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F. FIXDIXG-IXADEQUATE COKTROLS OK DISSE)JIXATIOX AXD HETEXTIOX )[.\JOR FIXDII\(; The COllllllittpr finds that the ]Jl'Odud of intellige]H'l' inH'stigations has been cliss('lllinated \yithout adequate eontrols. Heports on lawful politir'al actiyit~, amI la\y-alJiding eitizens han bern r!isselllillated to agcneies haying nO propcr reason to receiyc thclll. I nfoI'mation that should haye bccn discanlprl. plll'grrl. or spalrd, inc!urling th(· produet of illegal techniques anrl oypl'hl'Oad inyestigations. has l)(>en retained and is a\'ailable for futurp usp. ,,",'ubfi lidill g8 (a) .Agencies ha\'P yoluntrered massiYe amounts of irrelevant informat.ion to othpr ofliejals and ageneips and han ]'('spOlHled Im<jurstioningly in some ins~atl('es to rC'flurst" for data without assuring that thr information would br llspd for ala ,yful purpose. (ll) Excesoiin (!'isoiemjn:ltioll has sonH'tilllP" r'olltrilmtpd to tlw inrffieielley of the intelligp;lce pl'or'pois itsC'lf. (c) l~nd(']' tIl(' f('(lPl'al emp]oyC'l' spclll'ity program, II111H'cpssary information about the politieallJPlid" and a,:soeintions of prospeC!tjYe gO\'PTnment employres has [wen disspminatrd. ((I) TIlP FBI. \\'hich has 1)('en tlIP "c!earinghOllse" for all donwstic intelligC'ncl\ data, maintains ill rC'adily acces"'ible fill'S sensitiYe an(l derogatory personal information not rc1r,'ant to any invest,iga:tioll, as well as information \vhich was improperly or illegally obtained. 1:'1l1bomtion of Findings The acl\'Prse effects Oil priYacy of the (herbreadth of clolllPstic intelligenct' collection and of the us(' of Intrusi\'e Teehniques have been magnified many times onr by the dis,:plllination practices of the collecting ageneies. lnforma:tion which shoul(l not ha ,'e bern gathrrerl in the first place has g01l(' beyond thl' initial agl'nc\' to nllmel'OUS otlwl' agl'ncies awl officials, t hilS compOlIll<ling- (II(' ol'iginalintJ'lIsion. The amount disseminated within tlw Ex('('utive branch has oftl'n I){'cn so voluminous as to make it difficult to separate useful data from worthless detail. The Committee's flnding on Political Abuse describes dissemination of intelligenc(' for the political adn1l1tage of high officials or the self-interest of an agency. The problems of excessive dissemination, however, include morr than political lise. Dissrminatioll has not brrn confined to what is appropriate for law enforcement or oth('r proper gowrnnwnt purposes. Ratlwr. any information which could have been conceived to be useful was passecl on, and doubts were generally resoh'ed in favor of dissemination. rntil recently. none of the standards for the exchange of data among agencies has taken privacy interests into account. The same failure to consider privacy interests (253 ) 254 has charactBrized the retention of data by the original collecting agency. Subfil1ding (a) Agencies have volunteered massi,-e amounts of irrelevant information to other officials and agencies and have responded unquestioningly in some instances to requests for data without assurmg that the information would be used for a la,dul purpose, The following examples illustrate the extent of dissemination: -FBI reports on dissident Americans flowed to the CIA at a rate as high as 1,000 a month. CIA officials regarded any names in these reports as a standing requirement from the FBI for information about those persons.1 -In 1967 the IntBrnal Security Division of the Justice Department ,vas receiving 150 reports and memoranda a day from the FBI on "organizations and individuals engaged in agitational activity of one kind or another." 2 -Attorney General Ramsey Clark could not "keep up with" the volume of FBI memoranda coming into him and to the Assistant Attorneys General on the 700,000 FBI investigations per year.3 -The Justice Department's IDIU sent its computer list of 10,000 to 12,000 American dissidents to the CIA's Operation CHAOS (which apparently found it useless) and to the Special Sen-ice Staff of the Internal Revenue Senice ('Yhich did use it as part of its program of tax investiglltions)" -In fiscal year 1974 alone, the FBI, the Civil Senice Commission, and military intelligence received over 367.000 requests 'for "national agency checks," or name checks of their files, on prospective federal government employees.5 The information disseminated to other agencies has often been considered useless by the recipients. FBI officials have said they recei"ed "very little in the ,yay of good product" from the National Security Agency's interception of the international communications of Americans, G FBI offiCIals also considered most of the material on "the domestic scene" sent to them from the CIA mail opening project to be irrelevant "junk." 6a The Secret Service destroyed over ninety percent of the information disseminated to it by the FBI without ever putting it in its own intelligence files.' Defense Department directins require the destruction of a great deal of information it receiws from the FBI about civilians considered "threatening" to the military, including reports on civilian "subnrsion." R Sometimes dissemination has become 'almost an pnd in itsplf. The FBI would oftpn anticipate ,vhat it considered to be the needs of other 1 Richard Ober testimony, 10/28/75, pp. 67, 68, 2 :\Iemorandum from Kevin :\Iaroney, et aI, to Attorney General Ram~ey Clark, 12/6/67. 