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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

THE FBI'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAM TO DESTROY
THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
COXTEX'rs.
Page
Introduction______________________________________________________ 187
A. The effort to promote violence between the Black Panther Party and
other well-armed, potentially violent organizations_ _______________ 188
1. The effort to promote violence between the Black Panther
Party and the United Slaves (US), Inc_ _____ __ _____ _____ _ 189
2. The effort to promote violence between the Blackstone Rangers
and the Black Panther Party "________________________ 195
B. The effort to disrupt the Black Panther Party by promoting internal
dissention_ _____ ___ ___ __ ______________ __ ___ _______ __ ___ 198
1. General efforts to disrupt the Black Panther Party membership__________________________________________________
198
2. FBI role in the Newton-Cleaver rifL_______________________ 200
C. Covert efforts to undermine support of the Black Panther Party and to
destroy the party's public image________________________________ 208
1. Efforts to discourage and to discredit supporters of the Black
Panther rarty_________________________________________ 208
2. 'Efforts to promote criticism of the Black Panthers in the mass
media and to prevent the Black Panther Party and its
sympathizers from expressing their views_ _________________ 213
D. Cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local
police departments in disrupting the Black Panther Party _________ 220
(185)
•
THE FBI'S COVERT ACTION PRO(}R~\M TO DESTROY
THE BLACK PAXTHER PARTY
T~TROJ)LCTIOX
In August 1967. the FBI initiated a covert action programCOINTELPRO-
to disrupt and "neutralize" organizations which
the Bureau charact£'rized as "Black Xationalist Hate Groups." 1 The
FBI memorandum expanding the program described its goals as:
1. Prevent a coalition of militant black nationalist
groups....
2. Prevent the rise of a messiah who could unify and electrify
the militant nationalist movement ... Martin Luther
Ki~g, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all aspire
to this position....
:1. Prevent ,-iolence on the part of black nationalist
groups....
4. Preveilt militant black nationalist groups and leaders
from gaining respectability by discrediting them....
5.... prevent the long-range growth of militant black
nationalist organizations, especially among youth." 2
The targets of this nationwide program to disrupt "militant black
nationalist organizations" included groups such as the Soilthern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Revolutionary Action Movement
(RAM), and the Nation of Islam (NOI). It was expressly
directed against such leaders as Martin Luther King, .Jr., Stokley
Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Maxwell Stanford, and Elijah
l\fuhammad.
The Black Panther Party (BPI') was not among the original
"Black Nationalist" targets. In September 1968, however, FBI Director
J. Edgar Hoover dE'scribed the Panthers as:
"the greatest threat to the internal security of the country.
"Schooled in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the teaching
of Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung. its members
have perpetrated numerous assaults on police officers and hav£'
engaged in violent confrontations with police throughout the
country. Leaders and representatives of the Black Panther
Party travel extmsively all over the United States preaching
their gospel of hate and violence not only to ghetto residents,
1 For a description of the full range of COINTELPRO programs, see the staff \
report entitled "COINTELPRO: The FBI's Covert Action Programs Against
American Citizens."
• :Uemorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan. 2/29/68, pp. 3-4.
(187)
69-984 0 - 76 - 13
188
1>ut to students in colleges, universities and high schools as
well." :<
By .Tuly ID69, the HIack Panthers had becomt> the primary focus of
the program. and was ultimately the target of 2:3:) of the total 29;)
authorized "Black Xationalist" COINTELPHO actions}
Although the claimed purpose of the Bureau's COIXTELPRO
tactics was to prevent violence, some of the FBI's tactics against tlw
BPP were elearlv intended to foster violenee. and mallV others could
reasonably have 'been expeeted to cause violence. For' example. the
FBI's efforts to "intensify the degree of animosity" between the BPP
and the RlaekstOJlP Rangers. a Chieago street gang. included sending
an anonymous letter to the gang's leader falsely infonning him that
the Chicago Panthers had "a hit ont" on him:' The statNI intent of the
lettH was to indnce til(' Hangrr leader to "take reprisals against" the
Pantlwl" If'adership.6
Similarly. in Southern California. the FBI launched a covert effort
to "create further dissension in the ranks of the BPP." 7 This effort
included mailing anonymous letters and caricatures to BPP members
ridiculing the local and national BPP leadership for the express purpose
of exacerbating an existing "gang war" between the BPP and
an organization called the enited Slaves (US). This "gang war" resulted
in the killing of four BPP members by memoors of US and in
numerous beatings and shootings. Although individual incidents in
this dispute cannot be directly traced to efforts by the FBI. FBI officials
were clearly aware of the violent nature of the dispute, engaged
in actions which they hoped would prolong and intensify the dispute,
and proudly claimed credit for violent clashes between the rival factions
which. in the words of one FBI official, resulted in "shootings,
beatings, and a high degree of unrest ... in the area of southeast
San Diego." 8
.Tames Adams. Deputy A&sociate Director of the FBI's Intelligence
Division, told the Committee:
None of our programs have contemplated violence, and the
instructions prohibit it. and the record of turndowns of recommended
actions in some instances specifically say that we
do not approve this action because if we take it it could result
in harm to the indiddua1.9
But the Committee's record suggests otherwise. For example, in
May 1970, aft~r US organization members had already killed four
BPP members, the Spocial Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles FBI
office wrote to FBI headquarters:
Information received from local sources indicate that. in
generaL the membership of the Los Angeles BPP is physical-
3 New York Times, 9/8/68.
• This figure is based on the Select Committee's staff study of .Justice Depart·
ment COINTELPRO "Black Nationalist" summaries prepared by the FBI during
the Petersen Committee inquiry into COINTELPRO.
")Iemorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 1/13/69.
• Ibid.
7 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office (and 13
other offices). 11/25/68.
R Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/16/70.
• .Tames Adams testimony. 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 76.
189
ly afraid of US members and take premeditated precautions
to avoid confrontations.
In dew of their anxieties. it is not presently felt that the
Los Angeles BPP can be prompted into what could result in
an int~rnecine struggle between the two organizations....
The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile
feelings harbored between the organizations and the first
opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized.
It is intended that US Inc. will be appropriately and discreetly
advised of the time and location of BPP activities in order
that the two organizati01U3 m.ight be brought togethe1' and
thw5 grant nature the opportunity to take her due course.
[Emphasis added.] 10
This report focuses solely on the FBI's counterintelligence program
to disrupt and "neutralize" the Black Panther Party. It does not examine
the reasonableness of the basis for the FBI's investigation of the
BPP or se~k to justify either the politics. the rhetoric, 01' the actions
of the BPP. This report does demonstrate. however, that the chief
investigative branch of the Federal Government. which was charged
by law with investigating crimes and pn'venting criminal conduct,
itself engaged in lawless tactics and responded to deep-seated social
problems by fomenting ,"iolence and unrest.
A. The Effort to Promote Violence Betll'een the B7a<:k Panther Party
aJUI Other 1Vell-AImed. Potentially Violent 01'ganizatio1U3
The Select, Committee's staff investigation has disclosed a number
of instances in which the FBI sought to tU111 violence-prone organizations
against the Panthers in an effort to aggravat~"gang warfare."
Because of the milieu of violence in which members of the Panthers
often moved we have been unable to establish a direct link between
any of the FBI's specific. efforts to promot~ violence and particular
acts of violence that occurred. 'Ye have been able to establish beyond
doubt, however, that high officials of the FBI desired to promote
violent confrontations between TIPP members and members of other
groups, and that those officials condoned tadics calculate.d to achieve
thri.t end. It is deplora:ble that officials of the United States Government
should engage in the acti,"ities described below, however dangerous
a threat they might have considered the Panthers; equally disturbing
is the pride which those officials took in claiming credit for
the bloodshed that occurred.
1. The Effort to Promote Fio/puN Between the Black Prrnthn'
Party and the T'nited SlaNs (US), Inc. ,"
FBI memoranda indicate that the FBI leadership was a.ware of a
violent power struggle between the Black Panther Party and the
United Slaves (US) in late 1968. A memorandum 'to the head of the
FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division, for example, stated:
On 11/2/68, BPP received information indicating US
members intended to assassinate Leroy Eldridge Cleaver ...
10 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/26/70,
pp. 1-2.
190
at a rally scheduled at Los Angeles on 11/3/68. A Los
Angeles racial informant advised on 11/8/68 that [a BPP
member] had been identified as a rs infiltrator and that
BPP headquarters had instructed that [name deleted] should
be killed.
During BPP rally, -CS merribers including one [name
deleted], "'ere ordered to leave the rally site by LASS members
(Los .\ngeles BPP Security Squad) and did so. US
capitulation on this occasion promptpd BPP nlPmbers to
decide to kill [IlUIll(' dpletpd] and thpn take over rs organization.
~Ipmbprs of LASS ... \wre given orders to eliminate
[name deleted] and rname deleted]'l1
This memorandum also suggested that the two US members should
be told of the BPP's plans to "eliminate" them in order to convince
them to become Bureau informantsY
In Novem'ber 1968, the FBI took initial steps in its program to
disrupt the Black Panther Party in San Diego, California by aggravating
the existing hostility between the Panthers and US. A
memorandum from FBI Director Hoover to 14 field offices noted a
state of "gang warfare" existed, with "attendant threats of murder
and reprisals." between the BPP and rs in southern California and
added:
In order 'to fully capitalize upon BPP and US differences
as well as to exploit aU avenues of creating further dissention
in the ranks of the BPP, recipient offices are instructed to
submit imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence
measures aimed at crippling the BPPP
As the tempo of violence quickened. the FBI's field office in San
Diego developed tactics calculated to heighten tension between the hostile
factions. On .Tauuary 17, 1969, two members of the Black Panther
Party-Apprentice "Buchey" Carter and John Huggins-were killed
by US members on the UCLA campus following a meeting involving
the two organizations and university students.H One month later. the
San Diego field office requested permission from headquarters to mail
derogatory cartoons to local BPP offices and to the homes of prominent
BPP leaders around the country.15 The purpose was plainly
stated:
The purpose of the caricatures is to indicate to the BPP
that the US organization feels that they are ineffectual, inadequate,
and riddled with graft and oorruption.16
In the first week of March. the first cartoon was mailed to five EPP
members and two underground papers, all in the San Diego area.17
According to an FBI memorandum, the consensus of opinion within
U Memorandum from G. C. :\foore to W. C. Sullivan, 11/5/68.
12 Ibid. An earlier FBI memorandum had informed headquarters that "sources
have reported that the BPP has let a contract on Karenga [the leader of US]
because they feel he has sold out to the establishment." (Memorandum from
Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/25/68, p. 1.)
13 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office (and 13
other field offices), 11/25/68.
,. :\Iemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 1/20/69.
1S :\Iemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/20/69.
10 Ibid.
17 See memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/12/69.
191
the BPP was that GS was responsible and that the mailing constituted
an attack on the BPP by US.18
In mid-March 1969, the Fin learned that a BPP member had been
critically wounded by GS members at a rally in Los Angeles. The
field office concluded that shots subsequently fired into the home of
a US member were the results of a retaliatory raid by the RPPY
Tensions between the BPP and CS in San Diego, however, appeared
to lessen, and the FBI concluded that those chapters were trying
"to talk out their differences." The San Diego field office reported:
On 3/27/69 there was a meeting between the BPP and US
organization.... ",Vallace [BPP leader in San Diego] ...
concluded by stating that the BPP in San Diego would not
hold a grudge against the US members for the killing of the
Panthers in Los Angeles (Huggins and Carter). He stated
that he would leave any retaliation for this activity to the
black community....
