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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

III. FINDIXGS
The Committee makes senn major findings. Each finding is accompanied
by subfindings and by an elaboration ,,,hich draws upon the
Gvidentiary record set forth in our historical narrative (Part II herein)
and in the thirteen detailed reports ,vhich ,,,ill be published as supplements
to this volume. ,Ve have sought to analyze in our findings
characteristics shared by intelligence programs, practices which involnd
abuses, and general problems in the system which led to those
abuses.
The findings treat the fonowing themes that run through the facts
revealed by our investigation of domestic intelligence activity: (A)
Violating and Ignoring the Law; (B) Overbreadth of Domestic Intelligence
Activity; (C) Excessive Use of Intrusive Techniques; (D) r:-sing' Coycrt ~\ction to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups;
(E) Political Abuse of Intelligence Information; (F) Inadequate
Controls Oil Dissemination and Retention; (G) Deficiencies in Control
and Accountabilitv.
Vlewed separately, each finding demonstrates a serious problem in
the conduct and control of domestic intelligence operations. Taken
together, they make a compelling case for the necessity of change.
Our recommendations (in Part IV) flow from this analysis and propose
changes which the Committee believes to be appropriate in light
of the record.
A. VIOLATING AND IGNORING THE LAW
MAJOR FIXDING
The Committee finds that the domestic activities of the intelligence
community at times violated specific statutory prohibitions and
infringed the constitutional rights of American citizens.! The legal
questions involved in intelligence programs were often not considered.
On other occasions, they '''ere intentionally disregarded in the belief
that became the programs served the "national security" the law
did not apply. ,,\Vhile intelligence officers on occasion failed to disclose
to their superiors programs which were illegal or of questionable legality,
the Committee finds that the most serious breaches of duty
were those of senior officials, who were responsible for controlling
intelligence activities and generally failed to assure compliance with
the law.
81lbfindings
(a) In its attempt to implement instructions to protect the security
of the rnited States. the inte11igence community engaged in some ac-
I This spetion discusses the legal issues raised by particular programs and actiyities
only: a discussion of the aggregate effect upon constitutional rights of all
domestic surYeillance practices is at p. 290 of the Conclusions section.
( 137)
138
tivities which violated statntory law and the constitntional rights of
American citizens.
(b) Legal issnes "'ere often overlooke(l by mallY of tIl(' intelligence
officers who directed these operations. Some held a pragmatic view of
intelligence activities that did not regnlarly attach sufficient significance
to <jnestlons of legality. The question raised mlS nsually not
whether a particnlar program was legal or ethical. bnt ,,,hether it
worked.
(c) On some occasions ,vhen agency officials did assume~ 01' were told,
that a program ,ns illega1. they still permitted it to continue. They
justified their conduct in some cases on the ground that the failure of
"the enemy" to play by the rules g-ranted them the right to do likewise'.
and in other cases on the ground that the "national security" permitted
programs that would otherwise be illega1.
(d) Internal recognition of the illegality or the qnestionable legality
of many of these activities frequently led to a tightening of securit~
· rather than to their termination. Partly to avoid exposure and a
public "flap~" knowledge of these programs was tightly held within
the agencies. special filing procedures "'ere used. and "coYer stories"
were devised.
(e) On occasion. intelligence agencies failed to disclose candidly
their programs and practices to their own General Counsels, and to
Attorneys Genera1. Presidents~ and Congress.
(£) The internal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI
did not keep-and. in the case of the FBI, were not designed to keepthe
activities of those agencies within legal bounds. Their primary
concern was efficiency, not legality or propriety.
(g) Wben senior administration officials with a duty to control
domestic intelligence activities knew, or had a hasis for suspecting.
that questionable activities had occurred. they often responded with
silence or approva1. In eertain cases, they were presented with a partial
description of a program but did not ask for details. thereby
abdicating their responsibility. In other cases, they were fully aware
of the nature of the practice and implicitly or explicitly approved it.
Elaboration of findings
The elaboration which follmvs details the general finding of the
Committee that inattention to-and disregard of-legal issues was
an all too common occurrence in the intelligence commnnity. ",Vhile
this section focuses on the actions and attitudes of intelligence officials
and certain high policy officials, the Committee recognizes that a
pattern of lawless actiyity does not result from the deeds of a single
stratum of the gOYernment Or of a fe,v indidduals alone. The implementation
and continuation of illegal and qnestionable programs
wonld not han' [)pen possible withont tIl(' cooperation or tacit approya1
of people at all leYels within and ahow the intelligence community,
through many successive administrations.
The ag~nts in th~ field. for their part. rarel~' qnestioned tlw orders
tl~ey receIYed. TheIr often l1ncertain knmvledge of the la\v. conpled
WIth the l~atura1 desire to please one's snperiors and \vith simple
bnreancratIc momentum. clearly contributed to their wil1ino'ness to
participate in illegal and fjnesti'onahle programs. The ahsenc; of any
prosecutions for law violations by intelligence agents ineYitably af139
fected their attitudes as well. Under pressure from above to accomplish
their assigned tasks, and without the realistic threat of prosecution
to remind them of their legal obligations, it is understandable
that these agents frequently acted "'ithout concern for issues of law
and at times assumed that normal legal restraints and prohibitions
did not apply to their activities.
Significantly, those officials at the highest levels of government,
who had a duty to control the activities of the intelligence community,
sometimes set in motion the very forces that permitted lawlessness to
occur-even if every act committed by intelligence agencies was not
known to them. By demanding results "'ithout carefully limiting the
means by which the results were achieved; by over-emphasizing the
threats to national security without ensuring sensitivity to the rights
of American citizens; and by propounding concepts such as the right
of the "sovereign" to break the law, ultimate responsibility for the
consequent climate of permissiveness should be placed at their door.2
8ubfirtdirtg (a)
In its attempt to implement instructions to protect the security of
the rnited States, the intelligence cOlllmunity engaged in some activities
which violated statutorv la,w and the constitutional rights of
American citizens. .
From 1940 to 1973, the CIA and the FBI engaged in twelve covert
mail opening programs in violation of Sections 1701-1703 of Title 18
of the United States Code ,,,hich prohibit the obstruction, interception,
or opening of mail. Both of these agencies also engaged in warrantless
"surreptitious entries"-break-ins-against American citizens
within the United States in apparent violation of state laws prohibiting
trespass and burglary. Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934 was violated by NSA's program for obtaining millions
of telegrams of Americans unrelated to foreign targets and by the
Army Security Agency's interception of domestic radio communications.
All of these activities. as ,,,ell as the FBI's use of electronic surveillance
,,,ithout a substantial national security predicate, also infringed
the rights of rountless Americans under the Fourth Amendment
protection "against unreasonable searches and seizures."
The almsi"e techniques used by the FBI in COINTELPRO from
1956 to 1971 inclnde(l violations of both federal and state statutes prohibiting
mail fraud. ,,-ire fraud, incitement to violence, sending
obsrene material through thl' mail, and extortion. )10re fundamentally,
the harassment of innocent citizens engaged in lawful forms of political
expression did serious injury to tIle First Amendment guarantee
of freedom of speerh and the right of the people to assemble peaceably
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The
Bureau~smaintenance of the Security Index. whirh targeted thousands
of Ameriran citizl'ns for dl'tl'ntion in thl' event of national emergency,
elearly oycrsteppe(l the permissihle hounds estahlished by Congress
in the Emergl'ncy Detention .\ct of 1950 and represented, in contravention
of the Act, a potential general suspension of the privilege
2 Thl' acconntahility of Rl'nior adminiRtrntion offiC'ialR iR noted here to place
the (jl'tailR 'YhiC'h fol!O\y in their proper context. and is deYeloped at greater
length in Finding G, p. 265.
140
of the writ of hab('as corpus secured by Article I, Section 9. of the
Constitntion.
A distrpssi1J~t numhpr of tIl(' programs and technifllH's de\'eloped
by the intelligencp community involved transgressions against human
d('celln' that \\'('1'(' no less serious than any technical yiolations of la,Y.
Some of the most fUIl(lanwnta I nInes of tl\is society 'WI'P thl'patpnNl hy
activities such as the smear campaign against ·Dr. ::\fartin Luthe~
King, .rr., thp testing of (langerons drugs on unsuspecting American
ritizens. the dissemination of information about the sex lives. drinking:
habits. an(l marital prohlems of electronic sHlT('il1anre targets. an'd
the COIKTELPRO attempts to tnrn dissident organizations against
one another and to destroy marriages.
Subfil1dil1g (b)
Legal issues were often oYerlooked by many of the intelJigence
officers who directed these operations. Some held a pragmatic view
of intelligence activities that did not regularly attach sufficient significance
to questions of legality. The fluestion rais('d was usualJy not
whether a particular program was legal or ethical, but whether it
worked.
Legal issues were clearly not a primary consideration-if tlwy were
a consideration at all-in many of the programs and techni(]ues of
the intelligence community. When the former hrad of the FBI's Racial
Intelligence Section was asked whethrr anvbody in the FBI at
any time during the Ii>-year course of COINTELPRO discussed its
constitutionality or legal autl'ority. for example, he replied: "No, we
never gave it a thought." 3 This attitude is echoed by other Bureau
officials in connection with other programs. The former Section Chief
of one of the FBI's CounterinteJJigence sections, and the former
Assistant Director of the Bureau's Domestic Intelligence Division
both testified that legal considerations were simply not raised in policy
decisions concerning the FBI's mail opening programs.4 Similarly.
when the FBI was presented with the opportunity to assume responsibility
for the CIA's Ne'" York mail opening operation, legal factors
played no role in the Bnrean's refusal: rather. the opportunity was
declined simply because of the attendant expense, manpower requirements,
and security problems.5
One of the most abusiyf' of an FBI prog-rams was its attempt to
discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, .Jr. Yf't former FBI Assistant
Director ",ViJJiam C'. SnlliYan testified that he "nenr heard anyone
raise tl1f' qnestion of legality or constitutionality. neyer." 6 •
Former Director of Central Intf'lJigf'ncf' Richard Helms testifif'd
publicly that he neyer seriouslv qUf'stionf'd the legal status of the
twenty-year CIA New York mail opening project becanse he assumed
his prec1ecessor. Allen Dulles, had "made his legal peace with [it]." 7
• Georg-e C. Moore testimony. 11/3/75. p. 83.
