoach to .Jenkins, 8/21>/64.
ool\I"morandum from DeLoach to .Jenkins, R/25/64.
""l\If'morandum rom DpLoach to .Jenkins, R/25/64.
"'l\I"mornndum from DpLoach to .lpnkins, R/25/64.
58 Blind mpmoranoum from LR.I Library bearinl( handwritten date 8/26/64 and
thl' t,ppwrittl'n (Jatp R/19/64. Hparings. Vol. 6, Exhihit 63-2, p. 713.
•• In at least two instanccs. the wirptaps continued on targ-ets after they left
the EXPclltiye Brnnch and became aovisers to Senator Enmund Muskie, then the
lpafling DpmoC'rntic prosppct for thp Prpsi(fl'nC'y. Rpe Part n. P. 122.
M Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, 10/9/69.
236
Another target said that Senator Fulbright postponcd. congressional
hcarings on Vietnam because he d.id not belicye
they would be popular at that time.61
A well-known teleyision news correspond.cnt "was ycry
distressed oyer having been 'singled out' by the Vice President."
62
A friend of one of the targets said the Washington Star
planned to do an article critical of Henry KissingerY
One of the targets helped former Ambassador Sargent
Shriver write a press release criticizing a recent speech by
President Nixon in which the President "attacked" certain
Congressmen.64
One of the targets told a friend it "is clear the Administration
will win on the ABM by a two-Yote margin. He said
'They've got [a Senator] and they've got [another Senator].'."
65
A friend of one of the targets wanted to see if a Senator
would "buy a new amendment" and stated that "they" were
"going to meet with" another Senator.66
A friend of one of the targets described a Senator as "marginal"
on the Cooper-Church Amendment and stated that
another Senator might be persuaded to support it.67
One of the targets said Senator Mondale was in a "dilemma"
over the "trade bil1." 68
A friend of one of the targets said he had spoken to former
President .Johnson and "Johnson would not back Senator
Muskie for the Presidency as he intended to stay out of
politics." 69
There is at least one clear example of the political use of such
iI1formation. After the FBI Director informed the White House
that former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford planned to write a
magazine article criticizing President Nixon's Vietnam policy/o White
House aide .reb Stuart Magruder adyised John Ehrlichman and H. R.
Haldeman that "\ve are in a position to counteract this article in any
number of ways." 71 It is also significant that, after May 1970, the
FBI Director's letters summarizing the results of the wiretaps were
no longer sent to Henry Kissinger, the President's national security
advisor, but to the President's political advisor, H. R. Haldeman.72
.1 Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 12/3/69.
"Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 2/26/70.
"'Memorandum from Hoover to H. R. Haldeman, 6/2/70.
.. Ml'morandum from Hoover to Haldeman. 9/4/70.
85 Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 7/18/69.
"l\Il'morandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 5/18/70.
• 7 Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 6/23/70.
• 8 l\fl'morandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 11/24/70.
··Ml'morandllm from Hoover to Haldeman, 12/22/70.
70 Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, 12/29/69.
71 :Uemorandum from Magruder to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, 1/15/70. Ehrlichman
advised Haldl'man, "This is the kind of early warning Wl' nl'l'd morl' ofyour
game planners are now in an excellent position to map anticipatory action."
Olemorandum from "E" (Ehrlichman) to "H" (Haldeman), undated.) Haldeman
resnnndl'd, "1 Rg"rl'l' with ,John's point. Let's get !wing-." (:\Iemorandum from
"H" to "M" (MagrUder), undated).
'2 Report of the Bouse Judiciary Committee, 8/20/74, p. 147.
237
These four illustrations from administrations of both political parties
indicate clearly that direct ehannels of communication between
top FBI officials aild the White House, combined with the failure to
sereen out extraneous information, and coupled with overly broad investigations
in the first instance, have been sources of flagrant political
abuse of the intelligence process.73
8ubfinding (c)
The FBI has also volunteered information to Presidents and their
staffs, without having been asked for it, sometimes apparently to curry
favor with the current administration. Similarly, the FBI has assembled
information on its critics and on political figures it believed
might influence public attitudes or Congressional support.
There have been numerous instances over the past three decades
where the FBI volunteered to its superiors purely political or perSDnal
information believed by the FBI Director to be "of interest" to them.74
The following are examples of the information in Director Hoover's
letters under the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
administrations.75
To ~rajor General Harry Vaughn, Military Aide to President
Truman, a report on the activities of a former Roosevelt
aide who was trying to influence the Truman administration's
appointments.76
To Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to President Truman, a
report from a "very confidential source" about a meeting of
newspaper representatives in Chicago to plan publication of
stories exposing organized crime and corrupt politicians.77
To Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to President Eisenho\"
er, the advance text of a speech to be delivered by a prominent
labor leader.'8
73 It should be noted, however, that in at least one case the Bureau did distinguish
between political and non-political information. In 1968, when an aide
to Vice President Humphrey asked that a "special squad" be sent to the Democratic
XaUonal Convention in Chicago. Director Hoover not only declined. but
he also specifically instructed the SAC in Chicago not "to get into anything
political" but to confine his reports to "extreme action or violence." (Memorandum
from Hoover to Tolson., et aI, 8/15/68.) There were no comparable instructions
at Atlantic City.
7' Former Attorney General Francis Biddle recalled in his autobiography how
.T. Edgar Hoover shared with him some of the "intimate details" of what his
fellow Cabinet members did and said, "their likes and dislikes, their weaknesses
and their associations." Biddle confessed that he enjoyed hearing these derogatory
and sometimes "embarrassing" tidbits and that Hoover "knew how to flatter
his superior." (Francis Biddle, In Brief .'1uthority [Garden City: Doubleday,
1962], pp. 258-259. )
A fornwr FBI iJfficial has described one aspect of the Bureau's practice:
"Mr. Hoover wonld say what do we have in our files on this guy~ Just what do
we have? l'Iot blind memorandum, not public source information, everything we've
got. And we would maybe write a 25 page memo. 'Vhen he got it and saw what's
in it. he'd sa~' we'd better send that to the White House and the Attorney General
so the~' ean have in one place everything that the FBI has now on this guy....
(Dishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 141-142.)"
75 None of tllE'se letters indicate that they were in response to reqnests, as is
the ease with other similar letters examined b~' the Committee. All were voluntef'rerl
as matters which Director Hoover considered to be "of interest" to the
recipients.
7. Memorandum from Hoover to Vaughn, 2/15/47.
77 Memorandum from Hoover to Connelly, 1/27/50.
78 Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 4/21/55.
238
To Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower,
a report of a "confidential source" on plans of ;\1rs.
Eleanor Roosen~lt to hold a reception for the head of a civil
rights group.79
To Attorney General Robert Kennedy, information from a
Bureau "source" regarding plans of a group to publish allegations
about the President's personallife.80
To Attorney General Kenned~', a summary of material in
FBI files on a prominent entertamer which the FBI Director
thought "may be of interest"."