3 Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 249. This statistic refers to criminal inv- estigations as well as intelligence investigations. • See Part II, pp. 80. 95. , Stlttement of AHorney General Edward H. Levi before House Jndiciary Committee. February 1975. 6 \V. R. Wannall testimony, 10/3/7i:>. p. 13. •• W. A. Branigan testimony. 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 168. 7 GAO Report, p. 125. 8 DOD Directive 5200.27, 3/1/71. 255 "apj)I'Oj)l'iatr agrllcies"~ " The Hurrau has dissPlllinated datn to military intelligeIH~e agpneies. rPl.tardless of ,,,hethe]' OJ' not tll('re ,,,as likely to be serious yiolenee requiring t he dispatch of troops; the Bureau abo disspminatpd information when tl1('I'(' was no connection Iwtm'('n the subject of tIll' I'('port and any military personnel 01' facilityY Conseqlll'ntly, the comlmlerized and non-colllputprized dOlIlestic intelligpnce data banb cOlllpilpd by the Contin('ntal ,Arllly ComJIland cited the FBI as "data sourcp" for about MO pprcent of til(' information when' a source ,ras identified." FBI dissemination to the militarv has shown ho'" information can get into the hands of agencies which haye no pro])('r n'ason to receive it,!" The FBI disseminated a largp YOIUIHe of information on domestic political acti"ities to the CIA, thus ]H'o,-iding a substantial part of the data for the CHAOS programY Much of this information was also furnished to the State Department." The FBI sometimes disseminated rp])()rts to the CIA and the State Department if the subject matter inyoh-ed pllblic discussion of national security policy and possiblr "sub,'ersi ,-e" influenceY The FBI was also the largest source of political targets for tax inYestigations by thr Special Sen-ice Staff of the Internal Reyenue Senicc. 'While still in its fOl'lnatin~ clays, SSS "'as placed on the FBI's distribution list in response to a request from an Assistant IRS Commissioner for information regarding: various organizations of ]ll'pdominantly dissident or extremist nature and/or people prominently identified with those organizations,lll "For example. in 1966 hdore the FBI had recl'iyed any I'pecifil' inf.;trnctionH from the Attorney Gl'neral to g-ather civil diHturbance intelligence, Bureau Head( juarterH adyil'ed all Field Office~ tbat "national. state, and local" g-overnment officials "rel~' 011 us" for information "so th€'y can takl' appn;priate action to a ,'prt diHaf.;trous outhrpaks," ThuH, FBI offic€'s \YPre told to "int€'nl'if~' and expaml" their "col't'rage" of demonstrations opposing "Unit('(l Rta'teH forl'ign poli('~' in Yietnam" or "protl'HtH inYolYing- racial issueH," in order to insure that "adYance sig-nH" of Yiolence could hp "cliHspminated to appropriate authoritie.~." (RAe Letter 66-27, 5/2/66) 10 1'hese policies were part of the formal obligation of the FBI under the 194!) Delimitation Agreement with militan' intelligencl'. The Agreement itself reo quired the FBI to k('('p military intellig-pnce agencil'H adyil'ed of the actiyities of "cil'ilian groups" classed aH "I'ubYersive," (Delimitation Agreement, 2/23/49.) And a Supplementar~' Agreement said, "'Vhere 'there is doubt as to 'Whether or not one of the other agencieH is intl'reHted in information collt'('ted, it HllOUld he tranHmitted to the other agencr." (Supplemental Agreement ~o. 1 to the Delimitation Ag-reement, 6/2/4\).) 11 ":\Iilitarr RUrYeillance of Ciyilian Politics," Report of the Senate Subcommittel' on ConHtitutional Rights (1973), p. 72. 12 The Agreements between the FBI and military intelligence ha ye not been reyi,,-ed to take account of the restrictions on Army surYeillanee imposed bJ' the Department of Defense in 1971. See DOD Directiye 5200.27, 3/1/71. '" Richard Ober, 10/28/75, pp, 67, 68. H The }'BI :\lanual stated that information concerning" "proposed traYel abroad" by domestic "subversiYes" was to he furniHhed to the CIA and the State J)epartment, and Bureau Field OfficeH were told to recommend the "extent of foreig-n im'eiO;tig-a tion" required. (FBI :\Ianual of InstructionI', Seetion R7. p. 33a. rl'\'iHed 4/15/63.) 15 For example, Rl'portH on the AB:\I debate (!iHcuswd on pp. 257-251'. 10 :\Iemorandum from D. ·W. Bacon to Director, FBI, 8/8/69. 