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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., CASE STUDY
CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction - _________________________________________ 81
II. The COMINFIL Investigation________________________________ 86
III. Concern Increases in the FBI and the Kennedy Administration
Over Allegations of Communist Influence in the Civil Rights
Movement and the FBI Intensifies the Investigation: January
1962-0ctober 1963: Introduction and Summary________________ 94
A. The Justice Department warns Dr. King about advisers
A and B: January 1962-June 1963____________________ 95
B. Allegations about Dr. King du_ring hearings on the public
accommodations bill and the administration's response:
July 1963__________________________________________ 98
C. The Attorney General considers a wiretap of Dr. King and
rejects the idea: July 1963_ __________________________ 100
D. The Attorney General voices concern over continuing FBI
reports about Dr. King: July-August 1963_____________ 102
E. The FBI intensifies its investigation of alleged Communist
influence in the civil rights movement: July-September
1963_______________________________________________ 104
IV. Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference: Introduction and Summary___ 111
A. Legal standards governing the FBI's duty to inform the
Justice Department of wiretaps and microphones during
the period of the Martin Luther King investigation_ ____ 112
B. Wiretap surveillance of Dr. King and the SCLC: October
1963-June 1966____________________________________ 115
C. Microphone surveillance of Dr. King: January 1964-November
1965_______________________________________ 120
1. Reasons for the FBI's microphone surveillance of
Dr. King_ ________ ____ __ __ __ __ _______ _______ _ 120
2. Evidence bearing on whether the Attorneys General
authorized or knew about the microphone surveillance
of Dr. King_ ________________________ 123
a. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy______ 124
b. Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach_ 126
V. The FBI's Effort to Discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, 1964: Introduction
and Summary______ __ __ __ __ ___ __ ____ __ __ __ __ 131
A. The FBI disseminates the first King "Monograph" and Attorney
General Kennedy orders it recalled: October 1963 __ 131
B. The FBI plans its campaign to discredit Dr. King: December
23, 1963__ ___ __ _______________ __ ___ __ __ __ __ _ 133
C. William Sullivan proposes a plan to promote a new Negro
leader: January 1964________________________________ 135
D. FBI Headquarters orders the field offices to intensify efforts
to discredit Dr. King: April-August 1964_ _______ __ __ __ 137
E. Steps taken by the FBI in 1964 to discredit Dr. King_ ___ 140
1. Attempts to discredit Dr. King with the White
House_______________________________________ 140
2. Attempts to discredit Dr. King with the Congress. _ 140
3. Attempts to discredit Dr. King with universities_ __ 141
4. Attempts to discredit Dr. King with churches______ 142
5. Attempts to discredit Dr. King with the Pope_ ____ 142
6. The attempt to discredit Dr. King during his receipt
of the Nobel Peace Prize ______________________ 143
7. Attempts to block Dr. King's publications_________ 144
8. Attempt to undermine the National Science Foundation's
cooperation with the SCLC____________ 145
9. UI?success!ul. FBI attempts to locate financial
Impropnetles_ _______ _______ __ ____ ___ __ 145
F. The question of whether Government officials outside of the
FBI were aware of the FBI's effort to discredit Dr. King_ _ 146
(79)
VI.
VII.
VIII.
80
The Hoover-King Controversy Becomes Public and a Truce is
Called: April-December 1964: Summary _
A. First steps in the public controversy: April-November 1964-
B. Tapes are mailed to Dr. King: November 21,1964 _
C. Attempts by the FBI to "leak" to reporters tape recordings
embarrassing to Dr. King _
D. Roy Wilkins of NAACP meets with DeLoach to discuss
allegations about Dr. King: November 27,1964 _
E. Dr. King and Director Hoover meet: December 1,1964 _
F. Civil rights leaders attempt to dissuade the FBI from discrediting
Dr. King: December 1964-May 1965 _
1. Farmer-DeLoach meeting: December 1,1964 _
2. Yo1u9n6g5-Abernathy-DeLoach meeting: January 8_,
3. Carey-DeLoach meeting: May 19,1965 _
The FBI Program Against Dr. King: 1965-68:
A. Major efforts to discredit Dr. King: 1965-68 _
1. Attempts to discredit Dr. King with churches _
2. Attempts to discredit Dr. King with heads of Government
agencies _
3. Attempts to discredit Dr. King by using the press __
4. Attempts to discredit Dr. King with major political
and financialleaders _
5. Atlteeamdeprtss to discredit Dr. King with congressiona_l
B. COINTELPRO operations against Dr. King _
C. ThmeoFntBhIs's efforts to discredit Dr. King during his las_t
ConcDlu.siAonttempts to discredit Dr. King's reputation after his death___
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DR. MARTIX LUTHER KIXG, JR., CASE STUDY
1. INTIWDDCTlOX
From December 1963 until his death in 1968, Martin Luther King,
Jr. was the target of an intensive c:ampaign by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to "neutralize" him as an effective civil rights leader.
In the words of the man in charge of the FBI's "war" against Dr.
King:
No holds were barred. We have used [similar] techniques
against Soviet agents. [The same methods were] brought
home against any organization against which we were targeted.
We did not differentiate. This is a rough, tough business.
1
The FBI collected information about Dr. King's plans and activities
through an extensive surveillance program, employing nearly
every intelligence-gathering tochnique at the Bureau's disposal. Wiretaps,
which were initially approved by Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy, were maintained on Dr. King's home telephone from Octoher
1963 until mid-1965; the SCLC headquarter's telephones were
covered by wiretaps for an even longer period. Phones in the homes
and offices of some of Dr. King's close advisers were also wiretapped.
The FBI has acknowledged 16 occasions on which microphones !Were
hidden in Dr. King's hotel and mowl rooms in an "attempt" to obtain
information about the "private activities of King and his advisers"
for use to "completely discredit" them.2
FBI informants in the civil rights movement and reports from
field offices kept the Bureau's headquarters informed of developments
in the civil rights field. The FBI's presence was SO intrusive that one
major figure in the civil rights movement testified. that his colleagues
referred to themselves as members of "the FBI's golden record club." 3
The FBI's formal program to discredit Dr. King with Government
officials began with the distribution of a "monograph" which the FBI
realized could "be regarded as a personal attack on Martin Luther
King,'" and which was subsequently described by a Justice Department
official as "a personal diatribe ... a personal attack without
evidentiary support." 5
Congressional leaders were warned "off the record" about alleged
dangers posed by Reverend King. The FBI responded to Dr. King's
receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize by atwmpting to undermine his reception
by foreign heads of state and American ambassadors in the
countries that he planned to visit. When Dr. King returned to the
1 William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, p. 97.
• Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 1/28/64.
• Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, p. 55.
, Memorandum from Alan Belmont to Clyde Tolson, 10/17/63.
• Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 32.
(81)
82
United States, steps were taken to reduce support for a huge banquet
and a special "day" that were being planned in his honor.
The FBI's program to destroy Dr. King as the leader of the civil
rights movement entailed attempts to discredit him with churches,
universities, and the press. Steps were taken to attempt to convince the
National Council of Churches, the Baptist World Alliance, and leading
Protestant ministers to halt financial support of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and to persuade them that
"Negro leaders should completely isolate King and remove him from
the role he is now occupying in civil rights activities." 6 When the FBI
learned that Dr. King intended to visit the Pope, an agent was dispatched
to persuade Francis Cardinal Spellman to warn the Pope
about "the likely embarrassment that may result to the Pope should
he grant King an audience." 7 The FBI sought to influence universities
to withhold honorary degrees from Dr. King. Attempts were made to
prevent the publication of articles favorable to Dr. King and to find
"friendly" news sources that would print unfavorable articles. The
FBI offered to play for reporters tape recordings allegedly made from
microphone surveillance of Dr. King's hotel rooms.
The FBI mailed Dr. King a tape recording made from its microphone
coverage. According to the Chief of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence
Division, the tape was intended to precipitate a separation between
Dr. King and his wife in the belief that the separation would
reduce Dr. King's stature.7a The tape recording was accompanied by
a note which Dr. King and his advisers interpreted as a threat to release
the tape recording unless Dr. King committed suicide. The FBI
also made preparations to promote someone "to assume the role of
leadership of the Negro people when King has been completely discredited."
8
The campaign against Dr. King included attempts to destroy the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference by cutting off its sources
of funds. The FBI considered, and on some occasions executed, plans
to cut off the support of some of the SCLC's major contributors, including
religious organizations, a labor union, and donors of grants
such as the Ford Foundation. One FBI field office recommended that
the FBI send letters to the SCLC's donors over Dr. Kin~'s forged
signature warning them that the SCLC was under investIgation by
the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS files on Dr. King and the
SCLC were carefully scrutinized for financial irregularities. For over
a year, the FBI unsuccessfully attempted to establish that Dr. King
had a secret foreign bank account in which he was sequestering funds.
The FBI campaign to discredit and destroy Dr. King was marked
by extreme personal vindictiveness. As early as 1D62, Director Hoover
penned on an FBI memorandum, "King is no good." 9 At the August
1963 March on Washington, Dr. King told the country of his dream
that "all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles,
Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in
the words of the old Negro spiritual, 'Free at last, free at last. Thank
• Memorandum from William Sulli\"an to Alan Belmont, 12/16/64.
7 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/31/64, p. 1.
7a William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 104-105.
8 Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 118/64.
• Memorandum from James Bland to William Sullivan, W3/62.
83
God almighty, I'm free at last.' " 10 The FBI's Domestic Intelligence
Division described this "demagogic speech" as yet more evidence that
Dr. King was "the most dangerous and effective Negro leader in the
country." 11 Shortly afterward, Time magazine chose Dr. King as the
"Man of the Year," an honor which elicited Director Hoover's comment
that "they had to dig deep in the garbage to come up with this
one." 12 Hoover wrote "astounding" across the memorandum informing
him that Dr. King had been granted an audience with the Pope
despite the FBI's efforts to prevent such a meeting. The depth of Director
Hoover's bitterness toward Dr. King, a bitterness which he had
effectively communicated to his subordinates in the FBI, was apparent
from the FBI's attempts to sully Dr. King's reputation long after his
death. Plans were made to "brief" congressional leaders in 1969 to
prevent the passage of a "Martin Luther King Day." In 1970,
Director Hoover told reporters that Dr. King was the "last one in the
world who should ever have received" the Nobel Peace Prize.l3
The extent to which Government officials outside of the FBI must
bear responsibility for the FBI's campaign to discredit Dr. King is
not clear. Government officials outside of the FBI were not aware of
most of the specific FBI actions to discredit Dr. King. Officials in the
Justice Department and White House were aware, however, that the
FBI was conducting an intelligence investigation, not a criminal
investigation, of Dr. King; that the FBI had written authorization
from the Attorney General to wiretap Dr. King and the SOLO offices
in New York and Washington; and that the FBI reports on Dr. King
contained considerable information of a political and personal nature
which was "irrelevant and spurious" to the stated reasons for the
investigation,14 Those high executive branch officials were also aware
that the FBI was disseminating vicious characterizations of Dr. King
within the Government; that the FBI had tape recordings embarrassing
to Dr. King which it had offered to play to a White House
official and to reporters; and that the FBI had offered to "leak"
to reporters highly damaging accusations that some of Dr. King's
advisers were communists. Although some of those officials did ask
top FBI officials about these charges, they did not inquire further
after receiving false denials. In light of what those officials did know
about the FBI's conduct toward Dr. King, they were remiss in failing
to take appropriate steps to curb the Bureau's behavior. To the
extent that their neglect permitted the Bureau's activities to go on unchecked,
those officials must share responsibility for what occurred.
The FBI now agrees that its efforts to discredit Dr. King were
unjustified. The present Deputy Associate Director (Investigation)
testified:
Mr. ADAMS. There were approximately twenty-five incidents
of actions taken [to discredit Dr. King] ... I see no
statutory basis or no basis of justification for the activity.
The CHAIRMAN. Was Dr. King, in his advocacy of equal
10 Speech delivered by Dr. Martin Luther King during the March on Washington,
8/28/63.
11 Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 8/30/63, p. 1.
U Hoover note on United Press International release, 12/29/63.
to Time magazine, 12/14/70.
"Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, pp. 17-18.
84
rights for black citJizens, advocating a course of action that
in the opinion 01 the FBI constituted a crime ~
]{r.llo~s.~o,sir.
The CHAIRMAN. He was preaching non-violence was he not,
as a method of achieving equal rights for black citizens ~
]{r. lloAA1S. 'J1hat's right ... ~ow as far as the activities
which you are asking wbout, the discrediting, I know of no
basis for that and I will not wttempt to justify iUS
'J1he FBI conducted its investigation of Dr. King and the SCLe
under an FBI manual provision~lled COMINFIL-permitting
the investigation of legitimate noncommunist organizations, suspected
'by the FBI of having been infiltrated by communists, to
determine the extent, if any, of communist influence. The FBI's
investigation was based on its concern that Dr. King was being
influenced by two persons-hereinafter referred to ,as Adviser A and
Adviser B-that the Bureau believed were members of the Communist
Party. .
Officials in the Justice Department relied on the FBI's representations
that both of these advisers were communists, that they were in a
position to influence Dr. King, and that Adviser A in fact exercised
some influence in preparing Dr. King's speeches and publications.
Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights from
1961-1965, testified that he "never had any reason to doubt [the FBI's]
allegations concerning [Adviser A]." He recalled that the charges
a;bout Adviser A were "grave and serious," and said that he believed
Attorney General Kennedy had permitted the investigation to proceed
because:
Stopping the investigation in light of those circumstances
would have run the risk that there would have been a lot of
complaints that the Bureau had been blocked for political
reasons from investigating serious charges about communist
infiltration in the civil rights movementY
Edwin Guthman, P~ss Secretary for the Justice Department from
1961 through 1964, testified that Attorney General Robert Kennedy
"viewed this as a serious matter," that he did not recall "that any of
us doubted that the FBI knew what it was talking about," and that although
the question of whether Adviser A was influencing Dr. King
was never fully answered "we accepted pretty much what the FBI
reported as being accurate." 18
We have been unable to reach a conclusion concerning the accuracy
of the FBI's charges that the two Advisers were members of the Communist
Party, USA or under the control of the Party during the FBI's
COMINFII.J investigation. However, FBI files do contain information
that Adviser A and Adviser B had been members of the Communist
Party at some point prior to the opening of the COMI~FIL investigation
in October 1962. FBI documents provided to the Committee
to support the Bureau's claim that both men were members of the
Communist Party at the time the COMI~FIL investigation was
opened are inconclusive. Moreover, the FBI has stated. that it cannot
IS James Adams testimony, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 65.
11 Marshall, 3/3/76. p. 55.
10 Edwin Guthman testimony, 3/16/76, p. 16.
85
provide the Committee with the full factual basis for its charges on
the grounds that to do so would compromise informants of contmuing
use to the Bureau.
Without access to the factual evidence, we are unable to conclude
whether either of those two Advisers was connected with the Communist
Party when the "case" was opened in 1962, or at any time thereafter.
vVe have seen no evidence establishing that either of those
Advisers attempted to exploit the civil rights movement to carry out
the plans of the Communist Party.
In any event, the FBI has stated that at no time did it have any
evidence that Dr. King himself was a communist or connected with
the Communist Party. Dr. King repeatedly criticized Marxist philosophies
in his writing and speeches. The present Deputy ASSOCIate Director
of the .FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division, when asked by the
Committee if the FBI ever concluded that Dr. King was a communist,
testified, "No, sir, we did not." 20
The FBI's COMINFIL investigation appears to have centered
almost entirely on discussions among Dr. King and his advisers
about proposed civil rights activities rather than on whether those
advisers were in fact agents of the Communist Party. Although the
FBI conducted disruptive programs~COINTELPROs-againstalleged
communists whom it believed were attempting to influence civil
rights organizations, the Bureau did not undertake to discredit the
individual whom it considered Dr. King's most "dangerous" adviser
until more than four years after opening the COMINFIL investigation.
21 Moreover, when a field office reported to FBI headquarters in
1964 that the Adviser was not then under the influence and
control of the Communist Party, the FBI did not curtail either its
investigations or discrediting program against Dr. King, and we have
no indication that the Bureau informed the Justice Department of
this finding. 22 Rather than trying to discredit the alleged communists
it believed were attempting to influence Dr. King, the Bureau adopted
the curious tactic of trying to discredit the supposed target of Communist
Party interest-Dr. King himself.
Allegations of communist influence on Dr. King's organization must
not divert attention from the fact that, as the FBI now states, its
activities were unjustified and improper. In light of the Bureau's·
remarks about Dr. King, it..,> reactions to his criticisms, the viciousness
of its campaign to destroy him, and its failure to take comparable
measures against the Advisers that it believed were communists, it is
highly questionable whether the FBI's stated motivation was valid. It
was certainly not justification for continuing the investigation of Dr.
King for over six years. or for carrying out the attempts to destroy
him.
Our investigation indicates that FBI officials believed that some of
Dr. King's personal conduct was improper. Part of the FBI's efforts
to undermine Dr. King's reputation involved attempts to persuade
Government officials that Dr. King's personal behavior would be an
embarrassment to them. The Committee did not investigate Dr. King's
.. Adams, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 66.
ft Airtel from FBI Director to New York Office, 3/18/66.
22 Memorandum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 4/14/64.
86
personal life, since such a subject has no proper place in our investigation.
Moreover, in order to preclude any further dissemination of
information obtained during the electronic surveillances of Dr. King,
the Committee requested the FBI to excise from all documents submitted
to the Committee any information which was so obtained.
We raise the issue of Dr. King's private life here only because it may
have played a part in forming the attitudes of certain FBI and administration
officials toward Dr. King.
Many documents which we examined contained allegations about
the political affiliations and morality of numerous individuals. We
have attempted to be sensitive to the privacy interests of those individuals,
and have taken care not to advance the effort to discredit them.
We have excised many of the Bureau's characterizations from the documents
quoted in this report. In some cases, however, in order fully to
explain the story, it was judged necessary to quote extensively from
Bureau reports, even though they contam unsupported allegations.
We caution the reader not to accept these allegations on their face, but
rather to read them as part of a shameful chapter in the nation's
history.
The reader is also reminded that we did not conduct an investigation
into the assassination of Dr. King. In the course of investigating the
FBI's attempts to discredit Dr. King, we came across no indication
that the FBI was in any way involved in the assassination.
II. THE COMINFIL INVESTIGA.TION
In October 1962 the FBI opened its investigation of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference. and of it's president, Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. The investigation was conducted under an
FBI manual provision captioned "COMINFIL"-an acronylJ.l for
communist infiltration-which authorized investigations of legitimate
noncommunist organizations which the FBI believed to be influenced
by communist party members in order to determine the extent of the
alleged communist influence.23 These wide-ranging investigations were
... FBI Manual Section 81e. The Section in ell'ect at the time the FBI initiated
its investigation of Dr. King and the SCLe was captioned, "Legitimate
Noncommunist Organizations that are Communist Infiltrated," and provided
in part:
"(I) No investigation should be conducted without prior Bureau approval.
"(2) Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced agents.
"Advse Bureau promptly under caption 'COMINFIL (name of organization)'
when one of the following exists and include your recommendation for instituting
an investigation.
"(a) The Communist Party has specifically instructed its members to infiltrate
the organization.
"(b) Communist Party members have infiltrated the organization in sufficient
strength to influence or control the organization.
"(7) Data concerning following topics should be fully developed and reported
on:
"(a) Basis for investigation and fact that our investigation is directed solely
toward establishing extent of Communist Party infiltration, or that organization
is specific target for infiltration, and that Bureau is not investigating legitimate
activities of organization.
"(b) Address of organization.
"(c) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership.
" (d) Principal officers of organization.
87
conducted with the knowledge of the Attorney General and were predicated
on vague executive directives and broad statutes.24
The FBI kept close watch on Dr. King and the SCLC long before
opening its formal investigation. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
reacted to the formation of the SCLC in 1957 by reminding agents
in the field of the need for vigilance:
In the absence of any indication that the Communist Party
has attempted, or is attempting, to infiltrate this organization
you should conduct no investigation in this matter. However,
in view of the stated purpose of the organization, you should
remain alert for public source information concerning it in
connection with the racial situation.25
In May 1962 the FBI had included Dr. King on "Section A of t.b.e
Reserve Index" as a person to be rounded up and detained in the
event of a "national emergency." 26 During this same period the FBI
"(e) Communist Party program to infiltrate this organization and influence
its policy.
"(f) Results of this program, including Communist Party affiliations of
officers and members." C
Clarence Kelley, the present Director of the FBI, was asked by the Committee:
"Taking the current manual and trying to understand its applicability laid
against the facts in the Martin Luther King case, under section 87 permission
is granted to open investigations of the influence of non-subversive groups,
and the first sentence reads: 'When information is received indicating that
a subversive group is seeking to systematically infiltrate and control a nonsubversive
group or organization, an investigation can be opened.'''
"Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used in opening the
investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the 1960's,
so that investigation could still be opened today under the current FBI
manual?"
Mr. KELLEY. "I think so."
(Clarence Kelley testimony, 12/10/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 308.)
24 See Report, on the Development of FBI Domestic Investigations, p. 479.
.. Memorandum from Director, FBI to Special Agent in Charge, Atlanta,
9/20/57. The "stated purpose" of the SCLC was to organize a register-andvote
campaign among Negroes in the South. (Trezz Anderson, Pittsburgh
Courier, 8/17/57.) Considerable "public source" information was recorded
in FBI files both before and after this date.
.. The action memorandum stated that Dr. King's name "should be placed in
Section A of the Reserve Index and tabbed communist." (Memorandum
from Director, FBI, to SAC, Atlanta, 5/11/62.) Persons to be listed in Section A
of the Reserve Index were described by the FBI as people "who in time of
national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national
interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due
to their subversive associations and ideology." The types of persons to be listed
in Section A included:
.. (a) Professors, teachers or leaders;
" (b) Labor union organizers or leaders;
"(c) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others in the mass media
field;
"(d) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists;
"( e) Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level;
"(f) Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid." See
Committee sOOff report on Development of FBI Domestic Intelligence
Investigations.
Dr. King was placed on the Reserve Index despite the fact that as late as
November 1961 the Atlanta Field Office had advised FBI Headquarters that there
was "no information on which to base a security matter inquiry." (Airtel from
SAC, Atlanta, to Director, FBI, 11/21/61.)
88
ordered its field offices to review their files for "subversive" information
about Dr. King and to submit that information to FBI headquarters
in reports "suitable for dissemination." 27
The Bureau had apparently also been engaged in an extensive surveillance
of Dr. King's civil rights activities since the late 1950s
under an FBI program called "Racial Matters." This program, which
was unrelated to COMINFIL, required the collection of "all pertinent
information" about the "proposed or actual activities" of individuals
and organizations "in the racial field." Z8 Surveillance of Dr.
King's civil rights activities continued under the Racial Matters program
after the COMINFIL case was opened. Indeed, the October
1962 memorandum which authorized the COMINFIL case specifically
provided that "any information developed concerning the integration
or racial activities of the SCLC must [also] be reported
[under a] Racial Matters caption." 29
The first FBI allegations that the Communist Party was attempting
to infiltrate the SCLC appeared in a report from the FBI to
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, dated January 8, 1962.30 The
report stated that one of Dr. King's advisers--hereinafter referred
to as "Adviser A"-was a "member of the Communist Party, USA." 31
Within a few months FBI reports were describing another of Dr.
King's associates-hereinafter referred to as "Adviser B"-as a "member
of the National Committee of the Communist Party." 3Z The
allegations concerning these two individuals formed the basis for
opening the COMINFIL investigation in October 1962.
It is unclear why the FBI waited nine months to open the COMIN
FIL investigation.33 The Bureau might have been hoping to acquire
new information from microphone and wiretap surveillance of Adviser
A's office, which was initiated in March 1962.34 However, it does
1lI Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, Atlanta, 2/27/62. The instructions
did not define what was meant by "subversive." Reports from field offices during
the ensuing months considered as "subversive" such information as the fact that
Dr. King had been one of 350 signers of a petition to abolish the House Committee
011 Un-American Activities. (FBI Report, New York, 4/13/62.) These instructions
to the field ·were issued on the first day of Dr. King's trial in which he and seven
hundred other civil rights demonstrators were charged in Albany, Geor~with
parading without a permit. (Atlanta Constitution, 2/28/62, p. 1.)
.. FBI Manual Section 122, p. 5. This policy was later interpreted as requiring
"coverage" of demonstrations, meetings, "or any other pertinent information
concerning racial activity." (Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, Atlanta,
6/27/63.)
II Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, Atlanta, 10/23/62, p. 2.
.. On the same day the Southern Regional Counsel-a respected civil rights
study group-issued a report criticizing the Bureau's inaction during civil rights
demonstration that were then occurring in Albany, Georgia. This report is discussed
at pp. 89-90.
III Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 1/5/62.
.. Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 10/22/62.
.. FBI headquarters first requested the field offices for recommendations concerning
whether a COMINFIL investigation should be opened on July 20, 1962.
This was the same day on which officials in Albany, Georgia, sought a judicial
ban against demonstrations led by Dr. King, alleging that Negroe9 had been endangering
the lives of police officers "and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."
(New York Times, 7/22/62). _.
.. A microphone was installed in Adviser A's office on March 16, 1962 (Airtel
from ,SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 3/16/62) and a wiretap was installed
on his office telephone on, 3/20/62 (Airtel from SAO, New York to Director, FBI,
3/20/62). The wiretap was authorized by the Attorney General (Memorandum
from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 3/6/62). The microphone was approved
89
not appeal' that these sUlTeillance~ collected any additional infonnation
bearing on the FBI's characterization of Adyiser A as a "communist.
"
Despite the goals and procedures outlined in the COMINFIL section
of the FBI Manual, the Bureau's investigation of Dr. King did not
focus on whether any of his advisers were acting under Communist
Party llisciplinc and control or were working to enable the Communist
Party to influence or control the SCLC,35 The microphone which
had been installed in Adviser A's office in March 1962 was discontinued
before the COl\fIKFIL investigation began,36 and, although wiretap
coverage of Adviser A continued-and even intensified 3·-the information
obtained appears to have related solely to his advice to Dr.
King concerning the civil rights movement and not at all to the alleged
Communist Party origins of that advice.3s Two FBI reports prepared
in succeeding years which summarize the FBI's information about
Adviser A do not contain evidence substantiating his purported 'relationship
with the Communist Party.39
Without full access to the Bureau's files, the Committee cannot determine
whether the FBI's decision to initiate a COMINFIL investigation
was motivated solely by sincere concerns about alleged communist
infiltration, or whether it was in part influenced by Director
Hoover's animosity toward Dr. King. The FBI Director's sensitivity
to criticism and his attitude toward Dr. King are documented in several
events which occurred during the period when the FBI was considering
initiating the COMINFIL investigation.
As early as February 1962, Director Hoover wrote on a memorandum
that Dr. King was "no good." 40
In January 1962 an organization called the Southern Regional
Council issued a report criticizing the Bureau's inaction during- civil
rights demonstrations in Albany, GeorgiaY An updated versIOn o£
that report was released in November 1962. A section entitled "Where
was the Federal Government" made the following observations about
theFBI:
only at the FBI division level (Memorandum from James Bland to William Sullivan,
3/2/(2).
3l\ FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 12-13, 83-85. Former Assistant Director Sullivan
testified: "If a man is not under the discipline and control of the Communist
Party, ipso facto he is not really a member of the Communist Party. The Party
demands the man's complete discipline, the right of complete discipline over a
Party member. That is why they have the graduations, you see, the fellow
traveler, not a Party member, because he would not accept the entire discipline
of the Party. The sympathizer, another graduation of it, what we call the dupe,
the victim of Communist fronts and so forth. The key-I am glad you raised this
question-the key to membership is does this man accept completely the Party
discipline. If he does not, he is not regarded as a genuine member," (Sullivan,
11/1/75, p. 18.)
.. It was discontinued on August 16, 1962. See Airtels from SAC, New York to
Director, FBI, 8/16/62 and 11/15/62, and Memorandum from Director, FBI to
SAC, New York, 11/23/62.
'" The Attorney General authorized a wiretap on Adviser A's home telephone in
November 1962 (Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General,
11/20/62) .
.. E,g., Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General Kennedy.
39 Indeed, in April 1964 a field office reported that Adviser A was not under the
influence of the COmmunist Party. Memorandum from SAC New York to Direetor,
FBI, 4/14/64.
.. Memorandum from James Bland to William Sullivan, 2/3/62.
<1 Special Report, .southern Regional Council, 1/8/62.
90
-There is a considerable amount of distrust among Albany
Negroes for local members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
-With all the clear violations by local police of constitutional
rights, with undisputed evidence of beatings by sheriffs
and deputy sheriffs, the FBI has not made a single arrest on
behalf of Negro citizens.
-The FBI has [taken] dozens of affidavits from Negro
citizens complaining that their constitutional rights had been
violated by city and county officials. But eight months later,
there was no sign of action on these charges.
-The FBI is most effective in solving ordinary crimes,
and perhaps it should stick to that.42
Newspaper coverage of the report's allegations were forwarded to
Bureau headquarters by the Atlantic office. Although Bureau rules
required prompt investigation of allegations such as those in the Southern
Regional Council's Report, no investigation was undertaken.43
Before even receiving the full report, Bureau officials were describing
it as "slanted and biased," and were searching their files for information
about the report's author.44
Shortly after the Report was issued, newspapers quoted Dr. King as
saying that he agreed with the Report's conclusions that the FBI had
not vigorously investigated civil rights violations in Albany. Dr. King
reportedly stated:
One of the great problems we face with the FBI in the
South is that the agents are white Southerners who have been
influenced by the mores of the community. To maintain their
status, they have to be friendly with the local police and
people who are promoting segregation.
Every time I saw FBI men in Albany, they were with the
local police force.45
FBI headquarters was immediately notified of Dr. King's remarks.
46 After noting that Dr. King's comments "would appear to
dovetail with information ... indicating that King's advisors are
Communist Party (CP) members and he is under the domination of
.. "Albany, A StUdy of Racial Responsibility," Southern Regional Council,
11/14/62.
.. Item #17, FBI Response to Senate Select Committee, 10/15/75. FBI rules
provided that allegations about Bureau misconduct had to be investigated and
that "every logical lead which will establish the true facts should be completely
run out unless such action would embarrass the Bureau...."
.. Memorandum from Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont, 11/15/62. The updated
report was received at headquarters on December 5, 1962. (Memorandum from
SAC, Atlanta to Director, FBI, 12/4/62.)
.. Atlanta Constitution, 11/19/62, p. 18. In 1961 a report issued by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, entitled "Justice," had addressed the problem
of FBI agents investigating local law enforcement officials and reached a similar
conclusion, including mistrust of the FBI by southern Blacks.
.. Memorandum from SAC, Atlanta, to Director, FBI, 11/19/62.
91
the CP," 47 Bureau officials decided to contact Dr. King in an effort to
"set him straight." 48
The FBI's effort to contad Dr. King consisted ofa telephone call
to the SCLC office in Atlanta by Cartha D. DeLoach, head of the
FBI's Crime Records Division, and one by the Atlanta Special Agent
in Charge. Both calls were answered by secretaries who promised to
ask Dr. King to return the calls. 'When Dr. King did not respond,
DeLoaeh observed:
It would appear obvious that Rev. King does not desire to
be told the true facts. He obviously used deceit, lies, and
treachery as propaganda to further his own causes ... I see
no futher need to contacting Rev. King as he obviously does
not desire to be given the truth. The fact that he is a vicious
liar is amply demonstrated in the fact he constantly associates
with and takes instructions from [a] ... member of the Communist
Party.49
Two years lawr-in late 1964-the Director was refusing to meet with
Dr. King because "I gave him that opportunity once and he ignored
it." 50
William Sullivan, who was head of the Domestic Intelligence
Division during the investigation of Dr. King, testified:
[Director Hoover] was very upset about the criticism that
King made puhlicly about our failure to protect the Negro in
the South 'against violations of the Negro civil liberties, and
King on a number of occasions soundly criticized the Director....
Mr. Hoover was very distraught over these criticisms
and so that would figure in it. ... I think behind it all was the
racial bias, the dislike of Negroes, the dislike of the civil
rights movement. . . . I do not think he could rise above
that.51
.7 Memorandum from Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont, 11/20/62.
•• Memorandum from Alan Belmont to Olyde Tolson, 11/26/62. A decision was
made that Dr. King should be contacted by both Assistant Director DeLoach
and Assistant Director William Sullivan "in order that there will be a witness
and there can be no charge of provincialism inasmuch as Cartha D. DeLoach
comes from the South and Mr. Sullivan comes from the North." (Ibid.)
.. Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 1/15/63. FBI officials
also "interviewed" or otherwise contacted various newspaper publishers to set
[them] straight" about Dr. King's remarks. (Memorandum from Alex Rosen to
Alan Belmont. 1/17/63.) One of the publishers contacted was described as "impressed
with the Director" and as being on the "Special Correspondents List."
(Letter from Cartha DeLoach to one of the publishers, 11/29/62, p. 3.)
The FBI also took steps to "point out" the "evasive conduct of King" to the
Attorney General and Civil Rights Oommi,ssion. (Letter, FBI Director to Attorney
General, 1/18/63; Letter, FBI to Staff Director, Commission on Civil Rights,
1/18/63.)
50 Note on memorandum ~rom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan,
11/20/64.
" William Sullivan testimony. 11/1/75, p. 62. Sullivan's assessment must be
viewed in light of the feud that subsequently developed between Sullivan and
Hoover and which ultimately led to Sullivan's dismissal from the FBI. That fend
is discussed in the committee's final report.
69-984 a .. 76 .. 7
92
The FBI sent frequent reports about Dr. King's plans and activities
to officials in both the Justice Department and the White House from
the initiation of the COMINFIL investigation until Dr. King's death
in 1968. Despite the fact that the investigation of Dr. King failed to
produce evidence that Dr. King was a conununist, or that he was being
influenced to act in a way inimical to American interests, no responsible
Government offici'al ever asked the FBI to terminate the investigation.
Their inaction appears to have stemmed from a belief that it was
safer to permit the FBI to conduct the investigation than to stop the
Bureau and run the risk of charges that the FBI was being muzzled
for political reasons.