• Branigan testimony, 10/9/7G, pp. 13, 139, 14D; Wannall testimony, 10/24/75,
Hearing-i':. Vol. 4. p. 149.
6 Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 89.
• William C, Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, JIP. 49. 50.
7 Ri('hard Helms, 10/22/75. Hearings. Vol. 4. p. 94. This tf'stimony is partially
contradicted, howew'r. by the fact that in 1970 Helms SignM til(; Huston Report.
ill "'hid\ "('on'rt mail ('ol'el'age"-oefinf'd as mail opening-Ivas specifically
(Iescribed as illegal. (Special Report..Tune 1970, p. 30.)
141
" [F]rom time to time," he said, "the Agency got nseful inTormation
out of it," S so he permitted it to continue throughout his sevenveal'
tennre as Director.
. The Huston Plan that was prepared for President Richard Nixon
in .Tune 1070 constituted a virtual charter for the use of intrusive and
illegal techniques against American dissidents as well as foreign
agents. Its principal author has testified, howenr, that during the
drafting srssions with representatiYes of the FBI. CIA, NSA, and
Defense Intelligence Agency. no one ewr objected to any of the recommendations
on the grounds that they involved illegal acts, nor was
the legality or constitutionality of any of the recommendations ever
discussed. 9
William C. Sullivan. who participated in the drafting OT the Huston
Plan and served on the Pnited States Intelligence Board and as FBI
Assistant Director for Intelligence for 10 years, stated that in his
entire experience in the intelligence community he never heard legal
issues raised at all :
'Ye neYer gave any thought to this realm of reasoning. because
we were just naturally pragmatists. The one thing we
were concerned about was this: ,vm this course of action
work, ,,,ill it get us what we want, will we reach the objectiYe
that we desire to reach? As Tar as legality is concerned,
morals. or ethics, [it] was never raised by myself or
anyhody else ... I think this suggests really in government
that ,ve are amoral. In government-I am not speaking for
everyhody-the general atmosphere is one of amorality.lO
Subf/rlding (c)
On some occasions when agency officials did assume, or were told,
that a program was illegal. they still permitted it to continue. They
justifird their condnct in some cases on the ground that the failure of
"the enemy" to play hy the rules granted them the right to do likewise,
and in other cases on the ground that the "national security" permitted
programs that would otherwise be illegal.
Even when agency officials recognized certain programs or techniques
to be illegal. they sometimes advocated their implementation
or prrmitted them to continur nonetheless.
This point is illustrated by a passage in a 19;)4- mrmorandum from
an FBI Assistant Director to .T. Edgar Hoover. which recommended
that an rledronic listening dm'ice be planted in the hotel room of a
suspected Commnnist sympathizer: "Although such 'an installation
will not be lrg-al. it is belieYecl that the intellig-ence information to be
obtaine(l will' make such an installation neceSSary and desirable." 11
Hoover approvrd the installation.12 •
:Morc thana decade lat<>r, a memorandum was sent to Director
Hom'er "\\'hich described the current FBI policy and procedures for
"black bag: iobs" (warrantless break-ins for purposes other than lllicrophOl1f\
installation). This memorandum read in part :
B Helms. 10/22/75. Hearings. VoL 4. p. 103.
B Huston. 9/23/75. Hearings. Vol. 2, p. 21.
'" Sullivan, 11/1/75. pp. 92, 93.
11 :\fpmorandmn from MI'. Boardman to the Director, FBI, 4/30/54.
]2 Ibid.
142
Such a technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal;
therefore~ it mmJd be impossible to obtain any legal sanetion
for it. Despite this, "bJaek bag" jobs have been llspd because
they represent an invaluable technique in combatting subversiye
activities ... aimed directly at undermining and destroying
our nation.13
In other ,vords, breaking the law, ,vas seen as useful in combating
those who threatened the legal fabric of society. Although Hoover
terminated the general use of "black bag jobs" in .July 1fl66, they were
employed on a large scale before that time and have been used in
isolated instances since then.
Another example of disregard for the Jaw is found in a Hl6fl memorandum
from ,Yilliam C. Sullivan to Director Hoover. In .June of
that year, Sullivan was requested by the Director~ apparently at the
urging of ,Vhite House officials to travel to France for the purpose of
electronically monitoring the conversations of journalist .Joseph
Kraft.l! "'itlt the cooperation of local authorities, Sullivan was able
to have a microphone installed in Kraft's hotel room, and informed
Hooyer of his success. "Parenthetically," he wrote in his letter to the
Director, "I might add that such a cm'er is regarcledas illegal." 15
The attitude that legal standards and issues of privacy can be overridden
by other factors is further reflected in a memorandum written
by Richard Helms in connection with the testing of clangerous clrugs
on unsuspecting American citizens in 1963. Mr. Helms wrote the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence:
""Vhile I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program
which tends to intrude on an individual's private and legal
prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the Agency maintain
a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy
capabilities in the manipulation of human behavior, and
maintain an offensive capability. I, therefore, recommend
your approval for continuation of this testimony program
...15a
The history of the CIA's New York mail opening program is replete
with examples of conscious contravention of the law. The original
proposal for large-scale mail opening in 1955, for instance, explicitly
recognized that "[tJhere is no overt, authorized or legal censorship
or monitoring of first class mails which ent€r, depart or
transit the ljnited States at the present time." 16 A 1962 memorandum
on the project noted that its exposure could "give rise to grave charges
of criminal misuse of the mails by Government agencies" and that
"existing Federal statutes preclude the concoction of any legal excuse
for the violation ..." 17 And again in 1963, a CIA offieer "wrote:
"There is no legal basis for monitoring postal communications in the
l~nited States except during time of ,val' or national emergency ..." 18
"~I{'morandnmfrolll ,Yo C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66.
11 Heport of the House Judiciary Committee, 8/20/74, p. 150.
I.. ~rf'nlOra]](llllll froIII "'iJJiam C. Snllivan to .T. Edgar Hoon-r, 6/30/69.
1," :\If'lllorandnm from Richard Helms to the Deputy Director of Central IntelligeIlef',
12/17/f,3.
16 Blind memorandum, 11/7/55.
17 ~IeIllorandulll from Dpputy Chipf, COllnterintelligpIlce Staff, to Director, Ofliet'
of SN'l1l'i!y, 2/1/62.
"~IeIlloralldulll frolll Chief, CI/Projeet to Chief, DiYision, 9/26/63.
143
Doth the fonner Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff and the former
Director of Security-who ,vere in charge of the Xew York projecttestified
that they believed it to be illegaJ.19 One Inspector General who
reviewed the project in 1969 also flatly stated: "[OJf course, we
knew that this was illegal. ... [E]verybody knew that it was
[illegal]. ..." 20
In spite of the general recognition of its illegality, the New York
mail opening project continued for a total of 20 years and was not
terminated until 197;3, when the "Watergate-created political climate
had increased the risks of exposure.~l
"With the full knO\vledge of J. Edgar I-rooYer, moreover, the FBI
continued to receive the fruits of this project for three years after the
FBI Director informed the President of the United States that "the
FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail coverage because it is
clearly illegal ..... C~ The Bureau's own mail opening programs had
lle011 terminated in 1966, but it continued intentionally and knowingly
to benefit from the illegal acts of the CIA until 1973.
The Huston Plan is another disturbing reminder of the fact that
intelligence programs and techniques may be ad,'ocated and authorized
with the knowledge that they are illegal. At least two of the
options that were presented to President Nixon were described as
unla,dul on the face of the Report. Of "covert mail coverage" (mail
opening) it was written that "[t]his coverage, not haying the sanction
of la,v, runs the risk of any illicit act magnified by the im'olvement of
a Government agency." 23 The Report also noted that surreptitious
entry "involves illegal entry and trespass." 24 Thus, the intelligence
community presented the nation's highest executive official with the
option of approving courses of action described as illegal. The fact
that President Nixon did authorize them, even if only for five days, is
more disquieting stilU5
"-hen President :xixon eventually revoked his approval of the Huston
Plan, the intelligence cOlmmmity nevertheless proceded to initiate
some programs suggested in the Plan. Intelligence agencies also continued
to employ techniques recommended in the Plan, such as mail
opening which had been used previously without presidential apPl'OyuUG
]V Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p, 61; Howard Osborn, deposition,
1'/28/75, p. 00.
20 Gordon Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 28.
21 See e.g., Howard Osborn deposition, 8/28/75. p. 89.
" Special Report, June 1970, p. 31.
'" SI)ecial Report, June 1970, p. 30.
" Special Report, June 1900, p. 32.
" President Nixon stated that he approved these activities in part because they
"had bepn found to be effective." (Response of Richard 1'1. Nixon to Senate Select
Committee Interrogatory 19, 3/9/06, p. 13.)
,. For a description of the techniques which continued or were subsequently
in~tituted, see pp. 115-116,
A memorandum from John Dean to John Mitchell suggests that, after President
Xixon's revocation of approval for the Huston Plan, the "White House itself
~l1pported the continued pursuit of some of the objectives of the Huston Plan.
Through an interagency unit known as the Intelligence E"aluation Committee.
(~IplllOrandum from John Dean to the Attorne~' General, 9/18/70.) In this
memorllllClum, Dpan suggested the creation of such a unit for "both operational
and p'"aluation purposes." He wrote in part:
"[T]l1e unit can serve to make appropriate recommendations for the type of
intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the various agencies, In
(Continued)
144
The rrcent hi"torv of ~\rn1Y intrlligellce pr0"i(les all ad(litionaI example
of continuilig an actl\'ity descl'ilwd as illegal. Beginning in
1067, the Army Security ~\gen('y monijo]'('d the radio communications
of amatenr radio operators in this coulltry to determine if dissident
elements planned c1isruptin acti\'ity at particular demonstrations and
events. Because Army officials questioned \"hether such monitoring
was legal under Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of
]034. they requested a legal opinion from the Federal Communications
Commission. At a meeting held in August 1068. the FCC flfh'ised the
Armv that such monitoring \"as illeg'al 111lder the Act. FCC representatives
also stated that the matter had been raised \"ith Attorney
General Ramsey Clark and that he had disappr0"ed the program.27
The FCC agreed. however. to submit a written reply to the Army,
stating only that it could not "provide a positive answer to the Army's
proposa1." 28
Despite havinrt been told that their monitoring activitv was illegal,
and that the Attorney General himself disapproved it, the Army
Security Agencv continued to monitor the radio communications of
American citizens for another two vears.29
Several factors may explain th~ intelligence community's frequent
disregard of legal issues.
