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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

1. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS
The Select Committee's inyestigation of alleged assassination attempts
against foreign leaders raised (llwstiollS of possible connections
betwpen these plots and the assassination of President .fohn Fitzgerald
Kennedy. Questions \wre later raised about whether the agencies adequately
inYestigatpd theS(' possible COlllH'ctions and whpther infonnation
about these plots was pl'Oyidpd the P"esident's Commission on the
Assassination of Presidl'nt KpllIw(ly (the 'YalTl'n Commission). As a
result, punmant to its general mandate to )'('Yiew the performance of
the intelligence agencies, the Sdl'ct Committee redewed thpir specific
performance with respeet to tllPir inn'stigation of thl' assassination of
tlIP Prpsic!l'nt.
A. The Scope of the Committee's Inl·('sti.qatioll
The Committee did not attempt to duplicate the work of the 'Van'en
Commission. It did not review the findings and conclusions of the
'Va.J'ren Commission. It did not re-examine the physical evidence
which the 'ValTPn Commission had. It did not review one of the principal
questions facing the Commission: whether Lee Harvey Oswald
was in fact the assassin of P"esident Kennedy.
Instead, building upon the Select Cominittee's earlier work, and
utilizing its access to the agencies and its expmtise in their functions,
tllP Committee examined tlw performance of the intelligence agencies
in conducting their investigation of the assassination and their relationships
to the ,Yarren Commission.
In the course of this invpstigation, morp than 50 witnesses were
eitllPr interyiewed or deposPd. Literally tens of thousands of pages of
documentary evidence were "eviC\wd at the agencies and more than
iI,OOO pages\vcl'e acquired. In addition, the (\;mmittee relied a great
deal on testimony taken during the course of its invcstigation of
alleged plots to assassinate foreign leaders, especially testimony
relahng to knowledge of those plots.
The Committee has been imp)'(~ssed with the ability and dedication
of most of thoS(' in the intelligence communit:v. Most officials of the
FBI, the CIA. and other agencies performed their assigned tasks
thoroughly, con1"petently, and professionally. Supervisors at agBI1CY
headquarters similarly met their responsibilities and are deserving
of the highest pl'llisc. Yet. as this Report documents, these individuals
did not have access to all of the information held by the
most senior officials in their own agencies. Nor did they conty:ol. or
even influence, many of tIl(' (lecisions made by those senior offieials,
decisions "Which sha'ped the investigation and'the process by which
information was provided to the ,Varren Commission. Thus. it cannot
be too strongly pmphasized that this Report examines the performanee
of the senior ageney officials in light of the information
ava,ilable to them.
(1)
2
Many potential witnesses could not he called hecause of limitations
of time and rrsources. For this reason the Committee has relied a great
deal on the doculIlPntary record of events. The Committee's Report
distinguishes information ohtainrd from documents from information
it obtained through sworn testimony through citations, since the documentary
records may not accurately reflect the true events. On the
other hand, the Committee has on many occasions noted that witnesses
may ha\'e no recollection of the events described in documents which
they either prepared or in which they were mentioned.
The follO\ving Report details the evidence developed to date. The
Heport is intended to be descriptive of the facts the Committee has de\-
eloprd. The Committee believes the investigation should continue,
in ~rtain areas, and for that reason do~s not reach any final conclusions.
Instead, the Select Committee has recommended that the Senate
Committee on Intelligence continue this investigation in those areas
where the Select Committee's investigation could not be completed.
B. Summary
In the days following the assassination of President Kennedy,
nothing was more important to this country than to determine the
facts of his death; no one single ewnt has shaken the country more.
Yet the evidence the Committee has developed suggests that, for different
reasons, both t,he CIA and the FBI failed in, or avoided carrying
out, certain of their responsibilities in this matter.
The Committee emphasizes that this Report's discussion of investigative
deficiencies and the failure of ~\..merican intelligence agencies
to inform the 1Varren Commission of certain information does not
lead to the conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy.