256 The FBI, perceiving that SSS would "deal a blow to dissident elements," 17 decided to supply reports relating to this broad category of individuals and organizations. The FBI did not select the reports it forwarded on the basis of the presence of a probable tax violation, but on the basis of the political and ideological criteria IRS had supplied; yet the furnishing of the report resulted in establishment of an SSS file and, subject to resource limitations, to a rm'iew of possible tax liahility.18 Among the other lists of "extremists," "subversives" and dissidents SSS received was a list of 2,300 organizations the FBI categorized as "Old Left," "New Left," and "Right 'Ving." 19 One reason for the Bureau's widespread dissemination of intelligence throughout the Executive branch was recalled by a former FBI official. In the late 1940s a sensitive espionage case involved a high government official. At that time the FBI held such information "very tightly:' as it had during "~orld 'Val' II. Ho,,'ewr, one item of information that "became rather significant" had allegedly "not been disseminated to the 'Vhite House or the Secretary of State." Mr. Hoover was criticized for that, and frankly, he never forgot it. From then on, you might say, the policy was disseminate, disseminate, disseminate.2o This testimony illustrates the dilemma of an agency which was blamed for inadequate dissemination. but never criticized for too much dissemination. In practice, this dilemma was resolved by passing on any information "which in any ,,'ay even remotely suggested that there was a responsibility for another agency." 21 The follmving are examples of excessive dissemination, drawn from a random sample of materials in FBI headquarters files: -In 1969 the FBI disseminated to Army and Air Force intelligence, Secret Service, and the IDIU a report on a Black Student Union; the report which discussed "a tea" sponsored by the group to develop faculty- student "dialogue" as a junior college and the plans of the college to establish a conrse on "The History of the American 1\egro." There was no indication of violence whatsoever. Dissemination to the military intelligence agencies and Secret Service took place both at the field level and at headquarters in 'Vashington, D.C. The information came from college officials.22 -In 1970 thr FBI disseminated to military intelligence and the Secret Senicr (both 10cal1)' and at Headquarters), as well as to the .Justice Department (IDIU, Internal Security Division. and Civil Rights Division) a report reeeived from a local police intelligence unit on the picketing of a loeal Industril's of the Blind plant by "blind black ,vorkrrs" who ,vere on strikl'. The sixtl'en-page rl'port included a eopy of a handbill distributed at a Fnited Chureh of Christ annonnc- 17 FBI memorandum from D. J. Brennan, .Jr.. to W. C. Snllh'an. 8/15/69. 18 SSS Rj-\veekly Reports, 6/15/70: from Donald Bacon, 9/15/75 pp. 91-05. ,. SSS Bi-weekly Report, 8/29/69. 20 Former FBI liaison with CIA deposition, 9/22/75, pp. 16-17. Z1 FOrllwr FBI liaison "'ith CIA deposition. 9/22/75, pp. 16-17: memorandum from Attorney General Tom Clark to .r. Edg-ar Hoover. 12/5/47. ,. :\Iemorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters. fi/2fl/69. 257 ing a meeting at the church to support the strike, as well as copies of "leaflets that hall been distributed by the blind ,,-orkers." The only hint of ,-jolence in this report mlS the opinion of a local police intelJigpnce officer that "young black militants," ,yho supportpcl tIll' strike by urging blacks to boycott ,,-hite-O\Ylll'd stores in the community, might cause "confrontations that might result in yiolence." ~:l -The FBI dissiminated a report on Dr. Carl )fcIntyre's Amel·ican Christian Action Council to the Secret SPI'\"icp in IH72. The con'r memorandum to Secret Senicp indicated that the group fell within the category of the FBI-Send Srnice agrepment described as "potentially dangerous because of background. emotional instability or activity in groups engagpd in activities inimical to 1'.S." The report itself reflectecl no "activities inimical to" the country, but only plans to holcl peaceful demonstrations. The rrport also discussed policies and activities of the group ulll'elated to demonstrations, incll1(ling plans to entrr lawsuits in "schoollmsing" cases. opposition to "Nixon's China trip" and support for a constitutional amendment for "public school prayer." This data camr from a Bureau informanUl -In 1966 the FBI disseminatecl to the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence divisions, to the Secn>t Sen-ice (locally and at Headquarters) , to the .rustice Department and to the State Department a tenpage report on a "Free Unin,rsity.'