Some intelligence officials expressed the view that the legal and
ethical restraints that applied to the rest of societv simplv did not
apply to intelligence activities. This concept is reflected in a 1959
memorandum on the Armv's covert drug testing program: "In intelligence,
the stakes involnd and the interest of national security may
permit a more tolerflnt interpretation of moral-ethical values 000" 30
As 'William C. Sullivan also pointed out, many intelligence officers
had been imbued with a "war psychology." "Legality was not questionE'ft"
he said, "it was not an issue." 31 In war, one simply did what
(CnntinuPd)
regard to this ... point, I believe we agreed that it would be inappropriate to
havp any blanket removal of restrictions: rathpr. the most appropriate procedure
would be to decide on the type of intpl'igpnce we need, based on an
assessment of the recommendations of this unit, and then to proceed to remove
tbf' rf'straints as necessary to obtain such intelligence." (Dean memorandum,
9/18170. )
:n :\If'mornndum for the record b:v Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
8/16/68; Staff summary of S"l Tindenbaum (former Executive Assistant
to the Attorney General) intf'rvif'w. 5/8/75.
28 ~If'mornnrlum for the record by Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intf'lligence.
8/16/68.
29 Thf' Army's gpnpral rlomf'stic snrvpiIlanf>e prngram provirlps an examplf' of
evasion of a departuwntal order which barl heen issnerl out of concern with
legal issues. The practice of collecting vast amounts of information on American
citizf'ns was tf'rminated in 1971. when new Departmf'nt of Df'ff'nse restrictions
cl1me into effect calling for the de~truction of all files on "unaffiliaterl" persons
and organizations. Rather than df'stroyinrr the files, howpver. severn I Army
intf'llie;enf'e nni1." simply tnrnf'rl thpir intelli,gence tiles on rlissiflent imlh'irlnal
amI gronns oypr to local po!iCf' anth0ritips : and onp Air ForN' conntf'rintpllh!f'nf'e
nnit in San Diprro hprran to f'rpntp npw fill'S the next ypar. (Hpnrings IIPforp Rnhcommittee
on Constitntional Rie;hts. Cnmmittpp 0T1 th" .Tnrliciary. FR, Rf'nntf'.
!l2nfl Conrrrpss, 1~t ~e~sion, 1971. D. 1297: "Ex-FBI Aid Accnspd in I'olicf' Rpy
HenriT1r'S" r'IJjcrrrrn Trilmne. flI2117!'i. n. 3.)
3. PSAINTC Staff Study: Matprinl Testin'! Prorrram EA 1729. 10/15/5\).
31 Rn1liyan nttrihntf'~ mnf'h of this attitnrle to the mnlrlinrr inf!nenf'e of World
War II upon young intelligence agents who later rose to positions of influence in
145
one "as "expected to do as a soldier." 32 "It was my assumption," said
Gnc FBI oiIicial COllllcc!ecl with th(' BIl1'('all'8 mail olwning programs,
"that "hat \H' ,yere doing ,,'as justifieel by "hat \H' had to do." 33
Since the ;;('Hemy" did not play by the 1'\11('s. nlO1'eo,er, intelligence
officials often belie,-ed they could not aft'ord to do so either. H
One FBI intelligence officer appeared to attribute the disregard of
the la\, in the Bureau's COIXTELPRO operations to simple restlessness
on the part of ''artion-01'ientecl'' FBI agents. George C. .:\1oore,
the Racial Intelligence Section Chief, testified that:
... the FBI's counterintelligenee program came up because
if you ha,e anything in the FBI, you have an action-oriented
group of people ,,,ho see something happening and want to do
something to take its place.36
Others in the intelligence community have contended that questionable
and illegal acts were justified by a law higher than the
Fnitecl States Code or the Constitution. An FBI Counterintelligence
Section Chief. for example, stated the following reason for believing
in the necessity of techniques such as mail opening:
The greater good. the national security. this is correct. This
is "hat I believed in. 'Yhy I thought these programs were
good, it was that the national security required this, this is
correctY
Similarly. when intelligence officials sec'med the cooperation of telegraph
company executiyes for Project SILUIROCK, in which NSA
received millions of copies of international telegraph messages without
the sender's knowledge. they assmed the exeeutives that they would
not be' subjected to criminal liability because the project "as "in the
highest interests of the nation." 38
the intelli~ence community. (Sullivan. 11/1/75. pp. 94-95.) Disregard of the
"niceties of law." he stated. continued after the war had ended:
"Along ('ame the Colrl War. 'We pursuerl the same course in the Korean War,
and the Colrl 'Var eontinued. then the Vietnam 'Var. 'Ve never fref>rl ourselves
from that ps.\-cholog" that we were indoctrinated with. right after Pearl Harhor,
~-ou see. I think this accounts for the fact that nohody seemed to be coneerned
ahout raising the question is this lawful, is this legal, is this ethieal? It was just
like a snldier in the hattlefield. "rhen lie shot do~-n an enemy he did not ask
himself is this legal or lawful, is it ethical? It is what he was expeeted to do
as a soldier."
"We did what we were expected to do. It became part of our thinking, a part
of our persona Iit~'." (f'nllh-an. 11/1 /7e;. pp, 95. 96. )
Unfortnn'ltely, it made too little difference whether the "enemy" was a foreign
sp,. a civil rights leader, or a Vietnam protester.
" f'u1livan, 11/1/75, p. 96.
33 Rrani~an. 10/9/75. n. 41.
" Staff summary of William C. Sullivan interview, 6/10/75.
36 ~foore deposition. 11/3/75. p. 79.
31 Branigan deposition, 1/9/7i'l. p. 41. Richarrl Helms referred to another kind
of "~reater ~ood" when asked to speculate about the possible motivation of a
CIA scientist who did not he('rl Presirlent Xixon's directiwto destroy all biological
and chemical toxins. Xoting that the sC'if>ntist mi~ht haw "had thoughts
ahout immunization ... or treatment of rlismse \yhf>re [the toxin he had developPel]
might he useful," Hplms t.;airl that the l"ptention of this biological a~ent
could be explainpd as "yiplrling- to that human impulsp of the greater good."
I Ri<'lwJ'(1 Helms testimon,. fl/15175. p. fl6.)
38 Rohert Anclre\\'s testimon, fl/:?3175. p. 34: Rep XRA Rf>j1ort: "fUIA3IROCK."
By cooperating with the Gm-ernment in ~HA~rRO(,K. executives of three eompanies
chose to ignore the advice of their respective legal counsels who had recom(
Continued)
68-786 0 - 76 - 11
146
Perhaps the most novel reason for advocating illegal action was
proffered by Tom Charles Huston. Huston explained that he belie,-ed
the real threat to internal security ,vas potential repression by rightwing
forces within the United States. He argued that the "Xe,,' Left"
was capable of producing a climate of fear that ,Yould bring forth
every repressive demagogue in the country. Huston believed that the
intelligence professionals, if given the chance, could protect the people
from the latent forces of repression by monitoring the Kew Left,
including by illegal means.39 Illegal action directed against the New
Left, in other words, should be used by the Government to forestall
potential repression by the Right. .
In attempting to explain why illegal activities ,,-ere advocated
and defended, the impact of the attitudes and actions of government
officials in supervisory positions-Presidents, Cabinet officers, and
Congressmen-should not be discounted. Their occasional endorsement
of such activities, as well as the atmosphere of permissiveness created
by their emphasis on national security and their demands for results,
clearly contributed to the notion that strict adherence to the law was
unimportant. So, too, did the concept, propounded by some senior
officials, that a "sovereign" president may authorize violations of the
law,
,Yhahwer the reasons, hO\H'nr. it is clear that a number of intelligence
officers acted in knowing contravention of the law.
8ubfil1ding (d)
Internal recognition of the illegality or questionable legality of
many of these activities frequently led to a tightening of security
rather than to their termination. Partly to avoid exposure and a public
"flap,'~ knowledge of these programs was tightly held ",'ithin the agencies,
special filing procedures were used, and "cover stories" were
devised.
,Vhen intelligence agencies realized that certain programs and techniques
were of questionable legality. they frequently took special
security precautions to avoid public exposure, criticism. and embarrassment.
The CIA's study of student unrest throughout the world in the
late 1960s, for example, included a section on student dissent in the
United States, an area that was clearl;.-' outside the Agency's statutory
charter. DCI's Hichard Helms urged the Presi(lent's national securitv
advisor, Henry Kissinger. to treat it with extreme sensivity in
light of the acknmdedged jurisdictional violation:
"Herewith is a SUITev of student dissidence world-wide 'Us requested
by the President. In an effort to round out our discussion
of this subject, we have included a section on American
students. This is an area not within the charter ot this Agency.
so I need not emphasize hO\v extremely sensitive this makes
the paper. Should anyonp learn of its existence, it would prove
most embarrassing for all concerned." 40
Concern for the FBI's public imaQ'e prompted security mensures
which nrotected numerous questionable aetiyities. For example, in
(Continued )
mended ag-ainst participation hecause the:> considerf'd the prog-ram to he in
yiolation of thE' la\y and FCC reg-ulations. D[pmorandllm for thE' rpcord, Anued
ForcE'" SE'curH:> AI!E'ncy. SuhjE'ct: SHA~[ROCK OpE'ration. 1'/25/50.)
.. Tom Charles Huston dE'position, 5/22/75, p. 43; Staff Summary of Tom
CharlE's Huston interview. 5/22/75.
'" Letter from Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger. 2/18/69.
147
approving or denying COIXTELPRO proposals, many of ,,-hich were
clearly megaL a main consideration ,vas prrn·nting "embarrassment
to the Bureau." 41 A characteristic cantion to FBI agents appears in
the letter ,yhich initiated the COIXTELPRO against "Black
Xationalists" :
You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor
is such that under no circumstances shonkl the existence of
the program be made kn01yn outside the Bureau and appropriate
,yithin-office security should be afforded to sensiti,-c
operations and techniques considered under the program.
Examples of attention to such security are that anonymous letters had
to be 'Yritten on commercially purchased stationery; newsmen had to
bo so completely trnstwOlthy that they were guaranteed not to re"eal
the Bureau's interest; and inquiries of law enforcement officials had to
be made under the pretext of a criminal inycstigation.