Instead, this Report details the evidence the Committee developed
concerning the illYestigation those agencies conducted into the President's
assassination, their relationship \vith each other and with the
1Varren Commission, and the effect their own operations may have had
on the course of the investigation. It places particular emphasis on
the effect their Cuban operations seemed to have on the investigation.
Howewr, the Committee cautions that it has seen no evidence that
Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban gO\'Prnment plotted President
Kenne(lY's assassination in retaliation for F.S. operations against
Cuba. The Heport details these operations to illustrate why they were
re·levant to the inwstigation. Thus, the CIA operation involving a
high If\-el Cuhan official, code-nanlPd AMLASH, is des(',ribed in order
to illustrate \"l1v that opeI'lltion, and its possible ramifications, should
han' bepn examined as part. of the assa>;sination ill\'estigation. Similarly,
although Cuban exile groups opposed to Castro may ha\-e been
Ilpst't with Kennedy administration actions which rpstricted theil'
arti\'ities, the Committee has no eTidenre that such groups plotted the
assassination.
Almost from the day Castl'O took powel' in Cuba, the United States
beeamc the center of attempt>; to depose him. Cuban exiles, anticommunists,
business inteTests, underworld figurps, and the United
States Govemment all had their own reasons for seeking to over~
hro\\' the Castro gO\'el'llment. These intercsts generally operated
mdcpelHlcntly of the others; but on occasion, a few from each group
would join forces in a combine<l effort.
3
In c\ pril IBti!. a force of Cuban rxiles and soldiers of fortune hacked
by the CIA, attemptl'd an innlsion of Cuba at thl' Bay of Pigs, In
Xovembel' of that, year. the United States GoYt'rlllllent decided that
furthel' sueh OYt'I't' pal'amilitary operations \yerl' no longer feasible.
and embarked on Operation MONGOOSE. This operation attempted
to use Cuban f'xiles and dissidents insidc' Cuba to oYt'rthrO\y Castro.
",Vhen the UnitC'd States faced a major confrontation with the SO\'iet
Union during the Oetober l$lti2 Cuban missile, crisis. it terminated
MONGOOSE; the CIA's cm'ert operations against Cuba were reduced;
and the FBI and other agencips of goyel'llment began to restrict
tIl(' paramilitary operations of exile groups, This rather sudden
shift against paramilitary activity of Cuban exile groups genf'rated
hostility. SUPPOliers of some of tll('sP groups \H're angered by the
change in government policy. They vie\n·d this as a weakening of the
IT.S. will to oppose Castro.
Throughout this period, the CIA had bern plotting the assassination
of Castro as another method of achieving a change in the Cuban govel'llment.
Between Ul60 and early 196;) the CIA attempted to use underworld
figures for this assassination. By ~Ia'y 1962. the FBI knew of
such plots, and in.June 196;) leal'lled of their tel1llination.
Following a .June 196;) decision by a "Special Group" of the National
Security Council to increase COVeli operations against Cuba,
the CIA renewed contact with a high-level Cuban govel'llment official.
('ode-named AMLASH. At his first meeting with the CIA in over a
year. AMLASH proposed Castro's overthrow through an "inside
job," with U.S. support. AMLASH considered the assassination of
Castro a necessary part of this "inside job." Shortly after this meeting
with A}[LASH, Castro issued a public warning reported prominently
in the F.S. press about the United States' mpeting with terrorists who
wished to eliminate Cnban leaders. He threatened that Cuba would
answer in kind.
Five days after Castro issued this thrrat. the Coordinating Committee
for Cuhan affairs, an interagency planning committre subordinate
to the National Security Council's Special Group, met to
endorse or modify then existing contingency plans for possible retaliation
by the Cuban Government. Representatives of the CIA, and
of the State, Defense and .Justice Departments were on this Committee.
The CIA representatives on this Co~mittee were from its
Special Affairs Staff (SAS), the staffrespOIL'iible for Cuban matters
generally and the AMLASH operation. Those attending the meeting
on September 12 agreed unanimously that there was a strong
likelihood Castro would retaliate in some \yay against the rash of
covert activity in Cuba.
At this September 12 meeting this Committee concluded Castro
would not risk major confrontation with the United States. It therefore
rejected the possibility that Cuba \vould retaliate 'by attacking
American officials within the l"nited States; it assigned no agency the
responsibility for consideration of this contingency.