Burke Marshall testified that the "charges" made by the Bureau
against Adviser A "were grave and serious." The Kennedy Administration
had been outspoken in its support of Dr. King, and ordering
the FBI to terminate its investigation would, in Marshall's opinion,
"have run the risk" that there would have been a lot of complaints that
the Bureau had been blocked for political reasons from investigating
serious char'ges about communist infiltration in the civil right.,
·movement.52
Edwin O. Guthman, Press Chief for the Justice Department under
Attorney General Kennerly, testified that Robert Kennedy viewed the
char~esabout Adviser A :
as a serious matter and not in the interest of the country
and not in the interest of the civil rights movement.... The
question of whether he was influencing King and his contacts
with King, that was a matter which was not fully decided,
but in those days we accepted pretty much what the FBI
reported as being accurate.53 .
Guthman testified that he was told by Kennedy in 1968 that Kennedy
had approved wiretap coverage of Dr. King's home and of two SCLC
offices in October 1963 because "he felt that if he did not do it, Mr.
Hoover would move to impede or block the passage of the Civil Rights
Bill ... and that he felt that he might as well settle the matter as to
whether [Adviser A] did have the influence on King that the FBI
contended...." 54 Attorney General Kennedy's reasons for approving
the wiretaps are discussed at length in a subsequent chapter.55 Of
relevance here is the support which Guthman's observations lend to
Marshall's recollection that Attorney General Kennedy permitted the
COMINFIL investigation to continue from concern '/tbout the truth
of the FBI's charges and about the political consequences of terminating'the
investigation.
The Johnson Administration's willingness to permit the FBI to
continue its investigation of Dr. King also appears to have involved
political considerations. Bill Moyers, President Johnson's assistant,
testi.fied that sometime around the spring of 1965 President Johnson
"seemed satisfied that these allegations about Martin Luther King
were not founded." Yet President .Johnson did not order the investigation
terminated. When asked the reason, Moyers explained that
President Johnson:
.. Marshall, 3/3/76, p. 55.
53 Edwin Guthman testimony, 3/16/76, p. 16.
M Guthman, 3/16/76, p. 5.
.. See Pp. 115-116.
93
was very concerned that his embracing- the civil rights movement
and Martin Luther Kin~ personally would not backfire
politically. He didn't want to have a southern racist Senator
produce something that would be politically embarassing
to the President and to the civil rights movement. vVe had lots
of conversations abont that. ... ,Johnson, as everybody knows,
bord~red on paranoia about his enemies or about being
trapped by other people's activities over which he had no
responsibility.56
Intelligence reports submitted by the Bureau to the White House
and t.he J u.tice Department contained considerable intelligence of potential
political value to the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.
The Attorneys General were informed of meetings between Dr. King
and his advisers, including the details of advice that Dr. King received,
the strat~gies of the civil rights movement, and the attitude of civil
rights leaders toward the Administrations and their policies.57 The
implications of this inside knowledge were graphically described by
one of Dr. King's legal advisers, Harry Wachtel:
The easiest example I can give is that that if I'm an attorney
representing one side, negotiating and trying to achieve something,
and if the Attorney on the other side had information
about what my client was thinking and what we were talkin~
about, it would become a devastatingly important impedIment
to our negotiation, our freedom of action. 58
Burke Marshall, however, described the Bureau's reports about Dr.
-King and the SeLe as "of no use: it was stupid information." He
elaborated:
I was in touch with ~lartin King all the time about all
kinds of information that went way beyond what was reported
by the Bureau about what he was going to do, where he was
going to be, the wisdom of what he was going to do, who he
was going to do it with, what the political situation was. The
Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Dr. Kin~
were in some sense close associates of mine. [Information of
the type included in FBI reports] was all information that I
would have had any way.59
.. Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 22.
57 The FBI files are replete with examples or politically valuable intelligence
about Dr. King that was sent tQ the Justice Department and the White House.
For instance, in May 1963, at a critical point in the Congressional debate over
the pUblic accommodations bill, Hoover informed the Attorney General of a discussion
between Dr. King and an adviser "concerning a' conference which Reverend
King reportedly has requested with you and the President." The discus.
sion was reported to have centered on the Administration's sensitivity over its inability
to control the racial situation and on the need to maintain the pace of
civil rights activities "so that the President will have to look for an alternative."
Dr. King was said to believe that the President would then be receptive to ideas
from Dr. King which would provide'll soiution to "his problem, [his] foor or
violence ...." Dr. King was said to have stated that if a conference with the
President could not be worked out, then the movement would have to be "enlarged,"
and that "he would like to put so much pressure on the President that
he would have to sign an Executive Order making segregation unconstitutional."
(Memorandum from Direct'or, FBI to Attorney General, 5/31/63.)
58 Harry Wachtel testimony, 2/27/76, p. 12.
50 Burke Marshall, 3/3/76, p. 54; 56-57.
94
III. CONCERN INCREASES IN THE FBI AND THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
OVER ALLEGATIONS OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, AND THE FBI INTENSIFIES THE INVESTIGATION: JANUARY
196Z-oCTOBER 1963
1ntroduetion and Summary
This chapter explores developments in the Martin Luther King case
from the period preceding the FBI's opening of the COMINFIL investigation
in October 1962 through the FBI's decision to intensify
its investi,gation of suspected communist influence in the civil rights
movement in October 1963. Particular emphasis is placed on the internal
reasons for the FBI's intensification of its investigation of Dr.
King and on the interplay between the Justice Department and the
FBI during this period.
In summary, the evidence described in this chapter establishes that
the FBI barraged the Justice Department with a stream of memoranda
concerning the Communist Party's interest in the civil rights
movement and Dr. King's association with two individuals, referred
to in this report as Advisers A and B, who were alleged to have strong
ties to the Party.GO In response to the Bureau's warnings, the Justice
Department endeavored to convince Dr. King to sever his relations
with those individuals, but met with only mIXed success. Dr. King
continued to turn to Adviser A for advice; Adviser B, whose association
with Dr. King and allegedly with the Communist Party had
been picked up by the press in late 1962, publicly announced his resignation
from the SCLC in early July 1963, although he apparently
continued to associate with Dr. King on an informal basis.
During hearings over the administration's proposed public accommodations
bill in .July 1963, critics of the bill charged that the civil
rights movement, and Dr. King in particular, were influenced by Communists.
Dr. King's plans for a civil rights march on Washington in
August were reCeIving increasing publicity. On July 16, the Attorney
General raised with the FBI's Justice Department liaison, Courtney
Evans, the possibility of a wiretap on Dr.· King and one of his legal
advisers.
The following day the FBI sent an analysis of its COMINFIL
information to the Justice Department. The administration decided to
continue its public support of Dr. King. During the ensuing week, the
President informed the press that there was no evidence that civil
rights demonstrations were Communist-inspired; the Attorney General
announced that the FBI had no evidence that any civil rights
leaders were controlled by Communists; and the Attorney General
rejected the FBI's request for authority to wiretap Dr. King.
In August 1963, the Justice Department received a report from
the FBI which apparently contained allegations extremely unfavorable
to Dr. King. The Attorney General told Courtney Evans that he
faced impeachment if the report was "leaked," and demanded that it
be resubmitted with a cover memorandum detailing the factual basis
for the allegation. The memorandum submitted in response to that
request contained no information concerning Dr. King that had not
already been known to the Attorney General in July, but the Attorney
General permitted the investigation to proceed.
60 The memoranda also contained information about the civil rights movement
of considerable political value to the administration.
95
In late July 1963, the FBI opened a file entitled "Communist Influence
in Racial Matters," and closely monitored preparations for the
August 28 Civil Rights March on Washington. 'rhe FBI's Domestic
Intelligence Division informed Director' Hoover shortly before the
March that Communist influence in the civil rights movement was
negligible. The Director disagreed. The head of the Domestic Intelligence
Division, William Sullivan, responded by recommending more
in.tense FBI surveillance of the civil rights movement.
A. The Justice Departrnent WarM Dr. King About Advi,gers A and
B: January 196f£-June 1963
The Kennedy administration's .~oncerft over FBI allegations that
Communists were influencing the civil rights movement led the Justice
Department to make several attempts to persuade Dr. King to sever
his relations with Advisers A and B. In .Tanuary 1962, Hoover first
warned Attorney General Kennedy that Advisor A, a member of the
Communist Party, U.S.A., "is allegedly a close adviser to the Reverend
Martin Luther King." 62 Shortly afterwards, Assistant Attorney General
Burke Marshall of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division
told Dr. King that the Bureau claimed Adviser A was a communist
and advised that they break off relations.63 According to an
FBI memorandum, Deputy Attorney General Byron R. WhIte also
considered speaking with Dr. King about Adviser A, but -decided
against doing so when told by the FBI that revealing too much of the
FBI's information might tip off Dr. King or Adviser A to the identity
of certain FBI informants.64
Dr. King gave no indication of breaking off relations with Advisel'
A, who was a close friend and trusted ad\·isor. He did, however, apparently
consider the adverse effects on the civil rights movement that
his association with Adviser B might cause.65 In June 1962 the FBI
intercepted a conversation 66 in which Adviser A recommended that
Dr. King informally use Adviser B as his executive assistant, noting
that "as long as Adviser B did not have the title of Executive Director,
there would not be as much lightning flashing around him." Dr.
King was reported to haw\ agreed, remarkin.g that "no matter what
a man was, if he could stand up now and say he is not connected, then
as far as I am concerned, he is eligible to work for me." 67
On October 8, 1962, the FBrs Domestic Intelligence Division prepared
a memorandum summarizing accounts that had previously
appeared in newspapers concerning Adviser B's alleged Communist
background and his association with Dr. King. The Division forwarded
the memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach, head of the Crime
Records Division, the FBI's public relations arm, for "possible use
by his contacts in the news media field in such Southern states as
Alabama where Dr. King has announced that the next targets for
.. Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General 1/8/62.
.. Burke Marshall testimony, 3/31/76, p. 10.
Ol Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 2/6/62.
.. Allegations concerning Adviser B's membership in the Communist Party had
received wide publicity in the newspapers. There wpre no such press allegations
about Adviser A.
.. Adviser A's phones were covered by FBI wiretaps, See p. 88.
"'l\femorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/21/62, p. 6.
96
integration of universities are located." DeLoach's signature and the
notation, "handled, Augusta (illegible), Atlanta, 1-/19" appear on
the recommendation.68
The article was apparently disseminated, because an October 25,
1962, article in the Augusta Chronicle described Adviser B as a member
of the CPUSA's National Committee who was serving as Dr.
King's "Acting Executive Director." Dr. King publicly responded,
on October 30, that "no person of known Communist affiliation"
could serve on the staff of the SCLC and denied any knowledge that
Adviser B had Communist affiliations. Dr. King also announced Adviser
B's temporary resignation from the SCLC pending an SCLC
investigation of the allegations.
A stream of memoranda from the FBI, however, warned the Justice
Department that Adviser B continued as an associate of Dr.
King despite his apparent resignation from the SCLC. In December,
Director Hoover was cautioning the Attorney General that Adviser n
continued to "represent himself as being affiliated with the New York
Office of the SCLC and, during late November and early December
1962, was actively engaged in the work of this organization." 69 A few
days later, the Attorney General was informed that Advisers A and
B were planning a "closeted ... critical review" with Dr. King concerning
the direction of the civil rights movement. Kennedy penned 011
the memorandum: "Burke-this IS not getting any better." 70
In early February 1963, Dr. King asked the Justice Department
for a briefing on Adviser B's background, apparently in response to
newspaper articles about Adviser B resulting from the Bureau's campaign
to publicize Adviser B's relationship with Dr. King. Assistant
Attorney General Marshall noted in a memorandum that he had "been
in touch with the Attorney General on this matter and is anxious to
have it handled as soon as pos.<;ible." 7l Sometime later in February,
Marshall spoke with Dr. King about severing his association with Advisers
A and B. Memoranda from Director Hoover to the Justice Department
during the ensuing months, however, emphasized that Dr.
King was maintaining a close relationship with both men. Th()S(~
memoranda to the Justice Department contained no new information
substantiating the charges that either was a member of the Communist
Party, or that either was carrying out the Party's policies.72
.. Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William SUllivan, 10/8/62, p. 2.
The memorandum bears the caption "Communist Party, USA, COINTELPRO."
This is the first indication of a counterintelligence program directed against Adyiser
B. Adviser A became the subject of such a program in 1966. For a discussion
of the FBI's COINTELPRO effort, see staff report on COINTELPRO.
... Memorandum from DIrector, FBI to Attorney General, 1/23/63, p. 1.
'0 Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 1/10/63. The At·
torney General was subsequently told that Adviser B, Dr. King. and Adviser A
conferred with other members of the SCLC on January 10 and 11. (Memorandum
from Director. FBI to Burke Marshall, 1/31/63.)
71 Memorandum from Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont, 2/4/63.
.,. On March 10 the Attorney General was informed that Adviser A and Dr.
King had engaged in a lengthy conversation concerning an article that Dr. King
was preparing for The Nation. (Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney
General, 3/12/63.) On June 3, the Director sent the Attorney General a ninepage
"concise summary" of information about Adviser A, emphasizing his role
as Dr. King's adviser. (Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General,
6/3/63.) An FBI memorandum in early June reported a discussion between
97
The Attorney General's concern over Dr. King's association with
the two advisers continued. A memorandum by Hoover states that on
June 17,1963:
The Attorney General called and advised he would like to
have Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall talk to
Martin Luther King and tell Dr. King he has to get rid of
[Advisers A and B], that he should not have any contact with
them directly or indirectly.
I pointed out that if Dr. King continues this association, he
is going to hurt his own cause as there are more and more
Communists trying to take advantage of [the] movement and
bigots down South who are against integration are beginning
to charge Dr. King is tied in with Communists. I stated I
thought Marshall could very definitely say this association is
rather widely known and, with things crystalizing for them
now, nothing could be worse than for Dr. King to be associated
with it.73
Marshall subsequently spoke with Dr. King about Advisers A and
B.74 In a follow-up memorandum written several months later Marshall
stated:
... I brought the matter to the attention of Dr. King very
explicitly in my office on the morning of June 22 prior to a
scheduled meetmg which Dr. King had with the President.
This was done at the direction of the Attorney General, and
the President separately [and] strongly urged Dr. King that
there should be no further connection between Adviser Band
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Dr. King
stated that the connection would be ended.15
Dr. King later told one of his associates that the President had told
him "there was an attempt (by the FBI) to smear the movement on
the basis of Communist influence. The President also said, 'I assume
you know you're under very close surveillance.' " 16
Adviser A and Dr. King concerning whether Dr. King would appear on a television
program in connection with a projected article in the Saturday Evening
Post. Dr. King accepted Adviser A's recommendation that he read the article
before committing himself because the reporter "raised a lot of questions about
[Adviser B] and that kind of thing." (Memorandum from Director, FBI to
Attorney General, 6/1/63.)
73 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Clyde Tolson, Alan Belmont, Cartha
DeLoach, Alex Rosen, William Sullivan, 6/17/63. During this period the Attorney
General requested a report from the Internal Security Division concerning Dr.
King. The reply, dated June 28. cited Advisers A and B as the chief sources of
alleged Oommunist influence on Dr. King. (Memorandum from J. Walter Yeagley
to the Attorney General, 6/28/63.)
,. Andrew Young, who was present at the meeting with Burke :\Iarsllall, testified
that Marshall had said that the Bureau had informed the Justice Department
that there was in fact Communist influence in the civil rights movement,
and had explicitly mentioned Adviser A. When Young asked Marshall ,for proof,
he said that he had none, and that he "couldn't get anything out, of the Bureau."
Young recalled that Marshall had said, "We ask (the Bureau) for things and
we get these big memos, but they don't ever really say anything." Young testified
that Marshall "was asking us to disassociate ourselves from [Adviser A] altogether."
(Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76. pp. 40---44)
75 Memorandum from Burke Marsha'll to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/12/63.
7. Young, 2/19/76, p. 4().
98
Marshall's and the President's warnings did not go unheeded. On
July 3, 1963, Dr. King sent the Attorney General a copy of a letter
to Adviser B bearing that date.77 In that letter, Dr. King stated that
an investigation by the SCLC had proven the charges concerning Adviser
B's association with the Communist Party groundless, but that
his permanent resignation was necessary because "the situation in
our country is such that ... any allusion to the left brings forth an
emotional response which would seem to indicate that SCLC and the
Southern Freedom Movement are Communist inspired." 78
B. Allegations About Dr. King During Hearings on the Public
Accomrrwdations Bill and the A dminiJftratiffn's Resp<YMe:
July 1963
Allegations of Communist influence in the civil rights movement
were widely publicized in the summer of 1963 by opponents of the administration's
proposed public accommodations bill. Oli July 12, 1963,
Governor Ross E. Barnett of Mississippi testified before the Senate
Commerce Committee that civil rights legislation was "a part of the
world Communist conspiracy to divide and conquer our country from
within." 79 Barnett displayed a photograph entitled "Martin Luther
King at Communist Training School" taken by an informant for the
Georgia Commission of Education, which showed Dr. King at a 1957
Labor Day Weekend seminar at the Highland Folk School in Monteagle,
Tennessee with three individuals whom he alleged were communists.
When Senator Mike Monroney challenged the accuracy of
this characterization, Barnett stated that he had not checked the allegations
with the FBI and suggested that the Commerce Committee
do so. The FBI subsequently concluded that the charges were false.80
Later that day, Senator Monroney asked Director Hoover for his
views on whether Dr. King and the leaders of other civil rights organizations
had Communist affiliations.81 Senator Warren G. Magnuson
also asked Hoover about the authenticity of the photograph,
the status of the Georgia Commission on Education, and the nature of
the Highlander Folk Schoo1.82 Director Hoov~r forwarded these
requests and similar inquiries from other Senators to the Justice
n Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Adviser B, 7/3/63.
O. King letter, 7/3/63, which concluded: "We certainly appreciate the years of
unselfish service Which you have put into our New York OIDce and regret the necessity
of your departure. Certainly yours is a significant sacrifice commensurate
with the sufferings in jail and through loss of jobs under racist intimidation. We
all pray for the day when our nation may be truly the land of the free. May God
bless you and continue to inspire you in the service of your fellowman."
... RQSS 'Barnett testimony, Senate Commerce Committee, 7/12/63, p. 1.
oo The FBI informed the Justice Department that none of those individuals
were Communist Party members, and that there was no evidence supporting
the chaTge that the school was a communist training center. (Memorandum
fuoom Milton Jones to Cartha DeLoach, 7/16/63, p. 2).
Congressman Andrew Young, then an adviser to Dr. King, testified that the
Hi~hlander Folk School photograph had been frequently used to smear Dr. King
in the South. Congressman Young's testimony that the School was not a Communist
Institution was consistent with the FBI's conclusion (Andrew Young testimony,
2/18/16, p. 53).
11 Letter from Senator Mike Monroney to J. Edgar Hoover, 7/12/63.
'" Letter from Senator Warren G. Magnuson to J. Edgar Hoover, 7/16/63.
99
Department83 with a memorandum summarizing the COMINFIL
information about SCL :
In substance, the Communist Party, USA, is not able to assume
a role of leadership in the racial unrest at this time.
However, the Party is attempting to exploit the current
racial situation through propaganda and participation in
demonstrations and other activities whenever possible.
Through these tactics, the Party hopes ultimately to progress
from its current supporting role to a position of active
leadership. [Emphasis added.]
In the same memorandum, Director Hoover brought up the subject
of Advisers A and B's alleged Communist affiliations. He claimed that
the Communist Party had pinned its hopes on Adviser A, and that
although Adviser B had resigned from the SCLC, he continued to
associate with Dr. King.84
On July 15, Governor George C. Wallace of Alabama testified
before the Senate Commerce Committee in opposition to the Civil
Rights bill, berating officials for "fawning and pawing over such
people as Martin Luther King and his pro-Communist friends and
associates." Wallace referred to the picture displayed by Governor
Barnett three days before and added:
Recently Martin Luther King publicly professed to have
fired a known Communist, [Adviser B], who had been on his
payroll. But as discovered by a member of the US Congress,
the public profession was a lie, and Adviser B had remained
on King's payroll.86
On July 17, the President announced at a news conference:
We have no evidence that any of the leaders of the civil
rights movement in the United States are Communists. We
have no evidence that the demonstrations are Communistinspired.
There may be occasions when a Communist takes
part in a demonstration. We can't prevent that. But I think
it is a convenient scapegoat to suggest that all of the difficulties
are Communist and that if the Communist movement
would only disappear that we would end thisY
.. Tolson urged Hoover to let the Attorney General respond to these reports;
otherwise. Hoover might be called before the Committee to testify concerning
"current racial agitation." The Director noted on the bottom of the memoran4um,
"I share Tolson's views." Memorandum from Clyde Tolson to the Director,
7/16/63.
.. Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 7/17/63.
.. Wallace introduced into the record a copy of an article from the Birming"'
am News, "King'sSCLC Pays [Adviser B.] Despite Denial," June 30, 1963.
The article stated that Dr. King had tdld reporters that Adviser B had not been
associated with the SCLC since December 1962, but that a "highly authorized
source" revealed that Dr. IKing was continuing to accept Adviser B's services
and to pay his expenses. The article also reported allegations about Adviser B's
aSiOCiation with the Communist Party.
lIT Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, p. 574.
100
On July 23, Robert Kennedy sent to the Commerce Committee the
Justice Department's response to the queries of Senators Monroney
and Ma~lUson:
Based on all available evidence from the FBI and other
sources, we have no evidence that any of the top leaders of the
major civil rights groups are Communists, or Communist controlled.
This is true as to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., about
whom particular accusations were made, as well as other
leaders.
It is natural and inevitable that Communists have made
efforts to infiltrate the civil rights groups and to exploit the
current racial situation. In view of the real injustices that
exist and the resentment against them, these efforts have been
remarkably unsuccessfu1.88
Burke Marshall, who aided in formulating these responses for the
Justice Department, told the Committee that rumors of communist
infiltration in the civil rights movement had caused the Administration
considerable concern.
At tha,t point, in some sense the business was a political
problem, not from the point of view of the support that the
civil rights movement was giving the administration or anything
like that, but how to be honest with the Senators with
this problem facing us and at the same time not to give ammunition
to people who for substantive reasons were opposed to
civil rights legislation.
Generally, for years the civil rights movement in the South
and to some extent in some quarters in the North ..• were constantly
referred to as communist infiltra,ted, communist in·
spired, radical movements.... So that the political problem
that I would identify with this whole situation would be that
and not a question of whether or not there was support given
the Administration by civil rights groups in the South.89
O. The Attorney General O()1l,8iders a Wiretap of Dr. Kin.g and
Rejeots the Idea: July 1963
On July 16, 1963, the day after Governor Wallace's charges that
Dr. King was dominated by Communists and the day before the President's
denial of Communist influence in the civil rights movement, the
Attorney General raised with Courtney Evans the possibility of wiretap
coverage of Dr. King. According to Evans' memorandum about
thIS meeting:
The AG was contacted at his request late this afternoon.
He said that ... a New York attorney who has had cl6se association
with Martin Luther King, and with [Adviser A] had
been to see Burke Marshall about the racial situation. Ac-
.. Senator Richard RusseU of Georgia, who had also inquired of the FBI about
Dr. King, was orally briefed by Nicholas Katzenbach and Courtney Evans on
November I, 1963. According to a memorandum by Evans, tbe Attorney General
bad lllJlde several attempts to draft a reply to Senator RusseU's inquiries, and had
finally settled on an "innocuous" written reply and an ora'! briefing. (DeLoach to
Mohr, 2/5/76).
80 Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 13.
101
cording to the AG, [the attorney] had indicated he had some
reservations about talking with [Adviser A] on the phone.
Marshall thought he mi~ht have been referring to a possible
ph'6ne tap, and passed It off by telling [the New York attorney]
this was something he would have to take up with
[Adviser A.]
The purpose of the AG's contact was that this brought
to his attention the possibility of effecting technical coverage
on both [the Ne,w York attorney] and Martin Luther King.
I told the AG that I was not at all acquainted with [the New
York attorney], but that, in so far as Dr. King was concerned,
it was obvious from the reports that he was in a travel status
practically all the time, and it was, therefore, doubtful that
a technical surveillance on his office or home would be very
productive. I also raised the question as to the repercussions
if it should ever become known that such a surveillance had
been put on Dr. King.
The AG said this did not concern him at all, that in view
of the possible Communist influence in the racial situation,
he thought it advisable to have as complete coverage as
possible. I told him, under the circumstances, that we would
check into the matter to see if coverage was feasible, and,
if so, would submit an appropriate recommendation to him.90
Reports from the FBI offices indicated that wiretaps were feasible,91
and Director Hoover requested the Attorney General to approve wiretaps
on phones in Dr. King's home, SCLC offices,92 and the New York
attorney's home and law office.93
On July 24, the day after his letter to the Commerce Committee
exonerating Dr. King, the Attorney General informed Evans that
he had decided against technical surveillance of Dr. King but had approved
surveillance of the New York Attorney.94
The Attorney General informed me today that he had been
considering the request he made on July 16, 1963, for a
technical surveillance on Martin Luther King at his home
and office and was now of the opinion that those would be
ill-advised.
At the time the Attorney General initially asked for such
a surveillance, he was told there was considerable doubt that
the productivity of such surveillance would be worth the
risk because King travels most of the time and that there
might be serious repercussions should it ever become known
.. Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont. 7/16/63. The New
York attorney was described by the FBI as a coun8el to Dr. King, and an activist
in civil rights matters. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney
General, 7/22/63.)
" Airtel, from SAC Atlantic to Director FBI, 7/24/63: "Technical surveillance
feasible with full security."
.. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General, 7/23/63.
... Memorandum, J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney Geneml, 7/22/63.
.. The only evidence of communist ties of the New York attorney that the FBI
appears to have given the Attorney General was an informant's allegation that in
1953 and 1954 he had been an active member of the Labor Youth League, an
organization which had been cited as "subversive" under Executive Order
10450 (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General).
102
the Government had instituted this coverage. These were the
very thoughts that the Attorney General expressed today in
withdrawmg his request.
With reference to the other technical surveillance ,requested
at the same time, namely, the one on [the New York attorney],
the Attorney General felt this was in a different
category and we should go forward with this coverage. It is
noted that this was previously approved in writing by the
Attorney General.
... We will take no further action to effect technical coverage
on Martin Luther King, either at his home or at his office
at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, in the
absence of a further request from the Attorney General.95
In June 1969, Director Hoover told a reporter for the Washington
Evening Star that Attorney General Kennedy had "requested that the
telephones of Dr. King be covered by electronic devices and was persuaded
by our people not to do it in view of the possible repercussions,"
and because Dr. King's constant traveling made a wiretap
impractica1.96 When the CQmmittee asked Courtney Evans whether
the idea of installing a wiretap originated with the Attorney General,
he testified:
No, this is not clear in my mind at all. The record that has
been exhibited to me really doesn't establish this definitely,
although that inference can be drawn from some of the memoranda.
But it is my recollection, without the benefit of any
specifics, that there was much more to it than this. And I
have the feeling that there were pressures existing in time to
develop more specific information that may have had a
bearing here.
Q. Pressures emanating from where and upon whom ~
A. I think from both sides, the Bureau wanted to get more
specific information, and the Department wanted resolved
the rather indefinite information that had been received
.in.dicating the possibility of Communist influence on the Dr.
Kmg movement.91
D. The Attorney General Voices OO'TWem Over Oontinuing FBI
Report8 About King: July-August 1963
Following the appearance of an article on July 25, 1963, in the
Atlanta OonstifJwtion, titled "One-time Communist Organizer Heads
Rev. King's Office in N. Y.," Dr. King announced that an SOLe investigation
of Adviser B indicated that he had "no present connection
with the OP nor any sympathy with its philosophy." Dr. King explained
that Adviser B had been on the SOLe staff on a temporary
basis since his resignation in December 1962, but that he had left the
SOLO on June 26, 1963, by "mutual agreement" because of concern
.. Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 7/25/63.
.. Jeremiah O'Leary, The JjJvening Star, 6/19/69; Hoover memorandum for
record., 6/19/00.
'" Courtney Evans testimony, 12/1/75, pp. 7-8.
103
that his affiliation with the integration movement would be used
against it by "segregationists and race baiters."
The Justice Department, however, continued to receive reports
from the FBI that Dr. King was continuing his association with Advisers
A and B.99 Shortly after Attorney General Kennedy's July 23
response to the Commerce Committee, ('.,ourtney Evans:
Advisor B, [deleted].
pointed out to Marshall the undesirability of making the spe~
cific comments ... as to giving complete clearance to Martin
Luther King as Marshall had had the full details as to King's
association with [Adviser Aland [Adviser B.]
Marshall said that he was most appreciative of our warning
him about these pitfalls and. he would be guided accordingly
in any future statements. He added that he would also appreciate
our continuing to highlight for him any information
concerning communist activity in the Negro movement." 100
On July 29, Director Hoover sent the Justice Department a report
from the New York Office entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr. : Affiliation
with the Communist Movement." 101 The entry under the caption,
"Evidence of Communist Party Sympathies," has been deleted by the
FBI from copies of the report given to the Committee on the grounds
that it might compromise informants. It was a general characterization
and ran for only one and one-half lines. A memorandum from
Courtney Evans described Attorney General Kennedy's reaction:
The Attorney General stated that if this report got up to
the Hill at this time, he would be impeached. He noted if this
report got out, it would be alleged the FBI said King was
[excised by the FBI].
The Attorney General went on to say that the report had
been reviewed in detail by Assistant Attorney General Burke
Marshall who had told him there wasn't anything n~w here
concerning King's alleged communist sympathies but that it
was the timing of the report and its possible misuse that concerned
him. The Attorney General went on to say that he
didn't feel he could fully trust everyone in the Internal Security
Division of the Department.
I pointed out to the Attorney General that first of all this
report was classified secret and was just a summary report
to bring our files and that of the Department's up to date. He
said that while this was undoubtedly true, the submission of
the report at this time in this form presented definite hazards.
He therefore asked that the report be resubmitted to him with
a cover memorandum setting forth the exact evidence avail-
.. On July 17, in the midst of publicity concerning Dr. King's association with
Adviser B, Director Hoover informed the Attorney General that although Adviser
B had formally resigned from the SCLC, he was continuing his association
with Dr. King. (Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General,
7/17/63.)
100 Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 7/29/63.
101Report of Special Agent: Martin Luther King, Jr..· Affiliation with the Oommunist
Movement, 7/22/63.
104
able to support the statement that King has been described
[excised by the FBI].102
The reason for Attorney General Kennedy's reaction is unclear.l03
It may be that he feared a "leak" of the FBI's allegations concerning
communist influence over Dr. King would be particularly embarrassing
in light of the Administration's recent statements in support of
Dr. King. The Attorney General's insistence on a supplemental
memorandum detailing the underlying evidence, coupled with the tone
of the memorandum, also suggests that he was anxious to get to the
bottom of the charges. .
Hoover resubmitted the report with a cover letter stating in part:
In this connection, your attention is invited to my letter of
February 14, 1962, in captioned matter and to my letter of
July 17, 1963, captioned "Request from Senator Monroney
Concerning Current Racial Agitation," both of which contain
information to the effect that Adviser A has characterized
King [deleted by FBI].104
The relevant portions of the February 14, 1962, memorandum and
the .July 17, 1963, memorandum have been deleted from copies supplied
to the Committee. It is clear, however, that the Attorney General
had been aware of whatever information those memoranda contained
when he had decided not to approve the King wiretll.ps the
previous month.
Despite the FBI's failure to produce any new evidence to substantiate
its apparently unfavorable characterization of Dr. King, the
question of whether Advisers A and B continued to influence Dr. King
remained a matter of concern to the Justice Department. On August
20, 1963, Evans reported:
Today the Attorney General asked if we would continue to
keep him closely informed of information received relative
to Advisers B's contact with Martin Luther King. He had
specific reference to our letter of August 2,1963.
It appears that the Attorney General is receiving conflicting
advice within the Department proper 8S to whether there
is sufficient evidence of a continuing contact between King
and Adviser B to justify some action. The Civil Rights Division
has expressed the thou~ht that nothing need be done by
the Department. On the other hand, Andrew Oehmann, the
Attorney General's Executive Assistant, has counseled him
that in his judgment there is ample evidence there is a continuin~
relationship which Martin Luther King is trying to
concea1.l05
E. The FBI Intemifies Its Investigati(fl/, of Alleged Oorwmunist
I nfl;uerwe in. the Oi1,il Rights Movement : July-September 1963
On July 18, 1963, in response to intelligence reports that the Comml1nist
Party was encouraging- its members to participate actively in
1,. Memorandum frQm Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont. 8/1/63.
loa Burke Marshall testified that he could not recall this incident. Burke Marshall
testimony, 3/3/76, p. 25.
10& Memorandum from Director. FBI to Attorney general, 8/2/63.
UI Memorandum from Courtney·Evans to Alan Belmont, 8/20/63.
105
the forthcoming March on Washington, the FBI opened a file captioned
"Communist Influence in Racial Matters." Field offices were advised:
it is reasonable to assume that the future will witness a
strong effort on the part of the CPUSA tD inject itself into
and to exploit the struggle for equal rights for Negroes.
Therefore, during the investigation of the CPUSA, each recipient
office should be extremely alert to data indicating interest,
plans, or actual involvement of the Party in the
current Negro movement. This matter should be given close
attention and the Bureau kept currently advised.10o
The results of voluminous reports from field offices around the country
concerning the plans of the Communist Party and "other subversive
groups" were summarized by the Domestic Intelligence Division in a
report dated August 22,1963.107 That report concluded that there was
rio evidence that the March "was actually initiated by or is controlled
by the CP," 108 although the Party had publicly endorsed the March
and had urged members to "clandestinely participate" in order to
"foster the illusion that the CP is a humanitarian group acting in the
interest of the Negro." The Party's tactics were summarized:
CP leaders have stressed the fact that the :March is not the
be all and end all in itself. Events which subsequently flow
from the March will be of utmost importance, such as following
up in contacts now being made by CP members working in
support of the demonstration. rtilizing the March, the Party
has three basic general objectives:
(1) Participation by CP members through legitimate
organizations.
