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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

NATIONAL SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE
COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE: A REPORT ON THE
HUSTON PLAN
CONTENTS
I. Introduction
A. The Scope of the Investigation _
B. A Precis _
C. Issues _
II. Background: A Time of Turbulence
A. Frustrations in the White House _
B. The Huston-Sullivan Alliance _
C. The "New" Hoover _
D. The Pressure of Events _
III. The Meetings: The Writing of the Special Report
A. Who, What, When and Where _
B. At the White House, June 5th:
The President Reguests an Intelligence Report _
C. In Hoover's Office, June 8th:
A Premonitory Disagreement _
D. The Langley Meetings:
Drafting the Intelligence Report _
The SFeirttsitnLgatnhgeleAygMenedeating: _
The ESeacrolyndDLisacnugssleioynMs eeting: _
The Third Langley Meeting:
Reviewing the First Draft _
The TFhoeurFthinLalanDgrlaefyt Meeting: _
E. The Signing Ceremony _
IV. An Intelligence Report for the President
The options:
A. Category One: Communications Intelligence _
B. Category Two: Electronics Surveillance and Penetrations__
C. Category Three: Mail Coverage _
D. Category Four: Surreptitious Entry _
E. Category Five: Development of Campus Sources _
F. Category Six: Use of Military Undercover Agents _
G. Category Seven: Budget and Manpower _
H. Category Eight: Permanent and Interagency Committee _
I. Category Nine (Removed): Surreptitious Optical Surveillance_
J. Category Ten (Removed) : Investigations of DiplomaticPersonneL
V. The Huston Plan:
A. Huston Plan, Phase One: Advice for the President _
B. Huston Plan, Phase Two: The President's policy _
VI. Recision of the Huston Plan: A Time for Reconsideration:
A. The President Takes a Second Look _
B. Huston Leaves the White House _
VII. The AH.idDdeunplDiciimtyensions of the Huston Plan: _
B. Lawlessness _
C. Mixedmotives _
D. "Credit Card Revolutionaries" _
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VIII. Mtermath: The End-or the Beginning Page
A. The Intelligence Evaluation Committee__________________ 974
B. Secret Meeting with Hoover____________________________ 977
IX. Summary and Conclusions:
A. Accountability, Authority, and the Law____ ______ __ ___ 980
R The Quality and Coordination of Intelligence__ ___________ 981
C. Public Policy ImpliCatiOllS___ ___________________________ 981
Table: Summary of the Meetings for the Preparation of an Intelligence
Report for the President, June 1970 - ______ 935
Appendix: "Chronology of Huston Plan and Intelligence Evaluation
Committee" prepared by Senate Select Committee staff. _____________ 983
NATIONAL SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE
COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE: A REPORT ON THE
HUSTON PLAN
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Scope of the b'IIVestigation
On January 27,1975, the United States Senate, meeting early in th"
1st Session of the 94th Congress, established through Senate Resolution
21 a Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Select Committee on Intelligence
was given a broad mandate to investigate the extent, if any,
to which "illegal, improper, or unethical" activities were engaged III
by the intelligence a~ncies of the Federal Government.
Falling within thIS mandate was the specific charge in Section
2(3) of the Resolution to reveal "the full facts" with respect to "the
origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan to apply United
States intelligence a~ncy capabilities against individuals or organizations
within the Umted States." 1 This report presents the results of
the Select Committee inquiry into this controversial intelligence plan.
In June 1970 President Nixon requested a review of those intelligence
collection practices which mi~ht lead to better information on
domestic dissenters. In response, the mtelligence community produced
a 43 page Special Report on the subject. The Huston Plan, written
soon thereafter by presidential assistant Tom Charles Huston, was a
set of recommendations-for-action derived from the options presented
in this Special Report.
The following commentary on the Special Report and the Huston
Plan is or~anized, first, to reveal the background events which led
to the preSIdential request for an intelligence review. It then explores
in detail the views and activities of the men who wrote the Special
Report, as well as the reaction of the President to its controversial
spin-off, the Huston Plan. The effect of this episode upon the ongoing
activities of the intelligence agencies is examined next. Pursuant to
Senate Resolution 21, special attention was devoted throughout the
inquiry to the question of whether illegal, improper, or unethical acts
had been carried out by the President or those preparing the intelligence
report for him.
The Committee investigation into the Huston Plan began in April
1975. During the course of the inquiry over 40 interviews were conducted.
These included all major-and most minor-participants in
the intelligence agencies who helped draft the intelligence report for
1 Senate Resolution 21, January 27,1975, Sec. 2(3).
(923)
69-984 0 - 76 - 59
924
the President. The documents relevant to an understanding of the case
were obtained by the Committee, including those from the papers of
President Nixon.
Plans were made early in the investigation to interview the former
President regarding his views on the Huston Plan episode; but, after
lengthy negotiations, the conditions set for the interview by his lawyer
proved to be unacceptable to the Committee Members, who favored
an examination before the full Committee and on the record. The
Select Committee did decide, however, to send the former President
a set of written interrogatories on the Huston Plan. His responses are
included in this report.
Supplemented by this presidential retrospect, the extensive documentation
now available-as well as the existence of views from virtually
every other major participant still living-provides a reasonably
full understanding of the events which transpired in the summer of
19'70, now encapsulated in the phrase, "The Huston Plan." These
events are summarized briefly in the following precis.2
B. A Precis
Richard M. Nixon won his first Presidential election in 1968 by
less than one percent of the total popular vote. The Presidential campaign
that year had been accompanied by some of the most violent
street demonstrations in the history of American elections.
His first year in office provided the President with ample further
evidence of the mood of revolt in the country. In March and April
1969, student riots erupted in San Francisco, Cambridge, and Ithaca;
and in Chicago, ghetto blacks battled the police in the streets. By
October and November, the anti-war movement was sufficiently well
organized to bring to the nation's capital the largest mass demonstrations
ever witnessed in the United States. The magnitude of the unrest
was immense and, just as the nation was obsessed by Vietnam, so, too,
the White House grew increasingly preoccupied with the wave of
domestic protest sweeping the countryside.
Presidential assistant Tom Huston and others in the White House
believed that better intelligence on the plans of domeStic protesters
would enable the President to take more decisive action against
violence-prone dissenters. In their view, serious deficiencies in intelligence
collection had resulted from the decision in the mid-1960s by
J. Edgar' Hoover, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
to curtail certain collection techniques (particularly surreptitious
entry and electronic surveillance). This view was shared widely
by in'telligence officers throughout the Government. Hoover went so
far as to sever formal liaison ties between the FBI 'lIJld the CIA in
March 1970 and later with the other intelligence agencies, adding
further to the widespread disenchantment with his leadership in 'the
intelligence area.
Tom Huston grew more frustrated by the inability of the White
House to anticipate the plans of domestic dissenters. He was also
encouraged by William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director for Domestic
• See the main text for documentation of facts presented in the precis.
925
Intelligence, FBI, to help remove Hoover's restraints on intelligence
collection. By the spring of 1970, Huston decided to urge senior
White House personnel to have the President request a thorough
review of intelligence collection methods. The President, himself
greatly concerned about domestic unrest, agreed to the proposal.
On June 5, 1970, President Nixon held a meeting in the White
House with the leaders of the intelligence community. The purpose of
the meeting was to establish 'a special committee which would review
methods for improving the quality of intelligence particularly on the
New Left and its foreign connections. Specifically this Interagency
Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) was charged with the preparation
of a report for the President on existing intelligence gaps, how
to close them, and how to enhance coordination among the intelligence
agencies.
Assigned a tight deadline, the Ad Hoc Committee staff prepared
the study in a fortnight. The final report was entitled "Special Report
Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)" and, on June 25,
1970, it received the signatures of the four top intelligence directors:
Hoover (FBI), Helms (CIA), Bennett (DIA) and Gayler (NSA).8
The enterprise was unique. It pooled the resources of the foreignoriented
CIA, DIA, and NSA with those of the domestic-oriented
FBI. Many of the participants endorsed the enterprise enthusiastically,
not because of an interest in better data on the New Left but
because they sensed an opportunity to remove various restrictions on
the collection of strictly foreign intelligence. Others participated only
hesitantly and briefly, fearful of breaking through the mem.bl"lLlUl8
of law and propriety.
Drawing upon the Special Report, Tom Huston prepared a m6IIlOrandum
in early July for Presidential advisor H. R. (Bob) Haldeman
under the headmg "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection."
In this memorandum Huston, who had been the White House representative
at the Ad Hoc Committee meetings, recommended that the
President select for implementation those options in the S~ialReport
which would have relaxed dramatically the current restnctions on intelligence
collection. The set of options recommended by Huston is
defined in this particular report known as the Huston Plan, although
the phrase has been generally applied to the Special Report from
which Huston selected his options.sa
• J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of' Investigation (FBI) and
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coounittee; RiChard Helms, Director, 'Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA); Lt. General Donald V. Bennett, USA, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) ; Vice Admiral Noel Gayler (pronounced GUY·ler),
USN, Director, National Security Agency (NSA) .
• a Since the Senate Watergate Committee revealed Nixon White House relations
with the iDJtelligence community, the term "Huston Plan" has been generally
used in reference to recommendations and options described in both the Special
Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June uno,
and in the memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, July
1970. In this report, "Special Report" refers only to the Special Report of the
Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), and "Huston Plan" refers to
the recommendations outlined in the memorandum from Huston to Haldeman,
July 1970.
926
Presidential 'approval of the options rooorrunended by Huston would
have given intelligen~ and counterintelligence spooialists w~thin the
intelligence oommunity authority 11:0:
(1) monitor the international communications of U.S.
citizens;
(2) intensify the electronic surveillance of domestic dissenters
and selected establishments;
(3) read the international mail of American citizens;
(4) break into specified estJablishmen'tsand into homes of
domestic dissenters; and,
(5) intensify the surveillance of American college students.
Thus, in the summer of 1970, Tom Charles Huston believed the law
had to be set aside in order to combat forces which seemed to be
threatening the fabric of society. Apparently the President agreed, for
on July 14, 1970, Haldeman wrote ,a memorandum back to Huston
to inform him the President had 'approved his options to re1'ax collection
restraints. This decision later formed the core of Article II in
the Impeachment Articles framed by the J udidary Committee of tJhe
House of Representatives in 1974.
To implement the presidential decision, Huston next wrote a memorandum
to each of the intelligence agency directors, d<atOO July 23rd,
informing them that certain restraints on intelligence collootion were
being removed. Writing under the heading- "Domestic Intelligence,"
Huston invoked the authority of the PresIdent and outlined exactly
which restrictions were to be lifted. This document is the second version
of the Huston Plan and is similar to the first sent to the President
for his approV'al via Haldeman in early July.
Four days later on July 27th, the Huston Plan sent to the intelligence
directors was recalled by the White House "for reconsideration."
Most of these bare facts have been in the public domain since 1973,
when the Senate Watergllite investigation 'first brought to lig-ht the
history of the Huston PI'an. What is new as a result of this mquiry
conducted by the Senate Select Committee on InteIIigence is the discovery
of a much more extensive degree of impropriety in the intelligence
community than 'Was initi<ally revealed in 1973. Moreover,the
Committee found instances of duplicity between the intelligence agencies
and the President, and among agencies themselves.
Despite the request of the President Tor a complete report on intelligence
problems, the Special Report of J nne 1970 failed to mention
an ongoing CIA program that involved opening the internation'al
mail of American citizens or an on-going NSA program to select from
intercepted international communications of American citizens contained
on "watch lists" submitted by other agencies. The CIA mail
program was clearly illegal, and the NSA program was of Questionable
lawfulness. Not only were laws violated, but the President was
asked to consider approving the CIA mail-opening program apparently
without ever being told of its existence.
Furthermore, despite the ultimate decision by the President to revoke
the Huston Plan, severnl of its provisions were implemented
anyway. The intelligence agencies contributed an increasing- number
of names of Amerioon citizens to the NSA "watch list" so that NSA
927
would provide the contents of 'any intercepted international communications
of those citizens to the other intelligence agencies.
The number of Americans on this watch list expanded to a high
point in 1973. The CIA continued its illegal program of mail opening.
After the Huston Plan, the FBI lowered the age of campus informants,
thereby expanding surveillance of American college students as
sought through the Plan. In 1971, the FBI reinstated its use of mail
covers 3b and continued to submit names to the CIA mail program. In
December 1970, the intelligence community established-at the request
of the White House-a permanent interagency committee for intelligence
evaluation called the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC),
an entity highly comparable to one outlined in the Special Report.
Finally, several of the principals involved in the Huston Plan epIsode
continued to seek the full implementation of its provisions. Admiral
Gayler and Richard Helms, for instance, urged Attorney General
Mitchell on March 22, 1971, to relax the restrictions on key intelligence
collection operations previously barred by the President in his ultimate
rejection of the Huston Plan.
Placed in perspective, the Huston Plan must be viewed as but a
single example of a continuous effort by counterintellig-ence specialists
to expand collection capabilities at home and abroad often without the
knowledge or approval of the President or the Attorney General, and
certainly without the knowledge of Congress or the people. As a commentary
on accountability, the lesson of the Huston Plan is obvious:
often there was no accountability at all, beyond the intelligence agencies
themselves. The result was a neglect of civil liberties by the intelligence
collectors.
O. Issues
The case of the Huston Plan has been of particular significance
because it raises a host of central issues about the American intelligence
community that reappear throughout the broad range of the
Committee investigation. Among' these are the issues of accountability,
authority, lawlessness, the quality of intelligence, and the problem
of intelligence coordination.
A.ccountability and A.uthority.-Did the intelligence agencies conceal
operations from the President in June 1970~ From the representative
of the President, Tom Huston ~ From the Attorney General ~
From the Congress ~ From each other ~ What review procedures existed
to evaluate and approve the various collection techniques discussed
in the Special Report ~ Were these procedures used ~
Lawlessness.-Has the White House or the intelligence service acted
in disreg'ard for the law ~ Why did the intelligence community list
for the President in the Special Report options which were illegal'
Why did the President a{lprove for implementation in the Huston
Plan recommendations whICh were, in some cases, plainly illegal and,
in other cases, of dubious legality ~ Did the intelligence professionals
or Tom Huston seek legal consultation with the Justice Department,
Congress, the courts, or their own legal counsel in drafting the intelligence
plan~
ab A "mail cover" involves a request to the Postal Service to examine the exterior
of mail addressed to or from a particular individual or organization.
928
Quality and Ooordirultion of Intelligence.-How justified was the
dissatisfaction expressed by the Nixon Administration with the quality
and coordination of intelligence on domestic dissenters in 1969 and
1970 ~ Did the raising of barriers to intelligence collection by Hoover
in the mid-1960's significantly reduce the quality of counterintelligence
information ~ How badly were intelligence functions impaired by the
severance of formal liaison ties between the FBI and the other intelligence
entities in 19701
An inquiry into the Huston Plan permits an analysis of answers to
such issues found in the writings of the intelligence specialists who
prepared the Special Report for the President in June 1970. Their
views, reflected m the Report :md subsequent memoranda, are provocative
stimuli for thought, debate, and reform on the scope and method
of intelligence activities within the United States.
II. BACKGROUND: A TIME OF TURBULENCE
A. Frustrati01UJ in the White House
The antiwar protests and the incidents of violence and civil disobedience
which occurred throughout the country in 1969 and 1970
greatly concerned the Nixon Administration, much as it had the Johnson
Administration before it. Among the responses of both administrations
was the belief that hostile foreign powers must somehow be
responsible for, or at least influencing, the domestic unrest. President
Johnson often asked the intelligence agencies to probe the ~bility
of linkages between the antiwar movement and foreign mfluence.4
Not long after entering the White House, President Nixon took up
the refrain.
In April 1969 the President asked his aide, John Ehrlichman, to
have the intelligence community help him prepare a report on foreign
Communist support of campus disorders. Evidence of a foreign connection
was insubstantial; but the President and Ehrlichman were
dissatisfied with the intelligence provided by the agencies, believing
it to be inconclusive.5
Two months later, Ehrlichman assigned a young White House
Counsel on Pat Buchanan's Research and Speech-Writing staff to prepare
a second and more thorough report on foreign support of campus
disturbances. Tom Charles Huston, lawyer and recently discharged
Army intelligence officer, drew the assignment chiefly because he was
interested in the subject and seemed to know more about New Left
politics than anyone else on the White House staff.Q
On June 19, 1969, Huston paid his first visit to William C. Sullivan
of the FBI.7 Sullivan had served as the FBI's Assistant Director for
Domestic Intelligence since 1961. In this position, he was responsible
for counterintelligence, that aspect of intelligence activity designed
to discover and destroy the effectiveness of hostile foreiWl intelligence
services. Huston related to Sullivan the substance of a recent meeting
• C. D. Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 1M, 107, 135.
•Tom Charles Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 4.
• Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 4.
'Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 6/20/69. (Hearings,
Vol. 2, Exhibit 5)
929
he had with the President. Concerned about revolutionary activities
by the New Left, the President wanted to know the details on the
radical movement-"es.l?ecially," Sullivan remembers Huston emphasizing,
"all informatIOn possible relating to foreign influences and
the financing of the New Left." 8 (To at least one intelligence official
the line seemed extremely thin between the interest of President Nixon
in this kind of information for the purposes of national security,
on the one hand, and his interest for strictly political purposes, on the
other hand.) 9
Sullivan, replying to the White House inquiry for assistance from
the FBI, told Huston that his request would have to be put in writing
to Mr. Hoover, the FBI Director.Io On the next day, June 20, 1969,
Huston prepared the request to be sent to Hoover. WIth the earlier report
whICh the FBI had prepared for Ehrlichman in mind, Huston
told the Director that the available intelligence data on Communist
influence over radicals was "inadequate." 11 On behalf of the President,
Huston wanted to know what gaps existed in intelligence on
radicals and what steps could be taken to provide maximum possible
coverage of their actIvities. Unwilling to accept earlier intelligence
results which did not fit their preconceptions, the White House :.I?0licymakers
began to apply increased pressure on the FBI to try addItional
collection techniques.
Huston also gave this same assignment to the CIA, NSA, and DIA.
Each of the agencies submitted its report to Huston on a June 30th
deadline, with the NSA feeding its contribution through the DIA
presentation. The FBI report showed a "strong reliance upon the use
of electronic coverage", according to C. D. Brennan, an assistant to
William Sullivan who helped prepare the response to the White House
request.I2 Brennan concluded that increased coverage would be necessary
"as it appears there will be increasingly closer links between [the
New Left and black extremist movementsJ and foreign communists
in the future."
The quality of the intelligence supporting these reports apparently
failed to satisfy Ehrlichman and others in the White House, especially
the FBI data, and the disenchantment with the intelligence agencies
continued.I3
B. The Hmton-Sullivan Allimnce
Throughout the rest of 1969, Huston was assigned to receive and
disseminate FBI intelligence estimates sent to the White House. Contempt
for these estimates was voiced by Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and
Huston's colleague, Egil Krough.I4 Huston himself adopted more
moderate views on the quality of Bureau intelligence reports, especially
after he became more acquainted with Sullivan. Listening to the
8 Sullivan memorandum, 6/20/69.
• Stair summary of [CIA intelligence officer] interview, 6/27/75.
10 Sullivan memorandum, 6/20/69.
11 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to J. Edgar Hoover, 6/20/69. (Hearings,
Vol. 2, ExMbit6) .
... Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to William C. Sullivan, 6/30/69. (Hearings,
Vol. 2, Exhibit 7).
13 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 19.
U Huston deposition, 5/23/75, pp. 19, 21.
930
counterintelligence specialists made Huston sympathetic to the difficulties
of intelligence collection under the restraints imposed upon the
FBI by its Director. Sullivan often complained to Huston about the
Hquestion of coordination, the lack of manpower, the inability to get
the necessary resources, the problems of the various restraints that
were existing." 15
From June 1969 to June 1970, the important relationship between
Huston and Sullivan deepened into a working alliance devoted to the
lowering of intelligence collection barriers. As a Central Intelligence
Agency officer wrote in a memorandum for the record, HBy way of
background, it should be noted that Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Huston had
been in frequent contact on these matters before [June 1970], because
Mr. Sullivan was extremely displeased by the number of restrictions
which had been placed on the FBI by Mr. Hoover." 16 The two had
numerous meetings and telephone conversations during this period,
beginning with dialogues on the report prepared for the President in
June 1969 and followed by preparations to deal with protest activity in
the Washington, D.C., area.
As Huston recalls, it was during this period that he became close to
Sullivan and his assistant, Brennan. HI think I had their confidence,
in that I think they thought I understood a little bit about who the
players were and what was going on in the country in internal security
matters," Huston has testified. HAnd they certainly had my confidence.