Within weeks of this meeting the CIA escalated the level of its
covm't operations, informing A~[LASH the United States supported
his coup. Despite \yarnings from certain CIA staffers that the operation
was poorly conceived and insecure, the head of SAS, Desmond
Fitzgerald. met AMLASH on October 29, 196;), told him he was the
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"personal representati\'e" of Attol'lIPY General Hobert Kennedy. and
stated the l;nite(l States would support a coup. On No\'emheJ' :2:2. at
a 1)J'e-ananged nweting. a CIA Case Officer told AMLASH he would
IX' provided rifles \vith telescopic sights. and explosives \vith which
to carry out his plan. He was also offen'd a poison pen device.
Following tlIP President's d.eath, searches of FBI and CIA files
rewaled that Lee HarTey Os\vald was not unknown to the intelligence
agencies. In late 1030. the FBI opened a "security file" on Oswald
aftrr his drfection to the So\'iet Union. After Oswald's return to this
country in .Tune 1962. he was interviewed twice by FBI agents; on
each o~casion he repeatedly lied. He also refused to b(~ polygraphed
about his negatiw anS\WI'S to questions of ties with Soviet intelligence.
Yt't the FBI closed the Oswald seclII'ity ease immediately after the
second inten-iew. The case was reopened in March 1963, but Oswald
was not inten-iewed by the FBI until August 10, 196:3, when he re(
jllPsted an inten'iew after his arrest in Nmv Orleans for disturbing
the peace. On the occasion of this third interview, ,he again repeatP-clly
lied to FBI agents. A month later Oswald visited Mexico City, where
he visited both the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic establishments, and
contacted a vice consul at the latter who was in fact a KGB agent.
Despite recri\'ing this information on Oswald's Mexico City activity,
the FBI failed to intensify its im'estigative efforts. It failed to interview
him before the assassination despite receiving a note from him
warning the FBI to leaw his wife alone,
Immediately after the assassination, FBI Director .r. Edgar Hom'er
ordered a complete review of t.he FBI's handling of the Oswald security
case. 'Within six days he was given a report which detailed
serious investigati\'e deficiencies. As a result of these deficiencies
seventeen FBI per'SOnnel, including one Assistant Director, were disciplined.
The fact that the FBI felt there were investigative deficiencit's
and the disciplinary actions it took were ne\'er publicly dis('losed
by the Bureau 01' commun~catedto the ,Varren Commission.
. The evidence suggests that during the vVarren Commission investigation
top FBI officials were continually concerned with protecting
tht' Bureau's reputation and avoiding any criticism for not fulfilling
investigative responsibilities. ,Vithin weeks after the assassination, the
FBI, at the urging of senior Gon-rnment officials, is..'lued a report concluding
that Oswald was the assassin and that he had acted alone.
The Bureau issued its report on the basis of a narrow investigation
focused on Oswald. without conclucting a broad investigation of the
assassination which would have re\'Caled any conspiracy. foreign or
rlomestir.
Despite knowlerlge of Oswald's apparent interest in pro-Castro and
anti-Castro activities and top level awarenes..'l of certain CIA assassination
plots, the FBI, according to all agents and supervisory personnel
who testifierl before the Committee, lIlade no special investigative
effort into questions of pos..'lihle Cuban government or Cuban exile
involvement in the assassination independent of the Oswalrl investigation.
There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the
interviewing of Cuban sources or of sources within the Cuban exile
community. The division of t,he FBI responsible for investigating
criminal aspects of the assassination, and not the division responsible
for investigating suhversivp activities (including those of Cuban
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g-l'Oll p:-;), was primarily responsible for the inyestigation and srlTPd
as liaison to the "TaITPll Commission,
Director Hoover himself perceiYed the 'Vanen Commission as an
adn'rsary, lIe I'elwa(pdly ]'('marke(l that the Commission, particu,
lady the Chief .Ju:-;ticr. ,yas "St.·eking to critici%e" the FBI aIHI
merely attrmpting to "filHl gaps" in the FBI's il1\'estigation, On (,YO
:-;eparate occasions, the latter immediately upon release of the Commission's
Report, Director Hoovpr asked for all derogatory material
on 'Varren Commission memhers and staff contained in the FBI files.
