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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

III. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO
THE ASSASSINATION: NOVEMBER 22, 1963 TO JANUARY
1, 1964
This section of the Report discusses the performance of the FBI
and the CIA during the weeks immediately following the assassination
of President John F. Kennedy.
The performance of these agencies should not be evaluated in isolation.
Senior government officials. both within the agencies and outside
~hem, wanted the investigation completed promptly and all
conspIracy Tumors dispelled. For example, only three davs after the
assassination, Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzelibach wrote
Presidential Assistalit Bill Moyers:
It is important that all of the facts surrounding President
Kennedy's assassination be made public in a way which will
satisfy people in the United States and abroad that all the
facts have been told and that a statement to this effect be
made now.
1. The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the
'assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at
large; and that the evidence was such that he would have
been convicted at trial.
2. Speculation about Oswald's motivation ought to be cut
off', and we should have some basis for rebutting thought that
this was a Communist conspiracy or (as the Iron Curtain
press is saying) a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the
Communists.l
On November 29, 1963, President Johnson told Director Hoover
that, although he wanted to "get by" on just the FBI report, the only
way to stop the "rash of investigations" was to appoiiIt a high-level
committee to evaluate that reporCZ On December 9, 1963. Deputy Attorney
General Katzenbach wrote each member of the 'Warren Commission
recommending that the Commission immediately issue a press
release stating that the FBI report clearly showed there was no
international conspiracy, and that Oswald was a loner.3
A. The OIA Response
This section deals with the CIA's immediate response in investigating
the assas..<;ination. It discusses what information the CIA received
alleging Cuban involvement in the assassination, and the steps taken
by the Agency to investigate those allegations.
1 Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Bill Moyers, 11/26/63.
• Memorandum from Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, SnlliYun, DeLoach,
and Rosen, 11/29/63.
3 Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 12/12/63. No RIlCh releuRe "-UR iRsue<1.
(23)
24
Since Oswald had come to the attention of the CIA in October and
November 1963, the Agency needed no orders to begin an investigation
of the assassination. On November 8, the CIA received an FBI report
dated October 31, 1963, discussing the Bureau's investigation of
Oswald's activities in New Orleans. On Kovember 15, that report was
forwarded to SAS Counterintelligence, the CIA section specializing
in Cuban affairs. The routing slip on the report indicat~s it was sent
to the Count~rintelligenceDivision of the CIA on Xovember 22.4 The
Chief of SAS Counterintelligence recalled that immediately after the
assassination, Diredor McCone request~d all Agency ni.aterial on
Oswald. The Chief testified that he probably reported seeing a recent
FBI report on Oswald, but he could not remember whether SAS
had routed the repOIt to the Counterintelligence Division before or
after the assassination.5
The CIA ~Iexico Station also realized that Lee Harvey Oswald had
come to its attention in early October and cabled CIA Headquarters
at 5:00 p.m. on the afternoon of the assassination.6 Other CIA stations
and overseas elements of the Stat~ Department and Defense Department
soon began reporting any information they received which might
be relevant to the assassination.
For the first twenty-four hours after the assassination, the CIA's
attention focused primarily on Oswald's September 27, 1963, visit
to Mexico City. CIA Headquarters wanted all relevant information
developed by its Mexico Station in order to begin its analysis of the
information. On the morning of November 23, Director ~IcCone met
with President .Johnson and his national security advisor, McGeorge
Bundy, to brief them on the information CIA Headquarters had
receiv'ed from its Mexico Station. McCone's memorandum for the
record of that meeting contains the essential information extracted
from the Mexico Station's cable which had been received by that
time.1
According to the 1967 Inspector General Report, CIA Headquarters
cabled the AMLASH case officer on the morning of November 23,
and ordered him to break contact with AMLASH due to the President's
'assassination and to return to Headquarters.s Neither those
who prepared the I.G. Report, nor currellt CIA officials could locate
a copy of tha,t cable. The case officer testified he recalled receiving such
a cable, but could not recall whether it made specific mentiion of the
President's assassination as the reason for breaking contact with
AMLASH and returning.9 He did connect that, cable's instructions
with the assassination.~o
• Moreover, on September 16. 1963. the CIA had asked the FBI to obtain information
on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee which the A~ency could use in a
propaganda camoaign. In acquiring the information, the FBI obtained a copy
of one of Oswald's letters to FPCC headquarters.