· The report described in detail the courses offered. including such subjects as ")fodern Film," "'Vorkshop on Art and Values," "Contrmporary Music" "Poetry Kow," and "Autobiography and the Image of Self." OYer thirty "associates" werr listed by name, although only one \YaS identified as having "subYersiYe connections" (and his course had bren "dropprd because not enough students had registered.") Others were identified as "involved in Vietnam protes.t activities" or as being known to officials of a nearby established university as "problem people." The information came from several FBI informants and a confidential source.2 .5 -In 1966 the FBI disseminatpd to "appropriate fedpral and local authorities," including military intplligrncp, Secret Service. the Department of State and ,Tustice'. and a campus security officers (who was a former FBI agpnt) a rpport on a group formed for "discussion on Vietnam." The "controlling influence" on the organization \yas said to be "the local Friends ~feeting." Only one person characterized as "subversiyp," was actiye in the group. The report was deyoted to describing a "speak out" demonstration attended by approximately 300 pers~ns on a uniH'rsity campus. 'I'll(' gathpring was entirely peaceful and mcluded "sppakers who supported U.S. policies in Viet Nam." The dat.a came from two Bureau infonnants.26 -In 1969 the FBI disseminated reports to the 'White House, the CIA, the S!ate Department. the three military intelligence agencies. Secret SerVIce. the IDIU, the Attorney GeneraL the Drputy Attorney Gene.ral, and the Intprnal Security and Ciyil Rights DiYisions on a meetmg sponsored by a coalition of citizens concel'lled about the Anti- 23 :\If:>morandum from Charlottf:> Fif:>ld Officf:> to FBI Hf:>adquartf:>rl'. 12/10/70. 24 Lf:>ttf:>r from Acting Dirf:>ctor, FBI, to Dirf:>ctor, T'nitf:>!l Statf:>s St'cret St'rYict'. fi/2:J/72. 26 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66. ,. Memorandum from Springfield Fipld Officf:> to FBI Hpudquartprs, 7/5/66. 258 Ballistic )Iissile. The only indica! ion of "su!Jn>rsiw" influence ,,"as that Ol;C "'oman ma.rriec~ .to a Comlllunist :yas assisting ill publicity "'ork for the mcetmg. I he reports descl'l!wl! (fl'Om reliabll' FBI sources ~ the speakers, pro and con, including prominl'nt scientists, acadellllcs, and a Defense Department spokesman.27 -In 1974: t}lC FBI l!issl'minated to t lIP State Department, the D~f~'llse Intelhgl'nce Agcncy, till' S('cret SPl'yice. the Internal Sel'urity 1?lnsion, and the Ci\"il Disturbance rnit (formerly IDll"). l'xtl'I~Slye reports on a national cOllferl'llcc on amnesty for mIl' I'l'sisters. One of the participants had "recently organized '[a] nonyiolcnt protest demonstration" dnring a \'isit by President Ford. two others \yere identified as draft evaders. and the Yietnam Yeterans "\<rainst the ,Yar \wr(' aeti\'e at the conferencl'. Bnt the report "'ent ~nuch rnrther to describe-based on inrormation rrom FBI inrormantsthc actiyities of religions. ciyil lilwrties. and studc>nt p:ronps. as \wl1 as "ramilies or men killed in Yietnam" and congressional staff aides. 28 -In 1074 the FBI disseminated a report on it peaceful vigil in th(' vicinity or the Soviet Embassy in support of the rights of SO\'iet .Jews, not just to the Secret Sen-ice and the .Justice Department's Civil Disturbance rnit, but also to the CIA and the State Department. 29 -In 1072 the FBI disseminated a report to the CIA. ArlllY and Kary intelligence, and an 1m-named "r.s. Gonrnment agency ~yhich condncts security"type inwstigations" in ,Yest Germany (apparently a military intelligence agency). The latter agency had asked the £nr('a11 for inrormation ahont an antiwar resen"ist group and a project to furnish "legal aell'ice to GI's ancl wterans.'· The report described not only the resen"ists group, but also "a group dl'dicated to giving free legal aill to sen"icemen" and "an antiwar political group" \vhich endorsed "political candidatl's for office \1"110 haw a solid peace position and a fayorable chance of heing elected." The three gronps "planned to share offices," This data canV' from a Bnrean informant.3o The FBI does haye an obligation to disspminate to local la\y pn" forcement agencips information abont crimes \yithin their jmisdiction. Xe\"ertheless. there has been improper dissemination to local police nndpr at least two Bureau programs. Such dissemination occmred under COIXTELPRO, as part of the FBI's effort to discredit indiyidnals or disrupt gronps.01 Others \nre in rpsponsp to local police reqnests for "pnblie somee" information relating to "suhyersiye matters." 32 Experienced police officials confirmed that the term 27 ;\Iemorandum from 'Vashington Field Office to FBI Headquartprs, fi/2R/Ofl; nlPmorandum from Alexandria Field Officp to FBI HplHlquartprs, 0/3/Gfl. 28 ~Iemorandum from Louisyille Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/14/74, 11/15/74, 11/20/74. 2\l ~ll'morandum from "'ashington Field Office to FBI Headquarter~, 0/2R/74. 30 ~[emorandum from Legal Attache. Bonn, to FBI Headquartl'rs, 1/11/72; memorandum from Boston Field Offiee to FBI Headquarter". 5/V72. 