Neither the CIA. nor the FBI told the 'Varren Commission about
the CIA attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro, Allen Dulles, former
Director of Central Intelligencr. was a member of the 'Varren Commission
and pl'rsllInably knew about CIA plots during his tenure with
the Agency, although he probably was unaware of the .A~ILASH
operation. FBI Diredor Hoover and senior FBI officials also knew
about NlCse rarlier plots, In .Tuly H)()-±, two months before the 'ValTrn
Commission issued its 2o-volume report of its investigation and findings,
FBI officials learnrd that a Cuban official (not known to the
Bure,au as "AMLASH") was plotting with the CIA to assassinate
Castro. However, there is no cvidrnce this knowledge affectrd the FBI
inYestigation of the President's assassination in any way. The Attorney
General and other government officials knew there had been pre,-
ions assassination plots with the underworld. None of the testimony
or documents received by t,he 'Varren Commission mentioned the CIA
assassination plots. The' subordinate offi.cersat the FBI and the CIA
who acted as liaisons with the 'Varren Commission did not know of
the CIA assassination attempts.
The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the 'Vanen Commission's
work than the early CIA. assassination plots with the underworld.
Unlike those earlier plots, the AMLASH operation was in
progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the
AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to the CIA; and unlike
the earlier plots, the CIA thad endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a
coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite
Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly im'olved
in either agency's investigation was told of the AMLASH operation,
No one investigated a connrction between the AMLASH oprration
and President Kennedy's assassination. Although Oswald had been
in contact with pro-Cash'o and anti-Oastro groups for many months
before the assassination, the CIA did not conduct a thorough investigation
of questions of Cuban Government or Cuban exile involvement
in the assassination.
CIA officials knowledgeable of the A:\ILASH plot testified they
did not relate it to the President's assassination; however, those at CIA
and FBI responsible for their agency's investigation testified that, had
they been aware of the plot, they would have considered it relevant to
their investigation. The individual who (lirected the CIA investigation
for the first month after the assassination, testified that he felt knowledge
of the AMLASH operation would have been a "vital factor" in
shaping his investigation. His successor at the CIA also stated that
knowledge of the AMLASH plot would have made a difference in his
im'rstigation. Individuals on the 'Van'en Commission staff have expre,
ssed similar opinions as to all plots against Castro. There is also
6
e"idenCD that CIA im-estigatol'S re~lIested name traces which should
huyc made them aware of the AMLASH operation, but for some 'reason,
they did not learn of that operation.
Although the "~an"n Commission concluded its work in September
}f16-L the inwstigation of the assassinatlion was not to end. Both FBI
Director HoO\'er and CIA. DpplIty Director for Plans Richard Helms
pledged to kPep tlw mattPl" as an open case.
In 196.5. tlIP FBI awl tllP CIA recein'd information about the AMLASH
oprration. ,,-hich indicated the cntirc operation was inseeure,
and caused the CIA to terminate it. Despite the fact that the information
thpn re('eiwd might haye raised doubts about the inYeh'itigation of
the President's assassination. neither agency re-examined the assassinatlion.
The assassination of Presidpnt Kennedy again came to the attention
of tIl(' intelligence agpncies in l!J67. President .Johnson took a personal
interest in allegations that Cash'o had retaliated. Althoug-h the FBI
receiyed such allpgations, no inyestigation was conduct('(l.
On the ycry day President .Johnson received the FBI reports of
these allegations, he met with CIA Director Richard Helms. The next
(lay. Helms ordered the CIA Inspector General to prepare a report
on Agency sponsored assassination plots. Although this report raised
the question of a possible connection between the CIA plots against
Castro and the assassinaton of President Kennedy, it was not furnished
to CIA investigators who were to review the Kennedy assassination
investigation. Once again. although these CIA investigators
requested information that should have led them to diseover the
A~rLASHoperation. they apparently did not receive that information.
