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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

II. BACKGROUND FOR THE WARREN COMMISSION INVESTIGATION: CUBA AND THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
In assessing the perforlllance of the intelligence agl'ncil's in inYl'stigating
Pn'sident .John F. KelllH'dy's assassination, one of the focuses
of tIll' Sl'll'ct Committee's inYf'stigation \\'as whether the vVaJ'l'en COIllmission
was supplied all thl' information 1H'.cessaJ·y to conduct the
"t.horough and inde)wndent inn>stigation of till' eircumstances surrounding
the assassination" which President .rohnson had ordered. At
the outset of its im'estigation, tlw Select Committee had eyideJ1Ce that
the 'Varren Commission was not giwn information about CIA attempts
to assassinate foreign leade.rs. As the. Select Committpp lateJ'
discO\'cred, the 'VarI'('n Commission was also 1lila wal'(' of t.he full extp,
nt of the agpncies' inyolwnwnt in operations directed against Cuba.
This section of the rep0J't summarizes aspects of thog(> operations
relevant to the "'arren Commission's inyestigation.
On New Ypar's Day. HliiD, Fidel Castro's forcps oyprthrew the
Batista regime and assumed control of tlIP government of Cuba after
a long reyolutionary struggle which had recpived support from many
within the l'nited St.ates. Tlw SUhSN]Uent actions of the Cuban Govel"
llment. particularly its mon~ tmyar(l Communislll and alignment
\\·ith the, Soviet rnion, gradually prodllced forces strongly opposed to
Castro-forces whieh wanted :his gOYl'l"llment out of Culm..
Reports which the Select Committee has obtained from the intelligenee
agencies document tlIP varying interests ontside Cuba which
opposed Castro. PeJ'haps foremost in the opposition to Castro weI'(>
the thousands of Cubans who had fkd Cnha after his takeover. The
Cuban exiles in the rnited States formed a variety of organizations
to "oice their opposition to Castro. Some of these organizations not
only voiced opposition, but also planned and execnted paramilitary
operations to harass thc Castro governmcnt.
Many Americans olltside the Cuban exile eOJlllHunity oPpoSPfl the
Castro regime. To tlJPm. the Castro govcrnJllent represented a majOl'
move by the Soviet Fnion to spread Communism into the "Testei'll
Hemisphere. To these people. halting Castro meant halting
Communism.
Other less idpalistic interests ""l're also oppospd to Castro. His communist
goyernment had expropriated the property of foreign Imsinpsses
and Cubans \Yho had fh'd Cuba. Remoyal of the CastJ'O gon>rnment.
\Yas one \Yay to regain their lost businesses and pl'oIwrty. Other
busincss inten'sts opposed Castro because his control oyer tllP Cuban
economy had a majoJ' effect on their o,,"n operations.
(9)
10
Finally, cCItain underworld interests were opposed to Castro. Before
his takc over, Cuba had been very important to these interests,
but Castro had forced the underworld out. Removal of Castro likely
meant these interests could return to Cuba." .
In addition to this strong anti-Castro sentiment in the private sector,
the United States Government was pursuing a policy of opposition to
the Castro regime. The precise government policy varied during the
eurly 1960s as did the specific government action implementing that
policy. Both planning and implementation of the policy involved
almost all major departments of the Federal government, including
the intelligence agencies.
The intelligence agencie." had two primary responsibilities. All the
intelligence agencies collected information on Cuban, pro-Castro, and
anti-Castro activity. Their cDmbined efforts resulted in an extensive
inte'lligencc network in Cuba, in other Caribbean countries, and in the
United States, a network which reported on a wide range of matteI'S.
Second, the intelligence a.gencies, primarily the CIA, undertook covert
operations against Cuba. The techniques utilized in these covert operations
ranged from propaganda., to paramilitary action, and included
the outright invasion at the Ray of Pigs. These operations were conducted
not only throu~h individuals directly employed by the agencies,
but also through certain of the anti-Castro groups ostensibly independent
of the intellig-ence agencies.
Obviously, it is difficult to discover the deta~ls of any intelligence
operation, since intelligence operations were designed to prevent such
discovery. Except in a fmv instances, the Select Committee has not
attempted to unravel these operations, but has instead focllsed on the
general nature of the operations.