In fact, I do not think there was anyone in the government who I
respected more than Mr. Sullivan." 17
Though far different in temperament, age, and experience, Huston
and Sullivan found themselves in agreement on several points. Both
viewed the spiraling unrest in the country with alarm; both believed
in the need for greater interagency coordination among the intelligence
agencies; both thought the quality of data on domestic radicals could
be vastly improved; and both agreed that most of the intelligence deficiencies
could be remedied if the intelligence agencies-and particularly
the FBI-would reinstate collection methods common "in the
good old days," such as the use of electronic surveillance to obtain intelligence
data.18
O. The "New" Hoover
Counterintelligence specialists throughout the government were dismayed
when undercover FBI operations important to them, and carried
out for several years, were suddenly suspended by Hoover in the
1960s.19 The new emphasis in the Kennedy Administration on investi-
1$ Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 28; see also Tom Charles Huston testimony,
9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, pp.16-18.
,. Memorandum for the Record, James Angleton, 5/18/73, p. 2. (Hearings, Vol. 2,
Exhibit 61) ; see also Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 23 and staff summary of
William Sullivan interview, 6/10/75.
"Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 16.
10 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 33; Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75. See
Sullivan's endorsement in March 1970 of a proposal advanced by Richard HellIlt'l,
the CIA Director, that the FBI consider installing electronic surveillance upon
CIA request, with the prior approval of the Attorney General and "on a highly relative
basis." In a handWriUen note, Hoover vetoed the idea. (Memorandum from
William C. Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 3/30/70.)
11 Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
931
gations into organized crime and civil rights had already drained manpower
from security and intelligence operations, according to an experienced
FBI counterintelligence specialist.20
Then by the mid-1960s, Hoover began to terminate specific security
programs. In July 1966, for example, Hoover wrote on a memorandum
that henceforth all FBI break-in8-Qr "black-bag" jobs-were to be
cut Off.21 By its refusal to use rigorously a full array of intelligence
collection methods, Huston strongly believed the FBI was failing to
do its job. This belief was shared widely among intelligence professionals.
Helms, Bennett, and Gayler all expressed this view, as didprivately-
key intelligence officers within the FBI itself.22
Intelligence professionals were dismayed by Hoover's reluctance
now to order what he had allowed before on a regular basis. Some suggested
that the wiretap hearings held by Senator Edward V. Long in
1965 had turned public opinion against the use of certain intelligencegathering
techniques,23 and that the Director was merely reading the
writing on the wall. One seasoned CIA intelligence officer recalls:
Mr. Hoover's real concern was that during the Johnson Administration,
where the Congress was delving into matters
pertaining to FBI activities, Mr. Hoover looked to the President
to give him support in terms of conducting those operations.
And when that support was lacking, Mr. Hoover had
no recourse but to gradually eliminate activities which were
unfavorable to the Bureau and which in turn risked public
confidence in the num:ber one law enforcement agency..24
Others pointed to the increased risks involved in break-ins because
of new and sophisticated security precautions taken by various Bureau
targets. Hoover, according to this theory, was unwilling to engage in
past practices when faced with the new dangers of being cau~ht.25
The fact that Hoover reached age 70 in 1965 was also SIgnificant
in the view of still others, since he then came within the law which
required mandatory retirement. Henceforth, he served each year in a
somewhat vulnerable position, as his Directorship was now reviewed
for renewal on an annual basis. So he became, according to an FBI
official, "Vl'ry conscious of the fact that any incident which, within his
• Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, p. 101.
21 See also J. Edgar Hoover's handwritten notes on memorandum from William
C. Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 7/19/66, p. 3. As early as 1963, Hoover began to
oppose the broad use of domestic wiretaps. (Memorandum from William C.
Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 3/7/70.)
.. Richard Helms deposition, 9/10/75, p. 3; General Donald V. Bennett deposition,
8/5/75, p. 12; Admiral Noel Gayler deposition, 6/19/75, pp. 6--7; Sullivan
(staff summary), 6/10/75; Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 36. In the latter
part of 1969, Hoover was advising the CIA to see the Attorney General-not
him-if it wanted to expand its intelligence collection on foreigners within the
United States. (Sullivan memorandum, 3/30/70.)
"" Staff summary of (FBI intelligence officer), 8/20/75.
.. James Angleton testimony, 9/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 69--70. In April 1970,
Sullivan noted that "we have had to retrench in recent years largely as a result of
the lack of support [from 'responsible quarters'] ...." [Memorandum from William
C. Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 4/14/70. (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit
52).]
1II Sullivan (stafJ' summary), 6/10/75.
932
understanding might prove an embarrassment to the Bureau, could
reflect questionably on his leadership of the Bureau." 26
Several highly-placed observers in the intelligence community also
believed the Director was simply growing old and more wary about
preserving his established reputation-a wariness nurtured by the protective
instincts of his close friend and professional colleague, Clyde
Tolson, who held the second highest position in the FBI. Dr. Louis
Tordella, the long-time top civilian at NSA, speculated in conversations
with William C. Sullivan in 1969 that Tolson probably had told
Hoover something to the effect: "If these techniques ever backfire,
your image and the reputation of the Bureau will be badly damaged."
27
Tordella, Sullivan, and others in the intelligence world grew increasingly
impatient with the "new" Hoover and with what they considered
to be his obstinance on the question of intelligence collection.
If they were to expand their collection capabilities, as they and the
White House wished, the new restrictions would have to be eased.
Yet no one was willing to challenge Hoover's policy directly.
Tordella and General Marshall Carter, when he was Director of
NSA, tried in 1967 and failed.28 Their 15-minute appointment with
Mr. Hoover in the spring of that year stretched into two-and-a-half
hours. The communications experts first heard more than they wanted
to about John Dillinger, "Ma" Barker, and the "Communist Threat."
Finally, they were able to explain to Hoover their arguments for reinstating
certain collection practices valuable to the National Security
Agency. Hoover seemed to yield, telling the NSA spokesmen their
reasoning was persuasive and he would consider reestablishing the
earlier policies.
The news came a few days later that Hoover would allow FBI
agents to resume the collection methods desired by NSA. Tordella
and Carter were surprised, and gratified. Then three more days passed
and the FBI liaison to NSA brought the word that Hoover had
changed his mind; his new stringency would be maintained after all.
William Sullivan called to tell Tordella that "someone got to the
old man. It's dead." That someone, Sullivan surmised, was Tolson.
Hoover added a note to his message for Carter and Tordella, indicating
that he would assist the National Security Agency in its
collection requirements only if so ordered by the President or the
Attorney General. Tordella, however, was reluctant to approach
either. "I couldn't go to the chief law enforcement figure in the country
and ask him to approve something that was illegal," he recently explained
(despite the fact that he and General Carter had already
asked the DIrector of the FBI to approve an identical policy). As
for the President, this was "not a topic with which he should soil his
hands." For the time being, Tordella would let the NSA case rest.
Nor was Richard Helms going to be the man to urge Hoover to relax
the newly imposed restrictions. He and Hoover had little patience
for one another for several years. Hoover distrusted the
• Brennan, 9/25/75. Hearings, p. 97.
'" Statf summary of Louis Tordella interview, 6/16/75.
28 Tordella (statf summary), 6/16/75.
933
"Ivy League" style of CIA personnel in general; according to Sullivan,
"Ph.D. intelligence" was a term of derision Hoover liked to use
against the Agency.29 Gayler and Bennett, newcomers to the intelligence
community, were warned immediately by their assistants not
to challenge the Director of the Bureau directly on matters relating
to domestic intelligence.3o
It would take the pressure of events, skillful maneuvering by a
grou~ of FBI counterintelligence specialists, and Huston's strategic
positIOn on the White House staff to focus the attention of the President
on the problem of intelligence collection.
D. The Pressure of Events
Events encouraged action. Riots and bombings escalated throughout
the country' in the spring of 1970. In his official statement on the
Huston Plan, Issued while he was still in the White House, President
Nixon recalled that "in March a wave of bombings and explosions
struck college campuses and cities. There were 400 bomb threats in
one 24-hour period. in New York City." 31 The explosion of a Weatherman
"bomb factory" in a GreenWIch Village townhouse in March
particularly shocked Tom Huston and other White House staffers.32
The response of the President was to send anti-bombin·g legislation
to the Congress.
Moreover, in the spring of 1970 the FBI severed its formal liaison
to the CIA in reaction to a CIA-FBI dispute over confidential sources
in Colorado.33 Though hostility between the two agencies had surfaced
before with some frequency over matters such as disagreement
regarding the bona fides of communist defectors, this particular dispute
was "the one straw that broke the camel's back." 34 The incident
in Colorado, now known as the Riha Case, involved a CIA officer
who received information concerning the disappearance of a foreign
national on the faculty of the University of Colorado, a Czechoslovak
by the name of Thomas Riha.
The information apparently came from an unnamed FBI officer
stationed in Denver. Hoover demanded to know the identity of the
FBI agent; but, as a matter of personal integrity, the CIA officer refused
to divulge the name of his source. Hoover was furious with
Helms for not providing the FBI with this information and, "in a
fit of pique," 35 he broke formal Bureau ties with the Agency.38 To
.. Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
.. Gayler deposition, 6/19/75, p. 28; staff summary of General Donald Bennett
interview, 6/5/75.
n President Nixon statement, 5/22/13, Prelrillen.tial DOC1lment8, Vol. 9, No. 21,
May 28, 1973, p. 6tH.
III Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 21.
• Hoover issued an order that "direct liaison" with CIA Headquarters "be
terminated" and that "any contact with CIA in the future" be "by letter only."
Henceforth, the position of FBI "liaison agent" to the OIA wall eliminated.
See also Hoover's handwritten notes on a letter from &lebam Helms to J. Edgar
Hoover, 2/26/70 and sam Papich deposition, 9/22/75, p. 3.
S< Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, pp. 83-84.
IG Staff summary of [CIA intelligence officerJ, 2/9/76.
II By midsummer, formal Bureau liaison ties with all other intelligence agencies
had been terminated as well, leaving only 8. staff linkage between Sullivan
in the Bureau and Huston in the White House.
934
many observers, including Huston and Sullivan, the severance of these
ties contributed to the perceived inability of the Bureau's intelligence
division to perform their task adequately.
In this context, a special meeting was called on April 22, 1970, in
Haldeman's office. In attendance were Haldeman, Krogh, Huston,
Alexander Butterfield (who had responsibility for White House liaison
with the Secret Service), and Ehrlichman. The purpose of this gathering
was to improve coordination among the White House staff for
contact with intelligence agencies in the government and, more importantly,
as Huston remembers, to decide "whether-booause of the
escalating level of the violen~somethingwithin the government
further needed to be done." 37
A decision was made. The President would be asked to meet with
the dirootors of the four intelligence agencies to take some action that
might curb the growing violence. The intelligence agencies would be
asked by the President to write a report on what could be done. The
meeting was planned for May. In addition, Tom Huston was given a.
high staff position in the White House; henceforth, he would have
res~nsibilitiesfor internal security affairs.38 He was now in a strategic
pOSItion to help Sullivan reverse existing Bureau policies.
The meeting between President Nixon and the intelligence directors
was not held in May, because plans for, and the reaction to, the April
29 invasion of Cambodia in Southeast Asia disrupted the entire White
House schedule. In the aftermath of this event, the meeting "became
even more important," recalls Huston.39 The expansion of the Indochina
war into Cambodia and the shootings at Kent State and Jackson
State had focused the actions on antiwar movement and civil rights
activists.
As soon as the reaction to the Cambodian incursion had stabilized.
somewhat, the meeting between President Nixon and the intelligence
directors was rescheduled for June 5th. It was to start a chain of events
that would culminate in the Huston Plan.
ill. THE MEETINGS: THE WRITING OF THE SPECIAL REPORT
A. Who, What, When and Where
Throughout June 1970 a series of seven important meetings on intelligence
were held in Washington. They began on June 5th in the
Oval Office with a conference between the Chief Executive and the
intelligence directors, at which President Nixon requested the preparation
of an intelligence report; and they ended twenty days later
in Hoover's office where the directors gathered to officia.lly sign the report
for the President. In between these two meetings came a preliminary
planning- session in Hoover's office on June 8, and four subsequent
staff meetmgs held at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia..
It was at these staff meetings that the intelligence report WllS formulated.
(See Table 1.)
.. Huston deposition, 5/28/15, p. 22. H. R. Haldeman's appointment calendar
for April 22, 1910, includes a list of participants at this meeting.
II Memorandum from John R. Brown III to H. R. Haldeman, 4/30/10.
.. Huston deposition, 5/23/15, p. 26.
TABLE I.-SUMMARY OF THE MEETINGS FOR THE PREPARATION OF AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 1970
Meetina No.
2 3 4 5 6
Date of meetinll_. __ • ••• June 51_ •• • June 8 ._. June 9 ' •• • June 121_._ •• ._. June 17 '. •• _. June 23'. .. _. June 25.
Locatlon •__ • White House. • • FBI • CIA•••__ • CIA_••_•• ••• _. CIA_._•• ••••• __ ._ CIA •• __ •• _. FBI.
Princlpa. partlclpants•• President Nixon, Hoover, Helms, Helm.!! Anlleton (CIA), CrllIar (fBI), Ueu· Colonel Koller (AF>, Stilwell (DIA). Hoover, Helms,
Hoover (fBI), Ga~ler. Bennett, Bunnam. tenant Colonel O. Moilre (FIil), Sullivan, G. Moore Gayler Bennett,
Helms (CIA), Buflham (NSA). Downie (Army). Captain Ritenburllh (FBI). Sullivan, Huston,
Admiral Gayer Sullivan (FBl)l Huston. (Navy). Brennan.
~SA)' Bennett G. Moore (FBlI.
DIA), Ehrlichman
H), Haldeman
H), Huston (WH).
Purpose of meetillfl. Request for Intel· P1ann!nll aession ._ AlIenda settinll Review of workinll lstllrafL • ._. __ 2d draft__ • Sillninll eeremony.
Ilpnee plan papers.
I Robert F1~, an advisor to the President. also attended this meetinL but Just IS a holdover from
e previous mllUna Invited to stay on by the President
i Each of th_ individuals listed attended 1 or more of the 4 stafl meetlnp held at the Central
Intelllpnee Apncy.
Note: Helms, D. Moore, and Koller attended only the 1st CIA meetlnll. Alew other "observers"
not listed above attended 1 or more of the last 3 sessions at the CIA. includinll C. D. Brennan and
Fred J. Cassidy of the FBI.
936
B. At the White House, June 5th: The President Requests an Intelligence
Report
Huston was responsible for arranging the conference between President
Nixon and the intelligence leaders, and had briefed the President
in advance. The briefing was based on a two-page working paper that
Huston prepared, relying on his conversations with the considerably
more experienced Sullivan. As Sullivan's assistant, C. D. Brennan,
recalls: "Mr. Huston did not have that sufficient in-depth background
concerning intelligence matters to be able to give that strong direction
and guidance," and therefore Sullivan was the "principal tigUre" behind
the preparations leading to the Huston Plan.40 Sullivan's role
seemed to be to tell Huston what were desirable changes in the intelligence
services; Huston was to try to make what was desirable possible,
through his position as the White House man charged with responsibility
for domestic intelligence.
The two-page working paper outlined for the President items he
might discuss with the intelligence directors: the increase in domestic
violence; the need for better intelligence collection; a report to be prepared
for the President on radical threats to the national security and
gaps in current intelligence on radicals; and the use of an interagency
staff to write the report.41
Before the meeting, the President telephoned Huston to say he
wanted Hoover to be the chairman of the committee responsible for
the intelligence report. (The President had met privately with the
FBI Director the day before.42 ) Huston took the opportunity to urge
the President to appoint Sullivan as the chairman of the staff
subcommittee.43
The June 5th meeting in the Oval Office lasted less than an hour.
Reading from a talking-paper prepared for the session by Huston,
the President first emphasized the magnitude of the internal security
problem facing the United States. The paper read:
We are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in our
country-one which we know too little about. Certainly hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of Americans-mostly under 30are
determined to destroy our society. They find in many of
the legitimate grievanc.es of our citIzenry opportunities for
exploitation which never escape the attention of demagogues.
They are reaching out for the support-ideological and
otherwise-of foreign powers and they are developing their
own brand of indigenous revolutionary activism which is as
dangerous as anything which they could import from Cuba,
China, or the Soviet Union."
.. Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, pp.l05-106.
Huston stated that .the paper for the President "clearly reflected Bill's [,Sullivan's]
views." (Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 32.)
41 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 32.
4. Attachment to memorandum from J. Bruce Whelihan to Ron Ziegler, 1/29/74,
p. 2, from the Nixon Papers.
.. Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p, 33.
44 Talking Paper prepared for President Nixon, 6/5/70.
937
Among the chief factors complicating the internal security problem,
according to the paper, were the people of the United States:
"Our people-perhaps as a reaction to the excesses of the McCarthy
era-are unwilling to admit the possibility that 'their children' could
wish to destroy their country.... This is particularly true of the media
and the academic community." The solution to the problem of domestic
instability could be found in better intelligence: "The Government
must know more about the activities of these groups, and we must
develop a plan which will enable us to curtail the illegal activities of
those who are determined to destroy our society."
The President then expressed his dissatisfaction with the fIuality
of intelligence he had been receiving on the protest movement!5 "Based
on my review of the information which we have been receiving at the
White House," read his prepared notes, "I am convinced that we are
not currently allocating sufficient resources within the intelligence
community to the collection of intelligence data on the activities of
these revolutionary groups." 46 To obtain the "hard information" he
wanted, the President told the directors they were to serve on a special
committee to review the collection efforts of the intelligence agencies
in the internal security area. Based on this review, they were expected
to recommend steps which would strengthen the capabilities of the
government to collect intelligence on radicals.41
Departing from his prepared notes, the President next mentioned
a meeting he had had with President Calder of Venezuela earlier that
morning.48 President Calder had complained to him about the high
degree of violence and unrest in the Caribbean, noting that some
Latin American nation believes U.S. nationals-specifically black
radicals-were fomenting this unrest. President Nixon asked Helms
if he had any information on the relationship between black militancy
in the United States and unrest in the Caribbean. Helms said he did
not, but that he would investigate the matter for the President. (The
CIA gave the President a report on this subject, via Huston, on
July 6,1970.49
)
The President paused at this point in the meeting to ask Hoover and
Helms if there were any problems in coordination between their
respective agencies. Both assured him there were· not.50 Neither,
apparently, wished to discuss the Riha Case with other disagreements.
4JS General Bennett recalls that "the President chewed our butts." [Bennett
(staff summary), 6/5/75.] The Director of DIA took notes on the meeting, and
thought he remembered President Nixon turning on a taperecorder sitting on
his desk at the beginning of the session. No other participant recalls this taping,
and no such tape was found in the search through the papers of President NixoD
by his lawyers, at the request of the Select Committee.
... Talking Paper prepared for ,President Nixon, 6/5/70. In fact, however, this
matter had received considerable attention from the intelligence agencies. See,
for instance, the testimony of FBI intelligence officer Brennan, 9/25/75. Hearings,
Vol. 2, pp. 1M, 107, 135; and the Select Committee Report on CIA Project
CHAOS.
.. Talking Paper prepared for President Nixon, 6/5/70.
48 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, pp. 35-36.
.. 1teport to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the
United States, June 1975, p.122, note.
.. Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 36.
938
President Nixon concluded the meeting by directing the intelligence
directors to work with Tom Huston on the report they were to prepare.
Huston would "provide the subcommittee with detailed information
on the scope of the review which I have in mind," said the President.51
He also asked Hoover to serve as chairman of the committee, which was
to be known as the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc).
Finally, he recommended that Hoover name his Assistant Director for
Domestic Intelligence, William Sullivan,to be responsible for the staff
workgroup for the actual drafting of the Special Report. Hoover
agreed to be chairman and to place Sullivan in charge of the interagency
committee staff.52
The meeting in the Oval Office took place on a Friday. Sullivan's first
assignment from Hoover was to set up a preliminary planning session
to be held in Hoover's office the followmg Monday.
O. In Hoover's Office, Jwne 8th: A Premonitory DUJag~
At the Monday meeting, Hoover reminded the other intelligence
directors that the President was dissatisfied with the current state of
intelligence on domestic radicals, and stressed his own alarm at links
between protestors in this country and Cuba, China, and the Iron
Curtain countries.53 He said that President Nixon wanted an historical
summary of unrest in the country up to the present, and :M
spoke of the establishment of an interagency staff committee to meet
the President's objectives. Sullivan would be chairman of the staff
group, and its first meeting would occur the next afternoon, Tuesday,
June 9th, at the Central Intelligence Agency.