To )Ianin ,Yatson, Special Assistant to President .Tohnson,
a summary of data in Bureau files on the author of a play
satirizing the President.82
As these illustrations indicate, the FBI Director provided such data
to administrations of both political parties without apparent partisan
favoritism.83
Additionally, during the Nixon Administration, the FBI's INLET
(Intelligence Letter) Program for sending regular short summaries
of FBI intelligence to the "White House was used on one occasion to
provide information on the purely personal relationship between an
entertainer and the subject of an FBI domestic intelligence investigation.
84 SACs were instructed under the INLET program to submit
to Bureau headquarters items with an "unusual twist" or regarding
"prominent" persons.8.5
One reason for the Bureau's volunteering information to the "White
House was to please the Administration and thus presumably to build
high-level polItical support for the FBI. Thus, a 1975 Bureau report
on the' Atlantic City episode states:
One [agent said], "I would like to state that at no time did I
ever consider (it) to be a political operation but it was obvious
that DeLoach wanted to impress Jenkins and Moyers with the
Bureau's ability to develop information which would be of
interest to them." Furthermore, in response to a question as to
whether the Bureau's services were bemg utilized for political
reasons, [another] answered, "No. I do recall, however, that
on one occasion I was present when DeLoach held a lengthy
telephone conversation with ,Yalter Jenkins. They appeared
to be discussing the President's 'image.' At the end of the
conversation DeLoach told us something to the effect, 'that
may have sounded a little political to you but this doesn't do
the Bureau any harm.' " 86
In addition to providing information useful to superiors, the Bureau
assembled information on its own critics and on political figures it
believed might influence public attitudes or congressional support.
FBI Director Hoover had massive amounts of information at his
79 Memorandum from Hoover to Cutler, 2/13/58.
80 Memorandum from Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 11/20/63.
ill Memorandum from Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 2/10/61.
·'Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/9/67.
8o'J For additional examples, See Section II, pp. 51-53.
54 Staff memorandum: Review of I:\'LET letters, 11/18/7fi.
flU ?\Iemorandum from FBI Headqnarters to all SAC's, 11/26/69.
86 Memorandum from Bassett to Callahan, 1/29/75.
239
fingertips. As indicated aboye, he could hayc the Bureau's files checked
on anyone of interest to him. He personally received political information
and "personal tidbits" from the special agents in charge of
FBI field offices.s, This information, both from the files and Hooyer's
personal sources, was ayailable to discredit critics.
The follO\ving are examples of how the Bureau disseminated 1Ilformation
to discredit its opponents:
In 1949 the FBI prodded Attorney General .T. Howard
McGrath and Presidential aide Harry Vaughn inside information
on plans of the Lawyers Guild to denollnce Bureau
snrveillance so they would have an opportunity to prepare a
rebuttal ,veIl in advance of the expected criticism.s8
In 1$)60. when the Knoxville Area Human Relations Council
in Tellnessee charged that the FBI was practicing racial
discrimination. the Bureau conducted name checks on members
of the Council's board of directors and sent the results
to Attorney General ·William Rogers, including derogatory
personal allegations and political affiliations from as far back
as the late thirties and early forties. 89
"'hen a reporter wrote stories critical of the Bureau, he was
not only refused any further interviews, but an FBI official
in charge of press relations also spread derogatory personal
information about him to other newsmen.90
The Bureau also maintained a "not to contact list" of "those individuals
known to be hostile to the Bureau." Director Hoover specifically
ordered that "each name" on the list "should be the subject of
a memo." 91
B"i" Former FBI official :\Iark Felt has stated that the SAC's could have sent
personal letters to Hoover containing such "personal tidbits" "to curry favor
with him," and on one occasion he did so himself with respect to a "scandalous"
incident. (W. Mark Felt testimony, 2/3/76, p. 91.)
The following pxcerpt from one SAC's letter is an example of political information
fed to the Director: "I have heard several comments and items which I
wanted to bring to your attention. As I imagine is true in all States at this time,
the political situation in [this state] is getting to be very interesting. As you
know, Spnator [deletedl is coming up for re-election as is Representative [deletpd].
For a long- time it appeared that [the Senator] would have no opposition
to amount to anything in his campaign for re-election. The speculation and word
around the State right now is that probably [the Representative1 will file for
the U.S. Spnate Rpat now held by [the Senator]. I have alRo bpen informed that
[the Senator's1 forces have offered [the Representative] $50,000 if he will stay
out of the Senate race and run for re-election as Congressman." (Letter from
SAC to Hoover, 5/20/64.)
os Letter from Attornpy General McGrath to President Truman, 12/7/49;
lptter from Hoover to Vaughn, 1/14/50.
89 :\Ipmorandum from Hoover to Rogers, 5/25/60.
.. Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, p. 211. Bishop stated that he acted on his own,
rather than at the direction of higher Bureau executives. However, Director
Hoover did have a memorandum prepared on the reporter summarizing everything
in the Bureau's files about him, which he referred to when he met with
the reporter's superiors. (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, p. 215.)
., :\Iemorandum from Executivps Conferpnce to Hoover. 1/4/50. Early examplpR
includpd historian Hpnry Stpple Commagpr, "pprRonnpl of CBS," and former
Illtprior SpcTptary Harold IckpR. (:\Ipmorandum from :\Iohr to Tolson, 12/21/49.)
B.\" thp tilllP it ,vaR ahoIiRhpd in 1972, thp liRt includpd 332 namps, including
mYRtpry writpr Rpx Stout, whosp noyel 'Thp Doorhell Rang-" had "prpspntpd a
highl~' diRtortpd and mORt llnfa\'orable picture of the Bureau." (Memorandum
from :\1. A. Jones to Bishop, 7/11/72.)
240
This request for "a memo" on each critic meant that. before someOlw
was placed on the list, the Director receiyec1, in effeet, a "nam(> chcck"
report summarizing' "what ,\'c had in our files" on the indi,·idual.92
In addition to assembling information 'on critics. name ehccks ,YC're
run as a matter of regular Bureau policy on all "newly ejected ~}oYC'rnors
and Congressmen." The Crime Ueconls Diyision instructed the
field offices to submit "summary memoranda" on such officials, coyering
both "public source information" and "any other information that.
they had in their files." 93 Thesc "summary memoranda" were prm'ided
to Director IIooH'r and maintained in the Crime Hrcords Diyision for
use in "congressionalliaison"-which the Diyision head said included
"selling" hostile Congressmen on "liking the FRI." 94
It has been widely belieyed among )1em1wrs of Congress that the
Bureau had information on each of tlwm.95 The impact of that belief
led Congressman Boggs to state:
Our apathy in this Congress, our silence in this House, our
yery fear of speaking out in other forums has watered the
roots and hastened the growth of a vine of tyranny which
is ensnaring that Constitution and Bill of Rights which wc
are each sworn to uphold.
Our society can suryiye many challenges and many threa~s.
It cannot sUlTiye a planned and programmed fear of Its
own government bureaus and agencies.96
8ubfi11ding (d)
The FBI has also used intelligence as a yehicle for covert efforts
to influence social policy and political action.