On 4/2/69, there was a friendly confrontation between US
and the BPP with no weapons being exhibit{\d by either side. rs members met with BPP members and tried to talk out
their differences.2o
On }1arch 27, 1969-the day that the San Diego field office learned
that the local BPP leader had promised that his followers "would
not hold a grudge" against local US members for the killings in Los
Angeles-the San Diego office requested headquarters' approval for
three more cartoons ridiculing the BPP and falsely attributed to GS.
One week later, shortly after the San Diego office learned that US
and BPP members were again meeting and discussing their differences,
the San Diego field office mailed the cartoons with headqnarters'
approva1.21
On April ..I:. 1969 there was a confrontation between US and BPP
members in Southcrest Park in San Diego at which, according to an
FBI memorandum. the BPP members "ran the US members off." 22
On the same date. FS members broke into a BPP political education
meetin~ and roughed up a female BPP memner.23 The FBI's Special
Agent III Charge in San Diego hoastd that the cartoons had caused
these incidents:
The BPP members ... strongly objected being made fun of
by cartoons being- distributed by the 1'S organization (FBI
cartoons in actuality) ... [Infor'mantJ has advised on several
occasions that the cartoons are "really shaking up the BPP."
They have made the BPP feel that US is getting ready to
move and this was the cansI' of the confront8tion at Southcrest
Park on 4/4/69.24
~: :\Iemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/12/69. p. 4.
Memorandum from Los AngE>les Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/17/69.
20 :\lemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 4/10/69.
21 :\lemorandum from Sun Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/27/69.
.. Memorandum from San Diego Field Offiee to FBI Headquarters, 4/10/69. P. 4.
.. Ibid.
.. Ibid.
192
The fragile t.ruce had ended. On May 23, 1969, John Savage, a member
of the BPP in Southern Ca1ifornia, ,vas shot and killed by US
member Jerry I-(orne aka Tambuzi. The killing was reported in an
FBI memorandum '~'hich sta.ted that confrontrutions between the
groups were now "ranging from mere harras~ment up to and inc~uding
beating of various individuals." 25 In mId-June, the San DIego
FBI office informed vVashington headquarters that members of the
US organization were holding firearms practice and purchasing large
quantities of ammunition:
Reliable information has been received ... that members of
the US organization have purchased ammunition at one of the
local gun shops. On 6/5/69, an individual identified as [name
deleted] purchased 150 rounds of 9 MM ammunition, 100
rounds of .32 automatic ammunition, and 100 rounds of .38
special ammunition at a local gun shop. [Name deleted] was
tentatively identified as the individual who was responsible
for the shooting of BPP member [name deleted] in Los Angeles
onor about 3/14/69.26
Despite this atmosphere of violence, FBI headquarters authorized
the San Diego field office to compose an inflammatory letter over the
forged signature of a San Diego BPP member and to send it to BPP
headquarters in Oakland, California.27 The letter complained of the
killing of Panthers in San Diego by US members, and the fact that
a local BPP leader had a white girlfriend.28
According to a BPP bulletin, two Panthers were wounded by US
gunman on August 14, 1969, and the next day another BPP member,
Sylvester Bell, was killed in San Diego by US members.29 On August
30, 1969, the San Diego office of US was bombed. The FBI believed
the BPP was responsible for the bombing.30
The San Diego office of the FBI viewed this carnage as 'a positive
development and informed headquarters: "Efforts are being made
to determine how this situation can be capitalized upon for the benefit
of the Counterintelligence Program...." 31 The field office further
noted:
In view of the recent killing of BPP member Sylvester Bell,
a n.ew. cartoon is. being considered in the hopes that it will
aSSIst m the contmuance of the rift between BPP and US.32
The San Diego FBI office pointed with pride to the continued violence
between black groups:
Shooting;>, ?eatings, and a high degree of unrest continues
to prevaIl m t~e ghetto ~rea ~f southea;st San Diego. Although
no speCIfic countermtelhgence actIOn can be credited
with contributing to this overall situation, it is felt that a
: Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/5/69, p. 3.
27 )Iemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/13/00.
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 6/17/00.
29 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/6/69.
3Q Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/20/69.
31 M~morandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/18/69.
IbId, p. 3.
32 Ibid., p. 1.
193
substantial amount of the unrest is diJ'ectly att1'ibutable to
this program. [Emphasis added.] 33
In early September 1969, the San Diego field office informed headq.
ual'ters that Karenga, the Los Angeles US leader, feared assassinatIOn
?y t~e .BP~.34 It recei.ved permission from headquarters to
exploIt thIS sItuatIOn by sendmg Karenga a letter, purporting to be
from a US member in San Diego, alluding to an article in the BPP
new.spaper criticizing Karenga and suggesting that he order reprisals
agamst the Panthers. The Bureau memorandum which originally
proposed the letter explained:
The article, which is an attack on Ron Karenga of the US
organization, is self-explanatory. It is felt that if the following
letter be sent to Karenga, pointing out that the contents
of the article are objectionable to members of the US organization
in San Diego, the possibility exists that some sort
of retaliatory action will be taken against the BPP....35
FBI files do not indicate whether the letter, which was sent to
Karenga by the San Diego office, was responsible for any violence.
In January 1970, the San Diego office prepared a new series of
counterintelligence cartoons attacking the BPP and forwarded them
to FBI headquarters for approva}.36 The cartoons were composed to
look like a product of the US organization.
The purpose of the caricatures is to indicate to the BPP that
the US Organization considers them to be ineffectual, inadequate,
and [considers itself] vitally superior to the
BPP.37
One of the caricatures was "designed to attack" the Los Angeles
Panther leader as a bully tOlward women and children in the black
community. Another accused the BPP of "actually instigating" a recent
Los Angeles Police Department raid on US headquarters. A
third cartoon depicted Karenga as an overpowering indiVIdual "who
has the BPP completely at his mercy...." 38
On January 29, 1970, FBI headquarters approved distribution of
these caricatures by FBI field offices in San Diego, Los Angeles, and
San Francisco. The authorizing memorandum from headquarters
stated:
US Incorporated and the Black Panther Party are opposing
black extremist organizations. Feuding between representatives
of the two groups in the past had a tendency to
limit the effectiveness of both. The leaders and incidents depicted
in the caricatures are known to the genl\ral public,
particularly among the Negroes living in the metropolitan
a,reas of Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco.
The leaders and members of both g-roups are distrusted
by a large number of the citizen withm the Negro commu-
S3 Ibid., p. 2.
"Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 9/3/69.
35 :\Iemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69.
"Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/23/70.
37 Ibid.; p. 1.
.. Ibid., p. 2.
194
nities. Distribution of caricatures is expected to strengthen
this distrust.39
Bureau documents provided to the Seleot Committee do not indicate
whether violence between BPP 'and US members followed the mailing
of this third series of cartoons.
In early May 1970, FBI Headquarters became aware of an article
entitled "Karenga King of the Bloodsuckers" in the May 2, 1970,
edition of the BPP newspaper which "vilifies and debases Karenga
and the US organizllition." 40 Two field offices received the following
request from headquarters:
[s]ubmit recommendation to Bureau ... for exploitation
of same under captioned program. Consider from two
aspects, one 'against US and Karenga from obvious subject
matter; the second against BPP because inherent in article
is admission by BPP that i.t has done nothing to retaliate
against US for killing of Panther members attributed to
US and Karenga,an admission that the BPP has been
belliten at i.ts own game of violence.41
In response to this request, the Special Agent in Charge in Los
Angeles reported that the BPP newspaper article had already resulted
in violence, but that it was difficult to induce BPP members
to attack US members in Southern California because they feared
US members.42 The Los Angeles field office hoped, however, that
"internecine struggle" might be triggered through a skillful use of
informants within both groups:
The Los Angeles Division is 'aware of the mutually hostile
feelings harbored between the organizations and the first
opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized.
It is intended that US Inc. will be appropria·tely and discretely
advised of the time and location of BPP aotivities
in order that the two organizations might be brought together
and thus grant nature the opportunity to take her
due course. [Emphasis added.] 43
The release of Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, from
prison in August 1970 inspired yet another counterintelligence plan.
An FBI agent learned from a prison official tha:t Newton had told
an inmate that a rival group had let a $3,000 contract on his life.
The Los Angeles office presumed the group was US, and proposed
,thllitan anonymous letter be sent to David Hilliard, BPP Chief of
Staff in Oakland, purporting to be from the person holding the
contract on Newton's life. The proposed letter warned Hilliard not
to be around when the "unscheduled appointment" to kill Newton
was kept, and cautioned Hilliard not to "get in my way." 44
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 1/29/70.
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles and San Francisco
Field Offices, 5/15/70.
"Tbid.
: M,;mol'andum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/26/70.
Ibid., pp. 1-2.
.. Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/10/70.
195
FBI headquarters, however, denied authority to send the letter
to Hilliard. Its concern was not that the letter might cause violence
or thllit it was improper action by a law enforcement agency, but thllit
the letter might violate a Federal statute:
While Bureau appreciates obvious effort and interest exhibited
concerning anonymous le1Jt~r ... studied analysis of
same indicates implied threllit therein may constitute extortion
violation within investigative jurisdiction of Bureau
or postal authorities -and may subsequently be embarrassing
to Bureau.45
The Bureau's stated concern with legality was ironic in light of the
activities described above.
2. The Effort To Prorn.ote Violence Between the Blackstone
Rangers and the Black Panther Party
In late 1968 and early 1969, the FBI endeavored to pit the Blackstone
Rangers, a heavily armed, violence-prone organization, against
the Black Panthers"6 In December 1968, the FBI learned that the
recognized leader of the Blackstone Rangers, Jeff Fort, was resisting
Black Panther overtures to enlist "the support of the Blackstone
Rangers." 47 In order to increase the friction between these groups,
the Bureau's Chicago office proposed sending an anonymous letter
to Fort, informing him that two prominent leaders of the Chicago
BPP had been making disparaging remarks about his "lack of commitment
to black people generally." The field office observed:
Fort is reportedly aware that such remarks have been
circulated, but is not aware of the identities of the individual
responsible. He has stated that he would "take care
of" individuals responsible for the verbal attacks directed
against him.
Chicago, consequently, recommends that Fort be made
aware that [name deleted] and [name deleted] together with
other BPP members locally, are responsible for the circulation
of these remarks concerning him. It is felt that if Fort
were to be aware that the BPP was responsible, it would
lend impetus to his refusal to accept any BPP overtures to
the Rangers and additionally might. result in Fort having
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 9/30/70.
.. There is no question that the Blackstone Rangers were well·armed and
violent. The Chicago police had linked the Rangers and rival gangs in Chicago
to approximately 290 killings from 1965-69. Report of Captain Edward Buckney,
Chicago Police Dept., Gang Intelligence Unit, 2/23/70, p. 2. One Chicago police
officer, familiar with the Rangers, told a Committee staff member that their
governing body, the ~lain 21, was responsible for several ritualistic murders
of black youths in areas the gang controlled. (Staff summary of interview with
Renault Robinson, 9/25/75.)