31 See COI:'ITELPRO report: Sec. IV, for examples of FB[ dissemination to local police of data on triyial ofl'l'nse" for the purpose of disruption. "" The FBI responds to such requests with "a blind nlPmorandwn" upon till' condition that the Bureau's "identity as source of tile information mn"t 1,1' kept strietly confidentiaL" Bureau reg'ulations do not link tllis pro('lCrlnre to any specific eriminal la \y enforcl'ment funetion. (FBI ~Ianual of Hult's and Regulations, Part II, Section 5, p. 7.) 259 "subyersive" is so broad that it inevitably leads to dissemination about political beliefs. 01 " • Other executiw agcncies han' also engage(l in excessin> dissemination. The .Justice ])epartnwnt's Inter-Division Information Unit (IDle) sent its computerizcd data to the CIA, in order that the CIA could check its records on foreign travel of Ameriean dissidents. 34 The IDIU sent the same material to the Internal Ren~nue Senice's Special Senice Staff, which used thr information as part of its program for initiating tax audits.'" The Internal Hewnue Senice itself disseminated tax returns or related tax information to the CIA, the FBI, and the Justice Department's Internal Security Di,-ision (which also made requests on behalf of the FBI), without ascertaining whether there ,vas a proper basis for the request or the purpose for which the information would be used.36 Subfinding (b) Excessin' dissemination has sometimes contributed to the inefficiency of the intelligence process itself. The dissemination of lar:!c amounts of relatin·ly useless or totally irrelevant information has reduced thr efficiency of the intelligence process. It has made it difficult for decision-makers to ,veigh the importance of reports."' Agencies such as the FBI have collected intelligence, not because of its O\vn nee(ls or desires, or because it had been requested to do so, but because the data was assumed to bc of value to someone else. Units established to screen and evaluate intelligence have encouraged, rather than re(luced, further dissemination. In some instances the FBI has disseminated information to local police in a manner that was counterproducti"c to eJt'ecti "e law enforcement. One former police chief has (lescribed how the Bureau, under "pressure" from the "'hite House to prepare for a specific demonstration, "passed on information in such a way that it was totally usell'Ss" because it was not "evaluated" and thus exaggerated the dangers.38 The need for prior evaluation of the significance of raw intelligence has not been fully recognized in the Bureau's policy for dissemination of data on protest demonstrations.39 33 Testimony of Jame~ F. Ahern (former New Hayen police chirf) , Robert diGrazia (Boston chief of policr), and Patrick Y. :\Iurllhy (forIllPr Xew York police commissionrr and President of thr Police Foundation), 1/20/76, p. 44, Thrse experiencrd law rnforcement officials stated that local police do not need information from the FBI about "political IJrliefs." 34 Sre CHAOS Rrport: Srction III. 35 See IRS Rrport : Section, "SSS." 36 Sl'l' IRS Rrport: Sl'ction, "Dissrmination." '" On at lrast onr occasion, .Justice DrpartnlPnt offieials rxprrs~rd concern that thry had rrcl'iYl'd a report from til(' FBI on an incidl'nt and thrn a srcond report from Army intrlli~rnce which apprared to confirm the Burrau's infonnation, but the Army's report tUrIlrd out to have been basrd on the FBI's information. This lrd to a .Justicr DPpartmrnt rl'<Iurst that thr Army "scrren" its intrlli~rnce and srnd "only key itrms." (:\Irmorandum for the Reeord Grnrral Counsel Robert E. Jordan to l;nder Srcrrtary of the Army Dayid ~IcGiffrrt, 1/10/68.) 38 AhrrIl. 1/20/76, p. 4. :m Thp FBI had adhrrrd al'rnss-thr-!loanl to tilt' position that its rrports do not contain "{'on<:'!usions." and Burrau rulrs hayr lwrmittrd the dissrmination of data from "sources known to hl' unrrlia!lle" so long- as "g-ood .ill(l~mrnt" is used. It has !lrl'n up to the recipient ageneil's ··to intPllig-pntly l'nlluu tl' thl' information" on the iJusis of "drsl'riptiYe information" uhout tIJp Bun'lul's sourcrs. (FBI :\Ian· ('ontinurd) 260 The imprdiments to acnlrate illtelligl'ncr co]]retion hayr heen augmentrd hy thr dissemination pradicl",,; of HJllH' I(wal In\\' enforcement agencies. c\n example is the report Oll the C]licago Polin' Department's Security Section, \\hich has beell drsnil,ed as lw \'ing passrd "inlwrently inaccurate alld distort in: data" to fl'l]eral inte]]ige]H'e agl'ncies. 