The FBI's interference with the democratic process was not the
result of any ovcrt decision to reshapc society in conformance with
Bureau-approYed norms. Rather, the Bureau's aetions were the natural
consequence of attitudes ,,-ithin the Bureau toward social change, combined
with a strong sense of duty to protect society-even from its
own "wrong" choices.
The FBI saw itself as the guardian of the public order, and believed
that it had a responsibility to counter threats to that order,
using any means available.97 At the same time, the Bureau's assessment
of what constituted a "threat" was influenced by its attitude
toward the forces of change. In effect, the Bureau chose sides in the
0' Bishop depof1ition, 12/2/75, p. 207.
03 The field office was also expected to send to headquartHs any additional
allE'g;ations about thE' Congressman or GovE'rnor which might comE' to its attention
in future inwstig;ations, ewn if the Congressman or Governor was not
himself the "subject" of the investigation. (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 194200.)
., Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 206-7.
85 The FBI is not the only agency believed to have files on Congressmen. According
to Rep. Andrew Young, "in the freshman orientation" of new House
members, "one of the things you are told is that there are sew'n agenices that
kE'ep files on private lives of Congressmen." (Rep. Andrew Young testimony,
2/19/76, p. 48.)
.. Remarks hy Rep. Hale Boggs, House of ReprE'sentatives, 4/22/71, Congressional
Record, VoL 117, Part 9, p. 11562.
07 ThE' means used are discussed in the finding on "Covert Action to Disrnpt
and Discredit Domestic Groups", as well as the Detailed Reports on COIN·
TELPRO, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Panther Party.
241
major social mon-ments of the last fifteen years, and then attacked the
other side with the unchecked pmH'r at its ~lisposal.
The clearest proof of the Bureau's attitude tmyard ehange is its own
rhetoric. The language used in internal docunwnts ,,,hieh were not
intended to be disseminated outside the Bureau is that of the highly
eha rged polemic l'l'"caling clear biase's.
For example, in one of its annual internal reports on COIXTELPRO,
the Bureau took pride' in haying gin-n "the lie" to what it
calkd "the Communist canard" that "the Negro is downtrodde'n and
has no opportunities in America." This was accomplished by placing
a story in a newspappr in which a ",,,ealthy Kegro industrialist" stated
that "the Negro will haY(' to earn respectability and a responsible position
in the' community before he' is accepted as an equal." It is significant
that this "ie,,, ,yas expressed at about the same time' as the ciyil
rights mo"enwnt's March on 'Washington, ,,,hich ,,,as intended to
focus public attention on the denial of opportunities to black Americans,
and which rejected the view that inalienable rights haye to be
"earned." 98
The rhetoric used in dealing with the Vietnam "'Val' and those in
opposition to it is e"en more re"ealing. The war in Vietnam produced
sharply c1iyided opinions in the country; again, the Bureau knew
which side it ,,,as on. For instance, fifty copies of an article entitled
"Rabbi in Vietnam Says ",Vithdra,Yal Kot The Answer" ,,,ere anonymously
mailed by the FBI to members of the Vietnam Day Committee
to "con"ince" the recipients "of the correctness of the U.S. foreign
policy in Vietnam." 99
The Bureau also ordered copies of a film called "",Yhile Brave Men
Die" ,,,hich depicted "communists, left-,,,ing and pacifist acti"ities associated
with the so-called 'peace moycnwnt' or student agitational
demonstrations in opposition to the United States position in Vietnam."
The film was to be used for training Bureau personnel in connection
with "increased responsibilities relating to communist inspired
student agitational activities." 100
In the same yein, a directive to the Chicago field office shortly after
the 1!)(j8 Democratic Conwntion instructed it to "obtain all possible
evidence" that ,Yould "disprow" charges that the Chicago police
used undue force in dealing with anti,var demonstrations at the
Con"ention:
Once again, the liberal press and the bleeding hearts and
the forces on the lrft are taking ach-antage of the situation
in Chicago surrounding the Del110eratic National Convention
to attack the police and organized law enforcement agencies....
",Ye should be mindful of this situation and develop
all possible evidence to expose this activity and to refute
these false allegations.101
9';\[{'morandum from FBI Headqllart{'rs to Xew York Fi{'ld Office, et al.,
8/13/m.
.. ;\I{'moranallm from FBI H{'adquarters to San Francisco Field OfficI',
11/11/65
1oo ;\fpmorandllm from FBI H{'adqllart{'rs to Xew York Field Office et aI..
3/9/66.
101 Memorandum from FBI headqllart{'rs to Chicago Field Office 8/28/68.
242
The Bureau also attempted to enforce its "iew of sexual morality.
For example, two students became COIXTELPHO targets \vhen tl~ey
ddend(>d the usc of a four-letter word, e"PIl though thp dp!l1onstratIOn
in \"hidl thpy participated "(]ops not apppar to be illspirpd by the
Ke\v Ldt," lwcause it "sho\ys obyious disl'l'gard for (]pccncy and cstablished
morality." 10C An anollymous letter purportedly from an
irate parent and an artic]p pntitled "Frep Loye ('OlllPS to Austin"
\vere mailed to a state senator and the chair!l1an of the rniwrsity
of Texas Board of Hegents to air] in "forcing the 1-niwrsity to tak'e
action against those administrators who arC' pprl1litting an at!l1osplll're
to buildup on campus that will Ill' a fntile fjpld for the Xe\\" Left.'· 103
And a field office was outraged at the distrilmtion 011 cmnpns of a
IHmspaper caller] SCRE,Y, \vhieh \yas deseribed as "containing a
type of filth that could only originate in a depran'd mind. It is reprcsentatiy(~
of the type of mentality that is follO\ying tlH' Xc\\" Left
theory of immorality on certain college campnses." 104
As these C'xamples demonstrate, the FBI belieyec] it had a duty to
maintain the existing soeial and political order. ,Yhether or not one
agrees with the Bureau's views, it is profoundly disturbing that an
agency of the gonrnment secretly attempted to impose its views on the
American people.
(i) Use of the Media
The FBI attempted to influence public OpInIOn by supplying information
or articles to "confidential sources" in the ne\vS media. The
FBI's Crime Records Division 100 was responsible for covert liaison
with the media to ad vance bvo main domestic intelligence objectives: 106
102 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to :\finneapolis Field Offic€', 11/4/68.
103l\Ipmorandum from San Antonio field office to FBI Headquarters, 8/12/68;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to 'San Antonio Feld Office, 8/27/68.
'0' The field office also disapproved of the "hippy types" distrihuting the newspaper,
with their "unkempt clothes", "wild heards", and "other examples of their
nonconformity". Accordingly. an anonymous letter was sent to a state legislator
protesting the distrihution of such "depravity" at a state university, noting that
"this is becoming a way of campus life. Poison the minds of the young, destroy
their moral heing, and in less than one generation this country will he ripe for
its downfall." (:\femorandum from ~ew York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
5/2~/69; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Xewark Field Office, 1/69.