A similar preoccupation with security measures for improper acti,'·
ities affected both the XSA and the Army Security Agency.
XSA's guidelines for its watch list activity provided that NSA,s
name should not be on any of the disseminated watch list material
involving Americans. The aim was to "restrict the knowledge that
such information is !being collected and processed" by NSA.43
The Army Security Agency's radio monitoring activity, which continued
even after the Army was told that the> FCC and the Attorney
General regarded it as illegal, also had to be conducted in secrecy if a
public outcry ,vas to be aToided. 'Yhen Army officials decided to permit
radio monitoring in connection "'ith the military's Civil Disturbance
Collection Plan, their instruction prodded that all ASA
personnel had to be "disguised" either in civilian clothes or as members
of regular military unitsY
The perceived illegality-and consequent "flap potential"-of the
CIA's Kew York mail opening project Jed Agency officials to formulate
a drastic strategy to follow in the event of public exposure.
A review of the project by the Inspector General's Office in the early
1960s conclmled that it would be desirable to fabricate a "cover story."
A formal recommendation was therefore made that "[a]n emergency
plan and cover story be prepared for the possibility that the operation
might be blown." 45 In response to this recommendation, the Deputy
Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff agreed that "a 'flap' will put
us 'out of business' immediately and may give rise to grave charges
of criminal misllse of the mails by goyernment agencies," but he
argued:
41 See COINTELPRO Report: Sec. Y, "Outside the Bureau" memorandum; from
FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/25/67.
43 Buffham, 9/12/75, p. 20; ~IINARET Charter, 7/1/69.
At other times, however, NSA's special security measures were applied to
protect documents which concerned far more than NSA. Thus, at Richard Helms
suggestion, Huston Plan working papE'rs and documents WE're all stamped with
legends designed to protect XSA's lawful communications activity. although only
a fimall portion of the documents actually concerned NSA. (Unaddressed memorandum,
Subject: "Interagency Committee on Inte]]jgence, 'Working Subcommittee,
~Iinutf's of the Firfit ~If'('ting," 6/10/70.)
" DE'pal'tmE'nt of ArmJ' ~Iessage to Subordinate Commands, 3/31/68.
'0 CIA memorandum. Subject: Inspector General's Survey of the Office of
Security, Annex II, undated.
148
Since no good pUl'pose can bp sPr\'Nl by an official admission
of the \'iolation, and existing Federal statutes preclude the
concoction of any legal excuse for the \'iolation, it must be
recognized that no COHr story is available to any Government
Agency. Therefore, it is important that all Federal law
enforcement and 1'S Intelligence Agencies vigorously deny
any association, direct or indire~t, with any such activity as
charged.... Unless the charge is supported by the presentation
of interior items from the Project, it should be relatively
easy to "hush up" the entire affair, or to explain that it consists
of legal mail COYer activities conducted by the Post Office at
the request of authorized Federal agencies. Under the most
unfavorable circumstances ... it might be n~ssary after the
matter has cooled off during an extended period of inYestigation,
to find a scapegoat to blame for unauthorized tampering
with the mails. Such cases by their vel'Y nature do not
have much appeal to the imagination of the public, and this
would be an effective way to resolve the initial charge of
censorship of the mails.46
This strategy of complete denial and transferring blame to a scapegoat
\yas approved by the Director of Security in February 1962.47
Another extreme example of a security measure that was adopted because
of the threat that illegalnetivity might be exposed \yas the outright
destruction of files.
The FBI developed a special filing system-or, more a~urately, a
destruction system-for memoranda written about illegal techniques,
such as break-ins," and highly questionable operations, such as the mirrophone
surYeillance of .Joseph Kraft!9 Under this system-which
was referred to as the "DO XOT FILE" procedure-authorizing documents
and other memoranda were filed in special safes at headquarters
and field offices until the next annual inspection by the Inspection Division.
at \vhich time they \\'ere to be systematically destroyed.50
.. Memorandum from Deputy Chief, CI Staff, to Director Office of Security,
2/1/62,
.1 Memorandum from Sheffield Edwards. Director of Security. to Deputy Director
for Support, 2/21/62.
48 ~Iemorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach. 7/19/66. The same document
that describes the application of the "DO NOT FILE" procedure to "black
bag jobs" also notes that before a break-in could be approved within the FBI, the
Special Agent in Charge of the field office had to assure headquarters that it
could be accomplished without "embarrassment to the Bureau." (Sullivau memorandum,
7/19/66.)
An isolated instance of file destruction apparently occurred in the Los Angeles
office of the Internal Revenue Senice in December 1974, at a time when Congressional
investigation of the intelligence agencies was imminent. This office had
collected large amounts of essentially political information regarding black militants
and political activists. In violation of internal document destruction procedures
the files were destroyed prior to their proposed review b~' IRS authorities.
See IRS Report; Sec. IY. "The Information Gathering and Retrieval System"
; Staff Summary of interview \Yith Chief, IRS Diyision, Los Angeles. 8/1/75.
•• For example, letters from W. C. Sullivan to J. Edgar Hooyer, 6/30/69. 7/2/69,
7/3/69, 7/7/69. These letters were sent to Hooyer from Paris. where Sullivan
coordinated the Kraft sllrYeillance. All of them bear the notation "DO XOT
FJJ,J~."
00 ~Iemorandum from ViT
• C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66.
149
8ubfindinq (e)
On occasion, intelligence agencies failed to disclose candidly prog-
rams and practices to their own General Counsels, amI to Attorney
G-enerals, Presidents, and Congress.
(i) Concealment from E[J'ecuth'c Branch Officials
Intelligt'nce officers frequently conct'ult'c1 or misrt'presented illegal
activitit's to their own General Counsel and superiors \vithin and outside
the agencies in order to protE'ct these acti,:ities from exposure.
For example, during the entire 20-year history of the CIA's mail
opening project, the Agency's General Counsel was never informed of
its existence. According to one Agency official, this knowledge was
purposefully kept from him. Former Inspector General Gordon St€Wart
testified:
Well, I am sure that it was held back from [the General
Counsel] on purpose. An operation of this sort in the CIA is
run-if it is closely held, it is run by those people immediately
concerned, and to the extent that it is really possible, according
to the practices that we had in the fifties and sixties, those
persons not immediately concerned were supposed to be
ignorant of it.51
The evidence also jndicates that two Djrectors of Central Intelligence
under whom the Xcw York mail operations continued-John
McCone and Admiral Raborn-were never informed of its existence."'
In 1954, Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield was informed that
the CIA operated a mail cover project in New York, but he was not
told that the Agency opened or intended to open any mail.53 In 1965, the
CIA briefly considered informing Postmaster General John A. Gronouski
about the project when its existence was felt to be jeopardized
by a congressjonal subcommitt€e that was jnvestigatjng the use of majl
covers and other investigative techniques by federal agencies. According
to an internal memorandum, however, the idea was qujckly rejected
"in view of various statements by Gronouskj before this subcommittee."
54 Since Gronouski had agreed with the subcommittee that
tighter administrative controls on mail covers were necessary and generally
supported the principle of the sanctity of the mail, it is reasonable
to infer that CIA officials assumed he would not be sympathetic
to the technique of mail opening.r
..;
vI Gordon Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 29.
52 :\IcCone, 10/9/75, pp. 3-4; Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 20; Osborn, 10/21/75; Hearing-
b, Vol. 4, p. 38.
63 Memorandum from Richard Helms to Director of Security, 5/17/74; Helms,
10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 84. By the CIA's own account, moreoyer, at most
only three Cabinet-level officials may have been told about the mail opening aspects
of this project. Each of these three-Postmasters General J. Edward Day
and Winton :\1. Blount, and Attorney General John :\Iitchell-dispute the Agency's
claim. (Day, 10/22/75. Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 45; Blount, 10/22/75, Hearings,
Vol. 4, IJ. 47; :\Iitchell, 10/2/75. pp. 13-14.)
.. Blind memorandum from "CIA Officer," 4/23/65.
w Ibi(l. :\Ir. Grononski testified as follows about the CIA's successful attempt
to keep knowledge of the Xew York project from him:
"When this news [about CIA mail opening] broke [in 19751. I thought it was
incredible that a person in a top position of responsibility in Government in an
ug-ency should have something of this sort that is very illegal going- on within
his own agency and did not know about it. It is not that I did not try to know
about these things. I think it is incumbent upon anybody at the top office to try
to know everything that goes on in his organization." (Gronouski, 10/22/75,
Hearings, Vol. 4 p. 44.)
150
The only claim that any President may han known about the project
was made by Richard Helms, who testified that "there was a possibility"
that he "mentioned" it to President L;yndon .Tohnson in 1967
or 1968."6 X0 docllluentary e\-idence is availalJle that either supports or
refutes this statement. During the preparation of the Huston Plan,
neither CIA nor FBI representatives informed Tom Charles Huston,
President Xixon's representative, that the mail opening project
existed. The final interagency report on the Huston Plan signed by
Richard Helms and J. Edgar Hoover, was sent to the President with
the statement, contrary to fact, that all mail opening programs by
federal agencies had been discontinued.57
In connection with another CIA mail opening project, middle-level
Agency officials apparently did not even tell their own superiors within
the CIA that they intended to open mail, as opposed to merely inspecting
envelope exteriors. The ranking officials testified that they
approved the project believing it to be a mail cover program only.fiB
No Cabinet officials or President knew of this project and the approval
of the Deputy Chief Postal Inspector (for what he also beheved to
be a mail cover operation) was secured through conscious deception.59
A pattern of concealment was repeated by the FBI in their mail
opening programs. There is no claim by the Bureau that any Postmaster
General, Attorney General, or President was ever advised of
the true nature and scope of its mail projects. One FBI official testified
that it was an unofficial Bureau policy not to inform postal officials
with whom they dealt of the actual intention of FBI agents in receiving
the mail, and there is no indication that this policy was ever
violated.60 At one point in 1965, Assistant Director Alan Belmont and
Inspector Donald Moore apparently informed Attorney General
Xicholas deB. Katzenbach that FBI agents received custody of the
mail in connection with espionage cases on some occasions.61 But
:\'foore testified that the Attorney General was not told that mail was
actually opened. "'hen asked if he felt any need to hold back from
Katzenbach the fact of mail openings as opposed to the fact that Bureau
agents received direct access to the mail, Moore replied:
It is perhaps difficult to answer. Perhaps I could liken it
to ... a defector in place in the KGB. You don't want to tell
anybody his name, the location, the title, or anything like
that. Xot that you don't trust them completely, but the fact
66 Helms, 10/23/75, pp. 28, 30-3l.
5' Special Report, p. 29. Richard Helms testified as follows about this inaccurate
statement:
"... the only explanation I have for it was that this applied entirely to the
FBI and had nothing to do with the CIA, that we never .lld,-ertised to tllis Committee
or told this CommitLee that this mail operation was going on, and there
was no intention of attesting to a lit'. ..."