(2) Attempt to get the Party line into the hands of sympathizers
and supporters of the March through distribution
of "The 1Vorker"and Party pamphlets.
(3) Utilize the March as a steppingstone for future Party
activity through contacts now being made by Party members
involved in the March.109 .
The next day the Domestic Intelligence Division submitted to the
Director a 67-page Brief detailing the CPUSA's efforts to exploit the
American Negro, and finding virtually no successes in these efforts. A
synopsis observed:
(1) "The 19 million Negroes in the United States today
constitute the largest and most important racial target of the
Communist Party, USA. Since 1919, communist leaders have
devised countless tactics and programs designed to penetrate
and control Negro population." The "colossal efforts" focused
around "equal opportunity," and efforts were presently being
.... Memorandum from Director, FBI to Special Agents in Charge, 7/18/63, p. 2.
101 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/22/63,
p.l.
lOS Baumgardner memorandum, 8/22/63, p. 1. The report noted that Adviser A
was critical of the Party's role in the civil rights movement and that he had said
he did not consider himself under the control of the Party in his dealings with
Dr. King.
100 Baumgardner memorandum, 8/22/63, p. 2.
106
made with "limited degrees of success" to infiltrate legitimate
Negro organizations. "[T] here is no known substantial implementation
of Oommunist Party aims and policies arrumg
Negroes in the lab(Yf' field."
(2) "While not the instigator and presently unable to direct
or control the coming Negro August 28 March on Washington,
D.C., communist officials are planning to do all possible to
advance communist aims in a supporting role."
(3) "Despite tremendous sums of money and time spent by
the Communist Party, USA, on the American Negro during
the past 44 years, the Party has failed to reach its goal with
the Negroes."
(4) "There has been an obvious failure of the Oommunist
Party of the United States to appreciably infiltrate, influence,
or control large numbers of Arneriwll Negroes in this country
... The Communist Party in the next few years may
fail dismally with the American Negro as it has in the past.
On the other hand, it may make prodigious strides and great
success with the American Negroes, to the serious detriment of
our national security. Time alone wi)) tell." 110
'!"illiam Sullivan, who then headed the Domestic Intelligence Division
of the FBI, t~stified that this "Brief" precipitated a dispute
between Director Hoover and the Domestic Intelligence Division over
the extent of communist influence in the civil rights movement, and
that the resulting "intensification" was part of an attempt by the
Intelligence Division to regain Hoover's approval.lll The documentary
evidence bearing on the internal FBI dispute is set forth below, with
Sullivan's explanation of what occurred. Sullivan's comments, however,
should be considered in light of the intense personal feud that
subsequently developed between Sullivan and Director Hoover, and
which ultimately led to Sullivan's dismissal from the Bureau. While
Sullivan testified that the intensified investigation of the SCLC was
the product of Director Hoover's prodding the Domestic Intelligence
Division to conform its evidence to his preconooptions, the documentary
evidence may also be read as indicating that the Domestic Intelligence
Division was manipulating the Director in a subtle bureaucratic
battle to gain approval for expanded programs.
Sullivan testified that a careful review of the files in preparation for
writing the "Brief" revealed no evidence of "marked or substantial"
Communist infiltration of the movement, and that he had instructed
his assistant to "state the facts just as they are" and "then let the
storm break." 112 Sullivan said he had known that Hoover would be
displeased with his conclusions because Hoover was convinced the civil
rights movement was strongly influenced by communists. Sullivan's
prediction was borne out by Hoover's observations, scrawled across
the bottom of the memorandum:
This memo reminds me vividly of those I received when
Castro took over Cuba. You contended then that Castro and
his cohorts were not communists and not influenced by com-
110 MemorandUlli from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/23/63.
p.1 [Emphasis addedl.
111 William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, p. 12.
112 Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 13.
107
munists. Time alone proved you wrong. I for one can't ignore
the memoes ... re King, Advisers A and B ... et al.
a,.<; having only an infinitesimal effect on the efforts to exploit
the American Xegro by the Communists.'13
Sullivan recalled:
This [memorandum] set me at odds with Hoover ... A few
months went by before he would speak to me. Everything was
conducted by exchange of written communications. It was
evident that we had to change our ways or we would all be
out on the street.l14
The Director penned sarcastic notes on subsequent memoranda from
the Domestic Intelligence Division. In the margin of a report that
over 100 Communist Party members were planning to participate
in the March on Washington, the Director wrote, "just infinitesimal
I" 115 A preliminary report on possible communist influence on
t.he March noted that Party functionaries were pleased with the
March, believed it would impress Congress, and that a "rally of
similar proportions on the subject of automation could advance the
cause of socialism in the United States." Director Hoover remarked,
"I assume CP functionary claims are all frivolous." 116 Sullivan testified
:
the men and I discussed how to get out of trouble. To be in
trouble with Mr. Hoover was a serious matter. These men were
trying to buy homes, mortgages on homes, children in school.
They lived in fear of getting transferred, losing money on
their homes, as they usually did. In those days the market
was not soaring, and children in school, so they wanted
another memorandum written to get us out of this trouble we
,,'ere in. I said I would write the memorandum this time. The
onus always falls on the person who writes a memoral1dum.111
On August 30, Sullivan wrote his apologetic reply:
The Director is correct. We were completely wrong about
believing the evidf'nce was not sufficient to determine some
years ago that Fidel Castro was not a communist or under
communist influence. On investigating and writing about
communism and the American Negro, we had better remember
this and profit by the lesson it should teach us.
. . . Personally, I believe in the light of King's powerful
demagogic speech yesterday 118 he stands head and shoulders
over all other Negro leaders put together when it comes to
118 Baumgardner memorandum, 8/23/63, p. 3.
m Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 20.
liS Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/26/63,
p. l.
110 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/29/63,
p.3.
117 Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 22.
lIBThe "demagogic speech" was Dr. King's "I have a dream" speech. When
shown this entry by the Committee, Sullivan testified:
"I do not apologize for this tactic. You either had to use this tactic or you did
not exist. I put in this memorandum what Hoover wanted to hear. He was so
damn mad at us." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 29)
69-984 0 - 76 - 8
108
influencing great masses of Negroes. We must mark him now,
if we have not done so before, as the most dangerous Negro
of the future in this Kution from the standpoint of communism.
the Kegro and national security.
. . . [I]t may be unrealistic to limit ourselves as we have
been doing to legalistic proofs or definitely conclusive £'Vidl'nce
that "'oldd stand up in tl'stimony in court or before
Congressional Comm;ttl'l's that the Communist Party, USA,
does wil'ld substantial int/uencl' oyer Negroes which one day
could become dl'eisiw.
We regret greatly that the memorandum did not measure
up to what the Director has a right to expect from our
analysis.119
Sullivan testified eoncerning this memorandum:
Here again we had to engage in a lot of nonsense which
we ourselves really did not believe in. We either had to do
that or we would be finished. 12O
The memorandum stated that "The history of the Communist Party,
U.S.A., is replete with its attempts to exploit, influence and recruit
the Negro." After reading this entry. Sullivan testified:
These are words that are very significant to me because I
know what they mean. We build this thing ... and say all this
is a clear indication that the Party's favorite target is the
Negro today. When you analyze it, what does it mean? How
often has it been able to hit the target? ... We did not discuss
that because we would have to say they did not hit the target,
hardly at all.121
In an apparent further effort to please the Director, Sullivan. recommended,
on September Hi, 1963, "increased coverage of communist influence
on the Negro." His memorandum noted that "all indications"
pointed toward increasing "attempts" by the Party to exploit racial
unrest. The fie1d was to "intensify" coverage of communist influence
on Negroes by giving "fullest consideration to the use of all possible
investigative techniqnes."
Further, we are stressing the urgent need for imaginative
and aggressive tactics to be utilized through our Counterintelligencf1
Program-these desi'Tned to attempt to neutralize
or disrupt the Party's activities in the Negro field.122
Hoover rejected this proposal with the remarks:
No. I can't understand how you can so agilely switch your
thinking and evaluation. Just a few weeks ago you contended
that the Communist influence in the racial movement was ineffective
and infinitesimal. This-notwithstanding many
memos of specific instances of infiltration. Now you want to
load the Field down with more coverage in spite of your re-
119 :\Iemoralldum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont. 8/30/63. p. 1.
1'0 Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 30.
m Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, p. 41.
1" Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 9/16/63.
109
cent memo depreciating C.P. influence in racial movement. I
don't intend to waste time and money until you can make up
your minds what the situation really is.123
Sullivan testified that he had interpreted Hoover's note to mean that
the Director was:
egging us on, to come back and say, "Mr. Hoover, you are
right, we are wrong. There is communist infiltration of the
American Negro. vVe think we should go ahead and carry on
an intensified program against it." He knew when he wrote
this, he knew precisely what kind of reply he was going to
get.124
SulliYan responded in a memorandum to the Deputy Associate
Director, Alan Belmont:
On returning from a few days leave I have been advised
of the Director's continued dissatisfaction with the manner
in which we prepared a Brief on [communist influence in
racial matters] and subsequent memoranda on the same subject
matter. This situation is yery disturbing to those of us in
the Domestic Intelligence Division and we certainly want to
do everything possible to correct our shorteomings. . .. The
Director indicated he would not approve our last SAC letter
until there was a clarification and a meeting of minds relative
to the question of the extent of communist influence over
Negroes and their leaders . . . .
As we know, facts by themselves are not too meaningful,
for they are somewhat like stones tossed in Ii heap as contrasted
to the same stones put in the form of a sound edifice.
It is obvious that 1()(, did not Intt the proper interpretation
upon the frwts which 'lce gave to the Director. [Emphasis
added.]
As previously stated, we are in complete agreement with
the Director that communist influence is being exerted on
Martin Luther King, Jr., and that King is the stron~st of
the Negro leaders ... [w]e regard Martin Luther King to
be the most dangerous and effective Negro leader in the
country.
May I repeat that our failure to measure up to what the
Director expected of us in the area of Communist-Negro
relations is a subject of very deep concern to us in the Domestic
Intelligence Division. We are disturbed by this and ought
to be. I want him to know that we will do everything that is
humanly possible to deyelop all facts nationwide relative to
123 Director Hoover's note on Baumgardner memorandum. 9/16/63. p. 2. Hoover
commented on the transmittal slip:
"I have certainly been misled by previous memos which clearly showed communist
penetration of the racial movement. The attached is contradictory of all
that. We are wastin~ manpower and money investigating CP effort in racial
matter if the attached is correct. (Memorandum from Clyde Tolson to the Director.
9/18/63.)
1,. Sullivan, 11/1175, p. 46.
110
communist penetration and influence over Negro leaders and
their organizations.125
Sullivan resubmitted his proposed intensification instructions to the
field. This time the Director agreed.
The intensification was put into effect by an SAC letter dated October
1, 1963, which contained the usual allusion to "efforts" and "attempts"
by the Communist Party to influence the civil rights movement,
but which said nothing about the absence of results:
The history of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), is
replete with its attempts to e;rploit, influeru;e and 1'ecruit
the Negro. The March on Washington, August 28, 1963, was
a striking example as Party leaders early put into motion
efforts to accrue gains for the CPUSA from the March. The
presence at the March of around 200 Party members, ranging
from several national functionaries headed by CPUSA General
Secretary Gus Hall to many rank-and-file members, is
clear indication of the Party's favorite target (the Negro)
today.
All indications are that the March was not the "end of the
line" and that the Party will step up its efforts to exploit
racial unrest and in every possible way claim credit for itself
relating to any "gains" achieved by the Negro. A clear-cut
indication of the Party's designs is revealed in secret information
obtained from a most sensitive source that the Party
plans to hold a highly secretive leadership meeting in November,
1963, which will deal primarily with the Negro situation.
The Party has closely guarded plam for Gus Hall to undertake
a "barnstorming" trip through key areas of the country
to meet Party people and thus better prepare himself for the
November meeting.
In order for the Bureau to cope with the Party's efforts
and thus fulfill our responsibilities in the security field, it is
necessary that we at once intensify our coverage of communist
influence on the Negro. Fullest {,()l1sideration should be given
to the use of all possible investigative techniques in the investigation
of the CP-USA, those rommunist fronts through
which the Party channels its influence, and the many individual
Party members and dupes. There is also an urgent need
for imaginative and aggressive tactics to be utilized through
UlI Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 9/25/63, p. 1. Sullivan
named the "changing situation in the Communist Party-Negro relations area" as
the reason for a more intense investigation of communist influence in racial
matters:
"During the past two weeks in particular there have been sharp stepped-up
activities on the part of communist officials to infiltrate and to dominate Negro
developments in this country. Further, they are meeting with successes."
A review of the Bureau files for the month prior to Sullivan's memorandum
reveals no increase in CPUSA activity or any success on its part. The only relevant
entries indicate:
(1) At a meeting on Au~st 30. leading Party functionaries termed the
March on Washington a 'success,' and discussed what action to take to advance
civil rights legislation. Demonstrations were discussed, but none were planned.
(Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 9/5/63).
(2) On Au~st 30. Adviser B was obsprvpd spending an hour in the building
housing the New York SCLC offices. (Mpmorandum from Director, FBI to AttornPy
General, 9/5/63).
111
our Counterintelligence Program for the purpose of attempting
to neutralize or disrupt the Party's activities in the Negro
field. Because of the Bureau's responsibility for timely dissemination
of pertinent information to the Department and
other interested agencies, it is more than ever necessary that
all facets of this matter receive prompt handling.126
The instruction to use "all possible investigative techniques" appears
to have dictated the intensification of the COMINFIL investigation
oftheSCLC.
This was consistent with Sullivan~s assurance to Director Hoover at
the end of September that "we will do everything that is humanly
possible to develop all facts nationwide relative to the Communist
penetration and influence over Negro leaders and their organizations."
The emphasis on "imaginative and aggressive tactics" to disrupt
Communist Party activities in the Negro field appears to have involved
an expansion of the COINTELPRO operation already underway
against the Communist Party. In 1956, the Bureau had initiated
a COINTELPRO operll!tion against the Communist Party,
USA, with the goal of "feeding and fostering" internal friction within
the Party. The program was soon expanded to include "preventing
communists from seizing control of legitimate mass organizations,
and ... discrediting others who [are-] secretly operating inside such
organizations." 127 The October 1. 196:3 "intensification" instruction
emphasized this latter objective of disruption.129
The intensification order appears to have been more a product of
preconceptions and bureaucratic squabbles within the FBI than a
response to genuine concerns based on hard evidence that commnnists
might be influencing the civil rights movement. Because Director
Hoover is deceased. the Committee ,vas able to obtain onlv one
side of the story. Sullivan's version depicts the Domestic Intelligence
Division executing an about-face after Director Hoover reje.cted its
conclusion that e\-idence did not indicate significant communist influence,
reinterpreting its original data to reach conclusions the Director
wanted to hear, and then basing its recommendations for action on the
new "analysis." However, the memoranda could also support a contention
that the Domestic Intelligence Division misled Director Hoover in
order to maneuver him into supporting expanded domestic intelligence
programs.
IV. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTL\X LEADERSHIP COXFEREXCE
Introduction and Summary
In October 1963, Attorney General Robert Kennedy approved an
FBI request for permission to im~tall wiretaps on phones in Dr. King's
12< Director, FBI to SAC. lO/1/6H. [Emphasis added.]
121 The history of COINTELPRO-FBI's counterintelligence operations to disrupt
various domestic dissident groups-is discussed in a separate staff report.
Adviser B had been the target of one such COINTELPRO operation in 1962, when
the Bureau attempted to generate a series of newspaper articles designed to expose
his alleged Party background. See pp. 95-96.
129 The use of COINTELPRO techniques to discredit Dr. King is discussed in
the ensuing chapters.
112
home and in the SCLC~s New York and Atlanta offices to determine
the extent, if any, of "communist influence in the racial situation." The
FBI construed this authorization to extend to Dr. King's hotel rooms
and the home of a friend. No further authorization was sought until
mid-1965, after Attorney General Katzenbach required the FBI for
the first time to seek renewed authorization for all existing wiretaps.
The wiretaps on Dr. King~s home were apparently terminated at that
time by Attorney General Katzenbach; the SCLC wiretaps were
terminated by Attorney General Ramsay Clark in June 1966.
In December, 1963-three months after Attorney General Kennedy
approved the wiretaps-the FBI, without informing the Attorney
General, planned and implemented a secret effort to discredit Dr. King
and to "neutralize" him as the leader of the civil rights movement.
One of the first steps in this effort involved hiding microphones in
Dr. King's hotel rooms. Those microphones were installed without
Attorney General Kennedy's prior authorization or subsequent notification,
neither of which were required under practices then current.
The FBI continued to place microphones in Dr, King's hotel rooms
until November 1965. Attorney General Katzenbach was apparently
notified immediately after thl.' fact of the placement of three microphones
between May and Novem'ber 1965. It is not clear why the FBI
stopped its microphone surveillance of Dr. King, although its decision
may have been related to concern about public exposure during the
Long Committee's investigation of electronic surveillance.
This chapter examines the legal basis for the wiretaps and microphones,
the evidence surrounding the motives for their use, and the
degree to which Justice Department and White House officials were
aware of the FBI's elecironic surveillance of Dr. King.
A. Legal Starulards G01.·erning the FBI's Duty to Inform the Justice
Department of Wiretaps and Microphones During the Period of
the Martin Luther King bwcstigation
The FBI's use of wiretaps and microphones to follow Dr. King's
activities must be examined in li~ht of the accepted legal standards
and practices of the time. Before March 1965, the FBI followed different
procedures for the authorization of wiretaps and microphones.
Wiretaps required the approval of the Attorney General in advance.
However, once the Attorney General had authorized the FBI to initiate
wiretap coverage of a subject, the Bureau generally continued the
wiretap for as long as it judged necessary. As former Attorney General
Katzenbach testified:
The custom was not to put a time limit on 'a tap, or any wiretap
authorization. Indeed, I think the Bureau would have felt
free in 1965 to put a tap on a phone authorized by Attorney
General Jackson before World War II.130
In "national security" cases, the FBI was free to carry out microplume
surveillances without first seeking the approval of the Attorney
General or informing him afterward. The Bureau apparently derived
authority for its microphone practice from a 1954 memorandum sent
bv Attornl.'Y General Brownl.'ll to Director Hoover, stating:
taO Nicholas Katzenbach testimony. 11/12/75. p. 87.
113
It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance
is the only possible way to uncovering the activities
of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons.
In such instances I am of the opinion that the national
interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be
limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The
FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal
security matters equally as important as the duty of developing
evidence for presentation to the courts 'and the national
security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone
surveillance for the proper discharge of both such functions.
The Department of J usticeapproves the use of microphone
surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for
these purposes.... I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its
impoitant intelligence function, considerations of internal
security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore,
may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national
interest.lSI
The Justice Department was on notice that the FBI's practice was
to install microphones without first informing the Justice Department.
Director Hoover'told Deputy Attorney General Bryon White in May
1961 :
in the internal security field we are utilizing microphone
surveillances on a restricted basis even though trespass is necessary
to assist in uncovering the activity of Soviet intelligence
agents and Communist Party leaders.... In the interest
of national safety, microphone surveillances are also utilized
on a restricted basis, even though trespass is necessary,
in uncovering major criminal activities.132
A memorandum by Courtney Evans indicates that he discussed
microphones in "organized crime cases" with the Attorney General in
July 1961:
It was pointed out to the Attorney General that we had taken
action with regard to the use of microphones in [organized
crime] cases and . . . we were nevertheless utilizing them in
all instances where this was technically feasible and where
valuable information might be expected. The strong objections
to the utilization of telephone taps as contrasted to
microphone surveillances was stressed. The Attorney General
stated he recognized the reasons why telephone taps should
be restricted to national-defense-type cases and he was pleased
we had been using microphone surveillances, where these obm
Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director. FBI. "Microphone
Surveillance," 5/20/54. Attorney General Brownell's memorandum authorizing
"unrestricted use" of microphone surveillance in national security cases
was prompted by the Supreme Court's decision in Irvine v. Oalifornia, 347 U.S. 128
(1961 ). in which the Court denounced as "obnoxious" the installation of a microphone
in a criminal suspect's bedroom.
111 Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Deputy Attorney General Byron White,
5/4/61.
114
jections do not apply, wherever possible in organized crime
matters.133
The Justice Department later summarized this practice in a brief to
the Supreme Court :
Under Departmental practice in effect for a period of years
prior to 1963, and continuing into 1965, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation was given authority to approve
the installation of devices such as [microphones] for
intelligence (but not evidentiary) purposes when required
in the interest of internal security or national safety, including
organized crime, kidnappings, or matters wherem human
life might be at stake.134
On March 30, 1965, at the urging of Attorney General Katzenbach,
the FBI adopted a uniform procedure for submitting both wiretaps
and microphones to the Attorney General for his approval prior to installation.
Director Hoover described thenew procedures in a memo·
randum to the Attorney General:
In line with your suggestion this morning, I have already
set up the procedure SImilar to requesting of authority for
phone taps to be utilized in requesting authority for the placement
of microphones. In other words, I shall forward to you
from time to time r~uests for authority to install microphones
where deemed Imperative for your consideration and
approval or disapproval. Furthermore, I have instructed
that, where you have approved either a phone tap or the
installation of a microphone, you will be advised when such
is discontinued if in less than SIX months and, if not discontinued
in less than six months, that a new request be submitted
by me to you for extension of the telephone tap or microphone
installation.135
One week later Katzenbach sent to the White House a proposed
Presidential directive to all Federal agencies on electronic surveillance.
This directive, formally issued by President Johnson on June 30,
1965, forbade the nonconsensual interception of telephone communications
by Federal personnel, "except in connection with investigations
related to the national security" and then only after obtaining the
written approval of the Attorney General. The directive was less
precise concerning microphone surveillance:
Utilization of mechanical or electronic devices to overhear
nontelephone conversations is an even more difficult problem,
1U Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, July 7, 1961. A Bureau
memorandum by Director Hoover several y'ears later states that Evans subsequently
gave then Senator Robert Kennedy a letter, dated February 17, 1966,
stating that Evans had never discussed the use of microphones with Kennedy and
that Evans "did not know of any written material that was sent to you (Kennedy)"
concerning microphone surveillances. The letter from Evans to Kennedy
was released to the press. Director Hoover concluded in his memorandum reporting
this incident that in view of Evans "disregard for the truth and duplicity
toward the FBI, he should not be contacted without prior Bureau approval."
(Memorandum, J. Edgar Hoover, Re: Courtney A. Evans, Person Not To Be
Contacted, December 15, 1966.)
134 mack v. United State.~ 38.') U.S. 26 (1966).
'36 Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 3/30/65, p. 2.
115
which raises substantial and unresolved questions of constitutional
interpretation. I desire that each agency conducting
such investigations consult with the Attorney General
to ascertain whether the agency's practices are fully in accord
with the law and with a decent regard for the rights of
others.'36
B. Wiretap Surveillance of Dl'. King and the SOLO: October 1963June
1966
On September 6, 1963, Assistant Director William Sullivan first
recommended to Director Hoover that the FBI install wiretaps on Dr.
King's home and the offices of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
137 Sullivan's recommendation was apparently part of an at·
tempt to improve the Domestic Intelligence Division's standing with
the Director by convincing him that Sullivan's Division was concerned
about alleged communist influence on the civil rights movement and
that the Division intended, as Sullivan subsequently informed the
Director, to "do everything that is humanly possible" in conducting its
investigation.'38
Sullivan's recommendation was viewed with scepticism by the FBI
leadership since Attorney General Kennedy had rejected a similar
proposal two months earlier. Associate Director Clyde Tolson noted
on the memorandum containing Sullivan's proposal: "I see no point
in making this recommendation to the Attorney General in view
of the fact that he turned down a similar recommendation on July 22,
1963." 139 Director Hoover scrawled below Tolson's note: "I will
approve though I am dizzy over vacillation as to influence of
CPUSA." 140
In late September 1963 the FBI conducted a survey and concluded
that wiretap coverage of Dr. King's residence and of the New York
SCLC office could be implemented without detection.14l On October 7,
citing "possible communist influence in the racial situation," Hoover
requested the Attorney General's permission for a wiretap "on King at
his current address or at any future address to which he may move"
and "on the SCW office at the current New York address or to any
other address to which it may be moved." 142 Attorney General Kennedy
signed the request on October 10 and, on October 21, also approved
the FBI request for coverage of the SCIAJ's Atlanta OffiCe.'43
Two memoranda by Courtney Evans indicate that the Attorney General
was uncertain about the advisability of the wiretaps. On October
10, the Attorney General summoned Evans to discuss the FBI's
request for the wiretaps on Dr. King's home telephone and the New
York SCLC telephones. Evans wrote:
llll Lyndon B. Johnson, Presidential Directive, 6/30/65.
"" Memorandum from James Bland to William Sullivan, 9/6/63.
118 Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont. 9/25/63, p. 5. The
dispute between Sullivan and Hoover, and the intensification which developed
from it, are described pp. 104 et. seq.
"'" Memorandum from James Bland to William Sullivan, 10/4/63, attachment.
140 Bland memorandum, 10/4/63, attachment.
lU Bland memorandum, 10/4/63, p. 1.
,.. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy,
10/7/63. .
"" Hoover memorandum, 10/7/63; Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to
Attorney General Ro.bert Kennedy, 10/18/63.
116
The Attorney General said that he recognized the importance
of this coverage if substantial information is to be developed
concerning the relationship between King and the
communist party. He said there was no question in his mind
as to the coverage in New York City but that he was worried
about the security of an installation covering a residence in
Atlanta, Georgia. He noted that the last thing we could afford
to have would be a discovery of a wiretap on King's
residence.
I pointed out to the Attorney General the fact that a residence
was involved did not necessarily mean there was any
added risk because of the technical nature of the telephone
system. . . . After this discussion the Attorney General said
he felt we should go ahead with the technical coverage on
King on a trial basis, and to continue it if productive results
were forthcoming. He said he was certain that all Bureau
representatives involved would recognize the delicacy of this
particular matter and would thus be even more cautious than
ever in this assignment....144
According to Evans' memorandum, the Attorney General signed the
authorization for the wiretap immediately after this conversatlOn.
Another memorandum by Evans describes the Attorney General's
reaction on approving the Bureau's request for a wiretap on the
Atlanta SCLC office a week later:
The Attorney General is apparently still vacillating in his
position as to technical coverage.... I reminded him of our
previous conversation wherein he was assured that all possible
would be done to insure the security of this operation.
The Attorney General advised that he was approving [the
wiretaps] but asked that this coverage and that on King's
residence be evaluated at the end of thirty days in light of the
results secured so that the continuance of those surveillances
could be determined at that time.145
Wiretaps were installed on the SCLC"s New York office on October
24, 1963, and at Dr. King's home and the SCLC's Atlanta office
on November 8, 1963. The FBI made an internal evaluation of the
wiretaps in December 1963 and decided on its own to extend the
wiretaps for three months. Reading the Attorney General's authoriz~
tion broadly, the FBI construed permission to wiretap Dr. King "at
hIS current address or at any future address" to include hotel room
phones and the phone at the home of friends with whom he temporarily
stayed. The FBI installed wiretaps, without seeking further
authorization, on the following occasions:
location Installed Discontinued
~i~fs Atlanta home Nay. 8,1963 Apr. 30,1965
H nend's home Aug. 14,1964 Sept. 8,1964
Hyatt House Motelrlos Angeles Apr_ 2~ 1964 Apr. 26,1964
cra~t House Mote, los Angeles July 1,1964 July 9,1964
andge Hotel
h
Atlantic City Aug. 22,1964 Aug. 27,1964
~gtc Atlanta eadquarters Noy. 8,1963 June 21, 1966
C New York headquarters Oct. 24,1963 Jan. 24,1964
July 13, 1964 July 31, 1964
1« Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 10/10/63.
14J Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 10/21163_
117
The Committee was not able to ascertain why Attorney General Kennedy
approved the FBI's request for wiretaps in October 1963 after
refusing an identical request in July 1963. Burke Marshall, Kennedy's
assistant in charge of civil rights affairs, testified that he could
not recall ever having discussed the matter with the Attorney General.
It was his opinion, however, that the decision had been influenced by
events arising out of concern about possible communist influence in the
civil rights movement that had been widely publicized during the
hearings on the Public Accommodations Act in the summer of 1963.
Marshall recalled that Dr. King had made a "commitment" to the
Attorney General and to the President to "stop having any communication"
with Advisers A and B. Subsequently,
information came in, not as far as Adviser B, but as far
as Adviser A was concerned, that that commitment was not
lived up to, and I have assumed since, although I do not remember
discussing it with Robert Kennedy, that the reason
that he authorized the tap ... was that he wanted to find out
what was going on.
From his point of view, Martin Luther King had made a
commitment on a very important matter ... [and] King had
broken that commitment. So therefore the Attorney General
wanted to find out whether [Adviser A] did in fact have
influence over King, what he was telling King,and so forth.141
Marshall's answer to a question concerning whether anyone in the
Justice Department ever considered asking the FBI to 'discontinue
the investigation of Dr. King also sheds some light on why the Attorney
General might have decided to approve the wiretaps:
Not that I know of. [The FBI's allegations concerning Adviser
A] were grave and serious, and the inquiries from the
Senate and from the public, both to the President and to the
Attorney General, as well as the Bureau, had to be answered
and they had to be answered fully. Stopping the investigation
in light of those circumstances would have run the risk
that there would have been a lot of complaints that the Bureau
had been blocked for political reasons from investigating serious
charges about communist infiltration in the civil rights
movement.148
Edwin O. Guthman, the Justice Department Public Relations Chief
during Robert Kennedy's tenure as Attorney General, told the Committee
that he had spoken with then Senator Robert Kennedy a:bout
the wiretap when it was revealed in a Jack Anderson story in 1968.
According to Guthman, Robert Kennedy told him:
he had been importuned or requested by the FBI over a period
of time to wiretap the phones of Dr. King, specifically
wiretap the phones, as I recollect, at the headquarters of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference and, I think,
1<7 Burke Marshall testimony. 3/3/76. p. 20. The "commitment on a very important
matter" had been Dr. King's promise to sever his relations with Adviser A.
1" Marshall, 3/3/76, p. 55.
118
Martin Luther King~s home, but I'm not certain about
that....
Robert Kennedy said that he finally agreed in the fall of
1963 to give the FBI permission to wiretap the phones~ and
my clear recollection on this is that his feeling was that if he
did not do it~ Mr. Hoover would move to impede or block the
passage of the civil rights bi1l~ which had been introduced in
the summer of 1963, and that he felt that he might as well
settle the matter as to whether (Adviser A) did have the influence
on King that the FBI contended.... My recollection
is that there had been a number of conversations with King by
Burke Marshall and Robert Kennedy, and r think President
Kennedy had indicated to King that he ought not to have anything
to do with (Adviser A). My understanding and recollection
is that King said he would, and then each time the FBI
would come back and say, he's still in contact with (Adviser
A) ... Robert Kennedy viewed this as a serious matter and not
in the interest of the country and not in the interest of the
civil rights movement, if the FBI information was accurate,
149
Guthman testified that he could not recall Kennedy's elaborating
on the steps that he had feared Director Hoover would take against
the civil rights legislation if he had not agreed to the wiretap,
against the civil rights legislation if he had not agreed to the wiretap,
but gave his own opinion that "Hoover~s influence on the Hill could
be considerable and it could have been a form of public statement or
conferring with Senators in that area." 150
It is also not clea,r why Attorney General Kennedy insisted that the
wiretaps be evaluated after 30 days and then failed to complain when
the FBI neglected to send him an evaluation. Evans, after reviewing
his memorandum stating that the Attorney General required the FBI
to evaluate the wiretaps after 30 davs, testified that he assumed the
Attorney General had "expected the 'Bureau to ... submit the results
of that evaluation to him." When asked if the Attorney General had
ever inquired into whether the evaluation had been made, Evans
testified :
I am reasonably certain he never asked me. I would point out,
however, that the assassination of President Kennedy followed
these events reasonably close in point of time, and this
disrupted the operation of the Office of the Attorney Generapn
In March 1965 Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach requested the
FBI to submit all of its wiretaps for reauthorization.152 He testified:
In late April 1965~ in accordance with this progra.m, I received
a request from the Bureau to continue a tap on Dr.
King's personal phone. I ordered it discontinued. It is, however,
possible that a request for the continuation of a preexisting
tap on the headquarters of the Southern Christian
,.. Edwin O. Guthman testimony, 3/16/76, pp. 5, 15-17.
,.. Guthman testimony, 3/16/76, p. 17.
m Courtney Evans testimony, 12/1/75, p.15.
'12 Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.
119
Leadership Conference was made about the same time, and
I may have approved that tap. I do not recall the date or the
circumstances which would have led me to do SO.153
Documents provided to the Committee by the FBI reflect that in
early April 1965 the Atlanta office informed headquarters that it was
discontinuing the wiretap on Dr. King's home because he was moving.
On April 19 the Director authorized a survey to determine if a wiretap
could be placed on the phone in Dr. King's new residence with
"full security." The Director's memorandum also stated that "After
receipt of results of survey and Atlanta's recommendations, a memorandum
will be prepared along with any necessary correspondence
with the Attorney ~nera1."154 A memorandum from the Atlanta
office the next month states: "On [May 6, 1965], Mr. Sullivan telephonically
advised that the installation of this Tesur [technical surveillance]
was not authorized at this time." 155
The Bureau has been unable to find a record of anv discussions between
FBI officials and Attorney Katzenbach concerning this wiretap,
and there are no memoranda in the Bureau files which indicate the
reason that the wiretap on Dr. King's new home was not authorized.
The FBI terminated the wiretap on the New York SCLC office in
January 1964, only two months after it had been installed, "for lack
of productivity." 156 The wiretap was reinstalled in July 1964 and
discontinued later that month because "the office moved." 157 No further
wiretaps were placed on the New York office.
The wiretap on the Atlanta SCLC office was reviewed by Attorney
General Katzenbach on October 27, 1965, and received his approval.