Hoover asked Richard Helms first, and then the others, if they had
anything to add; none of the intelligence directors did. Then came
Tom Huston's turn to respond. The Director had misunderstood the
intent of the President, said the White House aide. The report was
not to be an historical summary at all. It was to be a current and future
threat assessment, a review of intelligence gaps, and a summary of
options for operational changes.54
Admiral Gayler of NSA then spoke up: it was his understanding,
too, that the committee was to concentrate on the shortcomings of
current intelligence collection. General Bennett, Gaylor, Helms, and
Huston proceeded to discuss their impressions of what the President
really meant.55 President Nixon wanted the pros and cons of various
collection methods spelled out clearly in the form of an options paper,
emphasized the young White House staffer. The President preferred
reports presented in this form to assure that decisions were not made
at a lower level, with the President merely the recipient of a fait accompli.
All the intelligence directors, except Hoover, supported the
objectives articulated by Huston.
Hoover-who was apparently irritated by this turn of events 116
finally agreed and the meeting ended abruptly. He asked the other
directors to give this matter the highest priority and to assign their
top experts to the project. After the meeting, Hoover confided to Wil-
G1 Talking Paper prepared tor President Nixon, 6/5/70.
.. Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 34.
.. Sullivan (stalf summary), 6/10/75.
.. Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 4.
.. Sullivan (stalf summary), 6/10/75.
.. William C. Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, p. 121.
939
liam Sullivan that he believed Huston was a "hippie intellectual." 57
Sullivan's own views on the importance of this undertaking were reflected.
in a statement which he prepared for Hoover as background
information for this meeting. "Individually, those of us in the intelligence
community are relatively small and limited," he wrote. "Unified
our own combined potential is magnified and limitless. It is thraugh
unity of action that we can tremendously increase our intelli~nce
gathering potential, and, I am certain, obtain the answers the PresIdent
wants." 58
D. The Langley Meetings: Drafting the Intelligence Report
The Ad Hoc Committee staff met the next day at CIA Headquarters
in Langley, Virginia, for the first of four drafting discussions.59
The First Langley Meeting: SettiJng the Agenda
At the first staff meeting Huston summed up for the participants
the objectives of the President, using a "Top Secret" outline he had
prepared.oo Under "Purposes," the outline noted that the Committee
was to prepare an analysis on the internal security threat; identify
gaps in the present collection efforts; recommend steps to close these
gaps; and review the status of interagency coordination. Under
"Procedures," Huston had written: "Operational details will be the
responsibility of the chairman. However, the scope and direction of
the review will 'be determined by the White House member." In other
words, Sullivan would provide the guiding expertise to layout what
collection barriers the counterintelligence experts wanted removed;
Huston would make sure the Committee did not stray from the &,oal
of suggesting options to remove these barriers. The ''Objectives' of
the Committee included "maximum use of fiJI special investigative
techniques...."
After the staff members had read the outline, Huston stressed to the
group the President's deep concern about New Left anarchism and
whether the intelligence agencies were doing all they could to cope
with the problem. He said, as he had in Hoover's office the day before,
the President wanted to see the pros and cons of any restraints so that
he could decide what action to take.
Following the presentation by Huston on the President's requirements
for the Committee, Sullivan asked for comments regardin~ the
level of classification for papers or reports prepared by the Comffilttee.
The classification "Top Secret" was adopted. Helms also recommended
the maintenance of a "Bigot Lisf' reflecting the names of all persons
who would have knowledge of the work of the Committee.
", Sullivan (staff summary), 9/23/75.
.. Attachment to William Sullivan memorandum to Cartha DeLoach, 6/6/70.
(Hearings, Vol 2, Exhibit 9.)
• The FBI served as secretariat for these meetings, with William Creegar
keeping the minutes. Summaries of the sessions are found in III series of FBI
memoranda: Memorandum from William 'Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 6/10/70
(Hearings, Vol 2, Exhibit 11) ; Memorandum from William Sullivan to Cartha
DeLoach, 6/15/701(Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 13) ; Memorandum from WIlliam
Sullivan to Oharles Tolson, 6/29/70 (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 17) ; Memorandum
from William Sullivan to Charles Tolson, 6/26/70 (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 18) ;
and Interagency Committee on Intelligence '(ICI) minutes, 6/19/70 '(Hearings,
Vol. 2, Erhibit 14).
eo Memorandum, "USIB Subcommittee on Domestic Intelligence," undated. A
summary of the first session is found in Sullivan memorandum, 6/10/70.
69-984 6'1 - 76 - 60
940
The Committee turned next to the heart of the matter: the methodology
of intelligence collection. Going around the table, the variom~
representatives discussed restraints upon the ability of their agencies
to develop the intelligence necessary to satisfy the concern of the PresiIt\
nt over "New Left" dissent and its possible foreign support. It was
:1 6:eed that members would bring to the next session a list of those
.""'" i.ctions which hampered their intelligence-collection activities.
Agah Huston urged them to remember the President's interest in
the pl'. IS and cons of each restriction.
Buff lam of NSA called attention to the outline circulated by Huston.
In its f rst paragraph the outline called upon the Committee "to define
and ass~s the existing internal security threat." The NSA representative
said that such a study would require immediate attention from
the cc.unterintelligence specialists from each member organization.
Huston suggested the FBI prepare a threat a&>essment from the domestic
point of view and CIA from the foreign point of view. All members
concurred, and Sullivan asked the FBI and CIA to have the papers
ready for distribution at the next meeting to allow consideratIOn
by the full committee as soon as possible.
Thus, the agenda was set. The work-group would begin by examining
restraints on intelligence collection and preparmg a threat
assessment. Members were cautioned to maintain tight security to
conceal the existence and activities of the Committee. To assist this
objective, the group agreed to continue meeting at CIA Headquarters.
The Committee adjourned until the following Thursday, June 12th.
(See the Chronology in the Appendix.) .
The Secorui Langley Meeting: Early D~cU88ions
At the next gathering of the work-group at CIA Headquarters on
Friday of the same week, agreement was reached to follow an outline
prepared by ,Huston and the FBI to guide the writing of the report
for the President.61 The report would cover three specific areas: (1) an
assessment of the current internal security threat and the likelihood
of future violence; (2) a listing of the current restraints on intelligence
collection; and (3) an evaluation of interagency coordination
within the intelligence community.
Just as he had reminded Hoover that Monday in the Director's
office, Huston again made the point that the threat assessment was
not to be merely an exercise in history writing. The President wanted
an up-to-date analysis of the "New Left" threat and an estimate on
future problems posed by the radicals.
For the meeting each agency had prepared a paper on intelligence
collection restraints. Huston found the preliminary drafts "totally
unacceptable," according to CIA representative James Angleton, and
said that the group "was n)t being responsive to the President's
needs." 62 As exemplified by ble FBI submission, Huston wanted the
restraints clearly identified, the pros and cons listed, and a format provided
whereby the President could inrlicate whether he wished the
restraints to be maintained, relaxed, or that he reQuired more information
to make a decision. The entire ranQ'e of collection options were
to be listed, whether the Committee thought they were preposterous or
.. The second Langley meeting is summarized in Sullivan memorandum.
6/15/70.
.. Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 57.
941
desirable. The representatives were asked by Huston to follow the FBI
model for their subsequent drafts.
As for the third portion of the report, opinion among the participants
was generally in favor of the establishment of a permanent interagency
committee on intelligence. It would evaluate intelligence,
coordinate operations, prepare ongoing threat assessments on domestic
protest, and develop new policies.
The idea of a permanent committee was strongly endorsed by Huston,
who said the President would probably favor its creation.
Privately, Huston thought this was "the most important recommendation."
63 Among the participating agencies only the CIA questioned
the need for a permanent committee, recommending instead the
establishment of a temporary group first to see if it would work.64 The
Agency's hesitancy may have reflected a reluctance to confront Hoover
with such a blatant entry into the domestic intelligence area, largely
the private preserve of the FBI in the past.
The FBI threat-assessment paper, entitled "Defining and Assessing
the Existing Internal Security Threat-Domestic," was circulated
at this second meeting and, at Huston's suggestion, was tabled to
allow each member time to review its contents carefully for discussion
at the third session. The CIA paper, captioned exactly like the Bureau's
except for the substitution of "Foreign" for "Domestic," was
not yet ready; but Richard Ober, the primary CIA drafter, said it
would be circulated in time for review by everyone before the third
meeting.65
The Committee agreed to have the FBI prepare a first draft of the
entire report to be circulated on June 16th. T. J. Smith and Richard
Cotter of the Bureau Research Division were assigned by Sullivan to
write the drafts; 66 everyone was to provide the Bureau WIth inputs on
or before June 15th. The third meeting of the Committee was set for
Wednesday, June 17th.
The Third Langley Meeting: Revie1ving the First Draft
This third session of the Ad Hoc Committee staff was the most important.
From it emerged the specific options which the group would
lay before the President. The first two sessions had been preparatory;
now the Committee was ready to examine thoroughly a first draft
of the report.67 The members dissected the draft in minute detail, spening
all afternoon and part of the evening going over it. The FBI and
CIA reports on "Defining and Assessing the Existing Internal Security
Threat" had been incorporated into the draft, as had the pros and
cons of various restraints inhibiting intelligence collection.
Starting at the beginning of the draft, the Committee first went
step-by-step through the section on the internal security threat facing
the United States. The military representatives criticized the CIA and
FBI data and interpretations' on militant "New Left" groups, black
.. Huston (staff summary) , 9/22/75.
.. Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, pp. 18-19; staff summary of James Angleton interview,
9/12/75.
.. Ober was also in charge of the controversial CIA "Operation CHAOS" to investigate
foreign contracts with American dissidents. See the Select Committee
Report on Operation Chaos.
.. Staff summary of Richard Cotter interview, 9/15/75; Sullivan (staff summary),
6/10/75.
•• For a review of the third ICI meeting, see the Interagency Committee on
Intelligence minutes, 6/19/70.
942
extremists, the intelligence services of Communist countries, and other
revolutionary groups (like the Puerto Rican nationalist extremists).
Eventually. however, virtually unanimous agreement was reached on
this threat assessment section.
The next section of the report on restraints was much more complex
and open to controversy. Huston made it clear early in the review of
this "Restraints" section that no individual agency would be allowed
to make a separate recommendation, conclusion, opinion, or observation.
The report had to be a joint effort, and only options were to be
listed for the President. The sole exception would be the possibility of
recommending to the President the establishment of a permanent
interagency group or committee to evaluate intelligence problems related
to internal security. While the discussion on the options was
. lengthy and punctuated by disagreements, the end result was a first
draft of the intelligence report which had the support of all the participating
agencies.
The FlfUrthLangley Meeting: The Final Draft
The fourth and final meeting of the ICI staff was held on June 23rd
and was devoted to improving the first draft and polishing it into a
final report.68 Between the third and fourth sessions, Sullivan and the
other representatives from the various agencies showed the first draft
to their superiors. While the other directors saw no significant problems
with the draft, Hoover balked. He would not sign the report, he
informed Sullivan. It would have to be completely rewritten to eliminate
the extreme options in the "Restraints" section and the recommendation
for the permanent interagency committee would have to be
removed also.69
Hoover explained his objections, as Sullivan recalls, in this way:
For years and years and years I have approved opening
mail and other similar operations, but no. It is becoming more
and more dangerous and we are apt to get caught. I am not
opposed to doing this. I'm not opposed to continuing the burglaries
and the opening of mail and other similar activities,
providing somebody higher than myself approves of it....
I no longer want to accept the sole responsibility-the Attorney
General or some high ranking person in the White
House-then I will carry out their decision. But I'm not
going to accept the responsibility myself anymore, even
though I've done it for many years.
Number two, I cannot look to the Attorney General to approve
these because the Attorney General was not asked to be
a member of the ad hoc committee. I cannot turn to the ad hoc
committee to approve of these burglaries and opening mail as
recommended here. The ad hoc committee, by its very nature,
will go out of business when this report has been approved.
That leaves me alone as the man who made the decision.
I am not going to do that any more . . . I want rou to prepare
a detailed memorandum and set forth these VIews....70
eo The last meeting of the lCI statr is summarized in the Sullivan memorandum,
6/~/70.
• Sullivan (statr summary), 6/10/75.
.. Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, pp. 122-24.
943
Sullivan pointed out to Hoover that it would not be entirely fair or
reasonable to rewrite completely a report which had been approved
already b~ everyone else. Instead the Director might wish to note
his objectIOns in the form of footnotes to the report, if he felt he
needed to as was commonly done on interagency intelligence papers.
Hoover finally agreed. Sullivan personally added the footnotes to the
draft, as requested by Hoover, and had hIS secretary type up the new
version to be presented at the fourth Langley meeting.71
Sullivan distributed this second draft of the report at the final
Langley meeting. It bore Hoover's footnotes conspicuously, and the
partICipants realized that Hoover had intervened.72 (The first draft
had been written in the Bureau Research Section and brought to the
third Langley meeting without being shown to Hoover.73
) Col. Downie,
the Army representative, remembers smiling as he read the second
draft; he found it amusing that Sullivan had "eaten humble pie."
Hoover had "put the brakes on," Downie figured, and now the Committee
was "back to square one." 74
Only one day separated the last meeting at Langley from the official
signing of the Special Report, which was to take place in Hoover's
office on June 25th. It left little time for the directors of CIA, DIA,
and NSA to react to the footnotes.'5 Certainly, Hoover did not call to
71 Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, pp. 124--125.
,. Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75. Sullivan also remembers the presence
of an Intelligence Review Board in the draft, which was designed to monitor
problems within the intelligence side of government. He remembers Hoover
demanding its removal at this stage, and Sullivan complied. No one else remembered
this Review Board concept.
,. Cotter (staff summary), 9/15/75.
.. Staff summary of Col. John Downie interview, 5/13/75.
... The footnote as-pect of the Special Report remains a mystery. A Sullivan
memorandum dated June 24, 1970, discussing the results of the final ICI stat!
meeting, notes that the Hoover footnotes were included in the final draft
distributed on June 23rd to all the participants. (Sullivan memorandum,
6/24/70.) Yet, Adm. Gayler now denies knowing about these notes until the
actual signing ceremony in Hoover's office on June 25th. [Gayler (stair sum·
mary) 6/19/75.] Gen. Bennett goes so far as to claim the footnotes were added
after the signing ceremony. [Bennett (staff summary) 6/5/75.] Going still
further, Col. Downie, the Army representative, believes the directors signed an
innocuous report, then the signature page was attached later-without the
knowledge of the other directors-to a report which included all the extreme
options appearing in the Special Report as we know it today. [Downie (stair
summary) 5/13/75.] This extreme version was then sent to the President via
Tom Huston.
What seems most likely to have haDpened regarding the footnotes is as
follows: Sullivan had told Huston early in the sessions at CIA Headquarters
that it would be a major error to show Hoover the final draft of the report at
the same time the other directors saw it. He would just "whack it away, and
will have no chance," .sullivan said. (Houston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 65.)
Instead, Sullivan decided to have the Ad Hoc staff first approve a draft (which
they did at their third meeting), The members were then to get their respective
agency hierarchies to approve it, also. This was accomplished directly after the
third meeting. Helms, Bennett, and Gayler reviewed this first draft and found
it generally acceptable. Bennett had it approved by his and Gayler's superiors
at the Defense Department. Finally, once the representatives of the various
agencies had reported back that their directors had given their approvals
(around June 20th) Sullivan approached Hoover, saying: "Here is the report
that has been approved by all the other agencies, and we need your approvaI."
[Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.]
Sullivan hoped that, faced with this united front. Hoover would go along.
[Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/76; Huston deposition, 5/23/75.]
944
forewarn them of his action. When their representatives brought news
of what the FBI Director had done, Gayler and Bennett were furious.
Both called Huston immediately.76
They were "mad as the dickens," Huston recalls. The White House
aide tried to calm them and urged them to "live with" Director
Hoover's additions to the Report.
The military intelligence director persisted. Hoover had no right
to add his own personal observations; and if he could do it, so could
they. Bennett and Gayler were particularly annoyed that Hoover
had objected to specific operations, when what was listed were options
for the President, not recommendations. Hoover's critical footnotes
made the options appear to be recommendations which the other
directors automatically supported. "They either wanted another meeting
among the Directors Lto] demand that the footnotes be withdrawn,
or else they wanted to insert their own footnotes saying they
favored certain things," recalls Huston.77 The White House staffer
was:
... very much interested in not creating any difficulties with
Mr. Hoover that could, at all, be avoided, and I told both
General Bennett and Admiral Gayler that I th~ught it was
unnecessary for them to take such aetion; that III my cover
memorandum to the President, I would set forth their views
as they had expressed them to me, and that I would appreciate
it if they would not raise the question with the Director.78
Helms has testified that he does recall the episode.79
At the time, Huston appeared unconcerned 8Jbout Hoover's notations.
One partioipant at 'the final session thought Huston would
achieve his ends anyway. "He seemed to exude the attitude that 'What
the White House wanted, the White House would gf!t,' " recallsaNavy
observer. "If Hoover didn\ want to play, it would be played some
other way." 80
Tordella of NSA, too, remembers that Sullivan was not particularly
upset by Hoover's move. With Helms, Bennatt, '8Jld Gayler still in support
of the Special Report, Sullivan believed President Nixon would
accept the options on relaxing restraints anyway.81
The final meeting at Langley was thus spent in the review of this
second draft. In addition to the footnotes, some changes were made.
Diotion which Hoover had found perjorative was removed ("procedures"
replaced "restri<t.ions" in one segment, for inStance) ; and
references to CIA-FBI liaison difficulties was excised, as was the concept
of a full-time working staff for the recommended permanent
interltgency committee. The essential alteration, however, was the
addition of Hoover's footndtes.82 The next step was to have the intelligence
directors sign the report.
.. Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 67.
'1'1 Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 7.
'7Il Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 7.
'II Helms deposition, 9/10/75, p. 40.
... Sta1l'.summary of B. Willard interview, 5/16/75.
Bl Tordella (staff summary), 6/16/75.
iii Sullivan memomndum, 6/24/70.
945
E. The Signing Oeremony
The meeting to review and sign the Special Report began at 3 :00
promptly on the afternoon of June 25th.83 The Director of the FBI
opened the meeting by commending the members for their outstanding
effort and coopevative spirit displayed in preparing the Special Report.
Hoover went through his normal routine on such occasions. He
started with page one of the Report and said "Does anyone have 'any
comment on Page 1?" He then proceeded to go through the 43-page
document, page by page, in this fashion.
For each page, Hoover addressed his question to each Director and
to Tom Huston. Hoover displayed his contempt for Huston by
addressing him with different names: "Any comments, Mr. Hoffman?
Any comments, Mr. Hutchinson?" and so on, getting the name wrong
six or seven different ways.84
Huston hoped the meeting would end before Gayler or BennEtt
raised the subject of the footnotes. "We got down to about 'X' number
of pages and, finally, it was just 'too much for Admiral Gayler," Huston
recalls, "'and so, sure enough,.there he goes. He started in about a
footnote, I think." 85 Bennett joined Gayler in querying the Director
about the footnotes.86
Hoover was surprised. It was not customary to respond critically
during the FBI Director's pro forma readings. Huston looked toward
Helms, who spoke up and managed to smooth the waters to some
degree.87 However, Hoover was clearly upset,s8 and hurried through
the rest of the Report. The four directors then signed the document.
Hoover reminded them to have all working copies of the Report
destroyed, thanked them for their participation, and dismissed the
Committee. The Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)
had completed its assignment.
IV. AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT: THE OPTIONS
The next day, June 26th, the Special Report was delivered to Huston
at the White House for the President. For each of the intellirnce
collection methods, the President was presented the option 0 (1)
continuing the present restrictions, (2) asking for more information,
or (3) accepting one of the relaxations listed below.s9 Hoover's notes
were typed in beneath the options for each collection technique.
The first category of options written into the report dealt with communications
intelligence.
A. Oategory One: Oommunications Intelligence 90
-Present interpretation should be broadened to permit
and program for coverage by NSA of the communications
of U.S. CItizens using internatIOnal facilities.
• Sullivan memorandum, 6/24/70.
.. Sullivan (stnff summary), 6/10/75.
.. Huston deposition, 5/23/75,p. 70.
"Bennett (staff summary), 6/5/75.
B1 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 70.
88 Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
III Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), 6/70 cited
in this report as Special Report. (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 1). See note Sa.
DO The "and" in the following two paragraphs is probably an original error and
should read "a".
946
-Present interpretation should be broadened to permit and
program for coverage by NSA at the request of the FBI of
the communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities.
[Original emphasis. No footnotes were added to this
section.]