41 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/16/68.
J<'orte also had a well·earned reputation for violence. Between September 1964
and ,Tanuary 1971, he was charged with more than 14 felonies, including murder
(twice), aggravated battery (seven times), robbery (twice), -and contempt of
Congress. (Select Committee staff interview of FBI criminal records.) A December
1968 FBI memorandum noted that a Rearch of Forte's apartment had
turned up a .22 caliber, four-shot derringer pistoL (Memorandum from Chicago
Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/12/68, p. 2.)
196
active steps taken to exact some form of 1'etribution toward
the leadership of the BPP. [Emphasis added.] 48
On about December 18, 1968, Jeff Fort and other Blackstone
Rangers were involved in a serious confrontation with members of
the Black Panther Party.
During that day twelve members of the BPP and five known members
of the Blackstone Rangers were arrested on Chicago's South
Side"" A report indicates that the Panthers and Rangers were arrested
following the shooting of one of the Panthers by a Ranger.4"a
That evening, according to an FBI informant, around 10 :30 p.m.,
approximately thirty Panthers went to the Blackstone Rangers' headquarters
at 6400 South Kimbark in Chicago. Upon their arrival Jeff
:Fort invited Fred Hampton, Bobby Rush and the other BPP members
to come upstairs and meet with him and the Ranger leadership"9b The
Bureau goes on to describe what transpired at this meeting:
... everyone went upstairs into a room which appeared to
be a gymnasium, where Fort told Hampton and Rush that
he had heard about the Panthers being in Ranger territory
during the day, attempting to show their "power" and he
wanted the Panthers to recognize the Rangers "power."
Source stated that Fort then gave orders, via walkie-talkie,
whereupon two men marched through the door carrying
pump shotguns. Another order and two men appeared carrying
sawed off carbines then eight more, each carrying a .45
caliber machine gun, clip type, operated from the shoulder
or hip, then others came with over and under type weapons.
Source stated that after this procession Fort had all Rangers
present, approximately 100, display their side arms and about
one half had .45 caliber revolvers. Source advised that all
the above weapons appeared to be new.
Source advised they left the gym, went downstairs to another
room where Rush and Hampton of the Panthers and
Fort and two members of the Main 21 sat by a table and discussed
the possibility of joining the two groups. Source related
that Fort took off his jacket and was wearing a .45
caliber revolver shoulder holster with gun and had a small
caliber weapon in his belt.
Source advised that nothing was decided at the meeting
about the two groups actually joining forces, however, a decision
was made to meet again on Christmas Day. Source
stated Fort did relate that the Rangers were behind the
Panthers but were not to be considered members. Fort wanted
the Panthers to join the Rangers and Hampton wanted the
opposite, stating that if the Rangers joined the Panthers,
then together they would be able to absorb all the other Chicago
gangs. Source advised Hampton did state that they
couldn't let the man keep the two groups apart. Source ad-
.. Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/16/68, p. 2.
.. Letter Head Memorandum. 12/20/68.
••• :B'rom confidential FBI interview with inmate at the House of Correction,
26th and California St. in Chicago, 11/12/69.
••b Letterhead Memorandum, 12/20/68.
197
vised that Fort also gave Hampton and Rush one of the
above .45 caliber machine guns to "tryout."
Source advised that based upon conversations during this
meeting, Fort did not appear over anxious to join forces with
the Panthers, however, neither did it appear that he wanted
to terminatB meeting for this purpose.49C
On December 26, 1968 Fort and Hampton met again to discuss the
possibility of the Panthers and Rangers working together. This meet·
ing was at a South Side Chicago bar and broke up after several
Panthers and Rangers got into an argument.4!Jd On December 27,
Hampton received a phone call at Brr Headquarters from Fort telling
him that the BPP had until December 28, 1968 to join the Bla~kstone
Hangers. Hampton told Fort he had until the same time for the
Rangers to join the BPP and they hung up!ge
In the wake of this incident, the Chicago office renewed its proposal
to send a letter to Forte, informing FBI headquarters:
As events have subsequently developed ... the Rangers
and the BPP have not only not been able to form any alliance,
but enmity and distrust have arisen, to the point where each
has been ordered to stay out of the other territory. The BPP
has since decided to conduct no activity or attempt to do
recruiting in Ranger territory.50
The proposed letter read:
Brother J eft' :
I've spent some time with some Panther friends on the
west side lately and I know what's been going on. The
brothers that run the Panthers blame you for blocking their
thing and there's s'Upposed to be G, hit out for you. I'm not a
Panther, or a Ranger, just black. From what I see these Panthers
are out for themselves not black people. I think you
ought to know what they're up to, I know what I'd do if I was
you. You might hear from me again.
(sgd.) A black brother you don't know.
[Emphasis added.] 51
The FBI's Chicago office explained the purpose of the letter as follows:
It is believed the above may intensify the degree of animosity
between the two groups and occasion Forte to take
retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead
to reprisals against its leadership.
Consideration has been given to a similar letter to the
BPP alleging a Ranger plot against the BPP leadership;
however, it is not felt this would be productive principally
because the BPP at present is not believed as violence prone
as the Rangers to whom violent type activity-shooting and
the like-is second nature.52
'.C Ibid., pp. 3-4.
'.d FBI Special Agent Informant Report. 12/30/68.
••• Ibid.
50 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/10/69.
•, Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/13/69, p. 1.
•• Ibid; .
198
On the e\'ening of January 13, 1969, Fred Hampton and Bobby
Rush appeared on a Chicago radio talk show called "Hot Line.~' During
the course of the program Hampton stated that the BPP was in
the "process of educating the Blackstone Rangers." 52a Shortly after
that statement Jeff Fort was on the phone to the radio program and
stated that Hampton had his facts confused and that the Rangers
were educating the BPP.52b
On January 16, Hampton, in a public meeting, stated that Jeff Fort
had threatened to blow his head off if he came within Ranger
territory.52c
On January 30, 1969~ Director Hoover authorized sending the anonymous
letter.53 'While the Committee staff could find no evidence linking
this letter to subsequent clashes between the Panthers and the
Rangers, the Bureau~sintent was clear.54
B. The Effort To Dismpt the Black Panther Party by Promoting
Internal DissensiO'n
1. General Efforts to Disrupt the Black Panther Party Membership
In addition to setting rival groups against the Panthers, the FBI
employed the full range of COINTELPRO techniques to create rifts
and factions, within the Party itself which it was believed would
"neutralize" the Party's effectiveness.55
Anonymous letters were commonly used to sow mistrust. For example,
in .March 1969 the Chicago FBI Field Office learned that a local
BPP member feared that a faction of the Party, allegedly led by
Fred Hampton and Bobby Rush, was "out to get" him.56 Headquarters
approved sending an anonymous letter to Hampton which was
drafted to exploit dissension within the BPP as well as to play on
mistrust between the Blackstone Rangers and the Chicago BPP leadership:
Brother Hampton:
Just a word of warning. A Stone friend tells me [name
deleted] wants'illC Panthers and is looking for somebody to
get you out of the way. Brother Jeff is supposed to be interested.
I'm just a black man looking for blacks working together,
not more of this gang banging.5'
02'Memorandum from Special Agent to SAC, Chicago, 1/15/69.
02b Ibid.
• 2. Memorandum from Special Agent to SAC, Chicago, 1/28/69, reporting on
informant report.
":.\Il'morandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69.
54 There are indications that a shooting incident between the Rangers and
the Panthers on April 2, 1969, in a Chicago suburb may have been triggered
by the FBI. According to Bobby Rush, coordinator of the Chicago BPP at the
time, a group of armed BPP members had confronted the Rangers because
Panther William O'Xeal-who has since surfaced as an FBI informant-had
told them that a Panther had been shot hy Blackstone Rangers and had insisted
that they retaliate. This account, however, has not been confirmed. (Staff summary
of interview with Bobby Rush, 11/26175.)
65 The various COINTELPRO techniques are described in detail in the Staff
Report on COINTELPRO.
56 )Iemorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/24/69.
67 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 4/8/69.
199
Bureau documents indicate that during this time an informant within
the BPP was also ilwolved in maintaining the division between the
Panthers and the Blackstone Rangers.5 'a
In December 1968, the Chicago FBI Field Office learned that a
leader of a Chicago youth gang, the Mau Mau's, planned to complain
to the national BPP headquarters abont the local BPP leadership and
questioned its loyalty.5' FBI headquarters approved an anonymous
letter to the ~Iau ~Iau leader, stating:
13rother [delet{>d] :
I'm from the south side and have some Panther friends
that I01mv you and tell me what's been going. I know those
two [name deleted] and [name deleted] that run the Panthers
for a long time and those mothers been with every black outfit
going where it looked like they was something in it for them.
The only black people they care about is themselves. I heard
too they're sweethearts and that [name deleited] has worked
for the man that's why he's not in Viet Nam. Mayibe that's
why they're just playing like real Panthers. I hear a lot of
the brothers are with you and want those mothers out but
don't know how. The Panthers need real black men for
leaders not freaks. Don't give up 'brothers. [Emphasis
added.] 5n
A 'black friend.
The FBI also resorted to anonymous phone calls, The San Diego
Field Office placed anonymous calls to local BPP leaders naming other
HPP members as "police agents:' According to a report from the field
office, these ealls, reinforced by rumors spread by FBI informants
within the BPP, induced a group of Panthers to accuse three Party
members of working for the police. The field office boasted that one
of the aceused nwmbers fled San Diego in fear for his life.GO
The FBI conducted harassing interviews of Black Panther members
to intimidate them and drive them from the Party. The Los
Angeles Field Offiee conducted a stringent interview program
in the hope that a state of distruct [sic] might remain among
the members and add to the turmoil presently going on within
the BPP.61
The Los Angeles office claimed that similar tactics had cut the membership
of the united States (uS) by 50 percent.G2
51. ~Iemorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/28/69.
0' ~Ielllorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/30/68.
'''' ~Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69.
00 ~IeillorandumfromSan Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/12/69.
Thp FBI had success with this technique in other cases. For example, the FBI
placpd anothpr anonJ"mous call to StokplJ" Carmichael's residence in New York
City. Carillichap'l's mother was informed falsely that several BPP members were
out to kill hp'r :;on, and that he :;hould "hidp' out." The FBI memora.ndum reporting
this incident said that Mrs. Carillichapl sounded "shocked" on hearing the
news and stated that she would tell Stokely when he carne horne. The memorandum
observeQ. that on the next day, Stokely Carmichael left New York for
Africa. (~Iemorandumfrom Xew York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68,
p.2.)
61 :.\Iemorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/17/69,
p.1.
62 :.\Ieillorandum from Los Angeles Field Office w FBI Headquarters, 2/3/69.
200
FBI agents attempted to convince landlords to force Black Panther
members and offices from their buildings. The Indianapolis Field OffiCE
reported that a local landlord had yielded to its urgings and promised
to tell his Black Panther tenants to relocate their offices.63 The San
Francisco office sent an article from the Black Panther newspaper to
the landlord of a BPP member who had rented an apartment under
an assumed name. The article, which had been written by that member
and contained her picture and true name, was accompanied by an anonymous
note stating, "(false name) is your tenant (true name)" 6.