A Bureau memorandum recommending continuation of the coverage
in April 1966 was returned with a notation by Katzenbach, dated .rune 20, 1966, stating: "I think this coverage should be discontinued,
particularly in light of possible charges of a criminal nature against
[certain SCLC employees]." 159 Technical coverage was discontinued
the following day.160
Attorney General Ramsey Clark turned down two requests by the
FBI for wiretaps on the phones of the SCLC, once on January 3,1968,
and again on January 17, 1969.161 Clark wrote the Director concerning
the 1968 request:
I am declining authorization of the requested installation of
the above telephone surveillance at the present time. There
has not been an adequate demonstration of a direct threat to
national security.162
Clark's refusal to authorize an SCLC wiretap in 1969 occurred two
days before he left office, at the termination of the Johnson Admin-
IllI Katzenba.ch, 12/3/75, Hearings, p. 210.
1M Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, Atlanta, 4/19/65.
1lII5 Memorandum from SAC, Atlanta to Director, FBI, 5/19/65.
wMemorandum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 1/27/64.
:Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, New York, 8/7/64.
Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 6/22/66. The charges
had nothing to do with Dr. King.
110 Memorandum from Joseph Sizoo to Fill'S. 6/23/66.
1'" Memorandum from Ramsey Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/3/68; memorandum
from Ramsey Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/17/69.
182 Clark memorandum, 1/3/68.
120
istration. Less than a month later the Director informed the Atlanta
office that an SCLC wiretap "is in line to be presented to the new Attorne;
r General, and a survey, with full security assured ... is desirable.'
163 FBI files contain no indication of the disposition of this final
request.
C. MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE OF DR. KING: JANUARY
1964-NOVEMBER 1965.
From January 1964 through November 1965, the FBI insta!led at
least 15 hidden microphones in hotel and motel rooms occupIed by
Martin Luther King. 164 The FBI has told the Committee about the
following microphone surveillances :
-Willard Hotel, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 5, 1964).
-Shroeder Hotel, Milwaukee (Jan. 27, 1964).
-Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu (Feb. 18, 1964).
-Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles (Feb. 20, 1964).
-Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles (Feb. 22, 1964).
-Statler Hotel, Detroit (Mar. 19, 1964).
-Senator Motel, Sacramento (Apr. 23, 1964).
-Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles (July 7, 1964).
-Manger Hotel, Savannah, Ga. (Sept. 28, 1964).
-Park Sheraton Hotel, New York (Jan. 8, 1965).
-Americana Hotel, New York (Jan. 28, 1965).
-Sheraton Atlantic Hotel, New York (May 12, 1965) .
-Astor Hotel, New York (Oct. 14, 1965).
- New York Hilton Hotel, New York (Oct. 28, 1965).
-Americana Hotel, New York (Nov. 29, 1965).165
1. Reas0'n8 for the FBI's Micropho'M SU1'Veillance of Dr. King.
The wiretaps on Dr. King's home telephone llind the phones of the
SCLC offices were authorized by the Attorney General for the stated
purpose of determining whether suspected communists were influencing
the course of the civil rights mm'ement. FBI documents indicate
that the microphone coverage, (which was initiated without the
knowledge of the Attorney Generals, in cQnforIJ1ance with practice
then current), was originally desiWled not only to 'pick up information
bearing on possible Communist influence over Dr. King, but also to
obtain information for use in the FBI's secret effort to discredit Dr.
181 Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, Atlanta, 2/14/69.
1M Witnesses have indicated that other microphones might have been used to
cover the activities of Dr. King and his associates, "although those microphones
might have been placed by local law enforcement officers. Bureau documents
indicate that the New York and Miami police did in fact place microphones in
Dr. King's hotel rooms. (Memorandum from Director, FBI to Speeillll Agent in
Charge, New York, 5/7/65; Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to Wtlliam
Sullivan, 5/27/66). Congressman Andrew Young, who was one of Dr. King's
chief aideR. testified: "We found a bug In the pulpit in a church in Selma, Alahllma.
in 1965, and we didn'it even move it or destroy it. We took it out from under
the pulpit, taped it on top of the pulpit, 'and Reverend Abernathy called it, 'this
little do-hickey' and he said, 'I want you to tell Mr. Hoover, I don't want it"under
here where there is a whole lot of static, I want him to get it straight,' and he
pn>ached to the little bug." (Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, p. 55.)
1" Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 7/24/75, pp. 4--0. (The Bureau
RIRO Ruthorized the installation of a microphone at the Park Sheraton Hotel in
New York on March 29. 1965, but Dr. King did not -stay at the hotel and the
coverage was terminated.)
121
King as the leader of the civil rights movement. 166 By 1965,
references to discrediting efforts had been dropped, and documents
requesting authorization for microphones mentioned only the purpose
of obtaining information about possible communist influences.m The
details of the Bureau's efforts to undermine Dr. King are discussed in
the ensuing chapters.
The first microphones were installed about two weeks after a December
23, 1963, FBI conference at which methods of "neutralizing" Dr.
King were explored.168 Microphone sunreillance was again discuss,ed
at an all-day conference at FBI Headquarters in February 1964,
attended by representatives of the FBI laboratory "preparatory to
effecting coverage of the activities of Martin Luther King, Jr., and
his associates in Honolulu." 169 Justifying the need for microphon.e
coverage, the Chief of the FBI's Intf'rnal Security Section wrote that
the FBI was "attempting" to obtain information about ''the [private]
activities of Dr. King and his associates" so that Dr. King could be
"completely discredited." 170
The FBI memorandum authorizing the placement of the first microphone
on Dr. King-at the Willard Hotel in early January 1964-gave
as a basis "the intelligence and counterintelligence possibilities which
thorough coverage of Dr. King's activities might develop...." 171
The '"Villard Hotel "bug" yielded 19 reels of tape. A memorandum
summarizing the tapes was sent to the Director with William Sullivan's
recommendation that it be shown to Walter Jenkins, President .Johnson's
Special Assistant, "inasmuch as Dr. King is seeking an appointment
with President Johnson." 112 Cllrtha D. DeLoach, Assistant to
the Director, showed the summary memorandum to Jenkins, and later
wrote:
I told Jenkins that the Director indicated I should leave this
attachment with him if he desired to let the President personally
read it. Jenkins mentioned that he was sufficiently aware
of the facts that he oould verbally advise the President of
the matter. Jenkins was of the opinion that the FBI oould
perform a good service to the country if this matter could
somehow be confidentially given to members of the press. I
1" See, for example, Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont,
1/6/64; memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 1/28/64.
Some Bureau witnesses have suggested that the microphones were installed only
to intercept conversations between Dr. King and other individuals, such as Ad·
viser A, to determine the extent of communist influence over King. The Bureau,
however, was uJllllble to produce any evidence that it had anticipated meetings between
Dr. King and Adviser A or between Dr. Kmg and any other of his advisers
whom the Bureau alleged had communist connections on the initial occasions
wben micropbones were used.
18'1 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 10/29/65:
wemorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 11/29/65.
1.. Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont. 1/13/64. This conference
and the FBI's attempts to discredit King are discussed infra, pp. 133
et seq.
1" Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 2/4/64.
170 Baumgardner memorandum, 1/28/64.
in Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/6/64.
ln Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/13/64. The memorandum
did not indicate how the information had been obtained.
122
told him the Director had this in mind, however, he also believed
we should obtain additional information prior to discussing
it with certain friends.173
The FBI was apparently encouraged by the intelligence afforded by
"bugs" and by the White House's receptiveness to that type of information.
A microphone was installed at the Shroeder Hotel in Milwaukee
two weeks later, but was declared "unproductive" because
"there were no activities of interest developed." 174 Dr. King's visit to
Honolulu in mid-February 1964 was covered by a squad of
surveillance experts brought in for the occasion from San Francisco.
One of these experts was described in a Bureau memorandum as the
"most experienced, most ingenious, most unruffled, most competent
sound man for this type of operation in the San Francisco Office;"
another was chosen because he had "shown unusual ingenuity, persistence,
and determination in making microphone installations;" and a
third had "been absolutely fearless in these types of operations for
over twelve years." 175 More than twenty reels of tape were obtained
during Dr. King's stay in Honolulu and his sojourn in Los Angeles
immediately afterward.176 Director Hoover agreed to send a copy of a
memorandum describing the contents of the tapes to Jenkins and
Attorney General Kennedy in order to:
remove all doubt from the Attorney General's mind as to the
type of pers0I!- ~ing is.. It will pro?ably also ~liminate King
from any partICIpatIOn m [a memorIal for PreSIdent Kennedy
which the Attorney General was helping to arrange].l11
Dr.. King's stay in Los Angeles in July 1964 was coveted by both
wiretaps and microphones in his hotel room. The wiretap was intended
to gain intelligence about Dr. King's plans at the Republican National
Convention. Microphone surveillance was requested to attempt to obtain
information useful in the campaigns to discredit him.118 Sullivan's
memorandum describing the coverage was sent to Hoover with
a recommendation against dissemination to the White HouS(' or the
Attorney General:
as in this instance it is merely repetitious and does not have
nearly the impact as prior such memoranda. We are continuing
to follow closely King's activities and giving consideration
to every possibility for future similar coverag-e that will
add to our record on King so that in the end he might be discredited
and thus be removed from his position of great stature
in the Negrocommunity.l19
'''' Memorandum from Cartha D. DeLoach to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/14/64. Jenkins
told members of Committee staff in an informal interview that he had never
suggested disseminating derogatory material about Dr. King to the press. (Staff
summary of interview with Walter Jenkins, 12/1/75, p. 2.) The Committee did
not take Jenkins testimony because Jenkins informed the Committee that he
was ill.
170 Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/28/64.
170 Airtel, Special Agent in charge, San Fnmcisco, to FBI Director, 2/25/64.
170 The FBI also covered Dr. King's activities with photographic surveillance.
177 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 3/4/64.
The memorandum did not show how the information had been obtained.
1711 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 7/2/64.
17"Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William SUllivan, 7/15/64.
123
Hoover wrote on the memorandum, "Send to Jenkins." The summary
memorandum and a cover letter were sent to Jenkins on
July 17.180
It should also be noted that Dr. King's activities at the Democratic
National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey in August 1964
were closely monitored by the FBI. Microphones were not installed
on that occasion, although wiretaps were placed on Dr. King's hotel
room phone. The stated justification for the wiretap was the investi*
ation of possible communist influence and the fact that Dr. King
'may indulge in a hunger fast as a means of protest." 181 A great deal
of potentially useful political information was obtained from this
wiretap and disseminated to the White House.182 ,
The memorandum authorizing microphone coverage of Dr. King's
room in Savannah, Georgia during the annual SCLC conference in
September and October 1964 described surveillance as necessary because
it was "expected that attempts will again be made to exert influence
upon the SCLC and in particular on King by communists." 183
The seven "bugs" in Dr. King's rooms during VIsits to New York
from January to November 1965 were justified in contemporaneous
internal FBI memoranda by anticipated meetings of Dr. King with
several people whom the FBI claimed had affiliations with the Communist
Party.184 No mention was made of the possibility of obtaining
private life material in memor:anda concerning these "bugs." 185
13. Eviderwe Bearing on Whetlwr tlw Attorneys General Authorized
or Knew About tlw Microvhone Surveillance of
lJr. King .
In summary, it is clear that the FBI never requested permission for
installing microphones to cover Dr. King from Attorney General Kennedy,
and there is no evidence that it ever directly informed him that
it was using microphones. There is some question, however, concerning
whether the Attorney General ultimately realized that the FBI was
using "bugs" because of the nature of the information that he was
being sent.
Evidence concerning Attorney General Katzenbach's knowledge of
microphone surveillance of Dr. King is contradictory. In March 1965,
Katzenbach required the FBI for the first time to seek the Justice
Department's approval for all microphone installations. The FBI has
given the Committee documents which indicate that Katzenbach was
180 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Walter Jenkins, 7/17/64.
181 Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 8/21/64.
1B2 The FBI's surveillance of Dr. King and other civil rights leaders at the
Atlantic City Democratic National Convention is discussed at length in a separate
staff report dealing with electronic surveillance.
1BI Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 9/28/64.
1Bl Memoranda from Joseph Sizoo to William Sullivan, 1/8/65, 1/29/65, and
5/13/65; memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 10/14/65; memoranda
from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 10/29/65 and 11/29/65.
'" Possible reasons that the mention of the collection of private life material
was dropped from FBI memoranda during this period include (1) the "truce"
between Dr. King and the FBI after December 1964 (see, pp. 163 et Iteq.) and
(2) the fact that after May 1965 the FBI was required to inform the Attorney
General of microphone surveillance and did not want to leave a "paper record"
referring to the FBI's program to discredit Dr. King.
69-984 0 • 76 - 9
124
informed shortly after the fact of three microphone installations on
Dr. King, that he did not object to those installations, and that he
urged the FBI to use caution in its surveillance activities. Katzenbach
does not now recall having been informed ahout the FBI's microphone
surveillance of Dr. Kmg.
(a) Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.-The FBI makes no
claim that Attorney General Kennedy was expressly informed about
the microphones placed in Dr. King's hotel rooms. The only FBI claim
that Attorney General Kennedy might have been aware of the microphones
is a Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum written in
December 1966, which states:
concerning microphone coverage of King, Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy was furnished the pertinent information
obtained. perusal of which would indicate that a microphone
was the source of this information.186
Next to this entry, Hoover wrote: "when?" A memorandum from the
Domestic Intelligence Division a few days later explained:
Attorney General Robert F. Kelmedy was furnished an eight
page "Top Secret" memorandum ... dated March 4, 1964.
This memorandum is a summary of microphone coverage ...
in the Willard Hotel, 'Washington, D.C.; Hilton Hawaiian
Village, Honolulu, Hawaii; Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles,
California; and the Hyatt House Hotel, Los Angeles, California.
The wording of the memorandum is couched in such
It manner that it is obvious that a microphone was the
source.187
The question of whether Attorney General Kennedy suspected
that the FBI was using microphones to gather information about
Dr. King must also be viewed in light of the Attorney General's express
authorization of wiretaps in the King case on national security
grounds, and of the FBI's practice-known to officials in the Justice
De.partment-of installing microphones in national security cases
without notifying the Department. 'Ve have examined the Bureau's
C'laim with respect to Attorney General Kennedy's possible knowledge
about the microphones and have found the following evidence.
As noted above, on .Tanuary 13, 1964, William Sullivan recommended
to Hoover that President Johnson's assistant, Walter Jenkins,
be given a copy of a memorandum detailing information discovered
through the Willard Hotel bug.lsS Sullivan expressed doubts, however,
about whether the Attorney General should be given the information:
The attached document is classified "Top Secret" to minimize
the likelihood that this material will be read by someone
who will leak it to King. However, it is possible despite its
classification, the Attorney General himself may reprimand
King on the basis of this material. If he does, it is not likely
,.. Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 12/15/66, p. 2.
1Bf Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 12/19/66.
'88 Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/13/64. This incident
is diSCUssed, at p. 121.
125
we will develop any more such information through the
means employed. It is highly important that we do develop
further information of this type in order that we may completely
discredit King as the leader of the Negro people.
Next to Sullivan's recommendation that Courtney Evans hand-deliver
a copy of the memorandum to the Attorney General, Director Hoover
wrote: "No. A copy need not be given the A.G." 189
Jenkins was subsequently shown a copy of the report, but was not
told the source of the information.
Shortly after the Honolulu bug, Sullivan changed his mind and
recommended that the Attorney General be informed of information
gathered by both the Willard and Honolulu bugs to "remove all doubt
from the Attorney General's mind about the type of person King
is." 190 Sullivan suggested:
Mr. Evans personally deliver to the Attorney General a
copy of the attached "Top Secret" memorandum. It is also
believed that Mr. Evans should indicate to the Attorney General
that if King was to become aware of our coverage of him
it is highly probable that we will no longer be able to develop
such information through the means employed to date and
that we, of course, are still desirous of continuing to develop
such information.
Director Hoover wrote next to this recommendation "O.K." A notation
in the margin states: "Done. 3/10/64. E[vans]." 191 The memorandum
sent to the Attorney General did not state the source of the information
that it contained.
When shown Sullivan's memorandum by the Committee, Courtney
Evans testified that he did not recall delivering the memorandum about
Dr. King to the Attorney General, but that "1 assume I must have in
view of this record." 192 He doubted that he had spoken with the Attorney
General about the substance of the memorandum, however, because
"if I did have a conversation with him, I believe I would have
written a memorandum as to that conversation." 193 When asked if he
recalled ever telling the Attorney General that the memorandum contained
information obtained through microphone coverage, Evanr.
testified:
No, I do not. And considering the tenor of the times then,
I would probably have been very circumspect and told him
I,. Sullivan memorandum, 1/13/64. Sullivan's remarks in this passage underscore
the tension generated by the mutually inconsistent policies of the FBI
and the Justice Department toward Dr. King. Sullivan viewed the FBI's task
as gathering information with which to discredit Dr. King. He perceived the Attorney
General's goal was to prevent Dr. King from being discredited. Sullivan
feared that if the Attorney General were told of the derogatory information about
Dr. King, the Attorney General might reprimand Dr. King. Thus, the FBI would
be thwarted in its goals if it gave the Attorney General information which he
needed to ensure that Dr. King not be discredited.
'.. Baumgardner memorandum, 3/4/64. See p. 122. Tbe memorandum also
stated: "We avoided mentioning specific dates as to when it took place or mention
of when the information was received~thus to avoid, if possible, a question
being raised by the Attorney General as to why he was not told earlier of
the Willard incident."
'91 Baumgardner memorandum, 3/4/64. p. 2.
,.. Courtney Evans testimony, 12/1/75, p. 20.
1.. Evans, 12/1/75, p. 20. The FBI has told the Committee that no such memorandum
exists in its files.
126
exactly what I was instructed to tell him and not~ing
more.... I think it is a matter of record that the relatIOnship
between the Att?rney General and the D~rector had
deteriorated to the pomt that they weren't speakmg to each
other. And consequently I felt that it was essential that I
followed these instructions very explicitly.194
A memorandum from Evans dated September 11, 1964, indicates
that the Attorney General had in fact received the summary memorandum,
but sheds no light on whether he was told the source of the
information:
Before leaving office, Attorney General Kennedy instructed
his Executive Assistant, Harold Reis, to return to the Bureau
copies of top secret memoranda submitted to him by
the FBI ... on March 4, 1964, and June 1, 1964, as Mr.
Kennedy did not feel this material should go to the general
Department files. These memoranda deal with activities of
Martin Luther King. Reis accordingly handed these memoranda
to me. They are attached.195
It is uncertain whether the Attorney General understood the source
of the information after reading the FBI summary memoranda.
Evans told the Committee that he never received any indication that
the Attorney General suspected the FBI was following Dr. King's
activities with hidden microphones, and surmised that the Attorney
General might have assumed the information was the product of live
informants, or surveillance by local law enforcement agencies.11l6
WaIter .Tenkins, who also read these memoranda, told the Committee
that he had not suspected that the FBI had obtained the information
in them by using microphones.197 Bill Moyers, President Johnson's
Assistant, also saw several of the memoranda concerning Dr.
King, and testified that he had not realized that the FBI had collected
the information through microphones. He told the Committee,
however. that "the nature of the general references that were being
made. I realized later, could only have come from that kind of
knowledge unless there was an informer in Martin Luther King's
presence a good bit of the time.IllS
(b) Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbaeh.-Four FBI documents
appear to indicate that Attorney General Katzenbach was
informed about the FBI's microphone surveillance of Dr. King. Katzenbach
testified that he could not recall having been informed of the
surveillance, and stated that it would have been inconsistent with his
claimed disapproval of a wiretap on Dr. King's home at the same time.
The Bureau's position appears in a DomestIc Intelligence memorandum
listing the wiretaps and microphones installed in the investigation
of Dr. King:
Attorney General Katzenbach was specifically notified of
three of these microphone installations. In each of these throo
... Evans, 1/21/75, pp. 21-22.
... Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 9/11/64.
"'" Evans 12/1/75, pp. 21-22.
'97 Staff summary of Walter Jenkins interview, 1971), p. 3•
... Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p.89.
127
instances the Attorney General was advised that a trespass
was involved in the installation.lss
The Bureau maintains that Attorney General Katzenbach was advised
of microphone placements in Dr. King's hotel rooms on the following
occasions:
On May 13, 1965, the New York field office installed a microphone
in Dr. Kmg's suite at the Sheraton Atlantic Hotel in New York,
pursuant to authorization from an In~ector in the Domestic Intelligence
Division, apparently without DIrector Hoover's prior knowledge.
According to a contemporaneous memorandum, the New York
office had only a few hours notice of Dr. King's arrival and needed
to install the microphone ''immediately.'' 200 A memorandum dated
May 17, addressed to the Attorney General and signed by Director
Hoover, stated:
On May 12, 1965, information was obtained indicating a meeting
of King and his advisors was to take place in New York
on that date. Because of the importance of that meeting and
the urgency of the situation, a microphone surveillance was
effected on May 13 . . .201
On October 14, 1965, a microphone was installed in Dr. King's
room in the Astor Hotel in New York. This installation was approved
by William Sullivan, head of the Domestic Intelligence Division, again
without Director Hoover's prior knowledge, "on New York's assurance
that. full security was available, and since time was of the essence"
(Sullivan claimed that the FBI had learned oiDr. King's plan to visit
New York only a few hours before.) 202 On his memorandum informing
Assistant to the Director Alan Belmont of the microphone placement,
Sullivan wrote: "Memo to AG being prepared." A memorandum
to the Attorney General, dated October 19 and signed by Director
Hoover, stated that the Astor Hotel surveillance had been placed
because of the "importance" of Dr. King's meeting with his advisers
in New York "and the urgency of the situation." 203
On November 9, 1965, a microphone was installed in Dr. King's
room in the Americana Hotel in New York. A Domestic Intelligence
Division memorandum of that date states:
On New York's assurance that full security was available
and since time was of the essence [as the FBI had learned of
Dr. King's planned visit to New York on that day], New
York was told to go ahead with the installation.... Inasmuch
as the installation will be made today (11/29/65) and deactivated
immediately upon Kin~'s departure, probably
11/30/65, we will promptly submit a memorandum to the
Attorney General advising when the installation was made
and when it was taken off.204
1111 Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 12/15/75, p. 2.
... Memorandum from Joseph Sizoo to William Sullivan, 5/13/65.
lI01 Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 5/17/65.
lIOI Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 10/14/65.
... Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 10/19/65.
... Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 11/29/65.
128
A memorandum to the Attorney General, dated December 1, 1965,
and bearing Director Hoover's signature, stated that "a microphone
surveillance was effected November 29,1965 on King ... and was discontinued
on November 30, 1965." The reason for the installation was
the "importance of the meeting and the urgency of the situation
" 205
N deB K 2'08
Katzenbach identified the handwritten note as his, and testified
that although he recalled writing the note, he could not recall why
he had written it. When asked if he recalled the "delicate surveillances"
mentioned in the note, Katzenbach told the Committee:
I don't recall, and I have nothing in my possession that
has served to refresh my recollection, and nothing has been
shown to me by the Committee staff that serves to refresh
my recollection.
Q. In your opinion, could this note have referred to the
three mentioned electronic surveillances against Dr. King?
Mr. KATZEXBACH. On its face it sa.ys that it did ... it
would seem to me that would be a possibility. I point out
that it could refer to almost anything. My opinion is obviously,
since I don't recall getting the first three, that this was
not associated with it, and I really don't have enough recollection
of what was a.ssociated with it to sa.y. I did see Mr.
The FBI has given the Committee copies of the three memoranda
to Attorney General Katzenbach informing him that microphones
had been placed on Dr. King's rooms. Each is initialed "N deB K"
in the upper right hand corner. When shown these memoranda, Katzenbach
testified: "Each of these bears my initials in what appears to be
my handwriting in the place where 'I customarily initialed Bureau
memoranda." 206 He denied, however, any recollection of having
received the memoranda.207
The Bureau also supplied the Committee with a transmittal slip
dated December 10, 1965.
Mr. Hoover-
Obviously these are particularly delicate surveillances and
we should be very cautious in terms of the non-FBI people
who may from time to time necessarily be involved in some
aspect of installation.
"'" Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 12/1/65.
,.,. :\Iicholas Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 211.
"'" When asked if he thought his initials in the comer of the three documents
were forgeries, Katzenbach testified: "Let me be just as clear about that as
I can. I have no recollection of receiving these documents, and I seriously
believe that I would have recollected them had I received them. If they are my
initials and if I put them on, then I am clearly mistaken in that recollection."
(Katzenbach.12/3/75. Hearings, p. 227.)
oat Memorandum from Nicholas Katzenbach to J. Edgar Hoover, 12/10/65.
The Bureau asserts that the transmittal slip, which bears an FBI secretary's
notation "Martin Luther King," was located in the FBI's Martin Lubber King
file. The serial number for filing on the transmittal slip is immediately subsequent
to the serial number of the December 1 notification. The Bureau has
Informed the committee, however, that there is no evidence that the two
memoranda were ever attached to one another, or that anything was attached
to the transmittal slip when it came to the Bureau.
129
Helms on that date. Whether it related to something he asked
for, I don't know.209
Katzenbach added that he was:
puzzled by the fact that the handwritten note, if related to
the December 1 memorandum from the Director, is written
on a separate piece of paper. It was then, and is now, my consistent
practice to write notes of that kind on the incoming
piece of paper, pl'Ovided there is room to do SO.210
The documentary evidence-the three notices that a microphone
had bee~n placed on a room occupied by Dr. King shortly before, and
the note in Katzenbach's handwriting referring to "delicate surveillances"
which the FBI states was sent to the Bureau with the last of
the notices-indicates that Attorney General Katzenbach knew of the
microphone surveillance but did not order it halted. Katzenbach, in
denying any knowledge of the microphones, pointed to two factors
mitIgating against the likelihood of his having permitted the surveillance
to continue once learning: of it: his rejection of a wiretap on
Dr. King's new home in April 1965, the fact that his handwritten note
urged caution in future surveillances, and that no microphone surveillances
were carried out after the date of the note.211
Katzenbach's position throughout his testimony before the Committee
is best summarized by a portion of a written, sworn statement that
he submitted at the time of his public appearance:
These memoranda do not indicate on their face the Bureau
sought any prior authorization, or state any reasons why it
was not sought. They appear to present me with information
after the fact and request no authority to perform similar
surveillances in the future. I believe the Bureau knew full well
that I would not authorize the surveillances in question, not
only because of the circumstances surrounding Dr. King, but
particularly because the bugs were to be placed in It hotel
room. That is among: the worst possible invasions of privacy
and would demand the strongest conceivable justification. Indeed,
I believe this position had been made clear in written
memoranda to the Bureau dating back to the 1950s, and I
have a clear recollection of being critical of the Bureau for
installing a bug in the bedroom of a leading member of the
Mafia. I reaffirmed this position to the Bureau sometime in
1965 or 1966, but that reaffirmation may have postdated these
memoranda.
Finally, I cannot recall any memoranda at any time informing
me that the Bureau had installed a tap or a bug without
"" Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, p. 229. Katzenbach also told the Committee:
"My calendar does show that on that date I had a meeting alone with the Deputy
Director of the CIA, Mr. Helms, which he had requested the previous afternoon.
The meeting was a brief one and would be consistent with a request by the CIA
for domestic surveillances by the FBI. I rarely saw Mr. Helms alone, and he
did on one or two occasions make such a request. But I oove no recollection of
the subject matter of that particular meeting and cannot, therefore say that this
handwritten note is related to it." (Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, p. 211.)
01. Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, p. 211.
211 Katzenbach, 11/12175, pp. 75-76.
130
my prior authorization. While I authorized Mr. Hoover to do
so in emergency circumstances in a memorandum written in
the summer of 1965, not only does the May memorandum predate
that authorization, but there is nothing in the memoranda
which su~gests that on any of these occasions was there
an "emergency.' Further, my calendars, which are in the
possession of the Committoo, indicate my general availability
212 to the Bureau on two occasions involving these
memoranda, and my total availability to the Bureau on the
third. Nor do I have any recollection that the "emergency"
procedure was ever invoked by the Bureau during my term
in office.
Obviously I do not believe that I received these memoranda.
Equally obvious is the fact that if I initialed them, I
am mistaken in my belief. 213
Although apparently no microphones were placed in Dr. King's
hotel rooms after the November 29,1965 "bug" at the Americana Hotel,
the Domestic Intelligence Division did make one further attempt to
install a microphone. A memorandum from William Sullivan to Carlha
DeLoach, then Assistant to the Director. dated January 21,1966, states
that Sullivan had authorized the New York office to "bug" King's room
during an anticipated three-day stay. Clyde Tolson wrote across this
memorandum, "Remove this surveillance at once. 1/21," and Hoover
added his "yes." Tolson added a note on the bottom of the memorandum,
complaining, "No one here approved this. I have told Sullivan
again not to instItute a mike surveillance without the Director's approval."
Hoover wrote next to this comment. "Right." 214
012 Katzenbach wrote in 8. footnote, asterisked after this reference to his "general
availability": "For communications purposes, it was my consistent practice
to be met by Bureau agents whenever I traveled. In addition, I kept the White
House operator informed of how to reach me at all times. In the first occasion,
I left my office for a flight to Chicago at 2 ;3() p.m. and was, as a practical matter,
unavailable to the Bureau only during the two-hour flight. On the second occa,
don, I left my office at 12 :35 p.m. for a one-hour flight to New York, and was
similarly unavailable only during the flight. On the third occasion, I was in my
Washington office all day, and thus always available to the Bureau."
212 Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, pp. 211-212.
21< Memorandum from William Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, V21/66. The
significance of this memorandum is unclear. Hoover's and Tolson's strong reactions
tn Sullivan's approval of a microphone on King's room-an action which Sullivan
hart taken several times before--may have been in response to the "delicate
surveillances" warning of the Attorney General, or an added caution in light of
the Long Committee investigation into electronic surveillance. (The Long Com·
mittee investigation is discussed in the Committee Staff Report about electronic
surveillance.) It is perhaps significant that on the same day that Tolson ordered
Rullivan to remove the "bug" from Dr. King's hotel room, C. D. DeLoach met
with Senator Long and, according to a memorandum by DeLoach, secured Senator
Long's promise not to call any FBI witnesses to testify before his Subcommittee.
DeLoach's account of that meeting states:
"While we have neutralized the threat of 'being embarrassed by the Long Subcommittee,
we have not yet eliminated certain dangers which might be created
as a result of newspaper pressure on Long. We therefore must keep on top of
this situation at all times." (Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach •.) C. Tolson,
11121/66. Ordering Sullivan to remove the microphone in Dr. King.~ .~tpl room,
whiC'h would have proven extremely embarrassing if it had been disco \ ered,
might have been one of Tolson's responses to DeLoach's warning.)
131
Y. THE FBI'S EFFORT TO DISCREDIT DR. MARTIX LUTHER KING: 1964
Introduction and Summary
In December 1963, a meeting was convened at FBI headquarters to
discuss various "avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as
an effective Negro leader." Two weeks later, FBI agents planted the
first microphones in Dr. King's hotel rooms in an "attempt" to obtain
information about the private "activities of Dr. King and his associates"
so that Dr. King could be "completely discredited." That same
week, the head of the Domestic Intellig-ence Division recommended
the promotion of a new "national Negro leader" who could "overshadow
King and be in the position to assume the role of the leadership
of the Negro people when King has been completely discredited."
The FBI's effort to discredit Dr. King and to undermine the SCLC
involved plans touching on virtually every aspect of Dr. King's life.
The FBI scrutinized Dr. King's tax returns, monitored his financial
affairs, and even tried to establish that he had a secret foreign bank
account. Religious leaders and institutions were contacted in an effort
to undermine their support of him, and unfavorable material was
"leaked" to the press. Bureau officials contacted members of Cong-ress,
and special "off the record" testimony was prepared for the Director's
use before the House Appropriations Committee. Efforts were made
to turn White House and Justice Department Officials against Dr.
King by barraging them with unfavorable reports and, according to
one witness, even offering to play for a White House official tape
recordings that the Bureau considered embarrassing to King.
This chapter examines not only the Bureau's efforts to discredit Dr.
King, but the degree to which officials in other branches of the Government
were responsible for those actions. A few months before the FBI
held its December 1963 conference at which its program against Dr.
King was apparently formulated, the Director distributed a "monog-
raph" about Dr. King to the heads of several Governmental ag-encies.
Attorney General Kennedy ordered it immediately withdrawn. During
the course of the followinl! year, the FBI sent several intellil!ence reports
bearing on Dr. King's private life to the White House and Justice
Department. Although government officials outside the FBI were
not aware of the extent of the FBI's efforts to discredit Dr. King,
officials of the Justice Department and of the White House did know
that the FBI had offered tape recordings and derogatory information
about Dr. King to reporters. The Attorney General went no further
than complaining to the President and accepting a Bureau official's
representation that the allegations were not true. President .rohnson
not only failed to order the Bureau to stop, but indeed cautioned it
against dealing with certain reporters wlio had complained of its
conduct.
A. The FBI Disseminates the First Kinq "Monograph" and Attorney
General Kennedy Orders It RN·ulled.· Ortober 1963
On October 15, 1963, William Sullivan forwarded to Assistant Director
Alan Belmont for his approval a monograph entitled "Communism
and the Negro Movement-A Current Analysis." He proposed
132
that it be distributed to the Attorney General, the ,Yhite House, CIA,
State Department, Defense Department, and Defense Department intelligence
agencies. 215 Sullivan testified that the purpose of the monograph
was to "discredit King." 216
Belmont submitted the monograph to the Director with a note
stating:
The attached analysis of Communism and the Negro movement
is highly explosive. It can be regarded as a personal
attack on Martin Luther King. There is no doubt it will have
a heavy impact on the Attorney General and anyone else to
whom we disseminate....
The memorandum makes good reading and is based on information
from reliable sources. 'Ve may well be charged,
however, with expressing opinions and conclusions, particularly
with reference to some of the statements about King.
This memorandum may startle the Attorney General, particularly
in view of his past association with King, and the
fact that we are disseminating this outside the Department.
He may resent this. Nevertheless, the memorandum is a powerful
warning against Communist influence in the Negro movement,
and we will be carrying out our responsibility by disseminating
it to the people indicated in the attached memorandum.