In 1961 the President was forced to admit publicly that the' Ray of
P~gs invasion was an operation sponsored by the CIA. In November
1961, after a period of reappraisal following the failure of the Ray of
Pigs invasion. another approach to the Cuba problem, Operation
;\fONGOOSE, was conceived. As described in more detail in the Selret
Committee's Report, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
1 Indeed. during the missile crisis. an FBI informant reported that "he believes
he could arrange to have Fidel Castro assassinated ... Underworld figures still
have chaunels inside Cuba through which the assassination of Castro could be
successfully arranged."
"He said that in the event the United States Government is interested
in haYing the attempt made. he would raise the necessary money and
would want nothing from the Government except the assurance that such
an undertaking would in no way adversely affect the national security.
He expressed confidence in his ability to accomplish this mission without
any additional contact with Government representatives and with a
minimum of contacts with private indh'iduals."
The Bureau reported this contact to the Attorney Gpneral and concluded:
The informant was told that his offer is outside our jurisdiction. which
he acknowledged. No commitments were made to him. At this time. we do
not VIan to further pursue the matter. Our relationship with him has
bCCll most carefully guarded and we would feel obligated to handle any
recontact of him concerning this matter if such is desired. (Memorandum
from Hoover to the Attorney Gpneral. 10/29/62.)
11
Leaders," MONGOOSE was to use Cuban exiles in operations designed
to foment an internal re\'olution in Cuba.2
The Soviet-U.S. confrontation during t'he Cuban missile crisis in
October 1962, ,vas a factor leading to another reappraisal of American
policy toward Cuba. This m"ulted in Operation MONGOOSE being
phased out and tlhe Special Group (Augmented) ordering It halt to
all sabotage operations.3
As the Assassination Report has detailed, from 1960 until 1962 the
Central Intelligence Agency met regularly with underworld figures
plotting the assassination of Fidel Castro. In early 1\)63, 'Villiam
Haney, the CIA's contact. to these underworld figures, told them the
CIA was no longer interested in assassinating Castro.4
After the missile crisis, CIA operations against Cuba apparently
decreased, while operations by Cuban exile groups on their own COIItinued.
On ~Iarch lEI, 1963, there was a reported atta~k on a Sm'iet
vessel off the northem coast of Cuba by members of two exile gl'OUpS,
Alpha 66. and the Second National Front of Escambray.5 TIH're was
another reported attack on a Soviet \'essel off t,he northem coast of
Cuba on the evening of Ma,reh 26-2i, 1963, by members of anothel'
anti-Castro group, Commandos L-6fi.6
This apparently caused considerable concel'll within the U.S. Govel'llment
that such activity by Cuban exile groups could produce a
confrontation with the Soviets.' One witness stated, "the whole apparatus
of govel'llment, Coast Guard, Customs, Immigmtion and Naturalization,
FBI, CIA, were working together to try to keep these
operations from going to Cuba." 8
These moves to restrict exile activities had an impact on New
Orleans at the time Lee Haney Oswald was living therc. As rcpOlied
2 "Alle~d Assassin'ation Plots Il1\'olving Foreign Leaders," 11/20/75, Iyp. 139148,
referred to hereinafter as the Assasl>illation Report.
The Committee has discovered since the issuance of its Assassination Report
that, in addition to the CIA and Department of DefenHe, the l<'BI was also conl>
nlted in l\I01'\GOOSE planning. In November 1961, the Bureau submitted its
own five-point program of action against Castro, advocating strong snpport of
l'ebpl acth'itr within Cuba. ()[pmorandnlll frolll Belmont to TolHon, 11/9/61.)
3 )[emorandnm for the record from General LanHdale, 10/30/62.
• The AHsassination Report discnssed at jpngth who knew of the CIA's aHsas,
Hination plots against Castro. So far as has !leen determined, knowledge of plots
iIn'olYing the underworld were known hy a number of gon>rnment officials ontside
the CIA. For exampll', l<'BI Director Hooyer prepared a memorandum datpd
:\Jar 10, 1962, in which he recounted a private meeting he had with the Attorn!'y
General that day. Hooyer noted:
::\1aheu had heen hired hy CIA to approaeh Giancana with a proposition
of paying $150,000 to hire some gunman to go into Cuba and kill Castro.
He further stated that CIA admitted having al>sisted ::\laheu in making
the bugging of Las Vegas.
A eopy of this mpmorandnm was disseminatPfI tn MessrS. TOlsnn, Belmont,
Sulliyan. and DeLoach.
;; :\1!'morandum from J\Iiami Field Office to }<'BI Headquarters, 3/29/63.