The National Security Agency pressed for the inclusion of these
options in an effort to obtain a clarification of their role in targeting
against communications traffic involving U.S. revolutionary leaders
and organizations.91 At the time, NSAbelieved that its authority precluded
production and dissemination of intelligence from international
communications between U.S. citizens and barred specific targeting
against the communications of U.S. nationals.92
At the heart of this option lay the NSA "Watch List." In 1967, the
NSA began to receive from the FBI, the CIA, and the Secret Service
the names of individuals whom these agencies viewed as threats to
American security. The NSA was supposed to select, from international
communications, messages which were sent to or from these individuals-
approximately 1,650 of whom were U.S. citizens.93 (The
present director of the NSA does not know whether or not the President
knew about the NSA Watch List.94 ) Unsure about the legality of
the practice, the June meetings were viewed by NSA as a chance to
obtain more explicit approval to do what, in fact, they were already
doing; that is, selecting the international messages of specified U.S.
nationals for tmnscription and dissemination to other intelligence
agencies. Explicit approval from the President for this practice would
have permitted an expansion of the American names on the Watch
List.
B. Oategory Two: Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations
-Present procedures should be changed to permit intensification
of coverage of individuals and groups in the United
States who pose a major threat to the internal security.
-Present procedures should be changed to permit intensification
of coverage of foreign nationals [classified] of interest
to the intelligence community.
Note: The FBI does not wish to change its present procedure
of selective coverage on major internal security threats
as it believes this coverage is adequate at this time. The FBI
would not oppose other agencies seeking authority of the Attorney
General for coverage required by them Il;nd thereafter
instituting such coverage themselves.
As the Special Report stated: "NSA has been particularly hard-hit
by this limitation." 95
The CIA had a strong interest in this option, too. In the mid-1960s,
Helms had approached Hoover to increase the number of telephone
01 Special Report, p. 23.
.. Special Report, p. 23.
.. General Lew Allen testimony, 10/28/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, P. 12. See also
NSA Report, Sec. II: "NSA's Monitoring of International Communications."
.. Allen, 10/28/75, hearings, p. 28.
'" Special Report, p. 26.
947
taps to assist the CIA in its missions.96 For similar reasons, the CIA
now joined the NSA in its quest for increased electronic coverage. As a
former high-level CIA counterintelligence officer has noted, "Thousands
of man-hours would have been saved if the Bureau had been willing
to place taps on [selected] telephones." 91
Among the arguments presented in the Special Report in favor of
the increased use of this technique was that "every major intelligence
service in the world, including those of the Communist bloc, use such
techniques as an essential part of their operations; and it is believed
the general public would support their use by the United States for the
same purpose." 98 Yet, five years earlier, Hoover had cut back on these
forms of surveillance in large part for the very reason that he believed
the American public would no longer tolerate their broad use.99
O. Oategory Three: Mail 001Jerage
-Restrictions on legal coverage should 'be removed.
-Present restrictions on covert coverage should be relaxed
on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal
security interest.
Note: The FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail
coverage because it is clearly illegal and it is likely that, if
done, information would leak out of the Post Office to the press
and serious damage would be done to the intelligence community.
The FBI has no objection to legal mail coverage providing
it is done on a carefully controlled and selective basis
in both criminal and security matters.100
As the draft explained, two types of mail coverage exist: routine cover·
age, which involves recordinlf, information from the face of envelopes,
and covert (or "sophisticated ') coverage which entails the examination
of contents within a sealed envelope. The former is legal, the latter is
not. "OO1Jert coverage has been discontiJnued," the President was told
in the Report, and one option placed before him read: "Present restrictions
on covert coverage should be relaxed on selected targets of priority
foreign intelligence and internal security interest." [Emphasis
added.] 101
In fact, "covert coverage" had not been discontinued. The CIA had
used covert mail programs to examine mail sent between the United
States and Communist countries since 1953. It was the judgment of
some Agency officials that, although warrantless mail opening was
illegal, the good that flowed from them in terms of anticipating threats
to the United States made it worthwhile.102 The objective was "to try
to uncover foreign involvement in this country," 103 but, in the retro-
.. Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
.., Staff summary of James Angleton interview, 7/10/75.
.. Special Report, p. 27.
.. Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
... This represented a change in Hoover's position, though the Bureau would
not actually engage in this legal coverage again until 1971. Earlier in the history
of the Bureau (prior to 19(4), it had been a common technique.
101 Special Report, p. 31. .
102 See, for example, Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 61. See also Mail Report.
100 Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 76.
948
spective view of the CIA officer in charge of the program, the covert
mail programs were "very much an error." 104 Since 1958, the FBI had
also known of these programs and, in fact, had contributed names to
the CIA's "Watch List".105
D. Oategory Four: Surreptiti0U8 Entry
-Present restrictions should be modified to permit procurement
of vitally needed foreign [classified] material.
-Present restrictions should also be modified to permit
selective use of this technique against other urgent and high
priority internal security targets.
Note: The FBI is opposed to surreptitious entry . . .
[classified] .
This option reflected the use of breaking and entering, and burglary,
by Government agents. Of all the agencies involved in these meetings,
NSA was the most interested in removing the restraints on surreptitious
entries.l07 Millions of dollars could be saved by such operations,
Buffham argued at the Langley meetings.lOB
One option for the President proposed that "present restrictions
should also be modified to permit selective use of this technique against
other urgent and high-priority internal securitX targets." 109 In short,
entries were to be made against the "New Left' subversives discussed
in the Special Report-if the President gave his approval to this
option.
E. Oategory Five: Development of Oampus Sources
-Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded
coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related
groups.
-CIA coverage of American students (and others) traveling
abroad or living abroad should be increased.
Note: The FBI is opposed to removing any present controls
and restrictions relating to the development of campus
sources. To do so would severely jeopardize its investigations
and could result in charges that investigative agencies are
interfering with academic freedom.l1O
The intelligence professionals complained at the drafting sessions that
it was difficult to gather data on student subversives when no secondary
school students and no one below the legal age in colleges and universities
were allowed to work for the intelligence agencies as sources.lll
Among other reasons for relaxing these restraints was the argument
that campus violence occurs quickly land with little planning. To
anticipate this kind of disorder, the intelligence community had to
have youthful informants. Hoover had taken the position, however,
10< Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 64.
1'" Angleton, 9/24/75, pp. 77-78; Mail Report.
107 Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75; see also memorandum from William
Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 6/19/70. (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 15).
108 Staff summary of Benson Buffham interview, 5/19/75.
109 Special Report, p. 33.
110 In the faU of 1970, the FBI reduced the age limits on campus informants
from 21 to 18.
m Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
949
that using informants below age twenty-one was too risky; they were
less reliable, and legal complications could arise with their parents
and the schooladministration.ll2
According to Huston, the FBI members of the ICI ad hoc staff
hoped to reduce the age level of informants to eighteen through the
Special Report; but, if they said so directly and explicitly, "it would
make Mr. Hoover mad." Therefore, they "couched this recommendations
in terms that 'campus informant coverage shall be expanded' " 113
The Special Report noted that, in this area, "the military services
have capabilities which could be of value to the FBI." 114
F. Oategory Six: Use of MiUtary Undercover Age'IbblJ
-The counterintelligence mission of the military services
should be expanded to include the active collection of intelligence
concerning student-related dissident activities, with
provisions for a close coordination with the FBI.
-No change should be made in the current mission of the
military counterintelligence services; however, present restrictions
should be relaxed to permit the use of trusted military
personnel as FBI assets in the collection of intelligence
regarding student-related activities.
Note: The FBI is opposed to the use of any military undercover
agents to develop domestic intelligence information because
this would be in violation of the Delimitations Agreement.
The military services, joined by the FBI, oppose any
modification of the Delimitations Agreement WhICh would
extend their jurisdiction beyond matters of interest to the
Department of Defense.
The only specific views on intelligence operations which Huston's
superiors at the White House discussed with him before the June
meetings had to do with the military. Haldeman expressed to Huston
the President's belief that "we should use the military services in collection
of domestic intelligence." 115 The vast resources of the military,
it was felt, could effectively supplement the intelligence gathering
capabilities of the other agencies.
At the third Langley meeting, Huston therefore told the group that
the President wanted a list of options on the use of the mIlitary for
dom.estic intelligence collection. The military voiced its opposition to
the Idea, however, and the FBI was also against it,116 The Committee
wanted to eliminate the option from the report. Huston himself
~hought th~ proposal was inappropriate, but he insisted the option be
mcluded, smce Haldeman and the President had explicitly requested
it.111
The respons~ of the Committee, in Huston's opinion, was to write a
set of optIOns m favor of using the military which were "very flimsy
112 Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
1lJl Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 23-24.
114 Special Report, p. 35.
m ~om Chnrles Huston deposition, 5/22/75, pp. 3~; see also Huston, 9/28/75,
Hennngs, pp. 17, 85.
m Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 35.
m Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 35.
950
and they would not convince anyone." In the Report, six "Advantages
of Maintaining Restrictions" were listed, compared to just three "Advantages
of Relaxing Restrictions." 118 The military representatives
stressed, in their discussion of these options, that disclosure of military
involvement in this kind of counterintelligence work "would certainly
result in considerable adverse publicity." 119
In fact, at that time Army officials were preparing for their appearance
before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,120
which was then investigating the question of military surveillance of
civilians in the United States. This investigation serves as 'all important
backdrop for understanding the marked caution of the military
intelligence representatives during the sessions at Langley.
The Special Report included two more sets of options for the President's
consideration:
G. Oategory Seven: Budget and Manpower
-Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to
projected manpower needs and other costs in the event the
varIOUS investigative restraints herein are lifted.
-Each agency must operate within its current budgetary
or manpower limitations, irrespective of action required as
result of this report.
H. Oategory Eight: Permanent Interagency Oommittee
-An ad hoc gToup consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA,
DIA, and the nulitary counterintelligence agencies should
be appointed and should serve as long as the President deems
necessary, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence,
prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, and carry
oJ}t the other dbjectives indicated albove.
-A permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA,
NSA, DIA, and the military countermtelligence agencies
should be appointed to provide ewluations of domestic intelligence,
prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates,
and carry out the other objectives indicatedaibove.
Note: The FBI is opposed to the creation of a permanent
committee for the purpose of providing evaluations of domestic
intelligence, however the FBI would approve of preparing
periodic domestic intelligence estimates.
In the first draft of the Report, the following options were also
included, though both were removed in the writing of the final
draft: 121
118 Special Report, pp. 37-38.
:m Special Report, p. 38.
uo"Federal Data Banks, Computers, 'and the Bill of Rights," Part II, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on OonstitutW1WU Rights, 2/31/71 through 3/17/71.
121 Sullivan memorandum, 6/24/70. Another option-to permit the use of truth
serum-went into an earrly rough draft in the Bureau. It was devi.lled by Bureau
staffers in hopes that Hoover would remove it from the final report 'but, as a
compromise, keep in 'all ;the dther options. SuUivan, however, decided to remove
this option before the first draft ever left the BUTeau to be read by the 101
slRff at lAlngley. [Cotter (staff summary), 9/15/75.]
951
I. Oategory Nine (ReJn(Yl)ed): Surreptitious Optical Surveillance
According to intelligence specialists, this phrase simply refers to
taking photographs of people without their knowledge. The discussion
of options under this heading was finally discarded from the report,
evidently because the members knew it was already being done and
saw no point in asking the President for his views on the subject.122
J. Oategory Ten (Removed) : Investigations of Diplornati<J PersorvMl
When conducting "investigations" of foreign diplomats (often a
euphemism for recruiting an agent) within the United States, the FBI
traditionally clears the probe with the State Department before proceeding.
This is done to make sure the Bureau is not entering into a
case that, for some reason, might be peculiarly sensitive, and disclosure
could have international repercussions detrimental to U.S. interests.
On occasion, some members of the Bureau have had investigations
blocked or delayed by the State Department for reasons which they
viewed as unsatisfactory. The question was consequently raised at the
Langley meetings as to whether these clearances from State were really
useful, or merely represented a further obstacle to intelligence work.
This was a subject of great interest to many of the counterintelligence
specialists who viewed the State Department skeptically. As one remarked
candidly, "Our roles are often conflictual: they're always trying
to 'build bridges'-detente and all that stuff-while we're trying
to catch spies." 123 On balance, though, opinion within the group favored
keeping the clearance procedure and avoiding a dispute with
State.
These first eight categories of options, then, constituted the vital
core of the special intelligence report for the President, from which
tho Huston Plan would be extracted. Behind them lay a variety of
forces and pressures which had preceded and shaped the Report, but
which were nowhere revealed in its formal language. (These hidden
dimensions are explored in Section VII below.)
In the weeks that followed the official signing of the Special Report,
Tom Charles Huston recommended to the President those options
from the Report which promised to eliminate most thoroughly the
existing restrictions on intelligence collection. These recommendations
became known as the Huston Plan.
V. THE HUSTON PLAN
A.. Huston Plan, Phww One: Advice for the President
For several weeks after the signing of the Special Report on
June 25th, it appeared to the intelligence agencies that their efforts
had come to nothing. No response had come from the White House,
and Sullivan began to believe the whole idea had "died aborning." 1.24
Yet, in the White House, Huston was working toward the next step.
He had succeeded in obtaining the four signatures from the chiefs of
the intelligence community, even Hoover's. Now he wanted to get the
12' ~taff summary of [FBI counterintelligence expert], 8/20/75.
m [FBI counterintelligence expert] (staff summary), 8/20/75.
U< Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
952
President to approve the strongest options in the Special Report designed
to remove the existing restrictions on intelligence collection. If
he were successful here, the intelligence collectors would then have all
the authority they desired.
Soon after the June 26th delivery of the Special Report to the White
House, Huston began to prepare carefully a memorandum addressed
to Haldeman on what the President ought to do with the Report. The
memo, dated simply "July 1970" but written in the early days of
July, was entitled "Domestic Intelligence Review." It was a synopsis
of the Ad Hoc meetings held during the month of June. Huston began
with a sharp diatribe against Hoover, the "only stumbling block" in
the proceedings (in contrast, Helms had been "most cooperative and
helpful").125 The FBI Director "refused to go along with a single
conclusion drawn or support a single recommendation made," until
Huston successfully opposed Hoover's attempt to rewrite the Report.
(In this description of the confrontation with Hoover, Sullivan was
never mentioned.)
Hoover then 'entered his objections as footnotes to the report,"
Huston wrote further. These objections were "generally inconsistent
and frivolous." 126 To avoid "a nasty scene" between the military directors
and Hoover over the footnotes, Huston assured Admiral Gayler
and General Bennett that their objections "would be brought to the
attention of the President." Turning to the substantive work of the
Ad Hoc group, Huston emphasized to Haldeman that everyone who
participated was dissatisfied with current intelligence collection procedures-
except Hoover. Even the FBI participants, according to
Huston, "believe that it is imperative that changes in operating procedures
be initiated at once." Furthermore, all members felt it "Imperative"
to establish a permanent interagency committee for intelligence
evaluation-again with the exception of the FBI Director.
Should the President decide to lift the current restrictions, Huston
recommended a face-to-face "stroking session" with Hoover in which
the President explained his decision and indicated "he is counting on
Edgar's cooperation...." In this way, Huston continued, "We can get
what we want without putting Edgar's nose out of I·oint." Though
the Director was "bullheaded as hell" and "getting 0 d and worried
about his legend," he would "not hesitate to accede to any decision the
President makes," predicted Huston. Attached to this optimistic appraisal
were Huston's specific recommendations on the decisions Nixon
should make concerning the lifting of operational restraints.
The Recmnmendations
The recommendations in this first version of the so-called Huston
Plan were written under the heading "Operational Restraints on Intelligence
Collection." 121 Huston offered advice on each operational
section of the Report, and each recommendation was buttressed by a
one-to-several paragraph rationale. The recomm.endations compris~ng
"" Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 7/70. (Hearings,
Vol. 2, Exhibit 2). See tootnote sa.
UI By "incoosistent," Huston is apparently referring to Hoover's willingness to
permit the exercise of collection techniques in the past which he would not permit
in 1970.
,.., Attachment to Huston memorandum, 7/70.
953
Huston's plan, as presented to the President, are outlined below with
the exception of the rationales which concluded chiefly that (1) coverage
was inadequate, and (2) all the methods had been used before
with great productivity.
{/omnnunir:ations Intelligence. Recommendation : 128
Present interpretation should be broadened to permit and
program for coverage by NSA of the communications of
U.S. citizens using international facilities.
Electrooie Surveillances and Penetrations. Recommendation:
Present procedures should be changed to permit intensification
of coverage of individuals and groups in the United
States who pose a major threat to the internal security.
ALSO, present procedures should be changed to permit intensification
of coverage of foreign nationals [classified].
Mail {/overage. Recommendation:
Restrictions on legal coverage should be removed.
ALSO, present restrictions on covert coverage should be
relaxed on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence
and internal security interest.
SU1'1'eptitioU8 Entry. Recommendation:
Present restrictions should be modified to permit procurement
of vitally needed foreign [classified] material.
ALSO, present restrictions should be modified to permit
selective use of this technique against other urgent and high
priority internal security targets.
Development of (!ampus Source8. Recommendation:
Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded
coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related
groups.
ALSO, CIA coverage of American students (and others)
traveling or living abroad should be increased. -
Use of Military Undercover Agents. Recommendation:
Present restrictions should be retained.
Beyond the lowering of specific operational restraints,
Huston made two further recommendations.
Manp010er and Budget. Recommendation:
Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to projected
manpower needs and other costs in the event the
various investigative restraints herein are lifted.
Measures to Impr01Je Domestic Intelligence Operations.
Recommendation:
A permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA,
DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies should be
appointed to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence,
1Jl8The "and" instead of "a" error from the S'pecial Report is repeated in
Huston's recommendation.
954
prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, and carry
out the other objectives specified in the report.
In his discussion of these methods, Huston raised-and quickly dismissed-
questions about the legality of two collection techniques
in particular: covert mail cover and surreptitious entry. "Covert
[mail] coverage is illegal, and there are serlOUS risks involved," he
wrote. "However, the advantages to be derived from its use outweigh
the risks." 129 .
As for surreptitious entry, Huston advised: "Use of this technique is
clearly illegal: it amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could
result in great embarrassment if exposed. However," he concluded, "it
is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence
which cannot be obtained in any other fashion." 130
In brief, the President's aid was asking the highest political figure
in the nation to sanction lawlessness within the intelligence community.
This attitude toward the law was not his alone; it was shared by
certain representatives of the intelligence community as well. The
recommendations made to the President, says Huston, "reflected what
I understood to be the consensus of the working group." 131 Huston
agreed with this consensus.
Sullivan has explained his view-not necessarily shared by others-that
he and the rest of the intelligence officers attending the Langley
meetings "had grown up 'topsy-turvy' during the War-a time when
legal aspects were far less important than getting a job done against
the enemy." Moreover, they shared the belief that intelligence work is
"something different," somehow falling outside the nonnal realm of
the law. The business required one to engage sometimes in activities
that would not always be acceptable to others. That many of the men
had served in the agencies operating overseas, unfettered by the legal
system of the United States, may have contributed to It disregard for
the "niceties of the law" in discussions of intelligence collection against
alleged subversives. Besides, the KGB did not play by a legal rulebook.
132
For Huston, the only Ad Hoc Committee member too young to have
grown up "topsy-turvy" during the War, the reasons for government
lawlessness were different. Viewed as a conservative intellectual of
sorts among his colleagues in the White House, he had spun a theory
on the New Left which led him inexorably toward helping to unbridle
the intelligence collectors. Huston believed that the real thrE:at
to internal security was repression. The New Left was capable of producing
a climate of fear that would bring forth every repressive demagogue
in the United States. These dema80gues were not in the government,
but out in the country; the intellIgence professionals, if given
UlI Attachment to Huston memorandum, 7/70, p. 2.
,.. Attachment to Huston memorandum, 7/70, p. 8. In using the word "burglary."
Huston sought to "escalate the rhetoric ... to make it as bold as possible." He
thought, that as a staff man, he should give the President "the worst possible
interpretation of what the recommendation would result in." (Huston deposition,
5/22/75, p. 69.)
181 Huston deposition, 5/22/75, p. 8.
130 Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
955
the chance, could protect the American people from these latent forces
of repression by monitoring the New Left and providing information
to stop the violence before it began. The Huston Plan would halt repression
on the Right by stopping violence on the Left.
Huston saw his own role as the Administration's coordinator of all
internal security matters. After writing his recommendations for the
President, he sent a memorandum to Richard Helms, dated July 9.
All future matters relatin¥c to domestic intelligence or internal security
were to be sent to the 'exclusive attention" of Tom Huston, since
"the President is anxious to centralize the coordination at the White
House of all information of this type...." Huston ended: "Dr. Kissinger
is aware of this new procedure." 134
Huston then waited expectantly for the decision of the President.
It came via Haldeman on July 14: The President had fl.pproved the
recommendations,135 Former President Nixon has since stated, ":My
approval was based largely on the fact that the procedures were consistent
with those employed by prior administrations and had been
found to be effective by the intelligence agencies." 136
Huston was pleased. There was only one problem: President Nixon
had told Haldeman he was too busy to meet again with Hoover and
the other intelligence directors on this subject, as Huston had recommended.
