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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS
COINTELPRO: THE FBI'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS
AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS
CONTENTS
I. Introduction and Summary _
A. "Ccoouvnetretrianctetilolingence program": a misnomer for domestic_
B. Who were the targets? _
1. The five targeted groups _
2. Labels without meaning _
C. What were the purposes of COINTELPRO? _
1. Protecting national security _
2. Preventing violence _
3. Maintaining the existing social and political order _
D. What techniques were usedL _
1. The techniques of wartime _
2. Techniques carrying a serious risk of physical, emotional,
or economic damage _
E. Legal restrictions were ignored _
F. Command and controL _
1. 1956-71 _
2. Post-1971 _
G. Termination _
1. Thteiggarteioynarea between counterintelligence and inves_-
2. Is COINTELPRO continuing? _
3. The future of COINTELPRO _
II. The Five Domestic Programs _
A. Origins _
B. The r~0(fpalJSA~-~~=====================================
2. The 1960 expansion _
3. Socialist Workers Party _
4. White hate _
5. Black nationalist-hate groups _
6. The Panther directives _
7. New Left _
8. New Left directives _
III. The Goals of COINTELPRO: Preventing or Disrupting the Exercise
of First Amendment Rights _
A. Efforts to prevent speaking _
B. Efforts to prevent teaching _
C. Efforts to prevent writing and publishing _
D. Efforts to prevent meeting _
IV. COINTELPRO techniques _
A. Propaganda _
1. Reprint mailings _
2. "Friendly" media _
3. Bureau-authored pamphlets and fliers _
B. Efforts to promote enmity and factionalism within groups or
between groups _
1. Encouraging violence between rival groups _
2. Anonymous mailings _
3. Interviews _
4. Using informants to raise controversial issues _
5. Fictitious organizations _
6. Labeling targets as informants _
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IV. COINTELPRO Techniques-Continued Page
C. Using hostile third parties against target groups___ _______ ___ 49
D. Disseminating derogatory information to family, friends, and
associates___________________________________________ 50
E. Contacts with employers_ _______________________________ 56
F. Use and abuse of Government processes__________________ 57
1. Selective law enforcement_ _______________________ 57
2. Interference with judicj.al process__________________ 58
3. Candidates and political appointees_ _______________ 59
4. Investigating committees_ ________________________ 60
G. Exposing "Communist infiltration" of groups______________ 60
V. Command and Control: The Problem of Oversight_ ___ __ _________ 62
A. Within the Bureau_ ___ __ ______________________ __ _ 62
1. Internal administration_____ _____ __ ___ _____ ____ ___ 62
2. Coordination____________________________________ 62
3. Results_________________________________________ 62
4. Bl~rred .dist~nction between counterintelligence and
mvestlgatlOn__ ___________ _____ _____ ___ __ _____ _ 63
5. Inspection______ _________ __ ___ __ ____ _____ _ 63
B. Outside the Bureau: 1956-7L_____ __ __ ___ __ __ 64
1. Executive branch_ _______________________________ 65
2. The Cabinet_ ___________________________________ 69
3. Legislative branch_ ______________________________ 70
C. Outside the Bureau: Post-197L ____ ____ __ ___ _____ _ 73
VI. Epilogue _____________________________________________________ 76
COIXTELPRO: THE FBI'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS
AGAIXST AMERICAX CITIZENS
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY , "
(
COINTELPRO is the FBI acronym for a series of covert action
programs directed against domestic groups. In these programs, the
Bureau went beyond the collection of intelligence to secret action designed
to "disrupt" and "neutralize" target groups and individuals.
The techniques were adopted wholesale from wartime counterintelligence,
and ranged from the trivial (mailing reprints of Reader's
Digest articles to college administrators) to the degrading (sending
anonymous poison-pen letters intended to break up marriages) and the
dangerous (encouragin~ gang warfare and falsely labeling members
of a violent group as polIce informers).
This report is based on a staff study of more than 20,000 pages of
Bureau documents, depositions of many of the Bureau agents involved
in the programs, and inteniews of several COINTELPRO targets.
The examples selected for discussion necessarily represent a small percentage
of the more than 2,000 approved COINTELPRO actions.
Nevertheless, the cases demonstrate the consequences of a Government
agency's decision to take the law into its own hands for the "greater
good" of the country.
COINTELPRO began in 1956, in part because of frustration with
Supreme Court rulings limiting the Government's power to proceed
overtly against dissident groups; it ended in 1971 with the threat of
public exposure.! In the intervening 15 years, the Bureau conducted
a sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing the
exercise of First Amendment rights of speech and association, on the
theory that preventing the growth of dangerous groups and the propagation
of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deter
violence.2
Many of the techniques used would be intolerable in a democratic
society even if all of the targets had been involved in violent activity,
but COINTELPRO went far beyond that. The unexpressed major
premise of the programs was that a law enforcement agency has the
duty to do whatever is necessary to combat perceived threats to the
existing social and political order.
l On March 8, 1971, the FBI resident agency in Media, Pennslyvania, was broken
into. Documents stolen in the break-in were widely circulated and published by
the press. Since some documents carried a "COINTELPRO" caption-a word
unknown outside the Bureau-Carl Stern, a reporter for NBC, commenced a
Freedom of Information Act lawsuit to compel the Bureau to produce other documents
relating to the programs. The Bureau decided because of "security
reasons" to terminate them on April 27,1971. (Memorandum from C, D. Brennan
to W. C. Sullivan, 4/27/71; Letter from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 4/28/71.)
• The Bureau's direct attacks on speaking, teaching, writing, and meeting are
discussed at pp. 28--33, attempts to prevent the growth of groups are set forth
at pp. 34-4{),
(3)
4
A. "Oounterintelligence Prograrn": A Misnomer for Dornestic Oovert
Action
COINTELPRO is an acronym for "counterintelligence program."
Counterintelligence is defined as those actions by an intelligence
agcncy intended to protect its own security and to undermine hostile
intelligence operations. Under COINTELPRO certain techniques the
Bureau had used against hostile foreign agents were adopted for use
against perceived domestic threats to the established political and
social order. The formal programs which incorporated these techniques
were, therefore, also called "counterintelligence." 2a
"Covert action" is, however, a more accurate term for the Bureau's
programs directed against American citizens. "Covert action" is the
label applied to clandestine activities intended to influence political
choices and soeial values."
B. Who lVel'e the Tal'gets?
1. The Five Targeted Groups
The Bureau's covert action programs were aimed at five perceived
threats to domestic tranquility: the "Communist Party, USA" program
(1956-71); the "Socialist Workers Party" program (1961-69);
the "White Hate Group" program (1964-71) ; the "Black NationalistHate
Group" program (1967-71); and the "New Left" program
(1968-71).
B. Labels Witlwut Mearling
The Bureau's titles for its programs should not be accepted uncritically.
They imply a precision of definition and of targeting which
did not exist.
Even the names of the later programs had no clear definition. The
Black Nationalist program, according to its supervisor, included "a
great number of organizations that you might not today characterize
as black nationalist but which were in fact primarily black." 3a Indeed,
the nonviolent Southern Christian Leadership Conference
was labeled as a Black Nationalist "Hate Group." 4 Nor could anyone
at the Bureau even define "New Left," except as "more 01' less an attitude."
5
Furthermore, the actual targets were ehosen from a far broader
group than the names of the programs would imply. The CPUSA
program targeted not only Party members but also sponsors of thc
2a For a discussion of U.S. intelligl'nce activities against hosUl' forl'ign intelligence
operations, see Report on Countl'rintelligl'ncl'.
3 See Sl'nate Sl'll'ct Committl'e Report, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving
Foreign Leaders" and Staff Report: "Covert Action in Chil<c>:'
3a Black Nationalist Supervisor deposition, 10/17/75, p. 12.
• Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/25/67, p. 2.
• New Left Supervisor's deposition, 10/28/75, p. 8. The closest any Bureau document
comes to a definition is found in an investigative directive: "The term
'New Left' does not refer to a definite organization, but to a movement which
is providing ideologies or platforms alternate to those of l'xisting communist
and other basic revolutionary organizations, the so-called 'Old Left.' The New
Left movement is a loosely-bound, free-wheeling, college-oriented movement
spearheaded by the Studl'nts for a Demorcatic Society and includes the more
extrl'me and militant anti-Vietnam war and anti-draft protl'st organizations."
(Memorandum from FBI Hl'adquarters to all SAC's, 10/28/68; Hl'arings. Vol. 6,
Exhibit 61, p. 669.) AlthQugh this characterization is longer than that of the
New Left Supervisor, it does not appear to be substantively different.
5
National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities
Committee 6 and civil rights leaders allegedly under Communist influence
or simply not "anti-Communist." 7 The Socialist Workers
Party program included non-S",VP sponsors of antiwar demonstrations
which were cosponsored by the SWP or the Young Socialist Alliance,
its youth group." The Black Nationalist program targeted a
range of organizations from the Panthers to SNCC to the peaceful
Southern Christian Leadership Conference,9 and included most black
student groups.10 New Left targets ranged from the SDS 11 to the Interuniversity
Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy,12 from all of
Antioch College ("vanguard of the New Left") 13 to the New Mexico
Free University 14 and other "alternate" schools,l5 and from underground
newspapers 16 to students protesting university censorship of
a student publication by carrying signs with four-letter words on
themY
O. What Were the Purposes of OOINTELPRO.'iI
The breadth of targeting and lack of substantive content in the
descriptive titles of the programs reflect the range of motivations for
COINTELPRO activity: protecting national security, preventing
violence, and maintaining the existing social and political order by
"disrupting" and "neutralizing" groups and individuals perceived
as threats.
1. Protecting National Security
The first COINTELPRO, against the CPUSA, was instituted to
counter what the Bureau believed to be a threat to the national security.
As the chief of the COINTELPRO unit explained it:
We were trying first to develop intelligence so we would know
what they were doing [and] second, to contain the threat....
To stop the spread of communism, to stop the effectiveness
of the Communist Party as a vehicle of Soviet intelligence,
propaganda and agitation.17a
Had the Bureau stopped there, perhaps the term "counterintelligence"
would have been an accurate label for the program. The ex-
• Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64.
7 One civil rights leader, the subject of at least three separate counterintelligence
actions under the CPUSA caption, was targeted because there was no
"direct evidence" that he was a communist, "neither is there any substantial
evidence that h!' is anti-communist." On!' of the actions utilized information
gained from a wiretap; the other two involved dissemination of })l'rsonal life infonnation.
(Memorandum from J.A. Sizoo to W.C. Sullivan, 2/4/64; Memorandum
from Xew York Fi!'ld Officp to FBI Headquartprs. 2/12/64; Mpmoranda from
FBI Hpartqnarters to Npw York Fi!'ld Offiep. 3/26/64 and 4/10/64; :\I!'morandum
to Npw York Fi!'ld Offie!' from FBI Headquarters, 4/21/64; Memorandum from
FBI Headquaters to Baltimnr!' Fipld Offic!', 10/6/65.)
• Memorandum from FBI Headquart!'rs to C'l!'v!'land Field Office, 11/29/68.
• FBI Headquarters mpmorandum, 8/25/67, p. 2.
10 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Jackson Field Office, 2/8/71, pp.
1-2.
11 lIIemorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 10/31/68.
.. Memorandum from I<'BI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/26/66.
,. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 6/18/68.
14 Mplllorandum from FBI Headquarters to Albuquerque Field Office, 3/14/69.
15l\IPlllorandum from FBI Headquartpr8 to San Antonio Fipld Officp. 7/2.1/69.
,. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Fipld Office, 11/14/69.
"MplIlorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis I<'ield Office, 11/4/68.
"·COINTELPRO Unit Chi!'f deposition, 10/16/75. p. 14.
6
pansion of the CPUSA program to non-Communists, however, and
the addition of subsequent programs, make it clear that other purposes
were also at work.
2. Preventing Violence
One of these purposes was the prevention of violence. Every Bureau
witness deposed stated that the purpose of the particular program or
programs with which he was associated was to deter violent acts by
the target groups, although the witnesses differed in their assessment
of how successful the programs were in achieving that goal. The preventive
function was not, however, intended to be a product of specific
proposals directed at specific criminal acts. Rather, the programs were
aimed at groups which the Bureau believed to be violent or to have the
potential for violence.
The programs were to prevent violence by deterring membership
in the target groups, even if neither the particular member nor the
group was violent at the time. As the supervisor of the Black Nationalist
COINTELPRO put it, "Obviously you are going to prevent violence
or a greater amount of violence if you have smaller groups."
(Black Nationalist supervisor ell'position, 10/17/75, p. 24.) The COIN
TELPRO unit chief agreed : "We also made an effort to deter or
counteract the propaganda ... and to deter recruitment where we
could. This was done with the view that if we could curb the organization,
we could curb the action or the violence within the organization."
m In short, the programs were to prevent violence indirectly,
rather than directly, by preventing possibly violent citizens from
joining or continuing to associate with possibly violent groupS.'S
The prevention of violence is clearly not, in itself, an improper
purpose; preventing violence is the ultimate goal of most law enforcement.
Prosecution and sentencing are intended to deter future criminal
behavior, not only of the subject but also of others who might
break the law. In that sense, law enforcement legitimately attempts
the indirect prevention of possible violence and, if the methods used
are proper, raises no constitutional issues. When the government goes
beyond traditional law enforcement methods, however, and attacks
group membership and advocacy, it treads on ground forbidden to it
by the Constitution. In Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the
Supreme Court held that the government is not permitted to "forbid
or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where
such advocacy is directed toward inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action." In the absence
of such clear and present danger, the government cannot act
against speech nor, presumably, against association.
3. Maintaining the Ewi8ting Social and Political Order
Protecting national security and preventing violence are the purposes
advanced by the Bureau for COINTELPRO. There is another
purpose for COINTELPRO which is not explicit but which offers
l1b Unit Chief deposition, 10/16/7(;, p. ;'4.
18 "Possibly violent" did not necessarily mean likely to be violent. Concededly
non-violent groups were targeted because they might someday change; Martin
Luther King, Jr. was targeted because (among other things) he might "abandon
his supposed 'obedience' to 'white, liberal doctrines' (non-violence) and embrace
black nationalism." (Memorandum from l<~BI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/4/68,
p. 3.)
7
the only explanation for those actions which had no conceivable rational
relationship to either national security or violent activity.
The unexpressed major premise of much of COINTELPRO is that
the Bureau has a role in maintaining the existing social order, and
that its efforts should be aimed toward combating those who threaten
that order.19
The "New Left" COINTELPRO presents the most striking example
of this attitude. As discussed earlier, the Bureau did not define the
term "New Left," and the range of targets went far beyond alleged
"subversives" or "extremists." Thus, for example, two student participants
in R "free speech" demonstration were targeted because they
defended the use of the classic four-letter word. Significantly, they
were made COINTELPRO subjects even though the demonstration
"does not appear to be inspired by the New Left" because it "shows
obvious disregard for decency and established morality." 20 In another
case, reprints of a newspaper article entitled "Rabbi in Vietnam Says
Withdrawal Not the Answer" were mailed to members of the Vietnam
Day Committee "to convince [them] of the correctness of the U.S. foreign
policy in Vietnam." 21 Still another document inveighs against the
"liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the forces on the left" which
were "taking advantage of the situation in Chicago surrounding the
Democratic National Convention to attack the police and organized
law enforcement agencies." 22 Upholding decency and established
morality, defending the correctness of U.S. foreign pol~cy, and attacking
those who thought the Chicago police used undue force have no
apparent connection with the expressed goals of protecting national
security and preventing violence. These documents, among others
examined, compel the conclusion that Federal law enforcement officers
looked upon themselves as guardians of the status quo. The attitude
should not be a surprise; the difficulty lies in the choice
of weapons.
D. What Techniques Were Used?
1. The Techniques of Wartime
Under the COINTELPRO programs, the arsenal of techniques
used against foreign espionage agents was transferred to domestic
enemies. As William C. Sullivan, former Assistant to the Director,
put it,
This is a rough, tough, dirty business, and dangerous. It was
dangerous at times. No holds were barred.... We have used
[these techniques] against Soviet agents. They have used
[them] against us.... [The same methods were] brought
home agamst any organization against which we were targeted.
We did not differentiate. This is a rough, tough business.
23
Mr. Sullivan's description-rough, tough, and dirty-is accurate. In
the course of COINTELPRO's fifteen-year history, a number of in-
,. This attitude toward change is apparent in many of those Bureau activities
investigated by the Committee. It played a large part in the Martin Luther King,
Jr. case, which is the subject of a separate report.
.. FBI Headquarters memorandum, 11/4/68.
21 Men}()randum from FBI Headquarters to San I<'rancisoo Field Office, 11/1/65.
"Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 8/29/64, pp. 1-8.
.. William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 97-98.
8
dividual actions may have violated specific criminal statutes; 24 a number
of individual actions involved risk of serious bodily injury or
death to the targets (at least four assaults were reported as "results")
; 25 and a number of actions, while not illegal or dangerous, can
only be described as "abhorrent in a free society." 26 On the other hand,
many of the actions were more silly than repellent.
The Bureau approved 2,370 separate counterintelligence actionsY
Their techniques ranged from anonymously mailing reprints of newspaper
and magazine articles (sometimes Bureau-authored or planted)
to group members or supporters to convince them of the error of their
ways,28 to mailing anonymous letters to a member's spouse accusing
the target of infidelity; 29 from using informants to raise controversial
issues at meetings in order to cause dissent,30 to the "snitch jacket"
(falsely labeling a group member as an informant),31 and encouraging
street warfare between violent groups; 32 from contacting members
of a "legitimate group to expose the alleged subversive background
of a fellow member,33 to contacting an employer to get a target
fired; 34 from attempting to arrange for reporters to interview
targets with planted questions,35 to trying to stop targets from speaking
at all; 36 from notifying state and local authorities of a target's
criminal law violations,31 to using the IRS to -audit a professor, not
just to collect any taxes owing, but to distract him from his political
activirties.38
"A memorandum prepared for the Justice Department Committee which
studied COINTELPRO in 1974 stated that COINTELPRO activities "may" have
violated the Civil Rights statute, the mail and wire fraud statutes, and the prohibition
against divulging information gained from wiretaps. (Memorandum
to H. E. Petersen, 4/25/74.) Internal Bureau documents show that Bureau
officials lJelieved sending threats through the lIlail might violate federal extortion
statutes. (See, e.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Newark }'ield
Office, 2/19/71.) Such threats were mailed or telephoned on several occasions.
25 :\Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/70. 2. Hearing of the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights
11/20/74, p. 11. The Petersen Committee, composed of Department of Justice
attorneys and Bureau agents, was formed in 1974 at the request of Attorney
General Saxbe to investigate COINTELPRO. Its conclusions are discussed on
pp.73-76.
27 3,247 actions were proposed.
28 E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
11/1/65.
28 E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
11/26/68.
30 E.g., Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
12/12/68.
31 E.g., Memorandum from Newark Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/3/69.
The term "snitch jacket" is not part of Bureau jargon; it was used by those
familiar with the Bureau's activities directed against the Black Panther Party
in a staff interview.
., E.g., Memorandum from Columbia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/4/70.
33 E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office. 8/2/68.
34 Kg., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland and Boston Field
Offices, 5/5/64.
.. E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office,
11/18/69.
00 E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office,
4/6/70.
37 E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office,
11/19/70.
38 E.g., Memorandum from Midwest City Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
8/1/68.
9
'!2. Techniques Oarrying A Serious Risk of Physical, E1TWtional,
01' EC01wmic Damage.
The Bureau recognized that some techniques were more likely than
others to cause serious physical, emotional, or economic damage to the
targets. Any proposed use of those techniques was scrutinized carefully
by headquarters supervisory personnel, in an attempt to balance
the "greater good" to be achieved by the proposal against the known
or risked harm to the target. If the "good" was sufficient, the proposal
was approved.39 For instance, in discussing anonymous letters to
spouses, the agent who supervised the New Left COINTELPRO
stated:
[Before recommending approval] I would want to know
what you want to get out of this, who are these people. If ifs
somebody, and say they did split up, what would accrue from
it as far as disrupting the New Left is concerned? Say they
broke up, what then....
[The question would be] is it worth it? 39a
Similarly, with regard to the "snitch jacket" technique-falsely
labeling a group member as a police informant-the chief of the Racial
Intelligence Section stated:
You have to be able to make decisions and I am sure that
labeling somebody as an informant, that you'd want to make
certain that it served a good purpose before you did it and not
do it haphazardly.... It is a serious thing.... As far as
I am aware, in the black extremist area, by using that technique,
no one was killed. I am sure of that.40
Moore was asked whether the fact that no one was killed was the
result of "luck or planning." He answered:
"Oh, it just happened that way, I am sure." 41
It is thus clear that, as Sullivan said, "No holds were barred," 42
although some holds were weighed more carefully than others.
When the willingness to use techniques which were concededly dangerous
or harmful to the targets is combined with the range of purposes
and criteria by which these targets were chosen, the result is
neither "within bounds" nor "justified" in a free society.43
39 Mechanicall~', tbe Bureau's programs were administered at headquarters.
but individual actions were proposed and usually carried out by the field. A
field proposal under the COINTELPRO caption would be routed to a special
agent supervising that particular program. During most of COIXTELPRO's
history that supervisor was a member of the section at the Domestic Intelligence
Division with investigative responsibility for the subject of the proposal. The
supervisor's recommendation then went up through the Bureau hierarchy. Proposals
were rarely approved below the level of Assistant Director in charge of
the Division, and often were approved uy one of the top three men in the Bureau.
39. Xew Left supervisor testimony, 10/28/75, pp. 72, 74.
4() George C. Moore testimony, 11/3/75, p. 62.
41 Moore, 11/3/75, p. 64.
e Sullh'all, 11/1/75, p. 97.
.. James B. Adams testimony, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 73, 75.
10
E. Legal Restrictions Were Ignored
What happened to turn a law enforcement agency into a law violator?
Why do those involved still believe their actions were not only
defensible, but right? H
The answers to these questions are found in a combination of factors:
the availability of information showing the targets' vulnerability
gathered through the unrestrained collection of domestic intelligence;
the belief both within and without the Bureau that it could handle
any problem; and frustration with the apparent inability of traditionaI
law enforcement methods to solve the problems presented..
There is no doubt that Congress and the public looked to the Bureau
for protection against domestic and foreign threats. As the COINTEL
PRO unit chief stated:
At this time [the mid-1950s] there was a ~neral philosophy
too, the general attitude of the public at tIns time was you did
not have to worry about Communism because the FBI would
take care of it. Leave it to the FBI.
I hardly know an agent who would ever go to a social affair
or something, if he were introduced as FBI, the comment
would be, "we feel very good because we know you are handling
the threat." "We were handling the threat with what
directives and statutes were available. There did not seem to
be any strong interest of anybody to give us stronger or better
defined statutes.45
Not only was no one interested in giving the Bureau better statutes
(nor, for that matter, did the Bureau request them), but the Supreme
Court drastically narrowed the scope of the statutes available. The
Bureau personnel involved trace the institution of the first formal
counterintelligence program to the Supreme Court reversal of the
Smith Act convictions. The unit chief testified:
The Supreme Court rulings had rendered the Smith Act
technically unenforceable.... It made it ineffective to prosecute
Communist Party members, made it impossible to prosecute
Communist Party members at the time.46
This belief in the failure of law enforcement produced the subsequent
COINTELPROs as well. The unit chief continued:
.. The unit chief stated: "The Bureau people did not think that they were doing
anything wrong and most of us to this day do not think we were doing anything
wrong." (Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 102.) Moore felt the same way: "1 thought I
did something very important during those days. 1 haw no apologies to make
for anything we did, really." (Moore 11/3/75, p. 25.)