4 " The (Jenera] ~\ccounting Office has confil'llH'l] that this is a genel'lll problem.41 '''hill' the Committee hns not examined local la\y enforcement intel1igenee, the dissemination practices of such agencirs re<juire as much careful control as federal agencies.,e The assumption that some other agency might neell information has not only produced excessin dissemination, but has also sen'eel as a specific rationale for collection of intel1igence that \yas not othenyise within an agency's jurisdiction. The best example is the FBI's col1ection of intelligence on "geneI'll I racial matters" for the militaryY One of the ironies in the recent history of domestic intel1igence was that the Justice Department's IDIF, \yhich \yas set up to collate and evaluate the massi\'e amounts of data f1mying to the .Justice Department from t Iw FBI. contrilmted to eYen more extensi \'e col1ection and diS'Semination. H The IDIl! encouragel] numerous fe(leral agencies (Continued) ual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 5) Thus the FBI has not adp(] uately distinguished hetwepn situations where evaluation is or is not neeeHsau. More than just "descripth'e information" auout FBI sources is needed to help recipients of dat'a on pOHsible violent proteHt demonstration understand the likelihood of actual disorders. 40 Sec Part II. p. 78. 41 The GAO ha~ ranked the typeH of Hourees of information relied upon by the FBI in ]wginning domestie intelligpnce inyeHtigationH according to whethE'r the data initially Hupplil'd werp "hard," "medium," or "HOft," Acco]"(ling' to the GAO. policE' and other HtatE' and local agl'nC'iPH \\'E're fOlllHl to han' IH'O\'idE'd thp loweHt proportion of "harel" information and thp highl'Ht proportion of "soft" informa, tion. (GAO Report, p. 106). C Two major citieH have made efforts reeently to establish Htandards for police intelligence activities, (Los Angeles Police DE'partmpnt, Public Disorder Intel, ligencl' Diyision: Standards and ProcedurE'H. 4/10/7ii; Xew York Cit~· l'oliel' J)p, partmpnt. Procedures: Public Security Actiyities of the Intelligence J)i\'ision, House Internal Speurity Committee, HE'arings, DomeHtic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, 1974.) '" TIl<' FBI }Ianual cited the lwedH of the military aH a lJasiH for itH intelligence, gathering on "gpneral racial mattE'rs," Thp }Ianual Htated that the Bureau did not itHelf ha\'e "illYestigatiyp juriHdiction oyer such general racial matters," but that its "intelligence function" ineludE'd adyiHing "appropriate Goyernmpnt agE'Il' cies" of information about "propose(1 or actual actidties of ill(liYiduals, offkialH. commi ttpPH, Ipgbla tureH, organiza tion~. ete., in tIlE' racial fipld.'· '1'he }lalllUll lJaHE'd "Fedpral juriHllidion" on thl' militar~"s reHponsibility : "Inwfar aH l"pdpral jurisdielion in gE'neral racial mattE'rs is concerned, U.S. Army n'gulationH plal'e rPHponsilJility upon the Army to kppp ad\'ised of any deyelopmentH of a l'iyil diHturlJancp naturp \yhich may rpl)uirp the reudering of assiHtance to ei\'il authoritipH or thl' intl'r\'ention of fpdl'ral troopH. OSI (Air Force) and OXI (Xa\'y) han' a collatpral reHponsibility undpr Army in Huch mattprs and eopies of pertinent doeumpnts (liHHelllinatpd to Army concerning Huch matters should lJp fUl'llishp<l to OS1 a1l(1 OX1.'· (1960 FBI }Ianual SE'etion 122, pp. [i-G) 44 For E'xample, in addition to ('ontaining' tIl<' WlllleH of known aeli\'i8tH, the IDIV printouts Hupplipd to 1HS'H SSi' abo l'ontainpd tlIP lIalllpS of lllan~' promiIIE'lIt citizenH whom tIl(' .JuHtkp l>epartlllpnt thoug'llt could lJp of aSHiHtancp in quelling' a civil disturlJancp in a l'artieular localit~' should 01lE' occur. Si'S perHonnel were unaware that tIlE' IDn' prilltout eontained thl' names of these persons and establiHhed files indiHcrimina tely on them. 261 (including many "'ithout rr,!..J1Jlar illYestigatin> functions) to dissrminatr information to it auout "organizations and incli,'i<luals" ,YllO might "instigate" or "pren>nF ci ,'il disol'dpl's."' f.,iubfinding (c) linder the federal pmployer security program, lmnN'essary information about tIl(' political bplipfs and associations of prospectivp gOn'rnment Plllployeps has been disseminated. For nNlr]y thirty years thp federal prIlployee spcttrity program has require<l a "national agrl1cy che<.'k" of tIl(' files of several gonrnment agrncirs, including tIll' FBI. the Civil Sen'ice Commission, and military intelligence, on prospective employees.4G Although there was often no information to report. federal agencies recei"ed "name check" reports on all candidates for employment. This appears to have been the single largest source of regular dissemination of data in intelligence files. These name check rpports ha"e provided information from intelligpll(' e files not only ahout possihlp criminal activity or personal weaknesses of the iIHlivi<lnal. hut also about la"'ful political activity and association. rentil recently the ExecutiY(' Order on employee security required reports on any "association" with a person or group supporting "subversive" views. These reports have been required for every federal employee, regardless of whether he or she holds a sensitive position or has access to classified infol'lnation.4' It has been the policy of the FBI, and presumably other agencies as well, to disseminate via name check reports any information in its files-no matter how old or how unreliable-which might relate to the standards of the Executive Order. 