The San Francisco office secured the eviction of one Black Panther
who lived in a public housing project by informing the Housing Authority
officials that she was using his apartment for the BPP Free
Breakfast Program.65 'When it was learned that the BPP was conducting
a Free Breakfast Program "in the notorious Haight-Ashbury
District of San Francisco,~~ the Bureau mailed a letter to the owners
of the building:
Dear Mr. (excised) :
I would call and talk to you about this matter, but I am not
sure how you feel, and I do not wish to become personally embroiled
with neighbors. It seems that the property owners on
(excised) Street have had enough trouble in the past without
bringing in Black Panthers.
Maybe you are not aware, but the Black Panthers have
taken over (address deleted). Perhaps if you drive up the
street, you can see what they are going to do to the property
values. They have already plastered a nearby garage with big
Black Panther posters.
-A concerned property owner.66
The Bureau also attempted to undermine the morale of Panther
members by attempting to break up their marriages. In one case, an
anonymous letter was sent to the wife of a prominent Panther leader
stating that her husband had been having affairs with several teenage
girls and had taken some of those girls with him on trips.67 Another
Panther leader told a Committee staff member that an FBI agent had
attempted to destroy his marriage by visiting his wife and showing
photographs purporting to depict him with other women.68
2. FBI Role in the Newton-OlemJer Rift
In March 1970, the FBI initiated a concerted program to drive a
permanent wedge between the followers of Eldridge Cleaver, who was
then out of the country and the supporters of Huey P. Newton, who
63 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/8/69. The
FBI discovered that the Indianapolis BPP would have difficulty in new quartl>rs
because of its financial plight, a fact which was discovered by monitoring its
bank account. (Memorandum from Indianapolis Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
9/23/69.)
., Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/15/69.
65 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/21/70.
.. Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/22/70.
or Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/26/68.
68 The Bureau documents presented to the Committee do not record of this
contact.
201
was tlwn serving a prison sentence in California.69 An anonymous
letter was sent to Cleanr in Algeria stating that BPP leaders in California
were seeking to undercut his influence. The Bureau subsequently
learned that Cleaver had assumed the letter was from the then
Panther representative in Scandanavia, Connie Matthews, and that
the letter had led Cleaver to expel three BPP international representatives
from the Party.10
Encouru!?:ed by the apparent success of this letter, FBI headquarters
instructed its Paris Legal Attache to mail a follow-up letter, again
written to appear as if Matthews was the author, to the Black PantherChief-
of-Staff, David Hilliard, in Oakland, California. The letter alleged
that Cleaver "has tripped out. Perhaps he has been working too
hard," and suggested that Hilliard "take some immediate action before
this becomes more serious." The Paris Legal Attache was instructed to
mail the letter:
At a time when Matthews is in or has just passed through
Paris immediately following one of her trips to Algiers. The
enclosed letter should be held by you until such an occasion
arises at which time you arc authorized to immediately mail
it in Paris in such a manner that it cannot be traced to the
BUl'f'au.11
Tn early May, Eldridge Cleaver called BPP national headquarters
from Algeria and talked with Connie Matthews, Elbert Howard, and
Roosevelt Hilliard. A Bureau report stated:
Various items were discussed by these individuals with Hilliard.
Connie Matthews discussed with Hilliard "those letters"
appearing to relate to the counterintelligence letters, which
have been submitted to Cleaver and Hilliard purportedly
by Matthews .
It appears that [Elbert Howard] had brought copies
of the second counterintelligence letter to David Hilliard
with him to Algiers which were then compared with the ...
letter previously sent to Cleaver in Algiers and that ... discussed
this situation....12
The San Francisco Field Office reported that some BPP leaders suspected
that the CIA or FBI had sent the letters, while others suspected
the Black Panther members in Paris. A subsequent FBI
memorandum indicated that suspicion had focused on the Panthers
in Europe.13
On Au.gust 13, 1970-the day that Huey Newton was released from
prison-the Philadelphia Field Office had an informant distribute a
fictitious BPP directive to Philadelphia Panthers, questioning New-
.. In September 1969, FBI Headquarters had encouraged the field offices to
undertake projects aimed at splitting the BPP on a nationwide basis. (Memorandum
from FBI HeadqU'arters to Newark, Kew York, and San Francisco Field
Offices, 9/18/69.)
'" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Legat, Paris and San Francisco
Field Office, 4/10/70.
11 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
72 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/8/70.
13 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters 5/28/70.
202
ton's leadership ability.74 The Philadelphia office informed FBI
Headquarters that the directive:
stresses the leadership and strength of David Hilliard and
Eldridge Cleaver while intimating Huey Newton is useful
only as a drawing card.
lt is recommended this directive ... be mailed personally
to Huey Newton with a short anonymous note. The note would
indicate the writer, a Commnnity Worker in Philadelphia for
the BPP, was incensed over the suggestion Huey was only
being used by the Party after founding it, and wanted no part
of this Chapter if it was slandering its leaders in private.75
Headquarters approved this plan on August 19,1970.76
FBI officials seized on several incidents during the following months
as opportunities to advance their program. In an August 1970 edition
of the BPP newspaper, Huey Newton appealed to "oppressed groups,"
including homosexuals, to "unite with the BPP in revolutionary
fashion." 77 FBI headquarters approved a plan to mail forged letters
from BPP sympathizers and supporters in ghetto areas-to David Hilliard,
protesting Newton's statements about joining with homosexuals,
hoping this would discredit Newton with other BPP leaders.78
In July and August 1970, Eldridge Cleaver led a United States delegation
to North Korea and North Vietnam. Ramparts editor Robert
Soheer, who had been a member of the delegation, held a press conference
in New York and, according to the Bureau, glossed over the
Panther's role in sponsoring the tour.79 The New York office was anthorized
to send an anonymous letter to Newton complaining about
Sheer's oversight to strain relations between the BPP and the "New
Left." 80 On November 13, 1970, the Los Angeles field office was asked
to prepare an anonymous letter to Cleaver criticizing Newton for not
aggressively obtaining BPP press coverage of the BPP's sponsorship
of the trip.8!
In October 1970, the FBI learned that Timothy Leary, who had
escaped from a California prison where he was serving a sentence for
possessing marijuana, was seeking asylum with Eldridge Cleaver in
Algiers. The San Francisco field office, notimg that the Panthers were
officially opposed to drugs, sent Newton an anonymous letter calling
his attention to Cleaver "playing footsie" with Leary.82 I'll January
when Cleaver publicly condemned Leary, FBI headquarters approved
sending Newton a bogus ]l'tter from a Berkeley, California
commune condemning Clea,ver for "divorcing the BPP from white
revolutionaries." 83
7< Memorandum from Philadelphia I<'ield Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/13/70.
7S Ibid., pp. 1-2.
7' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to PhiladelIJhia and San Francisco
Field Offices, 8/19/70.
77 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/31/70,
78 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San I<'rancisco Field Office, 9/9/70.
,. Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/21/70.
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and New York Field
Office, 10/29/70.
81 :\lemorandum from I<~BI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 11/3/70.
so Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/28/70.
83 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and New York Field
Offices, 2/5/71.
203
In December 1970, the BPP attempted to hold a Revolutionary Peoples'
Constitutional Convention (RPCC) in 'Washington, D.C. The
Bureau considered the converntion a failure and received reports that
most delegates had left it dissatisfied.84 The Los Angeles FBI field
office suggested a letter to Cleaver designed to
provoke Cleaver to openly question Newton's leadership ... It
is felt that distance and lack of personal contact between Newton
and Cleaver do offer a counterintelligence opportunity
that should be probed.
In view of the BPP's unsuccessful attempt to convene a
Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention (RPCC),
it is suggested that each division which had individuals attend
the RPCC write numerous letters to Cleaver criticizing Newton
for his lack of leadership. It is felt that, if Cleaver received
a sufficient number of complaints regarding Newton it
might . . . create dissension that later could 'be more fully
exploited.85
FBI headquarters approved the Los Angeles letter to Cleaver and
asked the Washington field office to supply a list of all organizations
attending the RPCC.86 A barrage of anonymous letters to Newton and
Cleaver followed:
Two weeks later, the San Francisco office mailed Newton an anonymous
letter, supposedly from a "white revolutionary," complaining
about the incompetence of the Panthers who had planned the conference.
86a The New York office mailed a complaint to the BPP national
headquarters, purportedly from a black student at Columbia University
who attended the RPCC as a member of the University's student
Afro-American Society.8llb The San Francisco office sent a letter containing
an article from the Berkeley Barb to Cleaver, attacking Newton's
leadership at the RPCC. Mailed with the article was a copy of
a letter to Newton criticizing the RPCC and bearing the notation:
Mr. Cleaver,
Here is a letter I sent to Huey Newton. rm sincere and hope
you can do something to set him right and get him off his
duff.86c
In January 1971, the Boston office sent a letter, purportedly from a
"white revolutionary," to Cleaver, stating in part:
"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Washington Field Offices, 12/15/70.
85 ~IE>morandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/3/70,
p.2.
"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Washington Field Offices, 12/15/70. A list of 10 organizations whose members attE>
nded the RPCC was forwarded to the FBI offices in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago,
Detroit, New York, and San Francisco. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to
Atlanta (and 5 other Field Offices), 12/31170.) Thl're is no indication concerning
how the Bureau obtained this list.
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
12/16/70.
..> Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/14/70.
86" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 1/6/71.
69-984 0 .. 76 .. 14
204
Dear Re"olutionary Comrade:
The people's revolution in America was greatly impeded
and the stature of the Black Panther Party, both nationally
and internationally, recei ,'ed a major setback as an outcome
of the recent Rm'olutionary People's Constitutional Convention....
The R~volutionaryPeople's Constitutional Convention did
little, if anything, to organize our forces to move against the
evils of capitalism, imperialism and racism. Any unity or
solidarity which existed behvecn the Black Panther Party
and the white re,'olutionary mOH'ment before the Convention
has now gone down the tube....
The responsibility of any undertaking as meaningful and
important to the revolution ... should not have been delegated
to the haphazard ways of [name deleted] whose title
of Convention Coordinator ... places him in the ... position
of receiving the Party's wrath ... Huey Newton himself
(should) have assumed command. . . .
The Black Panther Party has failed miserably. No longer
can the Party be looked upon as the "Vanguard of the Revolution."
Yours in Revolution,
La,vrence Thomas,
Students for a Democratic Society.
Memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/8/71. This letter
was sent to Cleaver through Oakland BPP headquarters to determine whether
the BPP in California would forward the letter to him. (Ibid.)
One letter to Cleaver, written to appear as if it had come from Connie
Matthews, Newton's personal ~retary read in part:
Things around headquarters are dreadfully disorganized
with the comrade commander not making proper decisions.
The newspaper is in a shambles. No one knows who is in
charge. The foreign department gets no support, .. I fear
there is rebellion working just beneath the surface.. , .
We must either get rid of the Supreme Commander [Newton]
or get rid of the disloyal membersY
In a January 28, 1971, evaluation, FBI headquarters noted that
Huey Newton had recently disciplined high EPP officials and that he
prepared "to respond violently to any question of his actions or policies."
The Bureau believed that Newton's reaction was in part a "result
of our counterintelligence projects now in operation."
87 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/18/70.
!<'BI headquarters authorized this letter on January 21, 1971 stating that the
Bureau must now seize the time and "immediately" send the letter. (Memorandum
from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 1/21/71, p. 2.)