• Chief, SAS/CI, 5/10/76, pp. 6-7.
e All times have been converted to Eastern Standard Time. The assassination
occurred at 1 :30 E.S.T.
7 On March 8, 1976, Walter Elder, 001 McCone's execl1tiye officer g-ave the
Committee staff access to Mr. McCone's calendar and memoranda from this time
period. The following discussion is based, in part, on these records.
• I.G. Report, p. 94.
e Case Officer, 2/11/76, p. 53.
10 Ibid.
25
That same morning. CIA personnel on the Counterintelligence staff
who wem responsible for Soviet. intclligence prepared a memorandum
sug~estin~ the possibility that Oswald's contacts in :Mexico City with
Soviet personncl mi~ht hnve sinister implications." Thr memorandum
also stated that the essrntial information was transmitted to the agency's
FBI liaison by telephone at 10 ;;10 a.m. that morning.
Sometime on November 2:3. Deputy Diredor for Plans Richard
Helms called a merting to outline responsibility for thr CIA investigation
of the assassination. At that merting Hrlms informed his
Deputy. Thomas Karamessinrs, and Chid of Connterintrlligence
.Tamrs Angleton, that a desk officc!> in the 'Yestern Hrmisphrl'e Division
would be in charge of the CIA inn>stigation. This desk officrl'
had professional expertise in conducting counterintelligence im'estigahans
for the Agency. Helms instructed Karamessines and Angleton
to provide t,he desk officer full cooperation and aocess to all information
he requestec1Y Karamessinrs testified he rould not recall the desk
officer being assigned responsibility for the inwstigationY
At [) :00 p.m. CIA Hradfjuarlers rrceived a cable from the Mexico
Station stating that the Mexican police were going to arrest Syh'ia
Duran, a Mexican national employed by the Cuban consulate who was
believed to have talked to Oswald when he visit(>c1 the consulate in
SeptemberY Headquarters personnel telephoned the Mexico Station
and asked them to stop the planned arrest.15 The Mexico Station said
that the arrest could not be stopped.16
After learning the arrest could not bc prevented, Karamessines
cablrd the Mexico Station that the arrest "could jeopardize U.S. freedom
of action on the whole question of Cuban responsibility." 17 The
(lr,'ik officer could not recall that cable or explain the reasons for transmitting
such a message.18 Karamessines could not recall preparing the
cable or his reasons lor issuing such a message. He speculated that
the CIA feared the Cuhans were responsible, and that Duran mig-ht
rereal this during an interrogation. He furtlher speoulaJted that if
Duran did possess such information, the CIA and the U.S. Government
would need time to react before it came to the attention of the
public,!9
Later that evening, the A~ILASH case officer aITired in 'Yashington.
The case officrr cannot recall whether he reported to Headquarters
that evening but he was in his office the next morning, Sunday, Novem-
Ji Memorandum from cr staff to the Director, 11/23/63. The thesis of the
memorandum was disproved by later investigation; however, it reflects thE' fact.
that at lffist some officials in the CIA were concerned with the possibilitJ' of a
conspiracy.
:I2Western Hemisphere Division Desk Officer, 5/7/76, p. 7. (Referred to hereinafter
as the Desk Officer. )
13 Karamessines, 4/18/76, p. 10.
t< Memorandum for the Record by Desk Officer, 11/23/63.
13 Administrative Sheet, Mexico Station Cable, 11/23/63.
1< Memorandum for the Record by Desk Officer, 11/23/63.
17 CIA Cable from CIA Headquarters to Mexico Station, 11/23/63.
Ul Desk Officer, 5/7/76, p. 52.
111 Karamessines, 4/18/76, pp. 26-27.
26
bel' 24. 20 Early that morning, tllP 24th the )Iexico Station ('abled its response
to a Headquarters request for the names of all knmyn contacts
of certain Soyiet lwrsonnel in )Iexico City. The pnrpose of obtaining
these names was to determine the significance of Oswald's contact
with the Soyiets and to assess their actiyities. A)IL.ASH's real name
was included in tIl(' list of names all the )Irxico Station cable.21
Karamessines mlS asked what would have been done ,yith this cablr.
Q. The message reporting back on this gan' all contacts,
known contacts that these individuals had in )Iexico City.