48 The current criteria have been substantially narrowed: tIl(' basic standards for reporting are group membership and potential criminal conduct. 19 However, the .Tustice Department has advised the FBI that "it is not possible to set definite parameters" for organizations and that the Bureau should include those with a "potential" for meeting the criteria.50 The FBI does not determine ,,-hether or not the information it furnishes is decisive under these standards. Departmental instructions state: It is not the Bureau's responsibility to determine whether the information is or is not of importance to the particular .5 Attorney General Clark to Maroney, et aI, 11/9/67. "" Executive Order 10450, Section 3 (a). For a discussion of the origins and application of this order, PP. 42-44. '" Executive Order 10450. Section 8(a) (5) . .. Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 3/3/76. •• The current criteria are: "Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association moYement, group, Or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or yiolence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to o"erthrow the Government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means." (Executive Order 11785, Section 3, June 4, 1974.) This order also abolished the "Attorney General's list." GO Memorandum fN'Jlll Assistant Attorney General Glen E. Pommerening to FBI Director Clarence Kelley, 11/1/74. 262 agency in the carrying out of its current acti "ities and responsibilities and "'hether or not any action is taken by the departmrnt or agency is not. of co'urse, a principal concern of the Bureau.51 The FBI itself has exprrssed misgiyings about thr hrradth of its responsibilities under the employee security program. It has continued to seck "clarification" from thr .Justice J)rpartnwnL and it has pointed out that there haye brrn no "adYl'rse actions" taken against current or prosprctiye Federal employees under tIl(' loyalty and srcurity prO\'isions of the Executiyc Order "for sewral :,ears." This has heen due to the fact "that (]ifficulties of proof imposed hy the courts in loyalty and security cases haw proH'd almost insunnountahle." 52 The employee security program has selTed an essrntial function in fu]] background in\'Cstigation and name checks for those haying access to classified information. But its pxtension to yaguely-ddined "subyersiws" in nonsensitiw positions has gone bpyond the Goyernment's proper need for information on the suitability of persons for employment. 53 Subfinding (d) Thr FBI. which has hepn the "clearinghouse" for al1 domestic intelligence data. maintains in readily accessible files sensitiyc and (]erogatory personal information not releyant to any inwstigation. as we]] as information which was improprrly or il1egal1y obtained. In recent years, the Secrrt. SPITice. military intel1igencr. aIH] other agencies haTe instituted significant programs for the drstruction or purging of useless information."" Howrwr. the FBI has retained its vast general files. accumulated OWl' the years under its duty to serve as a "clearinghouse" for domestic intel1igrnce data.5 ;; There are over 6,500.000 files at FBI hradquarters: and the data is retrievable through a general jndex consisting of over 58.000.000 index cards. Each Bureau Field Office has substantial additional information in its files. Domrstic jnte]]igence information inc1uded in tIl(' grneral index is described by the FBI as: associates and relatiYes of thr subject; members of organizations under inyestigation or determined to be possible subver- 51 Letter from Attorney General Tom Clark to J. Edgar HooH'r. 12/i'i/H. The FBI adyiseH that it considers 'this directiYe still to be in effect. pIemorandulll from FBI to Select Committee. 3/3/76.) &2 IRtter from Kelley to POlIlIIlerening. 12/11/74. The FBI haH advised that federal employePH are now eyaluated according' to "~uitability" rather than "loyalty and security" criteria. (Memorandum from FBI to SeleC't Committee, 3/3/76.) 53 According to a 1974 Bureau mpmorandum and a ('on firming .TuHtice Department memorandum. the purpoHe is to proYide "information concerning' pOHHilJle subyersiye infiltration into the Executive Branch of GoYernment." (Kelley to Pommerening, 8/14/74; Pommerening to Kelley. 8/26/74.) As indicated in the Committep's finding on oYerlJreadth, the concept "sulJverHion" iH HO yague and flexible as to inyitp exceHses. " Secret Seryice practices are described in RC1:iclC of Secret SCI"rice Proteetit'e Measures, Hearings bpfore the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 94Jth Cong., 1st Sess. (l!J7i'i), p. 16. Destruction of Army intelligence fileH is diHcnssed in Report on Military Surveillance. 55 For a discussion or the origins of this function, see p. 23. 