.. Unit chief. 10/16/75, pp. 11, 12, 14.
.. Unit chief, 10/10/75, pp. 12-14, Deputy Associate Director Adams' testimony
Oil G01NTELPRO noted that "interpretations as to the constitutionality of [the
Smith Act of 1940] leave us with a statute still on the books that proscribes certain
actions, but yet the degree of proof necessary to operate under the few
remaining areas is such that there was no satisfactory way to proceed." (Adams
testimony, 11/19/75. Hearings, Vol. 6. p. 71.) In fact, the Smith Act decisions
did not come down until 1957. Perhaps the witnesses were referring to Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Contro/' Board. 3~1 U.S. 115 (19;>6), which
held that testimony by "tainted" Government witnesses required remanding the
case to the Board.
11
The other COINTELPRO programs were opened as the
threat arose in areas of extremism and subversion and there
were not adequate statutes to proceed against the organization
or to prevent their activities.41
Every Bureau witness deposed agreed that his particular
COINTELPRO was the result of tremendous pressure on the Bureau
to do something about a perceived threat, coupled with the inability of
law enforcement techniques to cope with the situation, either because
there were no pertinent federal statutes,'8 or because local law enforcement
efforts were stymied by indifference or the refusal of those in
charge to call the police.
Outside pressure and law enforcement frustration do not, of course,
fully explain COINTELPRO. Perhaps, after all, the best explanation
was proffered by George C. Moore, the Racial Intelligence Section
chief:
The FBI's counterintelligence program came up because there
was a point-if you have anything in the FBI, you have an
action-oriented group of people who see something happening
and want to do something to take its place.49
F. Oommand and Oontrol
1. 1956-71
While that "action-oriented group of people" was proceeding with
fifteen years of COINTELPRO activities, where were those responsible
for the supervision and control of the Bureau? Part of the answer
lies in the definition of "covert action"-clandestine activities. Noone
outside the Bureau was supposed to know that COINTELPRO existed.
Even within the Bureau, the programs were handled ona "needto-
know" basis.
Nevertheless, the Bureau has supplied the Committee with documents
which support its contention that various Attorneys General,
advisors to Presidents, members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee,
and, in U)58, the Cabinet were at least put on notice of the
existence of the CPFSA and White Hate COINTELPROs. The
Bureau cannot support its claim that anyone outside the FBI was
informed of the existence of the SocialIst 'Vorkers Party, Black
Nationalist, or New Left COINTELPROs, and even those letters or
Of Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 15. _
.. One witness also pointed out that while the federal antiriot and antibombing
statutes were not passed until 1968. inadequate statutes were not the only
problem. Statutes directed at specific criminal acts would only have served to
allow prosecution after the crime; they would not have prevented the act in the
first place. He also stated that he did not believe it would be possible to pass
a statute which would have given the Bureau the tools necessary to prevent
violence by disrupting the growth of violence-prone organizations-"because of
something called the United States Constitution." When asked whether that answer
implied that preventing the growth of an organization is unconstitutional.
he answered, "I think so." (Black Nationalist supervisor. 10/1/75, pp. 25-26.)
He wa;; the only Bureau witness who 'had reservations about C01NTELPRO's
constitutionality. Another witness gave a more typical response. When asked
whethf'r anybody at any time during the course of the programs discussed their
constitutionality or legal authority. he replied, "No, we never gave it a thought."
(Moore, 11/3/75. p. 83.)
"Moore, 11/3/75, p. 79.
69-984 0 ~ 76 .. 2
12
briefings which referred (usually indirectly) to the CPUSA and
',"Vhite Hate COINTELPROs failed to mentIOn the use of techniques
which risked physical, emotional, or e~onomicdamage to their targets.
In any event, there is no record that any of these officials asked to
know more, and none of them appears to have expressed disapproval
based on the information they were given.
As the history of the Domestic Intelligence Division shows, the
absence of disapproval has been interpreted by the Bureau as sufficient
authorization to continue 'an activity (and occasionally, even
express disapproval has not sufficed to stop a practice). Perhaps,
however, the crux of the "command and control" problem lies in the
testimony by one former Attorney General that he was too busy to
know what the Bureau was doing,50 and by another that. as a matter
of political reality, he could not have stopped it anyway.51
2. Post-1971
'Whether the Attorney General can control the Bureau is still an
open question. The Petersen Committee, which was fornloo within
the Justice Department to investigate COINTELPRO at Attorney
General Saxbe's request, worked only with Bureau-prepared
summaries of the COINTELPRO files.52 Further, the fact that the
Department of Justice must work with the Bureau on a day-to-day
basis may influence the Department's judgment on Bureau activities.53
G. Termination
If COINTELPRO had been ,a short-lived aberration, the thorny
problems of motivation, techniques, and control presented might be
safely relegated to history. However, COINTELPRO existed for
years on an "ad hoc" basis before the formal programs were instituted,
and more significantly, COINTELPRO-type activities may continue
today under the rubric of "investigation."
1. The Grey Area Between Oounterintelligen<:e and lnvestigatUm,
The word "counterintelligence" had no fixed meaning even before
the programs were terminated. The Bureau witnesses agreed that there
is a large grey area between "counterintelligence" and "aggressive
investigation," and that headquarters supervisors sometimes had difficulty
in deciding which caption should go on certain proposals.54
Aggressive investigation continues, and may be even more disruptive
than covert action. An anonymous letter (COINTELPRO) can
be ignored as the work of a crank; an overt approach by the Bureau
eo Ramsey Clark testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p, 249.
M Xicholas deB. Katzenbach testimony. 12/3/75. Hearin~. Vol. 6, p. 217.
.. These summaries were the point of departure for the Select Committee's
investigati<ln but were deemed unsatisfactory for a complete inquiry.
53 For instance, the Department is defending litigati<ln commenced against
the Bureau by COINTELPRO victims who happen to have received their files
through Freedom of Information Act requests. More such litigation may arise
as more targets learn of Bureau actions taken against them.
.. The New Left supervisor stated, "[The COINTELPRO caption was] as much
as it was anything else. and administrative device to channel the mail to the Bureau
. . . we get back to this old argument between the s\1pervis()rs--n~targument,
but discussion, between the supervisors, it falls on yours. no, it doesn't, it's
yours." (New Left Supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 49.)
13
("investigation~') is not so easily dismissed.55 The line between information
collection and harassment can be extremely thin.
2.18 COIl\7ELPRO Continuing?
COINTELPRO-type activities "hich are clearly not within the
"grey area" between COINTELPRO and investigation have continued
on at least three occasions. Although all COINTELPROs were officially
terminated "for security reasonsn on April 27, 1971, the documents
discontinuing the program provided:
In exceptional circumstances where it is considered counterintelligence
action is ,,-arranted, recommendations should be
submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption to
which it pertains. These recommendations will he considered
on an individual basis.56
The Committee requested that the Bureau provide it with a list of
any "COINTELPRO-type" actions since April 28, 1971. The Bureau
first ad\-ised the Committee that a review failed to develop any information
indicating post-termination COINTELPRO activity. Subsequently,
the Bureau located and furnished to the Committee two
instmlces of COINTELPRO·,type operations.57 The Committee has
discovered a third instance; four months after COINTELPRO was
terminated, information on an attorney's political background was
furnished to friendly newspaper sources under the so-called "Mass
Media Program," intended to discredit both the attorney and his
client.58
The Committee has not been able to determine with any greater
precision the extent to which COINTELPRO may be continuing. Any
proposals to initiate COINTELPRO-type action would be filed under
the individual case caption. The Bureau has over 500,000 case files,
and each one would haveto be searched. In this context, it should be
55 The Bureau can and does reveal its interest in the SUbjects of investigation
to employees, family members, and neighbors. The Black Nationalist supervisor
explained, "Generally speaking, we should not be giving out information
to somebody we are trying to get information from. As a practical matter sometimes
we have to. The mere fact that you contact somebody about someone
gives them the indication that the FBI is interested in that person." (Black
Xationalist deposition, 10/17/75, p. 16). See also the statement of the Social
Workers Party, 10/2/75, which details more than 200 incidents involving its
members since COINTELPRO's termination. The S'VP believes these to be as
disruptive as the formal SWP COIXTELPRO.
56 Memorandum from Charles D. Brennan to William C. Sullivan, 4/27/71.
Hf>arillgs, Vol. 6, Exhibit 55--3.
<7 In one instance, a field office was authorized to contact the editor of a Southern
newspaper to suggest that he have reporters interview Klan members and
write an article based on those interviews. The editor was also furnished information
on Klan use of the polygraph to "weed out FBI informants." According to
the Bureau, "subsequent pUblication of the Klan's activities resulted in a number
of Klan officials cf>asing their activities." (Letter from FBI to the Senate Select
Committee 10/24/75.) The second case involwd an anonymous letter and derogatory
newspaper clipping which were sent to a Black Panther Party office in
the Xortheast to discredit a Panther leader's abilities. (Letter from FBI to the
Senate Select Committee, 9/24/75.)
58 It should be noted that Charles CaIson spent sen"n months in jail for similar
activity involving the client.
14
noted that a Bureau search of all field office COINTELPRO files
revealed the existence of five operations in addition to those known to
the Petersen committee.59 A search of all investigative files might be
similarly productive.
3. The Future of OOINTELPRO
Attitudes within and without the Bureau demonstrate a continued
belief by some that covert action against American citizens is permissible
if the need for it is strong enough. When the Petersen Committee
report on COINTELPRO was released, Director Kelley responded,
"For the FBI to haw done less under the circumstances would have
been an abdication of its responsibilities to the American people."
He also restated his "feeling that the FBI's counterintelligence programs
had 'an impact on the crises of the time and, therefore, that they
helped to bring about a favorable change in this country." 60 In his
testimony before the Select Committee, Director Kelley continued to
defend COIKTELPRO, albeit with some reservations:
What I said then, in 1974, 'and what I believe today, is that
the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they
felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General,
the Congress, and the people of the United States....
Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counterintelligence
Programs, and there were some substantial
ones, should not obscure the underlying purpose of those
programs.
We must recognize that situations have occurred in the past
-and will arise in the future where the Government may well
be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's
case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering agency,
and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent
threat to human life or property.62
Nor is the Director alone in his belief that faced with sufficient
threat, covert disruption is justified. The Department of Justice promulgated
tentative guidelines for the Bureau which would have permitted
the Attorney General to authorize "preventive action" where
.. Letter from Attorney General Edward H. Levi to the Senate Select Commitmittee,
5/23/75. These included: (1) 37 'actions authorized between 1960 and
1971 "aimed at militant groups which sought Puerto Rican independence;" (2)
"Operation HoodWink," from October 1966 to July 1968, "aimed 'at putting organized
crime elements in competition with the Communist Party USA;" (3) a
1961 program targeted against "a foreign-dominated group;" (4) two actions
taken between January 1969 and March 1971 against "a foreign nationality group
in the United States;" and (5) seven actions between 1961 and 1968 Il!gainst
members, leaders, and factions of "a foreign communist party."
The FBI's operations against "a foreign communist party" indiC'llte that the
Bureau, as well as the CIA, has engaged in covert action abroad.
.. Clarence M. Kelley testimony, House Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights
Subcommittee hearings, 11/20/74, pp. 44-45. This statement appears to be an
explicit recognition that one purpose of COINTELPRO was to influence politiC'lll
events.
82 Clarence )1. Kelley testimony, 12/10/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 283, 284.
Affirmative legal steps to meet an imminent threat to life or property are, of
course, quite proper. The difficulty with the Director's statement, juxtaposed
as it was with a discussion of COINTELPRO, is that the threats COINTELPRO
purported to meet were not imminent. the techniques used were sometimes
illegal, and the purposes went far beyond the prevention of death or destruction.
15
there is a substantial possibility that yiolence will occur and "prosecution
is impracticable." Although those guidelines ha\"e now been
dropped, the principle has not been rejected.
II. THE FIVE DO::\fESTIC I'ROGRA::\iS
A. Origins
The origins of COINTELPROare rooted in the Bureau's jurisdiction
to im"estigate hostile foreign intelligence activities on American
soil. Counterintelligence, of course, goes beyond inrestigation; it is
affirmatire action taken to neutralize hostile agents.
The Bureau believed its wartime counterattacks on foreign agents
to be effectiye-and \vhat works against one enemy will work against
another. In the atmosphere of the Cold ,rar, the American Communist
Party was viewed as a deadly threat to national security.
In 1956, the Bureau decided that a formal counterintelligence program,
coordinated from headquarters, would be an effecti\"e weapon in
the fight against Communism. The fiI'6t COIXTELPRO was therefore
initiated.63
The CPUSA COINTELPRO accounted for more than half of all
approved proposals.64 The Bureau personnel im'oh"ed believed that
the success of the program-one action was described as "the most
effective single blow ever dealt the organized communist movement"
65-made counterintelligence techniques the weapons of choice
whenever the Bureau assessed a new and, in its riew, equally serious
threat to the country,
As noted earlier, law enforcement frustration also played a part
in the origins of each COINTELPRO. In each case, Bureau witnesses
testified that the lack of adequate statutes, uncooperative or
ineffective local police, or restricti\"e court rulings had made it impossible
to use traditional law enforcement methods against the targeted
groups,
Additionally,a certain amount of empire building ma~ have been
at work. Under William C. SulliYllll, the Domestic Intelligence Division
greatly expanded its jurisdiction, Klan matters were transferred
in 1964 to the Intelligence Division from the General Investigative
Division; hla.ck nationalist g-roups were added in 1967; and, just as
the Old Left appeared to be dying out,66 the New Left was g-radually
added to the work of the Division's Internal Security Section in the
late 19608.
Finally, it, is significant that the five domestic COINTELPROs
were started ag-ainst the th"e groups which were the subject of intensified
investigative programs. Of course, the fact that snch intensiw
investigative programs were started at all reflects the Bureau's process
of threat assessment: the greatE'r the threat, the more need to
63 Memorandum from Alan Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 8/28/56, Hearings,
vol. 6, exhibit 12.
M 1,388 of a total of 2,370.
"" Excerpt from materials prepared for the FBI Director's briefing of the House
Appropriations Subcommittee, FY 1966, p. 2.
.. According to Sullivan. membership in <the Communist Pnrty declined steadily
through the '60s. When the CPU~A membership dropped below a certain figure,
Director Hoorer ordered that the membE'rnhip figures be classified. Sullivan
believes that this was done to protect the Bureau's appropriations. (Sullivan,
11/1/7:>, pp. 33-34.)
16
know about it (intelligence) and the more impetus to counter it
(covert aotion). More important, however, the mere existence of
the additional information gained through the investigative progmms
inevitably demonstrated those particular organizational or
personal weaknesses which were vulnerable to disruption. COIN
TELPRO demonstrates the dangers inherent in the overbroad collection
of domestic intelligence; when information is available, it can
be-and was-improperly used.
B. l'he ProgralnJJ
Before examining each program in detail, some general observations
may be useful. Each of the five domestic COINTELPROs had
certain traits in common. As noted above, each program used techniques
learned froln the Bureau's wartime efforts against hostile
foreign agents. Each sprang from frustration with the perceived
inability of law enforcement to deal with what the Bureau believed
to be a serious threat to the country. Each program depended on an
intensive intelligence effort to pmvide the mformation used to disrupt
the target groups.
The programs also differ to some extent. The White Hate program,
for example, was very precisely targeted; each of the other programs
spread to a number of groups which do not appear to fall within any
clear parameters.67 In fact, with each subsequent COINTELPRO,
. the targeting became more diffuse.
The White Hate COINTELPRO also used comparatively few
techniques which carried a risk of serious physical, emotional, or economic
damage to the targets, while the Black Nationalist COIN
TELPRO used such techniques extensively. TIll>' New Left COIN
TELPRO, on the other hand, had the highest proportion of proposals
aimed at preventing the exercise of free speech. Like the progression
in targeting, the use of dangerous, degrading, or blatantly unconstitutional
techniques also appears to have hecome less restrained with
ea.ch subsequent program.
1. OPllSA.-The first official COINTELPRO program, against
the Communist Party, USA, was started in August 1956 with Director
Hoover's approval. Although the formal program was instituted
in 1956, COINTELPRO-type activities had gone on for years. The
memorandum recommending the program refers to prior actions,
constituting "harassment," which were generated by the field during
the course of the Bureau's investigation of the Communist Party.68
.These prior actions were instituted on an ad hoc basis as the opportunity
arose. As Sullivan testified, "[Before 1956] we were engaged in
COINTELPRO tactics, divide, confuse, weaken in diverse ways, an
organization. . . . [Before 1956] it was more sporadic. It depended
on a J,{iven office...." no
In 1956, a series of field conferences was held to discuss the development
of new security informants. The Smith Act trials and related
proceedings had exposed over 100 informants, leaving the Bureau's
fit For instance, the Southern Christian I..eadership Conference was targeted
as a "Black Nationalist-Hate Group." (Memorandum from FBI headquarterR
to 1111 SAC's, 3/4/68, p. 4.)
.. Memorandum from Allin Belmont to L. V. BoardmalJ, R/2R/56, Hearing....,
Vol. 6. exhibit 12.
.. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 42-43.
17
intelligence apparatus in some disarray. During the field conferences,
a formal counterintelligence program was recommended, partly because
of the gaps in the informant ranks. 70
Since the Bureau had evidence that until the late 1$)40s the CPUSA
had been "blatantly" involved in Soviet espionage, and believe(] that
the Soviets were continuing to usc the Party for "political and intelligence
purposes," 71 there was no clear line of demarcation in the
Bureau's switch from foreign to domestic counterintelligence. The
initial areas of concentration were the use of informants to capitalize
on the conflicts within the Party over Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation
of Stalin; to prevent the CP'fj efforts to take over (via a merger)
a hroad-hasel] socialist group; to encourage the Socialist ",Vorkers
Party in its attacks on the cr; and to use the IRS to investigate underground
(,P memhers who eitlH'r failed to file, 01' filed under false
names.
As the program procepded, other targets and techniques were (]eveloped,
but tUltil 1960 the CPUSA targets were PaIty members, and
the techniqups were primarily aimed at the Party organization (factionalism,
puhlic exposure, etc.)
2. The 1960 Expallsioll.-In March 1960, CPUSA COINTELPRO
field officps receivpd a directive to intensify counterintplligence
efforts to prevent Communist infiltration ("COMINFIL") of mass
organizations, ranging from the NAACP 72 to a local scout troop.73
The usual technique would be to tell a leader of the organization about
the alleged Communist in its midst, the target, of course, being the
alleged Communist rather than the organization. In an increasing
number of cases, however, both the alleged Communist and the organization
were targeted, usually by planting a news alticle about Communists
active in the organization. For example, a newsman was given
information about Communist palticipation in a SANE march, with
the express purpose being to discredit SANE as well as the paIticipants,
and another newspaper was alerted to plans of Bettina Aptheker
to join a United Farm WorkPrs picket line. 74 The 1960 "COMIN
FIL" memorandum marks the beginning of the slide from targeting
CP members to those allegedly under CP "influence" (such civil rights
leaders as Martin Luther King, Jr.) to "fellow travelers" (those taking
positions supported by the Communists, such as school integration,
increased minority hiring, and opposition to HUAC.) 75
S. Socialist Workcr8 Party.-The Socialist Workers Patty
("SWP") COINTELPRO program was initiated on October 12, 1961,
by the headquarters supervisor handling the SWP desk (but with
Hoover's concurrence) apparently on a theory of even-handed treat-
7. As noted earlier, Bureau personnel also trace the decision to adopt counterintelligence
methods to the Supreme Court decisions overturning the Smith Act
convictions. As the unit chief put it, "The Supreme Court rulings had rendered
the Smith Act technically unenforceahle.... It made it ineffective to prosecute
Communist Party members, made it impossihle to prosecute Communist Party
memhers at the time." (Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 14).
71 l'nit chief. 10/16/75, p. 10.
72 Memorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/24/60.
7. Memorandum from Milwaukee Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/13/60,
pp.1-2.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 9/13/68.
71 Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 29.
18
ment: if the Bureau has a program against the CP, it was only fair to
have one against the Trotskyites. (The COINTELPRO unit chief, in
response to a question about why the Bureau targeted the H\VP in
view of the faet that the H\YP's hostility to the Communist Party had
been useful in disrupting- the CPHUA, answered, "I do not think that
the Bureau discriminates ag-ainst subversive organizations.") 76
The program "'as not gi\"en hig-h priority-only 45 actions were approved-
and was discontinued in I!J{)!), two years before the other four
programs ended. (The SWP program was then subsumed in the New
Left COINTELPRO.) Nevertheless, it marks an impOliant departure
from the CPUSA COINTELPHO: although the SWP had contacts
with foreign Trotskyite groups, there was no evidence that the SWP
was involypd in espionage. These were, in C. D. Brennan's phrase,
"home grown tomatoes." 77 The Bureau has conceded that the SWP has
never been eng-aged in organizational violence, nor has it taken any
criminal steps towai'd overthrowing the country!8
Nor doo..<.; the Bureau claim the SWP was engaged in revolutionary
acts. The Party was targeted for its rhetoric; significantly, the originating
letter points to the S\VPs "open" espousal of its line "through
running candidates for public office" and its dir'ectionand/or support
of "such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration problems arising in
the South." Fm1her, the American people had to be alerted to the
fact that "the SWP is not just another socialist group but follows the
revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin, and Engles as interpreted
by Leon Trotsky." 79
Like the CPUSA COINTELPRO, non-Paliy members were also
targeted, particularly when the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance
(the SWP's youth group) statted to co-sponsor antiwar marches.SO
4. White llate.-The Klan COINTELPRO began on July 30,
I!J64, with the transfer of the "responsibility for development of informantsand
gathering of intelligence on the KKK and other hate
g-roups" from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic
Intelligence Division. The memorandum recommending the reorganization
also suggested that "counterintelligence and disruption tactics
be given further study by DID and appropriate recommendations
made." 81
7. Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 40.
77 Charles D. Brennan testimony, Senate Select Committee on Campaign Activities,
6/13/73, p. 10.
7. Robert Shackleford testimony, 2/6/76, pp. 88--89.
7ll Memorandulll from FBI Headquarters.
.. I<'or example, anonymous letters were sent to the parents of two nonmember
students participating in a hunger strike against the war at a midwest college,
hecause the fast was sponsored by the Young Socialist Alliance. The letters
warned that the students' participation "could lead to injury to [their] health
and damage [their] academic stllnding," and alerted them to their sons' "involvement
in left wing activities," It was hoped that the parents would "protest to the
college that the fast is being allowed" and that the Young Socialist Alliance was
permitted on campus. (Memorandum from FBI headquarters to Cleveland Field
Office, 11/29/68.)
81 Memorandum from J. H. Gale to Charles Tolsen, 7/30/64, p. 5. Opinion within
the Division had been sharply divided on the merits of this transfer. Some saw
it as an attempt to hring the Intelligence Division's expertise in penetrating
secret organizations to bear on a problem-Klan involvement in the murder of
civil rights workers-creating tremendolls pressures on the Bureau to solve.