Shortly afterward, a letter was sent to Cleaver from alleged Puerto Rican political
allies of the BPP in Chicago, The Young Lords.
What do we get. A disorganized Convention, apologetic speakers and flunkys
who push us around, no leadership, no ideas, no nothing. . . . [Y]our talk is nice,
but your ideas and action is nothing.... You are gone, those you left behind
have big titles but cannot lead. cannot organize, are afraid to even come out
among the people. 'I'he oppressed of Amerikka cannot wait. 'VI' must move without
you.... (Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/19/71; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago and San Francisco
Field Offices, 1/27/71.)
205
The present chaotic situation within the BPP must be exploited
and recipients must maintain the present high level
of counterintelligence acti\·ity. You should each give this matter
priority attention and immediately furnish Bureau recommendations
. . . designed to further aggravate the dissention
\vithin BPP leadership and to fan the apparent distrust
by Newton of anyone who questions his wishes.88
The campaign was intensified. On February 2, 1971, FBI headquarters
directed each of 29 field offices to submit within eight days a proposal
to disrupt local BPP chapters and a proposal to cause dissention
between local BPP chapters and BPP national headquarters. The directive
noted that Huey Newton had recently expelled or disciplined
several "dedicated Panthers" and
This dissention coupled with financial difficulties offers an exceptional
opportunity to further disrupt, aggravate and possibly
neutralize this organization through counterintelligence.
In hght of above developments this program has been intensifield
... and selected offices should ... increase measurably
the pressure on the BPP and its leaders.89
A barrage of anonymous letters flowed from FBI field offices in
response to the urgings from FBI headquarters. A fictitious letter to
Cleaver, signed by the "New York 21," criticized Newton's leadership
and his expulsion of them from the BPP.90 An imaginary New York
City member of the Youth Against vVar and Facism added his voice
to the Bureau's fictitious chorus of critics of Newton and the RPCC.91
An anonymous letter was sent to Huey Newton's brother, Melvin Newton,
warning that followers of Eldridge Cleaver and the New York
BPP chapter were planning to have him killed.92 The FBI learned
that Melvin Newton told his brother he thought the letter had been
written by someone "on the inside" of the BPP organization because
of its specificity.93 Huey Newton reportedly remarked that he was
"definitely of the opinion there is an informer in the party right in the
ministry." 93a
On February 19, 1971, a false letter, allegedly from a BPP official
in Oakland, was mailed to Don Cox, a BPP official close to Cleaver in
Algeria. The letter intimated that the recent death of a BPP member
in California was the result of BPP factionalism (which the Bureau
knew was not the case.) The letter also warned Cleaver not to allow
his wife, Kathleen, to travel to the United States because of the possibility
of violence.9'
A letter over the forged signature of "Big Man" Howard, editor
of the BPP newspaper, told Cleaver:
os Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston, Los Angeles, New York, llIIld
San Francisco Field Offices, 1/28/71.
8Il Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to 29 Field Offices, 2/2/71.
00 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York and San Francisco Field
Offices, 2/3/71.
91 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 2/3/71.
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 2;10/71.
93 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/12 71.
93. The FBI was able to be specific because of its wiretaps on the phones of Huey
Newton and the Black Panther headquarters.
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 2/19/71.
206
Eldridge:
[Name deleted] told me Huey talked with you Friday and
what he had to say. I'm disgusted with things here and the
fact that you are being ignored.... It makes me mad to learn
that Huey now has to lie to you. I'm refening to his fancy
apartment which he refers to as the throne....
I can't risk a call as it would mean certain expulsion. You
should think a great deal before sending Kathleen. 1£ I could
talk to you I could tell you why I don't think you should.95
The San Francisco office reported to headquarters that because of
the various covert actions instituted against Cleaver and Newton
since No\"ember 11, 1970:
fortunes of the BPP are at a low ebb.... Newton is positive
there is an informant in Headquarters. Cleaver feels isolated
in Algeria and out of contact with Newton and the Supreme
Commander's [Kewton's] secretary (Connie Matthews) has
disappeared and been denounced.96
On April 8, 1976 in Executive Testimony Kathleen Cleaver testified
that many letters, written to appeal' as if they had come from BPP
members living in California caused disruption and confusion in the
relationship between the Algerian Section and the BPP leadership
in Oakland. She stated:
'Ve did not know who to believe about what, so the general
effect, not only of the letters but the whole situation in which
the letters were part was creating uncertainty. It was a very
bizarre feeling. 96a
On February 26, 1971, Eldridge Cleaver, in a television interview,
criticized the expulsion of BPP members and suggested that Panther
Chief-of-Staff David Hilliard be removed from his post. As II
result of Cleaver's statements, Newton expelled him and the "Intercommunal
Section of the Party" in Algiers, Algeria.97
On March 25, 1971, the Bureau's San Frane,isco office sent to
various BPP "Solidarity Committees" throughout Europe bogus letters
on "fascsimiles of BPP letterhead" stating:
95 Memorandum from J<1BI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 2/24/71.
The phone call from Cleaver to Xewton mentioned in this letter had been intercepted
oy the FBI. An FBI memorandum commented that the call had been
prompted oy an earlier Bureau lptter pUl'porting to come from Connie Matthews:
"The letter undouotedly provoked a long distance call from Cleaver to
JIIewton which resulted in our heing able to place in proper perspective the
relationship of Newton and Cleaver to obtain the details of the Geronimo [Elmer
Pratt] Group and learn of the disaffections and the expulsion of the Xew York
group." (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to J<'RI Headquarters,
2/25/71.)
.. Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/25/71.
... Kathleen Cleaver testimony, 4/8/76, p. 34.
97 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/71.
~BI headquarters instructed the SAC, San Francisco to mail Cleaver a copy of
the ~Iarch 6 edition of the BPP newspappr which announced his expulsion from
the BPP, along with an anonJ"mous note saying, "This is what we think of
punks and cowards." (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco
Field Office, 3/10/71.)
207
To Black Panther Embassies,
You have received copies of February 13, 1971 issue of The
Black Panther declaring [three BPP members] as enemies
of the People.
The Supreme Servant of the People, Huey P. Newton, with
concurrence of the Central Committee of the Black Panther
Party, has ordered the expulsion of the entire Intercommunal
Section of the Party at Algiers. You are advised that
Eldridge Leroy Cleaver is a murderer and a punk without
genitals. D.C. Cox is no better.
Leroy's running dogs in New York have been righteously
dealt with. Anyone giving any aid or comfort to Cleaver and
his jackanapes will be similarly dealt with no matter where
they may be locaJt:ed.
[Three BPP international representatives, names deleted]
were never members of the Black Panther Party and will
never become such.
Immediately report to the Supreme Commander any
attempts of these elements to contact you and be guided by
the above instructions.
Power to the People
David Hilliard, Chief of Staff
For Huey P. Newton
Supreme Commander.98
On the same day, FBI headquarters formally declared its counterintelligence
program aimed at "aggravaJt:ing dissension" between Newton
and Cleaver a success. A letter to the Chicago and San Francisco
Field Offices stated:
Since the differences between Newton and Cleaver now
appear to be irreconcilwble, no further counterintelligence
activity in this regard will be undertaken at this time and
now new targets must be established.
David Hilliard and Elbert "Big Man" Howard of National
Headquarters and Bob Rush of Chicago BPP Chapter are
likely future targets....
Hillia'rd's key position at National Headquarters makes
him an outstanding target.
Howard and Rush are also key Panther functionaries; and
since it was necessary for them to affirm their loyalty to Newton
in "The Black Panther" newspaper of 3/20/71, they must
be under a cerl:.ain amount of suspicion already, making them
prime targets.
San Francisco and Chicago furnish the Bureau their comments
and recommendations concerning counterintelligence
activity designed to cause Newton to expell Hilliard, Howard
and Rush.99
.. This letter was ~ntained in a memorandum from San Francisco Field Office
to FBI Headquarters, 3/16/71, pp. 1-2.
•, )femorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and Chicago Field
Offices, 3/25/71.
208
C. Covert Effo1'ts 1'0 Undermine Support of the Black Pant.her Party
and to Destroy the Pady's Public /1lU1ge
1. Efforts 1'0 Discourage and To Discredit Supporters of the
Black Panthers
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's program to "neutralize"
the Black Panther Party included attempts to deter individuals and
groups from supporting the Panthers and, when that could not be
accomplished, often extended to covert action targeted against those
supporters.
The Bureau made a series of progressively more severe efforts to
destroy the confidence between the Panthers and one of their major
California supporters, Donald Freed, a writer who headed an organization
of white BPP sympathizers called "Friends of the Panthers."
In July 1969, the Los Angeles Field Office sent the local BPP
office a memorandum bearing Freed's name and address to "Friends
of the Panthers." Written in a condescending tone and including a
list of six precautions whites should keep in mind when dealing with
Panthers, the memorandum was calculated to cause a "rift between
the Black Panther Party and their assisting organizations." 100 A few
days later, the Bureau had leaflets placed in a park near a BPPsponsored
national conference in Oakland, California, alleging that
Freed was a police informant.101
The FBI viewed with favor an intensive local investigation of Freed
for "harboring" and "possession of illegal firearms."
It is felt that any prosecution or exposure of either Freed or
[name deleted] will severely hurt the BPP. Any exposure
will not only deny the Panthers money, but additionally,
would cause other white supporters of the BPP to withdraw
their support. It is felt that the Los Angeles chapter of the
BPP could not operate without the financial support of
white sympathizers.102
The Bureau's Los Angeles Division also arranged for minutes of
a BPP support group to be provided to the BPP when it was learned
that statements of members of the support group were critical of
Panther leaders.103
The FBI attempted to disaffect another BPP supporter, Ed Pearl
of the Peac~ and Freedom Party, by sending him a cautiona~ letter
bearing a fictitious signature. A Bureau memorandum describmg the
letter says:
The writer states that although he is not a member of the
BPP, he is a Mexican who is trusted by BPP members. The
writer advises that he has learned from BPP members that
certain whites in the PFP who get in the way of the Panthers
will be dealt with in a violent manner. The object sought in
this letter is to cause a breach between the PFP and the BPP.
The former organization had been furnishing money and
support to the latter.104 '
100 Memorallldum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 7/25/69.
101 }Iemorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/28/169.
102 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/24/69.
103 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/29/69,
p.l.
100 Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 12/27/68.
209
Famous entertainment personalities who spoke in fa,vor of Panther
goals or associated with BPP members became the targets of FBI
programs. -VVhen the FBI learned that one well-known Hollywood
actress had become pregnant during an affair with a BPP member,
it reported this information to a famous Hollywood gossip columnist
in t!w form of an anonymous letter. The story was used by the Hollywood
colunmist.'Oc, In June 1970. FBI headquarters approved an
anonymous letter informing Hollywood gossip columnist Army
Archerd that actrE'SS .Tane Fonda had appeared at a BPP fWld-raising
function, noting that "It can be expected that Fonda's involvement
with the BPP cause could detract from her status with the general
public if reported in a Hollywood 'gossip column.' " 106 The wife of
a famous Hollywood actor was targeted by the FBI when it discovered
that she was a financial contributor and supporter of the BPP in Los
Angeles.107 A caricature attacking her was prepared by the San Diego
FBI office.loa
A famous entertainer was also targeted after the Bureau concluded
that he supported the Panthers. l\vo COINTELPRO actions against
this individual were approved because FBI headquarters "believed"
they:
would be an effective means of combating BPP fund-raising
activities among liberal and naive individuals,'09
The Bureau also contacted the employers of BPP contributors. It
sent a letter to the President and a Vice-President of Union Carbide in
January 1970 after learning that a production manager in its San
Diego division contributed to the BPP, The letter, which centered
around a threat not to purchase Union Carbide stock, stated in part:
Dear Mr. [name deleted] :
I am writing to you in regards to an employee in your San
Diego operation, [name deleted].. , ,
I am not generally considered a flag-waving exhibitionist,
but I do regard myself as being a loyal American citizen.