He preferred "that the thing simply be put into motion
on the basis of this approval." Huston felt a certain uneasiness. He
particularly wanted the President to invite Hoover in to give him
the decision directly, "because it seemed to me it would be easier
maybe to get him to accept it." 137 Nevertheless, Huston proceeded to
draw up the official memorandum which would carry the news to the
intelligence directors. The "Huston Plan" was now presidential policy.
B. Huston Plan, Phase Two: The President's Policy
Just over a week later, on July 23, 1970, Huston finished the official
version of this presidentially-ratified plan and sent it on its way via
courier to Hoover, Helms, Bennett and Gayler.13s With only minor
changes, this official intelligence plan repeated the recommendations
made by Huston to the President earlier in the month. Now it began
with the preface: "The President has carefully studied the special
report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence . . . and made
the following decisions." Huston had selected the most extreme options
posed by the counterintelligence experts and the President of
the United States had agreed with those recommendations.
Henceforth, with presidential authority, the intellig£'nce community
could at will intercept and transcribe the communications of
Americans using international communications facilities; eavesdrop
,.. Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Richard Helms, 7/9/70. (Hear·
inl'\'s, Vol. 2, Exhibit 19).
,.. Memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Tom Charles Huston, 7/14/70.
(Hearings Vol. 2, Exhibit 3.) See also H. R. Haldeman testimony, Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Hearings, 7/31/73, Vol. 8,
p.3030.
1311 Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 19,
3/19/76, p. 13-
,.., Huston, 9/23/75, pp. 23-24.
138 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Intelligence Directors, 7/23/70.
69-984 0 - 76 - 61
956
from near or afar on anyone deemed to be a "threat to the internal
!"ecurity ;" read the mail of American citizens; break into the homes
of anyone tagged as a security threat; and mtmitor in various ways
the activities of suspicious student groups. Only the restraints on
military intelligence collection were preserved, nO'doubt because the
military was dead set against further involvement in the face of pending
Congressional hearings on military surveillance of civilians.
The official memorandum to the intelligence directors further noted
that on August 1, 1970, the permanent inter-agency committee on
intelligence evaluation would be established, with the FBI Director
as chairman (a palliative, according to Huston, to the defeated
Hoover, meaning little, since he could easily be outvoted in the Committee).
Huston would be the "personal representative to the President,"
with complete White House staff responsibility for domestic
intelligence and internal security affairs. By September 1, 1970, just
before the reconvening of students on campuses across the country,
the agencies were expected to report on the steps they had taken to
implement these decisions.
Reaction to the Huston Plan was mixed among the intelligence directors,
ranging from surprise to shock and rage. Admiral Gayler was
"surprised" that the President had selected the most extreme options.
139 General Bennett was pleased to hear about approval of a
permanent committee for intelligence evaluation (he thought the FBI
needed help in this area), but thought everything else in the memorandum
was largely irrelevant to the mission of the Defense Intelligence
Agency.Ho According to his assistant, James Stilwell, the two joked
about Huston's signature on the plan. "They passed that one down
about as low as it could go," they agreed, concluding that President
Nixon and Haldeman "didn't have the guts" to sign it themselves. To
them, the use of Huston as a possible scapegoat indicated "what a hot
potato it was." 141
The Director of the FBI "went through the ceiling," Sullivan recalls.
H2 Hoover and his assistant, Cartha DeLoach, walked immediately
~o Attorney General Mitchell's office nearby. Mitchell was totally
surprIsed. It was the first time he had heard of the Ad Hoc Committee,
let alone the Special Report or Huston's memorandum. His
immediate reaction was to agree with Hoover: the illegalities spelled
out in the memorandum could not be presidential policy. As Mitchell
noted in Select Committee public hearings, individual items in the
Huston Plan had been suggested to him before July 1970, and had
been turned down. With the Huston Plan, "the aggregate was worse
than the individual parts that had been suggested." 143 Moreover, he
was "very much opposed to the thought of surreptitious entry, the
mail covers, and all of the other !lspeets of it that were involved at
the particular time." 144 Hoover later told Sullivan that the Attorney
UI Gayler deposition, 6/19/75, p. 42.
1" Bennett (staff summary), 6/5/75.
1&1 Staff summary of James Stilwell interview, 5/21/75.
142 Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
1" ,John Mitchell testimonY,10/24/75, Hearin/ts. Vol. 4, p.I23.
1" John Mitchell testimony, ISenate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities, Hearings, 7/10/73, Vol. 4, pp. 1603-1604.
957
General was angry he had been by-passed by Huston and others in the
White House on this whole affair.145
Mitchell told the Director to "sit ti~ht" until President Nixon returned
from San Clemente; the Attorney General would then discuss
the whole affair with the President.146 Hoover returned to his office
and wrote a memorandum to Mitchell, re-emphasizin~ his strong opposition
to the recommendations in this Huston Plan. In the memo,
the FBI Director said he would implement the Plan but only with
the explicit approval of the Attorney General or the President.
Despite my clear-cut and specific opposition to the lifting of
the various investigative restraints referred to above and to
the creation of a permanent interagency committee on domestic,
intelligence, the FBI is prepared to implement the instructions
of the White House at your direction. Of course, we
would continue to seek your specific authorization, where
appropriate, to utilize the various sensitive investigative techniques
involved in individual cases.147
Richard Helms eventually went to see the Attorney General about the
matter on July 27, 1970. The Director of Central Intelligence was
brreatly surprised to discover the Attorney General had heard of the
Special Report and the Huston Plan only in the last couple of days
from Hoover. "We had put our backs into this exercise," Helms told
Mitchell, "because we had thou~ht rthe Attorney General] knew all
about it and was behind it," 148 As Mitchell had advised Hoover, so too
he told Helms to sit tight.149
VI. RECISION OF THE HUSTON PLAN: A TIME FOR RECONSIDERATION
A. The President Takes a Second Look
When President Nixon returned from the Western White House,
one of his first conversations on July 27 was with the Attorney General.
The messa~ Mitchell delivered was, accordin~ to his testimony,
that "the proposals contained in the [Huston] Plan, in toto, were
inimical to the best interests of the country and certainly should not
be somethin~ that the President of the United States should be
approving." 150
As former President Nixon now recalls, "Mr. Mitchell informed me
that Mr. Hoover, Director of the FBI and Chairman of the Interagency
Committee on Intelligence, disagreed with my approval of
the Committee's special report." 151 President Nixon was surprised by
Hoover's objections because he had not voiced any reservations to
140 Sullivan (stair summary), 6/10/75.
148 Memorandum for the record from Richard Helms, 7/28/70. (Hearings, Vol.
2, Exhibit 20.) See also Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, p. 123, where be testified
that he "made known to the President any disagreement with the concept of the
plan and recommended that it be turned down."
147 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to John Mitchell, 7/25/70.
1" Helms memorandum, 7/28/70.
148 Richard Helms testimony, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p.89.
1M Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, p, 123.
m Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 17,
3/9/76, p. 11.
958
the President when the Committee met "a few days earlier." 152 The
Attorney General told the President that Hoover believed "initiating
a program which would permit several government intelligence agencies
to utilize the investigative techniques outlined in the Committee's
report would significantly increase the possibility of their public disclosure,"
former President Nixon recalls. "Mr. Mitchell explained to
me that Mr. Hoover believed that although each of the intelligence
gathering methods outlined in the Committee's recommendations had
been utilized by one or more previous administrations, their sensitivity
would likely generate media criticism if they were employed." 153
Mitchell also indicated, according to the former President, it was his
opinion that "the risk of disclosure of the possible illegal actions,
such as unauthorized entry into foreign embassies to install a microphone
transmitter, was greater than the ,Possible benefit to be
derived." 154 Based on his conversation with MItchell, President Nixon
decided to revoke his approval originally extended to the Committee's
recommendations.
Warned by Sullivan of the chain of events between Hoover and
Mitchell and the impending visit to the President by the Attorney
General, Huston was expecting a call from Haldeman, which came
later that day.1M The Attorney General had come to the White House
to talk about Huston's decision memorandum, Haldeman said. The
President had decided to revoke the memorandum immediately, so that
he, Haldeman, Mitchell, and Hoover could "reconsider" the recommendations.
The Attorney General did not take it upon himself to investigate the
past illegalities referred to in the Huston Plan lnemorandum brought
to his attention by Hoover. The following excnange ensued on this
point during public hearings:
Q. You do agree, do you not, that lookinr at the document,
dated June 19'70, it does reveal that in the past, at-least, mail
had been opened, does it not?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe that is the implication, yes.
Q. And it does state in the document that the opening of
mail is illegal, does it not?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe that with reference to a number of
subjects were illegal and I think opening of mail was one of
them.
Q. All right. Then based upon your knowledge from an
examination of the document, that in the past at least illegal
actions involving the opening of mail that had taken place, did
,.. Apparently the former President is referring to the June 5, 1970 meeting
with the intelligence directors in the WhiteHouse; if so, his statement is'puzzling,
since the recommendation had not been drafted at the time. If he is referring
to another meeting with Hoover, no other record of such a meeting after June 5
has been found. Most likely the former President had the June 5 meeting in mind
where Hoover indeed made no objections, tor there were no recommendatious
to object to at that time.
163 Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 17,
3/9/76, p. 11.
'50 Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 17,
3/9/76. p. 12.
- Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 24.
959
lOU convene a grand jury to look into the admitted acts of
Illegality on behalf of some intelligence services ~
Mr. Mitchell. I did not.
Q. And whynot~
Mr. Mitchell. I had no consideration of that subject matter
at the time. I did not focus on it and I was very happy that the
plan was thrown out the window, without pursuing any of its
provisions further.
Q. Are you now of the opinion that if you had had time to
focus on the matter then it would have been wise to convene
some investigation within the Department to determine what
had happened in the past?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe that that would be one of the normal
processes where you would give it initial consideration and see
where it led to, what the statute of limitations might have been
and all of the other factors you consider before you jump into
a grand jury investigation.
Q. Excepting those point, do you agree that you should
have at least considered the matter ~
Mr. Mitchell. I think if I had focused on it I might have
considered it more than I did.15ft
Upset, angered, and embarrassed about having to recall his memorandum,
Tom Huston walked to the White House Situation Room.m
The Sit Room, "mailbox" of the White House, was the location where,
among other things, couriers came and went. Huston went directly
to the Chief of the White House Situation Room with the presidential
order to rescind the decision memorandum of July 23, which had gone
through there on its way to the intelligence directors. Huston was
intense and agitated, the manager of the Sit Room recalls, and mentioned
something about Hoover having "pulled the rug out" from
under him.158 The Sit Room Chief contacted the CIA, NSA, DIA, and
the FBI to have the memoranda returned. By the close of business on
the next day, July 28, each agency had complied. From markings on
the memoranda, it was clear the agencies had removed the staples and
photocopied the document for their records.150
Though Huston had suffered a major setback, he was not going
to yield easily. On August 3, he went to Haldeman's office and tried to
persuade him to convince the President that the dbjections raised by
Hoover had to be overridden. He urged a meeting between Haldeman,
Mitchell, and Hoover.16o Two days later in anticipation of this meeting,
Huston put 'his views down on paper for Haldeman.
The memorandum, written under the title "Domestic Intelligence,"
ran five pages and was extremely critical of the FBI Director.16l
Huston first reminded Haldeman that all the agencies and all of
Hoover's own staff on the leI (Ad Hoc) supported the options
,.. Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, p, 145.
'67 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 56.
1A Statr summary of interview with the 1970 Ohief of the White House Situation
Room, 7/1/75.
110 1970 Chief of Situation Room (statr summary), 7/1/75.
110 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 62.
181 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 8/5/70.
960
selected by the President. Only Hoover dissented. "At some point,
Hoover has to be told who is President," Huston wrote. "He has
become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detrimental to our
domestic intelligence operations.... If he gets his way it is going to
look like he is more powerful than the PresIdent."
Huston further warned that "all of us are going to look damn silly
in the eyes of Helms, Gayler, Bennett, and the military chiefs if
Hoover can unilaterally reverse a presidential decision based on a
report that many people worked their asses off to prepare and which,
on its merits, was a first-rate, objective job." Tom Charles Huston was
"fighting mad," for "what Hoover is doing here is putting himself
above the President."
Two more days elapsed and, on August 7, 1970, Huston sent a
second, terser note to Haldeman.162 The FBI Director had left for
the West Coast on vacation just as the new school year was about
to open; across the country student violence loomed as a real possibility.
Huston again urged Haldeman to act: "I recommend that you
meet with the Attorney General and secure his support for the President's
decision that the Director be informed that the decisions will
stand, and that all intelligence agencies are to proceed to implement
them at once." However, by this time, Huston recalls, "I was, for all
intents and purposes, writing memos to myself.)' 163 Haldeman took
no action. Hoover had won the battle.
The reasons for Hoover's victory were many but, Huston believes,
having the support of the Attorney General was a large plus.l84 The
President had a high regard for John Mitchell. When both Mitchell
and Hoover agreed in their strong objections to the Plan, Nixon no
doubt saw little point in continuing the effort.
Looking back, Sullivan sees other factors which worked in Hoover's
favor as well. He believes the Chief Executive buckled under the pressure
of the FBI Director partly because President Nixon and Hoover
went back a long way, considered themselves old friends, and still
socialized together frequently; and partly because the President owed
his 19508 reputation as a staunch anti-Communist to Hoover. "Of
course," Sullivan adds, "Hoover had his files, too." 165 The Director
had another ace in the hole: he could always have had the Huston
recommendations leaked, bringing the enterprise to a sudden halt.
Moreover, Huston notes that the opinions of Helms, Gayler, and
Bennett were far less weighty than Hoover's.166 Neither President
Nixon nor Haldeman were well acquainted with Gayler or Bennett;
and Helm's relationship with the White House tended to be precarious,
Huston believes, "in view of the problems that he had with Mr.
Kissinger on foreign intelligence estimates." Finally, Huston recalls,
"neither the President nor Mr. Haldeman had, in my judgment, any
sensitivity to the operational aspects of intelligence collection." 161
182 Huston memorandum, 8/5/70.
1" Huston (staff summary), 5/22/75.
18< Huston (staff summary), 5/22/75.
1" Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
1" Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 78.
101 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 77.
961
B. HWlton Leave8 the White HOWle
The memoranda written by Huston went unanswered throughout
the month of August. Shortly after writing his August 7th memorandum,
Huston was informed by Haldeman that John Dean was
taking over his responsibilities at the White House for domestic intelligence.
Huston would be on Dean's staff. As Dean recalls, "Huston
was livid." 168
John Dean had come to the White House on July 27th from the
Justice Department, where he had worked with and impressed Mitchell
for his skillful handling of negotiations with demonstrators for
parade permits and other matters. He had no intelligence experience.
Dean realized that Huston was in an awkward situation. He asked
Huston on August 10, 1970, what he wished to do while on Dean's
staff. "Well, I'm a speechwriter," Huston replied.169 In the following
months, Huston would do practically whatever he felt like doing: 170
sending an occasional memo to the President or Haldeman on intelligence
matters; 171 writing speeches for Pat Buchanan; continuing to
circulate the daily FBI intelligence reports in the White House; reviewing
conflict-of-interest clearances; prodding the Internal Revenue
Service to investigate New Left organizations and their supporters; 172
and writing a lengthy history of Vietnam bombing negotiations.
Huston often spoke to his counterintelligence associates on a special
scrambler phone which he kept hidden in his office in a safe.173 Not
until February 2, 1971, did Dean inform the CIA that, henceforth, he
would be the White House contact on domestic intelligence matters,
rather than Huston.114
Huston occasionally sent further memoranda to Haldeman, again
urging him to encourage the President to relax intelligence collection
restraints. On August 17, 1970, for example, Huston complained that
Hoover "has made no effort to remove the restrictions on development
of informant coverage which currently exist," despite the PreSIdent's
oral request to Hoover on August 16 175 to intensify the investigation of
extremist organizations. "We need changes at the operating level, not
merely at the FBI," concluded Huston, "but throughout the intelligence
community." 176 Finally, Huston found time to relate briefly to
his new supervisor the saga of the Huston Plan. Dean had the distinct
impression that Huston wanted to become the domestic equivalent of
Henry Kissinger.177
Growing ever more disenchanted with his position and with Nixon's
policies, Huston resigned from the White House staff on June 13, 1971,
,.. Staff summary of John Dean interview, 8/7/75.
1" Dean (staff summary), 8/7/75.
"0 On Huston's activities during this period, see Huston deposition, 5/23/75.
171 For example, on Arab terrorism, see memorandum from Tom Charles Huston
to President Richard Nixon, 8/12/70.
m Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 9/21/70.
(Hearings, vol. 2, Exhibit 62).
17JDean (staff summary), 8/7/75. See also John Dean testimony, Senate
Watergate Hearings, June 28, 1973, Vol. 4, PP. 1446-1456.
11< Richard Ober handwritten notes on Huston memorandum, 7/9/70.
175 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to President Richard Nixon, 8/17/70.
170 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 8/17/70.
177 Dean (staff summary), 8/7/75.
962
and returned to Indiana to practice law.178 He continued to serve as a
consultant to the White House, finishing his study of Vietnam negotiations.
On October 7, 1972, he was named a member of a Census Bureau
Advisory Committee on privacy and confidentiality.
Huston's original ally, Wilham Sullivan, managed to remain on
good terms with J. Edgar Hoover, at least for a few months-he was
reprimanded by the DIrector for letting the Ad Hoc staff get out of
hand,179 but nonetheless was promoted to Number 3 man in the FBI.
Sullivan's fall from power began several months after the Huston
Plan, with his October 12, 1970 speech at Williamsburg, Virginia,
where his answers to questions were critical of Hoover's ability to
understand the changing nature of the U.S. internal security threat.
Sullivan told his audience that the race riots and student upheaval
had nothing to do with the Communist Party. Rather, they were attributable
to problems within the American social order and to the
Vietnam War. When he returned to Washin~n, Sullivan remembers,
"all hell broke loose." 180 Hoover told him lie had given "the wrong
answers.... How do you expect me to get my appropriations," said
the Director of the FBI, "if you keep downgrading the [Communist]
Party." The breached widened, and finally, a year later on October 1,
1971, Hoover had Sullivan literally locked out of his office for good.
VII. THE HIDDEN DIMENSIONS OF THE HUSTON PLAN
A. Duplicity
Looking back on the summer of 1970, Tom Huston observes that the
atmosphere of duplicity was the most astonishing aspect of the meetings
at Langley. On June 5, the President had sat across the table from
the directors of the major intelligence agencies and asked them for a
comprehensive report on intelligence collection methods against domestic
radicals. Instead, President Nixon and his representative were
victims of deception. "I didn't know about the CIA mail oJ?enings,
I didn't know about the COINTELPRO Program [an FBI mternal
security operation]," Huston says. "These people were conducting all
of these things on their own that the President of the United States
didn't know about.... In retrospect, we look like danmed fools." 181 In
interrogatory answers, the former President stated that he had no
knowledge the CIA mail-opening program was already in existence
before June 1970; he was aware, however, that the intelligence community
read the outside of envelopes of selected mail.182
Huston believes that part of the problem was bureaucratic gameplaying:
"... the Bureau had its own game going over there. They
didn't want us to know; they didn't want the [Justice] Department to
know; they didn't want the CIA to know." And, across the Potomac,
"the CIA had its own game going. They didn't want the Bureau to
know." 183
118 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, pp. 83-84.
110 Sullivan (staft' summary), 6/10/75.
1lIO Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, pp. 35--36.
181 Huston deposition 5/22/75, p. 50.
180 Answers of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatories,
3/9/76. pp. 1, 4, 5 and 14.
181 Huston deposition, 5/22/75, pp. 50-51.
963
Agencies concealed programs from one another partly out of "interagency
jealousies and rivalries," Huston speculated.184 They did not
want to have revealed the fact that they were working on each other's
"turf." For example, "Mr. Hoover would have had an absolute stroke
if he had known that the CIA had an Operations CHAOS going on." 185
Huston has suggested another possible motivation for concealment:
I think the second thing is tJOOt if you have got a program
going and you are perfectly happy with its results, why take
the risks that it might be turned off if the President of the
United States decides he does not want to do it; because they
had no way of knowing in advance what decision <the President
might make. So, why should the CIA ... the President
may say hell no, I doo't want you guys opening any mail.
Then if they had admitted it, they would have had to close
the thing down.1S"
The unfortunate end result of these concealments between agencies
was the fact that the President did not know what his intelligence
services were doing either.
The language in the Special Report concerning the CIA covert mail
project is a clear example of the concealment of an illegal intelligence
collection operation from the President. The section of the Report
dealing with mail plainly stated that "covert coverage has been discontinued."