Traditional law enforcement methods were insufficient because of a lack of
19
Accordingly, on September 2,1964, a directive was sent to seventeen
field offices instituting a COINTELPRO against Klan-type and hate
organizations "to expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize the activitie~
q of the various Klans and hate organizations, their leadership, and
adherents." 82 Seventeen Klan organizations and nine "hate" organizations
(e.g., American Nazi Patty, National States Rights Party, etc.)
were listed as targets. The field offices were also instructed specifically
to consider "Action Groups"-"the relatively few individuals in each
organization who use strong arm tactics and violent actions to achieve
their ends." 83 However, counterintelligence proposals were not to be
limited to these few, but were to include any influential member if
the oppOltunity arose. As the unit chief stated:
The emphasis 'was on determining the identity and exposing
and neutralizing the violen.ce prone activities of "Action
Groups," but also it was important to expose the unlawful
activities of other Klan organizations. We also made an effort
to deter or counteract the propaganda and to deter violence
and to deter recruitment where we could. This was done with
the view that if we could curb the organization, we could curb
the action or the violence within the organization.84
The White Hate COINTELPRO appears to have been limited, with
few exceptions,85 to the original named targets. No "legitimate" right
wing organizations were drawn into the program, in contrast with the
earlier spread of the CPUSA and SWP programs to non members.
This precision has been attributed by the Bureau to the superior intelligence
on "hate" groups received by excellent informant penetration.
Bureau witnesses believe the Klan program to have been highly
effective. The unit chief stated:
I think the Bureau got the job don.e.... I think that one
reason we were able to get the job done was that we were
able to use counterintelligence techniques. It is possible that
we eventually could have done the job without counterintelligence
techniques. I am not sure we could have done it as well
or as quickly.8G
This view was shared by George C. Moore, Section Chief of the
Racial Intelligence Section, which had responsibility for the White
Hat<, and Black Nationalist COINTELPROs:
I think from what I have seen and what I have read, as far
as the counterintelligence program on the Klan is concerned,
that it was effective. I think it was one of the most effective
I<'ederal statutes and the noncooperation of local law enforcement. Others thought
that the Klan's activities were essentially a law enforcement problem, and that
the transfer would dilute the Division's major internal security responsibility.
Those who opposed the transfer lost, and trace many of the Division's subsequent
difficulties to this "substantial enlargement" of the Division's responsibilities.
("Unit chief, 10/16/75, pp. 45-47.)
.. Memorandnm from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office, 9/2/64, p. 1.
.. FBI Headquarters memorandum, 9/2/64, p. 3.
M Unit Chief, 10/14/75, p. 54.
.. A few actions were approved against the "Minutemen," when it became
known that members were stockpiling weapons.
.. Unit Chief, 10/16/75, p. 48.
20
programs I have ever seen the Bureau handle as far as any
group is concerned.87
5. Bla(J/( Na.tio'llulist-Hate G1'OUps.88-In marked contrast to prior
COINTELPROs, which grew out of years of intensive intelligence
investigation, the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO and the racial
intelligence investigative section were set up at about the same time
in 1967.
Prior to that time, the Division's investigation of "Negro matters"
was limited to instances of alleged Communist infiltration of civil
rights groups and to monitoring civil rights protest activity. However,
the long, hot summer of 196i led to intense pressure on the Bureau
to do something to contain the problem, and once again, the Bureau
heeded the call.
The originating letter was sent out to twenty-three field offices on
August 25,1967, describing the program's purpose as
... to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwisp
neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type
organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmpn,
membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity
for violpnce and civil disordpr.... Efforts of the
various groups to consolidate thpir forces or to recruit new or
youthful adlwrents must be frustrated. 89
Initial group targets for "intensified attention" were the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee, Revolutionary Action Movement, Deacons for Defense
and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality, and the Nation of Islam.
Individuals named targets were Stokely Carmichael, H. "Rap" Brown,
Elijah Muhammed, and Maxwell Stanford. The targets were chosen
by conferring with Headquarters personnel supervising the racial
cases; the list was not intended to exclude other groups known to the
field.
According to the Black Nationalist supervisor, individuals and organizations
were targeted beeause of theIr propensit1. for violence or
their "radical or revolutionary rhetoric [and] actions' :
Revolutionary would be [defined as] advocacy of the overthrow
of the Government.... Radical [is] a loose term that
might cover, for example, the separatist view of the Nation of
Islam, the influence of a group called U.S. Incorporated....
Generally, they wanted a separate black nation.... They [the
NOI] advocated formation of a separate black nation on the
territory of five Southern states.90
8'1 Moore, 11/3/75, p. 31.
.. Note that this characterization had no substantive mt'aning within tilt'
Bureau. See p. 4.
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAO's, 8/25/67.
.. Black Nationalist supervisor, 10/17/75, pp. 66-67. The supervisor stated that
individual NOI members were involved with sporadic violence against police, but
the organization was not itself involved in violence. (Black National supervisor.
10/17/75. p. 67.) Moore agreed that the XOI was not involved in organizational
Violence, adding that the Nation of Islam had been unjustly blamed for
violence in the ghetto riots of 1967 and 1968: "We bad a good informant coverage
of the Nation of Islam.... We were able to take a very positive stand and tell
the Department of Justice and tell everybody else who accused the Nation of
21
The letter went on to direct field offices to exploit conflicts within and
between groups; to use news media contacts to disrupt, ridicule, or discredit
groups; to preclude "violence-prone" or "rabble rouser" leaders
of these groups from spreading their philosophy publicly; and to
gather information on the "unsavory backgrounds"-immorality, subversive
activity, and criminal activity-of group members.91
According to George C. Moore, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference was included because
... at that time it was still under investigation because of the
communist infiltration. As far as I know, there were not any
violent propensities, except that I note ... in the cover memo
[expanding the program] or somewhere, that they mentioned
that if Martin Luther King decided to go a certain way, he
could cause some trouble.... I cannot explain it satisfactorily
... this is something the section inherited.92
On March 4, 1968, the program was expanded from twenty-three
to forty-one field oflices.93 The letter expanding the program lists five
long-range goals for the program:
(1) to prevent the "coalition of militant black nationalist
groups," which might be the first step toward a real "Mau
Mau" in America;
(2) to prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could "unify,
and electrify," the movement, naming specifically Martin
Luther King, Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah Muhammed;
(B) to prevent violence on the part of black nationalist
groups, by pinpointing "potential troublemakers" and neutralizing
them "before they exercise their potential for
violence;"
(4) to prevent groups and leaders from gaining "respectability"
by discrediting them to the "responsible" Negro community,
to the white community (both the responsible community
and the "liberals"-the distinction is the Bureau's),
and to Negro radicals; and
Islam ... [that they] were not involved in any of the riots or disturbances. Elijah
Muhammed kept them under control, and he did not have them on the streets at
aU during any of the riots." (Moore, 11/3/75, p. 36.)
'Vhen asked why, therefore, the NOI was included as a target, Mr. Moore
answered: "Because of the potential. they did represent a potential ... they
were a paramilitary type. They had drills, the Fruit of Islam, they had the
capability because they were a force to be reckoned with, with the snap of his
finger Elijah MUhammed could bring them into any situation. So that there was
a very definite potential, very definite potential." (Moore, 11/3/75, p. 37.)
91 The unit chief, who wrote the letter on instructions from his superiors, eon·
eedes that the letter directed field offices to gather personal life information on
targets, not for "scandalous reasons," but "to deter violence or neutralize the activities
of violence-prone groups." (Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 66.)
.. Moore, 11/3/75, pp. 37, 39, 40.
93 Primary targets listed in this second letter are the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Revolutionary
Aetion Movement, Nation of Islam, Stokely Carmichael, H. "Rap" Brown,
Martin Luther King. Maxwell Stanford, and Elijah Muhammed. CORE was
dropped for reasons no witness was able to reconstruct. The agent who prepared
the second letter disagreed with the inclusion of the SOIA}, but lost. (Black
Nationalist super-visor, 10/17/75, p. 14,)
22
(5) to prevent the long range growth of these organizations,
especially among youth, by developing specific tactics
to "prevent these groups from recruiting young people." 94
6. The Panther Directives.-The Black Panther Party ("BPP")
was not included in the first two lists of primary targets (August
1967 and March 1968) because it had not attained national importance.
By November 1968, apparently the BPP had become sufficiently active
to be considered a pnmary target. A letter to certain field offices with
BPP activity dated November 25, 1968, ordered recipient offices to
submit "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures
aimed at crippling the BPP." Proposals were to be received every two
weeks. Particular attention was to be given to capitalizing upon the
differences between the BPP and US, Inc. (Ron Karenga's group),
which had reached such proportions that "it is taking on the aura
of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals." 95
On .January 30, 1969, this program against the BPP was expanded
to additional offices, noting that the BPP was attempting to create
a better image. In line with this effort, Bobby Seale was conducting
a "purge" 96 of the party, including expelling police informants.
Recipient offices were instructed to take advantage of the opportunity
to further plant the seeds of suspicion concerning disloyalty among
ranking officials.97
Bureau witnesses are not certain whether the Black Nationalist
program was effective. Mr. Moore stated:
I know that the ... overall results of the Klan [COINTEL
PRO] was much more effective from what I have been told
than the Black Extremism [COINTELPRO] 'because of the
number of informants in the Klan who could take action
which would be more effective. In the Black Extremism
Group ... we got a late start becoause we did not have extremist
activity [until] '67 and '68. Then we had to play
catch-up.... It is not easy to measure effectiveness.... There
were policemen killed in those days. There were bombs
thrown. There were e..'>l:ablishments burned with molotov
cocktails.... We can measure that damage. You cannot measure
over on the other side, what lives were saved because
somebody did not leave the organi:lJation or suspicion was
sown on his leadership and this organization gradually declined
and [there was] suspicion within it, or this organization
did not join with [that] organi:lJation as a result of a
bl'ack power conference which was 'aimed towards consolidation
efforts. All we know, either through their own ineptitude,
maybe it emerged through counterintelligence, maybe, I think
,ve like to think that that helped to do it, that thereW'as not
this development. . . . What part did counterintelligence
[play?] We hope that it did playa part. Maybe we just gave
it a nudge." 98 •
.. Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 3/4/68, pp. 3-4.
9G Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office. 11/25/68.
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's. 1/30/69.
97 This technique, the "snitch jacket," was used in all COINTELPRO programR.
.. Moore, 11/3/75, pp. 34, 50-52.
23
7. New Left.-The Internal Security Section had undergone a
slow transition from concentrating on the "Old Left"-the CPUSA
and SW·p-to focusing primarily on the activities of the "New
Left"-a term which had no precise definition within the Bureau.99
Some agents defined "New Leff' functionally, by connection with
protests. Others defined it by philosophy, particularly antiwar
philosophy.
On OC'Wber 28, 1968, the fifth and final COINTELPRO was started
against this undefined group. The program was t.riggeredin part by
the Columbia campus disturbance. Once again, law enforcement methods
had broken down, largely (in the Bureau's opinion) because college
administrators refused to call the police on campus to deal with
student demonstrations. The atmosphere at the time w'as described
by the Headquarters 'agent who supervised the New Left
COINTELPRO:
During that particular time, there was considerable public,
Administration-I mean governmental Administration[
and] news media interest in the protest movement to the extent
that some groups, I don't recall 'any specifics, but some
groups were calling for something to be done to blunt or reduce
the protest movements that were disrupting campuses.
I can't classify it as exactly an hysteria, but there was considerable
interest [and concern]. That was the framework
that we were working with.... It would be my impression
that asa result of this hysteria, some governmental leaders
were looking to the Bureau.tOO
And, once again, the combination of perceived threat, public outcry,
and law enforcement fnlstration produced a COINTELPRO.
According to the initiating lettN, the counterintelligence program's
purpose was to "expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize" the activities
of the various New Left organizations, their leadership, and adherents,
with particular attention to Key Activists, "the moving forces
behind the New Left." The final paragraph contains an exhortation to
a "forward look, enthusiasm, and interest" because of the Bureau's
concern that "the anarchist activities of a few can paralyze institutions
of learning, induction centers, cripple traffic, and tie the arms of law
enforcement officials all to the detriment of our society." The internal
memorandum recommending the program further sets forth the Bureau's
concerns:
Our Nation is undergoing an era of disruption and violence
caused to a large extent by various individuals generally connected
with the New Left. Some of these activists urge revolution
in America and call for the defeat of the United Stntes
in Vietnam. They continually and falsely allege police bru-
.. As the New Left supervisor put it, "I cannot recall any document that was
wrttten defini~ New Left as such. It is my impression that the characteriza<
tion of New Left /n"OUPS mther than being' defined at any specific time by document,
it more or less grew.... Agreeing it was a very amorphous term, he added:
"It has never been strictly defined, as far 'as I know.... It is more or less an
attitUde. I would think." (New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, pp. 7-8.)
1"'New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, pp. 21-22.
24
tality and do not hesitate to utilize unlawful acts to further
their so-called causes.
The document continues:
The New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurrilously
attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt
to hamper our inveStigation of it and to drive us off the
college campuses.lOl
Based on those factors, the Bureau decided to institute a new
COINTELPRO.
8. New Left Directives.-The Bureau's concern with "tyin~ the
hands of 1'aw enforcement officers," and with the perceived weakness
of college administrators in refusing to call police onto the campus,
led to a May 23, 1968, directive to all participating field offices to
gather information on three categories of New Left activities:
(1) false allegations of police brutality, to "counter the
IWide-spread charges of police brutality that invaria:bly arise
following student-police encounters" ;
(2) immorality, depicting the "scurrilous and depraved
nature of many of the characters, activities, habits, and living
conditions representative of New Left adherents"; and
(3) action by college administrators, "to show the value of
college administrators and school officials taking a firm stand,"
and pointing out "whether and to what extent faculty mem- .
hers rendered aid and encouragement."
The letter continues, "Every avenue of possible embarrassment must
be vigorously and enthusiastically explored. It cannot he expected
that information of this type will he easily obtained, and an imaginative
approach by your personnel is imperative to its success." 11)3
The order to furnish information on "immorality" was not carried,
out with sufficient enthusiasm. On October 9, 1968, headquarters sent
another letter to all offices, taking them to task for their failure to
"remain alert for and to seek specific data depicting the depraved
nature and moral looseness of the New Left" and to "use this material
in a vigorous and enthusiastic approach to neutralizing them." 104
Recipient offices were again instructed to be "particularly alert for this
type of data" 105 and told:
:LOt Memorandum from Charles D. Brennan to William C. SulliV'lln, 5/9/68.
103 Memorandum from FBI headquarters to aU SAC's, 5/23/68.
,.. :\Iemorandum from FBI headquarters to aU SACs, 10/9/68.
100 This time the field offices got the message. One example of information
furnished under the "Immorality" caption comes from the Boston field office;
"[Informant] who has provided reliable information in the past concerning
the activities of the New Left in the Metropolitan Boston area, has advised that
numerous meetings concerning anti-Vietnam and/or draft activity are conducted
by members sitting around the table or a living room completely in the nude.
These same individuals, both male imd female, live and sleep together regularly
and it is not unusual to have these people take up rf:>sidence with a different
partner after a six or seven month period.
"According to the informant, the living conditions and habits of some of the
New Left adherents are appalling in that certain individuals have been known
to wear the same clothes for an estimated period of weeks and in some instances
25
As the current school year commences, it can be expected that
the New Left with its anti-war and anti-draft entourage will
make every effort to confront college authorities, stifle military
recruiting, and frustrate the Selective Service System.
Each office will be expected, therefore, to afford this program
continuous effective attention in order that no opportunity
will be missed to destroy this insidious movement.,1OG
As to the police brutality and "college administrator" categories,
the Bureau's belief that getting tough ~\Yith Htudents and demonstrators
would solve the problem, and that any injuries which resulted w~re
deserved, is reflected in the Bureau's reaction to allegations of pollee
brutality following the Chicago Democratic Convention.
On August 28, 1968, a letter was sent to the Chicago fiel~l office
instructing it to "obtain all possible evidence that would dIsprove
these charges" [that the Chicago police used undue force] and to "consider
measures by which cooperative news media may be used to counteract
these allegations." The administrative "note" (for the file)
states :
Once again, the liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the
forces on the left, are taking advantage of the situation in
Chicago surrounding the Democratic National Convention to
attack the police and organized law enforcement agencies....
We should be mindful of this situation and develop all possible
evidence to expose this activity and to refute these false
allegations.lo1
In the same vein, on September 9, 1968, an instruction was sent to
all offices which had sent informants to the Chicago convention demonstrations,
ordering them to debrief the informants for information
"indicating incidents were staged to show police reacted with undue
force and any information that authorities were baited by militants
into using force." 108 The offices were also to obtain evidence of possible
violations of anti-riot laws.109
The originating New Left letter had asked all recipient offices to
respond with suggestions for counterintelligence action. Those refor
months. Personal hygiene and eating habits are equally neglected by these
people, the informant said.
"The informant has noted that those individuals who most recently joined
the movement are in most instances the ,vorst offenders as far as moral and
personal habits are concerned. However, if these individuals remain in the
movement for any length of time. their appearance and personal habits appear
to improve somewhat." (Memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
6/13/68.)
,.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/9/68.
,., )Ipmorandum from FRI Hpadquartprs to Chica~o Fipld Offi('p, 8/28/6R
'.. ;\Iemorandllm from FRI Headquarters to all ~AC·s. O/O/6R
'00 Kote that there was no attempt to determine whether the allegations were
trnp. Ramsey Clark, Attorney General at the time, testified that he did not know
that ('ither directiYe had heen issued and that "they are highly improper." He
also noted that the Bureau's close working relationship with state and local police
forces had made it necessary to "lIreempt the FBI" in cases involYing the investigation
of police misconduct; "we found it ne('essary to use the Cidl Rights Diyision,
and that is basically what we did." (Clark, 12/3/75 Hearings Vol. 6. liP.
254-255.) ,
26
sponses were analyzed and a letter sent to all offices on July 6, 1968,
setting forth twelve suggestions for counterintelligence action which
could be utilized by all offices. Briefly the techniques are:
(1) preparing leaflets designed to discredit student demonstrators,
using photographs of New Left leadership at the respective universities.
"Naturally, the most obnoxious pictures should be used";
(2) instigating "personal conflicts or animosities" between New Left
leaders;
(3) creating the impression that leaders are "informants for the
Bureau or other law enforcement agencies";
(4) sending articles from student newspapers or the "underground
press" which show the depravity of the New Left to university officials,
donors, legislators, and parents. "Articles showing advocation
of the use of narcotics and free sex are ideal" ;
(5) having members arrested on marijuana charges;
(6) sending anonymous letters about a student's activities to parents,
neighbors, and the parents' employers. "This could have the effect
of forcing the parents to take action" ; .
(7) sending anonymous letters or leaflets describing the "activities
and associations" of New Left faculty members and graduate assistants
to university officials, legislators, Boards of Reg-ents, and the press.
"These letters should be signed 'A Concerned Alumni,' or 'A Concerned
Taxpazer' " ;
(8) using' cooperative press contacts" to emphasize that the "disruptive
elements" constitute a "minority" of the students. "The press
should demand an immediate referendum on the issue in question";
(9) exploiting the "hostility" among the SDS and other New Left
groups toward the SVVP, YSA, and Prog-ressive Labor Party;
(10) using "friendly news media" and law enforcement officials to
disrupt New Left coffeehousl.'s nrar military bases which are attempting
to "influence members of the Armed Forces" ;
(11) using cartoons, photographs, and anonymous letters to "ridicule"
the New Left; and
(12) using "misinformation" to "confuse and disrupt" New Left
activities, such as by notifying members that events have been cancelledYo
As noted earlier, the lack of any Bureau definition of "New Left"
resulted in targeting almost every anti-war group,lll and spread to
students demonstrating against anything. One notable example is a
proposal targeting a student who carried an "obscene" sign in a demonstration
protesting administration censorship of the school newspaper,
UO MemQrandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 7/6/68.
Ul The New Left supervisor confirmed what the documents reveal: "legitimate"
(nonviolent) antiwar groups were targeted because they were "lending aid and
comfort" to more disruptive groups. According to the New Left supervisor:
"This [nonviolent groups protesting against the war] was the type of thing
that the New Left, the violent portion, would seize upon. The.v could use tbe
legitimacy of an accepted college group or outside group to further their interests."
(New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 39)
Nonviolent groups were thus disrupted so there would be less opportunity for
a violent group to make use of them and their respectability. Professors active in
"New Left matters," whether involved in violence or just in general protest, were
targeted for "using [their] good offices to lend aid and comfort to the entire
protest movement or to help disrupt the school through [their] programs." (New
Left supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 69.)
27
and another student who sent a letter to that paper defending the
demonstration.112 In another article regarding "free love" on a UnIversity
campus was anonymously mailed to college administrators and
state officials since free love allows "an atmosphere to build up on
campus that will be a fertile field for the New Left." 113
None of the Bureau witnesses deposed believes the New Left COIN
TELPRO was generally effective, in part because of the imprecise
targeting.
III. THE GOALS OF COINTELPRO: PREVENTING OR DISRUPTING THE EXERCISE
OF FIRST AMEND~IENTRIGHTS
The origins of COINTELPRO demonstrate that the Bureau adopted
extralegal methods to counter perceived threats to national security
and public order because the ordinary legal processes were believed to
be insufficient to do the job. In essence, the Bureau took the law into
its own hands, conducting a sophisticated vigilante operation against
domestic enemies.
The risks inherent in setting aside the laws, even though the purpose
seems compelling at the time, were described by Tom Charles
Huston in his testimony before the Committee: 114
The risk was that you would get people who would be susceptible
to political considerations as opposed to national
security considerations, or would construe political considerations
to be national security considerations, to move
from the kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and
from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper
sticker of the opposing candidate. And you just keep gomg
down the line. 115
The description is apt. Certainly, COINTELPRO took in a staggering
range of targets. As noted earlier, the choice of individuals
and organizations to be neutralized and disrupted ranged from the
violent elements of the Black Panther Party to Martin Luther King,
,Jr., who the Bureau concedes was an advocate of nonviolence; from
the Communist Party to the Ku Klux Klan; and from the advocates
of violent revolution such 3;S the Weathermen, to the supporters of
peaceful social change, including the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference and the Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign
Policy.
The breadth of targeting springs partly from a lack of definition
for the categories involved, and partly from the Bureau's belief that
dissident speech and association should be prevented because they were
incipient steps toward the possible ultimate commission of an act
which might be criminal. Thus, the Bureau's self-imposed role as protector
of the existing political and social order blurred the line be-
112 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters, Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.
113 ~I('morandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 8/27/68.
11< Huston was the Presidential assistant who coordinated the 1970 recommendations
by an interagency committee for expanded domestic intelligence,
including concededly illegal activity. The so-called "Huston Plan" is the subject
of a separate report.
1%5 Tom Charles Huston testimony, 9/23/75. Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 45.
69-984 0 - 76 - 3
28
tween targeting criminal activity and constitutionally protected acts
and advocacy.
The clearest example of actions directly aimed at the exercise of constitutional
rights are those targeting speakers, teachers, writers or
publications, and meetings or peaceful demonstrations.ll6 Approximately
18 per(;ent of all approved COINTELPRO proposals fell into
these categories.11l
The cases include attempts (sometimes successful) to get university
and high school teachers fired; to prevent targets from speaking on
campus; to stop chapters of target groups from being formed; to
prevent the distribution of books, newspapers, or periodicals; to disrupt
news conferences; to disrupt peaceful demonstrations, including
the SCLC's 'Vashington Spring Project and Poor People's Campaign,
and most of the large antiwar marches; and to deny facilities for meetings
or conferences.