100 The Crime Records Division also had responsihility for disseminating information
to cultivate a favorahle puhlic image for the FBI-a practice common to
many government agencies. This ohjectiYe was pursued in various ways. One section
of the Crime Records Division was assigned to assemhle "material that was
needed for a public relations program." This section "developed information for
television shows. for writers. for authors. for newspapermen. people who wanted
in-dept.h information concerning the FBI." The section also "handled scripts"
for public service radio programs produced by FBI Field Offices; reviewed scripts
for television and radio shows dealing with the FBI; and handled the "puhlic
relations and publidty aspect" of the "ten most wanted fugitives program." The
Burpau attempted to assert control over media presentations of information
about its activities. For example, Director Hoover's apprm'al was necessary
before the Crime Records Dh'ision would cooperate with an author intending
to write a hook about the FBI (Bishop testimony. 12/2/71). pp. 6--8. 1ft)
100 :Memoranda recommending use of the media for COIXTELPRO purposes
sometimes bore the designation "l\Iass :\Iedia Program." which appeared mere·
ly to signify the function of the Crime Records Diyision as a "conduit" for
disseminating information at the request of the Domestic Intel1igencp Division.
(Bif'hop testimony, 12/2/75. pp. 63-6R, 88.) The (lisspmina tion of derogator~'
information to the media was usuall~' re,'iewed through the Bureau's chain of
commnnd and received final approval from Director Hoover. (Bishop t€'stimony,
12/2/75, p. 89.)
243
(1) prm-iding derogatory information to the media intended to generally
clisereclit the aetiyities or ideas of targetecl groups or individuals;
and (2) disseminating unfavorable artieles, ne,,-s releases. and background
information in order to disrupt particular activities.
Typically. a loca1FBI agent ,,-ouM l)J'O\'ide information to a "friendly
Ile'''S sourcp" on tIl(' condition "that the Bureau's interest in these
I~atters is to be kept in tIl(' strietest confidence." 107 Thomas E. Bishop,
fonner Director of the Crime Records Division, testified that he kept
a list of the Bureau's "press friends" in his desk,"OS Bishop and one
of his predecessors indicated that the FBI sometimes refused to cooperate
with reporters critical of the Bureau or its Director."09
Bishop stated that as a "general rule," the Bureau disseminated only
"public record information" to its media contacts, but this category
was Yiewed by the Burrau to include any information which could
conceivablv he obtained by close scrutinv of eYen the most obscure publications.
110 'Within these r;arameters. background information supplied
to reporters "in most cases [conld] include everything" in the Bureau
files on a targeted individual; the selection of information for publication
'''oulel be left to the reporter's judgment.111
There are numerous examples of authorization for the preparation
and dissemination of unfa \'orablr information to discredit generally
the actiyities and ideas of a target; 112
-FBI headquarl€l's solicitrc1 information from field offices "on a
continuing basis" for "prompt ... dissemination to the news media ...
to discrrdit the Kew Left mOYement and its adherents." Headquarters
re'1uestedJ among other things. that:
specific data should be furnished depicting the scurrilons and
deprayed nature of many of the characters, activities, habits
and living conditions rrpresrntativc of New Left adherents.
Field Offices were to be exhorted that "Every avenue of possible embarrasslllPnt
mnst be vigorously and enthusiastically explored." 113
-FBI headqnarters authorized a Field Office to furnish a media contact
,vith "background information and any arrest record" on a man
107 For example, Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office,
10/22/68.
108 Bishop. 12/2/75. p. 33.
100 Cartha DpLoach. who handlf'cl Illpdia contacts f.lr seyeral Yl'ars, testified that
this technique was not actually uSl'd as much as thl' Director desired:
If any unfair comml'nt appearl'd in any sl'gml'nt of the prl'SS concerning
)rr. Hoon>r or thE' FHI ... )rr. HooYE'r ... would say do not contact
this particular newspappr or (!o not contact this pl'rson or do not cooperate
with this pf'rson.... If I had compliE'd strictly to til(' letter
of thE' law to )11'. HooYl'r's in~tructions, I think I would be fair in saying
that WE' wouldn't he cooperating with hardl~' a singlE' newspaper in
the United Statps.... ThE' nl('n down through the years had to oyerlook
some of thosp instructions an(! (!pa! fairly with ali ~egments of the
press. (DeLoach testimony. 11/2;-;/75, pp. 213-214.)
110 Bishop statrd that the Crime Rl'conls Diyision was "scrupulous" in proyiding
information which could hE' cHpd to a "pagp and paragraph" in a puhlic
SOl1rCP. (Bi~hop.12/2/75.pp. 24.177-178.)
on Bishop. 12/2/75. pp. 13r)-136.
112 T. R Bishop ~tat('d that from thl' FBI docun1Pnts ayailahlp to tIl(' Committl'l',
it was impossihlp to (!ptprminp wll('t1lPr an artie!f' was actuall~' printpd aftE'r a
npws r('lf'asl' or a clraft articll' had hl'('n supplipd to a mpdia sourcE'. (BishoJl.
12/2/7ii, p. 86.)
113 Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. G. Sullivan, 5/22/68.
244
affiliated with "a radical New Left element" who had been "active in
shmving films Oll the Blark Panthers and police in action at various
universities during student rioting." The media contact had requested
material from the Bureau ,vhich "would have a detrimental effect on
[tho taruet's] activitirs." 114
-PhcAographs depicting a radical group's apartm~nt as "a shambles
with le,vd, obscene and revolutionary slogans chsplayed on the
walls" were furnished to a free-lance ,niter. The directive from headquarters
said: "As this publicity ,vill be derogatory in nature and
might serve to neutralize the group, it is being approved."1l5
-The Boston Field Office ,vas authorized to furnish "derogatory
information about the Nation of Islam (NOI) to established source
[name excised]":
Your suggestions concerning material to furnish [name] are
good. Emphasize to him that the XOI predilection for violence,
preaching of race hatred, and hypocrisy, should be exposed.
Material furnished [name] should be either public
source or known to enough people as to protect your sources.
Insure the Bureau's interest in this matter is completely
protected by [name].116
One Bureau-inspired documentary on the NOI reached an audience
of 200,000.117 Alt1lOUgh the public ,vas to be convinced that the NOI
was "violent", the Bureau knmv this 'V,'as not in fact true of the organization
as a whole.118
-The Section whirh supervised the COINTELPRO against the
Communist Party intended to discredit a couple "identified with the
Community Party monment" by preparing a news release on the
drug arrest of their son, which was to be furnished to "news media
contacts and sources on Capitol HilL" A Bureau official observed
that the son's "arrest and the Party connections of himself ana his
parents presents an excellent oppor6mity for expoitation." The news
release noted that "the Russian-born mother is currently under a
deportation oroer" ana had a former marriage to the son o'f a prominent
Communist Party member. The release added: "the Red Chinese
have long used narcotics to help weaken the youth of target
conntries." 119
11< Memorandum to Director from SAC :\Iiami, 3/10/70. Bishop testified that
he "would hope" that in response to the directive to disseminate the target's
"arrest record" the Division would have disseminated only conviction records.