• :\Iemorandum from J. Edgar Hooyer to DirE"Ctor of Bureau of Intplligencp
and Research, Department of State, dated April 1, 1963. Subject: Anti-Castro
Actiyities in the United Stat!'s-Internal Spcnrity-Cnba-Xcntralitr Matters.
1 Section Chief testimony, :;/11/76, pp. 19-22.
R Chief, .DIWAYE testimony, 5/16/76, pp. 21. 22.
72-059 0 - 76 - 2
12
on page one of the New Orleans Times-Picayune on August 1, 1963,
the FBI seized more than a ton of dynamite, 20 bomb casings, napalm
material and other devices at a home in the New Orleans area on
July 31. Newspaper interest in the seizure continued with prominent
articles in the Times-Picayune on .'~ug-ust. 2 and Aug-ust 4. The ",Varren
Commission leamed that, on Augnst. 5, Oswald contacted a Cuban
eA~le in New Orleans, Carlos Bringuier, offering to help in training
anti-Cast.ro forces, Then on August 7, Oswald returned and left his
Marine Corps training manual for Bringuier. Two days later, Brin~
ier saw Oswald handing out pro-Castro literature, which resulted
III fight.ing· and their arrest. Oswald subsequently appe.an'd on a radio
debate with Bring-uier, again taking a pro-Castro position.9
Additional FBI reports provided to the Warren Commission detailed
other fads connected to this anti-Castro activitv in New Orleans
at the time of Oswald's contact with Bringuier. On' July 24, aocording
to FBI reports. ten Cuban exiles arrived in New Orleans from
Miami. These ten joined an existing group of exiles at a "training
camp" north of New Orleans, which was direded by the same individuals
who were ~nvolved in procuring the dynamite the FBI
seized. By late July, some 28 Cuban exiles were at the training camp,
allegedly awaiting transportation to Guatemala where they would
work fora lumber company.
Some of those who owned the land on which the Cuban exiles were
staying be,came concemed about the FBI interest. in the anti-Castro
activities and ordered them to leave. Carlos Rringuier was called upon
to assist in getting this group back to l\fiami.10
Although this was the extent of the ",Varren Commission investigation
of this incident, at least one FBI report, on the seizure of materials
which was not provided the 'Varren Commission, raises
additional questions about the purpose of Oswald's contact with
Bringuier. Inde~d, Bringuier himself believed Oswald W[lS attempting
to infiltrate the anti-Castro movement in order to report its
activities to pro-Oastro forces.u
A report of the Miami Office of the FBI revealed some of the information
the FBI had on this incident:
On June 14, 1963, information was received that a Ill'0up
of Cuban exiles had a plan to bomb the Shell refinery in Cuba.
On June 15, 1963, United States Customs Agents seized a
twin Beechcraft airplane on the outskirts of Miami, Florida,
along with a quantity of explosives. r...., ...., ....,"A" and ...., along with American
. , ..J were involved and detained, but not arrested. by the
United States Customs Agents. It was ascertained that r....Jsupplied the money and explosives for this operation.
[He1is well known as a former gambling concession operator
in Havana....
On July 19, 1963, r....J advised there was another plan to
bomb Cuba, using bomb casings and dynamite located on the
outskirts of New Orleans, Louisiana.
• Warren Report, pp. 407, 408.
10 Memorandum from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/15/64.
U Warren Report, Vol. X, pp. 43-45.
13
On July 31, 1963, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) at New Orleans, Louisiana, obtained a sea.rch warra.nt
and seized 2,400 pounds of dynamite and 20 bomb casings
near Lacombe, Louisiana. This material was located on the
property of [. . . .] brother of [. . . .], rofl Miami Bench
.... and former operator ofa casino in the Nacional Hotel,
Havana, Cuba.
Investigation determined that this dynamite was purchased
at Collinsville, Illinois, by ["B"] for "A", who was involved in
the June 14, 1963, seizures at Miami. "A" transported the
dynamite to New Orleans in a rented trailer. Also involved in
this bomb plot were . . . .
[....] a.dvised on June 14,1963, "B" of Collinsville, Illi·
nois, recently arrived in Miami, Florida, in a Ford station
wagon with a load of arms for sale. American adventurers
'and mercenaries, [....] and [....J took "B" around to
meet the different Cuban exile leaders in Miami...." 12
On another occasion, an intelligence agency conducted a sensitive
operation which developed information on tlhe location of arms caches
and tra.ining ca.mps in a.nother country. That informa.tion was given
to the other country, which then raided the camps and seized the materials.