187 In truth, however, the CIA program to read the international
mail of selected American citizens and foreigners was continuing
to operate at the time of the Langley meetings.
Director Helms thinks he told Attorney Geneml Mitchell about the
CIA mail program; and he is uncertain whether President Nixon knew
about it-he personally never informed the President.1s8 Mitchell has
denied that Helms told him of a CIA mail-opening program,189 and
has testified further that the President had no knowledge of the program
either, "at least not as of the time we discussed the Huston
plan." 190
Helms' suggested that Huston may not have been told about the
mail-opening program at any of the working group meetings because
he was the White House contact man for "domestIc intelligence. We
thought we were in the foreign intelligence field." Whatever the explanation,
however, it is clear that the President was given a misleadmg
document.
James Angleton, who served as Chief of the CIA Counterintelligence
Staff from 1954 to 1974 and was in charge of the CIA covert mail program
from 1955 to its termination in 1973, had other explanations for
the misleading language on the mail program in the Special Report.
AnglEt-on testified: "It is still my impression ... that this activitl
that IS referred to as having been discontinued refers to the Bureau s
activities in this field ... it is certainly my impression that this was
"" Huston 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 33.
lB:i Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 33.
w Huston. 9/23/75, Hearings p. 33-84.
U'1 Special Report, p. 29.
188 Hplms, 10/22/75, Hearing-s, PP. 89. 96.
1llO Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, p. 137. See also pp. 120, 122.
100 Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, p. 138.
964
the gap which the Bureau was seeking to cure." 193 The language of the
Report itself, however, does not reflect such a distinction.
Angleton also stated that the CIA would never discuss such a sensitive
topic as their mail program in large meetings like the ICI Ad Hoc
sessions at Langley, "The possibilities for leaks were too great for one
thing," he observes.194 One of Angleton's 'assistants has referred to the
Langley meetings as "a fish bowl." 195 Delicate matters, if they required
PresIdential approval, "would have been raised either by the Director
of the FBI or the Director of Central Intelligence," Angleton
stressed.196 Yet, insofar as the record indicates, neither of the Directors
did raise tms topic with the President.
During public hearings, Angleton stated that the concealment from
the President was not deliberate:
Mr. Angleton: Mr. Chairman, I don't think anyone would
have hesitated to inform the President if he had at any
moment asked for a review of intelligence operations.
Senator Church: That is what he did do. That is the very
thing he asked Huston to do. That is the very reason that
these agencies got together to make recommendations to him,
and when they made their recommendations, they misrepresented
the facts.
Mr. Angleton: I was referring, sir, to a much more restricted
forum.
Senator Church: I am referring to the mail, and what I
have said is solidly based upon the evidence. The President
wanted to be informed. He wanted recommendations. He
wanted to decide what should be done, and he was misinformed.
Not only was he misinformed, but when he reconsidered
authorizing the opening of the mail five days later and revoked
it, the CIA did not pay the slightest bit of attention
to him, did it, the Commander-in-Chief, as you say ~
Mr. Angleton: I have no satisfactory answer for that.
Senator Church: You have no satisfactory answed
Mr. Angleton : No, I do not.
Senator Church: I do not think there is a satisfaotory
answer because having revoked the authority the CIA went
ahead with the program. So that the Commander-in-Chief is
not the Commander-in-Cmef at all. He is just a problem. You
do not want to inform him in the first place because he might
say no. That is the truth of it. And when he did say no you
disregard it, and then you call him the Commander-inChief.
197
Questioning Tom Huston on the subject of mail openings, the Chairman
of the Select Committee summarized the Huston Plan exercise
as follows:
"" Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 54.
... Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 56.
'" Staff summary of [CIA counterintelligence specialist], 2/8176.
. 188 Angleton, 9/24175, Hearings, p. 56.
wr Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 37.
965
Senator Church: So we have a case where the President
is asked to authorize mail openings, even though they are
illegal. And quite apart from whether he should have done
it, and quite apart from whether or not the advice of the
Attorney General should have been asked, he acceded to that
request, thinking that he was authorizing these openingsnot
knowing that his authority was an idle gesture, since
these practices had been going on for a long time prior to the
request for his authority. And after he revoked that authority,
the practices continued, even though he had revoked it.
That is the state of the record, based on your testimony?
Mr. Huston: Yes, I think it is.'98
In retrospect, Huston reasons that if he and others in the White
House had known these intelligence options were being exercised already
and had not produced results significant enough to curb domestic
unrest, "it conceivably would have changed our entire attitude
toward the confidence we were willing to place in the hands of the
intelligence community in dealing with this problem." 199
Huston now points to the irony in the fact that intelligence is suppossed
to provide policymakers with information upon which to make
decisions, but in June 1970 the top policymaker in the government
was kept unaware that certain sources of information were even available.
20o Part of the problem seemed to be excessive compartmentation
in the intelligence agencies.
The failure of the CIA participants to tell Tom Huston of their
mail-opening program was not the only example of dissimulation
during this episode. Sullivan attempted to give Hoover the impression
that he was not a part of the efforts to relax the restraints on intelligence
collection. He wrote in a memorandum to Cartha DeLoachhis
immediate supervisor and the Number 3 man in the FBI in June
1970-that Benson Buffham (the NSA representative at the Langley
meeting'S) was takinQ' a particularly active role in the review of the
"restraints" section of the draft. "Admiral Noel Gaylor (sic) of the
National Security Agency," wrote Sullivan, "may have been a moving
force behind the creation of this committe~." [Emphasis added.] 202
Sullivan was indeed in a good oosition to know. He and Tordella of
NSA (Gaylor's deputy) had viewed these meetin~ since the beginnin{!'
as, in Tordello's worils. "nothing less than a hp,aven-sent opportunity
for NRA...."203 Yet, Sullivan pnded his memo for"the FBI
leadership with the admonition: "Contingent upon what the President
decides, it is clear that there could be problems involved for the
Bureau." 00i
This was the first written example of Sullivan's apnarent strategy to
impress upon Hoover, Tolson. and DeLoach his disassodation with
attempts to relax restraints which Hoover wanted maintained. Two
181 Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 16.
OIl Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 17.
.... Huston. 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 34.
... Sullivan memorandum, 6/19/70.
... Tordella (staff summary). 6/16/75.
... Sullivan memorandum, 6/19/70.
966
days later on June 20, Sullivan took a definitely pro-Hoover position
in a memorandum for the Director. He recommended that the FBI
oppose "the relaxation of investigative restraints which affect the
Bureau" 205 Everything he had been working for with Huston,
Tordella, and the others was denied. For the Director's consumption,
he portrayed himself as the arch-defender of the Bureau's image, protecting
Hoover and the FBI against the excesses of Huston's committee.
The memorandum was written on the same day Sullivan's rival,
Cartha DeLoach, made a decision to leave the FBI to become a business
executive, thereby clearing the pathway to higher office in the Bureau
for Sullivan.
As for the proposed interagency committee-an idea for which both
he and Huston had expressed strong commitment and lively interest
206-Sullivan concluded on the eve of his promotion to the Number
3 spot in the FBI: "I do not agree with the scope of this proposed
committee nor do I feel that an effort should be made at this time to
engage in any combined preparations of intelligence estimates." 201
Huston suspected that the opposition of the FBI's representatives
was ambivalent. "I am sure that, tactically, the people in the Bureau
probably were telling Hoover that 'the other fellows are pushing this
stuff,'" Huston has testified. "If I had to gamble, that would be my
bet. Probably 'Huston over there with a black snake whip,' or Helms
or somebody else-which didn't bother me, I mean tactically, if that
is the way the people figured that they had to push the Director to get
done what they wanted to do. 208
There is little doubt, however, that Huston and the Sullivan group
of the FBI set the agenda and shaped the format of the Special Report.
Huston, Sullivan, and Brennan had discussed the direction the Committee
ought to take many times over.209 They worked closely together
during the June meetings; and before formal meetings, Huston, Sullivan
and the Bureau representatives were in frequent contact over the
telephone or talking together directly. Members of the FBI contingent
would pick up Huston at the White House on the way to Langley and
bring him back after the ICI meetings. Often they lunched together.
Huston saw himself acting, in part, in the capacity of a sympathetic
White House staffer passing on to the President what the professionals
wanted. "And I agreed with them," he emphasizes. "I say 'agreed.'
After you work with somebody and you are convinced that what they
want to do is right, you agree with them." 210 There was no doubt in
Huston'l'I mind that FBI, CIA, and NSA professionals were pushing
hard for expanded intelligence collection operations. They "clearly
wanted me to recommend to the President that these operations be
adopted," he remembers.21l To conclude that Huston dominated and
... Memorandum kom WilHam Sullivan to Olyde Tolson, 6/20/70. (Hearings,
Vol. 2, Exhibit 16) .
... Huston deposition, 5/23/75; Sullivan (stat! summary), 6/10/75.
"'" Sullivan memorandum, 6/20/70.
... Huston deposition, 5/23/75, pp. 64-65.
100 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, pp. 62--63; Sullivan (stat! summary), 6/20/70;
FBI counterintelligence specialist (stat! summary), 8/20/75.
.... Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 63.
211 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 63.
967
manipulated the intelligence community is an error. The relationship
was symbiotic. As Huston has explained,
... the entire intelligence community, in the summer of 1970,
thought we had a serious crisis in this country. I though we
had a serious crisis in this country. My attitude was that we
have got to do something about it. Who knows what to do
about it. The professional intelligence community ~ The professional
intelligence community tells me, "you give us these
tools; we can solve the problem." I recommended those
tools.212
The duplicity went beyond the CIA mail program and Sullivan's
dissembling. A subsequent section of this commentary reveals that
the intelligence agencIes greatly expanded their collection programs
after PresIdent Nixon revoked his authority for the Huston plan,
without obtaining presidential approval for their actions.
B. La'wle887le88
Several of the techniques discussed in the drafting of the Special
Report were of questionable legality. For example, covert mail cover
and surreptitious entry were, in Huston's words, "clearly illegal." 218
And, the legitimacy of other intelligence collection methods, such as
placement of AmerIcan names on the NSA watch list, was highly questionable.
214 Yet, former President Nixon does not recall "any discussion
concernin~ the possible illegality of any of the intellIgence
gat.hering techniques described in the report during my meeting with
the rICIJ Committee [on June 5, 1970]." 215
During public hearings, Senator Walter Mondale asked Huston
whether anyone of the ICI staff members had objected "during the
course of making up these options to these recommendations which
involved illegal acts" :
Mr. Huston: At the working group level, I do not recall
any objection.
Senator Mondale :Do you recall any of them ever saying we
carulOt do this because it is illegal ~
Mr. Huston: No.
Senator Mondale: Can you recall any discussion whatsoever
concerning the illegality of these recommendations ~
Mr. Huston: No.
Senator Mondale: Does that strike you as peculiar that
top public officers in the most high level and sensitive positions
of goverrunent would discuss recommending to the
President actions which are clearly illegal and possibly unconstitutional
without ever asking themselves whether that
was a proper thin~ for them to be doing ~
Mr. Huston : Yes, I think it is, except for the fact that I
think that for many of those people we were talking about
2D Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p.17.
2D Attachment to Huston memorandum, 7/70, pp. 2, 3.
..4 See NSA RePOrt, Sec. II B 2.
m Answer d1' Richal"d 'M. Nixon to :Senate ISelect Committee Interrogutory 23,
3/9/76, p. 13.
69-984 0 - 76 - 62
968
something that they had been aware of, had been undertaking
for a long period of time.
Senator Mondale: Is that an adequate justification?
Mr. Huston: Sir, I am not trying to justify, I am just trying
to tell you what my impression is of what happened at
the time.
Senator Mondale: Because if criminals could be excused
on the grounds that someone had clone it before, there would
not be much of a population in any of the prisons today,
would there?
Mr. Huston: No.216
Legal advice was not sought, several important legal matters were involved
in preparing the report for the President. The CIA General
Counsel was not included or consulted, since, as Angleton had testified,
"the custom and usage was not to deal with General Counsel, as
a rule, until there were some troubles. He was not a part of the process
of 1?roject approval." 217
AVOIdance of legal and constitutional matters was, apparently, not
uncommon throughout the intelligence cOlnmtmity. William Sullivan
has testified :
During the ten years that I was on the U.S. Intelligence
Board, a Board that receives the cream of intelligence for this
country from all over the world and inside the United. States,
never once did I hear any body, including myself, raise the
question: "Is this course of action which we have agreed upon
lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral?" We never gave any
thought to this rea.lm of reasoning, because we were just naturally
pragmatists. The one thing we were concerned about
was this: will this course of action work, will it get us what
we want, will we reach the objective that we desire to reach ?218
Sullivan attributes much of this attitude concerning the law to the
molding influence of World War II upon young FBI agents who have
since risen to high position. In a deposition, Sullivan noted that during
the 1940s there was "a war psychology. Legality was not questioned.
Lawfulness was not a question; it was not an issue."
Senator Mond'ale: That carried on, unfortunately, after the
war.
Mr. Sullivan: Senator, you are right. We could not seem to
free ourselves either at the top or bottom, could not free
ourselves from that psychology with which we had been
imbued as young men, in particular, most all young men when
we went into the Bureau.
Along came the Cold War. We pursued the same course
in the Korean War, and the Cold War continued, then the
Vietnam War. We never freed ourselves from that psychology
that we were indoctrinated with, right after Pearl
Harbor, you see. I think this accounts for the fact that nobody
seemed to be concerned about raising the question, is this
...0 Husron, 9/28/75, Hearings, p. 21.
m Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 77.
m Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, pp. 92-93.
969
lawful, is. this legal, is this ethica.l. It was just like a. soldier
in the battlefield. When he shot down an enemy he did not
ask himself is this legal or lawful, is it ethical? It is what he
was expected to do as a soldier.
We did what we were expected to do. It became a part of
our thinking, a part of our personality.219
Neither the Attorney General nor anyone in his office was invited to
the sessions at Langley, or consulted during the proceedings. During
public hearings on the Huston Plan, Huston was asked about the
absence of consultations with the Attorney General.
Senator Church: And it never occurred to you, as the President's
representative, in making recommendations to him
that violated the law, that you or the White House should
confer with the Attorney General before making those recommendations?
Mr. Huston: No, it didn't. I should have, but it didn't.220
The Attorney General knew nothing of the preparation of an intelligence
report for the President until so informed by Hoover on
July 27,1970, several weeks after Hoover had signed the June "Special
Report." 221 One reason ,for the absence of Attorney General John
Mjtchell, Huston explains, is that this was an intellIgence matter to
be handled by the intelligence agency directors.222 Mitchell, the head
of Justice, was not included, just as Laird, the head of Defense, was
not included. Huston now claims, though, that he naturally thought
Hoover would check with Mitchell or his Deputy before signing the
Special Report, just as General Bennett cleared with his superior,
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, and informed the Secretary
of Defense, Melvin Laird.223
Another reason for the exclusion of Mitchell might have been the
institutional animosity which existed between the professional intelligence
establishment and the Office of the Attorney General. The
former was primarily interested in the collection of intelligence and
the protection of sources; the latter suffered, in Huston's view, from
"prosecutor's mentality"-an interest in the collection of evidence for
its use in securing prosecution. Huston states that there are "two
approaches" to handling the problem of violence-prone demonstrators:
One is the intelligence-collection approach where you try
to keep tabs on what is g'oing on and stop it before it happens.
The other approach, which is perhaps the only tolerable one
in a free society, from a perfectly legitimate point of view,
is you have to pay the price of letting a thing happen, and
then follow the law and hope you can apprehend the person
responsible and prosecute him according to the law.m
... Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, pp. 95-96.
... Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 15. In the summer of 1970, Huston held the
belief that "the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the President in the exercise
of matters relating to internal security or national security." (Huston, 9/23/75,
Hearings, p. 20.) lSee also Ruston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 14.
-Helms memorandum for the record, 7/28/70; Sullivan (sta1f summary),
6/10/75; Mitchell testimony, Senate Watergate Hearings, July 10, 1973, Vol. 4,
pp. 1603-04.
... Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 35.
... Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 15; Bennett (sta1f summary), 6/5/75.
... Huston deposition, 5/22/75, p. 167.
970
Considerable tension existed between these two approaches in 1970.
The enmity between some members of the 'White House staff (notably
Huston) and the Justice Department stretched back to preparations
for the antiwar demonstrations in Washington in 1969. The
Justice Department, Huston believes, saw the violence which occurred
as premeditated and leaned toward seeking indictments under the
Federal Anti-riot Act. In contrast, Huston and Sullivan saw the problem
from the perspective of an intelligence officer. The answer rested
in mobilizing the mtelligence agencies, not the law enforcement community.
225 As Huston has testified: "I frankly did not have a whole
lot of confidence in the Justice Department sensitivity with respect
to distinguishing between types of protest activity." 226 So the Justice
Department continued to seek more stringent criminal sanctions to
deal with the problem of subversives, and the intelligence collectors
pursued the expansion of their methodology as a better solution.
In his March 1976 interrogatory answers, former President Nixon
took the position that "there have been-and will be in the futurecircumstances
in which presidents may lawfully authorize actions in
the interests of the security of this country, which if undertaken by
other persons, or even by the president under different circumstances,
would be illegal." 227 As an example, the former President drew upon
the example of mail opening. "The opening of mail sent to related
priority targets of foreign intelligence, although impinging upon
the individual," said the former President, "may nevertheless serve a
salutory purpose when-as it has in the past-it results in preventing
the disclosure of sensitive military and state secrets to the enemies
of this country." 228
The White House staffer who recommended the use of illegal and
highly questionable intelligence gathering techniques in 1970 had decided
five years later that, in the end, the growth and preservation
of a free society depended upon a reliance on the law.229 For Huston,
the sanctions of criminal law had replaced his earlier faith in unrestricted
intelligence collection as the more appropriate response to
the threat of violence in our society.23o The risk inherent in the latter
approach was too great. In Huston's words:
The risk was that you would get people who would be susceptible
to political considerations as opposed to national
security considerations, or would construe political considerations
to be national security considerations, to move from
the kid with a. bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from
the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper
sticker of the opposing candidate. And you just keep going
down the line.231
... Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 24, Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
.. Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 15.
m Answer of Richa,rd 'M. Nixon to Senate ISelect Committee Interrogatory 34,
3/9/76, p. 17.
... Ibia.
"'" Huston, 9/23/75, HearingB, p. 45.
... Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 47.
..1 Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 45.
971
O. Mimed Motives
Also hidden behind the events of June 1970 were the reasons for
ardent participation-or lack thereof-in the writing of the intelligence
report. Reaction to the first gathering of the ICI (Ad Hoc)
work-group was mixed. Some participants were delighted by the
turn of events. For years, a group of counterintelligence specialists
within the FBI had favored reinstatement of collection procedures
taken lllW'ay from them by the Director and viewed the request from
the White House for a Special Report as a unique opportunity. The
CIA, NSA, and most of the FBI representatives shared an enthusiasm
for the project, with varying degrees of optimism that the
planning would actually be approved by Hoover.
'Not everyone, however, was sanguine albout the proceedings. "What
a bucket of worms!" observed Richard Ober, Angleton's backul> man
from the CIA, to Col. Koller of the Air Force after the meetmg.2S4
Koller thought it was worse than that. "I wouldn't have touched what
they were talking a!bout with a 10-foot pole," he noted recently. "The
things they were talking about were illegal, and certainly beyond our
interest and capalbility." 235 Koller dropped out after the first meeting,
warning his boss, General Triantafeller, not to get the Air Force involved.
The Air Force kept a representative at the meeting, Col.
Demelt "Gene" Walker, but only as an observer who h'ad been cautioned
to keep a safe distance from the planning and to protect the Air
Force.23B
This reaction was typical of all the military representatives. The
Army member, Col. John Downie, was the most outspoken. At the
first gathering he made it clear that ''the Army would keep the hell
out" of domestic intelligence collection, since it was already in deep
trouble over the recent exposure of Army surveillance of civilians.237
Downie and others were at that moment preparing for hearings before
the Senate's Constitutional Rights Subcommittee on that very subject.
Downie now states that the Army would have been far less resistant
to Sullivan's efforts to draw them in had they not been on the "hot
seat" 'at the time.238
Stilwell of DIA was also told by Gen. Bennett to proceed with extreme
caution; he was supposed to help out where he could, but
Bennett felt the DIA had little to contribute to the effort. Huston
recalls the DIA role as being minima1.239 "B." Willard, the Navy
civilian observer, remembers that the dominant feeling of the military
representatives was: "Don't try to draw us into this." 240 The attitude
"'" Staff summary of Col. Rudolph Koller interview, 8/11/75.