I, therefore, consider it absolutely ludicrous to invest in any
corporation whose ranking employees support, assist, and
encourage any organization which openly advocates the violent
overthrow of our free enterprise system,
It is because of my firm belief in this self-same free enterprise,
capitalistic system that I feel morally obligated to
bring this situation to your attention.
Sincerely yours,
T. F, Ellis
Post Office Box --.
San Diego, California 110
:: Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/70.
107 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 6/25/70.
108 ~lemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/3/70.
109 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/70.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office 3/5/70
110 ~lemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, '1/22/70:
The name "T. F. Ellis" is completely fictitious and the Post Office Box could not
have been traced to the FBI.
210
The response of Union Carbide's Vice President was reported in a
San Diego Field Office memorandum:
On 3/21/iO, a letter was reeeived from Mr, [name deleted],
Vice President of the l'nioll Carbide Corporation, concerning
a previously Bureau-appron'd letter sent to the Union
Carbide Corporation objectillg' to the financial and other support
to the BPP of one of their employees, [name deleted].
The letter indicated that Union Carbide has always made it
a policy not to become in vol \"ed in personal matters of their
employees unless such aetivity had an adverse affect upon
that particular employee's performance.lll
One of the Bureau's prime targets was the BPP's free "Breakfast
for Children" program, which FBI headquarters feared might be a
potentially successful effort by the BPP to teach children to hate
police and to spread "anti-white propaganda." 112 In an admitted attempt
"to impede their contributions to the BPP Breakfast Program,"
the FBI sent anonymous letters and copies of an inflammatory BIMk
Panther Coloring Book for children to contributors, induding Safeway
Stores, Inc., Mayfair Markets, and the Jack-In-The-Box Corporation.
113
On April 8, 1976 in Executive Testimony a former member of the
BPP Central Steering Committee stated that when the coloring book
came to the attention of the Panther's national leadership, Bobby
Seale ordered it destroyed because the book "did not correctly reflect
the ideology of the Black Panther Party . , ." 114
Churches that permitted the Panthers to use their facilities in the
free breakfast program were also targeted. \Vhen the FBI's San Diego
office discovered that a Catholic Priest, Father Frank Curran, was
permitting his church in San Diego to be used as a serving place for
the BPP Breakfast Program, it sent an anonymous letter to the
Bishop of the San Diego Diocese informin~ him of the priest's activities.
l15 In August 1969, the San Diego FIeld Office requested permission
from headquarters to place three telephone calls protesting
Father Curran's support of the BPP program to the Auxiliary Bishop
of the San Diego Diocese:
All of the above calls will be made from "parishioners" objecting
to the use of their church to assist a black militant
cause, Two of the callers will urge that Father Curran be removed
as Pastor of the church, and one will threaten suspension
of financial support of the church if the activities of
the Pastor are allowed to continue.
Fictitious names will be utilized in the event a name is requested
by the Bishop. It is felt that complaints, if they do
not effect the removal of Father Curran ... will at least
result in Father Curran becoming aware that his Bishop is
111 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/1/70.
112 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 7/30/69.
113 Ibid.,. Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
11/30/70.
11< K. Cleaver, 4/8/76, p. 16.
115 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/29/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 9/9/69.
A Concerned Christian.119
211
cognizant of his activities and will thus result in a curtailment
of these activities.1l6
After receiving permission and placing the calls, the San Diego office
reported: "the Bishop appeared to be ... quite concerned over the
fact that one of his Priests was deeply involved in utilization of church
facilities for this purpose." 117
A month later, the San Diego office reported that Father Curran
had been transferred from the San Diego Diocese to "somewhere in
the State of New Mexico for permanent assignment."
In view of the above, it would appear that Father Curran
has now been completely neutralized.
The BPP Breakfast Program, without the prompting of
Father Curran, has not been renewed in the San Diego area.
It is not anticipated at this time that any efforts to re-establish
the program will be made in the foreseeable futureYs
In another case, the FBI sent a letter to the superior of a clergyman
in Hartford, Connecticut who had expressed support for the Black
Panthers, which stated in part :
Dear BISHOP:
It pains me to have to write this letter to call to your attention
a matter which, if brought to public light, may cause
the church a great deal of embarrassment. I wish to remain
anonymous with regard to the information because in divulging
it I may have violated a trust. I feel, however, that what
I am writing is important enough that my conscience is clear.
Specifically, I'm referring to the fact that Reverend and
Mrs. [name deleted] are associating with leaders of the Black
Panther Party. I recently heard through a close friend of Reverend
[name deleted] that he is a revolutionist who advocates
overthrowing the Government of the United States and that
he has turned over a sizable sum of money to the Panthers.
I can present no evidence of fact but is it possible Reverend
[name deleted] is being influenced by Communists~ Some
statements he has made both in church and out have led me to
believe he is either a Communist himself, or so left-wing that
the only thing he lacks is a card.
I beseech you to counsel with Reverend [name deleted] and
relay our concern over his political philosophies which among
other things involves association with a known revolutionist,
[name deleted], head of the Black Panther Party in New
Haven. I truly believe Reverend [name deleted] to be a good
man, but his fellow men have caused him to go overboard
and he now needs a guiding light which only you can
provide.
Sincerely,
110 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/29/69.
117 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/18/69.
118 ~Iemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/6/69,
p.3.
U"l\!emorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69,
p.3.
212
Anonymous FBI mailings were also sent to public officials and
persons whose help might sway public opinion against the BPP. In
December 1969, the FBI mailed Bureau-reproduced copies of BPP
"Seasons Greetings" cards to ten FBI field offices 120 with the following
instructions:
Enclosed for each office are 20 copies of reproductions of
three types of Black Panther Party (BPP) "seasons greetings
cards" which depict the violent propensities of this organization.
You should anonymously mail these cards to those newspaper
editors, public officials, responsible businessmen, and
clergy in your territory who should be made aware of the
vicious nature of the BPP.12l
The San Francisco office mailed its cards to several prominent local
persons and organizations.'22
The Bureau also targeted attorneys representing Black Panther
members. In July 1969, the Los Angeles Field Office suggested that a
break between the BPP membership and Charles Garry, an attorney
who frequently represented BPP members, might be accomplished by
planting a rumor that Garry, Bobby Seale, and David Hilliard were
conspiring to keep BPP leader Huey :Newton in jail.123 This proposal
was rejected by FBI headquarters out of concern that the Bureau
might be recognized as the source of the rumor.'24 Headquarters did
suggest, however:
Los Angeles should review the ideas set forth ... especially
as they pertain to Charles Garry, Bobby Seale, and David
Hilliard, and prepare a specific counterintelligence proposal
designed to create a breach between the BPP and Garry,
Consider such things as anonymous communications and
anonymous telephone calls as well as cartoons and other logical
methods of transporting your idea.'25
When the San Francisco Division learned that Garry intended to
represent Bobby Seale at the Chicago 7 trial, it sent the Chicago office
transcripts of hearings before the House Committee on Un-American
Activities and the California State Senate's Report on Un-American
Activities, which allegedly showed that Garry ,vas connected with the
Communist Party. It was intended to distribute this material "to cooperative
news media in that city." 126
120 The offices were Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles,
Newark, New Haven, New York, San Diego, and San Francisco.
12:1. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore (and 9 other Field
Oflices),12/24/69,p.l.
12. These included the Mayor; the Glide Foundation (church foundation);
Catholic Archdiocese of San Francisco; Episcopal Diocese of California; Lutheran
Church; Editor, San Francisco Chronicle,. Editor, San Francisco
Examiner,. United Presbyterian Church, San Francisco Conference of Christians
and Jews; San Francisco Chamber of Commerce; San Francisco Bar Association;
and San Francisco Board of Supervisors. (Memorandum from San Francisco
Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/12/70.)
123 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/1/69.
124 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 7/14/69.
125 Ibid.
126 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquartrs, 10/6/69.
213
Similarly, when two local BPP leaders filed suit against the San
Diego Police Department charging harassment, illegal arrest, and
illegal searches, the San Diego Field Office reviewed its files
to determine if any public source information is available
which describes [the attorney's] activities in behalf of CP
(Communist Party) activities. If so, an appropriate request
will be forwarded to the Bureau concerning a possible letter to
the editor and/or an editorial.127
The FBI also sought to destroy community support for individual
BPP members by spreading rumors that they were immoral. This idea
was originally advanced in an August 1967 memorandum from FBI
headquarters to all major field offices:
Many individuals currently active in black nationalist organizations
have backgrounds in immorality, subversive activity,
and criminal records. Through your investigation of
key agitators, you should endeavor to establish their unsavory
backgrounds. Be alert to determine evidence of misappropriation
of funds or other ty,pes of personal misconduct on the
part of militant nationalist leaders so any practical or warranted
counterintelligence may be instituted.128
An example of "successful" implementation of this program was a
1970 report from the San Diego Field Office that it had anonymously
informed the parents of a teenage girl that she was pregnant by a
local Panther leader:
The parents showed extreme concern over a previously unknown
situation and [name deleted] was forced to resign
from the BPP and return home to live. It also became general
knowledge throughout the Negro community that a BPP
leader was responsible for the difficulty being experienced by
[name deleted]. 129
The field office also considered the operation successful because the
mother of another girl questioned the activities of her own daughter
after talking with the parent the agents had anonymously contacted.
She learned that her daughter, a BPP member, was also pregnant, and
had her committed to a reformatory asa wayward juvenile.13O
12. Efforts To P1'omote Oriti<:iS111 of the BlMk Panther8 in the
Mass Media (J;nd To Prevent the Black Panther Party and
Its Sympa.thiz,en from Expressing Their Views
The FBI's program to destroy the Black Panther Party included
a concerted effort to muzzle Black Panther publications to prevent
Panther members and persons sympathetic to their aims from expressing
their views, and to encourage the mass media to report stories unfavorable
to the Panthers.
121 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/2/70.
,., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Albany (and 22 other Field Of.
fices),8/25/67,p.2.
129 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/17/70,
p.3.
"'0 Ibid., p. 5.
214
In May 1970, FBI headquarters ordered the Chicago, Los Angeles,
Miami, Newark, New Haven, New York, San Diego, and San Francisco
field offices to advance proposals for crippling the BPP newspaper,
The Black Panther. Immediate action was deemed necessary
because:
The Black Panther Party newspaper is one of the most
effective propaganda operations of the BPP.
Distribution of this newspaper is increasing at a regular
rate thereby influencing a greater number of individuals in
the United States along the black extremist lines.