And ,yhat is the next step in your process! ,.
A. You check these names out to see whether your files gin
any e"idence of suspicious actiyity.•\nd if they don't, jf they
simply don't indicate any suspicious acti,-ity, that ,Yould be
the end of it. If it does indicate suspicious activity. then you
would fo11ow from there. and yon would pass this infonllation
on to other interested paliies ,yithin the Agency or ,yithin
the Goyernment. and vou would carrv on from there and investigate
further.' .
Q. That is the point I am getting to . . . Is it routine
standard operating procedure to check the CI [counterintelligence]
file on that named individual?
A. Yes, unless the desk officer that receins it happens to
know who that fellow is and doesn't han to check. And that
happens quite frequently.22
The Executin Officer in the Special Affairs Section ,vas asked what
would happen if those at the CIA investigating tlhe assassination had
requested a name trace on AMLASH.
A. The name trace ,yould have given whatever we knew
about the individual except our operational contacts with him.
It would be biographic information.
Q. 'Well, if the Counterintelligence Diyision asked for
information on A~ILASH. even if thev were furnished biographical
information. it would not coittain the fact that he
was involved in some assassination plot.
A. That's correct. That would normally go to the case officer
concerned, who ,,"ould be alerted by the name tracers that
somebody had asked for A'!\fLASH.
Q. Alid what would the case officer have done in that case?
A. 'VeIl. in this case Pm sure he would have gone and talked
to Mr. Fitzrrerald about it. .
Q. Do you know whether the case officer did?
A. I don't know. no.
Q. So in other words. the fact that the CIA. was involved
with AMLASH ... would normally have been kept from
the CL counterintelligence investigators.
A. It would have been held back from the ordinarv case
officer. yes. "7betherit would have been held back from the
20 Al\IT,ASH Case Officer, 2/11/76, pp. 54-55. (Referred to hereinafter as the
Case Officer. )
21 Cable from )Iexico Station to CIA Headquarters, 11/24/63.
'" Karamessines, 4/18/76, PP. 24-25.
27
men in charf!e. I don't know. That would haye been up to the
Chief of SAS. in this case. Fitzf!erald and the DDP.~3
Thus, early in the morning of Xo\'ember 24-, the CLt officials
inyestigating the assassination had come across A)IL~tSH's name.
Had routine procedure been followed. that name would haye been
checked in Agency £1les.24 Operational information. i.e., details of
CIA plots ,,"'ith A)ILASH to assassinate Castro. would not have been
routinely provided. The decision to proyide such information would
haye been made by Fitzgerald or Helms. The A)ILASH Case OfficBr
can recall no discussion about connections between A)ILASH and the
assassination of President Kennedv.25
CIA files on its investigation of the President's assassination contain
no c\'idence that such infonnation was pl'o\'ided. The Desk Officer
who coordinated the CIA investigation of the assassination testified
he was not then aware of any assassination plots and certainly was
not then aware of the ..:DILASH plot.
Q. Did you know that on Xowmber 22, 1963, about the
time Kennedy was assassinated. a CIA case officer was passing
a poison pen, offering a poison pen to a high-IHel Cuban
to use to assassinate Oastro ? -
A. No. I did not.
Q. 'Vould you have drawn a link in your mind between
that and the Kennedv assassination?
A. I certainly thi'nk that that \vould have become an absolutely
vital factor in 'analyzing the events surrounding
the Kennedyassassination.26
On November 24, at 10 a.m., Director McCone met with the Presideht
and briefed him about CIA operational plans against Cuba. That
hriefing could not have included a discussion of AMLASH since
)IcCone testified that he was not aware of the AMLASH assassination
effort.27
On November 25 at 12 :00 p.m., the ~fexico Station dispatched a
cable reminding Headquarters of Castro's September 7, 1963, statement
threatening U.S. leaders.28
The Case Officer's "contact report" on the NoYembel' 22 meeting
with A)ILASH bears the date November 25. He testified it was probably
prepared on either XQ\'ember 24 or 25.29 The report does not note
that the poison pen was offered to A~ILASH although it does state
that AMLASH ,,'as told he would receive explosives and rifles with
telescopic sights. The Case Officer testified fhe> contact report does
not discuss the poison pen because Fitzgerald ordered him to omit
that matter.30 He probably showed the report to Fitzgerald on thc
23 Executive Officer. 5/10/76. pp. 36-37.
'" No document in the A~ILASH file mentioned the poison pen. so even access
to his file would not have given a person knowledge of this key fact.