-Koller (stall' summary), 8/11/75. Col. Koller's protestations ahout "illegalities"
to the eon'trary ndtwithsfunding, no witness recaUs 'anyone-including
Kol'ler-who diSCUSSed the legal aspects of intelligence collections during the
Langley meetings.
.. Stall' summary of 001. Demelt Walker imerview, 7/28/75; Koller (staff
summary), 8/11/75.
"'" Downie (staff summaTY), 5/13/15.
.. Downie (staff summary), 5/13/75.
.. StHweD (staff summary), 5/21/75; Bennett (9taff summary), 6/5/75; Huston
deposition, 5/23/75, p. 40.
... Willard (staff summary), 5/16/75.
972
of the Air Force and the Navy, was, in Stilwell's opinion: "We
haven't been involved in domestic intelligence collection,and we're
not going to start now." And for the Army the attitude seemed to be :
"We may have been stupid enough to stick our nose in once, but we're
not going to get burned twice." 241
Among the FBI participants at Langley, Donald E. Moore was an
exception. After Sullivan, he was the senior Bureau representative
on the ICI staff. He had been involved in intelligence work for the
Bureau since 1956, and in June 1970 was the Inspector-in-Charge,
Espionage Research Branch. He was greatly troubled by the opening
meeting at Langley. "I felt very uneasy about the direction the work
group was taking," he remembers. "Their views were contrary to what
Mr. Hoover would have liked. I wanted out." m
A Hoover "loyalist," Moore went to Sullivan after the meeting and
asked to be excused from subsequent sessions. "Suit yourself," Sullivan
replied, and Donald Moore faded from the scene, except for desultory
comments made on the threat portions of a draft Sullivan asked him
to review a week later.U3
Even among the ICI enthusiasts, not all were pursuing the same
goal. Ostensibly, the Ad Hoc Committee was established to provide
better intelligence to the President, primarily, on New Left activities,
and, secondarily, on foreign influence over the New Left. The radical
protesters were clearly Tom Huston's main interest. Data collection
on the New Left and black militancy was of great interest to others
as well, such as George Moore, who was the Bureau Section Chief with
responsibilities in this area. However, several of the participants saw
the concern of the President over domestic intelligence chiefly as a
way to ride piggyback through the White House approval process
their own primary goal of knocking down obstacles to foreign intelligence
collection. As one FBI observer at the Langley meetings has
commented:
Hoover put us out of business in 1966 and 1967 when he placed
sharp restrictions on intelligence collection. I was a Soviet
specialist and I wanted a better coverage of the Soviets. I
felt-and still feel-that we need technical coverage on every
Soviet in the country. I didn't give a damn about the Black
Panthers myself, but I did about the Russians. I saw these
meetings as a perfect opportunity to get back the methods we
needed ... and so did Sullivan.2H
Huston was aware that Gayler and others were in the venture for
reasons other than strictly to improve domestic intelligence. "The
whole question of surreptitious entry . . . was an issue gomg into this
thing I didn't know anything about, and didn't understand really
what it had to do with the subject underhand," Huston recalls. "It
was really clear to me that it was a foreign intelligence matter.... It
just seemed to me that if these people felt so strongly about it, why
'''Downie (staff summary), 5/13/75.
... Staff summary of Donald E. Moore interview, 7/28/75.
... Donald Moore (staff summary), 7/28/75.
'<4 [FBI counterintelligence expert] (staff summary), 8/20/75.
973
should I say no1 And so it went III [to the report for the
President]." 2'5
Huston remembers another example of the a(>proach used by NSA:
the modification of its authority for the collectIOn of communications
intelligence. "For all I know that [directive] could have authorized
people to have free lunch in the White House mess," he says. "In other
words, Admiral Ga.yler sa.id, 'This is what needs to be done' and that's
wha.t I did." 2'6
Those focusing on domestic intelligence objeotives and those on
foreign intelligence, those committed to relaxing collection restraints
and those reluctant to.be involved-these were the central cleavages in
the staff of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc).
D. "Oredit Oard RevolJu,tionarWs"
Just as hidden from the President and Tom Huston as the CIA
mail program-though more from reasons of their own selective perception
than from duplicit~-wasthe reality of the antiwar movement
which helped spur the wrIting o~ the intelligenc~ report in the first
place. The threat assessment sectIon of the SpeCIal Report W88 not
too different from earlier assessment prepared for Ehrlichman and
Huston in April and June of 1969. Though more thorough, it also
failed to produce much concrete evidence of foreign influence over
domestic unrest. During the public hearings on the Huston Plan,
C. D. Brennan, the FBI witness, said that the Bureau W88 never able
to find evidence indicating the antiwar protesters in the United States
were financed by external sources. "I felt thu the extremist groups
and the others who were involved in antiwar activities and tIle like
at ,that time were of the middle- and upper-level income," stated Brennan,
"and we characterized them generally as credit-card revolutionaries."
2'7
Despite the lack of any substantial evidence of foreign involvement,
,the White House under both Johnson and Ni:ron had persistently
tasked the Bureau to discover evidence of foreign funding.u8 As in
earlier reports, however, the assessment seotion of the SpecIal Report
pointed to the danger of foreign connections developing in the f!dwre.
Consensus here was high. Like those in the White House, the intelligenceofficers
writing the Report walked It slippery slope when they
began to speak of tlie need to expand intelligence collection more
because of potential rather than -actual findings.
These were among the main forces, not immedi1ltely visible, whieh
were particularly important in shaping the Special Report and the
Huston Plan. Those who had sought to obtain presidential authority
to broaden intelligence collection methods had ul,timately failed;
but they remained oommitted to their objeotive of expansion nonetheless.
The intelligence collectors were not to be dissuaded by the simple
absence of presidential or congressional authority.
.. Huston deposition, 5/22/75, p. 41.
... Huston deposition, 5/22/75, p. 46. Tordella has also alluded to an additional
reason for high NSA interest in these proceedings. Intelligence budgets were
sagging in 1970 and some saw chances here for expanded intelligence activities
and increased funding. Tordella (stair summary), 6/16/75.
- Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, p. 134.
... Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, pp. 104, 107, 135.
974
VIII. AFTERMATH: THE ENIr-OR THE BEGINNING?
Two events of particular significance followed in the close wake of
the Huston Plan. One was the creation of the Interagency Evaluation
Oommittee (lEO), and the other was a secret meeting involving
Hoover, Helms, Gayler, and Mitchell.
The lEO has become controversial, since it was similar in some
respects to the permanent interagency group recommended in the Huston
Plan. Questions have thus been raised concerning whether the
lEO became the instrument for carrying out the provisions of the Huston
Plan, possibly even serving as the precursor of the "Plumbers"
group which broke into the Democratic National Headquarters in the
WaJtergate building in 1972.
A review of the lEO history by the Oommittee, summarized below,
suggests that the Committee did resemble the interagency committee
outlined in the Huston Plan; however, the IECamounted to little
more than a research 'group, with no operational dimension and no ties
to the "Plumbers" unit. The lEO, however, did bring to fruition the
Huston Plan concept of an interngency intelligence committee.
A. The lntelligenae Evaluatiotn OfYTTllTTl,ittee
Within a month of John Dean's arrival in the White House, he had
lea;rned----ehiefly through conversations with Huston-the basic details
wbout the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Intelligence and the collision
with Hoover. By l'ate August, Haldeman had approached Dean.
on the Huston Plan, instructing him ''to see what I could do to get the
plan implemented." 2U Dean h~ testified that he had found the plan.
"Wt:8.lly uncalled for and unjustified." 262 ,
Eventually, on September 17, 1970, Dean went to see John Mitchell
about the Huston Plan and Haldeman's request for its implementation.
Mitchell explained to him some of the details of the Plan. As
Dean now recalls, his reaction was.to think: "¥ou've gat to be kidding.
This sounds like something the people on Mission Imposs~ble would
dream up." 261
The Attorney General reiterated his position against the Planwith
one exception. Unlike Hoover, Mitchell now thought that a
pennanent interagency committee for intelligence evaluation might be
useful. As Dean testified in 1973: "After my conversations with Mitchell,
I wrote a memorandum requesting that the evaluation committee
be established, and the restraints could be removed later. I told Mr.
Haldeman that the only way to proceed was one step at a time and this
could be an important first step. He agreed." [Emphasis added.] 254
This memo of September 18th from Dean to Mitchell read in
part: "A key to the entire operation will be the creation of a (sic)
Interagency Intelligence unit for both operational and· evaluation purposes
... and then to proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to
obtain such intelligence." [Emphasis added.] 255 Echoing Huston's
.. Dean (staff summary), 8/7/75.
- Dean,Senate Watergate Hearings, 6/25/73, p. 916.
-Dean (staff summary), 8/7/75.
.. Dean, Senate Watergate Hearings, 6/25/73, p. 916.
- Memorandum from John Dean to John Mitchell, 9/18/70. (Hearings, VoL
2, ExhIbit 24.)
975
recommendation to Haldeman of a month before, the memo bore the
postscript: "Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that if you would like
him to join you in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy to do so."
Looking back on this memorandum, Dean pointed out that, although
he was against the intelligence collection methods in the Huston Plan,
he knew Haldeman supported them and would be reading the memo,
too. Dean recalls that to keep his rapport with Haldeman-and his
job-he included the operational language in the memorandum, actually
believing, he claims, that the permanent evaluation committee
would be as far as the undertaking would ever go. He and Mitchell
were in agreement that "the enthusiasts" in the White House would
require some kind of pacifier and this memorandum would give them
at least a sense of action and commitment. 256
Whatever the truth may be about the later intentions of Dean,
Mitchell, or Haldeman, an interagency Intelligence Evaluation Committee
was planned and set up by Dean and Robert Mardian (Assistant
Attorney General in charge of Internal Security) during the
waning weeks of 1970. The IEC held its first meeting in Dean's EOB
office on December 3rd, with Mardian in char~ 251 The meet~ represented
the fulfillment of one Huston Plan obJective: the creatIon of a
permanent interagency intelligence committee.
At this opening session of the IEC were several old hands from the
earlier ICI Ad Hoc Committee: Angleton of CIA, George Moore of
FBI, Bffman of NSA,and John Downie of DOD. At the subsequent
meetings the ~roup would be supplemented by staff aides, many of
whom (like RIChard Ober of CIA) had also seen duty at the Lan~ley
meetings in June. The focus of the IEC, it was decided at the meetmg,
would be onintelligence
in the possession of the United States Government
respecting revolutionary terrorist activities in the
United States and to evaluate this intelligence to determine
(a) the severity of the problem and (b) what form the Federal
response to the problem identified should take.21
'
Though Dean had received a special security clearance at CIA on
September 30th and had immersed himself, at Haldeman's request,
into the details of the Special Report and the Huston Plan, his ,participa.
tion in IEC meetings soon came to an end. The IEC began meetmg
in the Justice Department under Mardian's tutelage, and by
January of the new year Dean had stopped attending the sessions.lso
Thereafter, the lEC was chiefly operated by Mardian and Bernard A.
Wells, his deputy.
One of the military staffmen assiWled to the Intelligence Evaluation
Committee was Army counterintelligence specialist Col. Werner E.
Michel. His views on ihe lEC are shared by VIrtually everyone familiar
with its activities. Michel observes that (1) the IEC did very little-and
nothing of an operational character; (2) what little it did do
2M Dean (stat!' summary), 8/7/75.
., Memorandum from Robert Mardian to John Mitchell, 12/4/70. (Hearings,
Vol. 2, Exhibit 25.)
- Mardl.an memorandum, 12/4/70.
- Dean (stat!' summary), 8/7/75.
976
(chiefly, prepare intelligence reports) was not done very well; and
(3) its leadership-specifically, Mardian-was inexperienced when
it came to intelligence work.261
The principal representatives to the IEC, experts like Angleton,
Buffham, Downie, and George Moore, dropped out of the proceedings
by July 20, 1971, leaving behind subalterns to observe and participate.
General Bennett has said, for example, that an enlisted man was assigned
to the IEC staff "to make sure Mardian wasn't trying to drag
the military into something unwarranted." 262
The IEC prepared about thirty staff reports and fifty-five "intelligence
calendars" on radical events which were distributed to Dean
in the White House and to the heads of participating agencies (including
Treasury and the Secret Service). These reports were considered
to be of low quality by experienced intelligence specialists.263 The
singularly most questionable document to emerge from ,the IEC
files was a memorandum appearing on January 19, 1971. Typed on
Justice Department stationery and addressed to Mitchell, Ehrlichman,
and Haldeman, the unsigned memorandum purported to speak unanimously
for the' IEC rarticipants. It asked for the implementation of
the Special Report 0 June 1970; obviously, from the text, the memorandum
actually sought the adoption of Tom Huston's recommendations.
"All those who have been involved in the project firmly believe,"
read the memorandum, "that the starting point for an effective domestic
intelligence operation should be the implementation of the Special
Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence." The anonymous
author, or authors, added that "there is considerable doubt as to how
significant a contribution the proposed committee [the IEC] would
make to existing domestic intelligence operati0'ft8 without implementation
of the Ad Hoc Committee Report...." [Emphasis added.)284
Dean has stated that Mardian was responsible for this memorandum.
265 Mardian, however, denies he made any attempt or suggestion
to implement provisions of the Huston Plan or the Special Report of
June 1970. In his view, the IEC was strictly an effort ''to increase
formal liaison among the intelligence agencies, since Hoover had
broken it off the previous summer. . . . The IEC was only for
analysis." 268
The Committee does not appear to have done anything: more than
try to evaluate raw intelliP.'ence dllta, over 90 per cent of which was
generated by the FBI.281 Like the Huf'ton Plan itself, this inter~ency
effort also failed in large part because of Hoover's truculence toward
it. At one point, Hoover wrote to Mardian concerning It proposed
081 Stat!' summary of Col. Werner E. Michel interview, 5/12/75. See also memorandum
for the record, by Col. Werner E. Michel May 21, 1973.
- Bennett (stat!' summary). 6/5/75.
-Michel (stat!' summary). 5/12/75; Stilwell (staff summary), 5/21/75;
Downie (stat!' summary), 3/13/75; Buft'ham (stat!' summary), 7/19/75; Angleton
(stat!' summary), 11/5/75.
... Ml'morandum (unsigned) on Justice Department stationery to John Mitchell,
John Ehrlichman, and H. R. Haldeman, 1/19/11. (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit
29.)
- Dean (stat!' summary), 8/7/75.
- Staff summary of Robert Mardian telephone interview, 1/13/76.
.... Michel (800ft' summary), 5/12/75. The FBI did have, however, the henpfit Qf
NSA data, the CIA mail opening prodUct, and information from the CIA/CHAOS
project.
977
charter for the lEO: ".•. it is requested that an appropriwte change
be made in the wording of paragraph IV entitled .Staff' to clearly
show that the FBI will not provide personnel for the proposed permanent
intelligence estimation staff." 268
Mardian lwter complained to the Attorney General on February 12,
1971 thwt the content of ,the intelligence estim8ltes would be of insufficient
quality "to warrant continuing without [FBI] cooperation."
269 Eventually, Hoover did send over two analysts; but ,they
were considered to be less than satisfactory by most other part.iCIpants.
270 The Director of the FBI clearly was not interested in the
success of the lEO, no more ,than he had cared for the concept of an
interagency oommitteeas outlined in the Huston Plan.
According to various sources. the secrecy of the lEO stemmed from
its handling of secret documents; its desire to avoid publicity and
criticism which might come to an interagency intelligence group,
regardless of how innocuous its works; and, Mardian's 'llJt:tempt to
make the lEO appear to be more impo~tant than it really was.211
In early June 1973, the lEO was finally abolished by Assistant
Attorney General Henry E. Petersen. He concluded in a memorandum
to participating agencies: "Now that the war in Vietnam has ended,
demonstrations carrying a potential for violence have virtually ended;
therefore, I feel that the lEO function is no longer necessary." m Behind
this smoke screen lay the real reason, accordmg to lEO staff member,
James Stilwell: lEO leaders feared the mounting criticism of the
recently revealed Huston Plan (a copy of which a~peared in the New
YO'1'k Timea) would lead the "jackals of the press to their door.218 It
was time to close shop. Some members of the lEO staff argued that
it would be a mistake to abolish the IEO at this time because people
would conclude wrongly that it was in some wayan extension of the
Huston scheme. This viewpoint was overridden.214
B. Se()'l'et Meeting with Hoover
On March 25, 1971, an FBI counterintelligence officer wrote a memorandum
for Hoover's information re~rding a request from Attorney
General Mitchell which asked the DIrector to meet with him, Helms,
and Gayler on March 31. The officer did not know the agenda for the
meeting, but speculated that it would cover the subject of foreign intelligence
as it related to domestic subversives.215
*'" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Mardian, 1/8/71.
~ Memorandum from Robert Mardlan to John Mitchell, 2/12/71. (Hearinp,
Vol. 2, Exhibit 27).
lit For example, Michel (staff summary), 5/12115; Stilwell, (staff summary),
5/21/75.
m For example, Downie (staff summary), 3/13/75; Stilwell (sts1f summary),
5/21/75.
... Memorandum from Henry E. Petersen to Col. Werner E. Mi~bel, 6/11/78.
... Stilwell (staff summary), 5/21/75.
,,. Stilwell (staff summary), 5/21/75.
... Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan, 3/23/75. (Though W. R.
Wannall is the name on the memorandum, it may have been actually dictated by
a subordinate in the FBI Intelligence DiVision.) In January 1971 the NSA Director
had written a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney
General on how his Agency could assist with "intelligence bearing on domestic
problems." See memorandum from Noel Gayler to Melvin Laird and John Mitchell,
1/26/71. Benson Buffham of NSA personally showed the memorandum to John
MitchelL (Memorandum for the record by Benson K. Buffham, 2/8/71).
978
The NSA, noted the memorandum, was already sending intelligence
to the CIA and the FBI "on an extremely confidential basis" on the
international communications of American citizens, but only as byproduct
from NSA's communications monitori~ responsibilities. This
mformation was not developed in any systematIc way. The memorandum
suggested. that Helms and Gayler might have an interest in increasing
mtelligence output of this type.
The memorandum stated that the principal source of Bureau data
on subversive activities was electronic surveillance and live informants.
To supplement these collection techniques, Hoover was advised to "take
advantage of any resources of NSA and CIA which can be tapped for
the purpose of contributing to the solution of the problem." The memorandum
sounded like a fragment of conversation from the Langley
meetings the previousJune.
The meeting in Mitchell's office actually occurred on March 29. Later,
Hoover prepared a memorandum for the files which indicated that
Helms was primarily responsible for the gatherin~. The puryose of the
meeting was to discuss "a broadening of operatIons, partIcularly of
the very confidential type in covering intelli~nce both domestic and
forei~." Ga~ler was "most desirous" of havmg the Bureau reinstate
certam intellIgence collection programs; and Helms spoke of "further
coverage of mail"
These approaches were rebuffed by Hoover, who told Helms and
Gayler (according to his memorandum) that he "was not at all enthusiastic
about such an extension of operations insofar as the FBI was
concerned in view of the hazards involved." Mitchell then intervened,
according to Hoover's memorandum, and asked Helms and Gayler to
prepare "an in-depth examination" of exactly what collection methods
they desired. After reading the report, Mitchell said he would convene
the group again "and make the decision as to what could or could not
be done." According to the Hoover memo, Helms agreed and said he
would have the report prepared "very promptly." 276
The Huston Plan battle had been fought again, this time with the
inclusion of the major missing participant: Attorney General Mitchell.
The results were similar to the earlier outcome: a victory for Hoover.
Yet, clearly, the war was not over. While neither Helms nor Gayler
nor Mitchell recall this meeting, or the outcome of the Helms-Gayler
report, and while it is unclear whether such a report was ever actually
prepared, one thing is certain: efforts to implement pr01Ji8ions of tM
Huston Plan persisted. The unlawful OIA mail-opening program continued;
the list of names of American citizens on the NSA Watch List
eW1!anded during the years 1970 to 1973; the age limit on FBI campu8
informants was lowered from ~1 to 18; and the Bureau intensified its
i'lllVestigations in the interrwlsecurity field. z7T
"'" Memorandum for the files by J. Edgar Hoover, 4/12/71. (Hearings, Vol. 2,
Exhibit 31). Subsequent to .the meeting with Mitchell, "the Attorney General
reversed the FBI decision" against a proposed CIA electronic surveillance, according
to Angleton, and in May 1971 "all the devices which had been installed ...
were tested and all were working." See Memorandum for the record by James
Angleton, 5/18/73, p. 5. (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 61).
m For the detailed documented evidence on these points, see the Select Committee
Reports on the CIA mail program, the NSA, and the FBI internal security
programs. Information on the incidents of surreptitious entry remains classifted
but the cases are limited to foreign targets. See also Brennan testimony, 9/25/75,
Hearings, p. 100, on the extent of the FBI internal security investigation.