217
The monograph was distributed on October 18, 1963. One week later,
the Attorney General called Courtney Evans and stated that he had
just learned that the Army had received a copy of a report about Dr.
King's alleged communist activities. Evans reported to Belmont:
He was obviously irritated. He went on to ask if the Army
got copies of all reports submitted to him.... The Attorney
General asked what responsibilities the Army had in relation
to the communist background of Martin Luther King. I told
the Attorney General ... that the Army had an interest in
communist activities particularly in relation to racial matters .
because the military had to be called on if civil disturbances
arising out of such matters went beyond the ability of civilian
authorities. This explanation seemed to serve no purpose.21S
Director Hoover recorded in a memorandum of the same date :
The Attorney General called and advised me there was a lot
of talk at the Pentagon regarding the document.... The Attorney
General anticipated that this information would leak
out as the military didn't like the Negroes.
The Attorney General felt we should get back all copies of
the document. I told him ... we would get them from all agenlllliMemorandum
from William 'Sullivan to Alan Belmont,10/15/63.
216 William Sullivan testiClony, 11/1/75, p. 49.
217 Memorandum from Alan Belmont to Clyde Tolson, 10/17/63. Hoover wrote in
the margin "We must do our duty" and "I am glad you recognize nit last that
there exists such influence." Copies were sent to the Attorney General, the White
House, the Secretary of State, the Director of .ceIttral Intelligence, the 'Secretary
of Defense, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, and the Department of Special Investigations of 'the Air Force.
218 Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 10/25/63.
133
cies to which they were disseminated.... I also told him if an)'
newspapers asked about this, no comment would be made and
no mention would be made that such a document existed.219
All copies were recovered by October 28.
Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil
Rights Division under Robert Kennedy, told the Committee that the
monograph was:
a personal diatribe . . . a personal attack without evidentiary
support on the character, the moral character and
person of Dr. ~fartin Luther King, and it was only peripherally
related to anything substantive, like whether or not there
was communist infiltration or influence on the civil rights
movement.... It was a personal attack on the man and went
far afield trom the charges [of possible communist
influence]. 220
Marshall recalled that he had been very "irritated" about the monograph
and that the Attorney General had "thought it was outrageous."
He remembered that the Attorney General had ordered the monograph
withdrawn, but did not know if the Attorney General had taken
any further steps to reprimand the Bureau.221
B. The FBI Plans /t.~ Campaign To Di8('redit Dr. King: December ~3,
1963
On December 23, 1963, a nine-hour conference was held at FBI
headquarters to discuss Martin Luther King. In attendance were Assistant
Director Sullivan, Internal Security Section Chief Frederick
Baumgardner, three other FBI headquarters officials, and two agents
from the FBI's Atlanta Field Office.
A prepared list of twenty-one pro~osals was presented and discussed.
The proposals raised the possibIlity of "using" ministers, "disgruntled"
acquaintances, "aggressive" newsmen, "colored" agents, Dr.
King's housekeeper, and e\'en suggested using Dr. King's wife or
"placing a good looking female plant in King's office." 222 An
account of the meeting written by William Sullivan emphasized that
the Bureau must take a "discreet approach" in developing information
about Dr. King for use "at an opportune time in a counterintelli-
210 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Clyde Tolson. Alan Belmont. John
Mohr, Cartha DeLoach, Alex Rosen, and William Sullivan, 10/25/63.
zoo Burke Marshall testimony. 3/3/76. p. 32. Carl T. Rowan. then Director of
USIA, was sent a copy of the monograph. In a newspaper article in 1969. Rowan
wrote, "(p)erhaps this is the time for me to reveal that I have read the FBI
reports based on electronic surveillance of the late Nobel Prize·winner. I know
how much dirt the FBI has dug UP. and 90 percent of it is barn-yard gossip that
has nothing to do with 'internal security' or 'Marxist influences.'" (Carl T.
Rowan, "FBI Won't Talk About Additional Wiretappings," The Washington
D.C. Evening Star, 6/20/69, p. A-13)
.... Marshall testimony. 3/3/76, p. 34. ,
.., FBI work paper, "Questions To Be Explored at Oonference 12/23/63 re:
Communist Influ'ence in Racial Matters."
The Bureau subsequently considered the possibility of getting Detroit pollcemen
to raid Dr. King's hotel room in March 1964 and kept abreast of the Miami
police force's plans to raid Dr. King's hotel room in 1966 (Unsigned Bureau
memorandum, "For Telephonic Briefing of Detroit Office;" Airtel, Miami Office to
Director, FBI, 5/23/66).
134
gence move to discredit him." It was generally agreed that the Bureau
should make use of "all available investigative techniques coupled with
meticulous, planning, boldness, and ingenuity, tempered only with
good judgment," but that "discretion must not reach the point of
timidity." 223
Sullivan's memorandum reported that the following decisions were
made at the conference:
(1) We must determine and check out all of the employees
of the SCLC.
(2) We must locate and monitor the funds of the SCLC.
(3) We must identify and check out the sources who contribute
to the SCLC. .
(4) We must continue to keep close watch on King's personal
activities.
(5) We will, at the propel' time when it can be done without
embarrassment to the Bureau, expose King as an opportunist
who is not a sincere person but is exploiting the
racial situation for personal gain.
(6) We will explore the possibility of utilizing additional
specialized investIgative techniques at the SOLO office.
Sullivan described the purpose of the meeting as
To explore how best to carry on our investigation to produce
the desired results without embarrassment to the Bureau.
Included in our discussion was a complete analysis of
the avenues ofa;pproach aimed at neutralizing King as an effective
Negro leader and developing evidence concerning
King's continued dependence on communists for guidance
and direction.224
Precisely what prompted the Bureau to decide upon this drastic
new approach is still unclear.
William Sullivan was asked by the Committee whether tactics, such
as placing female "plants," were common practices of the FBI. Sullivan
testified that they were :
common practice among intelligence services all over the
world. This is not an isolated phenomenon. . . . This is a
common practice, rough, tough, dirty business. Whether we
should be in it or not, that is for you folks to decide. We are
in it .... No holds were barred. We have used that technique
against Soviet agents. They have used it against us.
Q'/.Wstion. The same methods were brought home ~
Mr. SULLIVAN. Brought home against any organization
against which we were targeted. We did not differentiate.
This is a rough, tough business.
Senator MONDALE. 'Vould it be safe to say that the techniques
we learned in fighting . . . true espionage in WorId
... Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/24/63. Six months
later, in April 1964, FBI headquarters was still instructing agents in the field to
"continue to gather information concerning King's personal activities . . . in
order that we may consider using this information at an opportune time in a
counterintelligence move to discredit him" and to consider the possibility of
"utilizing contracts in the news media field." (Memorandum from FBI Director
to Atlanta Office, April 1, 1964)
... Sullivan memorandum, 12/24/63.
135
War II came to be used against some of our own American
citizens~
Mr. SULLIVAN. That would be a correct deduction.225
Sullivan testified that the plans formulated at the December 24,
1963 meeting were in accord with "Mr. Hoover's policy." 226 After
reviewing the memoranda, Sullivan emphasized,
I want to make this clear. this is not an isolated phenomenon,
that this was a practice of the Bureau down through the
years. I might say it often became a real character assassination.
221
Sullivan was asked by the Committee whether he or any other employees
of the Bureau ever objected to using these tactics. Sullivan
responded:
Not to my recollootion ... I was not ready at that time to
collide with him. Everybody in Ithe Division went right along
with Hoover's policy. I do not recall anybody ever raising
a question.
. . . never once did I heal' anybody, including myself,
raise the question, is this course of action which we have
agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moraH We
never gave any thought to this realm of reasoning, because
we were just naturally pragmatists. The one thing we were
concerned about will this course of action work, will it get
us what we want, will we reach the objective that we desire
to reach ~
As far as legality is concerned, morals or ethics, was never
raised by myself or anybody else.... I think this suggests
really in government weare amoraJ.228
On December 29, 1963, less than a week after the FBI conference,
Time magazine chose Dr. King as the "Man of the Year," describing
him as the "unchallenged voice of the Negro people ... [who] has
infused the Negroes themselves with the fiber that gives their revolution
its true stature." 229 Hoover wrote across the memorandum informing
him of this honor : "They had to dig deep in the garbage
to come up with this one." 230
O. William Sullivan proposes (( plan to promote a new negro leader:
JanU4ry 1964-
On January 6, 1964-about two weeks after the FBI's conference
to plan methods of "neutralizing" Dr. King's influence and to gather
information about D. King's personal life-the FBI installed the
microphone in Dr. King's room at the Willard Hotel. As explained
in the preceding chapter, additional microphones soon followed;
... Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 97.
... Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 85.
"" Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 87.
... 'Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 92-93.
... United Press International release, 12/29/63, regarding 1/3/64 Time cover
story.
... UPI release, 12/29/63.
136
physical and photographic surveillance was initiated; special
Headquarters "briefings" were held; "dry runs" Were planned;
and the most sophisticated and experienced Bureau personnel were
deployed to gather information that might be used in a concerted
effort to destroy Dr. King's influence. -
Two days after the installation of the Willard Hotel microphones,
Assistant Director William Sullivan proposed that the FBI select
a new "national ~egro leader" as Dr. King's successor. In proposing the
plan, Sullivan stated:
It should be clear to all of us that Martin Luther King
must, at some propitious point in the future, be revealed to
the people of this country and to his Negro followers as
being what he actually is-a fmud, demagogue and scoundrel.
'Vhen the true facts concerning his activities are presented,
such should be enough, if handled properly, to take him off
his pedestal and to reduce him completely in influence. When
this is done, and it can be and will be done, obviously much
confusion will reign, particularly among the Negro people.
. . . The Negroes will be left WIthout a national leader of
sufficiently compelling personality to steer them in the proper
direction. This is what could happen, but need not happen
if the right kind of a national Negro leader could at this
time be gradually developed so as to overshadow Dr. King
and be in the position to assume the role of the leadership
of the :Negro people when King has been completely discredited.
For some months I have been thinking about this matter.
One day I had an opportunity to explore this from a philosophical
and sociological standpoint with [an acquaintance]
whom I have known for some years.... I asked [him] to
give the matter some attention and if he knew any Negro of
outstanding intelligence and ability to let me know and we
would have a discussion. [He] has submitted to me the name
of the above-captioned person. Enclosed with this memorandum
is an outline of [the person's] biography which is truly
remarkable for a man so young. On scanning this biography,
it will 'be seen that [he] does have all the qualifications of the
kind of a Negro I have in mind to advance to positions of nationalleadership....
If this thing can be set up properly without the Bureau in
any way becoming directly involved, I think it would be not
only a great help to the FBI but would be a fine thing for
the country at large. While I am not specifying at this
moment, there are various ways in which the FBI could give
this entire matter the proper direction and development.
There are highly placed contacts of the FBI who might be
very helpful to further such a step. These can be discussed in
detail later when I have probed more fully into the
possibilities 231
When Sullivan was shown this memorandum by the Committee, he
testified:
231 Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/8/64.
137
I'm very proud of this memorandum, one of the best memoranda
I ever wrote. I think here I was showing some concern
for the country.232
Sullivan sought the Director's approval "to explore this whole matter
in greater detail." The Director noted his own "o.k." and added:
I am glad to see that "lighf~ has finally, though dismally
delayed, come to the Domestic Int, Div. I struggled for
months to get over the fact that the communists were taking
over the racial movement but our experts here couldn't or
wouldn't see it.233
It is uncertain whether the FBI took steps to implement Sullivan's
plan. The FBI files contain no additional memoranda on the subject.
The successor for Dr. King proposed in Sullivan's memorandum has
told the Committee that he was nenr contacted by the FBI, and that
he was not aware of the FBI's plans for him or of any attempts by the
FBI to promote him as a ci,-il rights leader.234
D. FBI Headquarters Orders the Field Ofti(}('s To Intpnsijy Efforts
to Discredit Dr. [{ing: April-August 1964
On April 1, 1964, in response to a suggestion from the Atlanta field
office for another conference in Washington to plan strategy against
Dr. King, FBI Headquarters ordered the At lanta and New York
offices to:
give the matter of instant imestigation a thorough analysis
with a view toward suggesting new anmues of investigation
and intensification in areas already being explored. Bear in
mind the main goals of this matter; naJffiely~ determining the
extent of the communist influence in racial matters and taking
such action as is appropriate to neutralize or completely diJJcredit
the effectil'lless of Martin Luther [{ing, Jr., as a Negro
leader. ... 235 [Emphasis added.]
Headquarters listed several are-as "having potential for further
inquiry" :
possibilities of anonymous source contacts, possibilities of utilizing
contaets in the news media field; initiating discreet
checks relative to developing background information on
employees of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC); remaining alert to the possibility of capitalizing
on any disgruntled SCLC employee; the possihility of developing
information concerning any financial dealings of
King which may be illegal; and the development of subversive
information pertaining to SCLO employees.236
The Atlanta Office responded with several ideas for "how the effectiveness
of King can be neutralized or discredited.237
-'Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 149.
... Sullivan memorandum, 1/8/64.
... Staff interview. 11/17/75. This note by Director Hoover should be read in light
of his "feud" with the Domestic Intelligence Division described pp. 104 et seq.
... Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC Atlanta, 4/1/64.
"6 Director, FBI memorandum, 4/1/64.
231 Memorandum from SAC, Atlanta to Headquarters, 4/14/64, p. 11.
138
-Determining whether a "rift" was developing between Dr. King
and Roy Wilkins, head of the NAACP, and if so, using newspapers
friendly to the Bureau to "feed pertinent subversive connections and
dealings of King to Wilkins."
-"Furnishing to friendly newspapers on an anonymous basis, certain
specific leads where he may develop the necessary data so that
he may further write critical news stories."
-"Discreetly investigate the background of twelve key (SeLe)
employ~ and associates in an effort to obtain some weakness that
could be used fur counter-intelligence activities."
-"Injection of false infovmatlOn with certain discontented (SCLC)
employees."
-Sending letters to SCLC's financial donors, written on SCLC stationery
fabricated in the FBI laboratory and bearing Dr. King's signature,
advising the donors that the IRS was checking SCLC's tax
records. "It is believed that such a letter of this type from SCLC
may cause considerable concern and eliminwte future contributions."
-Placing a pretext call to an SCLC creditor to impress him with
the "financial plight" of the SCLC so that he "may be incited into
collection efforts."
-Examining Dr. King's checking accounts and credit card accounts
to develop information about his financial affairs.
-Making a survey to determine whether to install a "trash cover"
of the SCLC office in Atlanta.238
The Atlanta office also assured the Bureau that it would continue
to explore the possibility of technical coverage of an Atlanta apartment
frequently used by Dr. King, although coverage would involve
several security problems.239
Shortly, after these proposals were submitted, the Director expressed
"the Bureau's gratitude" to the Atlanta agents for their "aggressive
imagination looking toward more and better ways of meeting
the problems involved" in theinvestigation.240
The New York office submitted only a few new suggestions, assertings
that "It is felt that [our] coverage is adequate." 241 To this the
Dir~l3toJl ~plied:
The Bureau cannot adjudge as adequate any coverage which
does not positively ,provide to the Bureau 100 percent of the
intelligence relating to the communist influence in racial mat-
... SAO, Atlanta memorandum, 4/14/64.
... The FBI overcame similar security problems in another city where hotel
room coverage of Dr. King was d~ired by supplying "lead" information to
newsmen "in order that they might determine if they could develop sufficient
facts to cause an expose of King."
... Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, Atlanta, 4/24/64. The Domestic
Intelligence Division ultimately approved taking preliminary steps for possible
anonymous mailings to the newsman and to install coverage on any new apartments
that King might lease. The other suggestions were rejected because, they
did "not appear desirable and/or feasible for direct action by the Bureau at this
time." '(Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 5/6/64.)
"1 Memorandum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 4/14/64, p. 2. Those
suggestions essentiaHy included increasing coverage of the New York SCLe office
and sending an anonymous letter to a disaffected SCLe employee "to cause disruption
in the New York office." The anonymous \etter was ultimately mailed.
(Memorandum trom Director, FBI, to SAC, New York, 4/20/64.)
139
tel'S. Obviously, we are not securing all the information that
is pertinent and needs to be secured. Our coverage, therefore.
is not deemed adequate.242
'With respect to the New York office's conclusions about a civil rights
leader and associate of Dr. King, who was also under close Bureau
scrutiny for alleged "subversive" ties, the Director wrote:
The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the
New York office that [ ] is not sympathetic to the Party
cause. 'Yhile there may not be any direct evidence that
[ ] is a communist, neither is there any substantial evidence
that he is anticommunist.243
Surprisingly, the Bureau did not even comment on the statement
of the New York office that Adviser A was "not now under CP discipline
in the civil rights field." 244
In June 1964 a special unit was established in the Bureau's Internal
Security Sedion to handle exclusively "the over-all problem of communist
penetration with the racial movement." 245 The memorandum
justifying the special unit pointed out that "urgency for the FBI to
'stay ahead' of the situation is tied to pending civil rights legislation
and foreseeable ramifications arising out of the complex politICal situ~
ations in an election year where civil rights and social disturbances will
playa key role in campaign efforts and possible election results." 246
In August the Bureau issued new instructions directing the field "to
broaden its efforts relating to communist influences in the racial
field." 247 The term "communist," the field was told, "should be interpreted
in its broadest sense as including persons not only adhering to
the principles of the CPUSA itself, but also to such splinter and offshoot
groups as the Socialist 'Vorkers Party, Progressive Labor and
the like." 248 The Director pointed out:
The news media of recent months mirror the civil rights
issue as probably the number one domestic issue in the political
spectrum. There are clear and unmistakable signs that we
are in the midst of a social revolution with the racial movement
as its core. The Bureau, in meeting its responsibilities in
this area, is an integral part of this revolution....249
The Special Unit that had been established in June was made a permanent
unit.
2<2 Memorandum from Director, FBI. to SAC, New York, 4/24/64.
... Director, FBI memorandum, 4/24/64, p. 2.
:u, SAC, New York memorandum, 4/14/64. A detailed, comprehensive, 163-pal\'f'
internal Headquarters working paper, entitled "Communist Party, USA, Negro
Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters," dated April 27, 1964, includes
14 pages dealing solely with Adviser A, but does not include the information
received from New York just two weeks earlier that Adviser A "is not now
under CP discipline in the civil rights field."
". Unsigned FBI Memol'llndum, Addendum by Inspection Division, 6/4/64.
... Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 5/20/64,
addendum by Inspection Division, p. 1.
..7 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/25/64.
... Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, Atlanta, 8/28/64, p. 6.
... Director, FBI memorandum, 8/28/64, pp. 1-2.
69-984 0 - 76 - 10
140
E. Steps Taken by the FBI in 1964 to Discredit Dr. King
The FBI's program to "neutralize" Martin Luther King as the leader
of the civil rights movement went far beyond the planning and collection
stage. The Committee has discovered the following attempts by
the FBI to discredit Dr. King in 1964.
1. Attempts to Di.'5credit Dr. King 1vith the White HO'IJ}Je
As set forth in the preceding chapter, a memorandum summarizing
the contents of the Willard Hotel tapes was shown to presidential
assistant Walter Jenkins in January 1964 "inasmuch as King is seeking
an appointment with President Johnson.~' 250 The summary of information
obtained from surveillance at the Willard, Honolulu, and
Los Angeles hotels was sent to the White House and to the
Attorney General in March 1964 in order to "remove all doubt from
the Attorney General's mind as to the type of person King is." 251 A
third memorandum derived from microphone surveillance was sent to
the 1Vhite House in July.252
g. Attempts to Discredit /Jr. King With the Oongress
In January 1964, Director Hoover gave off-the-record testimony
before the House Appropriations Committee. His precise comments
are not known. The briefing paper prepared for his appearance by the
Domestic Intelligence Division. however, indicates that Director
Hoover was prepared to represent to the Committee that Dr. King's
advisers were communists and that Dr. King engaged in improper
behavior.lI53
The Director's off-the-record briefing had an immediate impact.
The FBI was soon told that the members of the Committee were "very
concerned regarding the background" of Dr. King, and that some
members of the Committe,e felt that the President should be requested.
to instruct the USIA to withdraw a film dealing favorably with the
August 1963 March on Washin¢,on. They were reported to be "particularly
disturbed and irked at the fact that Martin Luther King
appears to predominate the film." 25'
In March 1964 Cartha DeLoach. ~\ssistant to the Director. reported
that he had been approached by Representative Howard Smith (DYa.),
Chairman of the House Rules Committee. According to DeLoach's
memorandum, Representative Smith said that he had heard
about the Director's remarks before the Appropriations Committee.
Congressman Smith was reported to have a."ked for information for
a speech about Dr. King on the floor of the House" DeLoach declined
to furnish the required information. hut recommended to the Director
!SO Sullivan memorandum, 1/13/64, .p. 2.
"" Baumgardner memorandum, 3/4/64.
..2 See Chapter IV.
... Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 1/22/64.
... Memorandum from X. P. Callahan to John Mohr, 1/31/64.
Carl Rowan told a Committee staff member that shortly before his appointment
as Director of USIA was announced,· he had been invited to the White
House for 11 Sunday evening dinner with the Preo;ident and Mrs. Johnson to
vie,,' tbe fllm about th~ March. Rowan said that when the President asked him
if he was going to distribute the film, Rowan replied that if he could not, "you
have to find yourself a new Director." Rowan recalled that the President replied.
"That's good enough for me." Rowan recalled that after the film had been distributed,
he had been called aside by Congressman Rooney, who repeated stories
about Dr. King that had been gil'en to him by the Bureau. Rowan stated that
Rooney had specifically mentioned the bugging of Dr. King's suite at the Willard
Hotel. (Staff Interview of Carl T. Rowan, 8/29/75)
141
that Congressman Smith might be useful in the future because a
speech by him about Dr. King would be picked up by "newspapers all
over the Nation." 255
In a television interview several years later, C'ongrPA'lSman Roonpy
stated:
Now you talk about the FBI leaking something about Martin
Luther King. I happen to know all about Martin Luther
King, but I have never told anybody.
INTERVIEWER. How do you know everything about ·Martin
Luther King?
Representative ROOXEY. From the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
INTERVIEWER. They've told you-gave you information
based on tapes or other sources about Martin Luther King?
Representative ROOXEY. They did.
INTERVIEWER. Is that proper?
Representative ROONEY. "Thy not? 256
3. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with Universities
In parly ~farch 1964, the Burpaulearnpd that MarqllPtte Univprsity
in ~1ilwaukee,·Wisconsin contemplatPfI awarding Dr. King an honorary
degTPP. A memorandum notpd :
It is shocking indeed that the possibility exists that King
may recei"'e an Honorary Degrer from tlw samp institution
which honored thp Dirpctor with such a dpgrep in 1!);'')O. • • •
By making pertinpnt information availablp to [a Univprsity
official] at this time, on a strictly confidential hasis, we will
be giving thp Gniversity snfficipnt timp to mabIe it to take
postive action in a mannpr which mi.ght avoid embarrassment
to the University.25'
The university official was briefed by an FBI agent on Dr. King's
background and assured the Bureau that Dr. King would not be
considered for an honorary degree. The result of this FBI project is
unclear.
In April 1964, the FBI karnpo that Dr. King had bpen offl'rl'd an
honorary degree by Springfield College. DeLoach visited Senator
~everett Saltonstall? who .was a.member of the board or.t.he Cone~,
m an effort to convmce hIm to mfluence tpe College to WIthdraw Its
offer. According to DeLoach, Senlltor Saltonstall promised to speak
with an official or the College. The College offi<{ial was reported to
have subsequently visited DeLoach,258 but to have said that he would
be unable to "uninvite" Dr. King because the information concerning
.... Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 3/16/64, p. 2. Hoover
wrote on DeLoach's memorandum: "Someone on Senator [sic] Rooney's eolnmittee
certainly betrayed the secrecy of the 'off-the-record' testimony I gave re: King.
I do not want anything on King given to Smith nor anyone else at this time."
2M Interview with Congressman Rooney, NBC News' "First Tuesday," 6/1/71.
207 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 3/4/64.
The officer who handled this assignment was given a letter of commendation by
the Director and a monetary award. .
... DeLoach had originally intended not to contact the College official because
of his "close association with (Sargent) Shriver." Senator Saltonstall, however,
requested the College official to confer with DeLoach.
142
Dr. King had to be held in confidence, and the board of trustees was
governed by "liberals." 259
4. Attempts to Dis('redit Dr. King with Churches
On .June 12, 1964, ",Yilliam Sullivan wrote a ml.'morandum stating
that he had bel.'n contactl.'d by the General Serretary of the Xational
Council of the Churclws of Christ. Sullivan rl.'portl.'c! that, "I took
the }il)l,'rty of advising [him] confidl.'ntally of tlll.' faet that Dr. Martin
Luthe'r King not only le'ft a gre'at deal to he desired from the standpoint
of Communism. but also from the standpoint of personal conduct."
Sullivan observed:
I think that we have sowed an idl.'a here which may do some
good. I will follow up on the matter very discrertly to see
what dpsirahk rl.'sults may pmanate therpfrom.26o
Sullivan IIwt again with tJw Gpnpral Secrl'tary in mid-Decl'mber
Hl64 and reported that the Ge'neral Secretary had assured him "stl'PS
hav(' b('('n takrn hy tll{' XationaJ Council of the Churclll.'s of Christ to
make certain from this time on that :Martin Luther King will never
get 'one single dollar' of financial support from the Xational Council."
Sullivan reported that tIll' Se'cretary stated that he had discussed
Dr. King's background with some "key" protestant clergymen who
Wl're "horrified." Sullivan also notl.'d that the Secretary said that he
also intended to discuss the matter with Roy W"ilkins to persuade
'YiJkins "that Negro leadrrs should completely isolate King and
relllove him from the' role' Ill' is now occupying in civil rights
activities." 261
On December 8, 1964, the Director authorized the disclosure of information
about Dr. King's personal life to an influential member of the
Baptist World Alliance (HWA), so that he could pass the information
along to the General Secretary of BWA, and to BWA Program
Committee members, to prevent the Committee from inviting Dr. King
to address the BWA's 1965 Congress in Miami Beach. The Director
rejected a proposal, however, for "arranging for [certain B"WA members]
to listen to sources we have concerning this matter." 262
5. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King 1vith the Pope
On August 31, 1964, the FBI learned that Dr. King, who was going
to be tourmg Europe in September, might have plans to visit the Pope.
Internal Security Section Chief Baumgardner observed :
It would be shocking indeed for such an unscrupulous
character as King to receive an audience with the Pope. It is
believed that if a plan to see the Pope is in the making, it
ought to be nipped in the bud. We have considered different
possibilities for meeting this problem and believe that the
best one would be to have Assistant Director Malone of the
New York office personally contact Francis Cardinal Spellman
and on a highly confidential basis bring to the Cardinal's
attention the fact that King is to visit Rome....
""'Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 4/8/64. DeLoach stated
that he would "deny any such information had been furnish('(}" if the official
told anyone that the FBI had briefed him.
... Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/16/64.
"" Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/16/64.
2M }Iemorandum from Milton .Jones to Cartha DeLoach, 12/8/64.
143
Malone should be able to impress upon the Cardinal the
likely embarrassment that may result to the Pope should he
grant King an audience and King is later discredited.263
On September 8, Baumgardner reported:
Malone called today and stated that he had discussed the
situation with Cardinal Spellman over the weekend and
he said that the Cardinal took instant steps to advise the
Vatican against granting any audience to King ... Cardinal
Spellman is going to Rome next week . . . and thus wi~l
he on the scene personally and further insure that the Pope IS
not placed in an embarrassing position through any contact
with King.264
The FBI's efforts were to no avail. The Pope met with Dr. King. Thl'
Director wrote across the memoranda informing him of that meeting,
"astounding," and "I am amazed that the Pope gave an audience to
such a [excised by FBI].265 The Director then initiated inquiries into
the reason for the failure of this project.
6. The Attempt to Discredit Dr. King During His Rereipt of
the Nobel Pea.ce Prize
On October 14, 1964, Martin Luther King was named to win the
Nobel Peace Prize. He received the prize in Europe on December 10,
1965. The FBI took measures to dampen Dr. King's welcome, both in
Europe and on his return home.
On November 22, 1964--hvo weeks before Dr. King's trip to recei,Te
the prize-the Domestic Intelligence Division assembled a thirteenpage
updated printed version of the monograph which Attorney General
Kennedy had ordered recalled in October 1963.266 .A copy was sent
to Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, on December 1, 1964,
with a letter requesting his advice concerning whether the monograph
should also be distributed to "responsible officials in the Executive
Branch." 267 Moyers gave his permission on December 7,268 and copies
were distributed. to the heads of several executive agencies.269
Information about Dr. King's private life was also made available
to United Nations representatives Adlai Stevenson and Ralph Bunche,
who the Bureau had learned were being considered as possible par-
... Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to 'Villiam Sullivan, 8/31/64,
V.I.
The Chief of the Security Section recommend('d:
"If approved, Assistant Director ~lalone should personally orally bri('f Francis
Oardinal Spellman in accordance with the attached Top Secret summary [containing
information about Dr. King's private life] ... This is the '~ame HUlnmary
we previously used in preventing King's receiving an honorary degree from
Marquette Universtty." (Baumgardner to Sullivan, 8/31/64.)
... Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 9/8/64.
.... Director's notes on UPI release, 9/8/64, and New rork Herald Tribune.
9/19/64.
... Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 11/22/64. See pp. 13l
et seq.
... Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Bill Moyers, 12/1,164.
... Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 1217/64.
.... Copies were distributed to Acting Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach,
the Secretaries of State and Defense. the Director of the CIA. and the heads of
the ~i:ilitary Intelligence agencies, as well as to USIA.
144
ticipants at the December 1964 "welcome home" reception for Dr.
Kin<T. 270
Three days after Vice President-elect Humphrey participated in
one of the "welcome home" receptions for Dr, King in New York, the
Bureau sent him a copy of the updat€d King monograph and a separate
memorandum entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal
Conduct." 272 On December 8, 1964, the Bureau decided to brief Governor
Nelson Rockefeller about Dr. King's private life and alleged
Communist associations, apparently to dissuade the Governor from
taking part in ceremonies commending Dr. King for having received
the Nobel Prize.27:l
Upon learning that Dr. King might meet with a certain foreign
leader, FBI headquarters instructed the FBI repreS€lltative in that
country to brief the proper authorities about Dr. King.274 The United
States ambassadors in London and Oslo were briefed about Dr. King
be{lause "the Ambassadors might consider entertaining King while
he is in Europe to receive the Nobel Peace Prize" and it mIght be
possible to "forestall such action by the Ambassadors if they were
briefed." The ambassadors in Stockholm and Copenhagen were also
briefed becauS€ "King is also to visit those cities." 275
On November 10, 1964, the FBI learned that the United States
Information Agency was considering requesting Dr. King to engage
in a one-week lpcture tour in Europe following hIs receipt of the Noblp
Prize. Hoover approved the Domestic Intelligenc~ Division's recommendaHon
that USIA be furnished with the latest critical Bureau
reports about Dr. King,276
7, Attempts to Block Dr. Khlg's Publications
On September 11, 1964, the FBI learned that Dr. King intended to
publish an article in a major national publication. The Domestic Intelligence
Division not~d that it did not know "what line King will take
in the article or what its specific stands will be," but, nonetheless recommended
that "it would be well to prevent any publication of his
views." 277
The task of preventing publication was assigned to an agent with
contacts at the magazine who had "forestalled" the publication of an
article by Dr. King in that magazine earlier in 1964.278
The agent subsequently reported that he had contacted an official
of the magazine in late September. According to the agent, the
official had agreed to "endeavor to assist" thp FBI, and had been
briefed about King, but was unable to block publication because
a contractual agreement had already been made.279 The FBI did apparently
have some influence at the magazine, howevpr, becauS€ a memorandum
reporting the incident concludes:
270 Untitled memorandum, 11/12/64.
:m Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Hubert Humphrey, 12/21/64.
278 ~Iemorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to 'Villiam Sullivan, 12/R/&J.
27< Cable from Director, FBI to Legat, 11/10/64.
27. Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to 'Villiam Sullivan, 11/30/64.
276 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 11/12/64.
tn7 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 9/11/64.
Il7Il Baumgardner memorandum, 9/11/64.
279 Memorandum to Cartha DeLoach, 11/3/64.
145
In connection with this [magazine] article by King, our
sources have indicated that since he was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize he has attempted through some of his associates
to change the [magazine] article in an effort to soften criticism
made by him against other civil rights groups and
leaders. King feared that such criticism would cause difficulties
in the civil rights movement. The [magazine], however,
has resisted King's efforts to make these changes.2su
In February 1964~ the Director alerted the field offices that Dr. King
was writing a new book, and noted that "it is entirely possible that
with the publication of the book the Bureau may desire to take some
action, possibly in the counterintelligence area or otherwise, which
may be designed to discredit King or otherwise neutralize his
effectiveness ..." 281
The field offices were instructed to maintain information relating
to the preparation and publication of the hook. The FBI files indicate
that this information was collected, but it is not clear whether it was
ever used.
8. Attempt to Undermine the National Science Fowndation's
Oooperation with the SOLO
The FBI sent the National Science Foundation (NSF) a copy of the
second printed monograph on King in order to convince the NSF to
remove the SOLe from "the NSF program to obtain qualified Negro
students from southern schools." 282
9. V'fIJJWJcess!m FBI Attempts to Lovate Financial Improprieties
In early January 1964, the Chief of the Internal Security Section of
the Domestic Intelligence Division, Frederick J. Baumgardner, recommended
that "examination of recent income tax returns of King
might· well reveal information which could assist the Bureau in its
efforts to discredit King or neutralize his effectiveness." 283 The Intelligence
Division subsequently acquired from the Internal Revenue
Service copies of income tax returns for the prior five years of Dr.
King, the SCLC, and the Gandhi Society,284 an organization which
the FBI stated "augmented" the fund-raising activities of the
SCLC.2B5 The Intelligence Division of the IRS told the Bureau tha.t
"IRS had very carefully scrutinized King's returns in the past but
had not been able to establish a cause of action against him." 286 However,
the IRS assured the FBI that Dr. King's current returns would
lIOO FBI memorandum, 11/3/64, p. 21.
m Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Special Agent in Charge, New York,
2/18/64.
-Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William SulliV'lln, 12/17/64,
p.2. .
... Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 1/8/64.
Baumgardner observed that it was "essential that our current requests of the
IRS ... be handled in a manner which would provide for optimum security so
that neither King nor any other unauthorized individuals may become aware of
the Bureau'l!! interest and so that no embarrassment may come to the Bureau."
... A wiretap had been placed on the Ghandi Society in July, 1963.
... Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 3/25/64.
.. Memorandum from Daniel Brennan to William Sullivan, 3/27/64.
146
be scrutinized "very carefully to determine whether any violations appear.~~
287 None did.
"Gndeterred, the Director informed the field offices that "the Bureau
believes that more than ever it would be most desirable to identify any
bank where [King) may have lln account ... and consider an audit
of such account. ~~ 288
One effort to uncover derogatory information about Dr. King was
conceived by the Supervisor in charge of the King case during a golf
game.289 A remote acquaintance of the Supervisor mentioned that he
had heard from a friend that an acquaintance had said that Dr. King
had a numbered account in a foreign bank with a balance of over one
million dollars. The Supervisor suggested to Sullivan:
If we can prove that King is hoarding large sums of money,
we would have a'"ailable possibly the best information to date
which could be used to <liscredit him, especially in the eyes of
his own people .... we may take the action to discredit
King ourselves through friendly news sources, or the like, or
we might turn the information over to the Internal Revenue
Service for possible criminal prosecution.290
The plan was approved by Director Hoover and an inquiry was
initiated. By December 1965, the investigation into a possible foreign
bank account was described by the Director as "the most important
presently pending" facet of the King investigation.291 The investigation
was dropped shortly afterward, however, when it developed that
the initial source of the allej:!ation informed the FBI that "it WaS
merely a wild conclusion that had been predously drawn by someone
whose identity he does not now recall.'~ 292
F. The Question of Whether Go/'pl'Il1nent Officials Outside of the FBI
Were Aware of the FBI's Eff01't to Discredit Dr. King
There is no doubt that the responsible officials in the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations w<>re aware of the FBI's COMINFII.. investij:!
ation involving Dr. King and the SCLC and that the wiretaps
used by the FBI to collect its information were authorized under
procedures existing at the time. While there is some question concerning
whether officials outside of the FBI were aware that the FBI
was using microphones to cover Dr. King's activities. there is no doubt
that the product of the microphone surveillance waS widely disseminated
within the executive branch. Indeed, dissemination of the
printed "monoj:!raph" about Dr. King to several executive agencies
was expressly approved by Rill Moyers, President .Johnson's assistant,
in January 1965.
21ft Brennan memorandum, 3/27/64. On the bottom of this memorandum, Hoover
wrote "What 'R farce!"
... Memorandum from Director. FBI to Special Agent in Charge, New York,
5/21/64.
... It should be noted that the Supervisor in charge of the King case is still in
a hil/;h position with the FBI and handled the committee's documents requests in
the King case investigation.
... ~Iemorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 6/29/6,'5.
291 Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Special Agent in Charge, New Orlean!',
12/3/65.
-Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan. 12/10/65.
147
The Committee has been unable to determine the extent to which
tlw FBI's effort to discredit Dr. Kin~ and the SCLC by disseminatin~
unfavorable information outside of the Government was suspected
or known about by Government officials responsible for superdsing
the FBI. The Committee requested the FBI to provide any information
in its possession reflectin~ that any Presidents or Attorneys
General during the relevant periods were aware of any FBI efforts to
"discredit" or "neutralize" Dr. Kin~. The Bureau replied:
A review of the Kill~ file in response to other items included
in the request and a polling of all Headquarters personnel
involved in that and previous reviews did not result
in the location or recollection of any information in FBIHQ
files to indicate any of the aforementioned individuals were
specifically aware of any efforts, steps or plans or proposals
to "discredit" or "neutralize" Kin~.
It is, of course, evident that much information developed
in the course of the King case involvin~ him in activities of
interest to the 1Vhite House and to representatives of the
Department of .Justice, includin~ Attorneys General Kennedy
and Katzenbach, as well as Assistnnt Attorney General
Marshall, was such that it could conceivably ha,"e been the
opinion of one or more of the above individuals that such
information was being provided to "discredit" or "neutralize"
King.293
Nicholas Katzenbach, Burke Marshall, Walter Jenkins, and Bill
Moyers have told the Committee that they did not realize that the
FBI was engaged in a concerted effort to dIscredit Dr. King, and that
to the best of their knowledge, Presidents .John Kennedy and Lyndon
.Johnson, as well as Attorney General Robert Kennedy, werc not aware
of that effort. There was no evidence that the FBI's program to discredit
Dr. King was authorized outside of the FBI. There is evidence,
however, that officials responsible for supervising the FBI received
indications that such an effort to discredit Dr. Kiilg might be taking
place, and failed to take adequate steps to prevent it. President .Johnson
and his Attorneys General were aware at least of Bureau attempts
to disseminate unfavorable reports about Dr. King to the press. Top
Executive Branch officials have told the Committee that they had
believed that the FBI had tape recordings embarrassing to Dr. 'King,
and that the FBI had offered to play those tapes both to a government
official and to reporters. The evidence reveals a disturbing attitude of
unconcern by responsible officials and a failure on their part to make
appropriate corrective measures. As Nicholas Katzenbach explained
to the Committee:
Nobody in the Department of .Justice connected with Civil
Ri~hts could possihly hnve been unaware of Mr. Hoover's
feelings (against Dr. King). Nobody could have been unaware
of the potential for disaster which those feelings embodied.
But, given the realities of the situation, I do not
... Letter from FBI to thl' Senate Select Committee. 11/6/75.
148
believe one could have anticipated the extremes to which it
was apparently carried.294a
The following incidents have played a part in our determination
that high officials of the Executive Branch must share responsibility
for the FBI's effort against Dr. King.
(1) As described in the previous chapter, a summary memorandum
containing information gathered from the FBI microphone placed in
Dr. King's room in the Willard hotel was shown to Presidential
Assistant Walter Jenkins by Cartha DeLoach on January 14, 1964.
According to DeLoach's contemporaneous account of that meeting:
Jenkins was of the opinion that the FBI could perfonn a
good service to the country if this matter could somehow be
confidentially given to memoors of the press. I told him the
Director had this in mind, however, also believed we should
obtain additional information prior to discussing it with certain
friends.295
DeLoach testified that he could not recall the meeting with Jenkins,
but that the memorandum should accurately reflect his conversation.296
Jenkins told the Committee staff in an unsworn interview that he
did not recall the meeting described in DeLoach's memorandum, but
that he had no reason to doubt that he had read the summary memorandum
which DeLoach claims Jenkins saw. Jenkins expressly denied,
however, that he had suggested that the information in the summary
memorandum should be "leaked" to the press, or that either he or
President Johnson had ever suggested that information about Dr.
King should be "leaked" to anyone. He added, however, that he might
have used words to the effect that "this is something people should
know about"-referring to people in the Government-which could
have been misinterpreted by DeLoach. He did not recall DeLoach
telling him that the Director ultimately planned to leak this information
to "certain friends." 297
(2) A February 5, 1964 FBI memorandum reports a conversation
between Edwin Guthman, the Justice Department's press secretary,
and John Mohr of the Domestic Intelligence Division. According to
Mohr's memorandum, Guthman told Mohr that he had heard that
a reporter was preparing an article about Dr. King's alleged Communist
affiliations.
Guthman stated he was quite concerned inasmuch as it
appeared there had been a leak from the FBI in connection
with this matter. He told me the Attorney General had been
most hopeful that there would be no "leaks" concerning
King.
From the tone of Guthman's entire remarks, it would appear
he had two thoughts in mind without actually stating
such thoughts. These thoughts were (1) that the Attorney
.... Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 209.
2.. Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to .T. Edgar Hoover, 1/14/64. This
memorandum IR alRo dlRcussed pp. 121-122.
... Cartha DeLoach teRtimony, 11/25/75, p. 150.
- Staff summary, Walter Jenkins Interview, 12/1/75, pp. 1-2..Jenklns Raid that
he was physically unable to nndergo the Rtraln of a sworn and transcribed
Ression.
149
General is most anxious that information concerning King
not be released; and (2) that the Attorney General's co~nections
with King, and his defensive statements concerning
King to Congress in Civil Rights hearings, would certainly
injure the Attorney General's political chances for the
future.
(H)e told me once again the Attorney General was not
worried about what an exposure of King could do to him.
He stated he and the Attorney General are only trying to
protect FBI sources of information.298
The memorandum states that Guthman was told "there had been no
leaks from the FBI concerning Dr. Martin Luther King," and that
Guthman had responded that "he had no proof whatsoever that the
FBI had furnished information to the newspapers concerning King."
Guthman testified that he recalled the Justice Department had "suspected
that the information had been leaked by the FBI." When asked
the basis for that suspicion, he said that "we felt that the question of
King and the association with [Advisers A] was a matter which was
rather tightly held since it was not something of general knowledge."
299 Guthman said that he could "not specifically" recall a reaction
by Attorney General Kennedy to this "leak" :
except to be somewhat displeased orer it, But that was in a
sense all in a day's work and I don't recall 'anything
specific.30o
Guthroan testified that he did not recall any further efforts to determine
whether the FBI had in fact leaked the story.301
Guthman testified that DeLoach's memorandum "distorted" his
remarks. Guthman said that his visit had been motivated, not by concerns
about Kennedy's political future, but rather by a concern to protect
FBI sources.30la A memorandum dated February 5, 1964, by Guthman,
does not mention a meeting with Mohr, but does contlain an
account of a meet:ing between Guthmanand Cartha DeLoach on the
previous day.
We both agreed that it w.as inevitable that King~s connections
with (Adviser A) would ultimately become public. I
told DeLoach that our concern was over the FBI's source and
th1\)t we had no other concern as to what the Attorney General
h'ad said or what our -actions had been in connection with
Martin Luther King.
DeLoach said he thought we should be concerned in view of
what the Attorney General had said on the subject. I pointed
out that anything the Attorney General had said h'ad been
cleared with the FBI. I told Deke that our record in this matter
could stand 'any scrutiny and that both Senator Russell
... Memorandum from John Mohr to Cartha DeLoach, 2/5/64. Hoover wrote
next to the last paragraph quoted above, "There has never been such solicitude
in the past."
'""Edwin Guthman testimony. 3/16/76, p. 13.
llOO Guthman, 3/16/76, p. 12.
"'" Gllthman, 3/16/76, p. 20.
""'0 Guthman, 3/16/76, p. 22.
150
and Senator Monooney had been fully apprised of the faots
last summer or last fall. 302
A memorandum by Courtney Evans later that day reports that
Evans discussed this matter with Assistant Attorney General Burke
Marshall, who said that he did not intend to tell the reporter anything
about Dr. King, but that "if he developed anything at all with regard
to [the reporter's] source of information, he would pass this along to
us ..." Evans' memorandum also notes, "According to information
developed by our Atlanta office on February 4, 1964, [the reporter] had
in his possession what appeared to he a blind memorandum containing
information as to [Adviser A's alleged connections with the Communist
Party]." 303
A memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Director Hoover dated
February 18, 1964, apparently alludes to this incident and provides
some insight into the political implications of the FBI's investigation
of Dr. King. According to DeLoach's memorandum, Walter Jenkins
and Bill Moyers of the White House told him that Burke Marshall had
called and "indicated that the Attorney General had thought it highly
advisa:ble for the President to see the DepartJrnent of Justice file on
Mart.in Luther King . . . to make certain that the President knew all
about King." 304
The memorandum states that Marshall then:
told Moyers that he wanted to give the White House a little
warning. He stated that he personally knew that the FBI
had leaked information concerning Martin Luther King to a
newspaper reporter. Marshall told Moyers that he thought
the White House should know this inasmuch as informatIOn
concerning King would undoubtedly be coming out before
the public in the near future.
Director Hoover wrote next to this entrv, "Marshall is a liar." 305
The memorandum reports that Jenkins told DeLoach that he
thought the Attorney General was concerned with "being on record
with the President with the fact that although he has, for political
purposes, defended King, he wants the President to realize that he,
the Attorney General, is well aware of King's Communistic background."
306
The Director's handwritten note states: "Katzenbach did his dirt
against us before Warren Commission and now Marshall is trying to
poison theW(hite) H (ouse) about FBI." 307
Neither Burke Marshall nor Bill Moyers recalled the events described
in DeLoach's memorandum. Marshall testified, however, about
an incident involving the FBI's leaking information to a reporter
that may well have been the same incident. Marshall recalled that
sometime in 1964, a reporter told him that the Atlanta office of the
FBI had given him information unfavorable to Dr. King. Marshall
said that he phoned the Bureau official with whom he normally con-
... Memorandum, Edwin Gutbman, 2/5/64.
... Memorandum from Courtney Evan!! to Alan Belmont, 2/5/64.
... Memorandum from 08rtha DeLoach to .T. Edgar Hoover, 2/18/64.
80S DeLoach memorandum, 2/18/64.
..,. DeLoach memorandum, 2/18/64.
:lO'l' DpLoach memorandum, 2/18/64.
151
ducted business and said, "I'm informed by a reporter that your people
in Atlanta have given this information about Martin Luther King, and
that 1 think it is outrageous." The official at first said, "I don't believe
it," but promised to inquire further. He later called and said, "The
Director wants you to know that you're a ... damned liar." Marshall
told the Committee, "It was very difficult with the Bureau because
if you said that they were leaking derogatory information, they would
say, 'no, we're not.' "308
(3) Bill Moyers, President Johnson's assistant, testified that sometime
during the "hurley-burley disorganized period" shortly after
President Kennedy's assassination and prior to President Johnson's
state of the Union address, he heard laughter inside Walter Jenkins'
office. Moyers inquired and was told by a secretary that an FBI agent
had come to the office and offered to play for Jenkins It tape recording
which would have been personally embarrassing to Dr. King. Jenkins
refused to listen to the tape. A week later, the same FBI agent again
came to the White House and offered to play the tape for Jenkins,
and again Jenkins refused to listen to it.3011
Jenkins told the Committee that he did not recall ever having been
offered tapes by the FBI, and did not know of anyone on the White
House staff who had been.310
In addition to this incident, Moyers testified that he had been
generally aware that the FBI reports about Dr. King included information
of a personal nature, unrelated to the purpose of the FBI's investigation.
When asked if he had ever asked the FBI why it was disseminating
this type of material to the White House, Moyers reo
sponded:
I don't remember. I just assumed it was related to a fallout
of the investigations concerning the communist allegations,
which is what the President was concerned about.
Question. Did you ever question the propriety of the FBI's
disseminating that type of information?
Answer. I never questioned it, no. I thought it was spurious
and irrelevant ... If they were looking for other alleged communist
efforts to embarrass King and the President, which is
what the President thought, Kennedy or Johnson, it would
just seem natural that other irrelevant and spurious information
would come along with that investigation.
Question. And you found nothing improper about the
FBI's sending that information along also?
Answer. Unnecessary? Improper at that time, no.
Question. Do you recall anyone in the White House ever
questioning the propriety of the FBI's disseminating this
type of material?
Answer. 1 think ... there were comments that tended to
ridicule the FBI's doing this, but no.3ll
Moyers testified that he had not suspected that the FBI was covering
Dr. King's activities with microphones, although he con-
300 Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, pp. 46-47.
... Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 19, staff summary of Bill Moyers Interview,
11/24/75.
010 Jenkins (staff summary), 12/1/75, p. 4.
lIll Moyers, 3/2/76, p. 17.
152
ceded, "1 subsequently realized I should have assumed that. ... The
nature of the general references that were being made I realized
later could only have come from that kind of knowledge unless
there was an informer in Martin Luther King's presence a good bit
of the time." 312
(4) According to Nicholas Katzenbach, on November 25, 1964, the
Washington Bureau Chief of a national news publication told him
that one of his reporters had been approached by the FBI and given
an opportunity to listen to some "interesting" tapes involving Dr.
King.313 Katzenbach told the CommitteB :
I was shocked by this revelation, and felt that the President
should be advised immediately. On November 28, I flew,
with Mr. Burke Marshall, the retiring head of the Civil
Rights Division, to the LBJ Ranch.
On that occasion he and I informed the President of our
conversation with the news editor and expressed in very
strong terms our view that this was shocking conduct and politically
extremely dangerous to the Presidency. I told the
President my view that it should be stopped immediately and
that he should personally contact Mr. Hoover. I received the
impression that President Johnson took the matter very seriously
and that he would do as I recommended.
On the following Monday, I was informed by at least one
other reporter, and perhaps two, of similar offers made to
them the prior week. I spoke to the Bureau official who had
been identified as having made the offer and asked him about
it. He flatly denied that any such offer had been made or that
the FBI would engage in any such activity. Thereupon I
asked at least one of the reporters-perhaps all of themwhether
they would join me in confronting the Bureau on this
issue. They declined to do so.
I do not know whether President Johnson discussed this
matter with Mr. Hoover, or what, if anything, was said. However,
I was quite confident that that particular activity
ceased at that time, and I attributed it to Mr. Johnson's intervention.
From that time until I left the Justice Department I
never heard from any person of subsequent similar activity
by the Bureau, and I assumed it had ceased. I should add only
this: I believed that the tapes in question were not tapes resulting
from Bureau surveillance but tapes acquired from
State law enforcement authorities, and that such a representation
was made to the reporter at the time.314
Katzenbach testified that Cariha DeLoach was the Bureau official
whom the reporters had identified as having offered the tapes. Katzenbach
said that he had contacted DeLoach on his own volition, and that
he did not tell DeLoach that he had discussed the matter with the
President. He said that when he asked DeLoach if the Bureau had
lll2 lIoyers, 3/2/76, p. 17.
lll~ The two newsmen turned down the Bureau's offer.
..< Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/11>, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.
153
been offering to play tape recordings concerning Dr. King to reporters,
DeLoach "told me rather angrily they were noL" 315
Burke Marshall, ,,-hen questioned by the Committee about these
events, testified that the same two reporters had also informed him
thRt Director Hoover wRS offering to plRY tRpe recordings of Dr. King.
He testified that he had assumed the reporters "were telling the truth,
that these tape recordings existed, and that they were being leake(l by
the FBV' 316 He testified thRt he had not suspected that the FBI had
produced the tapes itself from microphone coverage, but that he had
assumed the FBI had acquired the tape recordings from Southern law
enforcement agencies.
It did not occur to me that the FBI would go around placing
microphones in Dr. King's hotel . . . The notion that they
would plant the microphone, that they had a whole system of
surveillance of that sort, involving illegal entry and trespass
and things like that, did not occur to me. I would not have put
it past the local police, but I considered at the time-except
for Mr. Hoover himself-that the Bureau was a tightly controlled,
well-run, efficient, law abiding law enforcement
agency, that it didn't do things like that, and therefore, it
didn't occur to me that they had done it.317
~Iarshall recalleAi that he and Katzenbach had flown to President
.Johnson's ranch in Texas and had told the President that the FBI was
offering the tape recordinhTS to reporters. Marshall said that the President
,,"'as "shocked," and that the "conversation was in the context of
it being very important and a very nasty piece of business that had
to be stopped." Marshall did not know, however, what action the
President subsequently took, if any, and could not remember whether
the President had voiced an intention to take any specific action.318
DeLoach, when asked if he had ever discussed the contents of tape
recordings or surveillances of Dr. King with members of the press,
testified: "I don't recall any snch conversations." 319 DeLoach did
state, however, that he had known about the tape recordings of Dr.
King. He testified that one such tape recording had been in his office on
one occasion, and that "it was so garbled and so terrible, I mean from
the standpoint of fidelity, that I told them to knock it off and take
it back." 320
The only record of this episode in tht FBI files is a memorandum
by DeLoach dated December 1, 1964, stating in part:
Bill Moyers, while I was at the White House, today, advised
that word had gotten to the President this afternoon that [the
newsman] was telling all over town ... that the FBI had
told him that Martin Luther King was [excised]. [The
newsman] according to Moyers, had stated to several people
... Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 11/12/75, pp. 97-9R.
318 Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 39.
311 Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 43.
318 Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 43.
319 DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75, p. 156.
320 DeLoach testimony, 11/25/76, p. 188.
154
that, "If the FBI ,,-ill do this to )Iartin Luther King, they
will undoubtedly do it to anyone for personal reasons." •
Moyers stated the President wanted to get this word to us
so we would knmv not to trust [the newsman]. Moyers also
stated that the President felt that [the newsman] lacked integrity
and was certainly no lover of the .Johnson administration
or thr FBI. I told :\loyers this was certainly obvious.321
DeLoach testified that IH' could not recall the events surrounding
this memorandum. Bill )loyers, after reviewing DeLoach's memorandum,
testified that he recalled nothing about the incide.nt invoh-ing
the newsman or about Katzenbach's and :Marshall's discussion with
the President. He did not I'l'call ever having heard that the Bureau
had offered to play tape recordings of Dr. King to reporters, or ever
having discussed the matter with DeLoach. He testified, however, that
DeLoach's memorandum:
sounds very plausible. I'm sure the President called me or he
told me to tell him whatever [DeLoach's document reflecJts].
Question. Did the President tell you that he understood
that [the newsman] was saying all over town that the Bureau
had been offering tapes?
Answer. I can't remember tIl(' details of that. You know, I
can't tell you the number of times the President was sounding
off at [the newsman].322 .
When asked if it would be fair to conclude that the President had complained
to Moyers about the newsman's revealing that the Bureau
had offered to play tapes rather than about the fact that the Bureau
had such tapl:'S and had offered to play them, Movers replied, "It would
be fair to conclude that. I don't recall if that was exactly the way the
President said it." 323
n. THE lIOOVER-KIXG CONTROVERSY BECOMER Pl;BLIC AND A TRUCE IS
CALLED: APRIL-DECEMBER] 064
Sum.mary
Director Hoover's dislike for Dr. King, which had been known within
the Bureau since early 1962,324 became a matter of public record in
November 1964 when Director Hoover described Dr. King at a meeting
with women reporters as the "most notorious liar': in the country.
Dr. King responded that the Director was obviously "faltering" under
the responsibilities of his office. The FBI immediately intensified its
secret campaign against Dr. King, offering to play the tapes from
microphone surveillance of Dr. King to reporters and to leak stories
concerning him to the press. The FBI also sent a tape recording made
from the microphone surveillance to Dr. King, with a warning which
Dr. King and his close associates interpreted as an invitation to
suieide.
The public aspects of the dispute peaked in December 1964, shortly
before Dr. King went to Europe to receive the Nobel Pea('e Prize, Dr.
321 Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 12/1/64.
8Z2 Bill ~Ioyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 8.
323 ~Ioyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 9.
32< As early as February 1962, the Director had informed the Domestic Intelligence
Division: "King is no good anyway."
155
King publicly announced that it was time for the controversy to end,
and arranged a meeting with Director Hoover to seal a truce. The
FBI's public criticism stopped, but the Bureau's secret campaign to
discredit Dr. King continued. Believing that Dr. King's downfall
would severely harm the entire movement for racial equality, several
prominent civil rights figures met with FBI officials to voice their concern
and seek assurances from the FBI that the attacks on Dr. King
would stop.
A. First Steps in the Public Oontroversy April-Novem1Jer 1964-
Although the FBI had been covertly engaged in a massive campaign
to discredit Dr. King for several months, the fact that the FBI was
the source of allegatIOns about communist influence in the civil rights
movement did not become public until the release of Director Hoover's
off-the-record testimony before the House Appropriations Committee
in April 1964. The Director was quoted in the press as having testified
that" 'Communist influence does exist in the Negro movement' and
can influence 'large masses' of people." 325 Dr. King immediately issued
a forceful reply:
It is very unfortunate that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, in his
claims of alleged communist infiltration in the civil ri~hts
movement, has allowed himself to aid and abet the salaCIOUS
claims of southern racists and the extreme right-wing
elements.
We challenge all who raise the "red" issue, whether they
be newspaper columnists or the head of the FBI himself-to
come forward and provide real evidence which contradicts
this stand of the SCLC. Weare confident that this cannot be
done.
We affirm that SCLC is unalterably opposed to the misguided
philosophy of communist.
It is difficult to accept the word of the FBI on communist
infiltration in the civil rights movement, when they have
been so completely ineffectual in resolving the continued mayhem
and brutality inflicted upon the Negro in the deep south.
It would be encouraging to us if Mr. Hoover and the FBI
would be as diligent in apprehending those responsible for
bombing churches and killing little children as they are in
seeking out alleged communist infiltration in the civil rights
movement.326
In early May 1964, Director Hoover made the following response to a .
question from United Presss International concerning whether any
... New York Time!!, 4/22/64, p. 30.
... FBI transcription of Dr. King's statement to press, Memorandum from William
Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 4/23/64. Another FBI memorandum which dealt
with Dr. King's statement indicated the Bureau's opinion that 9ODleone "high in
the Administration lIlot known to us . . . apparently agreed with Dr. King's press
release." Sullivan's report about Dr. King's statement pointed out that "King
quoted the AG against the Director, to the etIect that it is to be expected that
communist will try to infiltrate civil rights movements, but they had not succeeded
in making the expected impact." (Memorandum from William Sullivan
to Alan Belmont, 4/23/64.)
69-984 0 - 76 - 11
156
communists were in positions of leadership III the civil rights
movement:
Let me first emphasize that I realize the vast majority of
~egroes have rejected and recognize communism for what it
IS ....
The existence and importance of the communist influence
in the Negro movement should not be ignored or minimized,
nor should it be exaggerated. The Communist Party will use
its forces either in the open forum of public opinion or
through its sympathizers who do not wear the badge of communism
but who spout some of the same ideas carried in the
Communist Party line. This is the influence which is capable
of moving large masses of loyal and dedicated citizens toward
communist objectives while being lured away from the true
issues involved. It is up to the ciVIl rights organizations themselves
to recognize this and face up to it.321
On May 11, Dr. King appeared on the news program, "Face the
Nation." He denied commUnIsts had infiltrated decision-making positions
in the civil rights movement or the SCLC and remarked that it
was "unfortunate" that "such a great man" as Director Hoover had
made allegations to that effect. Dr. King added that ,the Director
should more appropriately have remarked on how surprising it was
that so few N~groes had turned to communism in light of the treatment
they had receIved. Dr. King said that the Justice Department had
warned him of only one suspected communist in the SCLC, and that
hahad fired that individua1.328
The feud between Director Hoover and Dr. King heightened on N0vember
18, 1964, with the Direector's public allegation that Dr. King
was the "most notorious liar" in the country. DIrector Hoover made
that comment during a meeting with women reporters in the context
of explaining how FBI agents were assigned in civil rights cases.
According to a memorandum of the meeting written by DeLoach:
[The Director] stated it was a common belief in some circles
that Special Agents in the South were all, without exception,
southern born agents. As a matter of fact, 70% of the agents
currently assigned to the South were born in the North. He
stated that the "notorious" Martin Luther King had attempted
to capitalize on this matter by claiming that all
agents assigned to the Albany, Georgia, Resident Agency
were southern born agents. As a matter of fact, 4 out of 5 of
... Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Edwin Guthman, 5/14/64, p. 4.
Director Hoover's answer was initially submitted to Guthman, the Attorney
General's Special ABSistant for Public Information. Guthman strongly objected to
the answer because it "put communist influence in the civil rights movement out
of perspective." He then had a lengthy conference with DeLoacll, and the answer,
quoted above, was agreed upon. (Memorandum from Edwin Guthmanto Cartha
DeLoach, 5/12/64; DeLoach memorandum, 5/14/64.)
.. Memorandum from Frederick BaumgaTdner to William SuUivan, 5/11/64.
The Headquarters agent who reported on the television program added the comment:
"King's obvious reference was to the 'removal' of (Adviser B) from the
SOLC. As expected, King lied about being warned of anyone else because he had
been warned about (AdviBer A) and has nevertheless maintained a close association
with (Adviser A)." (Baumgardner memorandum, 5/11/64.)
157
the agents assigned to the Albany. Georgia. Resident Agency
were northern born. The Director stated he had instructed
me to get in touch with Reverend King and line up an appointment
so that King could be given the true facts. He
stated that King had refused to gh'e me an appointment and.
therefore, he considered King to be the most "notorious liar"
in the country.329
When the reporters asked Director Hoover for more details about
Dr. King,
he stated, off the record, "He is one of the lowest characters
in the country." There was an immediate inquiry as to whether
he could be quoted on the original statement that Martin
Luther King was a liar and he stated, "Yes-that is public
record." 330
Nicholas Katzenbach, who was then Acting Attorney General, testi·
fied that he talked with Director Hoover about that press conference
and
[Hoover] told me that it was not his practice to have press
conferences, had not done so in the past, and would not do so
again in the future. Perhaps the depth of his feeling with
respect to Dr. King was revealed to me by his statement that
he did not understand all the publicity which the remark had
attracted because he had been asked a simple question and
given a simple truthful answer.331
Some of Dr. King's advisers drafted a strong response, one of which
would have "blown Hoover out of the water, calling him every name
in the book." 332 Before they had an opportunity to release the statement,
Dr. King, who was then in Bimini, issued the following public
reply:
I cannot conceive of Mr. Hoover making a statement like this
without being under extreme pressure. He has apparently faltered
under the awesome burden, complexities and responsibilities
of his office.333
Dr. King also sent a telegram to Director Hoover, which was made
public, stating:
I was appalled and surprised at your reported statement
maligning my integrity. What motivated such an irresponsible
accusation is a mystery to me.
• 20 Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John ~Iohr, 11/18/64, p. 6.
330 DeLoach memorandum, 11/18/64, p. 10. DeLoach to'ld the Committee about
the incident: "I passed Mr. Hoover a note and told him that if he really feU that
way, he should keep it {)ff the record. He paid no attention to that note. I passed
him a second note and made the same statement and he paid no attention to that,
and on the third occasion that I passed him a note, he said out loud to the women
that 'DeLoach tells me I should keep these statements concerning King oft' the
record, but that's none of his business. I made it for the record and you can use
it for the record:" (Cartha DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75, p. 169. See also
DeLoach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p.173.)
331 Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.
... Harry Wachtel testimony, 2/27/76, p. 42.
... New York Times, 11/20/64, p. 18.
158
I have sincerely questioned the effectiveness of the F.B.I. in
racial incidents, particularly where bombings and brutalities
against Negroes are at issue . . .
I 'will be happy to discuss this question with you at length
in the near future. Although your statement said you have attempted
to meet with me. I have sought in vain for any record
of such a request.334
Dr. King also criticized Director Hoover in a press inteITiew on the
same day for "following the path of appeasement of political powPrS
in the South." 335
The Domestic Intelligence Division prepared an analysis of the
allegations in Dr. King's telegram. emphasizing the events two years
earlier which the FBI had interpreted as a refusal by Dr. King to be
interviewed.336 Sullivan recommended against rpplying to Dr. King's
charges or meeting with Dr. King. The Director penned his agreement
on Sullivan's memorandum:
O.K. But I can't understand why we are unable to get the true
facts before the public. 'We can't even get our accomplishments
published. We are newr taking the aggressive, but
above lies remain unanswered.331
The following day, the FBI mailed a tape recording from the Willard
Hotel microphone surveillance to Dr. King accompanied by a
letter which Dr. King and his associates interpreted as an invitation
to suicide.
B. TapP8 Are Mailed to King: !l'm'ember 21. 1964
Sometime in mid-November 196:1: a decision was made at FBI Headquarters
to mail a tape recording made during- microphone surveillance
of Dr. King to the SCLCoffice in Atlanta. 'William Sullivan. who was
responsible for the proiect. testified that he first learned of the plan
when Alan Belmont, Assistant to the Director. told him that Director
Hoover wanted one of the King tapes mailed to Coretta King to
precipitate their separation, thereby diminishing Dr. King's stature.
Belmont told Sullivan that the FBI laboratory would "sterilize the
tape to prevent its being traced to the Bureau." Sullivan was to have
the tape mailed from a southern state.338
Sullivan told the Committee that he had opposed the plan because
it would warn Dr. King that his activities were being covered by microphones.
According to Sullivan. Belmont agreed that the plan was
unwise, but said that he had no power to stop it because the orders had
come from Hoover and Tolson.339
3M New York Times, 11/20/64, p. 1S.
136 New York Times. 11/20/64, p. 18.
... That incident is described at pp. 89-91.
.., :\Iemorandum from Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont, 11/20/64, p. 4. Director
Hoover remarked on another memorandum. "I have no intention of seeing King.
I gave him that opportunity once and he ignored it."
... William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 104-105. The Willard Hotel tape
WIIS ('aIled in from the Washington field office on November 19, 1964. The decision
at Headquarters would have been made sometime earlier, probably as II
result of the "notorious liar" controversy.
... Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 105.
159
The FBI technician who prepared the tape told the Committee that
he had been ordered to produce a "composite" tape from coverage of
hotel rooms in 'Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Los Angeles.
After the tape was completed, a copy was left with Sullivan.34o
Sullivan testified that he ordered a "tight-lipped ... reliable"
agent to fly to Tampa, Florida to mail a package to Coretta King. He
dId not tell the agent that the package contained the King tape.341 The
agent testified that he flew to Miami and then called SullIvan, who instructed
him to address the package to Martin Luther King, Jr. The
agent said that he mailed the package from a post office near the
Miami airport,342 A tra\'el voucher prO\'ided to the Committee by the
FBI indicates that the agent flew to Miami on November 21,1964.
Congressman Andrew Young, who was then Dr. King's assistant,
recalled that the tape arrived at the SCLC Headquarters in Atlanta
sometime before Dec,l'mber 1964. Congressman Young said that the
office personnel assumed the tape contained another of Dr. King's
speeches; it was stmed for a while. and later sent to Dr. King's home
along with several other tapes.343 Dr. King. Congressman Young, and
some others listened to the tape sometime after Dr. King had rf'turned
from receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. probably in January 196iJ. Congressman
Young testified that he probably destroyed the tape several
years later.