263 sive; individua Js contributing funds to subn>rsive-typr activity; subversiH' or SPtlitious publicat ions; wl'itel's of articles in subn'rsi H' or se(lit iO\ls publ icat ions: hookstores sl)('cializing in suhH'l'siH'-typp publications ant] relat<·d types of infol'matiOll." G The COll1miUr(' has found that t1H'I'l' arr massi\"(, amounts of irrelevant an(l tl'i\'ial info],]llation ill thpse filt-s,'" Tlw FBI has kept such (lata in its f1ling syskm on tlw theo]'y that they Illigllt 1)(' llseful someday in tIll' future to sol\"(· (,l'illlt's. fol' PlllploYe'e bnckgl'o11lHI c!H'cks, to pntluatl' the n·liability of tlll' sou]'t'P. or to "aJls\\'el' (1111'stions or challenges" about the' Bun·au".; COllduct.:" The FBI has recent Iv issued instructions to its Field Oflic('s to take gl'eatpl' care in ]'('c(ll'(iing dOlllPStic intelligem'e information in its hIes. T.1l(''v al'p to eXPl'cise ;'jmlgnH'nt" as to \\'hetllPr 01' not thp acti\' ity IS "!le'ltinpnt" to the BllI'pau's "legitimate' in\,pstigati\'e inten> st.""" XC\'Pl't lw]pss. C\ll'l'ent policies still a11m\' the' indexing of the lJaIllPS of pel'sons who are' not the subject of investigation hut just atte'nd 111e'etings of a group 11lH]er in\'l>stigation.60 56 :\Il'morandnm from FBI to Sl'natl' Sl'Il'<'t Conllnittl'e, ;)/22/7;), r;r Current FBI policies modify past practice with respect to the indexing' of unsolicited alleg'ations, including' thosp of "a pprsonalnature," not requiring' "investig'ative action," The Bureau no long'er ineludes in its name index the name of the person alJOut ",hom the information is ,'oluntt'r'red wht're tht' Burpall has "no leg'itimate investig'ath'e interl'st." In tIlt' case of an unsolicited letter, for example, the nanl(' of thp spndpr only is ineluded in thp iIHlpx. The letter itself is also retained so the FBI "mn rpt!'ieye" it yia thp index referpnce to the sender "should an occasion arise in the future when we need to refer back to it," DIemorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 11/10/75,) 68 ~Iemorandum from FBI to Splcet Committep, 7/21/75, This memorandum states that the Bureau has ado[ltpd, undpr regulations of the Xational Archiyes, a prog'ram for dpstroying' files 'Yhieh "no long'pr haye contemllorary \'alue," The FBI has not ineludpd within this l)rog'l'fim most of tlw inYestigati\'P and intellig'enep information in its files dating' back as far as Hl3fl, "~~Iemorandmn from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 1/:l7/7G. 'l'he Field Offices wpre g'i Yen the follO\ying' sllepific guidance: "For pxample, the statement of a lopallpader of the Ku Klux Klan in which he ach'ocates reg'ular attpll(lance at phurch would be merely an exercise of his right to free speeeh and, henpe, maintenanpe of suph a record would be prohibited, On the othpr hand, should this same indiddnal stand up before a gathering and ad," ocate the use of violence in furthering the organization's objecti\'es, this obviously would be pertinent to our irl\'estigation," Bureau headquarters recognized that these were "extreme" examples and that "problems" werp created in "those install(~ps which are in the middle and which are not so clear," Thus, FBI ag'pnts were pncouraged to consult Hendquartprs "to rpsolye an~' qupstion c'oncerning' a specific Ilroblpm." flO One Fit'ld Office has described reg'ular Bureau procedures as follmvs: "fOurJ informants, after nttending' nlPetings of thpsp organiziltions funder in,'estig'ntion], usually submit reports in which they describe briefly the fieti\' ities and diseus"ions which took place as well as listing those members and non,members in attpndancp Ilt such meeting's, Copies of tllPse infonnant reports are disspminated to various individuals' files and flie name8 of those in affrndunee where no indiriduul8 file e,ri.~f8, are inde:red to the organization's filp," (~Iemorandul1l from SAC to FBI Headquarters, 12/1/75), [Emphasis addPfI.J FBI hendquarters did not indicate that this ]lraetice was outside the "sC'Ope" of authorized "law enforcempnt netivity," It is considered "pertinent" to the in,' pstigation "to maintain repords concerning' mpl1lhPl'shijl, public utterings, and/or otlwr netivities" of an org'anization under investig'ation, (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 1/27/76,) 264 Fina]]y. there is information in FBI files ,,-hich was co]]eeted by illegal 01' improper means. It ranges from the fruits of "warrantless electronic sUITei]]anee, mail openings. anel Sllrreptitious entries, to the results of s\yepping intelligence inH'stigations \Yhieh col1eeted data about the lawful political aetiyities and personal lin'S of Americans. ",Yll('re such intel1igenee remain in tIl(' nanle-indexeel files, it can be retripwcl anel clis,.:eminated along with other information. thns continuing indefinitely the potential for eompouneling the initial intrusion into const itntiolla Ily protecteel area,.:.
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