A. Efforts to Prevent Speaking
An illustrative example of attacks on speaking concerns the plans of
a dissident stockholders' group to protest a large corporation's war
production at the annual stockholders meeting.uo The field office was
authorized to furnish information about the group's plans (obtained
from paid informants in the group) to a confidential source in the
company's management. The Bureau's purpose was not only to "circumvent
efforts to disrupt the corporate meeting," but also to prevent
any attempt to "obtain publicity or embarrass" corporate officials. t19
In another case,120 anonymous telephone calls were made to the editorial
desks of three newspapers in a Midwestern city, advising them
that a lecture to be given on a university campus was actually being
sponsored by a Communist-front organization. The universIty had
recently lifted its ban on Communist speakers on campus and was experiencing
some political difficulty over this decision. The express purpose
of the phone calls was to prevent a Communist-sponsored speaker
from appearing on campus and, for a time, it appeared to have worked.
One of the newspapers contacted the director of the university's conference
center. He in turn discussed the meeting with the president of
110 The usual constitutional inquiry is whether the government is "chilling"
First Amendment rights by indirectly discouraging a protected activity while
pursuing an otherwise legitimaJte purpose. In the case of COINTELPRO, the
Bureau was not attempting indirectly to chill free speech or association; it was
squarely attacking their exercise.
11l The percentage is derived from a cross-indexed tabulation of the Petersen
Committee summaries. Interestingly, these categories account for 39 percent of
the approved "New Left" proposals, which reflects both the close connection between
antiwar activities and the campuses, and the "aid and comfort" theory of
targeting, in which teachers were targeted for advocating an end to the war
through nonviolent means.
11B The group was composed largely of university teachers and clergymen who
had bought shares in order to attend the meetinJ::'. (Memorandum from Minneapolis
Field Office to FBI headquarters, 4/1/70.)
119 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 4/23/70;
memorandum from Minneapolis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/1/70.
120 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/26/60;
Memoranda from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/27/60, 10/28/60,
10/31/60; Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to Alan H. Belmont, 10/26/60.
29
the university who decided to cancel the meeting.101 The sponsoring
organization, supported by the ACLU, took the case to court, and won
a ruling that the university could not bar the speaker. (Bureau headquarters
then ordered the field office to furnish information on the
judge.) Although the lecture went ahead as scheduled, headquarters
commended the field office for the affirmative results of its suggestion:
the sponsoring organization had been forced to incur additional expense
and attorneys' fees, and had received newspaper exposure of its
"true communist character."
B. Efforts to Prevent TeMhing
Teachers were targ-eted because the Bureau believed that they were
in a unique position to "plant the seeds of communism [or whatever
ideology was under attack] in the minds of unsuspecting youth." Further,
as noted earlier, it was believed that a teacher's position gave
respectability to whatever cause he supported. In one case, a high
school teacher was targeted for inviting two poets to attend a class
at his school. The poets were noted for their efforts in the -draft resistance
movement. This invitation led to an investig-ation by the local
police, which in turn provoked sharp criticism from the ACLU. The
field office was authorized to send anonymous letters to two local
newspapers, to the city Board of Education, and to the high school
administration, suggesting that the ACLU should not criticize the
police for probin~ mto hig-h school activities, "but should rather have
focused attention on [the teacher1 who has been a convicted draft
-dodger." The letter continued, "[the teacher] is the assault on academIC
freedom and not the local poli~." The purpose of the letter,
according to Bureau documents, was "to highlight [the teacher's]
antidraft activities at the local high school" and to "discourage any
efforts" he may make there. The letter was also intended to "show
support for the local police against obvious attempts by the New
Left to agitate in the hig-h schools." 122 No results were reported.
In another case,123 a university professor who was "an active participant
in New Left demonstrations" had publicly surrendered hi::;
draft card and had been arrested twice (but not convicted) in antiwar
demonstrations. The Bureau decided that the professor should be,
"removed from his position" at the university. The field office was authorized
to contact a "confidential source" at a foundation which
contributed substantial funds to the university, and "discreetly suggest
that the [foundation] may desire to call to the attention of the University
administration questions concerning- the advisability of [the professor's]
continuing his position there." The foundation official was
told by the university that the professor's contract would not be renewed,
but in fact the professor did continue to teach. The following
121 It is interesting to note that after the anonymous calls to the newspapers
giving information on the "communist nature" of the sponsor, the conference
center director called the local FBI office to ask for information on the speaker.
He was informed that Bureau records are confidential and that the Bureau could
not make any comment.
122 :\Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 6/19/6ll.
123 :\lemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, !)/l/70.
30
academic year, therefore, the field office was authorized to furnish
additional information to the foundation official on 'the professor's
arrest and conviction (with a suspended sentence) in another demonstration.
No results were reported.
In a third instance, the Bureau attempted to "discredit and neutralize"
a university professor and the Inter-University Committee for
Debate on Foreign Policy, in which he was active. The field office was
authorized to send a fictitious-name letter to influential state political
figures, the mass media, university administrators, and the Board of
Regents, accusing the professor and "his protestin~cohorts" of "giving
aid and comfort to the enemy," and wondering' if the strategy is tc
bleed the United States white by prolonging the war in Vietnam and
pave the way for a takeover by Russia." No results were reported.124
O. Efforts to Prevent Writing and Publishing
The Bureau's purpose in targeting attempts to speak was explicitly
to prevent the "propagation" ofa target's philosophy and to deter "recruitment"
of new members. Publications and writers appear to have
been targeted for the same reasons. In one example,125 two university
instructors were targeted solely because they were influential in the
publication of and contributed financial support to a student "underground"
newspaper whose editorial policy was described as "left-ofcenter,
anti-establishment, and opposed [to] the University administration."
The Bureau believed that if the two instructors were forced
to withdraw their sUJ;>port of the newspaper, it would "fold and cease
publication.... ThIS would eliminate what voice the New Left has in
the area." Accordingly, the field office was authorized to send an
anonymous letter to a university official furnishing information concerning
the instructors' associatIOn with the newspaper, with a warning
that if the university did not persuade the instructors to cease their
support, the letter's author would be forced to expose their activities
publicly. The field office reported that as a result of this technique,
both teachers were placed on probation by the university president,
which would prevent them from getting any raises.
Newspapers were a common target. The Black Panther Party paper
was the subject of a number of actions, both 'because of its contents and
because it was a source of income for the Party.126 Other examples include
contacting the landlord of premises rented by two "New Left"
newspapers in an attempt to get them evicted; 127 an anonymous letter
to a state legislator protesting the distribution on campus of an underground
newspaper "representative of the type of mentality that is fol-
12< MemQranudm from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/11/66;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/26/66.
121 Memorandum from Mobile Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/70; memorandum
from FBI Headquarters to Mobile Field Office, 12/31/70; memorandum
from Mobile Field Offiee to FBI Headquarters, 2/3/71.
1011 In one example, a letter signed "A Black Parent" was sent to the mayor, the
Superintendent of Schools, the Commander of the American Legion, and two
newspapers in a northeastern city protesting a high school's subscription to the
BPP newspaper. The letter was also intended to focus attention on the teacher
who entered the subscription "so as to deter him from implementing black extremist
literature and philosophy into the Black History curriculum" of the school
system. (Memorandum £rom Buffalo Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/5/10.)
'21 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to SAC, Los Angeles Field Office, 9/28/68.
31
lowin*, the New Left theory of immorality on certain colle~e campuses
; 128 a letter signed "Disgusted Taxpayer and Patron' to advertisers
in a student newspaper intended to "increase pressure on the
student newspaper to discontinue the type of journalism that had been
employed" (an article had quoted a demonstrator's "vulgar language")
; 129 and proposals (which, according to the Bureau's response
to a staff inquiry, were never carried out) to physically disrupt
printing plants.'3o
D. Effwts to Prevent Meeting
The Bureau also attempted to prevent target groups from meeting.
Frequently used techniques include contacting the owner of meeting
facilities in order to have him refuse to rent to the group; 131 trying to
have a group's charter revoked; 132 using the press to disrupt a "closed"
meeting by arriving unannounced; 133 and attempting to persuade
sponsors to withdraw funds.134 The most striking examples of attacks
on meeting, however, involve the use of "disinformation." 135
In one "disinformation" case, the Chicago Field Office duplicated
blank forms prepared by the National Mobilization Committee to End
the War in Vietnam ("NMC") soliciting housing for demonstators
coming to Chicago for the Democratic National Convention. Chicago
filled out 217 of these forms with fictitious names and addresses and
sent them to the NMC, which provided them to demonstrators who
made "long and useless journeys to locate these addresses." The NMC
then decided to discard all replies received on the housing forms rather
than have out-of-town demonstrators try to locate nonexistent addresses.""
(The same program was carried out when the Washington
Mobilization Committee distributed housing forms for demonstrators
coming to Washington for the 1969 Presidential inaugural ceremonies.)
137
In another case, during the demonstrations accompanying inauguration
ceremonies, the Washington Field Office discovered that NMC
marshals were using walkie-talkies to coordinate their movements and
'28 Memorandum from Newark Field Office to IfBI Headquarters, 5/23/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Newark Field Office, 6/4/69.
'20 Memorandum from Detroit Fdeld Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/28/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 3/27/69.
100 For example, one proposal requested that the FBI Lab prepare a quart of
solution "capable of duplicating a scent of the most foul smelling feces available,"
along with a dispenser capable of squirting a narrow stream for a distance
of approximately three feet. The proposed targets were the physical plant of a
New Left publisher and BPP publications prior to their distribution. Headquarters
instructed the field office to furnish more information about the purpose
for the material's use and the manner and security with which it would be used.
The idea was then apparently dropped. (Memorandum from Detroit Field Office
to FBI Headquarters, 10/13/70; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit
Field Office, 10/23/70.)
13' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 9/23/6R
13lI Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 5/13/69.
133 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Indianapolis Field Office, 6/17/68.
134 ~Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 12/30/68.
135 One of the 12 standard techniques referred to in the New Left memorandum
discussed at pp. 25-26, disinformation bridges the line between "counterintelligence"
and sabotage.
''"Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 9/9/6R;
memorandum from Charles Brennan to William C. Sullivan, 8/15/68.
137 Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/21/69.
32
ac~i.vities. W~O used the same citizen band to supply the marshals with
mIsmformatIOn and, pretending to be an NMC unit, countermanded
NMC orders. 138
In a t~ird case 139 a midwest field office disrupted arrangements for
state unIversity students to attend the 1969 inaugural demonstrations
by making a series of anonymous telephone calls to the transportat~
on company. The calls were designed to confuse both the transportatIOn
company and the SDS leaders as to the cost of transportation and
the time and place for leaving and returning. This office also placed
confusing leaflets around the campus to show different times and
places for demonstration-planning meetings, as well as conflicting
times and dates for traveling to Washington.
In a fourth instance, the "East Village Other" planned to bomb
the Pentagon with flowers during the 1967 NMC rally in Washington.
The New York office answered the ad for a pilot, and kept up the
pretense right to the point at which the publisher showed up at the airport
with 200 pounds of flowers, with no one to fly the plane. Thus, the
Bureau was able to prevent this "agitational-propaganda activity as
relates to dropping flowers over "Vashington." 140
The cases discussed above are just a few examples of the Bureau's
direct attack on speaking, teaching, writing and meeting. Other instances
include targeting the New Mexico Free University for teaching,
among other things, "confrontation politics" and "draft counseling
training." 141 In another case, an editorial cartoonist for a northeast
newspaper was asked to prepare a cartoon which would "ridicule
and discredit" a group of antiwar activists who traveled to North
Vietnam to inspect conditions there; the cartoon was intended to
"depict [the individuals] as traitors to their country for traveling to
North Vietnam and making utterances against the foreign policy of
the United States." 142 A professor was targeted for being the facult~
advisor to a college group which circulated "The Student As Nigger'
138 Egil Krogh has stated to the Committee staff that he was in charge of coordinating
D.C. law enforcement efforts during demonstrations, and gained the
cooperation of NMC marshals to ensure an orderly demonstration. This law
enforcement/NMC coordination was effected through thl" saIlle walkie-talkie
system the Bureau was disrupting. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to
Washington Field Office, 1/10/69; staff summary of Egil Krogh interview,
5/23/75.)
130 Memorandum from Cincinnati Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/20/68;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 12/29/68.
""Memoranda from New York Ifield Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/15/67,
9/26/67, and 10/17/67; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field
Office, 9/29/67. By letter of January 14, 1976, the Bureau submitted specific instances
of "action, other than arrest and prosecution, to prevent any stage of [a]
crime or violent acts from being initiated" which had been taken. The examples
were Intended to aid in developing "preventive action" guidelines.
One of the examples was the prevention of the publisher's plan to drop fiowers
over the Pentagon: "A plan was thus thwarted which could well have resulted in
tragedy had another pilot accepted such a dangerous flying mission and violated
Federal or local regulations in flying low over the Pentagon which is also in the
heavy traffic pattern of the Washington National Airport." The letter does not
explain why it was necessary to act covertly in this case. If flying over the Pentagon
violates Federal regulations, the Bureau could have arrested those involved
when they aJ'rived at the airport. No informant was involved; the newspaper
had advertised openly for a pilot.
Hl Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Albuquerque Field Office, 3/19/69.
102 Memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/22/66.
33
on campus.143 A professor conducting a study on the effect and social
costs of McCarthyism was targeted because he sought information
and help from the American Institute of Marxist Studies.144 Contacts
were made with three separate law schools in an attempt to keep a
teaching candidate from being hired, or once hired, from getting his contract
renewed.145
The attacks on speaking, teaching, writing, and meeting have been
examined in some detail because they present, in their purist form,
the consequences of acting outside the legal process. Perhaps the Bureau
was correct in its assumption that words lead to deeds, and that
larger group membership produces a greater risk of violence. Nevertheless,
the law draws the line between criminal acts and constitutionally
protected activity, and that line must be kept.146 As Justice
Brandeis declared in a different context fifty years ago:
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people, by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt for law: it invites every man
to become a law untD himself. To declare that in the administration
of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to
declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to
secure the conviction of the private criminal-would bring
terrible retribution. Against the pernicious doctrine this
Court should resolutely set its face. Olmstead v. U.S., 277
U.S.439,485 (1927)
IV. COINTELPRO TECHNIQUES
The techniques used in COINTELPRO were-and are-used
against hostile foreign intelligence agents. Sullivan's testimony that
the "rough, tough, dirty business" 147 of foreign counterintelligence
was brought home against domestic enemies was corroborated by
George Moore, whose Racial Intelligence Section supervised the White
Hate and Black Nationalist COINTELPROs:
You can trace [the origins] up and back to foreign intelligence,
particularly penetration of the group by the individual
informant. Before you can engage in counterintelligence you
must have intelligence.... If you have good intelligence and
1<3 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to El Paso Field Office, 12/6/68.
1.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Offi~e, 3/19/65.
145 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland and Boston Field Offices,
5/5/64.
1.. Mr. Huston learned that lesson as well:
"We went from this kind of sincere intention, honest intention, to develop a
series of justifications and rationalizations based upon this ... distorted view
of inherent executive power and from that, whether it was direct ... or was
indirect or inevitable. as I tend to think it is. you went down the road to where
you ended up, with these people going into the \Vatergate.
"And so that has convinced me that you have just got to draw the line at the
top of the totem pole, and that we would then ha\'e to take the risk-it is not
a risk-free choice, but it is one that. I am afraid, in my judgment, that we do
not have any alternative but to take." (Huston, 9/23/75, p. 45.)
H7 RuIlivan, 11/1/75, pp. 97-98.
34
know what it's going to do, you can seed distrust, sow misinformation.
The same techmque is used in the foreign field.
The same technique is used, misinformation, disruption, is
used in the domestic groups, although in the domestic groups
you are dealing in '67 and '68 with many, many more across
the country ... than you had ever dealt with as far as your
foreign groupS.148
The arsenal of techniques used in the Bureau's secret war against
domestic enemies ranged from the trivial to the life-endangering.
Slightly more than a quarter of all approved actions were intended to
promote factionalization within groups and between groups; a roughly
equal number of actions involved the creation and dissemination of
propaganda.149 Other techniques involved the use of federal, state, and
local agencies in selective law enforcement, and other use (and abuse)
of government processes; disseminating derogatory information to
family, friends, and associates; contacting employers; exposing "communist
infiltration" or support of target groups; and using organizations
which were hostile to target groups to disrupt meetings or otherwise
attack the targets.
A. Propaganda
The Bureau's COINTELPRO propaganda efforts stem from the
same basic premise as the attacks on speaking, teaching, writing and
meeting: propaganda works. Certain ideas are dangerous, and if their
expresSIOn cannot be prevented, they should be countered with Bureauapproved
views. Three basic techniques were used: (1) mailing reprints
of newspaper and magazine articles to group members or potential
supporters intended to convince them of the error of their
ways; (2) writin§: articles for or furnishing information to "friendly"
media sources to expose" target groups; 150 and (3) writing, printing,
and disseminating pamphlets and fliers without identifying the Bureau
as the source.
1. Reprint Mailings
The documents contain case after case of articles and newspaper
clippings being mailed (anonymously, of course) to group members.
The Jewish members of the Communist Party appear to have been
inundated with clippings dealing with Soviet mistreatment of Jews.
Similarly, Jewish supporters of the Black Panther Party received
articles from the BPP newspaper containing anti-Semitic statements.
College administrators received reprints of a Reader's Digest
article 151 and a Barron's article on campus disturbances intended to
persuade them to "get tough." 152
Perhaps only one example need be examined in detail, and that only
~ause it clearly sets forth the purpose of propaganda reprint mailmgs.
Fifty copies of an article entitled "Rabbi in Vietnam Says With-
"8 Moore, 11/3/75, pp. 32-33.
u'The percentages used in this section are derived from a staff tabulation of
the Petersen Committee summaries. The numbers are approximate bt'cause it was
occasionally difficult to determine from the summary what the purpose of the
technique was.
:we The resulting articles could then be used in the reprint mailing program.
151 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.
153 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 9/12/68.
35
drawal Not the Answer," described as "an excellent article in support
of United States foreign policy in Vietnam," were mailed to certain
unnamed professors and members of the Vietnam Day Committee
"who have no other subversive organizational affiliations." The purpose
of the mailing was "to convince [the recipients] of the correctness
of the U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam." 15&
Reprint mailings would seem to fall under Attorney General Levi's
characterization of much of COINTELPRO as "foolishness." 15.
They violate no one's civil rights, but should the Bureau be in the
anonymous propaganda business?
'/2. "Friendly" Media
:Much of the Bureau's propaganda efforts involved giving information
or alticles to "friendly" media sources who could be relied upon
not to reveal the Bureau's interests.155 The Crime Records Division of
the Bureau was responsible for public relations, including all headquarters
contacts with the media. In the course of its work (most of
which had nothing to do with COINTELPRO) the Division assembled
a list of "friendly" news media sources-those who wrote proBureau
stories.156 Field offices also had "confidential sources" (unpaid
Bureau informants) in the media, and were able to ensure their
cooperation.
The Bureau's use of the news media took two different forms: placing
unfavorable articles and documentaries about targeted groups,
and leaking derogatory information intended to discredit individuals.
157
A typical example of media propaganda is the headquarters letter
authOrizing the Boston Field Office to furnish "derogatory information
about the Nation of Islam (NOI) to established source [name
excised]" : 158
153 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 11/1/65.
154 Levi 12/11/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 318.
1M "Name checks" were apparently run on all reporters proposed for use in the
program, to make sure they were reliable. In one case, a check of Bureau files
showed that a television reporter proposed as the recipient of information on
the SDS had the same name as someone who had served in the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade. The field office was asked to determine whether the "individuals" were
"identical." The field office obtained the reporter's credit records, voting registration,
and local police records, and determined that his credit rating was satisfactory,
that he had no arrest record, that he "stated a preference for one of the
two major political parties"-and that he was not, in fact, the man who fought
in the Spanish Civil War. Accordingly, the information was furnished. (Memorandum
from Pittsburgh Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/26/68; memorandum
from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 1/23/69.)
:1M The Bureau also noted, for its files, those who criticized its work or its
Director, and the Division maintained a "not-to-contact" list which included the
names of some reporters and authors. One proposal to leak information to the
Boston Globe was turned down because both the newspaper and one of its
reporters "have made unfounded criticisms of the FBI in the past." The Boston
Field Office was advised to resubmit the suggestion usin~ another newspaper.
(Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 2/8/68.)
'" Leakin~ derogatory information is discussed at p. 50.
168 The Committee's agreement with the Bureau governing document production
provided that the Bureau could excise the names of "confidential sources" when
the documents were delivered to the Committee. Although the staff was permitted
to see the excised names at Bureau headquarters, it was also agreed that the
names not be used.
36
Your suggestions concerning material to furnish [name] are
good. Emphasize to him that the NOI predilection for violence/
59 preaching of race hatred, and hypocrisy, should be
exposed. Material furnished [name] should be either public
source or known to enough people as to protect your sources.
Insure the Bureau's interest in this matter is completely protected
by [name] .160
In another case, information on the Junta of Militant Organizations
("JOMO", a Black Nationalist target) was furnished to a source at a
Tampa television station.l6l Ironically, the station manager, who had
no knowledge of the Bureau's involvement, invited the Special Agent
in Charge, his assistant, and other agents to a preview of the half-hour
film which resulted. The SAC complimented the station manager on
his product, and suggested that it be made available to civic groups.162
A Miami television station made four separate documentaries (on
the Klan, Black Nationalist groups, and the New Left) with materials
secretly supplied by the Bureau. One of the documentaries, which had
played to an estimated audience of 200,000, was the subject of an
internal memorandum "to advise of highly successful results of counterintelligence
exposing the black extremist Nation of Islam."
[Excised] was elated at the response. The station received
more favorable telephone calls from viewers than the switchboard
could handle. Community leaders have commented
favorably on the program, three civic organizations have
asked to show the film to their members as a public service,
and the Broward County Sheriff's Office plans to show the
film to its officers and in connection with its community service
program.
This expose showed that NOI leaders are of questionable
character and live in luxury through a large amount of money
taken as contributions from their members. The extreme
nature of NOI teachings was underscored. Miami sources advised
the expose has caused considerable concern to local
NOI leaders who have attempted to rebut the program at
each open meeting of the NOI since the program was presented.
Local NOI leaders plan a rebuttal in the NOI newspaper.
Attendance by visitors at weekly NOI meetings has
dropped 50%. This shows the value of carefully planned
counterintelligence action.163
The Bureau also planted derogatory articles about the Poor People's
Campaign, the Institute for Policy Studies, the Southern Students
Organizing Committee, the National Mobilization Committee, and a
host of other organizations it believed needed to be seen in their "true
light."
ISO Note that Bureau witnesses testified that the NOI was not, in fact, involved
in organization violence. See pp. 20--21.
100 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 2/27/68.
16l Memarandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/5/68.
161 Memorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/7/69.
1.. Memorandum from G. C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 10/21/69.
37
3. Bureau-Authored Pamphlets and Fliers.
The Bureau occasionally drafted, printed, and distributed its own
propaganda. These pieces were usually intended to ridicule their targets,
rather than offer "straight" propaganda on the issue. Four of
these fliers are reproduced in the following pages.
, . DiG,!t. 1t'5 ti~~ t~ pUll t~! chain, brcthers and slster~. It
the peace :~o\"~r.:,"nt in ;~~:2ri,,:l :~ to n'.;rv:\·~, 'the c:-a;l 1:tfl.>:ence
of the Soci~li~t rlor~crG ?3rty c"d its b~~tnrd youth ~:-c~p
_ Young Soc:zl~st Al:'i::.ncc - ~".;;~t 'co :'l\.;~r.il;J frc:n ;;-:w t'-cl:e
once and for ~ll. StC:;:;::'3.n't ::C:-C:l 11}:c F~eddie Hal:t~ad a~d
Harry Rln;, both r.:e~,"crn of the S~P ~at'l Co"~ltt~c, ~ust
be oUr.lpcci. Let'!) r,ot r:d 0:' t,;,;' CJrO.l. L1.y.~:lnSI '(iuJ
Horol-!1t7.11 cr.'j the Jca:1r..a 1-Hr.:11"3 :110n,,; "l\;h other SW'P shit:;!