Congressman' Young recalled that the tape was of "very poor quality,
very garbled," but that at least part of it appeared to have been
made during a conversation between Dr. King and other civil rights
leaders at the Willard Hotel. He testified that none of the comments
on the tape related to the commission of a crime or to "affection" for
communism. "It was personal conversation among friends." 344
According to Congressman Young a letter had accompanied the
tape, stating that the tape would be released in 34 days and threatening
"there is only onf' thing you can do to prf'vent this from happening."
Congressman Young said that when he and Dr. King read the lettH,
"we assumed that the letter and the tape had been mailed 34 days
before the receipt of the Nobel Prize. and that this was a threat to
expose Martin just before he received the Nobel Prize." Congressman
Young testified:
I think that the disturbing thing to Martin was that he
felt somebody was trying to get him to commit suicide, and
because it was a tape of a meeting in Washington and the
postmark was from Florida, we assumed nobody had the
capacity to do that other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
345
... Staff summary of [FBI Technician] interview, 7/25/75, p. 5. The tape which
was ultimately sent to Dr. King, however, may have consisted of the WiBard
coverage,
an Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 106.
Sf. Staff summary of [FBI Agent] interview, 4/23/75, The agent recalled that
the package, which was marked "fragile," did not have a return address. Sullivan
remembered that the agent had commented that he had had trouble mailing
the package because it had no return address, but that he had "talked his way
around it." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, p.109.l
3.. Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, pp. ~9. Young recalled that the package
containing the tape had a Florida postmark.
... Young, 2/19/76, p. 7.
... Young, 2/19/76, p. 8.
160
Both Young and Ralph Abernathy, who also heard the tape and read
the letter, interpreted it as inviting Dr. King to take his own life.346
"William Sullivan testified that he could not recall such a letter.347
The FBI provided the Committee with a copy of a letter which was
found in Sullivan's office files following his discharge in 1971.348 The
letter stated in part:
King, look into your heart. You know you are a complete
fraud and a greater liability to all of us Negroes. White people
in this country have enough frauds of their own but I am sure
they don't have one at this time that is any where near your
equal. You are no clergyman and you know it. I repeat that
you are a colossal fraud and an evil, vicious one at that....
King. like all frauds your end is approaching. You could
have been our greatest leader.... But you are done. Your
"honorary" degrees, your Nobel Prize (what a grim farce)
and other awards will not save you. King, I repeat you are
done....
The American public, the church organizations that have
been helping-Protestants. Catholics and Jews will know you
for what you are-an evil beast. So will others who have
backed you. You are done.
King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know
what it is. You have just 34 days in which to do (this exact
number has been selected for a specific reason, it has definite
practical significance) . Yon aTe done. There is but one way
out for you. You better take it before your filthy fraudulent
self is bared to the nation.
Andrew Young stated that the last paragraph of this letter was
identical with the letter that had been sent to the SCLC headquarters,
but that the other portions of the letter appeared to be an earlier draft
of the letter that he had seen.349 Sullivan testified that he did not recall
ever having seen the document, although it was "possible" that he
had something to do with it and simply cannot remember.350 Sullivan
also testified that he could. not recall any conversations at the FBI concerning
the possibility of Dr. King's committing suicide. After reading
the last paragraph of the letter. he conceded that it could be interpreted
as an invitation to suicide. although so far as Sullivan knew,
3" Young. 2/19/76, p. 8; staff summary of Ralph Abernathy interview, 11/19/
75, p. 3.
347 Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 112.
348 The Bureau said it could not find a copy in any of its other files.
... The letter given to the Committee by the FBI was single spaced; Andrew
Young testified that Dr. King had received "a double spaced letter and it was
about a page and a half. It was typed in a very old typewriter, very bad typing."
He was certain, however that the last paragraph of the two letters were nearly
identical. The one sent to Dr. King "was simplified and has shorter, simpler
sentences, but essentially said the same thing, especially the part about 'there's
only one thing left for you to do... .' I remember that vividly." (Young,
2/19/76, p. 36)
OliO Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 112. Sullivan suggested that the letter might have
been "planted" in his files.
161
the FBrs goal was simply to convince Dr. King to resign from the
SCLC, not to kill himself.351
'Yhen asked by the Committee what had ultimately happened to
the letter received by Heverend King, Andrew Young testified:
Pm not really sure about this now, but I think we discussed
something about a letter with DeLoach-I'm not certain
whether it was DeLoach or the local FBI agents-and they
said they would be glad to look into it. They said, whenever
we got any of these kind of threatening letters, to send them
to them, and they would be glad to investigate. That letter
may have been sent back to Dl'Loach.35~
C. Attempts by the FBI to "Leak" t.o Reporters Tape RecordiJngs
Embarrassing to Dr. Ki/lg
After Director Hoover denounced Dr. King as a "notoriolls liar" in
mid-November, the FBI apparently made several attempts to "leak"
tape recordings concerning Dr. King to newsmen. One offer involving
the Bureau Chief of a national news publication has been discussed at
length in the preceding chapter.353 David Kraslow, another reporter,
has told a Committee staff member, that one of his "better sources at
the Bureau" offered him a transcript of a tape recording about Dr.
King. Kraslow said that his SO\llW read him a portion of the transcript
on the phone, and claimed that it came from a "bug" operated by a
Southern police agency. Kraslow said that he declined the offer.354
It is not known how'many other reporters were arproached by the
FBI during that period; Nicholas Katzenbach testIfied that at least
one other reporter had informed him of a similar Bureau offer,m and
other witnesses, such as James Farmer, have mentioned additional
"leaks" from the Blireau.356
35' One FBI witness testified that he interpreted the "34 days" to refer to
Christmas, and that the FBI had apparently hoped Dr. King would resign for
Christmas. (James Adams testimony, 11/19/75, Hearings. Vol. 6. pp. 66--680)
When asked about this interpretation, Andrew Young testified:
"We didn't think of that. We thought that he was talking about committing
suicide, and we tied the date to the Noble Prize.... That is the way we discussed
it; to commit suicide, or that he was going to be publicly humiliated
just at the moment of his receipt of the Noble Prize." (Andrew Young, 2/19/'76,
p. 37)
Carl Rowan stated during a staff interyiew that he had heen informed by
a reliable source, whom he declined to identify, that the decision to mail the
tape recording and letter had been made during a meeting at which Director
Hooyer was present. Rowan's source said that the Director was "livid" over
Dr. King's receipt of the Nohel Peace Prize, and that methods of preventing Dr.
King from receiving the Prize were discussed at the meeting. According to the
source, there was a discussion at the meeting concerning allegations that Dr.
King had tried to commit suicide when he was young (such allegations had
'appeared in the news media--e.g. Time 1/3/64, p. 14 l, and that he still had
suicidal tendencies. The source told Rowan that the participants in the meeting
had concluded that if the tape were mailed. Dr. Kinl\' might be so distressed that
he would commit suicide. (~Haff summary of Carl Rowan interview, R/29/75.
p.2.)
... Young. 2/19/76. p. 3R. Younl\"s conferencp with DeLoach Is discussed p. HID.
p.-.
... See p. 152 et seq.
... Staff summary. Dayid Kraslow interyiew.
3&l Katzenhach. 11/12/7". p. 91. Katzenbach was nnahle to recall the identity
of the reporter.
35lI .Tames Farmer Staff Inter"iew. 11/13/75. p. 5.
162
D. Roy Wilkins of NAAOP meets-with DeLoach to dUCU88 allegation8
about Dr. King: November '27,1994
On November 24, 1964, Director Hoover gave a speech at Loyola
University in Chicago in which he referred to moral laxness in civil
rights group. On November 27, Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of
NAAQP, phoned DeLoach an~ requested a meeting. Wilkins ~old ~he
CommIttee that he had been dIsturbed by Hoover's Loyola Umversity
speech a few days before, and that he had realized Hoover had been
referring to Dr. King because of rumors then circulating that the
FBI had developed "derogatory" material about Dr. King. Wilkins
was spurred into meeting with DeLoach by pointed inqmries from
several reporters about whether Director Hoover's remarks had been
directed toward Dr. Kin~. Wilkins described his motivation in requesting
the meeting as 'protecting the civil rights movement." He
said that Dr. King did not learn of his meeting with DeLoaoh until
over a week after it had occurred.357
DeLoach and Wilkins have given the Committee differing accounts
of what was said at their meeting. DeLoach's version is summarized
in a letter that he sent to President Johnson on November 30, 1964:
Wilkins said that ... the ruination of King would spell the
downfall of the entire civil rights movement ... Wilkins indicated
that [if allegations concerning King's personal conduct
and supposed connections with communists were publicized],
many of his Negro associates would rise to his defense. He
felt, however, that many white people who believe in the civil
rights movement and who yearly contribute from $500 to
$50,000 to this movement would immediately cease their filllmcial
support. This loss, coupled with the loss of faith in King
by millions of Americans, would halt any further progress of
the civil rights movement.358
A memorandum by DeLoach written shortly after the meeting states:
I told him ... that if King wanted war we certainly would
give it to him. Wilkins shook his head and stated there was no
doubt in his mind as to which side would lose if the FBI really
came out with all its ammunition against King. I told him the
ammunition was plentiful and that while we were not responsible
for the many rumors being initiated against King, we
had heard of these rumors and were certainly in a position to
substantiate them.359
DeLoach's memorandum stated that the meeting had concluded with
Wilkins' promise to "tell King that he can't win in a battle with the
FBI and that the best thing for him to do is to retire from public life."
Wilkins told the Committee that DeLoach's description of the meeting
was "self serving and filled with inaccuracies" and denied DeLoach's
description of his remarks as "pure invention." 300 Wilkins
stated that he had expressed his concern that accusations about Dr.
King would cripple the civil rights movement, noting that if charges
"'" Staff summary, Roy Wilkins interview, 11/23/75, p. 1.
... Letter, Hoover to President, 11/30/64.
... Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach ,to John Mohr, 11/27/64, p. 2.
,",0 Wilkins staff summary, 11/23/75, p. 2.
163
were publicly levied against Dr. King, the black community wOllld
side with Dr. King and the white community with Director Hoover.
"Wilkins said that he arh'ised DeLoach that the FBI should not overreact
to Dr. King's criticisms and that he considered Dr. King's criticism
of the FBI's failure to dgorously enforce the civil rights laws to
be totally justified. Wilkins told the Committee that although he had
considered the meeting a "success" at the time, after reading DeLoach's
memorandu~ he reahze~ that he had failed to convey.the impressio.n
that he had mtended, smce DeLoach had clearly mlsmterpreted Ius
remarks.361
vVhen DeLoach was asked by the Committee if the "ammunition"
he had threatened to use against Ik King was the tape recordings,
DeLoach replied, "I don't know what I had in mind, frankly, it's been
so long ago, I can't recall." 362 'Wilkins did not remember DeLoach's
use of the term "ammunition," but diel recall that DeLoach frequently
alluded to "derogatory information:' although vVilkins was unclear
whether DeLoach was referring' to allegations about Dr. King's personal
conductor about Communist infiltration of the SCLC.363
The following day, an official of the Domestic Intelligence Division
proposed to 'Villiam Sullivan, head of the Dh·ision. that several leading
members of the Black community should be briefed about Dr.
King by the FBI "on a highly confidential basis." It was proposed
that "the use of a tape, such as contemplated in your memorandum,
together with a transcript for convenience in following the tape,"
should be used.
"The inclusion of U.S. Government officials, such as Carl
Rowan or Ralph Bunch, is not suggested as they might feel
a duty to advise the 'White House of such contemplated meeting....
This group should include such leadership as would
be capable of removing King from the scene if they, of their
own volition. decided this was thp thing to do after such a
briefing.~' 363a
E. Dr. King and Director lJoOl~eJ' J!eet: December 1, Jr)64
According to one of Dr. Kin~'s legal counsels, Harry 'Wachtel, several
prominent civil rights leaders told Dr. King of their concern that
publIc controversy with Director HOO\'er would hurt the civil rights
movement, but promised to support Dr. King should such a confrontation
occur. 'Wachtel recalled that Dr. King ann his staff pondered "how
to defuse this and prevent it from he('omin~ the principal focus of the
struggle. Hoover versus King." "'hich "could only have lead to a division
and thus a dilution of the growing strength of the civil rights
movement." Wachtel testified:
Everything pointed toward the problem of how Hoover would
respond if Dr. King said in effect. "you're a liar; prove your
case. If you call me a liar. prove it." Everv lawyer worth his
salt knows this is the beginninl! of the Alger Hiss type of
dilemma. Libel and slandpr litigation or public debate of
361 Wilkins (staff summary), 11/23/75, p. 2.
:J'" Cartha I)l'Loach tl'stim(}n~'. 11/25/75. p. 173.
363 Wilkins (staff summary). 11/23/75. p. 2.
3630 (Memorandum from .J. A. Sizoo to ·W. C. Snllivan. 12/1/64.)
164
famous personalities can easily lead to destruction of an ongoing
movement. You end up spending your time fighting
over "truth as a defense." eli4
Dr. ICing and his advisers settled on an approach to the problem, and
on the evening of November ;10, 1964, at a public meeting in honor of
his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Dr. ICing announced his intention
to meet with Diredor Hoover to iron out their differences.
I do not plan to engage in public debate with Mr. Hoover and
I think the time has come for all this controversy to end, and
for all of us to get on with the larger job of civil rights and
Inwenforcement.e65
According to Andrew Young, who was then Dr. ICing's Executive
Assistant, the meeting was arranged by Dr. Archibald Carey, a close
friend of both DeLoach and Dr. ICing, at ICing's request.366
Young recalled that Dr. King had been surprised by Director
Hoover's "most notorious liar" allegation and wanted to find out what
was at the heart of the problem.3M Waiter Fauntroy, who said that his
recollection of events surrounding the meeting was "fuzzy," added that
Dr. King had also been motivated by a desire to bring to the Director's
attention complaints of Southern SeLe workers concerning the
lack of FBI protection during civil rights demonstrations.368
The meeting between Dr. ICing and Director Hoover took place at
a:30 p.m. on tIl(' afternoon of December 1. 1964. Dr. ICing was accompanied
by Ralph Abel11athy, Secretary of the SeLe; Andrew Young,
Dr. King's Executive Assistant; and Walter Fauntroy, the SeIA) representative
in Washington. Director Hoover was accompanied by
Cartha DeLoach.
DeLoach detailed the meeting in a twelve-page memornndum which
Young and Abernathy described as "substantially" accurate, finding
fault chiefly with the praise of Director Hoover and of the FBI
which DpI..oach attributed to Dr. ICing. According to the DeLoach
account, Dr. ICing said:
(he) wanted to clear up any misunderstanding which might
have occurred. He stated that some Negroes had told him that
the FBI had been ineffective, however, he was inclined to discount
such criticism. Reverend King asked that the Director
please understand that any criticism of the Director and
the FBI which had been attributed to King was either a misquote
or an outright misrepresentation. He stated this particularly
concprned Albany, Georgia.
Reverend King stated he personally appreciated the great
work of the FBI which had bel'n done in so manv instances ...
Reverend King stated he has never made any personal at-
... Harry Wachtel testimony. 2/27/76. p. 46.
"'" Unitpd Press International release. 12/1/64.
.... Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, p. 13. Carey's recollection support9 this
RC<'Ount. (Staff summary of Archibald Carey interview, 1l/21/75.)
..., Staff summary of Andrpw Young intPl·yiew. 11/19/75, p. l.
... Staff summary of Walter Fauntroy inrerview, 11/17/75, p.l.
165
tack upon Mr. Hoover ... Reverend King said that the Director's
report to the President this summer on rioting was
a very excellent analysis.
Reverend King stated he has been, and still is very concerned
regarding the matter of communism in the civil rights
movement. Reverend King stated that from a strong philosophical
point of view he could never becomp a communist
... He claimed that wh~n lw learns of the identity of a communist
in his midst he immediately deals with the problem
by removing this man. He stated there have been one or two
communists who werp pngaged in fund raising for the Sf'Lf'.
Reverend King then corrected himself to say that these one
or two men were former communists and not Party members
at the present time ... He stated that he had insisted that
[Adviser B] leave his staff because the success of his organization
... was far more important than friendship with [Adviser
B.] 369
According to Young, the meeting opened with a simple exchange
of greetin~notwith the excessive praise of the Director reflected in
DeLoach's memorandum-and then Director Hoover proceeded to
give a monologue that lasted for some fifty-five minutes. DeLoach's
summary memorandum bears out Young's characterization of the
meeting as essentially a briefing by Director Hoover on_ FBI operations
relating to civil rights.370
... Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 12/2/64. pp. 1-2.
3m After reporting Dr. King's opening remarks to Director Hooyer. thl" paragraphs
from the bottom of the second page to thl" end oCthp memorandum begin:
"The Director interrupted King of state .
"The Director told King and his associates .
"The Director told Reverend King that the FBI ...
"The Director told King that many cases ...
"The Director mad(> it C'il"ar to Reye-rend King and hi!' associates ...
"The Dlrect.or madl" reference to Rew'rend King's alle-gation ...
"The Director made refe-rence to the rl"Cent case in ...
"Thl" Director explainl"d that therl" is a great misundeffltanding today .
"The Director spoke of the FBI's SUCCl'R8ful IJ('netration of the KKK .
"He spoke of the FBI's calle' in Louisiana ...
"The Director told the group that ...
"The Director explained that in Alabama ...
"The Difl"Ctor told Reverend King and his associates that ...
"The Director made it very clear to Reyerend King and his asS{)Ciates .
"The Dirl"Ctor told Reverend King he desired t.o give him some advice .
"The Director told Reverend King that in due time ...
"The Director praised the Georgia papers that ...
"The Dlrect.or told King that hl" wanted to make it very clear ...
"The Director explained that we have ...
"The Dirl"Ctor spoke once again of the necessity of ...
"The Director spoke of a ...
"ReYerend King interrupted the Director at this point amI al'ked ...
"The Director told Reverend King and his associates ...
"The Director mentioned that he wanted to make it very plain that ...
"The Director proUdly spoke of the ability of Agents to .
"The Dirl"Ct.or spoke of the Mack Charles Parker case In .
"The Dirl"Ctor told Reverend King that in many instances .
"Reverend Abernathy stated that the :-Iegroes have a real problem in ...
"The Director explained that ...
"Reverend Abernathy stated that ...
"The Dirl"Ctor stated that ...
"The Dirl"Ctor reiterated that ...
"The Director interrupted King and briefly detailed five ca.'les ...
166
Congressman Young testified that neither the Director's pointed criticism
of Dr. King nor the possibility that the FBI was spreading
rumors about Dr. King was rais('tl at the meeting.371 Neither Young nor
Abernathy recalled any hint of blackmail, but Abernathy did remember
quite clearly that at one point Hoover "gave King a lecture reminding
him that he was a man of the cloth" and a national leader, and that he
should "behave himself:' Abernathy did not discem any hint that Dr,
King had not lived up to the expected standards. He said that Dr. King
remained "very calm;' thanked Director Hoover for the reminder, and
agreed that it was important for a national leader to set a moral example.
Abernathy said that the Director then told Dr. King, "If you
haven't done anything wrong. yon don't have anything to worry
about:' 373
Although DeLoach's memorandum of the meeting states that Director
Hoover and Dr. King discussed possible Communist influence in
the SCLC, Andrew Young testified:
He never brought up the subject of Communism at all . , .
(Adviser A's) name never came up, and there was never any
discussion in our meeting abollt Communism or Communist
advisers.373
DeLoach described the meeting to the Committee as follows:
I fully expected it to be a confrontation. However, to the contrary,
it was more or less of a love feast with Mr. Hoover telling
Dr. King that Dr. King is a symbol of leadership for 12
million Negroes and should be careful about his associations
and about his personal conduct. and Dr. King telling Mr,
Hoover that he had not wished to cast any reflection upon the,
FBI and had no intention of doing so in the futuN'. In other
words, it was a very peacl'f1l1 meeting. (DeLoach, p. 170) 314
371 Young. 2/19/73. p.14.
372 Staff summary of Ralph Abernathy interview, 11/14/75, p.2. Upon reflection,
Abernathy statPd that he wa!> uncertain whether this latter exchange had occurrPd
at the December 1 meeting or at some other meeting. However, he could
not recall any other meeting hetwel'n Director Hoover and Dr. King at which hp
was present. DeLoach'!> memorandum account of the meeting dOl'S not mention
this exch'ange. and Andrew Young could not recall it.
In 1970. when thp Burpau rpcpin'd a !>eries of inquiries following a series of
!>toMes in the press suggesting that Director Hoover bad "blackmailed" Dr. King
at the December 1964 meeting by threatening to "expose" hls alleged "extramarital
activities," the FBI prepared a form letter stating:
"I receh'ed your letter of --- and would like to assure that the FBI does nat
engage in hlackmail activities. Also. there is not one shred of truth in the all('gation
that thi!> Bureau blackmailed Martin Luther King."
313 Young, 2/19/76. p. 19.
31< DeLoach, 11/2!'i/75, p. 170.
Time magazine subsequently carried two accounts of the Hoover-King mpeting.
According to the December 14, 1970 issue of Time, Director Hoover described the
meeting as follows:
"I got a wire from the Reverend King in New York. Be was getting rpady to
get the Nobel Prize. He was the last one in the world who should ever ha\'e received
it. He wired asking to !>ee me. I held him in complpte contempt becausE' of
the things he said and because of his conduct. First I felt I shouldn't !!PI' him, hut
then I thought he might become a martyr if I didn't. King was very suave and
smooth. He sat right there where you're :<itting and !>aid, he never criticizt>d thE'
FBI. I said. Mr. King-I never called him reverend-stop right there. you're lying.
He then pulled out a pres!> relea!>e that he !>aid he intended to give to the prpss. I
said, don't show it to me or read it to me. I couldn't under!>tand how he could have
167
Andrew Young agreed that there had been
not even an attitude of hostility. In fact, Hoover was very
disarming in that he congratulated Dr. King for h~ving won
the Nobel Prize, and as far as we are concerned, tIllS was not
the same man that called Martin a notorious liar. We attributed
it to the fact of his age and the kinds of possible
fluctuations that are possible with people under pressure in
advanced years.375
Young also told the Committee that within a few ,veeks of the meeting,
the FBI announced that it had arrested suspects in the summer
murder of three civil rights workers in the South. "So in a sense we
were reassured that the FBI was doing its law enforcement job, and we
hoped the personal tensions, as far as Dr., King was concerned, were
over and done." 376
Harry Wachtel said that Dr. King and his advisors had viewed the
meeting as a success because it had "defused" the FBI's attacks in
time to pennit Dr. King to travel to Europe and receive the Nobel
Prize. 'Wachtel believed that Dr. King's response to Hoover's challenge
prevented the FBI from succeeding in what 1Vachtel viewed as
an attempt to promote disputes and factionalism among the civil rights
leaders :
The factionalism that the FBI sought to create was widespread.
It came out in the Committee's record that they were
even seeking a new leader. In CIA terms, you find yourself a
new president of a country who is in your control ... They
were applying to domestic affairs the type of factionalism
that they had worked on so successfully.... And you had to be
around to know that it didn't take much to disrupt this delicate
marriage of the leadership of the civil rights movement.
377
A memorandum written by DeLoach on December 12, 1964, indicates
that the FBI also viewed the feud with Dr. King as having
quieted. In response to an inquiry from William Sullivan concerning
prepared a press release even before we met. Then he asked if I would go out and
have a photograph taken with him. and I said I eertainly would mind. And I said,
if you ever say anything that is a lie again, I will brand you a liar again. Strange
to say. he never attacked the Bureau again for as long as he lived:'
The exchange which Director Hoover reported to Time magazine does not appear
in DeLoach's detailed memorandum of the meeting. Young also denied the
Director's account, and noted that "there was a public Hoover that made remarks
about Dr. King that were more on that tone, hut in the meeting, none of that kind
of attitude or none of those statements were made." (Young, 2/19/75, p. 17.)
The August 17, 1970 issue of Time magazine states:
"Hoover, Time learned, explained to King just what damaging private detail he
had on the tapes, and lectured him that his morals should be those betltting a
Nobel Prize winner. He also suggested that King Rhould t01l1' down his critieiRm
of the FBI."
Young testified, "there was nothing like that at the meeting." (Young. 2/19/76,
p. 17) and DeLoach's memorandum of thl' ml'eting doeR not report such a
conversation.
:n. Young, 2119/76, p. 15.
,to Young, 2/19/75. p. 14.
377 Wachtel, 2/27/76, p. 48.
168
whether the remainder of the tape recordings about Dr. King should
be transcribed, DeLoach responded:
I fully agree that the work should eventually be done, particularly
if an additional controversy arises with King. I see no
necessity, however, in this work being done at the present time
inasmuch as the controversy has quieted down considerably
and we are not in need of transcripts right now ... I would
recommend that we hold off doing this tremendous amount of
work until there is an actual need.318
F. Oivil Rights Leaders Attempt 1'0 DUisiuade the FBI From DUicrediting
Dr. King: December 1964-May 1965
1. Farmel'-DeLoadl l1feeting: December 1,1964
On December 1, 1964-apparently immediately following Hoover's
meeting with Dr. King 379-James Farmer, National Director of the
Congress of Racial Equality, met with DeLoach to convince him not to
launch a smear campaign against Dr. King. Farmer explained the
circumstances leading up to the meeting to the Committee as follows.
During the last week in November 1964:, Farmer met with the editor
of a New York newspaper who said that he had been with an FBI
agent when Director Hoover's accusation of Dr. King as a "notorious
liar," was reported. The editor told Farmer that the Agent had remarked,
"the Chief has finally gotten it off his chest." The Agent then
went into a "tirade" against Dr. King. A few days later, Farmer was
told by a reporter from the New York Post that stories about Dr. King
were being repeated in journalistic circles. Shortly afterwards, Farmer
was informed that a conservative columnist was preparing a derogatory
story about Dr. King, and that the FBI was prepared to back up
his allegations.
Farmer told the Committee that a CORE staff member had verified
this rumor with an FBI contact who reportedly said "the chief
wants Farmer to know" that he had no interest in "getting Farmer,
Whitney Young, or Roy Wilkins-only King." 380
Farmer then called DeLoach, whom he considered to be a "man of
his word," and asked for a private conference. Before the meeting,
Farmer met with Dr. King and told him about the allegations. Dr.
King approved Farmer's meeting with DeLoach, but did not tell
Farmer that he was intending; to meet with Director Hoover.
On December 1, Farmer conferred with DeLoach in the back seat
of a limousine while driving around Washington, D.C. Farmer told the
Committee that DeLoach began the conversation by remarking, "I
know why you wanted to come down here." He recalled that DeLoach
"'" DeLoach memorandum, 12/10/64, addendum. Dir~tor Hoover wrote on the
memorandum. "I think it should 'be done now while it is fresh in the minds of the
specially trained agents." A notation states; "Done. We have prepared 321 pp.
of transcripts, 3/26/65."
". DeLoach's memorandum of the meeting sets it at 5 p.m., after the KingHoover
meeting. Farmer, however, said that DeLoach left the King-Hoover
meetin~ to confer with him. (Staff summary of .James Farmer interview,
11/13/75, p. 5.)
... Farmer (staff summary), 11/13/75, pp.1-2.
169
said that the FBI did have evidence which supported the rumors about
Dr. King, but that the Bureau was not "peddling" the information.381
DeLoach's memorandum of that meeting states:
Farmer told me that he had heard from a number of newsmen
that the FBI planned to expose Reverend King by
tomorrow, Wednesday, December 2, 1964. He stated that he
and King had had a lengthy conference last night in New
York City and that it had been agreed that Farmer should
come down to see me and prevent this action being taken if
at all possible. He stated he knew that King had made a
sudden decision to come down also and that he hoped that
King's meeting with the Director had been an amiable one.
I told him that it had been.
I told Farmer that we, of course, had no plan whatsoever
to expose Reverend King. I told him that our files were
sacred to us and that it would be unheard of for the FBI
to leak such information to newsmen. I told him I was completely
appalled at the very thought of the FBI engaging in
such endeavors....
I again repeated that we had never entertained the idea
to expose Reverend King; however, I wanted Farmer to definitely
know that the campaign of slander and vilification
against the Director and the FBI should stop without any
delay. I told him that if this war continued that we, out of
necessity, must defend ourselves. I mentioned that I hoped
it would not be necessary for the FBI to adopt defensive
tactics. Farmer got the point without any difficulty whatsoever.
He immediately assured me that there would be no
further criticism from him. He stated he felt certain there
would be no further criticism from King.
Farmer was shown DeLoach's memorandum by the Committee. He
denied that he had assured DeLoach that his or Dr. King's criticism
of the FBI would cease, that there had been any discussion of "warfare,"
and he stated that he did not know what the reference to his
"getting the point" meant.383
2. Y oung-Abernathy-lJeJ.oach Meeting: .1anuary 8, 1965
On January 8, 1965-shortly after the tape and letter were brought
to the attention of the leaders of the SCLC-Andrew Young and
Ralph Abernathy, at Dr. King's urgings, requested a meeting with
Director Hoover.
Both Young and Abernathy told the Committee that the purpose
of the meeting was to determine why the FBI was antagonistic toward
Dr. King and to stem continuing attacks against Dr. King's character.
Young said that the meeting was prompted by the receipt of the tape
and letter.384 Abernathy confirmed this account, and added that allI81
Farmer (staff summary), 11/13/75, pp. 2--4.
... Farmer (statt summary), 11/13/76, p. 4.
... Young, 2/19/76, p. 20. Young testified that:
"We asked for the meeting because even though we thought that Hoover
wasn't as bad as he seemed publicly, and we thought this was just a sort of lapse
in his behavior, we still kept getting reports from the press about stories that
were stilI being told, and we received the tape."
170
though they had not assumed that the FBI had sent the tape itself,
they did believe that the FBI had at least known about the tape and
could help in terminating the campaign of personal abuse directed
against Dr. King.38s
DeLoach, rather than Director Hoover, met with Young and Abernathy.
Abernathy told the Committee that he had made it unmistakably
clear to DeLoach they were concerned about charges bearing
on Dr. King's personal conduct.386 DeLoach's memorandum of the
meeting states:
Reverend Abernathy spoke very generally, pointing out
that people were always "making charges" and "innuendoes"
against Mr. King.... Reverend Young said it looked like
there were some attempts to smear and ruin the civil rights
movement; that just lately there has been some new evidence
in this regard and that very obviously the activities of Mr.
King and the SCLC are under close surveillance....
[Young] said he did feel though there must be some sort of
concerted organized campaign that was being directed against
King and the SCLC....
Reverend Abernathy stated that there were three points
they had wanted to discuss; communist infiltration, allegations
that King was getting rich on the civil rights movement
and the third point had to do with allegations about
the personal life and moral character of King.... Abernathy
said that he was not going to make allegatIOns against the
FBI but that some things were going on they just could not
understand.
Reverend Young said that King had been receiving letters
charging him with immorality, that these letters attacked
his personal life.
Reverend Young said that he was deeply concerned about
irresponsible usage of personal information on the part of
scandalmongers and wondered if there could be any "leaks"
from the Government. He was assured that there were no leaks
from the FBI, that the Director ran a tight organization and
that any irresponsibility on the part of any agent would not
'be tolerated.387
Andrew Young testified that he "thought" that he had mentioned the
letter and tape recording that had been received by Dr. King. He recalled
that DeLoach
denied everything. He denied that an FBI agent would ever
talk to the press about anything.
Que8tion. Did you bring up the issue of whether the FBI
was tapping Dr. King's phone, SOLe's phone, or bugging
Dr. King~
YOUNG. Yes, we did. He assured us that was not true.388
385 Abernathy (staff summary), 11/14/75, pp. 2-3.
• 80 Abernathy (staff summary), 11/14/75, p. 2.
381 Memorandum from Gartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 1/11/65, pp. 1-3.
ass Young, 2/19/76, p. 38.
171
3. Garey-DeLoach Meeting: May 19, 1965
On May 19, 1965, Dr. Archibald J. Carey, Jr., then a Chicago
attorney who was well acquainted with Dr. King, DeLoach, and
Director Hoover, met with DeLoach to "mediate" in what he regarded
as an unfortunate dispute among his friends. Dr. Carey told
the Committee staff that Dr. King had first brought to his attention
rumors about Dr. King~s "communist sympathies" and personal conduct
during a weekend visit to Chicago some time in May 1965. On that
occasion, Dr. King told Dr. Carey that the FBI was trying to discredit
him and might release stories to the press regardmg his personal
life in the near future. Dr. Carey told the Committee that
Dr. King did not ask him to talk with the FBI about their attempt
to discredit him, but rather that he had volunteered to "see what he
could do." Dr. King gave his assent.389
DeLoach, in a memorandum of the meeting, wrote that "Carey
told me that he wanted to enlist the sympathies of the FBI in not
letting any effort to discredit King occur." DeLoach said that he
had told Dr. Carey that "the FBI had plenty to do without bein~
responsible for a discrediting campaign against Reverend King.'
DeLoach ended the memorandum with the comment:
Dr. Carey is the third individual that King has had come to
see us relative to requesting that we not expose him. Roy
Wilkins, Jim Farmer, and Reverend Abernathy have all
been here for the same purpose. It is obvious that King is
becoming very disturbed and worried about his background,
else he would not go to such great efforts to have people approach
the FBI. I did not commit the FBI in any manner
insofar as exposing King is concerned. To the contrary, I
let Carey flatly know of King's derelictions insofar as false
allegations against us are concerned and or the fact that
King and other civil rights workers owed the FBI a debt
or gratitude they would never be able to repay.390
Director Hoover wrote on the memorandum, "Well handled."
Dr. Carey told the Committee staff that he contacted Dr. King
arter the meeting and suggested that criticizing the FBI was not
the best strategy for the civil rights movement. Dr. Carey said that
he had asked hoth Dr. King and Director Hoover not to alienate each
other. He also said that he had been concerned less with the truth
or falsity of any of the allegations that were made than with ending
the dispute.390'
... Staff summary of Archibald Carey interview 12/21/75, pp. 1-2. DeLoach
in a memorandum concerning his meeting with Dr. Carey, wrote that Dr. Carey
had said:
"He had come to see us on behalf of Martin I,uther King. He added that King
was in Chicago last weekend and stayed in Carey's home, and at that time
indicated every evidence of great disturbance. King told Carey he had been
reliably informed there was a massive effort to discredit him by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. This effort is to begin this week." (Memorandum from
Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 5/19/6.";, p. 1)
Dr. Garey told the Committee that DeLoach had exaggerated Dr. King's concern
over these rumours in his memorandum.