"And if I signed this thing, then mayiJe I didn't read it carefully enough."
"There was no intention to mislead or lie to the President." (Helms. 10/22/75,
Hearings Vol. 4, p. 95) .
38 Howard Osborn, 8/28/75, pp. 58, 59; Thomas Karamessilles. 10/8/75, p. 12;
Richard Helms, 9/10/75, p. 127.
59 For example, Chief, Security Support Division memorandum, 12/24/74;
Memorandum from C/TSD/CCG/CRB to the filp, 3/26/69; memorandum from
C/TSD/CCG/CRB to the file, 9/15/69.
00 Donald E. )!oore, 10/1/75, p. 79.
61 )!oore, 10/1/75, p. 31; Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hparings, vol. G, pp. 204, 20::;.
151
is that any time one additional person becomes aware of it,
there is a potential for the information to ... go further.""
Another Bmeau agent speculat('rl that the Attol'lll'Y General ,vas
not told because mail opening "was not legaL as far as I knew." G:I
SimilarlY, there is no indication that the FBI ever informerl anv
Attorney (;'enpral about its use of "black bag jobs" (illegal brpak-ills
for purposes other than microphone instaHations) ; the full scope of
its activities ill COIXTELPHO; or its submission of names for inclusion
on either the CIA's "",Yatch List" for mail opening or. before 1973,
on the XSA's "",Yatch List" for electronic monitoring of international
eommunications.G4
After .T. Edgar Hoover disregarded Attorney General Biddle's
1943 order to terminate the Custodial Detention List by merely changing
its name to the Security Index moreover, Bureau headquarters
instructed the field officers that the new Jist should be kept "strictly
confidential" and that it should neYer be mentioned in FBI reports or
"discussed with agencies or individuals outside the Bureau" except for
military intelligence agencies. For sHeral years thereafter, the Attorney
General and the .Justice Department ,vere not informed of the
FBI's decision.60
An incirlent which occurred in 1967 in connection with the Bureau's
COIXTELPRO operations is particularly iIlustrative of the lengths to
which intelligence agencies ,vould go to protect illegal programs from
scrutiny byexeeutive branch officers outside the intelligence comnlllnity.
As one phase of its disruption of the rnited lOans of America,
the Bureau sent a letter to Klan officers purportedly prepared by the
highly secret "Xational Intelligence Committee" (NIC) of the Klan.66
The fake letter pmported to fire the Xorth Carolina Graml Dragon
for personal misconduct and misfeasance in office, and to suspend
Imperial "'izard Robert Shelton for his failure to remove the Grand
Dragon. Shelton complained to the FBI and the Post Office auout.
this apparent violation of the mail fraud statutes-without realizing
that the Bureau had in fact sent the letter.G7 The Bureau, after
solemnly assuring Shelton that his complaint wa,.<.; not within the
FBI's jurisdiction, approached tIlE' Chief Postal Inspector's office in
"Tashington to determine what action the Post Office planned to take
regarding Shelton's allegation. The FBI was advised that the matter
had 1)('el\ referred to the .Justice Department's Criminal Division.GS
At no time did the Bureau inform either the Post Office or the ,Justice
Department that FBI agents had authored the letter. ",Yhen no investigation
,vas deemed to be warranted by the Criminal Division, FBI
Headquarters directed the Bureauls Charlotte, Xorth Carolina office
to prepare a second phony XIC letter to send to Klan officials.69 This
.2 )loore 10/1/75, p. 48. See )Iail Report: Sec. IV, "Xnture and Value of the
Product Received."
G:l FBI agent testimony, 10/10/75. p. 30.
., See XSA Report: Sec. II. "Summary of XSA Watch List Acth·ity."
"0 )Iemorandulll from .J. Edgar Hom'er to J<'BI Field Offices, 8/14/43.
66 )IelllOrandulll from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters. tI/7/tiT.
'" )Iemorandull! froll! Birmingham Field Office to FBI Headquarter~, 6/14/67.
68Po~tal official~ toW Bureau liaison that ~ince Shelton's all(>gations "appear
to involn> an internal struggle for control of Ku Klux Klan activities in Xorth
Carolina and ~inee the evidence of mail fraud was somewhat tenuous in nature.
the Post Offiee did not contemplate any inn'stigation." Dlemorandum from Speeial
Ag'ent to n ..J. Brennan. 7/11/67.) Had tllP J<'BI informed the Post Office
that Bureau agent~ had written tllP letter, it would han' been apparent that
SI1Plton'~ allegation~ '\"pre not hased Oil an "internal ~truggle" within the KKK.
69 )lemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office. 8/21/67.
152
letter ,,-as not mailed. hmvever, because the Charlotte office proposed
and implemented a <lifferent idea-the formation of an FBI-controlled
alternative Klan organization, which eventually attracted 21)0
members.70
The Huston Plan itself was prepared ,,-ithout the knmvledge of the
Attorney General. K either the ~\Jtornev General nor anvone in his
office ,,-;s ill\-ited to the drafting sessioni at Langley or cOl{sulted during
the proceedings. Huston testified that it never occurred to him
to confer with the Attorney General before making the recommendations
in the Report. in part because the plan ,,-as seen as an intelligence
matter to be handled by the intelligence agency directors!"
Similarly. the CIA's General Counsel ,,-as not included or consulted
in the fOrIl1Ulation of the Huston Plan. As James Angleton testified.
"the custom and usage was not to deal ,vith the General Counsel, as a
rule, until there were some troubles. lIe was not a part of the process
of project approval." 73
(ii) Ooncealment from Oongress
At times, knowledge of illegal programs and techniques has been
concealed from Congress as well as executive branch officials. On two
occasions, for example, officials of the Army Security Agency ordered
its units-in apparent yiolation of that Agency's jurisdiction-to conduct
general searches of the radio spectrum without regard to the
source or subject matter of the transmissions. ASA did not report these
incidents to ranking Army officials. e\-en when specifically asked to do
so as part of the Army's preparation for the hearings of the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in 1971.74
Events surrounding the 1965 and 1966 investigation by Senator Edward
Long of )Iissouri into federal agencies' use of mail covers and
other investigative techniques clearly showed the desire on the part of
CIA and FBI officials to protect their programs from congressional
r~view.75 Fearing that the Xew York mail opening program might be
dIscovered by this subcommittee, the CIA considered suspending the
operation until the investigation had been completed. An internal
CIA memorandum dated April 23, 1965, reads in part :
Mr. Karamessines [Assistant Deputy Director for Plans]
felt that the dangers inherent in Long's subcommittee activi-
70 Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters 8/22/67.
71 Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, Yol. 2, p. 24.
When J. Edgar HOO\'er informed Attorney General .John :\Iitchell about the
Report on July 27, 1970, :\Iitchell oojected to its propoEals and influenced the
President to withdraw his original approval.
According to John :\Iitchell, he believed that the proposals "were inimical to
the hest interests of the country and certainly should not be something that the
President of the Cnited States should oe approving." (John :\Iitchell testimony.
10/24/75. Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 23.)
73 .James Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, Yol. 2, p. 77.
.. See ~Iilitary Surveillance Report: Sec. I, "Improper Surwillance of Private
Citizens or the :\Iilitary"; Inspector General Report, Department of the Arm~',
1/3/72.
75 The Johnson Administration itself attempted to restrict the Long Subcommittee's
im-estigation into national security matters, although there is no indication
that this attempt was motivated by a desire to protect ille~al activities.
(E.g., :\Iemorandum from A. H. Belmont to :\Ir. Tolson, 2/27/65; memorandum
from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, and
DeLoach, 3/2/65,)
153
ties to the security of the Project's operations in Xew York
shoulc1 be thoroughly studied in order that a determination
ean be made as to \yhether these operations shoulcl be partially
01' fully suspended until the subcommittee's innstigations are
completed.76
,Yhen it \yas lea1'lled that Chief Postal Inspector Henry }Iontague
had been contacted about the Long in\·pstigation and belien'cl that it
\ycmld "soon cool ofI". hO\yc\'er. it \yas elecieled to continUE thc operation
\yithout snspcnsion. 77 .
The FBI was also concerned that the subcommittpe might expose its
mail opening programs. Bureau nlC'llloranda indicate that the FBI intencled
to ;'\yarn the Long Committee away from those arcas \yhich
would be injurious to the national defense," 7S .r. Edgar Hooycr personally
contacted the Chairman of the Senate .Judiciary Committee,'"
and u;'ged him "to see Long not later than ,Yednesday nlorning to caution
him that [the Chief Counsell must not go into thc kind of question
he madc of Chief Inspector :\Iontague of thl:' Post Office Department'"
SO~qucstioning that had threatened to rHeal the FBI's mail
projpct the pn>\'ious week.SI
"llC'n the Long subcommittee began to inYestigate electronic suryeillance
practiccs seycral months later, Bureau officials conyinced
Senator Echyarcl Long that there \yas no need to l)1\rsue such an in\'
estigation sine'e. thH saiel. the FBI's operations were tightl~' controlled
and properly implemented.s2 According to Bureau documents,
FBI agents \\Tote a press releasp for the Spnator from }fissouri. \yith
his approyal, that statpd his snbcommittee had
cOlHlncted pxhaustin> research into the aetiYities, procedures,
and techniques of this agel1('~' [andl based upon careful study
... \H~ are fully satisfied that the FBI has not participated in
highhanded or uncontrolled usage of wiretaps. microphones.
01' other electronic equi pment.'j
Xot onl~' \vas this release \\Titten by the FBI itself, it \yas misleading.