Dl:)JJU:D A:l £ND ~"O st.;? B:;LLI~;G! :~ri t~ ;;1.....,/ Mchc tod:~.'l .~ t r'
'Suite 900, l03g ·y·~r;.iG:~i; J\Vi.'., !~"r':., ~:;),;jhir.:~ton. D.C. ",' i
..., ,\ " '1 •. ""~ ,"\,'", ; ; J
~ ",'. , t" .' I ~.. ~ .. ). "";.J .; ••
.. .., . ..,.J ."". ""..
\,
NOTE: Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/14/70; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office,
1/20/70.
38
.. YOU can win I
.:~ !~u!'~1 J Hurry I
* Uothlnr, To Buy r
r~·"·~~·:·~·1
rr .' . .".:11
l~2 ··~gj_A.·,J,
:~? ~;. :1
OMe Dcilinger
C·_" ;C.-\:.: RULES:
• 'C':::II'~
Simnly pick 'the faFP:ot from the fo11011ing photos. I'rint
you~ choice on the cntry blank at tho bottom of this
pc~e and pop it into the mall. YOU COU!-D E\S.ILY liDU
r-'2~~--1 ", "~~:'~~,C'~-Jr ..~~~~.,
.(!"'l' ~ '., ; •.-..",. ~~ I·..... ",1
I -. ..." '. ! •. : I' ?' \~'-' I .":.~.. '\\ ':
I ~t~~ ,.-(' ,:~~ \. z'r,~). :l·.··)i .~'.
\ .~:- 'liZ -' 1 \ "7: . I. . '-""l~")'
" ",;'.:,-. Jr' I \:"'" ". I ..\I.. ~_.~".'~-".-;: /~. -' -_.~.~..~~_._- '-~~-~~' .
Cilo Gucrvera* Hark Rudd Herbert ~:arcuBe
.cHtC,: Tf.ESE COLOSSA L PR IZES I
• CRI'.hlI PRlz'E•••••••••••• 'O •••••• ~"lv",n fun dRyS in Hanoi - Expenses paid.'
*.SECC!:D PRIZE•••••••••••••••• Fcurteen full days in Hanoi!
* TaIRD PRIZE••••••••••••••• A wcekend with Josie Duke in d Bcnuine
fire-damoRed Columbia, University
dormitory I
* FOURTH PRIZE •••••••••••• Two weekends with tubby little Joslel
,} ADDITIO!!AL PRIZES ••••• SOD /'olls of red toilet tissue, each
9hee~ ~eorinF, the picture of Chairman Mao
in l1vinr; colorl
"',..::.~:.:}.::..;:.;:..::•.;:-;:..::.::..::.-::-:;..:;..::-::-.::·-::-::··;f-·::··:HN·::-::-:;··;:··::··::-::·:·1A I L TODAy·::-:t·::..J;:-:t·:H:-::-::·<f:-:;.-::-~::·*"::-::-::·*·:r::-:-::*:;.~*
r:.G CO;!TEST,
Pc;~ Office Box 220, rld Chelsea Station,
N..., Ycrk, Hew York (l0011)
'i'he ~ Far; picturod above 19 ••••••••••..•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
H~mo ••••••••••••••••••••••••Addre3s ••••••••••••••••••• •••••••Zip•••••••
("!Cote: Che, unfortunt<.t.r,1y, was discennocted fro", tho world last year.)
NOTE: Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/7/69; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 2/14/69.
DESPERATE DAVE DAi:GLES DIKGUS
Murdereusly Mangles HeBE
39
Sl:iJ :\ .)~: .
. ; I
,.. I J
i- (, ]
~ashi~ptcn. D. C. Jan. 20 - Speakjng in his usual hleh pitched
voice, De-ve Dellinrer, National Chairman of tr.e National .
Mobilizat~n Co~ittee (Y.OBE), today clRiroed that the antiinaugural
demonstrations called by his err-anization had been
responsible in getting the Paris peace talks going again.
Dellinger maae this startling disclosure before an audience
of newsman in the dingy lmlVthorne School whi~h housed many
or his followers. A cluster of the latter str.od behind their
Guru sniffling and finr:erin~ wilted flo.rers. Dellinger,
leokin£ pale - more fairy-liko than ever - tried to centrol
the squeal~s in his voice to no avail. "How many demonstrators
did l-!OtlE brinG to the inau['ural?", he was asked.
IIAt least 10,000, " he answered.
IIBullshit", was heard in several sections of the room.
Dellinger shuffled his notes. " Let's make that 5.000."
"Bullshit".
"UO\.i.lG Y(l\.i.- t&l:lti-YU :;,OOO?1t :'~lai-iUQ. Dav.;; l':ullc;d h:'.s e~'~s
at the ceiling: "I'n: not poinr, to play at numbers, " he chirped.
"l'iha t matters is that 1'l"llE Il.ccomplished so lnUch. \ole did get tho
peace talks going. r/e did break some windolis in the !~sticna~
Geographic Society build1n~. Despite police brutality, our
brave people managed to thrO'l cans and s ticks a t the Pres ident.1t
His voice went hi~her - soundin~ like glass bells in a soft
summer br.eeze. ""Ie shook the establishment, gentlemen."
Aesoc:l.ated Press stood up. "\1e understand HOBE is broke. That
you lest control of the thing. That SDS and many other
organizations in the peace movement refused to back you. That
you have no idea hOli M0BE funds ..ere spent." .
~ellinr.er put a fin~er in his mouth end sucked it
ref] ec tively. SonJe minute!:: passed befo~e he spoke. "NOBE
is solvent, boys. As of this morninr" we have ~1.5u in the
treasury. The price of peace is hirh." He tried to look grim.
"SDS, of course, is just a bunch of dirty co11ore kids with grass
for brains. Vie didn't want the;!! er need them." He f'orr.ed hi3
lips into a cu to bow. "I mus t ("0 nOll. He I re hitching. a .ride
back to New York to'day unless we een rhise bus faro."
He shoved four fin("er!:: intc his mouth And was led slowly
from the room humminG "\-:e Shall (',ercolno."
NOTE: Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/21/69; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office,
1/24/69.
40
hi t "'1. I vent to • Pantber :"-;
In May. I • ~~.... ,. ..t. 117 and the,. bro1t:. -1 , ..;
c.'Plt.ll~t 'With!~ iO'1 ~:w tooth and the ,.:'-:'11;:.;",'
• 'bottle and the / ~ thel" a", t ~ot 30 ~~.~;.;.
bastard broko r.:y:! ..' "', ~ /':3 s tor being a bUll. "':::::=",
nose. Our ch1ef ;(.·\.:~~i;yr;;·\o!.rl' SDS ls dead l L~ .
aeld hoed, Mork \ ,~,\ ~~. ~ f • now 'n,B Panthors ,.........b Rudd, 1told ~s ~~i'\' .hat; our guts and tho I _,/
~ur.~ ~ U~h.~9 ~~ FA.- AT,lI" 'Won't have •• , '!--"'-_.';'.'"":'./
nc ro r J~'"I ........ l:onder 11' tho ~':':"-'_:--""":"'1
so ~_ I ~ folks stl1ll1ve ~~ -~_~
, .~. ~ in the S8.e old ~... ".. ;-:-::-,..;>1
~":;' ;.!\'PleceT ~ ~..:-; '.._~:;;;2
s - - .~
""'. ,,'1.·t\lD~nTS VQn .\ DEHOCRf\1'IC SOCISTl ..
·i."
NOTE: Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
8/5/69; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 8/11/69.
B. Effects to Promote Enmity awl Factionalism Within Groups or
Between Groups
Approximately 28% of the Bureau's COINTELPRO efforts were
designed to weaken groups by setting members against each other, or
to separate groups which might otherwise be allies, and convert them
into mutual enemies. The techniques used included anonymous mailings
(reprints, Bureau-authored articles and letters) to group members
criticizing a leader or an allied group; 164 using informants to
raise controversial issues; forming a "notional"-a Bureau-run
splinter group-to draw away membership from the target organization;
encouraging hostility up to and including gang warfare, between
rival groups; and the "snitch jacket."
1. Encouraging Violence Between Rival Groups
The Bureau's attempts to capitalize on active hostility between target
groups carried with them the risk of serious physical injury to
the targets. As the Black Nationalist supervisor put it :
It is not easy [to judge the risks inherent in this technique].
You make the best judgment you can based on all the circumstances
and you always have an element of doubt where you
are dealing with individuals that I think most people would
characterize as having a degree of instability.165
The Bureau took that risk. The Panther directive instructing recipient
officers to encourage the differences between the Panthers and
164 This technique was also used in disseminating propaganda. The distinction
lies in the purpose for which the letter, article or flier was mailed.
1" Black Nationalist supervisor, 10/17/75, p. 40.
41
U.S., Inc. which were "taking on the aura of gang warfare with
attendant threats of murder and reprisals," 166 is just one example.
A separate report on disruptive efforts aimed at the Panthers will
examine in detail the Bureau's attempts to foment violence. These
efforts included anonymously distributing cartoons which pictured the
U.S. organization gloating over the corpses of two murdered Panthers,
and suggested that other BPP members would be next,167 and sending
a New Jersey Panther leader the following letter which purported to
be from an SDS member: 168
"To Former Comrade [name]
"As one of 'those little bourgeois, snooty nose'-'little
schoolboys'-'little sissies' Dave Hilliard spoke of in the
'Guardian' of 8/16/69, I would like to say that you and the
rest of you black racists can go to hell. I stood shoulder to
shoulder with Carl Nichols last year in Military Park in
Newark and got my a--whipped by a Newark pig all for the
cause of the wineheads like you and the rest of the black
pussycats that call themselves Panthers. Big deal; you have to
have a three hour educational session just to teach those ...
(you all know what that means don't you! It·s the first word
your handkerchief head mamma teaches you) how to spell it.
"Who the hell set you and the Panthers up as the vanguard
of the revolutionary and disciplinary group. You can tell all
those wineheads you associate with that you'll kick no one's
'... a-,' because you'd have to take a three year course in
spelling to know what an a- is and three more years to be
taug:ht where it's located.
"Julius Lester called the BPP the vanguard (that's leader)
organization so international whore Cleaver calls him racist,
now when full allegiance is not given to the Panthers, again
racist. What the hell do you want? Are you getting this?
Are you lost? If you're not digging then you're really hopeless.
"Oh yes! We are not concerned about Hilliard's threats.
"Brains will win over brawn. The way the Panthers have
retaliated against US is another indication. The score: US-6 :
Panthers-O.
"Why, I read an article in the Panther paper where a
California Panther sat in his car and watched his friend get
shot by Kareng-a's group and what did he do? He run back
and write a full pap:e story about how tough the Panthers are
and what they're going- to do. HaHa-B-8--.
. "Goodbye [name] baby-and watch out. Karenga's commg.
1116 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office, 11/25/68.
161 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/20/69;
memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 3/27/69; memorandum
from FBI HeadquaTters to San Diego Field Office, 4/4/69.
.,.. Memorandum from Newark Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 8/2.'l/69.
According to the proposal, the letter would not be typed by the field office stenographic
pool because of the language. The field office also used asterisks in its
communication with headquarters which "refer to that colloquial phrase ...
which implies an unnatural physical relationship with a material parent." Presumallly
the phrase was used in the letter when it was sent to the Panthers.
42
"'Right On' as they say."
An anonymous letter was also sent to the leader of the Blackstone
Rangers, a Ohicago gang "to whom violent type activity, shooting,
and the like, are second nature," advising him that "the brothers that
run the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's supposed
to be a hit out for you." The letter was intended to "intensify the
degree of animosity between the two groups" and cause "retaliatory
action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its
leadership." 169
EDITOR:
What's with this hull-- SDS outfit? I'll tell you what
they has finally showed there true color White. They are
just like the commies and all the other white radical groups
that suck up to the blacks and use us. We voted at our meeting
in Oakland for community control over the pigs but SDS says
no. Well we can do with out them mothers. We can do it by
ourselfs.
OFF THE PIGS POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Soul Brother Jake
In another case, the Bureau tried to promote violence, not between
violent groups, but between a possibly violent person and another
target. The field office was given permission to arrange a meeting
between an SOLO officer and the leader of a small group described as
"anti-Vietnam black nationalist [veterans'] organization." The leader
of the veterans' group was known to be upset because he was not
receiving funds from the SOLO. He was also known to be on leave
from a mental hospital, and the Bureau had been advised that he
would he recommitted if he were arrested on any charge. It was believed
that "if the confrontation occurs at SOLO headquarters," the
veterans' group leader "will lose his temper, start a fight," and the
"police will be called in." The purpose was to "neutralize" the leader
by causing his commitment to a mental hospital, and to gain "unfavorable
publicity for the SOLO." 170
At least four assaults-two of them on women-were reported as
"results" of Bureau actions. The San Diego field office claimed credit
for three of them. In one case, US members "broke into" a BPP
meeting and "roughed up" a woman member.l7l
In the second Instance, a critical newspaper article in the Black
Panther paper was sent to the US leader. The field office noted that
"the possibility exists that some sort of retaliatory actions will be
taken against the BPP." 172 The prediction proved correct; the field
office reported that as a result of this mailing, members of US assaulted
a Panther newspaper vendor.173 The third assault occurred after the
'" Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/12/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Ohicago Field Office, 1/30/69.
170 Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
11/25/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Philadelphia Field Office,
12/9/68.
171 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/10/00,
p.4.
1T2 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69.
113 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69.
43
San Diego Police Department, acting on a tip from the Bureau that
"sex orgies" were taking place at Panther headquarters, raided the
premises. (The police department conducted a "research project," discovered
two outstanding traffic warrants for a BPP member, and used
the warrants to gain entry.) The field office reported that as a "direct
result" of the raid, the woman who allowed the officers into the BPP
headquarters had been "severely beaten up" by other membersY4
In the fourth case, the New Haven field office reported that an informant
had joined in a "heated conversation" between several group
members and sided with one of the parties "in order to increase the
tension." The argument ended with members hitting each other. The
informant "departed the premises at this point, since he felt that he
had been successful, causing a flammable situation to erupt into a
fight." i75
2. Anon'!fllW'U8 Mailings
The Bureau's use of anonymous mailings to promote factionalism
range from the relatively bland mailing of reprints or fliers criticizing
a group's leaders for living ostentatiously or being ineffective speakers,
to reporting a chapter's mfractions to the group's headquarters intended
to cause censure or disciplinary action.
Critical letters were also sent to one group purporting to be from
another, or from a member of the group registering a protest over a
proposed alliance.
For instance, the Bureau was particularly concerned with the alliance
between the SDS and the Black Panther Party. A typical example
of anonymous mailing intended to separate these groups is a
letter sent to the Black Panther newspaper: 116
In a similar vein, is a letter mailed to Black Panther and New Left
leaders.177
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
Since when do us Blacks have to swallow the dictates of the
honky SDS? Doing this only hinders the Party progress in
gaining Black control over Black people. We've been --over
by the white facists pigs and the Man's control over our
destiny. We're sick and tired of being severly brutalized,
denied our rights and treated like animals by the white pigs.
We say to hell with the SDS and its honky intellectual approaches
which only perpetuate control of Black people by
the honkies.
The Black Panther Party theory for community control is
the only answer to our problems and that is to be followed
and enforced by all means necessary to insure control by
Blacks over all police departments regardless of whether they
are run by honkie.q or uncle toms.
The damn SDS is a paper organization with a severe case
of diarhea of the mouth which has done nothing but feed us
174 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/3/69.
IT"Memorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/18/70.
1T6 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 8/27/69 ;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 9/5/69.
171 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/10/70; memorandum
from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 3/3/70.
69-984 0 - 76 - 4
44
lip service. Those few idiots calling themselves weathermen
run around like kids on halloween. A good example is their
"militant" activities at the Northland Shopping Center a
couple of weeks ago. They call themselves revolutionaries but
take a look at who they are. Most of them come from well
heeled families even by honky standards. They think they're
helping us Blacks but their futile, misguided and above all
white e~ortsonly muddy the revolutionary waters.
The time has come for an absolute break with any nonBlack
group and especially those---SDS and a return to
our pursuit of a pure black revolution by Blacks for Blacks.
Power!
Off the Pigs! ! ! !
These examples are not, of course, exclusive, but they do give the flavor
of the anonymous mailings effort.
3. Interview8
Interviewing group members or supporters was an overt "investigative"
technique sometimes used for the covert purpose of disruption.
For example, one field office noted that "other [BPP] weaknesses
that have been capitalized on include interviews of members
wherein jealousy among the members has been stimulated and at the
same time has caused a number of persons to fall under suspicion and
be purged from the Party." 178
In another case, fourteen field offices were instructed to conduct
simultaneous interviews of individuals known to have been contacted
by members of the Revolutionary Union. The purpose of the coordinated
interviews was "to make possible affiliates of the RU believe that
the organization is infiltrated by infonnants on a high level.179
In a third instance, 'a "black nationalist" target attempted to organize
a youth group in Mississippi. The field office used informants
to determine "the identities of leaders of this group 'and in interviewing
these leaders, expressed to them [the target's] background and
his true intentions regarding organizing Negro youth groups." Agents
also interviewed the target's la,ndlords and "advised them of certain
aspects of [his] past activities and his reputation in the Jackson vicinity
as being a Negro extremist." Three of the landlords asked the
target to move.180 The same field office reported that it had interviewed
members of the Tougaloo College Political Action Committee, an
"SNCC 'affiliated" student group. The members were interviewed
while they were home on summer vacation. "Sources report that these
interviews had a very upsetting effect on the PAC organization and
they felt they have been betrayed by someone 'at Tougaloo College.
Many of the members have limited their participation in PAC affaIrs
since their interview by Agents during the summer of 1968." 181
4. Using Informants To Raise Oontroversial /88'1..teS
The Bureau's use of informants generally is the subject of a separate
report. It is worth noting here, however, that the use of infonn-
178 Memorandum from Indianapolis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/23/69.
ITO Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/28/70.
1110 Memorandum from Jackson Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/27/68.
181 Ibid.
45
ants to take 'advantage of ideological splits in an organization dates
back to the first COINTELPRO. The originating CUPSA document
refers to the use of informants to cwpitahze on the discussion within
the Party following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin.182
Informants were also used to widen rifts in other organizations.
For instJance, an informant 'was instructed to imply that the head of
one faction of the SDS was using group funds for his drug habit,
and that a second leader embezzled funds at another school. The field
office reported that "as a result of actions taken by this informant,
there have been fist fights and acts of name calling at several of the
recent SDS mootings." In addition, members of one faction "have
made early morning telephone calls" to other SDS members and "have
threatened them and attempted to discourage them from attending
SDS mootings." 183
In another case, 'an informant was used to "raise the question"
among his associates that an unmarried, 30-year old group leader
"may be either a bisexual or a homosexual." The field office believed
that the question would "rapidly 'become 'a rumor" and "could have
serious results concerning the ability and effectiveness of [the target's]
leadership." 184
5. Fwtitious Organizations
There are basically three kinds of "notional" or fictitious organizations.
All three were used in COINTELPRO attempts to factionalize.
The first kind of "notional" was the organization whose members
were all Bureau informants. Because of the Committee's agreement
with the Bureau not to reveal the identities of informants, the only
example which can be discussed publicly is a proposal which, although
approved, was never implemented. That proposal involved setting up
a chapter of the W.E.B. DuBois Club in a Southern city which would
be composed entirely of Bureau informants and fictitious persons.
The initial purpose of the chapter was to cause the CPUSA expense by
sending organizers into the area, cause the Party to fund Bureau
coverage of out-of-town CP meetings by paying the informants'
expenses, and receive literature and instructions. Later, the chapter
was to begin to engage in deviation from the Party line so that it
would be expelled from the main organization "and then they could
claim to be the victim of a Stalinist type purge." It was anticipated
that the entire operation would take no more than 18 months.18s
'J1he second kind of "notional" was the fictitious organization with
some unsuspecting (non-informant) members. For example, Bureau
informants set up a Klan organization intended to attract membership
away from the United Klans of America. The Bureau paid the
informant's personal expenses in setting up the new organization,
which had, at its height, 250 members.18G
The third type of "notional" was the wholly fictitious organization,
with no actual members, whi~h was used as a pseudonym for mailing
1lD Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 9/6/56.
181 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/12/68,
p.2.
184 Memorandum from Sa'll Diego Field Oftice 00 FBI Headquarters, 2/2/70.
ISS Memorandum from New York Field Oftice to FBI Headquarters, 7/9/64.
180 :a-Iemorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 8(28(67.
46
letters or pamphlets. For instance, the Bureau sent out newsletters
from something called "The Committee for Expansion of Socialist
Thought in America," whieh attacked the CPUSA from the "Marxist
right" for at least two years.l~1
6. Labeling Targets As Informants
The "snitch jacket" technique-neutralizing a target by labeling
him a "snitch" or informant, so that he would no longer be trustedwas
used in all COINTELPROs. The methods utilized ranged from
having an authentic informant start a rumor about the target member,
188 to anonymous letters or phone calls,189 to faked informants'
reports. 190
When the technique was used against a member of a nonviolent
group, the result was often alienation from the group. For example, a
~an Diego man was targeted because he was active in draft counseling
at the CIty'S Message Information Center. He had, coincidentally,
been present at the arrest of a Selective Service violator, and had been
at a "crash pad" just prior to the arrest of a second violator. The
Bureau used a real informant to suggest at a Center meeting that it
was "strange" that the two men had been arrested by federal agents
shortly after the target became aware of their locations. The field
office reported that the target had been "completely ostracized by
members of the Message Information Center and all of the other
individuals throughout the area ... associated with this and/or
related groups." 191
In another case, a local police officer was used to "jacket" ,the head
of the Student Mobilization Committee at the University of South
Carolina. The police officer picked up two members of the Committee
on the pretext of interviewing them concerning narcotics. By prearranged
signal, he had his radio operator call him with the message,
"[name of target] just called. Wants you to contact her. Said you have
her number." 192 No results were reported.
The "snitch jacket" is a particularly nasty technique even when
used in peaceful groups. It gains an added dimension of danger when
it is used-as, indeed, it was-in groups known to have murdered
, informers.193
For instance, a Black Panther leader was arrested by the local police
with four other members of the BPP. The others were released, but
the leader remained in custody. Headquarters authorized the field office
to circulate the rumor that the leader "is the last to be released" because
"he is cooperating with and has made a deal with the Los Angeles
Police Department to furnish them information concerning the BPP."
18'1 Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 1/5/65.
188 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Omce, 2/14/69.
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Jackson Field Office. 11/15/68.
]JlO Memorandum from FBI Headquaters to New York Field Office, 2/9/60.
101 Memorandum from San Diego Field Omce to FBI Headquarters, 2/17/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 3/6/69;
memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters 4/30/69.
182 Memorandum from San Diego Field Omce to FBI Headquarters, 1/31/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 2/14/69.
... One Bureau document stated that the Black Panther Party "has murdered
two members it suspected of being police informants." (Memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 2/18/71.)