"" Case Officer. 2/11/76. pp, 59, 60.
.. Desk Officer, 5/7/76. pp. 31, 32.
.., McCone testimony. 6/6/76, p. 59.
28 Cable from Mexico Station to CIA Headquarters, 11/25/63.
"" Case Officer, 2/11/76, p. 61.
.. Ibid., p. 65.
'l2 -059 0 - 76 - 3
28
same day, but recalls no discussion with Fitzgerald about a possible
connection between the A~ILASHoperation and President Kennedy's
assassinaJion.R1 The Case Officer also stated that thf're was no reason to
make such a connection and he cf'l"tainly made no such cOl1lwction in
his mind.32 ,Vhen asked whv he did not associate President Kennedy's
assassination by a pro-Casti·o activist with his own involvement in the
AMLASH operation, the Case Officer stated he does not know to this
day that Oswald had any pro-Castro leanings."
The case officer said he was reassigned sllOl·tly after returning to
Headquarters. He testified that he was never involved in discussions
at the CIA about possible connections between his November 22 meeting
with AMLASH and President Kennedy's assassill'ation.34
At noon on November 25, "D," a Latin American, appeared at the
American Embassy in ·Mexico City.35 He told Embassy personnel that
he was in the Cuban consulate on September 17 and saw Cubans
who discussed assassination pay Os\vald a sum of money. He later
repeated his story to the CIA Mex·ico Station Chief. The CIA and
the ,Vanen Commis..sion later concluded that the story was a fabrieation,
but the Agency was clf'arly eoncerned with "D's" story at the
time,36
On the evening of November 25. a senior American Embassy official
in Mexico City informed a senior ~rcxican government offieial of the
known facts about Oswald's visit to Mexico Citv.31 This memorandum
eone1udes by posing questions designed to deteI:mine whether Oswald's
visit to Mexico City was part of a pre-conceived plan to assassinate
the President and whether the Cubans \wrf' involved in sueh a plan.
On November 26, Director ~rcCone aga,in met with President
.Tohnson, who told him that the FBI had responsibility for investigating
the President's death and direeted him to make CIA resour.ces
available to assist the Burf>an. Tlw Desk Officer testified that there
was a feeling in the CIA that the Bureau may have been derelict in
its handling of Oswald before the assassination, and that the CIA
investigative efforts should be as independent as possible of tJhe
FBI's.38
Later in that day, the Mf'xico Station cabled Hpadquarters on the
details of its intf'lTogation of "D".39 It also reported other information
from a sensitive and rpliahle source which tended to confirm "D's"
story that Oswald may have been paid by the Cubans to assassinate
President Kennedy. This report, has never been satisfactorily explained,
although it was made available to the ,Varren Commission
31 Case Officer, 7/29/75, pp. 115-116; Case Officer, 2/11/76, pp. 59-60.
B2 Case Officer, 7/29/75, pp. 115-116.
.. Case Officer, 2/11/76. p. 91.
.. Case Officer. 7/29/75, p. 115; Case Officer. 2/11/76, p. 76.
3S This incident is discnssf'd in the 'Varren Report, pp. 308, 309; Cable from
Mexico Station to CIA Headquarters. 11/25/63.
3. "D" later admitted that the story abont Oswald had been fabricated. (Cable
from l\If'xico City to CIA Headqnarters. 11/30/63.) It had also bl'en determinl'd
hy the FBI that Oswald probably was in Xew Orleans on September 17. (Cable
from CIA Headquartl'rs to Mexico Station, 11/28/63.)
37l\1emorandnm. 11/25/63.
38 Dl'sk officer. 5/7/76. pp. 62, 63.
30 Cable from Mexico Station to CIA Headquarters, 11/26/63.
29
stafl'. In any event, these reports certainly must have fueled suspicions
of Cuban involvement in the assassination. Based on the evidence it
reviewed, the WTarren Commission later determined that "D's" story
was a fabrication.