Tlw "exhausti n> research" apparently consistrd of a ninety-minute
briefing by FBI officials describing their eleetronic sUlTeillance practices;
neitlwr the Senator nor the publiC' lrarned of the instances of
improper P]rctronie sUITeillancrs that had been conducted by the
FBI.s4 ,Vhen Senator E<h\'ard Long later asked certain FBI officials
to testify about the BUI'rau's rlrctronic s\llTeillance policy before the
Subcommitter. they rrfused. arguing: " ... to put an FBI witness on the
70 Blind memorandum from "CIA Officer," 4/23/65.
• 7 Ibid.
78 1Iemoralldum from A. H. Belmont to ::\11'. 'l'olson, 2/27/65.
71l 11emorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to 1Iessrs. Tolson. Belmont. Gale, ROHen.
Sullivan. and DeLoach. 3/1/65.
BO 1Iemorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to 1Iessrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale. Rosen,
Sullivan. and DeLoach 3/1/65.
H 1Iail Rpport Part IV. Sec. VII, "ConcPrJ] with Exposure." At the time of his
t€'stimon~' hpfore the Long Suhcommittpp. Chi€'f Postal Inspector Montague knew
of ongoing FBI proj€'C'ts in which Bur€'au agents received custody of the mail,
hut he was apparentl~' unaware that th€'He projects illYolved mail openingH.
'" For examplp. )lemorandum from C. D. DeLoach to )11'. Tolson, 1/10/66.
" 1[emoralldum from 1I. A..J ones to 11r. 'Yick, Attachmen'r, 1/11/66.
" Se€' pp. 62-65, 105, 205-206 for a description of some of these improper
surveillances.
154
stand would be an attempt to open a Pandora's box, insofar as our
enemies in the press \yere concerned...." B5
~'"fter the press release hall been deliwred to Senator Long and
tlw refusal to testify had bern accepted. onp FBI official wrote to the
~,"ssociate Director that \yhile SOIllr pl'olJlems still existed, ",,-e haye
neutralized the threat of being embarrassed by the Long Subcommittee
..." 86
Subfirtding (f)
The internal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI did
not keep-and, in the case of the FBI, were not designed to keep-the
activities of those agencies within legal bounds. Their primary concern
was efficiency, not legality or propriety.
The intemal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI were
ineffective in ensuring that the activities of these agencies were kept
within legal bounds. This failure was sometimes due to structural
deficiencies which kept knmdedge of (pIestionable programs tightly
compartmented and shielded froIll those who could Haluate their
legality.
As noted above, for example, the CIA's General Counsel was not
informed about either the Xe\\" York mail opening project or CIA's
participation in the Huston Plan deliberations. The role of the CIA's
General Counsel ,,-as essentially a passi \-e one; he did not initiate
inquiries but responded to requests from other Agency components.
As James Angleton stated, the General Counsel was not a part of
the normal project approval process and generally was not consulted
lllltil "something \yas going wrong." 8,
'Vhen the General Counsel was consulted, he often exerted a positive
influence on the conduct of CIA activities. For example, the CIA
stopped monitoring telephone calls to and from Latin America after
the General Counsel issued an opinion describing the telephone intercepts
as illegal. 8s But intprnal CIA regulations have never required
employees who know of illegal. improper, or questionable activities
to report them to the General Counsel; rathel', employes with such
knowledge are instructed to inform either tlll~ Director of Central
Intelligence or the Inspector General. The Diredor and the Inspector
General may refer the matter to the General Counsel but until recentIv
they were Il0t obligated to (10 SO.b'a As Richard Helms stated. "Some'times
we did [consult the General Counsel]; sonwtimes we did not. I
think the record on that is rather spotty, quitc frankly." 89
IJ1(leerl. the record suggests that those programs that wcre most
questionable-such as the Xew York mail opening: project and Project
CHAOS-were not referred to the General Counsel because they were
B."i :\lemorandum from C. D. DeLoach to :\11'. Tolson, 1/21/66.
86 DeLoach memorandum, 1/21/66. This incident also illustrates that Congress
has at times permitted itself to be "neu'tralized." The general reluctance of
Congress to discharge its responsibilities toward intelligence agencies is discussed
at pp. 277-281.
87 James Angleton. 9/17175. D. 48.
SlI :\lemorandum from Lawrence Houston to Acting Chief, Di\"isioll D, 1/29/73.
SR. Proposed regulations drafted in response to Executil"f> Order 1190;; (:\Iarcl!
1976) require the Inspector General tll refpr "all lpgal mattprs" to thp Office of
General Counsel. (Draft Reg. HR 1-3.)
89 Helms deposition, 9/10/75, p. 59.
155
considered extremely sensitin."o EYen whpn questionable actiyities
were called to the attention of the Gelll'ral Counsel. moreonl'. the internal
Agency regulations diel not guarantee him llllrestriete<l access
to all relevant information. Thus, the General Counsel was not in a
position to conduct a complete ('\'aluation of the propriety of particular
programs.
Part of the failurC' of internal inspection to terminate improper programs
and practices may be attributed to the fact that the primary
focus of the CIA's Office of the Inslwctor General and the FBI's Inspection
Division has been on efficiency amI effectiveness rather than
on propriety.
The CL\.\; Inspecltor General is charged with the respons'ibility,
among othpr mattl'rs, of inH'stigating activities \vhich might be construell
as "ilkgaL impl'opcr, and outside 'the CIA's legislatin'
chartcl'." Vl In at least one case, the Inspector General dill force the
suspension of ~t suspeclt activity: the sUl'l'rpt,itious a<lministration of
LSD to unwitting, non-\-Olllllteer, Illlman snbjects \vhich was suspended
in Hl63.92 An earlier Inspector General's review of the larger,
more general program for the testing of behayorial control agents.
hmyever. ha<llabele<l that program "unethical and illegal" and it nonetheless
continurcl for another seyen yrars."" In general, as the Rockefr]]
er Commission pointed out. "the focus of the Inspector General
component revie\ys was on operational effectivC'ness. Examination of
the legality or pl'Oprirty of CIA aetivitirs was not llorma]]y a primary
C'onerrn." "' Two separate reviews of the Xrw York mail opening projccts
by the Inspector General's office, for example, considered iSStll's
of administration and srcurity at lenbrth lmt did not eYen mention
legal considerations.D5
Intemal inspedion at 'the FBI has tradit.ionally nat encompassed
legal 01' ethical questions at all. Aceonling to "T. ~Iark Felt, the As·
sistant FBI J)irec~ol' in eharge of the Inspection Division from 1964 to
1971, his job was to ensure that Bureau progmllls were being opemlted
efficientl y. not constirtutionally: "There was no instruction to me," he
stated. "nor do I belicH' there is any instmction in the Insprctor's
manna,]s, that inspectors shoulll be on the alert to ser that constitutional
values are bCl;ng protected." 96 He could nut recall any program
\yhich ,vas terminated because it might han> been violating someone's
civil rights.97 .
90 Gordon Stewart deposition. 4/30/73, p. 29; Rockeller ComDlis~ion Report,
p. 146; Report 011 the Offices of the General Counsel and Inspector General; The
General Counsel's Responsibilities, 9/30/75, p. 29.
9'Regulation HR 7-1a(6l.
92 :.\Iemorandum for the Record by .J. S. Earman, Inspector General, 11/29/63;
:.\Iemorandum from Helms to DCI, 11/9/64.
93 1937 I.G. Inspection of the Technical Services Di"ision.
.. Rockefeller Commission Report, 6/6/73, p. Sf).
" :.\Iemorandum from L. K. "'hitI', Deput.v Director for Support, to Acting In~
pector Genl'ral, Attachment, 3/9/62; hlind memorandum, undated (1969). The
Inspector General under whose auspice;; the second review W'aS conducted stated
"[Olf course we knl'w that thi~ wa~ illegal." but Iw believed that it \vas "Ullne('
p~~ary" to rai~e the ma tter of its illegality ,vitb Diredor Helms "since everJ-body
knew that it wa~ [illp~al] and it didn't sPpm ... that I would be telling
:.\11'. Helms anything that he didn't know," (Gordon Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 32.)
11. 32.)
00 W. :.\Iark Felt testimony, 2/3/75, p. 65.
91 Felt, 2/3/75, p. 57.
156
A number of questionable FBI programs were apparently never inspected.
Felt could recall no inspection, for instanC€, of either the FBI
mail opening programs or the Bureau's participation in the CIA's
Xew York mail opening project.as Even when improper programs
were inspected, the Inspection Division did not attempt to exercise
oversight in the sense of looking for wrongdoing. Its responsibility
was simply to enSure that FBI policy, as definE'cl by J. Edgar Hoover
was effectively implemented and not to question the propriety of the
policy.DD Thus, Felt testified that if, in the COllrse of an inspection of a
field office, he discovered a microphone surveillance on )Iartin Luther
King, Jr., the only questions he would ask were whether it had been
approved by the Director and whether the procedures had been properly
followed. loo
'\'hen Felt was asked whether the Inspection Division conducted
any investigation infto the propriety of COIXTELPRO, the
following exchange ensued:
)11'. FELT. Kot into the propriety.
Q. So in the case of COIKTELPRO, as in the case of
XSA interceptions, your job as Inspector was to determine
,,·hether the program was being pursued effectively as opposed
to whether it was proper?
)11'. FELT. Right., ,vith this exception, that in any of these
situations, Counterintelligence Program or whatewr, it very
frequently happened that the inspectors, in reviewing :the
files, would clirC('t thart a certain investigation be discont,inued,
that i:t was not productive, or thoM there ,,-as some reason that
it be discontinued.
But I don't recall any cases being discontinued in the
COlmtel1intelligence program.IOl
As a result of this role definition, the Inspection Division became an
active participant in some of the most questionable FBI programs For
example, it was responsible for reviewing on an annual basis all memoranda
relating to illegal break-ins prior to their destmction under the
"DO XOT FILE" procedure.
Improper programs and techniques in the FBI were protected not
only by the Inspection Division's perceptrion of its function, but also
by the maxim that FBI agents should newr "embarrass the Bureau."
This standard, which sened as a shield to outside scrutiny, was
explicitly reflected in the FBI Manual:
Any investigation necessary to develop complete essential
facts regarding any allegation against Bureau employees
must be instituted promptly, and eyery logical lead which
will esta,blish the true facts should be completely run out
unless such action would embarrass the BUlY'au ... in which
event the Bureau will weigh the facts, along with the re,commendations
of the division head. [Emphasis addecl.] 102
9. Felt, 2/3/75, pp. 54, 55.
.. Felt, 2/3/75, pp. 59-60.