Each recipient submit by 6/5/70 proposed counterintelligence
measures which will hinder the vicious propaganda bemg
spread by the BPP.
The BPP newspaper has a circulation in excess of 100,000
and has reached the height of 139,000. It is the voice of the
BPP and if it could be effectively hindered it would result in
helping to cripple the BPP. Deadline being set in view of the
need to receive recommendations for the purpose of taking
appropriate action expeditiously.l3l
The San Francisco Field Office submitted an analysis of the local
Black Panther printing schedules and circulation. It discouraged disruption
of nationwide distribution because the airline company which
had contracted with the Panthers might lose business or face a law
suit and recommended instead:
a vigorous inquiry by the Internal Revenue Service to have
"The Black Panther" report their income from the sale of
over 100,000 papers each week. Perhaps the Bureau through
liaison at SOG [seat of government] could suggest such a
course of action. It is noted that Internal Revenue Service at
San Francisco is receiving copies of Black Panther Party
funds and letterhead memoranda.
It is regllested that the Bureau give consideration to discussion
WIth Internal Revenue Service requesting financial
records and income tax return for "The Black Panther." 132
The San Diego Field Office, while noting that the BPP newspaper
had the same legal immunity from tax laws and other state legislation
as other newspapers, suggested three California statutes which might
be used against The Black Panther. One was a State tax on printmg
equipment; the second a "rarely used transportation tax law"; and
the third a law prohibiting business in a residential area.133
The San Diego Field Office had a more imaginative suggestion however;
spray the newspaper printing room with a foul-smelling
chemical:
The Bureau may also wish to consider the utilization of
"Skatol", which is a chemical agent in powdered form and
when applied toa particular surfa-ee emits an extremely
noxious odor rrndering the premises surrOlmding the point of
application uninhabitable. Ftilization of such a chemietal of
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago (and seven other Field
Offices), 5/15/70.
132 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/22/70.
133 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/20/70.
215
course, would be dependent upon whether an entry could be
achieved into the area which is utilized for the production of
"The Black Panther." 134
The San Diego Division also thought that threats from another
radical organization 'aga.inst the newspaper might convince the BPP
to cease publication:
Another possibility which the Bureau may wish to consider
would be the composition and mailing of numerous letters
to BPP Headquarters from various points throughout ,the
country on stationary [sic] containing the national emblem
of the Minutemen organization. These letters, in several different
forms, would 'all have the common theme ofw'arning
the Black Panthers to cease publication or drastic measures
would be taken by the ~IinU'temen organiZJation....
Utilization of the ~finutemen organization through direction
of informants within that group would also be a very
effeet.ive measure for the disruption of the publication of this
newspaper.'35
On another occasion, however, FBI agents contacted United Airlines
officials and inquired about the rates being charged for transporting
the Black Panther magazine. A Bureau memorandum states that
the BPP was being charged "the General Rate" for printed material,
but that in the future it would be forced to pay the "full legal rate
allowable for newspaper shipment." The memorandum continued:
Officials advise this increase ... means approximately a
forty percent increase. Officials agree to determine consignor
in San Francisco and from this determine consignees
throughout the United States so that it can impose full legal
tariff. They believe the airlines are due the differences in
freight tariffs as noted above for past six to eight months, and
are considering discussions with their legal staff concerning
suit for recovery of deficit. ... (T)hey estimate that in New
York alone will exceed ten thousand dollars.13l>
In August 1970, the New York Field Office reported that it was considering
pllans:
direeted against (1) the production of the BPP newspaper;
(2) the distribution of that newspaper and (3) the use of
information contained in particular issues for topical counterintelligence
proposals.
The NYO [New York Office] realizes the financial benefits
coming to the BPP through the sale of their newspaper.
Continued efforts will be made to derive logical and practical
plans to thwart this crucial BPP operation.'31
A few months later, FBI headquarters directed 39 field offices to distribute
copies of a column written by Vietor Riesel, a labor columnist,
"" Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/20/70, p. 2.
135 Ibid., p. 3.
1:,. ::'Ilemorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters and San
Francisco Field Office, 10/11/69.
137 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/19/70.
216
calling for a nationwide union boycott against handling the BPP
newspaper.
Enclosed for e'ach office are riO reproductions of a column
written by Victor Riesel regarding the Black Panther Party
(BPP).
Portions of the column deals w~th proposal that union
members refuse to handle shipments of BPP newspapers.
Obviously if such a boycott gains national support it will
result in effectively cutting off BPP propaganda and finances,
therefore, it is most desirable this proposal be brought to 'attention
of members and officials of unions such as Teamsters
and others involved in handling of shipments of BPP newspapers.
These shipments are generally by air freight. The
column also deals with repeated calls for murder of police
that appear in BPP paper; therefore, it would also be desirable
to bring boycott proposal to attention of members and officials
of police associations who might be in a position to
encourage boycatt.
Each office anonymously mail copies of enclosed to officials
of appropriate unions, police organizations or other individuals
within its territory who could encourage such a
boycott....
Handle promptly and advise Bureau of any positive results
noted. Any publicity observed concerning proposed boycott
should be brought to attention of Bureau.
Be alert for any other opportunities to further exploit
this proposal.'38
Bureau documents submitted to the Select Committee staff do not
indicate the outcome of this plan.
On one occasion the FBI's Racial Intelligence Section concocted
a scheme to create friction between the Black Panthers and the Nation
of Islam by reducing sales of the NOI paper, Muhammed Speaks:
While both papers advocate white hate, a noticeable loss
of revenue to NOI due to decreased sales of their paper
caused by the BPP might well be the spark to ignite the fuel
of conflict between the two organizations. Both are extremely
money conscious.
We feel that our network of racial informants, many of
whom are directly involved in the sale of the NOI and BPP
newspapers, are in a position to cause a material reduction in
NOI newspaper sales. Our sources can 'bring the fact of revenue
loss directly to NOI leader, Elijah Muhammad, who
might well be influenced to take positive steps to counteract
the sale of BPP papers in the Negro community. We feel
that with careful planning and close supervision an open
dispute can be developed between the two organizations.139
FBI headquarters promptly forwarded this suggestion to the field
offices in Chicago, New York, and San Francisco with the express
hope that Elijah Muhammed might be influenced "to take positive
138 ~Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to SAC's in 39 cities, 11/10/70.
139 Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 6/26/70.
217
steps to counteract the sale of BPP newspapers in the Negro community."
140 The following month, the ChIcago Field Office advised
against using informants for this project because animosity was already
developing between the BPP and NOI, and any revelation of a
Bureau attempt to encourage conflict might serve to bring the BPI>
and NOI closer together,141
Sumerous attempts were made to prevent Black Panthers from
airing their views in public. For example, in February 1969, the FBI
joined with the Chicago police force to prevent the local BPP leader,
Fred Hampton, from appearing on a television talk show. The FBI
memorandum explaining this incident states:
the [informant] also enabled Chicago to further harass the
local BPP when he provided information the afternoon of
1/24/69 reflecting that Fred Hampton was to appear that
evening at local TV studio for video tape interview.... The
tape was to be aired the following day.
Chicago was aware a warrant for mob action was outstanding
for Hampton in his home town and the above information
. . . was provided the Maywood Police Department with
a suggestion that they request the Chicago Police Department
to serve this arrest warrant. This was subsequently done with
Hampton arrested at television studio in presence of 25 BPP
members and studio personnel. This caused considerable embarrassment
to the local BPP and disrupted the plans for
Hampton's tdevision appearance.142
Headquarters congratulated the Chicago Field Office on the timing of
the arrest "under circumstances which proved highly embarrassing
to the BPP." 143
The Bureau's San Francisco office took credit for preventing Bobby
Seale from keeping a number of speaking engagements in Oregon and
Washington. In May 1969, while Seale was traveling from a speaking
engagement at Yale University to begin his West Coast tour, a bombing
took place in Eugene, Oregon which the FBI suspected involved
the Black Panthers. The San Francisco Field Office subsequently
reported:
As this was on the eve of Seale's speech, this seemed to be
very poor advance publicity for Seale.... It was ... determined
to telephone Mrs. Seale [Bobby Seale's mother]
claiming to be a friend from Oregon, bearing the warning that
it might be dangerous for Seale to come up. This was done.
Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Seale reported this to BPP headquarters,
claiming an unknown brother had sent a warning
to Bobby from Oregon. Headquarters took this very seriously
and when Bobby arrived shortly thereafter, he decIded not to
go north with "all the action going on up the·re." He subsequently
cancelled 'a trip to Seattle. It is believed that the
140 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago, New York, and San
Francisco Field Offices, 6/26/70.
141 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/15/70.
142 ~Iemorandumfrom Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/10/69.
143 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 2/20/69.
218
above mentioned telephone call was a pivotal point in persuading
Seale to stay home.144
The San Francisco office reported that not only had Seale been prevented
from making his appearances, but that he had lost over $1,700
in "badly needed" fees and that relations between Seale and "New
Left" leaders who had been scheduled to appear with him had become
strained.
In December 1969, FBI headquarters stressed to the San Francisco
Field Office the need to prevent Black Panther speaking engagements :
Several recent communications reeeived at the Bureau indicate
the BPP is encouraging their branches to set up speaking
engagements at schools and colleges and the showing of films
in order to raise money.... San Francisco should instruct
[local FBI] office covering to immediately submit to the Bureau
for approval a counterintelligence proposal aimed at preventing
the activities scheduled....
The BPP in an effort to bolster its weak financial position
is now soliciting speaking engagements and information has
been developed indicating they are reducing their monetary
requirements for such speeches. 1Ve have been successful in
the past through contacts with established sources in preventing
such speeches in colleges or other institutions.145
In March 1970, a representative of a Jewish organization contacted
the San Francisco FBI Field Office when it learned that one of its local
lodges had invited David Hilliard, BPP Chief-of-Staff, and Attorney
Charles Garry to speak. San Francisco subsequently reported to
headquarters :
Public source information relating to David Hilliard, Garry,
and the BPP, induding "The Black Panther" newspaper itself,
was brought to [source's] attention. He subsequently
notified the [FBI] office that the [name deleted] had altered
their arrangements for this speech and that the invitation to
Hilliard was wit.hdrawn but that Charles Garry was permitted
to speak but his speech was confined solely to the recent
case of the Chicago 7.146
The FBI exhibited comparable fervor in disseminating information
unfavorable to the Black Panthers to the press and television
stations. A directive from FBI headquarters to nine field offices in
January 1970 explained the program:
To counteract any favorable support in publicity to the
Black Panther Party (BPP) recipient offices are requested
to submit their observations and recommendations regarding
contacts with e,.<;tablished and reliable sources in the television
and/or radio field who might be interested in drawing up a
program for local consumption depicting the true facts regarding
the BPP.
1« Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/26/69.
". :\Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 12/4/69.
". :\Iemorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/18/iO.
219
The suggested program would deal mainly with local BPP
activities and data furnished would be ofa public source
nature. This data could be implemented by information on
the BPP nationally if needed. . . .