979
The intensified intelligence activities of the FBI included surveillance
of "every Black Student Union and similar group, regardle88 of
their paBt or present involvement in disorders." [Emphasis added.] 218
This involved the opening of 4/JOO new cases. Also, members of the
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) were placed under investigation
accounting for an additional 6,500 new cases.279
The FBI witness during the Huston Plan public hearings did not
believe the President was ever told about this increased Bureau
activity.280 Nor, according to other witnesses, was he told about the
instances of expanded intelligence collection by other agencies, Speaking
of the CIA mail program, former Attorney General John Mitchell
suggested that "the old-school-tie boys, who had been doing it for 20
years, just decided they were going to continue to do it." 281
Looking back on the Huston Plan, President Nixon said in an official
statement in 1973: "Because the approval was withdrawn before it had
been implemented, the net result was that the plan for expanded intelligence
activities never went into effect." 282 It was not that simple,
however. As a former CIA Chief of Counterintelligence, James Angleton,
noted:
The Huston Plan, in effect, as far as we were concerned, was
dead in five days and therefore all of the other matters of enlarging
procurement within the intelligence community were
the same concerns that existed prior to the Huston Plan, 'and
subsequent to the Huston Plan. The Huston Plan had no impact
whatsoever on the priorities within the intelligence community.
28S
"People are reading a lot into the Huston Plan," Angleton continued,
"and, at the same tIme, are unaware that on several levels in the community
identical bilateral discussions were goin§: on." 284 Angleton
stated that, since the creation of the CIA in 1947, ' there has been constant
discussion of operations and improvement of collection, so there
is nothing unusual in time.... There were a number of ongoing bilateral
discussions every day with other elements within the intelligence
community which mayor may not have duplicated the broad,
general plan that HustQn brought about." 286
The fact that the President approved the Huston Plan-if only
briefly-is deeply troubling in itself, as some of its provisions contravened
the law. That some of the intelligence ag-encies could continue
these programs after the President revoked his authority-and, in
fact, expand them-is cause for great alarm. These facts raise serious
questions about the sensitivity of the White House and the intelligence
agencies to the law and the Constitution.
no Memorandum from Executives Conference to Clyde Tolson, 10/29/70. (Hearings,
Vol. 2, 10/29/70). The Executives Conference was an occasional gathering
of senior officials in the FBI.
!'lI Executives Conference memorandum, 10/29/70.
-Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, pp.138--139.
ll81 Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, p. 141. On the apparent lack of presidential
awareness of the NSA watch list expansion, see Allen, 10/29/75. Hearings,
pp. 28--29. and Nixon's answers to interrogatories, 3/9/76. p. 1.
.. President Richard Nixon, Pretridential Documents, 5/22/13, pp. 693-6195•
... Angleton, 9/24/75. Hearings, pp. 70--71.
... Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 82.
... Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 83.
980
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Huston Plan episode is a story of lawlessness and impropriety
at the highest levels of government. It is also a story of high-level deception,
for some of the intelligence agencies concealed Illegal programs
from the President and his representatives, from the Congress,
and from one another. The findings in this investigation are similar to
those disclosed in other phases of the Select Committee inquiry into the
American intelligence community, namely: a lack of accountability.
unclear lines of authority, and frequent disregard for the law.
A. AccountalJility, Authority, and the Law
On June 5, 1970, the President ordered the intelligence community
to provide the White House with 'a complete and factual review of selected
intelligence collection procedures, restraints upon these procedures,
and options for relaxing the restraints. Instead, his representative,
Tom Charles Huston, was deceived. The intelligence report for the
President failed to disclose an ongoing illegal mail-opening program
conducted by the CIA (with the cooperation and knowledge of the
FBI). It also failed to mention the improper domestic intelligence
activities of the CIA and the FBI, now known respectively as "Operation
CHAOS" and "COINTELPRO." 290 In short, the authority of
the President's order for a candid report carried little weight.
L8Iter, on July 23, 1970, when the President revoked his authority
to implement the Huston Plan provisions, his action again had little
effect upon the intelligence services. The CIA mail-opening continued;
Operation CHAOS and COINTELPRO went on; NSA selection
of international communications involving Americans was
expanded (apparently, largely as a result of names contributed to
the NSA "Watch List" bv the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, BNDD); the FBl opened thousands of new cases on domestic
dissenters and intensified its campus surveillance by lowering
the age of informants to 18; the intelligence agencies formed a permanent
interagency committee for intelligence, as envisaged in the
Huston Plan; and, the intelligence directors from the CIA and the
NSA continued to seek the full implementation of certain Huston
Plan provisions.
The intelligence officers conducted illegal and questionable collection
programs apparently partly because they concluded the good that
flowed from them in terms of anticipa,ting threats to the United States
made the programs worthwhile, and partly because of the pressure for
results from the White House. In addition, the threats of civil strife
faced by the nation in 1970 seemed to justify to the intelligence collectors
the use of extraordinary methods. Few of the counterintelligence
experts who prepared the report leading to the Huston Plan
objected to the inclusion of illegal options for the President. They did
not consul~ the Attorney General; they did not consult the Congress;
and they dId not consult their own legal counsels.
.. Although these two programs were not strictly within the intelligence collection
mandate of the ICI Ad Hoc Committee, they did deal with matters of internal
security and, in the case of CHAOS, with the connection between domestic
dissent and foreign powers; therefore, the CIA and FBI were being far from
candid with one another--and with the President's representative--by concealing
these programs at the Langley meetings.
981
B. The Quality and Ooordination of Intelligence
The Huston Plan is a story not only of impropriety and duplicity in
the nation's intelligence community, but also of frustration over the
quality and coordination of intelligence. The frustration came from
several sources and took many forms. The White House was dissatisfied
with the information available on domestic dissenters and their
foreign supporters, and was concerned about the disintegration of
liaison ties between the FBI and the other intelligence agencies.
Within the intelligence agencies themselves various degrees of dissatisfaction
over the quality and coordination of intelligence were also
expressed. In particular, J. Edgar Hoover was viewed widely as an
obstacle to the expansion of intelligence collection methods, especially
for the acquisition of foreign intelligence.
Most of the counterintelligence experts involved in the Huston Plan
episode did not share the White House view that domestic dissenters
were receiving substantial foreign funding. Despite considerable attention
to this matter, at the request of the White House, the intelligence
agencies were unable to discover evidence of such a link:. Nonetheless,
the President's men insisted upon still further investigation of
possible foreign ties and complained about the poor quality of intelligence
data in this area.
Reactions to the break-down of formal liaison coordination between
the FBI and the other intelligence agencies was also viewed from
different perspectives by various participants in 1970. William C.
Sullivan of the FBI and Tom Huston saw the severing of formal
ties by Hoover as another manifestation of paralysis in the conduct
of Bureau intelligence affairs. Others viewed the development as an
unfortunate inconvenience, but one that was soon surmounted by
sundry informal methods of communication. Severing formal liaison,
in other words, did not terminate cooperation between the intelligence
agencies and the FBI; rather, it forced the establishment of different
channels of communication, chiefly through increased telephone conversation
and the exchange of memoranda. No one, however, thought
the situation was as good as before formal ties were broken; and
everyone looked upon the general lack of communication between
Hoover and the other directors-especially Helms-as unfortunate.
O. Public Policy ImplicatiO'flB
The case of the Huston Plan provides a tragic commentary on the
state of American democracy in the summer of 1970. Tom Charles
Huston, the top White House adviser for internal security affairs,
advised the President of the United States, in effect, authorize the
violation of to the Constitution and specific federal statutes protecting
the rights of American citizens. The President, Richard M. Nixon,
accepted the advice and gave his brief approval to the unlawful intelligence
plan which now bears the name of his adviser. Throughout
the episode, some of the intelligence agencies concealed projects from
the White House and from one another; and, after the President took
back his authority from the intelligence plan, certain agencies continued
to implement the provisions anyway.
The conclusion to be drawn from this case is that: no longer can
the intelligence agencies be exempted from the law or from hnes of
higher authority. The final report of the Senate Select Committee on
982
Intelligence sets forth a series of recommendations to help prevent
this from happening again. Central to each of the issues of accountability,
authority, lawlessness, and the quality and coordination of intelligence
is the question of control. The provisions in the Final Report
would tighten control over the intelligence community.
Yet to avoid the dangers of tyranny inherent in greater control
in the government, the authority and responsibility for this increased
supervision must be shared among the intelligence agencies themselves,
the President, the Justice Department, the Congress, and the courts.
If shared and closer control is one answer emerging from this investigation
into the Huston Plan, another is the need for more frequent
dialogue on intelligence problems among responsible individuals in
each branch of the Government. The Huston Plan arose because wellmeaning
and intelligent people wanted solutions to pressing questions
of intelligence quality and coordination. The solutions arrived at in
June 1970 were inappropriate and have been rightly criticized, but
the original problems have not been completely unresolved. And they
will not be until leaders in the Congress and the Executive Branch
face them, discuss them,and decide upon appropriate courses of action.
The objective of the Select Committee has been to contribute to this
vital process.
APPENDIX
"CHRONOLOGY OF HUSTON PLAN AND INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE" PREPARED BY SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE STAFF
Date Central event Related developments
1965 As a result of Senator Long's wiretap hearings,
Hoover terminates "black ball" jobs.
December 1966 ._._ FBI terminates break· ins.
1967-68.._.... .... Capt. Thomas Charles Huston. U.S. Army.
works at DIA in the area of covert aerial
reconnaissance.
1968••_._. ._. Huston works part time in the Nixon cam·
paign.
April 1968.._._. • __ ...... • • •__ •• __ Dr. Martin Luther King. Jr•• ia murdered;
May 1. 1968_._. • Posotur dPeenot prlieo'ab amtaCrcohlumhbeiaadsUnfoivrerWsitaya.hington
from Memphis.
June 5. 1968 • • • .. • • • Robert F. Kennedy is murdered in Los Angeles.
Aug. 28. 1968_.. •__ • • • ._... __ •• Chicago police and some 3.000 demonstrators
confront outside the Chicago Hilton.
January 1969....._. Huston begins employment at the White
House on the Speechwriling and Research
staff.
March 1969••••••••• _., •• _. ._. _••_._ student riob at SIn Francisco Stete College.
April 1969... -. - -. - -. -. - -•. Ri:~'1en\nri:~ J:::~~~'::r~~II~hlCago.
April 1969 _.. . __ •__ . • .. •• EhrJichman prepares a report for Nixon on
foreign Communist support of campus dis·
orders: the White House concludes that
present intelligence collection capabilities
were inadequate.
May 1969..... ..._. ._._. ._. ._. Nixon places first of 17 tapa on government
otficlala.
June 1969. __ ._ ... _._ ... Huston ia aasigned by Ehrlichman (through
Krogh) to investigate poasible foreign aup·
port 01 campua disorders; receives briefinga
and reporta from CIA and FBI; obtains little
evidence to sUPJlort the hypothesia. though
is displeased With quality of dau-peel·
ally from the Bureau; has first contact with
the intelligence community since entering
the White House. .
July 1.1969 _ _._._ _ _._._ .. _ __ .. ._ .. Huston advises IRS to move allainst leftist
organizations.
July22.1969......... ..... .... _. • • • . Mitchell establishes the "Civil Disturbance
Group" (COG) to coordinate intellillence,
policy'and action within Justice concerning
domestic civil disturbances-apparenUy because
he doubted the edequacy of FBI
efforts in this area.
October-November 1969. DUring the demonstrations. Huston monitors
FBI intelligence estimates for the White
House;, Krogh. Haldeman. and Ehrlichman
complain about quality of FBI data.
December 1969 Huston asks Sullivan to have the Bureau pre-
Plre areport 011 the Novembermoratorium,
showinll that the Weathermen were to
blame for the violence not the NewMobilization
(a conclusion allreed upon by Huston
and Sullivan and contrary to the pOSition of
the Department of Justice). i
January 1970.. __ .. __ .. _ _ __ Army domestic surveillance prollram s
revealed; Ervin bellins investlption: Huston
continues responsibilities tor monltorinlland
disseminating FBI intelligence to the White
House; student riots at UC Slnte Barbare.
March 1970 _ _._ _._ _._ __ ••• _._ _ Exp,loslon of Greenwich Vlllaae townhouse
'bomb factorY;" Weathermen bomblnga of
COrporat!OII ollices In New York; Increase In
bombing incidents throughout the United
States.
, (983)
984
"CHRONOLOGY OF HUSTON PLAN ANO INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITIEE" PREPARED BY SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE STAFF-Continued
Date Central event Related developments
June 4,1970 Huston recommends to Nixon thai Sullivan be
named chairman of work group for Special
Report; earlier, Huston and Sullivan had
met together to outline the restraints on
Intelligence collection which Huston could
show to Nixon in order to persuade him to
establish the Interagency Committee on
Intelligence (ICI) (ad hoc).
June 5, 1970 Nixon holds meeting in White House to create
ICI (ad hoc); Hoover named chairman;
present at the meeting with Nixon are:
Hoover, Helms, Bennett, Gayler, Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, Finch, and Huston.
June 8, 1970 Hoover convenes meetinl\ of intelligence
principals to plan the wnting of a Special
Report for the President; names Sullivan
work group chairman; meeting attended by
Helms, Hoover, Gayler, Bennett, Huston,
Sullivan, and G. Moore.
June 9,1970 First meeting of ICI (ad hoc) work group at
Langley; discussion on the purpose of the
assembled group; each agpncy assigned
task of preparing a list of restraints hamperJune
10,1970 ing intelligence collection. Sullivan is promoted to No.3 man in the
Bureau, succeeding Oe Loach as Assistant
to the Director; De Loach retires on July 20,
1970.
MalCh 19, 1970 Executiva Protaction Service established,
Apr. 4, 1970 40,p!lOlaOcingmaarchheavdioewrnguaPrednnasryoluvnadniaemAbvaes.sieins.
washington, D.C.
Apr. 22,1970__ • Meeting in Haldeman's office: Huston is told
to meet regularly with intelligence agencies
on questions of domestic violence and
report to the White House; decision that
Nixon should meet with intelligence community
principals regarding intelligence
gaps; Cambodian incursion prevents meetMay
1970 ing from being held in May. Kent State and Jackson State shootings; antiwar
demonstrations; Hoover terminates FB I
Iiasion to CIA; Army phases out domestic
surveillance program.
June 12, 1970 Second meeting of work group _
June 17, 1970 Third meeting of work group _
June 23,1970 Fourth and final meeting of the work group___ wi June 23, 1970 Hoover terminates all FBI formaillalson .th
. NSA, DIA, Secret Service, and the military
services.
Early July 1970 In a memo to Haldeman entitled "Operational
Restraints on Intelligence Collaction,"
Huston recommends that Nixon selact most
of the options relaxin~ restraints on Intelfigence
collection; hiS recommendation,
he says, reflacts tne consensus of the Ie
(ad hoc), not just his own viewpoint. Huston
writes a separate meRlO encouraging Nixon
to implement the Special Report options
in a face-to-face meeting With the Agency
chiefs; otherwise, thought Huston, Hoover
might not accept the relaxations.
Ju'y 9,1970. In a memo, Huston proclaims himself the
"exclusive" contact point at the White
House on matters of domestic intelligence
or internal security.
July 14, 1970 Haldeman writes memo to Huston saying that
Nixon had approved Huston's planJthough
he did not agree to the face-ta-llce announcement
of the decision. Nixon tells
Haldeman, who tells Huston, that he did
not want to take the time to call the I\&ency
Directors in.
June 25, 1970 Principals meet in Hoover's office to sign the
Special Report.
June 26, 1970 A copy of the Special Report delivered to
July 1970 Huston at the White House. John Dean transfers to the White House from
Justice, where he had often represented the
Government in discussions with protest
leaders about demonstration permits for the
Washington, D.C. area.
985
"CHRONOLOGY OF HUSTON PLAN AND INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE" PREPARED BY SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE STAFF-Continued .
Date Central event Related developments
late Augus!. Haldeman shows Dean the Huston Plan and
asks himto implement it.
Aug. 25,1970 In a memo to Haldeman, Huston urges White
House expansion of Subversive Activities
Control Board via an Executive order.
Sept. 10, 1970 Huston writes a memo to Haldeman on the
SUbject of air hijacking in which he states
the need for improved intelligence community
coordination, referring to Hoover as the
chief obstacle.
July 23,1970 Huston prepares a memo on Nixon's approval
of the extreme options, has the memo approved
by Haldeman, and sends itto Helms,
Hoover, Gayler, and Bennett. Sullivan calls
Huston soon thereatter to say that Hoover
was furious about the memo and intended
to see Mitchell" Hoover calls and writes
Mitchell to complain (the first time Mitchell
hears about the Special Report). Hoover
goes to Mitchell's ollice to object to the
removal of restraints on intelligence collection
methods; Mitchell supports Hoover's
objectives.
Ju Iy 27, 1970. • Mitchell confers with the President. Haldeman
calls Huston to say that Mitchell has talked
to Nixon about the Huston Plan, and the
July 23, decision memo was being recalled
so that Nixon, Hoover, Mitchell, and Haldeman
could reconsider the plan. David McManus
of the White House Situation Room
telephones each agency to request the return
of the decision memo and the Special
Report. .
July 28, 1970__ • The agencies return the decision memoran·
dums to the White House Situation Room.
Aug. 3,1970 Huston and Haldeman "hassle" verbally
about whether Nixon should let Hoover's
Objections to the Huston Plan prevail.
Aug. 5,1970 Huston writes a memo to Haldeman urging
implementation of the Presidential decision
reflected in the July 23, memo.
Aug. 7, 1970 In a memo to Haldeman, Huston advises (1)
that Haldeman meet with Mitchell to secure
his supportfor the President's decision; (2)
that the FBI Director be informed the decision
will stand; and (3) that all intelligence
agencies are to proceed to implement them
at once.
Aug. 10, 1970 Huston is shitted to a subordinate position
under John Dean, who is charged with
assuming Huston's intelligence responsibilities
in the White House. Henceforth,
Huston's main responsibilities related to
conflict of interest clearances and the reo
view of Executive orders, though he occasionally
prepared intelligence reports for
Haldeman and continued to be the liaison
in the White House for FBI information.
Huston also worked on a White House history
of Vietnam negotiations.
Allg. 14,1970 • Huston asks IRS for a progress report 0". its
review of the operations of Ideological
organizations.
Sept. 17, 1970 Mitchell has lunch at CIA to discuss possi·
bility of improved interagency coordination;
meets with Dean in the afternoon and says
that he opposes Huston Plan but (unlike
Hoover), approves of an interagency evalua·
ation committee to improve intelligence coordination.
In a memo to Haldeman. Dean
recommends the establishment of such a
committee as a first step toward implementing
the Huston Plan. Haldeman concurs.
Sept. 18, 1970 In a memo to Mitchell, Dean recommends the
creation of an IntelliJllnce Evaluation Committee
(IEC) for the Improved coordination
and evaluation of domestic intelligence. The
Interdivisional Information Unit in the De·
partment of Justice would provide cover for
lEe. (The IDIU monitOred information on
civil disturbances for the AG.)
986
"CHRONOLOGY OF HUSTON PLAN ANO INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE" PREPAREO BY SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE STAFF-Continued
Oate central event Related developments
Sept. 21, 1970 • In a memo to Haldeman, Huston complain.
that the IRS has failed to take any notable
actions against ideological organizations.
In a memo to IRS, Huston recommends that
the Agency put together a small group of
agents to use information gleaned from tax
records ''to harass or embarrass" certain
individuals.
Oec. 3
L
1970 IEC holds first meeting in Oean's office _
Jan. b, 1971. An unsigned memo on Department of Justice
stationery goes to Mitchell, Ehrlichman,
and Haldeman, recommending implementation
of the Huston Plan and supposedly
reflecting unanimous IEC opinion.
Feb. 3,1971. Hoover refuses to provide FBI stafl for IEC _
Mar. 29, 31, 1971. Hoover, Helms, Gayler meet in Mitchell's
office to discuss relaxation of restraints on
intelligence collection.
June 13,1971. Pentagon Papers are published; Huston returns
to law practice in Indiana soon thereafter,
but continues to serve as aconsultant
July 2, 1971. to the White House thro•ughout the year. Erhlichman forms "Plumbers" group at
Ocl6, 1971.. • SuNlliivxaonn'srerseigqnusefsrol m the Bureau.
May 2, 1972 • • Hoover dies. .
May I-June 1972_. Watergate break-lOS.
Ocl7, 1972 Huston is named a member of a census
Bureau Advisory Committee on privacy and
Apr. 30..1973 JochonnfDideeanntiaislityfir.ed as White House Counsel.
June 19/3 ._ IEC abolished _

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