47
The target of the first proposal then received an anonymous phone
call stating that his own arrest was caused by a rival leader.194
In another case, the Bureau learned that the chairman of the New
York BPP chapter was under suspicion as an informant because
of the arrest of another member for weapons possession. In order
to "cast further suspicion on him" the Bureau sent anonymous letters
to BPP headquarters in the state, the wife of the arrested member,
and a local member of CORE, saying "Danger-Beware-Black Brothers,
[name of target] is the fink who told the pigs that [arrested
members] were carrying guns." The letter also gave the target's
address.l95
In a third instance, the Bureau learned through electronic surveillance
of the BPP the whereabouts of a fugitive. After his arrest, the
Bureau sent a letter in a "purposely somewhat illiterate type scrawl"
to the fugiti ve's half-brother:
Brother:
Jimmie was sold out by Sister [name-the BPP leader who
made the phone call picked up by the tap] for some pig money
to pay her rent. When she don't get it that way she takes
Panther money. How come her kid sells the paper in his school
and no one bothers him. How comes Tyler got busted up by
the pigs and her kid didn't. How comes the FBI pig fascists
knew where to bust Lonnie and Minnie way out where they
were.
-Think baby.l9G
In another example, the chairman of the Kansas City BPP chapter
went to Washington in an attempt to testify before a Senate subcommittee
about information he allegedly possessed about the transfer of
firearms from the Kansas City Police Department to a retired Army
General. The attempt did not succeed; the committee chairman adjourned
the hearing and then asked the BPP member to present his
information to an aide. The Bureau then authorized an anonymous
phone call to BPP headquarters "to the effect that [the target] was
paid by the committee to testify, that he has cooperated fully with
this committee, and that he intends to return at a later date to furnish·
additional testimony which will include complete details of the BPP
operation in Kansas Citv." 197
In the fifth case, the Bureau had so successfully disrupted the San
Diego BPP that it no longer existed. One of the former members, however,
was" 'politicking' for the position of local leader if the group
is ever reorganized." Headquarters authorized the San Diego field
office to send anonymous notes to "selected individuals within the black
community of San Diego" to "initiate the rumor that [the target],
1M Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/11/69;
memorandum to San Diego Field Office from FBI Headquarters, 2/19/69.
""Memorandum from New York l!'ield Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/14/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 3/10/69.
1" Memorandum to FBI Headquarters from SAC, Newark, 7/3/69; memorandum
to Newark Field Office from FBI Headquarters, 7/14/69.
101 Memorandum from Kansas City Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/16/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 11/3/69.
48
who has aspirations of becoming the local Black Panther Party Captain,
is a police informant." 198
In a SIxth case, a letter alleging that a Washington, D.C., BPP
leader was a police informant was sent "as part of our continuing
effort to foment internal dissension within ranks of Black Panther
Party:" 199
Brother:
I recently read in the Black Panther newspaper about that
low dog Gaines down in Texas who betrayed hIS people to the
pigs and it reminded me of a recent incident that I should tell
you about. Around the first part of Feb. I was locked up at
the local pigpen when the pigs brought in this dude who told
me he was a Panther. This dude who said his name was [deleted]
said he was vamped on by six pigs and was brutalized
by them. This dude talked real bad and said he had killed
pigs and was going to get more when he got out, so I thought
he probably was one of you. The morning after [name] was
brought in a couple of other dudes in suits came to see him
and called him out of the cell and he was gone a couple of
hours. Later on these dudes came back again to see him.
[Name] told me the dudes were his lawyers but they smelled
like pig to me. It seems to me that you might want to look
into thIS because I know you don't want anymore low-life
dogs helping the pigs brutalize the people. You don't know
me and I'm not a Panther but I want to help with the cause
when I can.
A lumpen brother
In a. seventh case, the "most influential BPP activist in North Carolina"
had been photographed outside a house where a "shoot out" with
local police had taken place. The photograph, which appeared in the
local newspaper, showed the target talking to a policeman. The photograph
and an accompanying article were sent to BPP headquarters
in Oakland, California, with a handwritten note, supposedly from a
female BPP member known to be "disenchanted" with the target, saying,
"I think this is two pigs oinking." 200
Although Bureau WItnesses stated that they did not authorize a
"snitch jacket" when they had information that the group was at that
tim,e actually killing suspected informants,201 they admitted thwt the
risk was there whenever the technique was used.
lOll Memorandum to FBI Headquarters from San Diego Field Office, 3/6170;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 3/6170.
110 Memorandum trom Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/23171;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 3/31/71.
... Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters 3/23/71;
memorandum FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 3/31/71.
- In fact, some proposals were turned down for that reason. See, e.g., letter
from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 2/18/71, in which a proposal
that 'an imprisoned BPP member be labeled a "pig informer" was rejected because
it was possible it would result in the target's death. But note that just one
month later, two similar proposals were approved. Letter from FBI Headquarters
to Washington Field Office, 3/19/71, and letter from FBI Headquarters
to Charlotte Field Office, 3/31/71.
49
It would be fair tD say there was an element of risk there
which we tried 10 examine on a case by case basis.202
Moore added, "I am not aware of any time we ever labeled anybody
as an informant, that anything [violent] ever happened as a result,
and that is something that could be measured." When asked whether
that was luck or lack of planning, he responded, "Oh, it just happened
that way, I am sure." 203
O. Using Hostile Third Parties Again.~t Target (Jrvups
The Bureau's factionalism efforts were intended to separate individuals
or groups which might otherwise be allies. Another set of ac-'
tions is a variant of that technique; organizations already opposed to
the target groups were used to attack them.
The American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, for example,
printed and distributed under their own names Bureauauthored
pamphlets condemning the SDS and the DuBois Clubs.
In another case, a confidential source who headed an anti-Communist
organization in Cleveland, and who published a "self-described
conservative weekly newspaper," the Oleveland Times, was anonymously
mailed information on the Unitarian Society of Cleveland's
sponsorship of efforts to abolish the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. The source had "embarrassed" the Unitarian minister with
questions about the alleged Communist connections of other cosponsors
"at public meetings." 204
It was anticipated that the source would publish a critical article in
her newspaper, which "may very well have the result of alerting the
more responsible people in the community" to the nature of the movement
and "stifle it before it gets started." 205
The source newspaper did publish an article entitled "Locals to Aid
Red Line," which named the Minister, among others, as a local sponsor
of what it termed a "Communist dominated plot" to abolish the House
Committee.206
One group, described as a "militant anticommunist right wing organization,
more of an activist group than is the more well known John
Birch Society," was used on at least four separate occasions. The Bureau
developed a long-range program to use the organization in "counterintelligence
actiVIty" by establishing a fictitious person nam.ed
"Lester Johnson" who sent letters, made phone calls, offered finanCIal
support, and suggested action:
In view of the activist nature of this organization, and their
lack of experience and knowledge concerning the interior
workings of the [local] CP, [the field office proposes] that
efforts be made to take over their activities and use them in
such a manner as would be best calculated by this office 10
... Black Nationalist supervisor, 10/17/75, p. 39.
... Moore, 11/3/15, p. M.
:lO< The minister has given the Select Committee an affidavit which states that
there was an organized attempt by the Bureau's source to disrupt the Church's
meetings, including "fist fights." Affidavit of Rev. Dennis G. Kuby, 10/19/75.
... Memorandum from Cleveland Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/28/M;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/M.
"'lIfemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64.
50
completely disrupt and neutralize the [local] CP, all without
[the organization] becoming aware of the Bureau's interest
in its operation.207
"Lester Johnson" used the organization to distribute fliers and letters
opposing the candidacy of a lawyer running for a judgeship 208
and to disrupt a dinner at which an alleged Communist was to speak.209
"Johnson" also congratulated the organization on disrupting an antidraft
meeting at a Methodist Church, furnishing further information
about a speaker at the meeting/10 and suggested that members picket
the home of a local "communist functionary." 211
Another case is slightly different from the usual "hostile third
party" actions, in that both organizations were Bureau targets. "Operation
Hoodwink" was intended to be a long-range program to disrupt
both La Cosa Nostra (which was not otherwise a COINTELPRO
target) and the Communist Party by "having them expend their energies
attacking each other." The initial project was to prepare and
send a leaflet, which purported to be from a Communist Party leader
to a member of a New York "family" attacking working condItions at
a business owned by the family member.212
D. Disseminating Derogatory Inform.ation to Family, Friends, and
Associates
Although this technique was used in relatively few cases it accounts
for some of the most distressing of all COINTELPRO actions. Personal
life information, some of which was gathered expressly to be
used in the programs, was then disseminated, either directly to the
target's family through an anonymous letter or telephone call, or indirectly,
by giving the information to the media.
... Memorandum from Detroit Field 01flce to FBI Headquarters, 10/18/66, p. 2.
... Memorandum from Detroit Field 01flce to FBI Headquarters, 1/19/67.
The lawyer was targeted, along with his law firm, because the firm "has a long
history of providing services for individual communists and communist organizations,"
and because he belonged to the National Lawyers Guild.
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field 01flce, 1/16/67.
llW Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field 01flce, 1/10/67.
III Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field 01flce, 11/8/66.
... Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 10/4/66;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field 01flce, 10/5/66-
A similar proposal attempted "to cause dissension between Negro numbers
operators and the Italian hoodlum element" in Detroit. The Bureau had information
that black "numbers men" were contributing money to the local "black
power movement." An anonymous letter containing a black hand and the words
"watch out" was sent a minister who was "the best known black militant in
Detroit." The letter was intended to achieve two objectives. First, the minister
was expected to assume that "the Italian hoodlum element was responsible
for this letter, report this to the Negro numbers operators, and thereby cause
them to further resent the Italian hoodlum element." 'Second, it is also possible
that [the minister] may become extremely frightened upon receipt of this letter
and sever his contact with the Negro numbers men in Detroit and might even
restrict his black nationalist activity or leave Detroit. (Memorandum from the
Detroit Field 01flce to FBI Headquarters, 6/14/68; Memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to Detroit Field 01flce, 6/28/68.)
51
Several letters were sent to spouses; three examples follow.213 The
names have been deleted for privacy reasons.
The first letter was sent to the wife of a Grand Dragon of the
United Klans of America ("Mrs. A"). It was to be "typed on plain
paper in an amateurish fashion." 214
"My Dear Mrs. (A),
"1 write this letter to you only after a long period of praying
to God. 1 must cleanse my soul of these thoughts. I
certainly do not want to create problems inside a family but
lowe a duty to the klans and its principles as well as to my
own menfolk who have cast their divine lot with the klans.
"Your husband came to [deleted] about a year ago and
my menfolk blindly followed his leadership, believing him to
be the savior of this country. They never believed the "stories
that he stole money from the klans in [deleted] or that he is
now making over $25,000 a year. They never believed the
stories that your house in [deleted] has a new refrigerator,
washer, dryer and yet one year ago, was threadbare. They
refuse to believe that your husband now owns three cars and
a truck, including the' new white car. But I believe all these
things and 1 can forgive them for a man wants to do for his
family in the best way he can.
"I don't have any of these things and 1 don't grudge you
any of them neither. But your husband has been committing
the greatest of the sins of our Lord for many years. He has
taken the flesh of another unto himself.
"Yes, Mrs. A, he has been committing adultery. My menfolk
say they don't believe this but 1 think they do. 1 feel like
crying. 1 saw her with my own eyes. They call her Ruby. Her
last name is something like [deleted] and she lives in the 700
block of [deleted] Street in [deleted.] 1 know this. T saw her
strut around at a rally with her lustfilled eyes and smart aleck
figure.
"1 cannot stand for this. 1 will not let my husband and two
brothers stand side by side with your husband and this woman
in the glorious robes of the klan. 1 am typing this because 1
am going to send copys to Mr. Shelton and some of the klans
leaders that 1 have faith in. 1 will not stop until your husband
is driven from [deleted] and back into the flesh-pots from
wherein he came.
213 Letters were also sent to parents informing them that their children were
in communes, or with a roommate of the opposite sex; information on an actress'
pregnancy by a Black Panther was sent to a gossip columnist; and information
about a partner's affair with another partner's wife was sent to the members of
a law firm as well as the injured spouses.
Personal life information was not the only kind of derogatory information
disseminated; information on the "subversive background" of a target (or family
member) was also used, as were arrest records.
214 }lemorandum from Richmond Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/26/66.
52
"1 am a loyal klanswoman and a good churchgoer. 1 feel
this problem affects the future of our great country. 1 hope
I do not cause you harm by this and if you believe in the
Good Book as I do, you may soon receive your husband back
into the fold. I pray for you and your beautiful little children
and only wish I could tell you who I am. I will soon,
but I am afraid my own men would be harmed if I do."
"A God-fearing klanswoman"
The second letter was sent to the husband ("Mr. B") of a woman
who had the distinction of being both a New Left and Black Nationalist
target; she was a leader in the local branch of the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom, "which group is active
in draft resistance, antiwar rallies and New Left activities," and an
officer in ACTION, a biracial group which broke off from the local
chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality and which "engaged
in numerous acts of civil disruption and disobedience." 215
Two informants reported that Mr. B had been making suspicious
inquiries about his wife's relationship with the Black males in
ACTION. The local field office proposed an anonymous letter to the
husband which would confirm his suspicions, although the informants
did not know whether the allegations of misconduct were true.
It was hoped that the "resulting marital tempest" would "result in
ACTION losing: ~heir [offi~r] and the. WILPF losing: a yaluable
leader, thus stnkmg a maJor blow against both orgamzatlOns." 210
Accordingly, the following letter,216a written in black ink, was sent
to the husband:
:no Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/30/70.
210 Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/30/70.
Note that there is no allegation that ACTION was engaged in violence. When
the target was interviewed by the staff, she was asked whether ACTION ever took
part in violent activities. She replied that someone once spat in a communion cup
during a church sit-in and that members sometimes used four letter words, which
was considered violent in her city. The staff member then asked about more conventionally
violent acts, such as thrOWing bricks or burning 'buildings. Her
response was a shocked, "Oh, no! I'm a pacifist-I wouldn't be involved in an
organization like that." (Staff interview of a COINTELPRO target.)
"'8. Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/30/70.
53
A lm-ter from the field office to headquarters four months later
reported as a "tangible result" of the letter that the target and her
husband had recently separated, following a series of marital
arguments:
54
This matrimonial stress and stmin should cause her to function
much less effectively in ACTION. While the letter sent
by the [field office] was probably not the sole cause of this
separation, it certainly contributed very strongly.217
The third letter was sent to the wife of a leader of the Black Liberators
("Mrs. C"). She was living in their home town with their two
daughters while he worked in the city. Bureau docwnents describe
Mrs. C. as a ":fu.ithful, loving wife, who is apparently convinced that
her husband is performing a vital service to the Black world. . ..
She is to 'all indications an inJUllligent, respectable young mother, who
is active in the AME Methodist Church." 218
The letter was "prepared from a penmanship, spelling style to imitate
,that of the average Black Liberator member. It contains several
accusations which should Clause [X's] wife greaJt concern." It was
expressly intended to produce "ill feeling and possibly a lasting distrust"
between X and his wife; it was hoped that the "concern over
what tA:> doltbout it" would "detract from his time spent in the pl(jf;g
and plans of his organization." 219
The letter was addressed to "Sister C":
217 Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/17/70.
218 Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/14/69, p. 1.
219 Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/14/ 69, pp.
2-3.
55
The Petersen Committee said that some COINTELPRO actions
were "abhorrent in a free society." This technique surely falls within
dl!a.t condemnation.220
... House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutioll'lll
Rights, Hearings, 11/20/74, p.ll.
56
E. Oontacts with Employers
The Bureau o:f.~n tried to get targets fired, with some success.221 If
th(\ target was a teacher, the intent was usually to deprive him of a
forum and to remove what the Bureau believed to be the added prestige
given a political cause by educ<ators. In other employer contacts,
the purpose was either to eliminate a source of funds for the individual
or (if the target was a donor) the group, or to have the employer apply
pressure on the target to stop his activities.
For example, an Episcopal minister furnished "financi'al 'and other"
assistance to the Black Panther Party in his city. The Bureau sent an
anonymous letter to his bishop so th3Jt the church would exert pressure
on the minister to "refrain from 'assistance to the Black Panther
Party." 222 Similarly, a priest who allowed the Black Panther Party
to use his church for its breakfast program was ,targeted; his bishop
received both an anonymous letter and three anonymous phone calls.
The priest was transferred shortly thereafter.223
In another case, a black county employee was targeted because he had
attended a fund raiser for the Mississippi Summer Project and, on
another occasion, a presentation of a Negro History Week pro?,ram.
Both functions had been supported by "clandestine CP members. ' The
employee, according to the documents, had no record of subversive activities;
"he and his wife appear to be genuinely interested in the welfare
of Negroes and other minority groups and are being taken in by
the communists." The Bureau chose a curiously indirect way to inform
the target of his friends' Party membership; a locallaw enforcement
official was used to contact the County Administrator in the
expectation that the employee would be "called in and questioned
about his left-wing associates." 224
The Bureau made several attempts to stop outside sources from
funding target operations.225 For example, the Bureau learned that
SNCC was trying to obtain funds from the Episcopal Church for a
"liberation school." Two carefully spaced letters were sent to the
Church which falsely alleged that SNCC was engaged in a "fraudulent
scheme" involving the anticipated funds. The letters purported to be
from local businessmen approached by SNCC to place fictitious orders
for school supplies and divide the money when the Church paid the
bills.226 Similar letters were sent to the Interreligious Foundation for
Community Organizing, from which SNCC had requested a grant for
its "AgrarIan Reform Plan." This time, the letters alleged kickback
approaches in the sale of farm equipment and real estate.227
Other targets include an employee of the Urban League, who was
fired because the Bureau contacted a confidential source in a foundation
which funded the League; 228 a lawyer known for his representation
l!2l There were 84 contacts with employers or 3 percent of the total.
m Memorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69.
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 9/11/69.
.... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisoo Field 01ftce, 9/29/64.
... The FBI also used a "confidential source" in a foundation to gain funding
for a "moderate" civil rights organb:ation. (Memorandum from G. C. Moore to
W. C. Sullivan, 10/23/68.)
... Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/18/70. =Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/19/70.
... Memoranda from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 3/3/69 and
4/3/69.
57
of "subversives," whose nonmovement client received an anonymous
letter advising it not to employ a "well-known Communist Party
apologist"; 229 and a television commentator who was transferred after
his station and superiors received an anonymous protest letter. The
commentator, who had a weekly religious program. had expressed
admiration for a black nationalist leader and criticized the United
States' defense policy.230
F. U8e and Abu8e oj Government Proce88e8
This category, which comprises 9 percent of all approved proposals
includes selective law enforcement (using Federal, state, or local
authorities to arrest, audit, raid, inspect, deport, etc.) ; interference
with judicial proceedings, including targeting lawyers who represent
"subversives"; interference with candidates or political appointees;
and using politicians and investigating committees, sometimes without
their knowledge, to take action against targets.
1. Selective Law Enforcement
Bureau documents often state that notifying law enforcement agencies
of violations committed by COINTELPRO targets is not counterintelligence,
but part of normal Bureau responsibility. Other documents,
however, make it clear that "counterintelligence" was precisely
the purpose. "Be alert to have them arrested," reads a New Left
OOINTELPRO directive to all participating field offices. 231 Further,
there is clearly a difference between notifying other agencies of
information that the Bureau happened across in an investigation-in
plain view, so to speak-and instructing field offices to find evidence
of violations-any violations-to "get" a target. As George Moore
stated:
Ordinarily, we would not be interested in health violations
beoause it is not my jurisdiction, we would not waste our time.
But under this program, we would tell our informants perhaps
to be alert to any health violations or other licensing
requirements or things of that nature, whether there were
violations and we would see that they were reported.232
State and local agencies were frequently informed of alleged statutory
violations which would come within their jurisdiction.233 As
noted above, this was not always normal Bureau procedure.
A typical example of the attempted use of local authorities to disrupt
targeted activities is the Bureau's attempt to have a Democratic Party
fund raiser raided by the state Alcoholic Beverage Control Commis-
229 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 7/2/64.
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 3/28/69.
231 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 10/9/68.
m Moore, 11/3/75, p. 47.
... Federal agencies were also used. For instance, a foreign-born professor
active in the New Left was deported by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service at the Bureau's instigation. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to
San Diego Field Office, 9/6/68.) The Bureau's use of the IRS in COINTELPRO
is included in a separate report. Among other actions, the Bureau obtained
an activist professor's tax returns and then used a source in a regional IRS
office to arrange an audit. The audit was intended to be timed to interfere with
the professor's meetings to plan protest demonstrations in the 1968 Democratic
convention;
58
sion.234 The function was to be held at a private house: the admission
charge included "refreshments." It was anticipated that alcoholic
beverage.<; would be served. A confide.ntial source in the ABC Commission
agreed to send an agent to the fund raiser to determine if
liquor was being served and then to conduct a raid.235 (In fact, the
raid was cancelled for reasons beyond the Bureau's control. A prior
raid on the local fire department's fund raiser had give.n rise to considerable
criticism and the District Attorney issued an advisory opinion
that such affairs did not violate state law. The confidential source
advised the field office that the ABC would not, after all, raid the
Democmts because of "political ramifications.") 238
In the second case, the target was a "key figure" Communist. He
had a history of homosexualIty lIind was known to freque.nt a local
hotel. The Bureau requested that the local police have him arrested
for homosexuality; it was then intended to publicize. the arrest to
"embarrass the Party." Interestingly, the Bureau withdrew its request
when the target stopped working actively for the Party because it
would no longer cause the intended disruption.237 This would appear
to rebut the Bureau's contention that turning over evidence of violations
to local authoritie.<; was not really COINTELPRO at -all, but
just part of its job.
16. Interference With Judicial Process
The Bureau's attempts to interfere with judicial processes affecting
targets are particularly disturbing because they violate a fundamental
principle of our system of government. Justice is supposed to be blind.
Nevertheless, when a target appeared before a judge, a jury, or a
probation board, he sometimes carried an unknown burden; the Bureau
had gotten there first.
Three example.<; should be sufficient. A university student who was
a leader of the Afro American Action Committee had been arrested
in a demonstration at the university. The Bureau sent an anonymous
letter to the county prosecutor intended to discredit her by exposing
her "subversive connections"; her adoptive father was described as
a Communist Party member. The Bureau believed that the letter
might aid the prosecutor in his case against the student. Another
anonymous letter containing the same information was mailed to a
local radio announcer who had an "open mike" program critical of
2M The fund raiser was targeted because of two of the candidates who would
be present. One, a state assemblyman running for reelection, was active in the
Vietnam Day Committee; the other, the Democratic candidate for Congress, had
been a sponsor of the National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on
Un-American Activities and had led demonstrations opposing the manufacture
of napalm bombs. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco
Field Office, 10/21/66.)
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
11/14/66.
... Ibid.
"'" Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/23/60;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 3/11/60; memorandum
from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/10/60; memorandum
from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Oftice,l1/17/60.
59
local "leftist" activity. The letter was intended to further publicize
the "connection" between the student and the Communist Party.239
In the second example, a Klan leader who had boon convicted on
a weapons charge was out on bail pending appeal. He spoke at a Klan
rally, and the Bureau arranged to have newsmen present. The resulting
stories and photographs were then delivered to the appellate
judges considering his case.240
The third instance involved a real estate speculator's bequest of
over a million dollars to the three representatives of the Communist
Party who were expected to turn it over to the Party. The Bureau
interviewed the probate judge sitting on the case, who was "very cooperative"
and promised to look the case over carefully. The judge
asked the Bureau to determine whether the widow would be willing
to "take any action designed to keep the Communist Party from
getting the money." The Bureau's efforts to gain the widow's help in
contesting the will proved unsuccessful.241
3. Oa1Ulidates a1Ul Political Appointees
The Bureau apparently did not trust the American people to make
the proper choices in the voting booth. Candidates who, in the Bureau's
opinion, should not be elected were therefore targeted. The
case of the Democratic fundraiseI' discussed earlier was just one
example.