Bishop said that under the Attorney General's guidelines then in effect only
conviction records or arrests which were a matter of public record in a particular
jurisdiction were to be disseminated. Bishop stated that his policy was
not to disseminate an arrest record "especially if that arrest record resulted in
an acquittal or if the charge was never completed ... because that is not, to my
mind. anything derogatory against a guy, until he actually gets convicted."
(Bishop testimony, 12/2/75. pp. 163-167, 173.)
11G Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 1/13/68.
u6,remorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office 2/27/68.
117 :\Iemorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarte~f\. 2/7/69.
118 Deposition of Black Nationalist COINTELPRO supervisor. 10/17/7;;, p. 21;
Deposition of George C. Moore, Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section, 11/3/7;;.
p.36.
U> Memorandum from F..J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 6/3/63.
245
-vVhen the wife of a Communist Party leader purchased a new car,
the FBI prepared a news item for distribution to "a cooperative ne,,'s
media source" mocking the leader's "prosperity" "as a disruptive
tactic." The item commented sarcastically that "comrades of the sel£proclaimed
leader of the American wOl:king class should not allow
this example of [the leader's] prosperity to discourage their continued
contributions to Part" cofrers." 120
-After a public meeting' in Xew York City, where "the handling
of the [.JFK assassination] inwstigation was criticized," the FBI
prepared a news item for placement "with a cooperative news media
source" to discredit the meeting on the grounds that "a reliable [FBI]
source" had reported a "convicted perjurer and identified espionage
agent as present in the audience." 121
-As part of the new Left COIXTELPRO, the FBI sent a letter
under a fictitious name to Life magazine to "call attention to the
unsavory character" of the editor of an underground magazine, who
was characterized as "one of the moving forces behind the Youth
International Party, commonly kno\vn as the Yippies." To counteract
a recent Lif(', "article favorable" to the Yippie editor, the FBI's fictitious
letter said that "the cuckoo editor of an unimportant smutty
little rag" should be "left in thp sewers." 122
Much of the Bureau's use of the me(lia to influence public opinion
was directed at disrupting specific activities or plans of targeted
groups or individuals:
-In March 1£)68, FBI Headquarters granted authority for furnishing
to a "cooperative national news media source" an article "designed
to curtail success of )[artin Luthrr King's fund raising" for the poor
people's march on 'Vashington, D.C. by asserting that "an embarrassment
of riches has befallen King ... and King doesn't need the
money." 123 To further this objeetiw, Headquarters authorized the
)[iami Office "to furnish data concrrning money wasted by the Poor
Prople's Campaign" to a friendly news reporter on the usual condition
that "the Bureau must nat 1)(' revpalpcI as thr sourcp." 124
The Section Chief in charge of thp Black Nationalist COINTELPRO
also recommended that "photographs of demonstrators" at the
march should be furnished: he attached six photographs of Poor
People's Campaign participants at a Cleycland rally, accompanied by
the note: "These show the militant, aggressive appearance of the participants
anl1 might be of intl'rest to a cooperative news source." 125
-As part of the Xe,,' Left COIXTELPRO, authority was granted
to tIll' Atlanta Field Offi(,p to furnish a ne\vspapl'r editor who had
"\\Titten 1llIml'J'OUS rditorinls praising the Bureau" with "information
to supplpment that alrpady known to him from public SOll!'ces concerning
subversive influences in tlw Atlanta peace movement. His use of
this matprial in \vl'll-timNl articles \vould 1)(' uspd to thwart the
[upcoming-] demonstrations." 126
"" Mf'mornnrlnlll frolll F . .T. Bnnmnrrlnf'r to "'. C. Rnllivan. R/fl/65.
m Mf'mornndnlll fr0111 F . .T. Bnnlll,c-nnlnpr to '\Y. C. Rnllh'nn. 2/24/64.
'" :I[Plllora]](lnlll from );'P\Y York Fipld Offipf' to FBI Hf'nrlqnartprs, 10/16/6R.
123 :I[pmo]'fi]](lnD1 from G. C. :I[oorp to "'. ('. i"llllinm, 10/2%R,
'04 :I[P111orn1l{111111 from FBI H('arlqnnrtprs to :I[in111i Fi('lrl OfficI', 7/11/6R.
,>1 :\[f'l1lOrnll(llllll from G, C, :lroOrf' to "'. C, Rll l li"all. :l/li/io,
'2<l :I[Pl1l0rnnrlll111 from FBI Headfjllartprs to Atlanta Fi"ld Office. 10/22/68.
246
-An FBI Special Agent in Chicago contacted a reporter for a
major newspaper to arrange for the publication of an article which
was expected to "greatly encourage factional antagonisms during the
SDS COI1\'elltioll" by publicizing the attempt of "an underground
communist organization" to take over SDS. This contact resulted in
an article headlined "Red Fnit Seeks SDS Rule." 127
-FBI Director Hoonr approYed a Field Office plan "to get cooperative
news media to cover closed meetings of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) and other New Left groups" with the aim of "disrupting
them." 128
-Se\'eral months after COINTELPRO operations were supposed
to have terminated, the FBI attempted to discredit attorney Leonard
Boudin at the time of his defense of Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon
Papers case. The FBI "called to the attention" of the Washington
bureau chief of a major news senice information on Boudin~s alleged
"sympathy" and "legal seryices~' for "communist causes." The reporter
placed a detailed ne\ys release on the wires which cited Boudin's "identification
with Leftist causes" and included references to the arrest of
Boudin~s daughter~ his legal representation of the Cuban goyernment
and "Communist sympathizer" Paul Robeson, and the statement that
"his name also has been connected \"ith a number of other alleged communist
front groups." III a handwritten note, J. Rclgfir Hoover directed
that copies of the news release be sent to "Haldeman, A. G.,
and Deputy." 129
The Bureau sometimes used its media contacts to preYent or postpone
the publication of articles it considered favorable 1:0 its targets
of unfaYorable to the FBI. For example~ to influence articles which
related to the FBI, the Bureau took advantage of a close relwtionship
with a high official of a major national magazine, described in an FBI
m ~lpmorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/18/69.
128 i\Ipmorandum from FBI Headquarters to Indianapolis Fipld Office, 6/17/6R
129 I<'BI Memorandum from Bishop to ~lohr, 7/6/71; Bishop testimony, 12/2/75,
pp.148-151.