Raids and seizures such as these apparently were commonplace
throughout the summer a.nd fall of 1963.13 Those individuals appa.rently
sponsoring- this activity were angoered by these raids and seizures.
Reports in the files of the intelligence agencies in mid-1963, document
a series of meetings among major leaders of the anti-Castro
movement.14 These reports indicate that some of these leaders claimed
the support of the United States Government.
Whether these were in fact related to decisions by the U.S. Government
is not known, but such meetings followed the June 1963 decision
of the Special Group to step up various covert operations designed
to encourage dissident groups inside Cuba, to worsen economic conditions
in the country, and to cause Cubans to doubt the ability of the
Castro regime to defend the countryY
Contemporaneously, the CIA took steps to renew its contact with a
high-level Cuban official code named AMLASH. The CIA's previous
contact with him had been sporadic; he had not been in direct contact
with the CIA since before the missile crisis of October 1962.
The exact purpose the CIA had for renewing contact is unknown,
but there is no evidence the CIA intended at this time to use AMLASH
in an assassination operation.
On August 16, 1963, the Chica:go Sun Times carried an article clwiming
that the CIA had dealings with an underworld fi~re, Sam
Giancana. This prompted Director McCone to ask tlhe Deputy Director
for Plans, Richard Helms, for a report about the article. McCone
testified that Helms gave him a memorandum on the CIA operation
12 Memorandum from Miami Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/3/63.
.. Intelligence officer's testimony, 5/10/64, pp. 21-24, 26.
"For example. memorandum from Miami Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/18/63, pp. 5-10.
'" Memorandum for the Special Group. 6/19/63.
14
involving Giancana and orally informed him that it involwd assassination
on August 16.16
Within weeks of Helms' report to the DCI, CIA case officers held
their first 1963 meeting with AMLASH. Although before this meeting
CIA's interest in AMLASH may have been to gain intelligence and
to cultivate him as an asset for covert operations, the case officers
learned that Al\fLASH was interested primarily in getting the United
St,ates to invade Cuba, or in attempting an "inside job" against Castro,
and that he wa." awaiting a U.S. plan of actionY This was communicated
to CIA Headquarters on September 7.
Late in the evening of September 7, Premier Castro held an impromptu,
three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel
Harker and in that interview warned against the United States "aiding
terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders." He stated, according
to Harker, United States leaders would be in danrrer if they helped in
any attempt to do away with leaders of Cuba. "'Ve are prepared to
fight them and answer in kind. United States leaders should think that
if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they
themselves will not be safe." He added: "Yet the CIA and other
dreamers believe their hopes of an insurrection or a successful guerrilla
war. They can go on dreaming forever." 18
Of course, discussions among Cuban exiles regarding the assassination
of Castro were common among the more militant Cuban exiles.
. . . "assassination" was part of the ambience of that time ...
nobody could be involved in Cuban operations without having
had some sort of a discussion at some time with some
Cuban who said ... the way to create a revolution is to
shoot Fidel and Raul ... so the fact that somebody would
talk about assassination just wasn't anything really out of
the ordinary at that time.19
One FBI report on a Cuban exile organization reported an exile group
meeting in August 1963. A military officer from a Latin American
country was there:
rHe1 acted tough, talking about assassinations and left no
doubt he is a military man. He offered training camps, military
equipment, and military bases from which Cuba could be
attacked. He spoke very derogatorily of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and explained that his proposed operations
had the sanction and support of top United States
military officials.20
10 A!':!':a!':sination Report, p. 107.
17 Characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation is di!':puted. The
A!':!':assination Report concluded this was an assassination operation. hut several
CTA official!': involved do not agree with this conclu!'iion. However, thl' CIA ca!':e
officer for this operation agreed that AMLASH himself helieved assassinlltion
was thl' first step of any coup in Cuba and the CTA met with him on that hasi!':.
18 This account of the interview appeared in the Miami Herald, p. lA. September
9. HI63. While other major newspapers carried the story, some did not include
Premier Castro's warning.
19 Chief. JMWAVE testimony, l'i/6/76. p. 35.
20 Memorandum from Miami Field Office to FBI HeadQuarters. R/19/63.
The Committee found no evidence to support such a claim of support by American
military officers.