The American Ambassador in Mexico later sent a cable to the State
Department through CIA channels. In that cable he gave his opinion
that the Cubans were involved in the assassination, and recommended
certain investigative steps which should be taken in Mexico.40
On the same day, a cable listing DDP Helms as the releasing officer
was dispatched to CIA stations in Europe and Canada. This cable
stated that stations should carefully examine material obtained from
a specified sensitive and reliable source, "because of obvious significance
of any scrap information which bears on [the] assassination
issue." 41 The Desk Officer in charge of the CIA investigation was
unaware that such a message had been sent out and was at the time
unaware of the sensitive and reliable source mentioned.42
On November 27, a European Station cabled information to Headquarters
which had been obtained through the use of this sensitive and
reliable source. That information indicated that AMLASH was indiscreet
in his conversations.43 This cable does not reference anv Headquarters'
cable, as station cables often do, but, since it reports information
obtained through the use of the sensitive and reliable source
which had been specified in the November 26 cable which Helms released,
it appears likely that it was indeed a response to the Helms
request. The cable from the European Station was placed in the
AMLASH file but was not disseminated to those investigating the
assassination.
By November 27, the Mexico Station and CIA Headquarters were
also beginning to question the 'accuracy of "D's" story. The cables
between the Mexico Station and Headquarters indicate the possibility
that the story was a fabrication. Nevertheless, on November 28, Headquarters
cabled a reminder to the Mexico Station to "follow allleads."
The Station was instructed to continue investigating the possibility
or Cuban or Soviet involvement, because Headquarters had not excluded
the possibility that other persons were involved with Oswald.44
Later that day Headquarters learned that Mexican authorities
planned to arrest Sylvia Duran again and warned the station that
the Mexicans must take responsibility for the arrest. After learning
that the U.S. Ambassador was cant,inuing to press for a vigorous
investigation into Cuban inVOlvement, Headquarters also warned
the Station Chief that the Ambassador was pushing the case too hard
and his proposals could lead to a "flap" with the Cubans.46 Finally,
the Agency concluded that "D's" story was a fabrication and terminated
its interest in him.41
O. Cable from Mexico Station to CIA Headquarters, 11/26/63.
"Cable from CIA Headquarters to various European and Canadian stations,
11/26/63. Precise text of this cable paraphrased to protect sensitive intelligence
sources and methods.
.. Desk Officer, 5/7/76, pp. 27-28.
43 Cable from European station to CIA Headquarters,l1/27/63.
.. A cable from CIA Headquarters to Mexico Station, 11/28/63.
.. Ibid.,-11/28/63.
.. Ibid.
30
On Kovember 30, Director ~fcConemet with the President at 11 a.m.
The meeting lasted for an hour and a half. McCone's memorandum
for record states that the President "again" raised the question of
Cuba and that McCone pointed out speeches made by President Kennedy
on September 5, September 13, and November 20, 1962.48 The
memorandum also refers to a discussion of a Cuban arms cache which
had been discovered in Venezuela. "While there was a discussion of the
allegations made by "D" the memorandum records no action was
required on the "Oswa.ld situation." 49
On December 1, McCone met with the President and Bundy. McCone's
memorandum of the meeting indicates they again discussed
"D's" story. Later that day, Headquarters cabled the Mexico Station
and stated that the "White House had been told the story was a
fabrication.
Headquarters a.lso informed the Station that it had received information
f"rom a sensitive source that a Cubana airlines flight to Havana
had been delayed in "Mexico City from 6 p.m. until 11 p.m. E.S.T. on
the day of the assassination, to await an unidentified passenger who
arrived in a twin-engine aircraft and boarded the Cubana aircraft
without goin~ through customs.5
0 According to the CIA information,
the unidentified passenger rode in the cockpit on the flight to Havana.
This cable was found in the Mexico Station file, but the Agency has no
record of any follow-up action on the repor1.51 The FAA was contacted
by the Select Committee staff in order to determine the origins of the
twin-engine aircraft, but indicated it would have no records, such as
flight plans, from that time period.
On December 2, ~fcCone met with the President and Bundy at
10 a.m. Later that day, the Mexico Station reported it had reason to
doubt its earlier conclusion that "D" was fabricating. At 3 p.m.
that afternoon, Director McCone's calendar reveals he attended a
meeting on Cuba in the CIA conference room.