Socialist Workers Party candidates were routinely selected for
counterintelligence, although they had never come close to winning an
election. In one case, a SWP candidate for state office inadvertently
protected herself from action by announcing at a news conference
that she had no objections to premarital sex; a field office thereupon
withdrew its previously approved proposal to publicize her common
law marriage.241
'
Other candidates were also targeted. A Midwest lawyer whose firm
represented "subversives" (defendants in the Smith Act trials) ran
for City Council. The lawyer had been active in the civil rights movement
in the South, and the John Birch Society in his city had recently
mailed a book called "It's Very Simple-The True Story of Civil
Rights" to various ministers, priests, and rabbis. The Bureau received
a copy of the mailing list from a source in the Birch Society and sent
an anonymous follow-up letter to the book's recipients noting the
pages on which the candidate had been mentioned and calling their
attention to the "Communist background" of this "charlatan." 242 The
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 7/22/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 4/9/69.
Charles Colson spent seven months in jail for violating the civil rights of a defendant
in a criminal case through the deliberate creation of prejudicial pretrial
publicity.
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 6/23/66; memorandum
from Miami Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/30/66.
• <1 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/5/67. The
Bureau also obtained legal advice from a probate attorney on how the will could
be attacked; contacted other relatives of the deceased; leaked information about
the will to a city newspaper; and solicited the efforts of the IRS and state taxing
authorities to deplete the estate as much as possible.
24'. Memorandum from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 7/13/70.
... MemQrandum from DetrQit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/15/65;
memorandum froin FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office. 9/22/65.
69-984 0 - 76 - 5
60
Bureau also sent a fictitious-name letter to a television station on
which the candidate was to appear, enclosing a series of informative
questions it believed should be asked.243 The candidate was defeated.
He subsequently ran (successfully, as it happened) for a judgeship.
Political appointees were also targeted. One target was a member of
the board of the NAACP and the Democratic State Central Committee.
His brother, a.ccording to the documents, was a communist, and
the target had participated in some Party youth group activities
fifteen years earlier. The target's appointment as secretary of a city
transportation board elicited an anonymous letter to the Mayor, with
carbons to two newspapers, protesting the use of "us taxpayers' money"
in the appointment of a "known Communist" to a highly paid job;
more anonymous letters to various politicians, the American Legion,
and the county prose.cutor in the same vein; and a pseudonymous letter
to the members of the transportation board, stating that the Mayor
had "saddled them with a Commie secretary because he thinks it will
get him a few Negro votes.244
4. Inve8tigating Oommittee8
State and Federal legislative investigating committees were occasionally
used to attack a target, since the committees' interests usually
marched with the Bureau's.
Perhaps the most elaborate use of an investigating committee was
the framing of a complicated "snitch jacket." In October 1959, a legislative
committee held hearings in Philadelphia, "ostensibly" to show
a resurgence of CP activity in the area.245 The Bureau's target was
subpoenaed to appear before the committee but was not actually called
to testify. The field office proposed that local OP leaders be contacted to
raise the question of "how it was possible for [the target] to escape
testifying" before the committee; this "might place suspicion on him
as being cooperative" with the investigators and "raise sufficient doubt
in the minds of the leaders regarding [the target] to force him out of
the OP or at least to isolate and neutralize him." Strangely enough, the
target was not a bona fide CP member; he was an undercover infiltrator
for a private anti-Communist group who had been a source of
trouble for the FBI because he kept getting in their way.
A more typical example of the use of a legislative committee is a
series of anonymous letters sent to the chairman of a state investigating
committee that was designated to look into New Left activities on the
sta.te's college campuses. The target was an activist professor, and the
letters detailed his "subversive background."
G. Exposing "Oommuni.<Jt InfUtration" of Groups
This technique was used in approximately 4 percent of all approved
proposals. The most common method involved anonymously notify-
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/1/65.
... Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/24/66;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 1113/66.
... According to the documents, "operating under the direction of New York
headquarters," a document was placed in the record by the Committee which
according to the "presiding officer," indicated that the CP planned to hold its
national convention in Philadelphia. The field office added, "This office is not
aware of any such plan of the CP." Memorandum from, Philadelphia Field Office
to FBI Headquarters, 11/3/59; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Philadelphia
Field Office, 11/12/59.
61
ing the group (civil rights organization, PTA, Boy Scouts, etc.) that
one or more 'of its members was a "Communist," 246 so that it could
take whatever action it deemed appropriate. Occasionally, however,
the group itself was the COINTELPRO target. In those cases, the
information went to the media, and the intent was to link the gToup
to the Communist Party.
For example, one target was a Western professor who was the immediate
past president of a local peaee center, "a coalition of antiVietnam
and anti-draft gTOUps." He had resigned to become chairman
of the state's McCarthy campaign organization, but it was anticipated
that he would return 'to the peace center after the election. Aceording
to the documents, the professor's wife had been a Communist
Party member in the early 1950s. This information was furnished to a
newspaper editor who had written an editorial branding the SDS
and various black power groups as "professional revolutionists."
The information was intended to "expose these people at this time
when they are receiving considerable publicity to not only educaw.
the public to their character, but disrupt the members" of the peace
organization.241
In another case, the Bureau learned through electronic surveillance
of a civil rights leader's plans to attend a reception at the Roviet Mission
to the United Nations. (The reception was to honor a Soviet
author.) The civil rights leader was active in a school boycott which
had been previously targeted; the Bureau arranged to have news
photographers at the scene to photograph him entering the Soviet
mission.248
Other instances include furnishing information to the media on
the participation of the Communist Party Presidential candidate in
a United Farm Workers' picket line: 249 "confidentially" telling established
sources of three Northern California newspapers that the San
Francisco County CP Committee had stated that the Bay area civil
rights groups would "begin working" on the area's large newspapers
"in an effort to secure greater employment of Negroes;" 250 and furnishing
information on Socialist Workers Party participation in tht'
Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam to "discredit"
the antiwar group by tying it "into the subversive
movement." 251
J<O Note that the "Communist" label was loosely applied, and might mean only
that an informant reported that a target had attended meetings of a "front"
group some years earlier. As noted earlier. none 01 the "COINTELPRO" labels
were precise.
.., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Phoenix Field Office, 6/11/68.
... Memorandum from William C. Sullivan, 2/4/64; memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to New York Field Office, 2/12/64.
... The target was not intended to be the United Farm Workers, but a local
college professor expected to participate in the picket line. The Bureau had unsuccessfully
directed "considerable efforts to prevent hiring" the professor. Apparently,
the Bureau did not consider the impact of this technique on the United
Farm Workers' efforts. Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI
Headquarters 9/12/68; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco
Field Office, 9/13/68.
... Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/16/64.
... Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/10/67 ;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 3/14/67.
62
V. COMMAND AND COXTROL: THE PROBLEM OF OVERSIGHT
A. Within the Bureau
1. Internal Administration
The Bureau attempted to exercise stringent internal controls over
COINTELPRO. All counterintelligence proposals had to be approved
by headquarters. Every originating COINTELPRO document contains
a strong warning to the field that "no counterintelligence action
may he initiated by the field without specific BureauauthoriZ'ation."
The field would send a proposal under the COINTELPRO caption
to the Seat of Government-the Bureau term for headquarterswhere
it would be routed to the Section Chief of the section handling
the particular COINTELPRO program.252
The recommendation would then be atJ/:Jached to the proposal, beginning
the process of administrative review. The lowest level on
which a pr?J?OSR-I could be approved was the Assistant Director, Domestic
Intelhgence Division, to whom the Section Chief reported via
the Branch Chief. More often, the proposal would go through the
Assistant to the Director and often to the Director himself.
2. Ooordination
The Counterintelligence programs were coordinated with the rest
of the sect,ion's work primarily through infonnal oontacts, but also
through section meetings and the Section Chief's knowledge of the
work of his entire section.
Further, although the initial COINTELPRO was an effort to centralize
what h'ad been an ad hoc series of field actions, the programs
continued to be essentially field-oriented with little target selection by
headquarters. However, the Section Chief would attempt to make sure
targets were being effectively chosen by occasionally sending out di·
rectives to field offices to intensify the investigation of a particular
individual or group and to consider the subject for counterintelligence
action.253
3. Re8ult8
~rticipating field offices were required to send in status letters
(usually every ninety days) reporting any tangible results. They were
instructed to resolve any doubts as to whether a counterintelligence
action caused the observed result in their favor. Nevertheless, results
were reported in only 527 cases, or 22 percent, of the approved actions.
When a "good" result was reported, the field office or agent involved
frequently received a letter of commendation or incentive 'award.254
... The CPUSA, SWP, and New Left prognuns were handled in the Internal
Security Section; the White Hate program was first handled in a short-lived
three-man "COINTELPRO unit" Which, during the three years of its existence,
supervised the CP and SWP programs as well, and then was transferred to the
Extremists Section; the Black Nationalist program was supervised by the Racial
Intelligence 'Section. The Section Chief would then route the proposal to the
COINTELPRO supervisor fur each program. Oceasionally the Section Chief
made a recommendation as to the proposal; more often the supervisor made
the initial decision to approve or deny.
lOa No control file was maintained of these directives. Since these directives
were sent out under the investigative caption, the first time the COINTELPRO
caption would be used was on the field proposal which responded to the
directives.
2M (Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 167.) There is no central file of such awards, so the
number is r~rievable only by searching each agent's personnel file.
63
4. Blurred Distinction Between Oounterintelligence and In·
vestigation
It is possible that some actions did not receive headquarters scrutiny
simply because the field offices were never told precisely what "counterintelligence"
was. Although Bureau procedures strictly required
COINTELPRO proposals to be approved at headquarters and a control
file to be mamtained both in the field and at headquarters, the
field offices had no way to determine with any certainty just what was
counterintelligence and what was investigation. Many of the techniques
overlap: contacts with employers, contacts with 'family members,
contacts with local law enforcement, even straight interviewing, are
all investigative techniques which were used in COINTELPRO actions.
255 More importantly, actions in the Rev. Martin Luther King
case which cannot, by any stretch of the language, be called "investigative"
were not called COINTELPRO, but were carried under the
investigative caption.256
The Bureau witnesses agree that COINTELPRO has no fixed definition,
and that there is a large grey area between what is counterintelligence
and what is aggressive investigation. As the Black Nationalist
supervisor put it, "Basically actions taken to neutralize an individual
or disrupt an organization would be COINTELPRO; actions which
were primarily investigative would have been handled by the investigative
desks," even though the investigative action had disruptive
effects. 256a Aggressive investigation contmues, and in many cases may
be as disruptive as COINTELPRO, because in an investigation the
Bureau can and does reveal its interest. An anonymous letter (COIN
TELPRO) can be discarded as the work of a crank; but if the local
FBI agent say's the subject of an investigation is a subversive an employer
or famIly member pays attention.
5. Inspection
The Inspection Division attempted to ensure that standard procedures
were being followed. The Ins'pectors focused on two things: field
office participatIOn, and the mechamcs of headquarters approvaL However,
the Inspection Division did not exercise oversight, in the sense of
looking for wrongdoing. Rather, it was an active participant in
COINTELPRO by attempting to make sure that it was being efficiently
and enthusiastically conducted.257
... According to Moore. even the "snitch jacket"-labeling a group member as
an informant when he is not-is not solely a counterintelligence technique, but
may be used, in an ordinary investigation, to protect a real informant, "Maybe
. . . you had an informant whose life was at stake because somebody suspected
him and the degree of response ... might be the degree that you would have
to use in order to sow enough suspicion on other people to take it away from
your informant." (Moore, 11/3/75, p. 70)
... See Dr. Martin Luther King Report.
.... Black Nationalist deposition, 10/17/75, p. 15.
..1 As Moore put it, "This was a program, and whenever the Bureau had a program,
you had to produce results because it was scrutinized by the inspectors, not
only during your own inspection on a yearly basis, but also scrutinized in the field
during field inspections." (Moore, 11/3/75, p. 48.) The New Left supervisor, who
received copies of the inspection reports, stated that "it would be an innocuous
type report in every instance I can recall." (New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 72)
For example, one Domestic Intelligence Division inspection report on the
"White Hate" programs noted under "Accomplishments" that the decline in Klan
orgarlizatioJ1s i8 attributable to "hard-hitting investigations, counterintelligence
(Continued)
64
As the Assistant Director then in charge of the Inspection Division
testified, the "propriety" of COINTELPRO was not investigated. He
agreed that his job was to "determine whether the program was being
pursued effectively as opposed to whether it was proper," and added,
"There was no instruction to me, nor do I believe there is any instruction
in the Inspector's manual that the Inspector should be on the alert
to see that constitutional values are being protected." 258
B. Outside the Bureau: 1956-1971
There is no clear answer to the question whether anyone outside the
Bureau knew about COINTELPRO. One of the hallmarks of
COINTELPRO was its secrecy. No one outside the Bureau was to
know it existed.259 A characteristic instruction appeared in the Black
Nationalist originating letter:
You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor
is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the
program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate
within-office security should be afforded to sensitive operations
and techniques considered under the program.260
Thus, for example, anonymous letters had to be written on commercially
purchased stationery; newsmen had to be so completely trustworthy
that they were guaranteed not to reveal the Bureau's interest;
and inquiries of law enforcement officials had to be under investigative
pretext. In approving or denying any proposal, the primary consideration
was preventing "embarrassment to the Bureau." Embarrassment
is a term of art. It means both public relations embarrassmentcriticism-
and any revelation of the Bureau's investi~ative interest
to the subject, which may then be expected to take countermeasures.261
(Continued)
programs directed at them, and penetration ... by our racial informants." The
report then lists several specific actions, including the defeat of a candidate with
Klan affiliations; the removal from office of a high Klan official; and the issuance
of a derogatory press release. (Inspection, Domestic Intelligence Division, 1/826/
71, pp. 15. 17-19.)
... Mark Felt testimony, 2/3/76, pp. 56, 65.
.... For security reasons, no instructions were printed in the Manual. In service
training for intelligence agents did contain an hour on COINTELPRO, so it may
be assumed that most agents knew something about the programs.
For instances in which Attorneys General, the Cabinet, and the House Subcommittee
on Appropriations were allegedly informed of the existence of the
CPUSA and Klan COINTELPROs.
... Memorandum from FBI HeadQ.uarters to all SAC'S, 8/25/67.
.., One example of the lengths to which the Bureau went in maintaining
secrecy may be instructive. The Bureau sent a letter to Klan members purporting
to 'be from the "National Intelligence Committee"-a super-secret Klan
disciplinary body. The letter fired the North Carolina Grand Dragon and suspended
the Imperial Wizard, Robert Shelton. Shelton complained to both the
local postal inspector and the FBI resident agency (which solemnly assured him
that his complaint was not within the Bureau's jurisdiction). The Bureau had
intended to mail a second "NIC" letter, but the plans were held in abeyance
until it could be learned whether the postal inspector intended to act on Shelton's
complaint. The Bureau, therefore, contacted the local postal inspector, using
th~ir investigation of Shelton's complaint as a pretext, to see what the inspector
intended to do. The field office reported that the local inspector had forwarded
the complaint to regional headquarters, which in turn referred it to a Chief Postal
Inspector in Washington, D.C. The Bureau's liaison agent was then sent to that
office to determine what action the postal authorities planned to take. He
returned with the information that the Post Office had referred the matter to the
Fraud Section of the Department of Justice's Criminal Dhision, under a cover
65
This secrecy has an obvious impact on the oversight process. There is
some question whether anyone with oversight responsibility outside
the Bureau was informed of COINTELPRO. In response to the Committee's
request, the Bureau has assembled all documents available in
its files which indicate that members of the executive and legislative
branches were so informed.262
1. Exe(JUtive Branch
On May 8, 1958, Director Hoover sent two letters, one to the Honorable
Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, and
the other to Attorney General William Rogers, containing the same
information. The Attorney General's letter is captioned "COMMUNIsT
PARTY, USA-INTERNAL SECURITY." The letters are
fairly explicit notification of the CPUSA COINTELPRO:
In August of 1956, this Bureau initiated a program designed
to promote disruption within the ranks of the Communist
Party (CP) USA ... Several techniques have been utilized
to accomplish our objectives.263
The letters go on to detail use of informants to engage in controversial
discussions, after which "acrimonious debates ensued, suspicions
were aroused, and jealousies fomented"; and anonymous mailings of
anti-communist material, both reprinted and Bureau-prepared, to
active CP members.264 (Two examples of the Bureau's product were
enclosed.) "Tangible accomplishments" achieved by the program were
"disillusionment and defection among Party members and increased
factionalism at all levels." 265 However, the only techniques disclosed
were use of informants and anonymous propaganda mailings. There is
no record of any reply to these letters.
letter stating that since Shelton's allegations "appear to involve an internal
struggle" for Klan control, and "since the evidence of mail fraud was somewhat
tenuous in nature," the Post Office did not contemplate any investigation. Neither,
apparently, did the Department. The Bureau did not inform either the Postal
Inspector or the Criminal Division that it had authored the letter under review.
Instead, when it appeared the FBI's role would not be discovered, the Bureau
prepared to send out the second letter-a plan which was discontinued when the
Klan "notional" was proposed.
Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/9/67;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 5/24/67; memorandum
from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/31/67; memorandum
from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/7/67; memorandum from
Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/13/67; memorandum from Birmingham
Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/14/67; memorandum from Charlotte
Field Office to FBI HeadqWlrters, 6/28/67; memorandum from FBI Headquarters
to Atlanta and Charlotte Field Offices. 6/29/67; memorandum from Atlanta
Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/27/67; memorandum from Bernard Rachner
to Charles Brennan, 7/11/67; memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI
Headquarters, 8/22/67; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte
Field Office, 8/21/67.
""" These documents were also made available to the Petersen Committee. The
Petersen Committee twice asked the Bureau for documents showing outside
knowledge, and twice was told there were none. Only as the Petersen report was
ready to go to press did the Bureau find the documents delivered. (Staff interview
with Henry Petersen.)
2<3 Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58.
... Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5(8(58.
""'l\Iemorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58.
66
On January 10, 1961, letters from the Director were sent to Dean
Rusk, Robert Kennedy, and Byron R. White, who were about to take
office as Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Deputy Attorney
General, respectively. The letters enclosed a top secret summary memorandum
setting forth the overall activities of the Communist Party,
USA, and stated, "Our responsibilities in the internal security field
and our counterattack against the CPUSA are also set out in this
memorandum." 266
The five-page memorandum contains one section entitled "FBI
Counterattack." This section details penetration of the Party at all
levels with security informants; use of various techniques to keep the
Party off-balance and disillusioned; infiltration by informants; intensive
investigation of Party members; and prosecution. Only o?e
paragraph of that report appears at all related to the Bureau's clalID
that the CPUSA COINTELPRO was disclosed:
As an adjunct to our regular investigative operations, we
carryon a carefully planned program of counterattack
against the CPUSA WhICh keeps it off balance. Our primary
purpose in this program is to bring about disillusionment
on the part of individual members which is carried on from
both inside and outside the Party organization. [Sentence
on use of informants to disrupt excised for security reasons.]
In certain instances we have been successful in preventing
communists from seizing control of legitimate mass organizations
and have discredited others who were secretly operating
inside such organizations. For example, during 1959
we were able to prevent the CPUSA from seizing control of
the 20,OOO-member branch of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People in Chicago, Illinois.261
The only techniques disclosed were use of informants and COMINFIL
exposure. There is no record of any replies to these letters.
On September 2, 1965, letters were sent to the Honorable Marvin
Watson, Special Assistant to President Johnson and Attorney General
Katzenbach (whose letter was captioned "PENETRATION AND
DISRUPTION OF KLAN ORGANIZATIONS-RACIAL MATTERS").
These two-pa~ letters refer to the Bureau's success in solving
a number of cases involving racial violence in the South. They
then detail the development of a large number of informants and the
value of the information received from them.
One paragraph deals with "disruption" :
We also are seizing every opportunity to disrupt the activities
of Klan organizations. Typical is the manner in which we
exposed and thwarted a "kick back" scheme a Klan group was
using in one southern state to help finance its activities. One
member of the group was selling insurance to other Klan members
and would deposit a generous portion of the premium.
refunds in the Klan treasury. As a result of action we took, the
insurance company learned of the scheme and cancelled all
the policies held by Klan members, thereby cutting 011 it siz-
>OS Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 1/10/61.
"'" Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 1/10/61, p; 4.
67
able source of revenue which had been used to finance Klan
activities.268
Notifying an insurance company of a kick back scheme involving its
premiums is not a "typical" COINTELPRO technique. It falls within
that grey area between counterintelligence and ordinary Bureau responsibilities.
Nevertheless, the statement that the Bureau is "seizing
every opportunity to disrupt the activities of Klan organizations" is
considered by the Bureau to be notification of the White Hate
COINTELPRO, even though it does not distinguish between the inevitable
and sometimes proper disruption of intensive investigation and
the intended disruption of covert action.
On September 3, 1965, Mr. Katzenbach replied tothe Director's letter
with a two-paragraph memorandum captioned "Re: Your memorandum
of September 2, regarding penetration and disruption of Klan
organizations." The body of the memorandum makes no reference to
disruption, but praises the accomplishments of the Bureau in the area
of Klan penetration and congratulates Director Hoover on the development
of his informant system and the results obtained through it.
The letter concludes:
It is unfortunate that the value of these activities would in
most cases be lost if too extensive publicity were given to
them; however, perhaps at some point it may be possible to
place these achievements on the public record, so that the
Bureau can receive its due credit.269
The Bureau interpreted this letter as approval and praise of its White
Hate COINTELPRO. Mr. Katzenbach has said that he has no memory
of this document, nor of the response. He testified that during his term
in the Department he had never heard the terms "COINTEL" or
COINTELPRO, and that while he was familiar with the Klan investigation,
he was not aware of any improper activities such as letters
to wives.27(} Mr. Katzenbach added :
It never occurred to me that the Bureau would engage in the
sort of sustained improper activity which it apparently did.
Moreover, given these excesses, I am not surprised that I and
others were unaware of them. Would it have made sense for
the FBI to seek approval for activities of this nature-especially
from Attorneys General who did not share Mr. Hoover's
political views, who would not have been in sympathy with
the purpose of these attacks, and who would not have condoned
the methods? 271
The files do not reveal any response from Mr. Watson.
On December 19, 1967, Director Hoover sent a letter to Attorney
General Ramsey Clark, with a copy to Deputy Attorney General
Warren Christopher, captioned "KU KLUX KLAN INVESTIGATIONS-
FBI ACCOMPLISHMENTS" and attaching a ten-page
memorandum with the same caption and a list of statements and pub-
... Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 9/2/65, p. 2.
... Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbacb to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/3/65.
270 Nicholas deB. Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 2()6.-207.
271 Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 217.
68
lications regarding the Ku Klux Klan "and the FBI's role in investigating
Klan matters." The memorandum was prepared "pursuant to
your conversation with Cartha DeLoach of this Bureau concerning
FBI coverage and penetration of the Ku Klux Klan." 272
The memo is divided into ele\'en sections: Background, Present
Status, FBI Hesponsibility, Major Cases, Informants, Special Projects,
Liaison 1Yith Local Authorities, Klan Infiltration of Law Enforcement,
Acquisition of VlTeapons and Dynamite of the Ku Klux
Klan, Interviews of Klansmen, and Hecent Developments.
The first statement in the memorandum which might conceivably
relate to the White Hate COINTELPRO appears under the heading
"FBI Hesponsibility":
... We conduct intelligence investigations with the view
toward infiltrating the Ku Klux Klan with informants,.
neutralizing it as a terrorist organization, and deterring violence.