Two years earlier the Crime Records Division prepared a sixteen-page memorandum
containing information on "I.€onard B. Boudin, Attorney for Dr. Benjamin
Spock," written at the time of Spock's indictment for conspiring to violate
the Splective Service Act. (FBI :\Iemorandum from i\I. A. Jones to T. E. Bishop,
2/26/68) The memorandum described "alleged associations and activities of
Boudin" related to organizations or individuals considered "subyersive" by the
FBI, (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 134-135) and induded: names of many of Boudin's
clients; citatiDns to magazines and journals in whieh Boudin had puhlished
articlE's; references to petitions he had signed; and notes on rallies and academic
conferences at which he had spoken. The memorandum indicated that "the White
House and Attorney General have heen advised" of the information on Boudin's
hackground. Notations on the coyer sheet of the memorandum hy high Bureau
officials indicate that approval was granted for "furnishing the attached information
to one of our friendly news contacts" hut the information was not used
until after the "results of appeal in Spock's casE'." Bishop did not recall distributing
the Boudin memorandum. (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 125-126)
The head of thE' Crime Records Diyision speculated that the memorandum
was prE'pared at the request of a N'porter hE'CausE' he did not rE'memher a request
from Hoover or from the Domestic Intelligence DiYision, which was the normal
route for assignments to the Crime Records Diyision. Diyision Chief Bishop
testified that he probahly instmctE'd the Diyision "to gE't Ujl any puhlic sourcp
information that we havE' cOllcerning Boudin that shows his COllllE'Ction with the
Communist Party or related groups of that nature." (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 131133)
247
memorandum as "our good friend." Through this rl'latiollship. the
FBI "squekhed" an "unfavorable article against the Bureau" \Hitten
by a free-lance \\Titcl' about an FBI inn>stig'ation; "postponpd puhlication"
of an article on another FBI case; "forrstalle(] publication"
of an al-ticle· by Dr. ~\Iartin Luther King', .Jr.; and rrcrin~d information
about proposed editing of King's articles. DO
The BUreflll also attempted to influence public opinion b)' using
nmys media som'crs to discredit dissident groups by linking thrm to
the Communist Party:
-A confidential s'ource ,Yho published a "self-described consenatiYlo
\yerkly newspaper" \yas anonymously mailed information on a
church's sponsorship of efforts to aholish the Housr Committee on
lTn-American aeti"itirs, This prompted an articlr entitled "Locals to
Aid Red Linr," naming 'the ministrr. among others, as a local sponsor
of what it tennrcl a "Communist clominatrd plot" to abolish HU.\C.l31
-The Bureau targeted a professor who hac] been the presiclf'nt of
a local peacr centrr, a "coalition of anti-Virtnam and anti-draft
groups." In 1D6R, he resigned trmporarily to become state chairman of
Eugene ~IcCarthy's presidential campaign organization. Information
on the professor's wifr, who had apparently associated with Communist
Pariy members in the early 1850's, was furnished to a nrwspaper
editor to "expose those people at this time when they are receiving
considerable publicity in order" to "disrupt the members" of the
peace organization.132
-Other instances included an attempt to link a school boycott with
the Communists by aleliing newsmen to the boycott leader's plans to
attend a literary reception at the Soviet mission; 133 furnishing information
to the media on the participation of the Communist Pariy
presic]ential candidate in the rnited Farm ,Yorkers' picket line; 134
"confidentially" informing established sources in three nOlihel'll California
nmYspapers that the San Francisco County Communist Party
Committee had statpcl that civil rights groups were to "begin working"
Oll thp arpa~s large newspapers "in an effort to secure greater
employment of K ('groes;" 133 anel furnishing information to the media
Oll Socialist ,Yorkers Pariy participation in the Spring }Iobilization
Committee to Errel the 'Yar in Vietnam to "discredit" the antiwar
group.13G
(H) Attad'8 011 Lcadel'8
Through CO\'Clt propaganda, the FBI not only attempted to influrnce
public opinion Oll matters of social policy, but also directly in-
1:<0 )[cmorandum from "', H, Stapleton to C. n, DeLoach, 11/5/64,
131 )[pmorandum from (']p\'e]and Fie]d Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/28/64:
mpnWraIH]UIJI frolJl FBI Headquarters to ('leyplan(l Field OfficI', 11/6/64,
m )[p!Ilorandum from FBI HplHlcjuarters to l'hopnix Fie]d Officp, 6/11/68.
1~1 )Ipnwrandum fram FBI Hpadquartprs to Xew York Fipld Office, 2/4/64,
"" Thp targ-et was not intended to Ill' the l'nited Farm "\Yorkers, but a ]oca]
('oI!Pg'P profpssor exppC'ted to participatp in the picket Jill(', The Bureau had
unsuccrssfully dirpcted "considerahle rfforts to preypnt hiring-" the professor,
Apparentl~', the Burpau did not considpr thp impact of this tpchnique (In the
T'nitpd Far!ll 'YorkNs' efforts, (Memorandum from San Francisco Fipld Offi:ce to
FBI TTpad(jlwrtprs. !)/12/6R; memorandum frolJl FBI Hpadquartprs to San Franebco
Fip](1 Offiep, 9/13/6R.)
l.~, )[PIJIOraIH]ulll fro III San Frandsco Fipld Offiep to FBI Hpa<1quartprs, 4/16/64.
'''' )[pnlOran(lum frolJl San Francisco FipJd Office to FBI Hpadquartprs, 3/10/67;
memoranduIJI from FBI Headquarters to San Frandsco Field Office, 3/14/67,
248
tervened in the people's choice of leadership both through the electoral
process and in other, less formal arenas.
For instance, the Bureau made plans to disrupt a possible "Peace
Party" ticket in the 1£)68 elections. One field office noted that "effectively
tabbing as communists or as communist-backed the more hystericaI
opponents of the President on the Yietnam question in the midst
of the presidential campaign "'oulll be a real boon to )11'.•Johnson." ,;, ..
In the FBI's COIXTELPHO programs, political candidates were
targrted for disruption. The docullwnt which originated the Socialist
'Vorkers Party COIXTELPHO noted that the S'YP "has, over the
past several years, been openly espousing its line on a local and
national basis through running candidates for public office." The
Bureau decided to "alert the public to the fact that the S'YP is not
just another socialist group but foJ1mvs the revolutionary principles
of Marx, Lenin, and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky." Several
f:nVp candidates were targeted, usually by leaking derogatory information
about the candidate to the press.'3S
Other COINTELPRO progmms also included attempts to disrupt
campaigns. For example, a Midwest la"'yer running for City Council
was targeted because he and his firm had represented "subYersives".
The Bureau sent an anonymous letter to several community leaders
which drcried his "commUliist background" and labelled him a~'char1atan."
'09 rnder a fictitious name, the Bureau sent a lettel' to a television
station on which the candidate was to appear, enclosing a series of
qurstions about his clients and his activities ,vhich it believed should
be asked.140 The candidate was defeated. He later ran (successfully,
as it happened) for a judgeship. The Bureau attempted to disrupt this
subsequent, successful campaign for a judgeship by using an anticommunist
group to distribute fliers and ,,-rite letters opposing his
candidacy.14'
In another instance, the FBI attempted to have a Democratic Party
fundraising affair raided by the state Alcoholic Beverage Control
Commission. The fund raiser ,vas targeted because of two of the candidates
,vho ,vould be present. One, a state assemblyman running for
reelection, was active in the Vietnam Day Committee; the other, the
Democratic candidate for Congress, had been a sponsor of the National
Committee to Abolish tlw House Committee on Un-American Activities
and had led demonstrations opposing the manufacture of napalm
bOlnbs.142
Although the disruption of election campaigns is the clearest example,
the FBI's interference ,vith the political process ,vas much broader.