On December 3, CIA Headquarters first received information from
the Mexico Station on a Cuban-American. According to Pa..ssport
Office records, his file there was checked on December 4 by a representative
of the CIA. This CIA representative testified that he could
not recall such a check or the report.52
The CIA received its first report from a Cuban agent on December
4. This agent reported that he believed he had met Oswald in
Cuba, Mexico or the United States, since his face sermed familiar.
He also reiterated his belief that the Cuban government employed
assassins and had carried out at least one assassination in Mexico.53
On December 5, the Mexico Station cabled that a source saw the
Cuban-American board a flight from Mexico City to Havana reported
that he "looked suspicious." It also reported what was then
known about his itinerary.54 On December 8, CIA Headquarters cabled
.. Memorandum for the Record by Director McCone, 12/2/63.
.. Ibid.
50 Cable from CIA Headquarters to Mexico Rtation, 12/1/63.
G1 J.l'tter from CIA to Senate Sl'le<'t Committee, 2/4/76.
62 CIA Liaison Offil'er testimony, 5/7/76, p. 9.
53 Cahle from Mexico Station to CIA Headquarters. 12/4/63.
54 CIA Cable from Mexico to Headquarters, 12/5763.
31
its Florida Station ordering it to halt two planned operations against
Cuba pending a high-level policy review.55 One of these operations
was the delivery of rifles, telescopic sights, and explosives to
AMLASH.
A December 9 memorandum to Director McCone discusses U.S.
operations against Cuba. Although the memorandum did mention a
plot for a coup in Cuba, it does not refer to the Al\fLASH operation.
It noted that:
... These non-Communist anti-Castro dissident Cubans
... assert that they must have solemn assurances from high
level U.S. spokesman, especia]]y the President, that the
United States will exert its decisive influence during and
immediately aIter the coup to prevent their personal liquidation
and a political regression.
2. CIA has attempted in a general and very limited manner
to provide these assurances, but it remains for the President
and other Administration spokesman to instill a genuine
sense of U.S. commitment to our efforts.56
On December 10, Director ~fcCone met with CIA staff in the
Agency conference room at noon to discuss Cuba. On December 12
the Mexico Station reported that the FBI was attempting to complete
the Mexico 'aspects of the case.57
The desk officer in charge of the investigation reca]]ed sometime
in the latter part of December he completed and submitted a brief
report on his ,investigation ,,-hich was then taken to the President.58
After he prepared the report, he was given an opportunity to review
the FBI report on its part of the investigation. The desk officer testified
that in revie\ving the Bureau's report he, learned many ne,w facts
which he felt were significant but which had not been knmm to him
during his investigation.59 As an example, he testified that until reading
the FBI report, he had not known that Oswald a]]egedly shot at
General Walker in April 1963.60
The desk officer recalled a meeting in late, December 1963 with
Helms, Karamessines, Angleton and others where the CIA report was
discus..sed. According to the desk officer, Angleton suggested that his
own Counterintelligence Division take over the investigation and
Helms acceded to this suggestion.61 According to one of Angleton's subordinates,
he did not become involved with the investigation until
,January 23, 1964. whpn the 'Varren Commission began requesting information
from the CIA. at which time Angleton designated him the
"point of record" for a]] matters related to the assassination and the
'Varren Commission.62
Ii:; Cable from CIA Headquartl'rs to JMWAVEStation, 12/R/63.
.. Memornndum for the DCI, "Policy Considerations for Cuba and Latin
America," 12/9/63.
&7 Cable from Mexico Station to CIA Headquarters, 12/12/63.
58 Desk Officer, 5/7/76, pp. 6---9.
Gll Ibid.
00 Ibid.
61 Desk Officer, 5/7/76, pp. 60, 61.
Mr. Karamessines could recall no meetings on the structure of the CIA's
iIlYestigatiou. (Karamessines, 4/18/76, p. 41.)
62 Staff summary of interview of CIA analyst, 3/15/76.
32
B. The FBI Response
The FBI investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy
was a massive effort. Literally thousands of leads were followed in the
field by hundreds of agents, many of whom worked around the clock
during the days immediately following the assassination. The FBI
files produced by this investigation are in excess of five hundred and
ninety volumes.