100 Felt, 2/3/75, p. 60.
101 Felt, 2/3/75, pp. 56, 57.
102 When asked about this Manual provision, Attorney General Edward Levi
stated:
"I do believe ... some further explanation is in order. First, the Bureau informs
me that the provision has not been interpreted to mean that an investiga157
Such an instruction, coupled with the Inspection Diyision's inattention
to the law, could only inhibit or prcYeut the tcrmination and exposure
of illegal practices.
Subfinding (g)
"When senior administration officials with a duty to control domestic
intelligence activities kne,,·, or had a basis for suspecting, that questionable
activities had occurred, they often responded with silence or
approval. In certain cases, they were presented "with a partial description
of a program but did not ask for details, thereby abdicating their
responsibility. In other cases, they were fully aware of the nature of
the practice and implicitly or explicitly approved it.
On several occasions, senior administration officials with a duty to
control domestic intelligence activities were supplied with partial
details about questionable or illegal programs but they did not ask
for additional information and the programs continued.
Sometimes the failure to probe further stemmed from the administration
official's assumption that an intelligence agency would not
engage in lawless conduct. Former Chief Postal Inspector Henry
){ontague, for example, was aware that the FBI received custody
of the mail in connection with several of its mail opening programsindeed,
he had approved such custody in one case-but he testified
that he believed these were mail cover operations only.loa Montague
stated that he did not ask FBI officials if the Bureau opened mail
because he:
never thought that would be necessary.... I trusted them
the same as I would another [Postal] Inspector. I would
never feel that I would have to tell a Postal person that you
cannot open mail. By the same token, I would not consider
it necessary to emphasize it to any great degree with the
FBI."04
A former FBI official has also testified, as noted above, that he
informed Attorney General Katzenbach about selected aspects of the
FBI mail opening programs. This official did not tell Katzenbach
that mail was actually opened, but he testified that he "pointed out
[to the Attorney General] that we do receive mail from the Post
Office in certain sensitive areas." 105 "While Katzenbach stated that he
never knew mail was opened or that the FBI gained access to mail
on a regular basis in large-scale operations,"06 the former Attorney
Hon should not take place and that 'any interpretation that an investigation
,vould not be instituted because of the possibility of emlJarrassment to the Bureau
was never intended and, in fact, has never been the policy of this Bureau.' I am
told that 'what was intended to be conveyed was that in such eventuality FBI
Headquarters desired to be advised of the matter hefore investigation is instituted
so that Headquarters would be on notice and could direct the inquiry.
if necessary.' "
"Second, the manual provision dates hack to March 30, 1955."
"Third, I am informed by the Bureau that 'rimmeuilate steps are heing taken to
remm"e that phraseology from our ::\lanual of Rules and Regulations.' "
(Letter from Attorney Gem'raJ Levi to Senator Richard Rchweiker, 11/10/75.)
103 Henry ::\lontague testimony, 10/2/75, pp. 55, 71.
10< Henry Montagne, 10/2/75, pp. 15-16.
lOll Donald ::\loore, 10/1/75, p. 31.
100 ~icholas Katzenbach, 10/11/75, p. 3f).
158
General acknmdedged that he did learn that "in some cases the outside
of mail might haye been examined or ewn photographed by
persons other than Post Office employees~~.lo7 HOWe\Oel', neither at this
time nor at any other time did the .Justicp Dppal'tment make any
inquiry to dP1ermine the full scope of the FBI mail operations.
Similarly, former Attorneys General Xicholas Katzenbach and Ramsey
Clark testified that they '\"ere familia I' with the FBI's efforts to
disrupt the Ku Klux Klan through regular inyestigatiye techniques
but said thev were una\yare of the offensiye tactics that occurred
in COIKTELPRO. Katzenbach said he did not believe it necessary
to explore possible irregularities since" [i]t neyer occurred to
me that the Bureau would engage in the sort of sustained improper
aetiyity which it apparently did." 108
Both Robert Kennedy and Xicholas Katzenoach were also aware of
some aspects of the FBI's inYestigation of Dr. ~fartin Luther King,
.Jr., yet neither ascertaineel the full eletails of the Bureau's campaign to
discredit the ci viI rights leaeler. Kenneely intensified the original "communist
influence" inwstigation in October UJ68 by authorizing wiretaps
on King's home and office telephones.l09 Kennedy requested that
an evaluation of the results be submitted to him in thirty days in
order to determine whether or not to maintain the taps, but the eYaluation
was nenr delivered to him and he diel not insist on it.110 Since
he neyer ordered the termination of the wiretap, the Bureau could,
and did, install additional 'Yiretaps on King by inyoking the original
authorirA'ltion. lll According to Bureau memoranda apparently initialled
by Attorney General Katzenbach~ Katzenbach receiveel after
the fact notification in 1965 that three bugs had been planted in
Dr. King's hotel rOOl11s.112 A transmittal memorandum \yritten by
107 Katzenbach statement, 12/3/75, Hearings, Yol. 6, p. 205.
108 Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Yol. 6, p. 207; Ramsey ('lark,
12/3/75; Hearings, Vol. 6 p. 235; KatzenbaCT1's and Clark's knowledge of disruptire
operations is discussed at greater length in Finding G: "Deficiences in Control
and Accountability" p. 265.
100 ~Iemorandum from J. Edgar Hoorer to the Attorney. General, 10/7/63;
memorandum from ,T. Edgar HoO'oer to the Attorney General, 10/18/63.
110 ~Iemorandulll from C. A. Eyans to ~Ir. Belmont 10/21/63.
In May 1961, Robert Kennedy also became awar" of the CIA's use of organized
crime figures in connection with "clandestine efforts" against the Cuban goyernment.
(Memorandum from J. Edgar HoO'oer to the Attorney General, 5/22/61. J
But he did not instruct the CIA to terminate its inrolyement with underworld
figures either at that time or in ~Iay 1962, when he learned at a briefing br CIA
officials that an assassination attempt had occurred. According to the CIA's General
Counsel, who partIcipated in the 1962 briefing, Kennedy only said, "... if we
were going to get inyolyed with :Mafia per,;;onnel again he ,yanted to be informed
first." (La ",rence HOllston deposition, 6/2/75, p. 14. J
The CIA's use of underworld figures clearly posed problems for the FBI's ongoing
investigation of organized crime in the "CnitE'd States, which had in large
part been initiated b~o Attorney GeIlPral Kenned~o himself. (Senate Select Committee,
"Alleged Assassination Plots Im'olving ForE'ign Ll'aders." pp. 125-129.)
111 The FBI instituted additional wiretaps on King on four separate occasions
betwE'E'n 1964 and 1\)65. Since Justice Department policy before ~Iarch 1965
imposed no limit on the duration of wiretaps and they were approyed by the
Attorm'y General, the Bureau claimed that the King taps WE're justifipd as a continuation
of the tap originally authorized hy Kennedy in October 1963. (For example.
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Fipld Office. 4/19/&,:
~[artin Luther King Report: Sec. IC, ",nrE'tap Surypil!ancp of Dr. King and the
SCLf'." -
110 Katzcnbach's initials apppar on Il!pnlOranda addrpssed to thp Attorney General
adyising him of these bugs, but he eannot recall seeing or initialing them.
159
Katzenbach also indicates thM he lIlay han' instmcted the FBI to
be '",-ery etl utious~~ in conducting t hes~' surTeillanees.11.3 There is no
iJl(licatiOll, llO\yen'l", that he l'eqw'sU'd fmother (letails about any of
tllrm or prohibit!'d til!' FBI f!'Om futun' lise of this technique against
Dr. King.
"\Yhil!' there is no e\-idence that the fll11 extcnt of tllP FBI's campaign
to discl'c<!it Dr. IGn<r ,nlS authorizc(l by or knO\yn to anyone outside
of the Bureau, therpis pyi(lence that officials responsible for supen-ising
thc FBI recpiw(] indications that somc such efforts ,,-ere being
undertaken. For (·xample, fonner Attorney General Katzenbaehand
former Assistant AttoI'll!'v General Blll'ke ~Iarshall both testifiell
that in late 10fi-! thry lea]']1e(] that thp Burpan h~H] offerc(] tape recon]ings
of Dr. King to ccrtain neWSlllcn in 'Yashington. D.C. They further
stated that they inforllle(l Pn'sident .Johnson of the FBI's
offers. ' H The Committee has discoYere<! no evi(]enee. hO\yever, that the
Prcsil]ent 01' .Jnstice Depal'tment officials made any further effort to
halt the discrediting campaign at this time or at any other time; indeed,
the Bureau~s eampaign eontinuec1 for seYeral years after this
ineident.
On some oecasions, a(lministration officials did not request further
details abont intelligence programs because they simply did not "ant
to knO\y. Former Pustmaster General .J. Edward Dav testified that
when Allen Dulles and Richard Hclms spoke to hin'l about a CIA
project in !!)()l, he intcrrupte(l them before thcy could tell him the
purpose of their "isit (which Helms sail] was to say mail mlS being
opened). Day stated:
... Ml'. Dulles~ after some pn'liminary yisiting aIH] so on,
said that he wanted to tell me something ,-ery secret~ and I
said, "Do I han> to 100mY about it?"~ And lw said, "Xo:~
I said. "~ly experience is that where there is something that
is Yery secret. it is likely to leak out, an(l anybody that kne,v
about it is likely to be suspected of lUl\-ing been part of leaking-
it out. so I ,yould rather not know anything about it."
"That additional things were said in connection with him
building up to that. I don't knO\v. But I am sure ... that I
,,-as not told anything about opening maiL" 115
By his own account, therefore, }Ir. Day did not leal'll the true natun,
of this project because he "would rather not know anything about it.~~
Although rarely expressed in such unequivocal terms, this attitude
appears to have been all too common among senior government
officials. . .
C\Iemoranda from .T. Edgar Hoo,-er to the Attorney General. 5/17/65. 10/19/65,
1:!/l/6:i: KatzPllbach. 1:!/1/75. Hearing~, YoL 6, p. 211, p. 46.) He stated. how1'\"('
1', that if he had read the~e doeument~. lw would hare "done ~omething ahout
it." (KatzeniJach, Hparing~. vol. 6. p. 230.)