137 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/1/67.
'''' ~Iemorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all RAC's, 10/1:?/61.
1:19 ~Iemorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/1/65; memorandum
from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 9/2:?/6:>.
140 ~Iemorandumfrom Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 9/2R/6,'5 ; memorandum
from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office. 10/1/65.
141 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office. to FBI Headquarters. 1/19/67.
'" ~Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 11/14/66.
The attempt was unsuccessful: a prior raid on a fire department's fund raiser
had angered the local District Attorney. and tIlE' ABC decided not to raid the
Democrats because of "political ramifications."
249
For example, all of the COINTELPRO programs ,wre aimed at the
leadership of dissident groups.'4"
In one ease, the Bureau's plans to discredit a civil rights leader include(
l an attempt to replace him ,yith a candidate chosen by the
Bureau. During lDG4, the FBI began a massiyc program to discredit
nr. Martin Luther King, .Jr. and to "neutralize" his effecti"eness
as the leader of the civil rights mO\'ement.144 On .January 8, lD64,
Assistant Director ",Yilliam C. Sulli"an proposed that the FBI select
a nmy "national Negro leader" as Dr. King's successor afh'r the Bureau
had taken Dr. King "off his pedestaF:
",Vhen this is done, and it can and will be done ... the
Negroes will be left without a national leader of sufficiently
compelling personality to stper them in the right direction.
This is ,yhat could happen, but need not happen if the right
kind of Negro leader could at this time be gradually developed
so as to o,'eTshadO\y Dr. King and be in the position to
assume the role of leadership of the Negro people when King
has been completely discredited.
I want to make it clear at oncl' that I don't propose that
the FBI in any ,yay became involved openly as the sponsor
of a Negro leader to o,'ershadow )Iartin Luther King....
But I (10 propose that I be giYen permission to explore further
this entire matter....
If this thing can be set up properly without the Bureau in
any way becoming diredly ilwoh'ed, T think it would not
only be a grl'at lwlp to the FBI hut ,Yould ]w a fine thing for
the country at large. ",Vhile T am not specifying at this
moment, there are .-cHious ways in ,Yhich the FBI could give
this entire matter the propel' dirl'ction and development.
There are highly placed contacts of the FBI who might. he
very helpful to further such a step....145
Thl', Bureau's efforts to discredit Dr. King are discussed more fully
elsewhere.'46 It is, hmyeYCL important to note here that some of the
Bureau's efforts coincided ,vith Dr. King's activities and statements
conceJ'lling major social and political issues.
(i£i) Exa.qgerating The Threat
The Bureau also used its control over the information-gathering
process to shape the views of gon'J'Ilment officials and the public on the
1<3 The originating document for the "Black Xationalist" COIXTELPRO ordered
field offices to "expose. disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize" the
"leadership" and "spokesmen" of the target groups. The "Xew Left" originating
memo called for efforts to "neutralize" the Xew Left and the "Key Activitists,"
definf'CI as "those individuals who are the moving forces behind the New Left;"
the letter to field offices made it clear that the targets were the "leadership"
of the "X('w L('ft"-a t('rm which was ne\'er defined. (Memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to all SAC's. 8/25/67.) .
1<, ~Iemorandum from Brennan to Sullivan, 5/9/68; memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to all SAC's. :'/10/61'.
'" :\Iemoran<Jum from Sullivan to Belmont, 1/8/64. Although this proposal
was approvpd by Director Hooyer, there is no evidence that any steps were taken
to implement the plan.
1<. See :\Iartin Luther King, .Jr. Report: Sec. Y, The FBI's Efforts to Discredit
Dr. :\Iartin Luther King: 1964, Sec. YII, The FBI Program Against Dr. King:
]965-1968.
250
threats it perceiwd to the social order. For example, the FBI exaggerated
the strength of the Communist Party and its influence oyer
the ciyilrights and anti-Vietnam ,,-ar mOH'nwnts.
Opponents of ciyil rights legislation in the early HlGOs had charged
that such legislation was "a part of the ,yorId Communist conspiracy
to divide and conquer our country from ,yithin." The truth or falsity
of these charges was a matter of concern to the administration. Congress,
and the public. Since the BUI'eau ,yas assigned to compile intelligencr
on Communist actiYity, its estinwte ,yas sought and, prrslllnahly,
relircl upon. Accordingly, in lU():j. thr Domestic Intelligence Division
submitted a memorandum to Director Hooyer detailing the CP1JSA's
"efforts" to exploit black ~\mericans, which it concluded were an
"oo,-ious failure." 147
Director HooYer was not pleased with this conclusion. He sent a
sharp message hack to the Diyision ,Yhich, according to the Assistant
Director in chargr. made it "eYident that we had to change om ,yays
or we would all he out on the strret." 148 Another memorandum was
:therefore "Titten to giw the Director "what Hoover ,Yanted to
hear." 149
The memorandum stated, "The Director is correct;" it called Dr.
Martin Luther King, .Jr. "the most dangerous Negro of the future in
this Nation from the standpoint of communism, the Negro, and national
secmity:" and it concluded that it was "unrealistic" to "limit
ourselves" to '''legalistic proofs or definitely conclusive evidence" that
the Communist Party ,vields "substantial influence over Negroes which
one day could become decisive." 150
Altl~ough the Division still had not said the influence 1ra8 decisiYe,
by 1UG4 the Dirpctor testified brforr the Housr Appropriations Subcommittee
that thr "Communist influence" in the "Negro moycmrnt"
was "vitally important." 151 Only someone with access to the underlying
information would note that the facts could be interpreted quite differently.
l51a
1<7 ~Iemorandum from Baumgardner to Sulliyan, 8/23/63, p. 1.
1<' Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, p. 20.
1<. Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, p. 29.
1Oo~Iemorandum from Sullivan to Director, FBI, 8/30/63. Sullivan described
this process of "interpreti,-e" memo writing to lead a reader to belieye the Communists
were influential without actually stating they were in control of a movement:
"You have to spend years in the Bureau really to get the feel of this. _ ..
You came down here to 'efforts', these 'colossal efforts'. That was a key word of
ours when we are getting around the facts.... You will not find anywhere in the
memorandum whether the efforts were successful or unsuccessful. ... Here is
another one of our words that we used to cover up the facts, 'cfforts to cxploit',
that word 'exploit'. Nowhere will you find in some of these memos the results of
the exploitation. [Like] 'planning to do all possible', you can search in vain for a
statpment to the effect that their plans were successful or unsuccessful, partly successful
or partly unsuccessful." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 15-16.) =Hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964). p. 309. Director Hoover's statement was widely publicized.
(E.g., "HoO\'er Says Reds Exploit Xeg-roes," Xew York Times, 4/22/64, p. 30)
It caused serious concern among- civil rig-hts leaders who feared that it would
hurt the prospects for passag-e of the 1964 civil rights bill.