Two divisions at FBI headquarters supervised the assassination
investigation. Because the Bureau's jurisdiction was originally predicated
upon statutes which made it a crime to assault a Federal officer,
primary responsibility for the investigation was assumed by the General
Investigative Division, "'hich regularly supervised those kinds
of criminal investigations. Certain respoILsibilities for the investigation
were assumed by the Domestic Intelligence Division which had
conducted a se~urity investigation of Oswald in connection with his
trip to the Soviet Union and activities on behalf of the Fair Play for
Cuba Committee.
Although the Domestic Intelligence Division did participate in the
Bureau's inquiry, the case was handled primarily as a traditional
criminal inwstigation. Lee Harvey Oswald was charged with the
murder of the President and, as the identified subject of a criminal
case, became the focus of the Bureau's investigation. The investigation
collected evidence on Oswald's background, activities, and contacts,
and specific data relative to the act of the assassination itself.
The investigation thus relied heavily upon interviews of eyewitnesses,
analyses of phvsical evidence, and ballistic tests. The Committee has
found no evidence that the Bureau ever conducted a wide-ranging
investigation which explored larger questions, such as possible foreign
involvement in the assassination.
1. The 11l1.·estigaHre Attitude of Senior FBI Officials
Almost immediatelv after the assassination, Director Hoover, the
.Tustice Department 'and the ·Wbite House "exerted pressure" on
senior Bureau officials to complete their investigation and issue a
factual report supporting the conclusion that Oswald was the lone
assassin. Thus, it is not suprising that. from its inception, the assassination
investigation focused almost exclusively on Lee Harvey
Oswald.
On November 23. 1963, .r. Edgar Hoover forwarded an FBI memorandum
to President .Tohnson which detailed the results of the Bureau's
preliminary "inquiry into the 'fissassination" and "background
information rl'lative to Lee Harvev Oswald." 63 The ml'morandum
stated that "state complaints were filed on November 22, 196:3, charging
Oswald with the murder of President Kennedy" and detailed
evidence ,,-hich indicated that Oswald had indeed assassinated the
President. Although the ml'morandum did not inform Pres.ident
.Tohnson that the FBI had an open securitv case on Oswald at the
time or the assassination. it did provide it limited description or
Oswald's background. including his visit to the Soviet Ullion and
activities for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.64
"" Letter from Hoover to President Johnson, 11/23/63, with attachment.
.. Ibid.
33
In a telephone eonwrsation with 1Vhite House Aide 1VaIter Jenkins
immediately following Os,,-ald's murder, Director Hom-er stated:
The thin!! I am most concerned about, and so is )11'. Katzenbach,
is haying something issued so ,,-e can cOlwince the
public that Oswald is the real assassin.65
The pressure to issue a report that would establish Oswald as the lone
assassin is reflected in internal Bureau memoranda. On NOYember 24,
1963, Assistant FBI Director Alan Belmont informed Associate FBI
Director Clyde Tolson that he was sending two Headquarters supervisors
to Dallas to review
the written interview and investigative findings of our agents
on the Oswald matter, so that we can prepare a memorandum
to the Attorney General ... [setting] out the evidence
showing that Oswald is responsible for the shooting that
killed the President.66
On Noyember 26, 1963, J. Edgar Hoover spoke with Deputy Attorney
General Katzenbach. According to Alan Belmont, Hoover
relayed:
Katzenbach's feeling that this [FBI] report should include
everything which may raise a question in the mind of the
public or press regarding this matter.
In other words, this report is to settle the dust, insofar as
Oswald and hi.~ activities are concerned, both from the standpoint
that he is the man who assassinated the President, and
relative to Oswald himself and his activities and background.
67 [Emphasis added.]
The next day, Belmont responded.
Relative to the Director's question as to how long we estimate
the investigation in this matter will t'ake, we plan to
have the report on this matter, and on the Jack Ruby matter,
this Friday, 11/29/63.
The investigation in both cases will, however, continue,
because we are receiving literally hUl1dreds of allegations
regarding the activities of Oswald and Ruby, and these, of
course, are being run out as received. I think this will continue
and ,in the absence of being able to prove Oswald's motive
and complete activities. we must check out and continue to investigate
to resolve as far as possible any allegations or possibility
that he was associated with others in this assassination.
Likewise. we have to continue to prove [sic] the possibility
that Jack Rubv was associated with someone else in connection
with his killing of Oswald.6s [Emphasis added.]