15
Castro's September 7 statement could have been referring to information
he had received relating to such assassination plots hatched bv
exile leaders. In addition there were paramilitarv raids on Cuba b"
exile groups shortly before Castro's inteITiew.· However, Castrofs
warning about the safety of "U.S. leaders ... aiding terrorist plans
to eliminate Cuban leaders" suggests he was aware of some activity
attributable to the U.S. Government.21
At this time review and approval of covert operations against Cubn.
were the responsibility of the National Security Council's Special
Group, chaired by McGeorge Bundy. Responsibility for developing
covert action proposals was delegated to an Interagency Cuban Coordinating
Committee chaired by a Coordinator from the State
Department.22
On September 12, only three days after the A&<;ociated Press story
about Castro's September 7 warning to U.S. leaders was carried in
American newspapers, the Cuban Coordinating Committee met. The
purpose of this meeting, was to conduct a broad review of the U.S.
Government's Cuban contingency plans and to come up with an endorsement
or modification of the existing plans. Specifically the Committee,
according to this memorandum, unanimously agreed:
that there was a strong likelihood that Castro would retaliate
in some way against the rash of covert activity in Cuba. At the
same time, the Coordinator emphasized that it was his view
that any Castro retaliation will be at a low level and not along
a track which would precipitate a direct confrontation with
the United States.~3
The Coordinator, again according to this memorandum, referred to
the meeting as a "brainstorming" session. This memorandum listed
the possible retaliatory actions Cuba might undertake.
4. Actions against U.S. targets in Latin America employing
Castro allied forces.
(c) Increased attempts at kidnaping or attempts at assassination
of American officials or citizens. (Likely)
5. Actions against targets in the U.S.
(a) Sabotage or terrorist bombings. (Unlikely)
(b) Attcwks agairt8t V..S. officials. (Unlikely)
(c) Cuban controlled raids by unmarked boats or aircraft
in the Keys. (Unlikely)
(d) Jammings of U.S. radio stations. (Likely)24
'" The individual who was the CIA "point of record" for working with the
Warren Commission wrote in 1975 :
There can be no question from the facts surrounding the Castro appearance,
which had not been expected, and his agreement to the interview.
that this event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message
on the record in the United States. (CIA memorandum, 5/23/75.)
A CIA analyst on Cuban affairs reached a similar conclusion. (Briefing
of Select Committee staff. 1/7/76.)
.. Assassination Report, p. 170.
.. Memorandum for the Record, by DOD representative, 9/13/63. Subject:
Minutes of Cuban Coordinating Committee meeting held at Department of State,
1430 hours, 12 Sel,>tember 1963.
16
The memorandum concluded by noting the Coordinator had stated
that the State Depar1:ml'nt would proyide a list or the most significant
Castro actions on Friday, September 13, and expect comment by September
17 from the members. The next meeting was scheduled for
September 18.
On September 13, 1963, the Coordinator circulated a list of "those
possible retaliatory actions by Nle Cuban CTOyernment which we agreed
at our meeting of September 12 represent situations which han,
priority in a reyiew or our contingency planning." 25 The list of possible
actions included: "Actions against U.S. Ta.rgets in Latin America
Through Castro-Allied Forces ... Increased Attempts at Kidnapping
01' Attempts at Assassination or American Officials or
Cit;zens." It also includl'd a category "Actions Against Targets in the
U.S." '~Vhile the Committee dl'.cided at its Sl'ptl'mber 12 meeting that
sabotage or terrorist bombing was an unlikely action, that possibility
was included in the September 13 list. The possibility of "Attacks
Against U.S. Official" was not included in t,he September 13 list.
On September 27, 1963, the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs prepared
a memorandum listing assignments ror contingency papers relating to
possible retaliatory actions by the Castro regime?6 The Subcommittee
on Cuban Subversion was directed to submit papers on the possible
increased attempts at kidnapping or attempts at assassination of
American officials or citizens by October 4. The memorandum noted:
"This exercise will be part or the Subcommittee's study of measnres to
meet general intensification by Castro regime of subversiye efforts in
Latin America." 27
Possible attacks against U.S. officials in the United States was not
considered a likely contingency at the September 12 meeting and so
the September 27 memorandum gave no agency responsibility for that
contingency. 'Vith regard to "sabotage or terroristie bombings against
U.S. territory," the assignment "'as given to the .Justice representative
to "bring Coordinating Committee's views to the attention of the
FBI." 28
The available information indicates that the CIA Special Affairs
Staff which was responsible for Cuban operations, was, as an organizational
entity both plotting with A~ILASH and at the very same time
participating in this interagency rCYiew of contingency plans for possible
Cuban retaliation.29 Moreover, SAS as an organizational entity,
.. Ibid. (Emphasis added)
.. Memorandum to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban
Affairs, from Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, 9/13/63, re: Possible Retaliatory
Actions by Castro Government.