111 A tran~mittal ~Iip, which the FBI claims had been nttaehed to the 12/1/65
memorandum, notes that "these are particnlarly delicate surreillances" and
that "we ~hould be ren' eaution~ in terms of the non-]'BI people who may from
time to time necp~~arily hI' ill\'ol1'ed ill some a~peet of installation." (:\Iemorandum
from Xicholas Katzpllbach to .T. Edgar Hoon-r. 12/10/65.) This mes~
age i~ ~igned h~' KatzPllhaeh, hut he te~tified that he i~ unsure it related to
tll(' Kill!!; ~lIrreillallef'S. (KatzP1I1Jaeh. 12/3/7.•. Hearings, Vol. 6. II. 229.)
11\ Katzenlmch. 12/3/7;). Hparings. YoL 6, ]l. 210; Burkp ~Iarshall te~timony.
3/3/7(;. JlJl. 39-13.
'" .T. Ed\Yard Day tp~tilllony, 10/22/7.). Hearings, VoL 4. p. 45.
160
Enn ,,-hen administration officials ,vere fully apprised of the illegal
or questionable nature of celtain programs awl techniques. they sometimes
permitted them to continue..\n example of acquiescence is presented
in the case of 'Yilliam Cotter, a former Chief Postal InspectDr
who knew that the CIA opene(lmail in connection ,yith its Xe'y York
project but took no direct action to terminate the project for a period
of four years.l16 Cotter had learned of this project in his capacity as a
CIA official in the mid-1930's and he knew that it ,vas continuing ,yhen
he was sworn in as Chief Postal Inspector in April 1969,117 Because
the primary responsibilit)- of his position ,vas to insure the
sanctity of the mails, he ,vas understandably "yery. very uncomfort·
able ,vith [knowledge of the ~ew YorkJ project," 118 b1lt he felt constrained
by the letter and spirit of the secrecy oath ,vhich he had signed
when he left the CIA in 1969 "attesting to the fact that I ,Yould not
divulge secret information that came into my possession during the
time that I was with the eLL" 119 Cotter stated; "After coming from
eighteen years in the CIA. I ,vas hypersensitive. perhaps, to the protection
of what I 'believed to be a most sensitive project ..." 120 For
senral years. he placrd the dictate of the secrecy oath above that of
the law he was charged ,,-ith enforcing.
Former "7hite House ad,-iser .John Ehrlichman also stated that he
learned of a program of intercepting mail bebveen the United States
and Communist countries "because I had seen reports that cited those
kinds of sources in connection with this. the bombings, the dissident
activities." 121 Yet he cannot recall any "'hite House inquiry that was
made into such a program nor can he recall raising the matter with the
Presiclent,122
"'hen President Xixon learned of the illegal techniques that were
recommended in the Huston Plan. he initially endorsed, rather than
disavowed them. The former President state'd that "[tJo the extent
that I reviewed the Special Report of Interagency Committee on Intelligence.
I would have been informed that certain recommendations
or decisions set forth in that report were, or might be construed to be,
illegal." 123 He nonetheless approved them. in part because they represented
an efficient method of intelligence collection. As President Nixon
explained, "PIJy approval was based largely on the fact that the procedures
were consistent with those employed by prior administrations
and had been found to be effectin by the intelligence agencies." 124
Mr. Nixon also apparently relied on the theory that a "sovereign"
President can authorize the violation of criminalla,vs in the name of
"national securitv" when the President, in his wle discretion, deems it
appropriate. He ~ecent1y stated:
116 In 1973, however, :\lr. Cotter was instrumental in effecting the termination
of the CIA's New York project. (Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 45.)
117 Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 45.
116 Ibid.
11' Cotter 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 74.
120 Ibid.
121 John Erlichman testimony, President's Commission on CIA Actiyities
Within the l:nited States, 4/17/75, p. gs.
122 Erlichman testimony, President's Commission on CIA Actiyities 'Within the
United States, 4/17/75, p. 98.
223 Answer of Richard ;'\1. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 23,
3/9/76, p. 13.
'" Answer of Richard :\1. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogaton' 19,
3/9/76, p. 13.
161
It is quite obvious that there are certain inherently gm'emmental
aetions \vhieh if undertaken by the sovereign in protection
of the interrst of the nation's sec1ll'ity are la\vful lmt
which if undertaken by pri\'flte persons are Ilot. ...
. . . [1]t is nain~ to att('mpt to categorize activities a Prpsident
might authorize as "legal" 0/' ;'illegal" ,vithout referencr
to the circumstances undrr which he concludes that the
activity is llrcessarY....
In short. thprr l;an> brpn-and \vill bp ill thr fut1ll'r--circumstances
in \vhich Presidents may ]awfulh authorize actions
in tIl(' interests of thp secl1l'ity ~)f this cOlmtry, which if
nndertaken by other persons. or ('Yen by the President under
ditlerent circumstancrs. \vouldlX' illegal.l2:i
As the former President described this doctrine, it could apply not
only to actions taken openly, which are subject to later challenge by
Congress and the courts, but also to actions snch as those recolllmrnded
in tIle Huston Plan, which arr covertly endorsed and implemented.
The dangers inherent in this theory are clear, for it permits a 'p.resident
to create exceptions to normal legal restraints and prohibItIOns,
without review by a neutral authority and without objectiYe standards
to guide him.'26 The Huston Plan itself seITes as a reminder of
these dangers.
Significantly, President Xixon's revocation of approval for the
Huston Plan \vas based on the possibility of "media criticism" if the
usc of these techniques \vas revealed. The former President stated:
Mr. Jfitchell informed me that it was Director Hoover's opinion
that initiating a program which would permit several
government intelligence agencies to utilize the investigati,-e
techniques outlined in the Committee's report would significantly
increase the possibility of their public disclosure. JIr.
Mitchell explained to me that JIr. Hoover believed that although
each of the intelligence gathering methods outlined in
the Committee's recommendations had been utilized by one or
more previous Administrations. their sensitivity \vould likely
generate media criticism if they \Yere employed. Ml'. Jfitchell
further informed me that it was his opinion that the risk of
disclosure of the possible illegal actions, such as unauthorized
entry into foreign embassies to install a microphone transmitter,
was greater than the possible benefit to be derived. Based
upon this conversation with AttDrney General Mitchell, I decided
to revoke the approval originally extended to the Committee's
recommendations.'27
In more than one instance, administration officials outside the intelligence
community haw specifically requested intelligence agencies
to undertake questionable actions. XSA~s program of monitoring telephoni?
communications bet\wen Xew York City and a city in South
Amel'lca, for example, was undertaken at the specific request of the
Bureau of ~arcotics and Dangerous Drugs, a law enforcement agency.
'''' Answer of Richard ~I. Xixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 34,
,~/!l/7G, pp. 16-17.
"'" President Ford has recently rejected this doctrine of Presidential power.
127 Answer of Richard ~I. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 17,
3/9/76,pp.11-12.
68-786 0 - 76 - 12
162
BXDD officials had been conc2rned ahout drug deals that were apparently
arrano-cd in calls from public telephones in Xe'" York to South
Am;>rira. b~t they felt that they C011]d not legally wiretap these telephone
booths.128 In order to avoid tapping a limited number of phones
in Xew York. B~DD submitted the names of 450 American citizens
for inclusion in XSA's 'Yatrh List. and requested XSA to monitOl' a
communications link behveen Xew York and South America which
necessitated the interception of thousands of international telephone
ca11s.'29
The legal limitations on domestic wiretapping apparently did not
conrern certain offiria]s in the 'White H01lse or Attol11evS General ,vho
requested the FBI to do their bidding. In some instances. they specifically
requested the FBI to institute wiretaps on American citizens
,vith no substantial national security predicate for doing so,13°
On occasion, Attorneys General have also encouraged the FBI to
rirrumn>nt the will of both Congress and the Snpreme Court. As noted
aboye. after Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 to
regulate the FBI program for listing people to be detained in case of
war or other emergency, Justice Department officials conrlnded that
its procedural safeguards and substantive standards 'YeTI' "nnworkable".
Attorney General .J. Howard McGrath instructed the FBI to
disregard the statute and "proceed with the fSecurity Index] program
as preyiously outlined." 131 Two subsequent Attorneys General-James
McGranery and Herbert Brownell-endorsed the decision to ignore
the Emergency Detention Act.132
In 1954, the Supreme Court denounced the use of microphone surveillances
by local police in criminal cases: 133 the fact that a microphone
had been installed in a defendant's bedroom particularly outraged
the court. 'Yithin weeks of this decision, however, Attorney
General Herbert Brownell rerersed the existing .Tustice Department
policy prohibiting trespassory microphone installations by the FBI.
and IYaye the Rnreau sweeping new authority to engage in bugging for
intelligence purposes-even when it meant planting microphones in
bedrooms.'34 Brownell wrote J. Edgar Hoover:
Obviously. the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or
in some comparably intimate location should be avoided
whenever possible. It may appear. however, that important
intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected ,vith the
national security can onlv be obtained bv the installation of a
microphone in s;lch a location. . . . .
... . I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intellIgence
function, considerations of internal security and the
national safety are paramount and, therefore. may compel the
unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.135
128 :\filton Iredell, 9/18/75, p. 99.
129 ::Uemorandum from Ingersoll to Gayler, 4/10/70.
1:10 gee Findings, "Political Abusp" and "Intrusire Tpchniques" for examples.
131 :\!emorandum from A. H. Belmont to D. :\1. Ladd. 10/15/52.
132 :\!emorandum from Attorney General .Tames :\IcGranery to .T. Edgar Hoover.
11/25/52: memorandum from Attorney General Herbert Brownell to .T. Edgar
Hoorer, 4/27/53.
133 lrvil1e v. Calijnrnia, 347 U.S. 121' (954).
~: :\!emorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI. 5/20/54.
":\Iemorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI. 5/20/54.
163
Bro,,",l(~ll did not eYen require the Bureau to seek the Attorney General's
prior approval for microphonE' installations in particular
caSE's.136 In the face of the l1'l'ill£ decision, therefore, he gave the FBI
authority to bug "'homeYer it wished whereH'r it wished in cases that
the Bureau-and not thE' Attornev General-determined "'E're "in the
national interest.~~ .
In ShOli~ disregard of the la,,' by intel1igE'nce officers "'as seldom
corrected, and sometimes encouraged or facilitated~ by officials out;.:
ide the agencies. 'Whether hy inaction 01' dirpct participation, these
administration officials contributed to the percE'ption that legal restraints
did not apply to intelligence activities.
136 Ibid.

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