273
The Bureau considers the word "neutralize" to be a COINTELPRO
key word.
Some specific activities which were carried out within the Bureau
under the COINTELPRO caption are then detailed under the heading
"Special Projects." The use of Bureau informants to effect the removal
of Klan officers is set forth under the subheadings "Florida,"
"Mississippi," and "Louisiana." More significantly, the "Florida"
paragraph includes the statement that, "We have found that by the
removal of top Klan officers and provoking scandal within the state
Klan organization through our informants, the Klan in a particular
area can be rendered ineffective." 274 This sentence, although somewhat
buried should, if focused upon, have alerted the recipients to actions
going beyond normal investigative activity. Other references are
more vague, referring only to "containing the growth" or "controlling
the expansion" of state Klans.275 There is no record of any reply to this
letter, which Clark does not remember receiving:
Did [these phrases in the letter] put me on notice? No. Why?
I either did not read them, or if I did read them, didn't read
them carefully.... I think I didn't read this. I think perhaps
I had asked for it for someone else, and either bucked it on
to them or never saw it.276
210 Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 12/19/67, p. 1.
na Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 2/19/67, p. 4.
.,. Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney Genernl, 12/19/67, p. 8.
215 The paragraph under the SUbheading "Tennessee" includes the statement
that, through a highly placed Bureau informant, "we were able to control the expansion
of the Klan." The paragraphs under the subheading "Virginia" states
that, after the United Kians of America began an intensive organizational effort
in the state, "We immediately began an all-out effort to penetrate the Virginia
Klan, contain its growth, and deter violence." The specific examples given, however,
are not OOINTELPRO actions, but liaison with state and local authorities,
prosecution, cooperation with the Governor, and warning a civil rights worker of
a piot against his life. The paragraph under the subheading "Illinois" contains
nothing relating to COINTELPRO activities, but refers to cooperation with
state authorities in the prosecution of a Klan official for a series of bombings.
(Memorandum from Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, 12/19/67, pp. 8-10.)
". Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 23.'5.
69
He added, "1 think that any disruptive activities, such as those you
reveal, regarding the COINTEL program and the Ku Klux Klan,
should be absolutely prohibited and subjected to criminal prosecution."
271
Finally, on September 17, 1969, a lett~r was sent to Attorney General
Mitchell, with copies to the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant
Attorneys General of the Criminal Division, Internal Security Division,
and Civil Division, captioned "INVESTIGATION OF KLAN
ORGANIZATIONS-RACIAL MATTERS (KLAN)," which informs
the recipients of the "significant progress we have recently made
in our investigation of the Ku Klux Klan." The one pac-e letter states
that, "during the last several months,278 while various national and
state leaders of the United Klan of America remain in prison, we have
attempted to negate the activities of the temporary leaders of the Ku
Klux Klan." 279
The only example given is the "careful use and instruction of selected
racial informants" to "initiate a split within the United Klans of
America." This split was evidenced by a Klan rally during which
"approximately 150 Klan membership ~ards were tacked to a cross
and burned to signify this breach." 280
The letter concludes, "We will continue to give full attention to our
responsibilities in an effort to accomplish the maximum possible neutralization
of the Klan." 281 There is no record of any replies to these
letters.
While the only documentary evidence that members of the executive
branch were informed of the existence of any COINTELPRO has
~n set forth above, the COINTELPRO unit chief stated that he was
certain that Director Hoover orally briefed every Attorney General
and President, since he wrote "squibs" for the Director to use in such
briefings. He could not, however, remember the dates or subject matter
of the briefings, and the Bureau was unable to produce any such
"squibs" (which would not, in any case, have been routinely saved).
Cartha DeLoach, former Assistant to the Director, testified that
he "distinctly" recalled briefing Attorney General Clark, "generally
... concerning COINTELPRO.282 Clark denied that DeLoach's testimony
was either true or accurate, adding "I do not believe that he
briefed me on anything even, as he says, generally concerning
COINTELPRO, whatever that means." 283 The Bureau has failed to
produce any memoranda of such oral briefings, although it was the
habit of both Director Hoover and DeLoach to write memoranda for
the files in such situations.284
~. The Oabinet
The Bureau has furnished the Committee a portion of a briefing
paper prepared for Director Hoover for his briefing of the Cabinet,
217 Clark. 12/3/75. Hearings. p. 221.
1'18 The White Hate COINTELPRO had been going on for five years.
..,. Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 9/17/69.
... Ibid.
2111 Ibid.
... DeLoach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 183.
"'Clark. 12/3/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 232.
JI8I Unit Chief, 10/14/75, p. 136; and 10/21/75, p. 42.
70
presided over by President Eisenhower, dated November 6, 1958.
There is no transcript of the actual briefing. The briefing as a whole
apparently dealt with, among other things, seven prog-rams which
are "part of our overall counterintelligence operations" and which
are "specific answers to specific problems which have arisen within
our investigative jurisdiction." Six of the programs apparently related
to espionage. The seventh deals with the CPUSA :
To counteract a resurgence of Communist Party influence
in the United States, we have a seventh program designed
to intensify any confusion and dissatisfaction among its
members. During the past few years, this program has been
most effective. Selective informants were briefed and trained
to raise controversial issues within the Party. In the process,
many were able to advance themselves to higher positions.
The Internal Revenue Service was furnished the names and
addresses of Party functionaries !Who had been adtive in the
underground 'apparatus. Based on this information, investigations
were instituted in 262 possible income tax evasion
cases. Anticommunist literature and simulated Party documents
were mailed anonymously to carefully chosen members.
285
This statement, although concise, would appear to bea fairly explicit
notification of the existence of the CPUSA COINTELPRO. There
are no documents reflecting any response.
3. Legislative Branch
The Bureau has furnished excerpts from briefing papers prepared
for the Director in 'his annual appearances before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee. During the hearings pertaining to fiscal years
1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1963, 1966, and 1967,286 these briefing papers
were given to the Director to be used in top secret, off-the-record testimony
relating to the CPUSA and White Hate COINTELPROs. No
transcripts are available of the actual briefings, and it is, therefore,
not possible to d~rmine whether the briefing papers were used at all,
or, conversely, whether the Director went beyond them to give additional
information. Additionally, portions of the briefing papers are
underlined by hand and port-ions have been crossed out, also by 'hand.
Some sections are bdth underlined and crossed out. The Bureau has
not 'been able to explain the meaning of the underlining or cross
marks. However, if the briefing papers were used as written, the Subcommittee
was informed of the existence of the CPUSA and Klan
COINTELPROs.
The FY 1958 briefing paper is in outline form. Under the heading
"auxiliary measures dirooted against Communist Party-USA" is a
paragraph entitled "FBI counterintelligence program to exploit
Party 'split':"
The Bureau also recently inaugurated a newly devised counterintelligence
program which is designed to capitalize upon
... Excerpt from FBI Director's 'briefing to 'the President and his C8.'binet,
11/6/58, pp. 85-36.
-The actual dates of the hearings would be 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960. 1962, 1965,
and 1966.
71
the "splitt" presently existing in the leadership of the Communist
Party-USA. Among other objectives, efforts are being
made by the Bureau, through informants and other techniques,
to keep these rifts open, and to otherwise weaken t;he
party where possible to do so in an anonymous manner. The
Internal Revenue Service has be~n given the names of 336
communist underground subjects~ so that the agency may be
able to entertain prosecutions for filing of false income tax
returns or other violations within the jurisdiction of that
Service.
The FY 1959 briefing paper on the CPUSA deals primarily with
informant penetration, but includes the statement that "to counteract
[CPUSA] activities the FBI for years has had a planned intensive
program designed to infiltrate, penetrate, disorganize, and disrupt the
Communist Party, USA." 287 In covering informant activities, the
paper includes the statement "they [informants] have likewise worked
to excellent advantage as a disruptive tactic." 288 The one specific example
cited has been deleted by the Bureau because it tends to identify
an informant.
The FY 1960 briefing paper is even more explicit. The pertinent
section is entitled "FBI's Anti-Communist Counterintelligence Program."
It details use of informants to engage in controversial discussions
"to promote dissension, factionalIsm and defections" which
"have been extremely successful from a disruptive standpoint." 289 One
paragraph deals with propaganda mailings "carefully concealing the
identity of the FBI as its source"; 290 another paragraph states that
"Communist Party leaders are considerably concerned over this
anonymous dissemination of literature." 291
The FY 1961 briefing paper, again titled "FBI's Counterintelligence
Program", states that the program was devised "to promote dissension,
factionalism and defections within the communist cause." 292
The only technique discussed (but f\lt some length) is anonymous
propaganda mailings. The effectiveness of the technique, according
to the paper, was proven from the mouth of the enemy that the mailings
"appear to be the greatest danger to the Communist Party,
USA." 293
The FY 1963 briefing paper, captioned "Counterintelligence Program,"
is extraordinarily explicit. It reveals that:
Since August, 1956, we have augmented our regular investigative
operations against the Communist Party-USA with a
"counterintelligence program" which involves the applica-
"'" Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations SU!bcommittee,
FY 1959, p. 54.
288 Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee,
FY 1959, p. 58.
... Excerpt f·rom FBI Director's briefing of the House ApproprIations Subcommittee,
FY 1960, p. 76.
... Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee,
FY 1960, p. 76.
201 Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House AppropriatiollB Subcommittee,
FY 1960, p. 77.
on Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House AppropriatiollB
Subcommittee, FY 1961, p. BO.
... Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee,
FY 1961; p.S1.
72
tion of disruptive techniques and psychological warfare direct.
ed at discrediting and disrupting the operations of the
Party, and causing disillusionment and defections within
the communist ranks. The tangible results we are obtaining
through these covert and extreme>ly sensitive operations speak
for themselves.294
The paper goes on to set forth such techniques as disrupting meetings,
rallies, and press conferences through causing the last-minute
cancellation of the rental of the hall, packing the audience with anticommunists,
arranging adverse publicity in the press, and giving
friendly reporters "embarrassing questions" for Communists they
interviewed. The briefing paper also mentions the use of newsmen to
take photographs which show the close relationship between the
leaders of the CPUSA and officials of the Soviet Union, using informants
to sow discord and factionalism, exposing and discrediting Communists
in such "legitimate organizations" as the YMCA and the Boy
Scouts, and mailing anonymous propaganda.295
The briefing paper for FY 1966 again refers to "counterintelligence
action:" "We have since 1956 carried on a sensitive prow-am for the
purpose of disrupting, exposing, discrediting, and otherwise neutralizing
the Communist Party-USA and related organizations." 296 The
paper cites two examples. The first is an operation conducted against
a Communist Party functionary who arrIved in a (deleted) CIty to
conduct a secret two-week Party school for local youth. The Bureau
arranged for him to be greeted at the airport by local television newsmen.
The functionary lost his rempel', pushing the reporter away and
swinging his briefcase at the cameraman, who was busily filming the
entire incident. The film was later televised nationally. The second
technique is described as "the most effective single blow ever dealt
the organized communist movement." The description has been deleted
"as it tends to reveal a highly sensitive technique." 297 The
COINTELPRO unit chief also stated that this one single action succeeded
in causing a "radical decrease" in CPUSA membership, but
refused to tell the Committee staff what that action was because it
involved foreign counterintelligence.298
The final briefing paper, for FY 1967, refers to the CPUSA program
and its expansion in 1964 to include "Klan and hate-type organizations
and their memberships." It continues, "counterintellIgence
action t~ay is a valuable adjunct to investigative responsibilities and
the techmques used complement our investIgations. All information
rel~ted. ,to the targeted organ~zations, their leadership and members,
whIch IS developed from a varIety of sources, is carefully reviewed for
its potential for use under this program." 299
... Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, FY 1963.
... Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, FY 1963.
... Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, FY 1966, p. 62. This is the first time the targeting of non-Party
members can be inferred.
... Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
SubcommLttee, FY 1966, p. 63.
... Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 113.
,.. Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, FY 1967, p. 71.
73
Examples cited are the Bureau's preparation of a leaflet on the
W.E.B. DuBois Clubs entitled "Target ... American Youth!" sponsored
by the VFW; alerting owners of meeting locations to their use
by Communists; alerting the Veterar.s Admmistration to a Klan
member's full-time employment in order to reduce his pension, and
the IRS to the fact, thllit he failed to file tax returns; exposing the insurance
kick back scheme also referred to in the 1965 letters to Watson
and Katzenbach; and increasing informant coverage by duplicating
a Klan business card given to prospective members.30o
O. Outside the Bureau: Post-1971.
In the fall of 1973, the Department of Justice released certain
COINTELPRO documents which had been requested by NBC reo'
porter Carl Stern in a Freedom of Information Act request following
the Media, Pennsylvania, break-in. In January 1974, Attorney General
Saxbe asked Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen to form an
intradepartmental committee to study COINTELPROand report
back to him.30l The committee was composed of both Department attorneys
and Bureau agents. The Department lawyers did not work
directly with Bureau documents; instead the Bureau prepared summaries
of the documents in the COINTELPRO control file, which did
not include the identities or affiliations of the targets, and the Department
members were allowed to do a sample comparison to verify the
accuracy of the summaries.
A revised and shortened version of the report of the Petersen Committee
was made public in November 1974. The public report was prefaced
by a statement from Attorney General Saxbe which stated th.at
while "in a small number of instances, some of these programs involved
what we consider today to be improper activities," most of the
aotivities "were legitimate." 301" The public version did not examine the
purposes or legality of the programs or the techniques, although i't did
state some COINTELPRO activities involved "isolated instances" of
practices that "can only be considered abhorrent in a free society." 302
The confidential report to Attorney General Saxbe examined the
legal issues at some length. It emphasized that many COINTELPRO
activities "were entirely proper and appropriate law enforcement procedures."
303 These included the following:
notifying other Government authorities of civil and criminal
violations of group members; interviewing such group members;
disseminating public source material on such individuals
and groups to media representatives; encouraging informants
to argue against the use of violence by such groups;
and issuing general public comment on the activities, policies
300 Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
SUbcommittee, FY 1967, pp. 72-73.
301 Although portions of the Committee's report were made public in April 1974,
Petersen has testified that the purpose of the report was simply to inform the
Attorney General. The inquiry was not intended to be conclusive and certainly
was not an adversary proceeding. "We were doing a survey rather than conducting
'an investigation." (Henry Petersen testimony, 12/11/75, Hearing, Vol.
6, p. 271.)
..10 William Saxbe statement, Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights SubCommittee
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 11/20/74, p, 9.
.... Petersen committee report, CRCR Hearings, 11/20/74, p, 11.
303 Petersen committee report, CRCR, Hearings, 11/20/74, p. 26.
74
and objectives of such groups through testimony at legislative
hearings and in other formal reports.304
On the other hand, the report concluded that many other COINTEL
PRO activities designed tQ expose, disrupt, and neutralize domestic
groups "exceeded the Bureau's investigative authority and may be said
to constitute an unwarranted interference with First Amendment
rights of free speech and associations of the target individuals and organizations."
305
Department attorneys prepared two legal memoranda, one viewing
COINTELPRO as a conspiracy to deprive persons of First
Amendment rights under 18 U.S.C. 241, and the other rejecting that
view.306 The committee itself reached the following conclusion:
While as a matter of pure legal theory it is arguable that
these programs resulted in Section 241 violations, it is the view
of the committee that any decision as to whether prosecution
should be undertaken must also take into account several
other important factors which bear upon the events in question.
These factors are: first, the historical context in which
the programs were conceived and executed by the Bureau
in response to public and even Congressional demands for
action to neutralize the self-proclaimed revolutionary aims
and violence prone activities of extremist groups which posed
a threat to the peace and tranquility of our cities in the mid
and late sixties; second, the fact that each of the COINTEL
PRO programs was personally approved and supported by
the late Director of the FBI; and third, the fact that the interferences
with First Amendment rights resulting from individual
implemented prog-ram actions were insubstantial.
Under these circumstances, It is the view of the committee that
the opening of a criminal investigation of these matters is not
warranted.307
The report also concluded that there were "substantial questions" as
to the liability of various former and present officials to civil suit
"under tort theories of defamation of interference with contract
rights." 308
The Departmental committee's crucial conclusion waS that the interferences
with First Amendment rights were "insubstantiaL" It appears
to have reached that conclusion by ignoring the declared goals of the
programs: cutting down group membership and preventing the "propagation"
of a group's philosophy. Further, the committee brushed over
dangerous or degrading techniques by breaking down the categories
of actions into very small percentages, and then concluded that, if only
1 percent of the actions involved poison pen letters to spouses, then the
activity was "insubstantial" as compared to the entirety of COINTEL
proposals, even though, as to the individuals in that category, the invasion
might be very substantial indeed.
... Petersen Committee Report, pp. 26-27.
:JOG Petersen Committee Report, p. 27.
30\1 Petersen Committee Report, p. 21.
lJfJ7 Peterson Committee Report, pp. 21-22.
.... Petersen Committee Report, p. 22.
75
Another weakness in the Petersen committee report is its chara.cterizat'ion
as legitimate of such techniques as "leaking" public source
material to the media, interviewing group members, and notifying
other government authorities of civil and criminal violations. The
term "public source material" is misleading, since the FBI's files contain
a large amount of so-called public source data (such as arrest
records, outdated or inaccurate news stories) which should not be
"leaked" outside the Bureau to discredit an individuaJ.309 Interviews
can be conducted in such an intrustive and persistent manner as to
constitute harassment. Minor technical law violations can be magnified
when uncovered and reported by the FBI to another agency for
the purpose of disruption rather than objective law enforcement.310
Claims that a technique is legitimate per se should not be accepted
without examining the actual purpose and effect of the activity.
Although the Petersen committee's report concluded that "the
opening of a criminal investigation of these matters is not warranted."
311 the Committee did recommend broad changes in Bureau
procedures. First, the report urged that "a sharp distinction ... be
made between FBI activities in the area of foreign counterintelligence
and those in the domestic field." 312 The committee proposed that the
Attorney General issue a directive to the FBI:
prohibiting it from instituting any counterintelli~enceprogram
such as COINTELPRO without his prior knowledge
and approval. Specifically, this directive should make it unmistakably
clear that no disruptive action should be taken
by the FBI in connection with its investigative responsibilities
involving domestic based organizations, except those
.... For instance, the 2o-years-past "Communist" activities of a target professor's
wife were fOlUld in "public source material," as were the arrest records of a
prominent civil rights leader. Both were leaked to ''friendly'' media on condition
that the Bureau's interest not be revealed.
1110 See, e.g., the attempt to get an agent on the Alcohol Beverage Control Board
to raid a Democratic Party fundraiser.
llll The Civil Rights Division refused to endorse this conclusion, although it was
under heavy pressure from top Department executives to do so. Assistant Attorney
General J. Stanley Pottinger was first informed of the Petersen committee
report a week before its public release; and no official of the Civil Rights Division
had previously examined any of the COINTELPRO materials or summaries. After
the report's release, the Civil Rights Division was permitted a short time to
review some of the materials. (Staff summary of interview with Assistant
Attorney General Pottinger, 4/21/76.)
Under these restrictions the Civil Rights Division was not alJile to review
"everytWng in the voluminous fi'les," but rather conducted only a "general survey
of the program unrelated to specific allegations of criminal violations." Assistant
Attorney General Pottinger advised Attorney General Saxbe, upon the completion
of this brief examination of COINTELPRO, that the Division found "no basis for
making crimina'! charges against particular individuals or involving particu'lar
incidents." Although some of the acts reviewed appeared "to amount to technical
violations," the Division concluded that "without more" infarmation, prosecutive
action would not be justified under its "normal criteria." However, Pottinger
stre;:sed that a "different prosecution judgment would be indicated if specific acts.
more fully known and developed, could be evaluated in a complete factual
context." (Memorandum from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General, to
Attorney General Saxbe, 12/13/74.)
81J Petersen Committee Report, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, Hearings, 11/20/74, p. 25.
69-984 0 - 76 - 6
76
which are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially
reco~ized and accepted police practIces, and which are not
in VIOlation of state or federal law. The FBI should also be
charged that in any event where a proposed action may be
perceived, with reason, to unfairly affect the rights of citizens,
it is the responsibility of the FBI as an institution and
of FBI agents as individuals to seek legal advice from the
Attorney General or his authorized representative.313
Attorney General Saxbe did not issue such a directive, and the mattel
is still pending before Attorney General Levi.3H
VI. EPILOGUE
On April 1, 1976, Attorney General Levi announced the establishment
of So special review committee within the Department of Justice
to notify COINTELPRO victims that they were the subjects of FBI
activities directed against them. Notification will be made "in those instances
where the specific COINTELPROactivity was improper, actual
harm may have occurred, and the subjects are not already 'aware
that they were the targets of CONINTELPRO activities." 315
The review committee has established guidelines for determining
which COINTELPRO activities were "improper," but it will
be difficult to make that determination without giving an official imprimatur
to questionable activities which do not meet the notification
criteria. For example, there is little point in notifying all recipients
of anonymous reprint mailings that they received their copy of a
Reader's Digest article from the FBI, but the Department should not
suggest that the activity itself is a proper Bureau function. Other acts
which fall within the "grey area" between COINTELPRO and
aggressive investigation present similar problems.316
Nevertheless, a Departmental notification program is an important
step toward redressing the wrongs done, and carries with it some
313 Petersen Committee Report, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights hearings, 11/20/74, p. 28.
31< Attorney General Levi has proposed a series of guidelines on domestic
intelligence. A set of "preventive action" guidelines was prepared which would
have authorized the Bureau to take "nonviolent emergency measures" to "obstruct
or prevent" the use of force or violence upon the Attorney Generals'
authorization. These guidelines have now been abandoned because the Attorney
General determined that it was not possible to frame general language which
would permit proper (and indeed ordinary) law enforcement measures such as
increased guards around building or traffic control during a demonstration while
preventing COINTELPRO type activity.
31lI Department of Justice release, 4/1/76.
III The notification guidelines read as follows:
1. The review of the COINTELPRO files should be conducted by the eXisting
Shaheen committee.
2. An individual should be notified in those instances where an action directed
against him was improper and, in addition, there is reason to believe he may
have been caused actual harm. In making this determination in doubtful cases,
the committee should resolve the question in favor of notification.
3. Excluded from notification should be those individuals who are known to be
aware that they were the subjects of COINTELPRO activities.
4. An advisory group will he created to pass upon those instances where the
committee is uncertain as to whether notification should be given, and otherwise
to advise the committee as requested.
5. The manner of notification should be determined in each case to protect
rights to privacy.
77
additional benefits. For the first time, Departmental attorneys will
review the original files, rather than relying on Bureau-prepared summaries.
Further, the Department will have acknowledged-finallythat
COINTELPRO ,vas wrong. Official repudiation of the programs
is long overdue.
The American people need to be assured that never again will an
agency of the government be permitted to conduct a secret war against
those citizens it considers threats to the established order. Only a
combination of legislative prohibition and Departmental control can
guarantee that COINTELPRO will not happen again. The notification
program is an auspicious beginning.
6. Notification should be given as the work of the eommittee proeeeds, without
waiting for the entire review to be completed.
7. In the event that the committel' dl'termines in the process of review that
eonduct sugg-ests disciplinary action or referral of a mattl'r to the Criminal or
Civil Rights Divi:o;ions, the appropriate rl'fl'rral should be made.
8. Xo departure from thl'se instructions will bl' made without the exprl'SS
approval of the Attorney General. The committee may request such departure
only through and with thl' recommendation of the advisory group.
(Letter from Department of Justice to the Select Committei', 4/23/76.)
 

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