.. Memorandum to the Indepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs,
from Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, 9/27/63. Subject: Contingency Pap€r
Assignments re Possible Retaliatory Actions by Castro Government.
•, Ibid.
28 Ibid.
.. Beeause the Select Committee staff only reeently discovered the documents
discussed above, it has had no opportunity to question the persons who prepared
them or who attended these meetings. The Select Committee staff has requested
a number of agencies to provide photo copies of all documents on the Cuban
Coordinating Committee, including documents on the possibility of retaliation
and is awaiting a response from these agencies. The Committee staff has been
told informally that the CIA representatives on this Committee were from its
Special Affairs S~ff.
17
had knowledge that the interagency committee had concluded "Cuban
attack against U.S. officials within the United States" was an unlikE-Jy
response to the rash of covert activity in Cuba. Nevertheless, either
during or shortly after completion of the review of possible retaliatory
actions, SAS made the decision to escalate the level of CIA covert
adivity directoo against Cuba.
Meetings between CIA case officers and AMLASH continued after
this review.3D At one such meeting, AThILASH was told his proposal
(a coup. the first step of which was the assassination of Fidel Castro)
was under consideration at the "highest levels". The case offieer who
made this representation testified he only intended to refer to the
highest levels of the CIA.31
In response to this representation, AMLASH requested a personal
meeting with Robert Kennedy to obtain his assurance of U.S. support.
Instead, the CIA sent Desmond Fitzgerald, the senior CIA officer
who headed the Special Affairs Stuff, which was the CIA section
charged with responsibility for Cuban affairs, to meet AMLASH on
October 29, 1963.32
3<l The security of the AMLASH operation as of October 1963 was very dubious.
CIA files contain several reports in this time period which raise questions about
the security of the operation. The Chief of HAS Counterintelligence testified h('
always doubtffi the security of the operation.
Moreover. although the CIA did not inform the FBI about the AMLASH operation,
and in fact the code-name, AMLASH, was unknown to the FBI, the FBI
on October 10, 1963, received a report from an informant that a certain Cuban
official was meeting with the CIA. The Cuban official identififfi by his true name in
that report is in fact AMLASH. This report was not passed to the CIA, although
the fact the FBI had learned the CIA was meeting with Al\ILASH might have
prompted the CIA to scrutinize the security of the Al\ILASH operation.
31 AMLASH Case Officer, 2/11/76, p. 18.
32 Two CIA officials have testified they advised Fitzgerald not to meet per·
sonally with Al\ILASH. The Chief of .Jl\IWAVE Station testified:
My advice to [Fitzgerald] was that it \vould probably not be a good
idea for [Fitzgerald] to meet with [AMLASH] the only thing I
could see coming out of the contact would be that Fitzgerald would
get a feel for what makes some of these people tick and that probably
was too high a price to pay for the prospect if anything went wrong,
an individual as prominent in Washington, both within the Agency and
in the social world in Washington [as Fitzgerald] would be exposed in
the press. That would create a flap that I thought was not worth what
would be gained from the meeting.
(Chief, JMWAVE testimony, 8/19/75, p. 80; see also his testimony,
5/6/76, pp. 45-46.)
The Chief of Counterintelligence for the SAS testified he thought the operation
was "nonsense" and "counterproductive" and that AMLASH's "bona fides were
subject to question."
I disagreed basically with whole thrust of the AMLASH operation. My
disapproval of it was very strong. Des Fitzgerald knew it ... and preferred
not to discuss it anymore with me.
(Chief, SAS/CI testimony, 5/10/76, pp. 21-23.)
Howe\'er, the Executh'e Officer for Desmond Fitzgerald dismissed the possibility
that Fitzgerald's meeting with AMLASH exposed the CIA to possible
embarrassment becanse Fitzgerald had not used his real name and, therefore,
AMLASH would have been unahle to identify Fitzgerald as a CIA officer. (Executive
officer testimony, 4/22/76, p. 55.)