... DeLoach memorandum, 5/19/65, p. 2.
.... Carey (staff summary), 11/21/75, p. 3.
69-984 0 - 76 - 12
172
VII. THE FBI PROGRAM AGAINST DR. KING: 1965-1968
The public dispute between Dr. King and Director Hoover ended
with their December 1, 1964, meeting. The Bureau's covert attempts
to discredit Dr. King and undermine his influence in the civil rights
movement did not cease, however, but continued unabated until Dr.
King's death.391 Although the intensity of the FBI's campaign against
Dr. King appears to have been reduced somewhat in 1966 and 1967,
Dr. King's public stand against the war in Vietnam in mid-1967 revived
the FBI's attempt to link Dr. King and the SCLC with communism.
A. Major Efforts to Duwredit Dr. King: 1965-1968
1. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King With Churches
On February 1, 1965, The Domestic Intelligence Division learned that
Dr. King was scheduled to speak at the Davenport, Iowa, Catholic
InterracIal Council's banquet and receive a "Pacem in Terris" award
in memory of Pope John. Internal Security Section chief Frederick
Baumgardner observed, "it is shocking indeed that King continues to
be honored by religious groups." 392 Baumgardner recommended that
Assistant Director Malone contact Francis Cardinal Spellman and
suggest that "in the end it might well be embarrassing to the Catholic
Church for having given honors to King." The Director noted on the
memorandum, "I see no need to further approach Spellman"; he was
apparently alluding to the unsuccessful atteJ9.pt to sabotage Dr. King's
audience with the Pope through Spellman's intervention. There is no
record of any further action.
In February 1966 Dr. King held a press conference following a
meeting with the Reverend John P. Cody, Archbishop of the Chicago
Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church, and announced that he and
Cody were in agreement on general civil rights goals and that he hoped
priests and nuns in Chicago would partIcipate in SCLC programs.
The Domestic Intelligence Division subsequently recommended that a
special agent acquainted with the Archbishop brief him about Dr.
King to aid "the Archbishop in determining the degree of cooperation
his archdiocese will extend to King's program in Chicago and [to]
result in a lessening of King's influence in Chicago." 393
The Archbishop was briefed on February 24, 1966, "along the lines
discussed with Assistant Director Sullivan." 394 The agent who conducted
the briefing wrote that he felt "certain that [Cody] will do
everything possible to neutralize King's effect in this area." 396
In April 1966 the FBI Legal Attache in Paris requested permission
to inform the pastor of the American Church in Paris of Dr. King's
background "in an effort to convince him that his continued support
of Martin Luther King may result in embarrassment for him and the
101 Even after Dr. King's death, the ~I tried to tarnish his public image. See
pp. 183.
.. 'Memorandum frQDl Frederick Baumgardner to William 'Su1l1van, 2/1/65•
... Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William 'Su1l1van, 2/18/66.
... Memorandum from SAC, Chicago, to Direclor, FBI, 2124/66. Sullivan had
a'pparently suggested that the Archbishop be informed about alleged communist
influence on Dr. King and about Dr. King's private life.
... SAC, Chicago memorandum, 2124/66.
173
American Church in Paris." 396 The pastor was briefed on May 9, 1966.
According to the agent who conducted the briefing, the pastor was
skeptical about the FBI allegations, but promised to keep the information
in mind for future dealings with Dr. King.397
2. Attempts to Discredit Dr. Kinq With Heads of Government
Agencies
In March 1965 the FBI contacted former Florida Governor LeRoy
Collins. Collins was then Director of the Community Relations Service,
Department of Commerce, a position the Bureau viewed as "something
of a 'mediator' in problems relating to the racial field." 398 The
FBI told Collins that Corretta King had criticized his participation
in developments in Selma, Alabama and had said that Collins was
"blinded by prejudice." A copy of the December 1964 monograph
about Dr. King was also sent to Collins, "in view of [his] important
position relative to the racial movement." 399
Also in March 1965 the FBI learned that the Internal Revenue Service
intended to invite Dr. King as one of 19 guest lecturers at a series
of seminars on Equal Employment Opportunities. When the IRS
requested routine name checks on the 19 individuals, Director Hoover
approved a Domestic Intelligence Division request to send the IRS a
copy of the December 1964 monograph; normal procedures were followed
in checking the other 18 people.40o
In December 1966 Domestic Intelligence Director William Sullivan
reported that he had met with Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson during
a tour of the FBI's Legal Attache Office in Japan and was surprised
to learn that Johnson was unaware of allegations that communists were
influencing Dr. King. Sullivan recommended that Johnson be sent a
copy of the monograph about Dr. King "because of his position." 401
Director Hoover approved the plan, and a copy of the monograph
was sent to the FBI Legal Attache in Tokyo for hand-delivery to the
Ambassador.402
Dr. King publicly announced his opposition to American involvement
in the war in Vietnam in a speech at New York's Riverside
Church on April 4, 1967. Six days later, Charles Brennan of the Domestic
Intelligence Division recommended the circulation of an updated
draft of the King monograph to the White House. Brennan's
memorandum states that the revised monograph contained allegations
about communist influence over Dr. King as well as personally derogatory
allegations.403
Director Hoover approved and copies of the revised monogra.ph were
sent to the White House, the Secretary of State, the Secreta.ry of De-
... Memorandum from LEGAT. Paril!l, to Director, FBI, 4/14/66.
:JeT Memorandum from LEGAT, Paris, to Director, FBI, 5/9/66.
... Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 3/23/65.
... Baumgardner memorandum, 3/23/65.
... Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 3/31/65.
The delivery was made shortly thereafter (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover
to Internal Revenue Service, 4/2/65) .
.... Memorandum from William Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 12/19/66.
... Memorandum from Director, FBI to LEGAT, Tokyo, 12/28/66.
too Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 4/10/67.
174
tense, the Director of the Secret Service, and the Attorney GeneraI.404
A copy was subsequently sent to the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
who had been interested in "King's activities in the civil rights movement
but recently had become quite concerned as to whether there are
any subversive influences which have caused King to link the civil
rights movement with the anti-Vietnam War movement." The Domestic
Intelligence Division recommended that a copy be given to the
Marine Commandant because "it is felt would definitely be to the benefit
of [the Commandant] and to the Bureau...." 405
In February 1968, FBI Headquarters learned that Dr. King planned
a "Washington Spring Project" for April 1968. According to a Domestic
Intelligence Division memorandum, the Director suggested that
the King monograph be again revised. That memorandum noted:
Bringing this monograph up-to-date and disseminating it
at high level prior to King's "'Washington Spring Project"
should serve again to remind top-level officials in Government
of the wholly disreputable character of King. . . .
Because of the importance of doing a thorough job on this,
we will conduct an exhaustive field review to bring together
the most complete and up-to-date information and to present
it in a hard-hitting manner.40U
The revised monograph, dated March 12, 1968, was disseminated to
the White House, the Attorney General, and the heads of various government
intelligence agencies.407
3. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King By Using the Press
Despite Cartha DeLoach's assurances to Andrew Young and Ralph
Abernathy that the FBI would never disseminate information to the
press, the Bureau continued its efforts to cultivate "friendly" news
sources that would be willing to release information unfavorable to
Dr. King. Ralph McGill, the pro-civil rights editor of the Atlanta
OonstitutWn, was a major focus of the Bureau's attentions. The Bureau
apparently first furnished McGill with derogatory information
about Dr. King as part of an attempt to dissuade community leaders
in Atlanta from participating in a banquet planned to honor Dr. King
upon his return from the Nobel Prize ceremonies. After a meeting
with McGill, 'William Sullivan reported that McGill said that he had
stopped speaking favorably of Dr. King, that he had refused to take an
active part in preparing for the banquet, and that he had even taken
steps to undermine the banquet. McGill's version of wha,t transpired
will never be known, since McGill is deceased. According to Sullivan's
memorandum, however:
Mr. McGill told me that following my first discussion with
him a few weeks ago he contacted a banker friend in Atlanta
who was helping to finance the banquet to be given King next
Wednesday night. The banker was disturbed and said he
... Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General; Director, U.S. Secret
Service; the Secretary of State; the White House; and the Secretary of Defense,
4/10/67.
'(6 Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 8/30/67.
... Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 2/29/68.
• lJ1 Memoranda from George Moore to William Sullivan, 3/11/68 and 3/19/68.
175
would contact some other bankers also involved and see if support
could be guietly withdrawn. McGilPs friend and some of
the bankers dId take steps to withdraw but this was very
quickly relayed to bankers in Haiti who were on the threshold
of an important financial deal with the Atlanta, Georgia,
bankers. They took the position that if the Atlanta bankers
did not support the Martin Luther King party, their financial
deal with these Georgia bankers was off.... As a result
they got cold feet and decided to go ahead with financing
King's party.
McGill told me that ... , a Catholic leader in Georgia, an
Episcopal clergyman and a Jewish rabbi are also quite active
in support of this party for King ... I told him that ... he
might want to explore very confidentially and discreetly the
subject matter with these three men. . . .
McGill told me that he thinks it is too late now, especially
in view of the financial interest of the Georgia bankers in
the Haiti deal, to prevent the banquet from taking place.
However, McGill said he would do what he could to encourage
key people to limit their praise and support of King as much
as possible.
McGill also told me that he is taking steps through [a
Negro leader] to get key Negro leaders to unite in oPROsition
to King and to gradually force him out of the civil) rights
movement if at all possible.4
0
9
The FBI subsequently told the White House that McGill:
believes that the very best thing that could happen would be
to have King step completely out of the civil rights movement
and public life for he feels that if this is not done,
sooner or later King 'will be publicly exposed. Mr. McGill
believes that an exposure of King will do irreparable harm
to the civil rights movement in which he, Mr. McGill, and
others are so interested and have worked so hard for; and
likewise it will do injury to different citizens of the country
who have been supporting King....410
In late May 1965, a reporter from United Press International requested
the Bureau for information about Dr. King for use in a series of
articles about the civil rights leader. The Special Agent in Charge hI
Atlanta recommended that the Bureau give the reporter both public
source and confidential information a;bout Dr. King because the reporter
"is the UPJ's authority in the South on the Negro movement
and his articles carry a great deal of influence and [the SAC did not
believe] that he would prepare anything flattering or favorable to
King." The Director approved a recommendation that the reporter be
supplied with a public source document and with a "short summation"
of allegations concerning communist influence over Dr. King to
be used "merely for orientation purposes." 411
... Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/21/65.
610 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Bill Moyers, 1/22/65.
on Memorandum from Joseph Sizoo to William Sullivan, 5/24/65.
176
In October 1966, the Domestic Intelligence Division recommended
that a'n article "indicting KiIig for his failure to take a stand on the
[black power] issue and at the same time exposing the degree of communist
influence on him" be given to a newspaper contact "friendly"
to the Bureau, "such as . . . [the] Editor of U.S. News and World
Report."
It is felt that the public should again be reminded of this communist
influence on King, and the current controversy among
civil rights leaders makes this timely to do SO.412
Attached to the memorandum was a proposed, article which noted
that the efforts of several civil rights leaders to denounce "Black
Power" had been: "undermined by one man in the civil rights movement
who holds in his hands the power to silence the rabOle rousers and
to give the movement renewed momentum." The article attributed Dr.
King's equivocation to his advisers, who were alleged to have had
affiliations with the Communist Party or organizations associated with
the Party. Dr. King's decision to oppose the Vietnamese war was also
attributed to these advisers.413
One project involving the mass media which the FBI felt had been
particularly successful was its attempt to prevent Dr. King from obtaining
contributions from James Hoffa of the Teamsters Union. In
October 1966, the FBI discovered that Dr. King' planned to meet with
Hoffa, but that Dr. King had wanted to avoid publicity because, in
the words of the Bureau:
Disclosure of King's transparent attempt to blackmail Hoffa
with the large Negro membership of Hoffa's union, to solve
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's financial
problems, would cause an uproar among leaders of organizations
having large Negro memberships; pointing out their
own vulnerability to such a squeeze by any unscrupulouscivil
rights leader. This, potential ,collusion between la.rge labor
unions and the civil rights movement could, also react to the
detriment of the Negr6 in that through large financial donations,
l!'n uIiscruPl!lo~s labor Jead~r. co~ld subvert the legiHmate
allns and ObjectIVes of the cIvll rIghts movement to hIS
own purposes.414
" . .
The Crime Records Division prepared an article for public release
mising the question of, "who really gets squeez~d when these two
pythons get together." 416 The Domestic Intelligence Division also
recommended:
a Bureau official be de'signated now to alert friendly news
media of the meeting once the meeting date is learned so that
.u Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to WilHam Sullivan, 10/27/66.
... Director Hoover's "O.K" appears at the bottom of the memorandum. Tbere
is also a note stating, "U.S. News and World Report will not use article of tllis
natute... It is not known whether tim article was actually distributed.
"', Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 10/28166.
<14 Memorandum from Charles Brennan to Frederick Baumgardner, WilUam
SlifUvan, attached to Baumgardner memorandum, 10/28166.
177
arrangements can be made for appropriate press coverage of
the planned meeting to expose and dIsrupt it.417
Director Hoover's "O.K." appears below thlV recommendation.
On discovering that the meeting was aoou~ to occur, the Crime
Records Division notified a reporter for the New, York Daily NeW8
and a national columnist. "News photographers and wire services are
also being alerted to give coverage...." 418
A Crime Records Division memorandum on the following day reported
that "in view of publicity in the New York Daily News regarding
this proposed meeting, King and his aides had decided that it would
be unwise to meet with Hoffa." The Bureau then notified reporters that
Dr. King was coming to Washington, D.C. The reporters "cornered"
Dr. King as he came off the plane and quizzed him about the proposed
meeting. The Crime Records Division reported these events to the
Director with the assessment that "our counterintelligence aim to
thwart King from receiving mQney from the Teamsters has been quite
successful to date." Director H60ver initialed the memorandum reportin,
g this news, "Excellen,t." 419
In March 1967 Director H-oover approved a recommendation by the
Domestic Intelligence Division to furnish' "friendly" reporters questions
to ask Dr. King. The IntelHgence Division believed that Dr.
King 'Yould be, particularly "vulnerable" to questions concerning his
opposition to the war in Vietnam, and. reqommerided. that a reporter
be selected to intervieW Dr.Jting "ostensibly to' question King about
his new book," but with the objective of bringing out the foreignpolicy
aspects of Dr. Kirig'sphilosophy.
This could then be linked to show that King's current policies
remarkably parallel communist efforts. This would cause extreme
embarrassment to King.420
In October 1967 the Domestic Intelligence Division recommended
that an editorial in a Negro magazine, which criticized Dr. King for
his stance on the Vietnam war, be given to "friendly news sources."
The purpose of the dissemination was to "publicize King as a traitor
to his country and his race" and to "reduce his income" from a series of
shows given by Harry Belafont;e to e$rn fundsfor the SCLC. The
recommendation was approved by the Directoi' and is marked
"Handled 10/28/67." 421
4. Attempts to Discredit /Jr. King With MajtYi' Political aiul
Financial Leaders
In March 1965 the FBI learned t4at a "Martin Luther King Day"
was being planned in a major .city. The D?mestic}ntellige~ceDivif>io~
recommended that the SpecIal Agent IIi. Charge "personally meet
with the Governor and brief hiin c6ncernmg King" in order to "induce
him to minimize the affair and especially the award for King."
fiT Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 11/3/66.
<18 Memorandum from Robert Wick to Cartha DeLoach, 11/8/66.
11' Memorandum from Robert Wick to Cartha DeLoach, 11/9/66.
... Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 3/8/67. The proposal
was given Director Hoover's "O.K." and a handwritten note in the margin
initial~ by the Chief of. the Crime Records Division ~tates, ·~hjlndled."
m Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan; 16118/67.
178
The Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum was initialed by
the Director and bears the handwritten notation, "handled 3-5-65,
WCS[ullivan]." 422
In October 1966 the FBI learned that Dr. King had met with
McGeorge Bundy, then Director of the Ford Foundation, and received
a tentative offer of a grant for the SCLC. The Domestic Intelligence
Division decided that officials of the Foundation might not be aware
of the "subversive backgrounds of King's principal advisers," but
that if they were briefed, "this might preclude any assistance being
granted." Director Hoover approved a plan to have a former FBI
agent, who was then a vice-president of the Ford Motor Company,
approach Bundy.423 The ex-agent was contacted, briefed on Dr. King,
and according to DeLoach, "stated he would personally contact Bundy
in an effort to put a stop to King receiving any funds from the Ford
Foundation." 424
In a memorandum dated October 26, 1966, DeLoach reported that
the ex-agent had contacted Bundy, but that Bundy had refused to
talk with him about Dr. King, saying that he would only talk with
a person having first-hand knowledge about Dr. King, and would not
listen to rumors. DeLoach recommended that the FBI not directly approach
Bundy, since "it is doubtful that contact with him by the FBI
will convince him one way or another." Director Hoover wrote on
DeLoach's memorandum, "Yes. We would get no where with
Bundy." 425
5. Attempts to DiJscredit Dr. King With Congressional Leaders
According to a memorandum by Assistant to the Director DeLoach,
Speaker of the House John McCormack requested a briefing about
Dr. King's background and activities in August 1965. DeLoach reported
that he briefed McCormack for 45 minutes about Dr. King's
private life and about possible communist influence over Dr. King.
According to DeLoach, McCormack stated that "he now recognized
the gravity of the situation and that something obviously must be
done about it." 426 McCormack was not interviewed by the committee
staff.
Not all Contrressional inquiries about Dr. King, however, were answered
by the Bureau. For example, in January 1968, DeLoach reported
that he had met with 'Senator Robert C. Byrd at the Senator's
request. DeLoach's memorandum of the meeting states that the Senator
expressed concern over Dr. King's plan for demonstrations in
Washington, D.C. during the summer and said that it was time Dr.
King "met his Waterloo." DeLoach's memorandum states that Senator
Bvrd asked if the FBI would prepare a speech about Dr. King
which he could rleliver on the floor of the Senate. DeLoach declined
to provide any information that was not on the public record, al-
... Memorandum from Frederick Baumj!;ardner to William Sullivan, 3/2/65.
... Memorandum from Frederick Bauml!:ardner to William Sullivan, 10/24/66.
... Memorandum from Carthll DeLoach to Clyde TolRon, 10/26/66.
... Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 10/26/66. DeLoaCh's
memorandum noted: "I personally feel that Bundy is of the pseudo-lntellectUlll,
Ivy League .j1;roup that has little respect for the FBI." Bundy confirmed
that he had been approllched concerning Dr. Kinj!; and that he had refused to
talk abollt Dr. Kinj!;.
co Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 8/14/65.
179
though he did promise to keep the Senator informed of new public
source items.427 The Committee staff did not interview Senator Byrd.
B. OOINTELPRO Operations Agaiwt Dr. King and His Associates
The FBI elevated its activities against Dr. King and his associates
to the status of formal counterintelligence programs (COINTEL
PRO) during this period.428 In July 196u, the Director instructed
the New York field office that "immediate steps should be taken
to discredit, expose, or otherwise neutralize Adviser A's role as a
clandestine communist." 429 An agent was assigned full-time to "carefully
review the [Adviser A] case file seeking possible counterintelligence
approaches." He reported that there was no derogatory information
on Adviser A's personallife,430 and that the only "effective
way to neutralize [him] is by public exposure" of his alleged Communist
Party assoeiations.<3l None of the FBI's efforts against Adviser
A appear to have met success.
The FBI considered initiating a formal COINTELPRO to discredit
Dr. King and Dr. Benjamin Spock in May 1967 when rumors
developed concerning the possibility that King and Spock might run
as "peace" candidates in the 1968 presidential election. The New York
field office recommended postponing the effort to expose "communist
connedions" of persons associated with King and Spock until they had
formally announced their candidacy.<32 The Chicago field office proposed
waiting until the summer of 1968, reasoning- that by then the
Administration would have either resolved the Vietnam conflict or,
if not, the Communist Party would be emphasizing the peace theme,
and exposure of Communist Party links with the King-Spook camnaign
"would doubtlessly be appreciated by the Administration." 433
",Vhile the Chicago field office felt that the Bureau should not "rule
out" the use of "flyers, leaflets, cards and bumper stickers" to discredit
the King-Spock ticket, it recommended "the use of a political columnist
or reporter for this purpose." 434 Apparently no steps were taken
to implement the plan. .
In August 1967 the Bureau initiated a COINTELPRO captioned
"Black Nationalist-Hate Groups." This program is extensively described
in the Staff Report on COINTELPRO: The document initiating
the program states:
m Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Olyde Tolson, 1/19/68.
42. COIKTELPRO is discuss!'d at length in the Staff Report on OOINTELPRO.
... Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, New York, 7/18/66. Allegations
concerning Adviser A's suspected Communist Party affiliations are discussed
at pp. 149-150.
..0 The complete absence of any derogatory information on Adviser A's personal
life did not prevent the Bureau from attempting to develop such information.
In October 1967 the !'ew York office informed Washington it would "continue
its efforts to place [Adviser A] in a compromising position" with a woman
acquaintance. (Memorandum from SAC New York to Director. FBI. 10/7/66.)
.., Memorandum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI. 8/15/66.
.... Memorandum from SAC, Kew York to Director, FBI, 2/25/67.
... Memorandum from SAC The field office noted: "Effectively tabbing as communists
or as communlst-baek!'d the more hysterical opponents of the President
on the Vietnam question in the midst of the Pr!'sidential campaign would be a
real boon to Mr..Johnson."
... M!'morandum from SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI, 6/1/67. The Chicago
office observed: "It is !'mphasiz!'d that this person should be respected for his
balance and fair-mindedness. An article or series by an established conservative
would not adequately serve our purposes."
180
The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor is to
expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize
the activities of black-nationalist, hate-type organizations and
groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership and
supporters, and to counter their propensity for VIOlence
and civil disorder.
Intensified attention under this program should 'be afforded
to the activities of such groups as the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee, Southern Ohri8tian Leader8hip
Oonfererwe, Revolutionary Action Movement, the Deacons
for Defense and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality, and the
Nation of Islam. [Emphasis added.] 435
The Domestic Intelligence Division expanded the Black Nationalist-
Hate Groups COINTELPRO in February 1968. The instructions
to the field offices listed as a "goal":
Prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could unify and electrify
the militant black nationalist movement. Malcolm X
might have been such a "messiah;" he is the martyr of the
movement today. Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael,
and Elijah Muhammed all aspire to this position. Elijah
Muhammed is less of a threat because of his age. King could
be a real contender for this position should he abandon his
supposed "obedience" to "white, liberal doctrines" (nonviolence)
and embrace black nationalism....436
The SCLC was retained as a "primary target" of the COINTELPRO,
and Martin Luther King's name was added to the list of persons who
were targets.
The supervisor of the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO, told the
Committee that he could recall no counterintelligence activities directed
against the SCLC, but that several were taken against Dr.
King.437
C. The FBI'8 Effort8 to Discredit Dr. King During His Last Months
Between 1965 and early 1967, the files indicate that Bureau concern
about Dr. King had decreased. This concern was revived by Dr. King's
April 4, 1967, speech at New York's Riverside Church, in which he
opposed the Administration's position in Vietnam. The FBI interpreted
this position as proof he "has been influenced by communist
advisers," and noted that King's remarks were "a direct parallel of
the communist position on Vietnam." 438 A week after the speech the
FBI sent the White House and the Justice Department a revised edition
of the printed King monograph.
In early December 1967 Dr. King announced plans to hold demonstrations
in major American cities, including Washingion, D.C., to
spur Congress into enacting civil rights legislation. The FBI followed
closely developments in Dr. King's "Washington Spring Project" forwarding
to the White House information concerning Adviser A's
... Memorandum from Director, FBI to Special Agents in Charge, 8/25/67.
... Memorandum from Director, FBI to Special Agents in Charge, 3/4/68.
431 Testimony, 10/17/75, p.14.
..... Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 4/10/67.
181
fund-raising activities and Dr. King's plans to tape a lecture series for
a foreign television system, allegedly to raise funds for the project.HIl
In February 1968 the FBI again revised the King monograph and
distributed it to certain officials in the Executive Branch. The Domestic
Intelligence Division memorandum recommending the new monograph
stated that its dissemination "prior to King's 'Washington Spring
Project' should serve again to remind top-level officials in Government
of the wholly disreputable character of King." 441
In early March, the Bureau broadened its Black Nationalist-Hate
Groups COINTELPRO explicitly to include Dr. King.442 Toward the
end of the month, the FBI began to disseminate information to the
press "designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund
raising campaign for the Washington Spring ProjecL" The first of
many plans included circulating a story
that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people
he solicited. Since the churches have offered support, no more
money is needed and any contributed would only be used by
King for other purposes. This item would need nation-wide
circulation in order to reach all the potential contributors and
curtail their donations}43
On March 25, the Bureau approved a plan to mail an anonymous
letter to a civil rights leader in Selma, Alabama, who was "miffed"
with Dr. King, and a copy of that letter to a Selma newspaper, hoping
that the newspaper might interview the leader about its contents. The
Bureau described the purpose of the letter as calling
to the attention of [the ci viI rights leader] that King is merely
using the Negroes of the Selma area for his own personal
aggrandizement; that he is not genuinely interested in their
welfare, but only in their donatIons; that in all probability
the individuals going to Washington for the Sprmg Project
will be left stranded without suitable housing or food. The
letter should also play up the possibility of violence.444
There is no indication in FBI files that the letter was mailed.
During the latter part of March, Dr. King went to Memphis, Tennessee,
where a strike by Sanitation Workers had erupted into violent
riots.
A March 28, 1968, Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum
stated:
A sanitation strike has been going onin Memphis for some
time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a march composed
of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis. King
was in an automobile precedmg the marchers. As the march
developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke out including
the breaking of windows in stores and some looting.
"" Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 12/18/67; memorandum
from Director, FBI to LEGAT, 12/21/67.
'" Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 2/29/68.
... See discussion, supra, p. 180.
... Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 3/26/68.
... Memorandum from SAC, Mobile to Director, FBI, 3/25/68; memorandum
from Director, FBI to SAC, Mobile, 4/2/68.
182
This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called nonviolence
advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same thing could
happen in his planned massive civil disobedience for Washington
in April.
ACTION
Attached is a blind memorandum pointing out the above,
which if you approve, should be made available by Crime
Records Division to cooperative news media sources.
The memorandum carried Director Hoover's "O.K." and the notation,
"handled on 3/28/68." 445
On March 29, 1968, the Domestic Intelligence Division recommended
that the following article be furnished to a cooperative news source: .
Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike
in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown
white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3/29/68
King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading
lambs to slaughter King led the ma,rchel'S to violence, and
when the violence broke out, King disappeared.
The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized
exclusively by N~groes but King didn't go there for his
hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn
Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively patronized,
was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of
white merchants for King, only for his followers.446
On April 4, Dr. King returned to Memphis. This time he registered
at the Lorraine Hotel. We have discovered no evidence that the FBI
was responsible for Dr. King's move to the Lorraine Hotel.447
... Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 3/28/68. An article
about violence in the sanitation strike, published in the Memphis Commercial
Clarion on March 29, 1968, echoed the wording of the l<'BI memorandum, although
there is no proof that the FBI was responsible for the article. The article stated :
"Yesterday's march, ostensibly a protest on behalf of the city's striking sanita·
tion workers, was generally considered to be a 'dress rehearsal' by Dr. King for
his planned march on Washington April 22." (Memphis Commercial Clarioll,
3/29/68.)
... Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 3/29/68.
U7 Dr. King's associates and the FBI both deny that this last eft'ort to discredit
Dr. King in1luenced his decision to move to the Lorraine Hotel. Dr. Ralph Abel'·
nathy, who was with Dr. King during his last days, told the Committee that he
had not been aware of any newspaper articles criticizing Dr. King for staying at
the Holiday Inn during his visit the previous week. He was certain that the Lorraine
had not been chosen because of any articles that might have appeared and
said that Dr. King always stayed at the Lorraine when he visited Memphis, with
the exception of the prior visit. In that instance, Dr. King had been brought to
the Holiday Inn by police following a riot during the sanitation strike. (Staff sum·
mary of Ralph Abernathy interview, 11/19/75, p. 2.)
A handwritten note on the FBI memorandum criticizing Dr. King for staying
at the Holiday Inn states: "handled, 4-3-68." The FBI questioned the agent
who wrote "handled" on the memorandum and informed the Committee that be
did not recall the memorandum, and did not know whether "handled" indicated
that he had disseminated the article or simply cleared the memorandum through
the Crime Records Division of the FBI.
According to the FBI, Dr. King checked into the Lorraine Hotel at 10 :30 a.m.
on April 3. The FBI has concluded that "the notation indicating that the proposed
furnishing of information to news media was 'handled' on April 3, 1968,
would, of course, preclude any such information from appearing in the press
prior !xl King's checking into the Hotel Lorraine. . .."
183
D. Attempts to Di8credit Dr'. King's Reputation After Hi8 Death
The FBI's attempts to discredit Dr. King did not end with his
death. In March 1969 the Bureau was informed that Congress wa.s
considering declaring Dr. King's birthday a national holiday, and
that members of the House Committee on Internal Security might be
contacting the Bureau for a briefing about Dr. King. The Crime
Records Division recommended briefing the Congressmen because they
were "in a position to keep the bill from being reported out of Committee"
if "they realize King wa.s a scoundrel." DeLoach noted: "This
is a delicate matter-but can be handled very cautiously." Director
Hoover wrote, "I agree. It must be handledl'ery cautioWJly." H7a
In April 1969 FBI Headquarters received a recommendation for a
counterintelligence program from the Atlanta Field Office. The nature
of the proposed program has not been revealed to the Committee.
A memorandum concerning the plan which the Bureau has given
to the Committee, however, notes that the plan might be used "in
the event the Bureau is inclined to entertain counterintelligence action
against Corebta Scott King and/or the continuous projection of the
public image of Martin Luther King...." 447' The Director informed
the Atlanta office that "the Bureau does not desire counterintelligence
action against Coretta King of the nature you suggest at this time.448
CONCLUSION
Although it is impossible to gauge the full extent to which the
FBI's discrediting programs affected the civil rights movement, the
faot that there wa.s impact is unquestionable.
Rumors circulated by the FBI had a profound impaot on the
SCLC's ability to raise funds. According to Congressman Andrew
Young, a personal friend and associate of Dr. King, the FBI's effort
against Dr. King and the SCrA; "chilled contributions. There were direct
attempts at some of our larger contributors who told U$ that they
had been told by agents that Martin had a Swiss bank account, or that
Martin had confiscated some of the monies from the March on Washington
for his personal use. None of that was true." H9 Harry Wachtel,
one of Dr. King's legal counsels who handled many of the financial and
fund raising activities of the SCLC, emphasized thllit the SCLC was
always in need of funds. "Getting a grant or getting a contribution
is a very fr~ile thing. A want delayed ha.s a very serious impact on
an organization whose financial condition was pretty rough." 450
Wachtel testified that the SCLC continually had to overcome rumors
of poor financial management and communist connections.
The mater~al ... stayed in the political bloodstream all the
way through to the time of Dr. King's de8ith, and even after.
In our efforts to build a King Center, it was around. It was
like a contamination.451
..,. Memorandum from Milton Jones to Thomas Bishop, 3/18/69. [Emphasis in
original]
...., Memorandum from SAC, Atlanta to Director. FBI, 4/3/69.
... Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, Atlanta, 4/14/69.
u. Young, 2/19/76, pp. 25-26.
... Wachtel, 2/27/76, PP. 31--32.
... Wachtel, 2/27/76, p. 49.
184
The SeLC leadership assumed that anything said in meetings or
over the telephone would be intercepted by wiretaps, bugs, or informants.
Ironically, the FBI memorandum reporting that a wiretap
of the SCLC's Atlanta office was feasible stated:
In the past when interviews have been conducted in the
office of Southern Christian Leadership Conference certain
employees when asked a question, in a half joking manner
and a half serious manner replied, "You should know that
already, don't you have our wires tapped 1" It is noted in the
past, State of Georgia has conducted investigations regarding
subject and Southern Christian Leadership Conference.452
Harry Wachtel commented on the impact constant surveillance on
members of the SCLe :
When you live in a fishbowl, you act like you're in a fishbowl,
whether you do it consciously or unconsciously.... I
can't put specifics before you, except to say that it beggars
the imagination not to believe that the SCLC, Dr. King, and
all its leaders were not chilled or inhibited from all kinds of
activities, political and even social.453
Wachtel also pointed out the ramifications stemming from the Government's
advance knowledge of what civil rights leaders were
thinking:
It is like political intelligence. It did not chill us from saying
it, but it affected the strategies and tactics because the {>OOple
you were having strategies and tactics about were pnvy to
what you were about. They knew your doubts. . . . Take
events like strategies in Atlantic City.... Decision-making
concerning which way to go, joining one challenge or not,
supporting a particular situatIOn, or not, had to be limited
very strongly by the fact that information which was expressed
by telephone, or which could even possibly be picked
up by bugging, would be in the hands of the President.454
Perhaps most difficult to gauge is the personal impact of the
Bureau's programs. Congressman Young told the Committee that
while Dr. King was not deterred by the attacks which are now known
to have been instigated in part by the FBI, there is "no question" but
that he was personally affected:
It was a great burden to be 81ttacked by people he respected,
particularly when the attacks engendered by the FBI came
from people like Ralph McGill. He sat down and cried at the
New York Times editorial about his statement on Vietnam,
but this just made him more determined. It was a great
personal suffering, but since we don't really know all that
they did, we have no way of knowing the ways that they
affected US,455
... Memorandum, Special Agent in Charge, Atlanta, to Director, FBI, 10/10/63.
... Wachtel, 2/27/76, pp. 10, 19.
4M Wachtel, 2/Z'l/76, p. 10.
4M Young, 2/19/76, p.16.

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