15" Director Hoover had included similar exaggerated statements about Communist
influence in a briefing to the Eisenhower Cabinet in H156. Hooyer had
stated, reg-arding- an XAACP-sponsored conference:
"The Communist Party plan.~ to use this conference to emharrass the Administration
hy causing a rift between the Administration and Dixiecrats ,vho have
251
A similar exaggeration o('cnrred in some of the Bnreau's statements
on comillunist influencc on the anti-Yietnam \"ar demonstrations.
In April 18(;;") Presi(knt .Johnson met \"ith Dirpctor Hoon'r to discuss
.Johnson·s "collC'prn oyer thp anti-Yietnam situation." A('('ording
to lIoowr.•Johnson said JJP ha(l "no doubt" that Communists wprp
"lwhin(l the disturbancps." 1C>2 Hoowr agreed. stating that upcoming
dplllOllstrations in eighty-fiw cities \"ere lwing plannpd by tlw Students
for a J)(:mocratic Socipty and that SDS \ras "largply intlltratpd by
commulllsts and [it] has lwpn \"onn into tll(' ci,'il riuhts situation
\"hich \YP know has large communist influence." 1;;.1 I'-
Immpdiately after the nw(~ting. 11Owp\"('r. 1100\'pr told his associates
that the Bureau might not bc able to "technically statr" that SDS was
"an actual comlllllllist organization." Thp FBI lflerely knew that there
\wre "communists in it." Hoowr instructed. ho\YPwr, ",Yhat I want
to get to thr Prrsident is the backgl'Ound \"ith rmphasis upon thr
communist influrncr thrrrin so that hp \"ill kno\" exact ly what the pictum
is." Thr Director addpd t bat he wanted "a good, strong memorandum"
pinpointing that tll(' demonstrations had lwrn "largely participated
in by communists ewn though they may not haw initiated
them;" the Bureau rould "at least" say that they had "joined and
forced the issue." According to t hr Director, President .Johnson was
"quite concel'lled" and wanted "prompt aIHI quick action." 1.>4
Once again. the Bureau \\Totr a rrport which made Communist "efforts"
sound like COlllmunist success. Thr pight-page memorandum
drtailed all of the Communist Party's attempts to "encourage" domestic
dissrnt by "a crescendo of criticism ainwd at negating every effort
of the Fnited Statrs to prewnt Yidnam from bring rngulfed by communist
aggrrssors." Twicp in the eight pagt's. for a total of t\"o and a
half sentencrs. it was pointed out that most drmonstrators \YPrr not
Party memlwrs and thrir decisions \wre not initiatrd or controlled by
the communists. Each of these brief statements moreover, was followed
by a qualification: (1) "howe/'e/'. the Comlllunist Party. FSA .. , has
vigoronsly supported these groups and rxprte(l influence;" (2) "lVhilc
the )Iarch [on ,Yashington1was not Communist initiatrd ... Communist
Party mrmbrrs froIII throughout thr nation palticipatecl."
[Emphasis added.] ]'",
The rest of the mrlllomndulll is an illustration of \"hat formrr
Assistant Director SulliYan called "intrrpreti\'r" mrmo \\Titing in
~ullllorted it, hy forcing the Adlllini~tration to take a ~tand on ciyil right~ leg;
i~Il1'tion with tlw lln'.~E'nt CongrE'~~. Tlw Party llOpe8 through a rift to affE'ct the
In;;n election~'" [Emllha~i~ added.] C\Iemorandum froIII Director, FlU, to the
ExecutivE' Assi~tant to tlw Attorney General, 8/9/3G. and enclosure.)
Dirl'C'tor Hooyer did not inelude in hi~ llrl'llared hriE'fing ~tatE'lllellt <thl' information
rl'llorted to tllp 'Vhite House separately par!ipr that ther!' \\'a~ "no indientioll"
the the XAACP had "allo\\'l'd thE' Communist Party to infiltrate the
confl'rpnce." (Iloon'!' to Dillon Ander~on. Rpeeial A~~i~tant to thl' Pre~idE'nt.
8/5;',}G.) Aecording to one historical account, Hooyer's Cahinet hriefing "reinforcpd
the Pre~idl'nt'~ inclination to pa~~iYity" on civil right~ legi~lation, I.T. "'.
Andpr~on, Ri8enhower, Rroll'l/ell, al/d the Congre88: The Tal/llied Orillin8 of the
ril'il Ri,qht8 Bill of 11156-57 [Cniversity of Alabama Press, 19G4]. p. 34.)
]c., :\[l'morandum from Hoover to subordinate FBI official~, 4/21'/65.
]c" Hom'er IllPlllorandulll, 4/21'/6".
]c" lIooye!' melllorandum. 4/21'/G,'}.
]C,.' Lettpr frolll Hoover to :\IcGeorge B\lIl{l~', Rpecial A~~i~tant to the
Presidpnt (Xational Recurit~·). 4/28/6;;, eJl('lo~ing FBI memorandulll, RuhjE'ct:
Comlllunist "\ctiyities Relative to United States Policy on Vietnam,
252
which Communist efforts and desires are emphasized without any
enduation of whether they had been or were likely to be successful.
The exaggeration of Communist participation, both by the FBI
and ",Vhite House staff members relying on FBI reports,lOG could only
haye had the effect of reinforcing President .Tohnson's original tendency
to disconnt dissent against the YietJiam "'Val' as "Commnnist
inspired"-a belief shared by his successor,IO' It is impossible to Ill,easure
the full effect of this distorted perception at the \"Cry highest policymaking
level.
156 See, e,g., a memorandum from ~Iarvin (Watson) to the President, 5/16/67,
quoting from a Burpau report that: "the Communist Party and other org-anizations
are continuing their effort~ to force the United States to change it~ present
policy toward Yietnam."
157 The report prepared by the intelligence agencies as the basi~ for the 1970
"Hu~ton Plan" included the following similar empha~is on the potential thrpat
(and downplaying of the actual lack of success) :
"Leadprs of student protest group~" who tranled abroad wpre "considprpd to
have potential for recruitment and participation in forpign-dirpcted intelligE'nce
activity."
"Antiwar activists" who had "frequently travPled abroad" wpre considpred
"as having potential for engaging in foreign-directed intelligence collection."
The CIA wa~ "of the view that the Soviet and bloc intelligence services are
committed at the political level to exploit all domestic dissidents wherever
possible."
Although there was "no hard evidence" of substantial foreig-n control of "tIH'
black extremist movement," there was "a marked potential" and the groups were
"highly susceptible to E'xploitation by hostilE' foreign intelligE'nce sen'ices."
"Communi~t intelligence sen'ice~ are capable of using their per~onnel, facilitie~,
and agent personnel to work in the black extremist field."
While there were "no suhstantial indications that the communist intplligence
~ervices have actively fomented domestic unrest," their "capability" could not
"be minimized,"
"TIl(' dissidence and violence in the {'nitpr! State~ today prpsent adversary
intpl!igence services with opportunities unparalleled for forty years." [l<Jmphasis
added.) (Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc),
.Tune 1970; substantial portions of this report appear in Hearings, Yo!. 2,
pp. 141-188.)

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