O. Fil1ding8
The CommitteR emphasize,s that lit has not uncovered any eyidence
sufficient to justify a eonelusion that, there was a conspiracy to assassinate
President Kennedv.
The Committee has, h~wewr. developed evidence which impeache,.<;
the process by which the intelligence agencies arrived at their own
conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided information
to the 'Warren Commission. This evidence indicates that
the investigation of the assassination was deficient and that faets
which might haw substantially affected the course of the ill\-estig-ation
were not provided the 'Varren Commission or those indi"iduals
within the FBI and the CIA.. as well as otheT a,geneies of Govemment,
who were charged with investigating the assassination.
The Committee has found that the FBI, the agency with primary
responsibility in the matter, was ordered by Director Hoover and
pre,ssurcd by higher go\-C'rnment officials, to conclude its investigation
quickly. The FBI conducted its investigation in an atmosphere of concem
among senior Bure.au officials that it would be criticized and its
reputation tarnished. Rather than addressing its inve,.<;tigation to all
significant circumstances, including all possibilities of conspiracy, the
FBI im-estigation foe-used narrowly on Lee Harvey Oswald.
The Committee has found that eYen with this nalrrow focus, the FBI
investigation, as well as the CIA inquiry, was deficient on the specific
question of the significance. of Os\vald's contacts with pro-Castro and
anti-Castro groups for the many months before the assassination.
7
Those indi\'iduals direct Iy responsible for the ill\'estigations were not
fully conversant with the fluctuations in American policy toward
those who opposed Castro, and they lacked a working knowledge of
IH'o-Cast,m and anti-Castro aeti\city. They did not know the full ext~mt
of F.S. operations against Cuba including the CIA efforts to assassinat{'
Castm. The Committee further found that these im'estigatiye
deficiencies are probably the reason that significant leads recei yed by
intelligence agencies were not pursued.
Senior Bureau officials should haye realized the FBI efforts were
focused too narmwly to allow fO!' a full investigation. They should
han> realized the significance of Oswald's Cuban contacts could not be
fully analyzed without the direct inyolvenH>nt of FBI personnel who
had expertise in such matters. Yei these senior officials permitted the
inn>stigation to take. this course a.nd viewell the 1Varren Commission
investigation in an adversarial light.
Senior CIA officials also should han> realized that their agency was
not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and
anti-Castro connections. They should ,have realized that CIA operations
against Cuba, particulai'ly operations involving the assassination
of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they
directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation 'without telling
them of these vital facts. These officials. whom the 1Varren Commission
relied upon for exprrtise, ad vised the 1ValTen Commission
that the CIA had no evidence of foreign conspiracy.
1Vhy senior officials of the FBI and the CIA permitted the inyestigation
to go forward, in light of these deficiencies, and why they permitted
the "Tarren Commission to reach its conclusion without all
relevant information is still unclear. Certainly, concern with public
reputation, problems of coordination between agencies, possible
bureaucratic failure and embarrassment, am] the extreme compartmentation
of knowledge of sensitive operations may have contributed
to these short{;omings. But the possibility \exists that senior officials in
both agencies made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially
important information.
Because the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
1Vith Respect to Intelligence Activities ended on May 31, 1976, a
final resolution of these questions was impossible. Nevertheless, the
Committee decided to make its findings public. because the people have
a right to know how these spe~ial agencies of the Government fulfill
their responsi bilit ies.
The Committee recommends that its successor, the Senate Seh>ct
Committee on Intelligence, the permanent Senate Committee overseeing
intelligence operations, continue the investigation in an attempt to
resolve these questions. To a,;sist its successor. this Committee has forwarded
all files pertaining to this investigation.
This phase of the. Committee's work will undoubtedly stir controversy.
Few events ,in recent memory have so aroused the emotions of
this Nation and the world, as those in Dallas, in November 1963.
Conspiracy theories and theorists abound, and the public remains unsatisfied.
Regrettably, this Report will not put the matter to rest. Even
after additional investigative work, no additional evidence may come
to light on the ultimate question of why President Kennedy was
assassinated.

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