18
Fitzgerald used an alias and was introduced to A-:\ILASH as a "personal
reprepcntativc" of Attomey General Kennedv.33
.According to the case officer's' report on the October 29 meeting~
Fitzgerald told AMLASH that the United States was not prepared
to support an isolated uprising. According to this report, Fitzgerald
told A)ILASH that the 17nitcd States was prepared to provide support
only after a real coup had been effected, and th(' group involved
was in a position to request U.S. recognition and support. The memorandum
goes on to say:
Xothing of an operational nature was discussed at the Fitzgerald
meeting. After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that
he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to
know what technical support we could provide him.34
Whether AMLASH interpreted this.meeting as CIA endorsement
of his proposal to initiate the coup by assassination is not clear. 'Vhen
interviewed by the CIA Inspector General staff in 1967, Fitzgerald,
who is now dead, said that A)ILASH spoke of the need for an assassination
weapon, spl:'eificall~', a high-powered rifle with tell:'scopic
sights or some other weapon which could be used to assassinate Castro
from a distance, Fitzgerald said he rejected this request and ordered
the case officer, who served as interpreter, to tdl A~fLASHthe United
States simply did not do sneh things.35 Fitzgerald's executive officer,
who was not at the meeting but was fully briefed on tIll:', AMLASH
operation, also told the Inspector General staff that Fitzgerald had
rejected A)ILASH's request .36
Fitzgerald's recollection of this meeting is supported by a CIA
memorandum of a conversation with A~nVHIP, a Cuban exile who
had talked to AMLASH after this October 29 meeting. According
to that memorandum, the meeting satisfied A~ILASH as far as policy
was concerned:
but he was not at all happy with the fact that he stilI was
not given the technical assistance for the operational plan as
he saw it. He could not understand why he was denied certain
sman pieces of equipment which permitted a final solution to
the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. Government
gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their
ineffective excursions.37
Fitzgerald's recollection of the October 29 meeting conflicts with the
case officer's s,Yorn testimony before the Select Conimittee in 1975 and
1976. The case officer, who was also the interpreter for Fitzgerald~
33 The Committee found no evidence that the Attorney General authorized, or
was aware of this representation. Helms testified he did not seek the Attorney
General's approval because he thought it was "unnecessary." (Helms, 6/13/75,
pp. 117-118.)
.. Case officer's }\Ipmorandnm for Record, 11/13/63.
36 1967 Inspector General Report, p. 90.
36 Ibid. I
37 CIA Memorandum for the Record, 11/14/63.
19
testified that Fitzgerald gave assurances that the United States not
only would support the government which emerged after a suCC€ssful
coup, but also gave general assurances that the United States would
help in bringing about that COllp.37a The case officer testified that he
recalled no discussion of what specific support the CIA would give
and he did not recall Fitzgerald saying the U.S. would have no part
of assassination.
Q. Was it also dear that in some way or other Fitzgerald
was promising that support would be given for the planning
of a coup operation as you have said, which was not contingent
on whether the operation was successful or not?
A. That was implied, definitely, that support would be
given, and again, I repeat, AMLASH did interpret it that
way.37b
The case officer returned to Headquarters sometime in November.
By November 19, Fitzgerald had told the case officer that he was
authorized to tell AMLASH that the rifles, telescopic sights, and explosi\'£'~
s would be, provided. The case officer also waited at Headquarters
while a ballpoint pen was fashioned with a needle on it which
could be used to inject a lethal dose of poison. The pen proved difficult
to fashion and it was not ready until a few days before the November
22 meeting. The exact purpose the CIA had for offering AMLASH
the pen is discussed in detail in the As,<;assination Report.38
On November 19, AMLASH told a CIA officer that he planned to
return to Cuba immediately.38a On November 20, 1963, a CIA officer
telephoned AMLASH and asked him to postpone his return to Cuba
in order to attend a mceting on November 22. AMLASH asked if the
meeting would be interesting, and the CIA officer responded he did
not know whether it would be interesting but it was the meeting
AMLASH had requested.38b
At earlier meetings with the CIA, AMI..ASH had only received general
assurances of U.S. support for a coup plan and thus the November
20 telephone call was the first indication that he might receive the
specific support he requested. Of course, AMLASH could not have
known with certainty what support, i.e., weapons, he would receive
until November 22.