All offices should give this matter their prompt consideration
and submit replies by letter.147
Soon afterward, the Los Angeles office identified two local news
reporters whom it believed might be willing to help in the effort to
discredit the BPP and received permission to
discreetly contact [name deleted] for the purpose of ascertaining
his amenability to the preparation of a program
which would present the true facts about the Black Panther
Party as part of a counterintelligence effort.148
Headquarters also suggested information and materials to give to a
local newsman who expressed an interest in airing a series of programs
against the Panthers.149
In .July 1970, the FBI furnished information to a Los Angeles TV
news commentator who agreed to air a series of shows against the
BPP, "especiaHy in the area of \vhite liberals contributing to the
BPP." '"'' In October, the Los Angeles Division sent headquarters a
copy of an FBI-assisted television editorial and reported that another
newsman was preparing yet another editorial attack on the
Panthers.'o!
In November 1970, the San Francisco Field Office notified the Director
that Huey Newton had "recently rented a luxurious lakeshore
apartment in Oakland, California." The San Francisco office saw
"potential counterintelligence value" in this information since this
apartment was far more elegant than "the ghetto-like BPP 'pads' and
community centers utilized by the Party." It was decided not to
"presently" leak "this information to cooperative news sources," because
of a "pending special ill\'estigative technique." 152 The information
was giwn to the Sail Franif'i8CO Examiner, however, in February
1971, and an article was published stating- that Huey P. Newton, BPP
Supreme Commander, had movpd into a $650-a-month apartment
147 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office (and 8
other offices), 1/23/70. The San Diego office had already made pfforts along the
lines proposed in this memorandum. In Noypmher 1969 it requested permission
from hpadquarters to inform two newscasters "for use in editorials"' that the
sister and brother-in-law of a Communist Party member were believPd to be
nwmhers of the local Black Panthers, The office also proposed preparing "an
editorial for publication in the CQpley press."' (Airtel from SAC, San Dipgo to
Dirpctor, FBI, 11/12/69.) The San Francisco office llad also leaked information
to a San Frandsco Examiner reporter, who wrote a front-page story compll'tl'
with photographs concerning "the conyersion by the BPP of an apartment into
a fortress,"' (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/21/70.) H. Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/6/70;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angples Field Office 3/5/70 (this
memorandum bears Director Hoover's initials).
149 ~Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles and San Francisco
Field Offices, 5/27/70.
'''' ~Iemorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to I<'BI Headquarters, n!1O!70,
p.2.
m ~Iel11orandum from Los Angeles Field OfficI' to FBI Headquarters, 10/23/70.
"'2 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
11/24/70.
69-984 0 - 76 - 15
220
oH'rlooking Lake 1Iel'1'itt in Oakland, California, under the assume(l
nanw of Don Penn.153 Headquarters approved anonymously mailing
copies of the article to HPP branches and ordered copies of the article
for "di \"isions with HPP activity for mailing to newspaper editors." 15.
The San Francisco office informed FBI headquarters later in February
that
BPP Headquarters was bl'seiged with inquiries after the
printing of the San Francisco Examiner article and the
people at headquarters refuse to answer the news media or
other callers on this question. This source has further reported
that a representative of the Richmond, Virginia HPP contacted
headquarters on 2/18/71, stating they had received a
xeroxed copy of . . . the article and believed it had been
forwarded by the pigs but still wanted to know if it was
true.155
D. Cooperation Between the Federal Bureau of Inve8tigation and
Local Police Department8 in Di8rupti1tg the Black Panther
Party
The FBI enlisted the cooperation of local police departments in
several of its covert action programs to disrupt and "neutralize" the
Black Panther Party. The FBI frequently worked with the San
Diego Police Department, supplying it, with informant reports to
encourage raids on the homes of BPP members, often with little or no
apparent evidence of violations of State or Federal law.156
Examples are numel'OUs. In February 1969, the San Diego Field
Office learned that members of the local HPP chapter were following
each other to determine if police informants had infiltrated their
organization. The field office passed this information to the San
Diego police with the suggestion that BPP members engaged in these
surveillances might be followed and arrested for violations of "local
'""':Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/12/7l.
:w. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Franciseo Field Office,
2/8/7l.
1'" Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/18/71. In a February 1971 report on recent COINTELPRO activity, the San
Francisco Division described the San Francisco Examiner article as one of its
"counterintelligence activities." This report said that because of the article,
Xewton had given an interview to another San Francisco daily to try 00 explain
his seemingly expensive lifestyle. The report also states that copies of the article
were Rent to "all BPP and N'CCl<' [National Committee to Combat Fascism]
offices in the United States and to three BPP contacts in Europe." (Memorandum
from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/2.'5/71.)
lJ;6 The suggestion of encouraging local police to raid and arrest members of
so-called "Black Nationalist Hate Groups" was first put forward in a February
29, 1961'\ memoranrlum to field officeR. This memorandum cited as an example of
RuccesRful use of this tcchnique: "The Rev·olutionary Action Movement (RAM).
a pro-Chinese CommuniRt group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa., in the summer
of 1967. The Philadelphia office alerted local police who then put RAM leaders
under close scrutiny. They were arrested on every pORsible charge until they
could no longer make 'bail. As a result, RAM leaders spent most of the summer
in jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place." (Memorandum from
G. C. :\loore to W. C. Sullimn, 2/29/68, p. 3.)
221
Motor Vehicle Code laws." 1", When the San Diego Field Office recei
ved reports that fiY~ BPP mell~bers were living; in the lo:a~, ~~P
headquarters and "hanng sex orgies on almost a mghtly basi~, ' It Illformed
the local police with the hope that a legal basIs for a raId could
be found. 15s Two days later, the San Diego office reported to headquarters:
As a result of the Bureau-approved information furnished
to the San DieO"o Police Department regarding the "sex
orgies" being held at BPP Headquarters in Soan Diego, which
had not previously been known to the Pollee Department,
a raid was conducted at BPP Headquarters on 11/20/69.
[Name deleted], San Diego ~ol.ice Depaortment, In.telligence
Unit, ad,-ised that, due to tlus lllform3:tlO~, he assIg~ed t~o
officers to a research project to determllle If any sohd basIs
could be found to conduct a raid. His officers discovered two
outstanding traffic warrants for [name deleted], a memb~r
of the BPP, and his officers used these warrants to obtalll
entry into BPP Headquarters.
As a result of this raid [6 persons] were all arrested.
Seized at the time of the arrests ,,,ere three shotguns, one
of which was stolen, one rifle, four gas masks and one tear
gas canister.
Also as a result of this raid, the six remaining members
of the TIPP in San Diego were summoned to Los Angeles on
11/28/69.... Upon their arrival, they were informed that due
to numerous problems with the TIPP in San Diego, including
the recent raid on BPP Headquarters, the BPP Branch in
San Diego was being dissolved.
Also, as a direct result of the above raid [informants]
have reported that [name deleted] has been severely beaten
up by other members of the BPP due to the fact that she
allowed the officers to enter BPP Headquarters the night
of the raid.159
A later memorandum states that confidential files belonging to the
San Diego Panthers were also "obtained" during this raid.160
In March 1969, the San Diego Field Office informed Bureau headquarters:
information was made available to the San Diego Police
Department who have been arranging periodic raids in the
1.., The San Diego office reported to headquarters: "As of one week ago, the
BPI' in San Diego was so completely disrupted and so much suspicion, fear,
and distrust has been interjected into the party that the members have taken
to running surveillances on one another in an attempt to determine who the
'police agents' are. On 2/19/69, this information was furnished to the San
Diego Police De-partment with the suggestion that possibly local Motor Vehicle
Code laws were being violated during the course of these surveillances.'''
(Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters 2/27/69.)
108 ~Iemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/10/69.
Headquarters told the San Diego office that if there was no legal basis for
a raid. it should "give this matter further thought and submit other proposals
to capitalize on this information ill' the counterintelligence field." (Memorandum
from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 11/18/69, p. 1.)
'50 ~Iemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/3/69,
PPo 2-3.
'" Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/17170.
222
hope of establishing a possession of marijuana and dangerous
drug charge [against two BPP members]. ...
The BPP finally managC'd to rent the Rhodesian Club at
2907 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, which will be utilized for
a meeting hall. A request will be forthcoming to have the
San Diego Police Department and local health inspectors
examine the club for health and safety defects which are
undoubted by [8i(:] present."i!
The San Diego office also conducted "racial briefing sessions" for the
San Diego police. Headquarters was informed:
It is also felt that the racial briefing sessions being given
by the San Diego Division are affording tangible results for
the Counterintelligence Program. Through these briefings,
the command le\'els of virtually all of the police departments
in the San Diego Division are being apprised of the identities
of the leaders of the yarious militant groups. It is felt
that, although specific instances cannot be attributed directly
to the racial briefing program, police officers are much more
alert for these black militant individuals and as such are contributing
to the over-all Counterintelligence Program,
directed against these groups.162
The Committee staff has seen documents indicating extensive cooperation
between local police and the FBI in several other cities. For
example, the FBI in Oakland prevented a reconciliation meeting
between Huey Newton's brother and former Panthers by having the
Oakland police inform one of the former Panthers that the meeting
was 'a "set up." The San Francisco office concluded:
It is believed that such quick dissemination of this type of
information may have been instrumental in preventing the
various dissidents from rejoining forces with the BPP.163
Another Bureau memorandum reflected similar cooperation in Los
Angeles:
The Los Angeles office is furnishing on a daily basis information
to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office Intelligence
Division and the Los Angeles Police Department Intelligence
and Criminal Conspiracy Divisions concerning the
activities of the black nationalist groups in the anticipation
that such information might lead to the arrest of these militants.
164
Information from Bureau files in Chicago on the Panthers was given
to Chicago police upon request, and Chicago Police Department files
were open to the Bureau.165 A Special Agent who handled liaison between
the FBI's Racial MaUers Squad (responsible for monitoring
BPP activity in Chicago) and the Panther Squad of the Gang Intelligence
Unit (GIU) of the Chicago Police Department from 1967
through July 1969, testified that he visited GIlT between three and
101 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/26/69.
'''''Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/15/69.
'63 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/21/69.
'M M('morandum Los Angelefl Field OfficI' to FBI H('adquarters, 12/1/69.
lOS Special Agent deposition, 2/26/75. p. p. 00.
223
five times a week to exchange information.166 The Bureau and Chicago
Police both maintained paid informants in the BPP, shared informant
information, and the FBI provided information which was
used by Chicago police in planning raids against the Chicago BPP.1
6.
According to an FBI memorandum, this sharing of informant
information was crucial to police during their raid on the apartment
occupied by several Black Panther members which resulted in the
death of the local Chairman, Fred Hampton, and another Panther:
[Prior to the raid], a detailed inventory of the weapons and
also a detailed floor plan of the apartment were furnished
to local authorities. In addition, the identities of BPP members
utilizing the apartment at the above address were furnished.
This information was not available from any other
source and subsequently proved to be of tremendous value in
that it subsequently saved injury and possible death to police
officers participating in a raid ... on the morning of 12/4/69.
The raid was based on the information furnished by the
informant ...168 [Emphasis added.]
166 SIJPcial Agent deposition, 2/26/7;;, p. R-l. The Agent alHo testified that other
FBI agentH in the Racial )IatterH Squad were alHo im'olved in the "free flow
of information between the Racial )IatterH Squad and GIl.... and that at one
time or another, every agent had exchanged information with GIl;.
167l\Iemorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/3/69, p. 2;
memorandum from Special Agent to Chicago Field Office, 12/12/69.
168 )Iemorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/8/69.

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