The case officer met with AMLASH on November 22,1963. At that
meeting, the case officer referred to the President's November Iii
speech in Miami as an indication that the President supported a coup,
That speech described the Ca.<;tro government as a "small band of
conspirators" wfiich formed a "barrier" which "once removed" would
37. Case officer's testimony, 7/29/75, pp. 77-80.
37. Case officer testimony, 7/29/75. pp. 79-80.
38 Assassination Report, pp. AA-89.
38. CIA cahIe to Headquarters, 11/19/63.
38. CIAcabIe to He'adquariters, 11/20/63.
20
ensure rnited States support for progressive goals in Cuba.39 The case
officer told AMLASH that Fitzgerald had helped 'Hite the speech.4o
The case officer also told A~ILASH that explosires and rifles with
telescopic sights 41 would be provided. The case officer showed AMLASH
the poison pen and suggested he could use the commercial
poison, Black Leaf-40 in it,42 The caSe officer cannot recall specifically
what happened to the poison pen; he does not belieYe AMLASH carried
it with him when he left the meeting. He docs recall that AMLASH
was dissatisfied with the device. As A~ILASH and the case
officer broke up their meeting, they were told the President had been
assassinated.
Two other events which occurred in the October-November 1963
timc pedod should be noted jn this discllssion of U.S.-Cuban relations.
The first is that talks between the Cuban delegate to the UN, La
Chuga, and a U.S. delegate, 'William Atwood, were, proposed by the
Cubans on September 5. Although there were discussions about the
location for such talks and Atwood's expressed U.S. interest, no concrete
plans for meetings were made. On November 2~, La Chuga inquired
again of Atwood about U.S. jnterest in talks.43
so Washin~ton Post, 11(19(63, p. A-15.
.. Case Officer testimony, 2(11(76.
The fact that the CIA intended President Kennedy's speech to serve as a
signal to dissident elements in Cuba that the U.S. would support a coup is confirmed
by a CIA paper, completed less than two weeks after Kennedy's assassination,
which suggested statements the Johnson administration could make
which would "stimulate anti-Castro action on the part of dissident elements in
the Cuban armed forces." The paper states that Cuban dissidents
must have solemn assurances from high level U.S. spokesmen, especially
the President, that the United States wiII exert its decisive influence
during and immediately after the coup....
Citing Kennedy's speech of November 18, 1963. the CIA paper concluded "... it
remains for President [.Johnson] and other admini~trlltion spokesmen to instill
a genuine sense of U.S. commitment to our efforts." (Memorandum for the DCI,
"Considerations for U.S. Policy Toward Cuba and Latin America," 12(9(63.)
41 The Chief of JMWAVE testified that although this operation often was
tasked to get weapons into Cuba. he could not recall heing tasked to get rifles
aud telescopic sights into Cuba. The documentary record reveals, however, that
the .JMWAVE station was tasked to supply the explosives. rifles, and telescopic
sights to AMLASH. The Chief of the JMWAYE station testified he did not recall
seeing the cable containing these instructions.
Q. Was it common to drop caches of rifles or telescopic sights for
agents?
A. I would not necessarily have known what was in each cache.
Q. Well, was it common ..., to your knowledge, to drop rifles with
telescopic sights?
A. Well. I think the thing that would he uncommon would be telescopic
sights. Many of our caches were weapons caches.... I think if
I were looking at a cache list and I saw a telescope on it matched up
with a Springfield '03 rifle. that probahly would have struck me as being
unusual. hut I did not see the inventories of all the caches.
(Chief..JMWAVE testimony, 5(6(76, pp. 47-48.)
" Assassination Report. p. 89; Case Officer testimony, 2(11/76. p. 46.
'" Assassination Report, pp. 173-174; William Atwood testimony, 7(10(75, p. 9.
21
Second, the French reporter, Jean Daniel, had a brief interview
with President Kennedy on October 24, before setting off on an assignment
in Cuba. At that meeting the President expressed his feeling
that Castro had betrayed the revolution."
Daniel travelled to Cuba but got no hint of a similar meeting with
Castro. Then on November 19, the day after the President's speech in
Miami, Castro contacted Daniel and spent six hours talking to him
about U.S.-Cuban relations. Daniel again met Castro on November 22,
spending most of the day with him. Daniel's report of this meeting,
"When Castro Heard t!he News," describes Castro's reaction to word
of the assassination. After word that President .rohnson had been
sworn in reached Castro, he asked: "What authority does he exercise
over the CIA1" 45
.. Daniel, "Unofficial Envoy; A Historic Report from Two Capitals," New Republic,
12/14/63.
.. Daniel, "When Castro Heard the News," New Republic, 12/7/63.

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