""Memorandum to the Files, by Walter Jenkins, 11/24/63, (4 p.m.).
By November 23 the State Department had concluded there was no foreign
conspiracy involYed in the President's aRsa~sination. (Dean Rusk testimony,
6/10/64, Warren CommisRion, Vol. V, pp. 367~368.)
00 :Memorandum from Belmont to Tolson, 11/24/63.
67 Memorandum from Belmont to SulliYan, 11/26/63.
.. Memorandum from Belmont to Tolson, 11/27/63.
34
The following notation appears at the bottom of this memorandum
in Director Hoover's handwriting:
The Presidential Report on both matters should not be prepared
until all allegations and angles have been completed.69
The FBI delivered these reports to the 'White House and the Attorney
General on December 5, 1963.
1n a November 29, 1963, memorandum, Hoover recounted a telephone
conversation he had that day with President Johnson:
The President called and asked if I am familiar with the
proposed group they are trying to get to study my reporttwo
from the House, two from the Senate, two from the courts,
and a couple of outsiders. I replied that I had not heard of
that but had seen reports from the Senate Investigating
Committee.
The President stated he wanted to get by just with my file
and my report. I told him I thought it would be very bad to
have a rash of investigations. He then indicated the only way
to stop it is to appoint a high-level committee to eva.luate my
report and tell the House and Senate not to go ahead with the
investigation. I stated that would be a three-ring circus.
I advised the President that we hope to have. the investigation
wrapped up today, but probably won't have it before
the first of the week as an angle in Mexico is giving troubl&the
matter of Oswald's getting $6,500 from the Cuban Embassy
and coming back to this country with it; that we are not
able to prove that fact; that we have information he was there
on September 18 and we are able to prove he was in New
Orleans on that date; that a story came in changing the date
to September 28 and he was in Mexico on the 28th.70
On December 3, 1963, the UPI wire carried a story reported m
various newspapers under the following lead
An exhaustive FBI report now nearly ready for the White
House will indicate that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone
and unaided assassin of President Kennedy, Government
sources said today.71
When he was informed of these news articles, Director Hoover wrote,
"I thought no one knew this outside the FBI." 72 According to William
Sullivan, Hoover himself ordered the report "leaked" to the press, in
.. Ibid.
10 Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, Mohr, Sullivan and
Rosen, 11/29/63.
William C. Sullivan, former Assistant Diredor in char~e of the Domestic InteIligen<>
e Division. stated that "on Novemher 29, 1963, the FBI had no data to support
the conclusion that there was no foreign conspiracy." (Staff interview of
William C. Sullivan, 4/21/76.)
'11 Washington Evening Star, 12/3/63.
72 Hoover handwritten note on UPI ticker of 12/3/63.
35
an attrmpt to "blunt the driye for an indeprndent im-estigation of the
assassination.~~73
In a December 196:3 memorandum prepared to aid the Director in
briefing the President, ",Y. C. Sullivan wrote:
No eyidence has been deyeloped which would indicate
Oswald~s assassination of the President was inspired or directed
by thp5e [pro-Castro] organizations or by any foreign
country.74
tE. Investigation by the General Investigative Division
The evidpnce developed by the Committpe reveals that certain senior
FBI offiials in Mav 1962 learnpc1 of the 1960-1962 CIA-underworld
plots to a.ssassinat~ Fidel Castro. and learned from an informant in
July 1964 that meetings between the CIA and a Cuban official dealt
with the assassinatioll of Castro.75 Information concerning thpse plots
was not general knowledge within the Bureau. For example, Alex
RosPll the Assistant Director in charge of the General Tnyestigative
Dh-ision during the assassination investigation, testified that he had
been unaware of CIA efforts to kill Castro and of Castro's retaliation
Nlreat. 76 Rosen was also unaware of any discussion of possible Cuban
involvement in the assassination. For example, he test,ified :
I don't remember the Castro name coming up. Obviously it
did, but I do not recall it. It is not fixed in my memory at all
as being pertinent to the investigation.77
The Committee heard similar testimony from the Headquarters
officials who wpre actually responsihle for the Division's day-to-day
supervision of the assassination case.78 One of these supervisors testified
that he had "no knowledge whatsoever" of any Federal investigation
of possihle Cuban goyernment involvement in the assassination
of Prpsidpnt Kennedy.79 Anothel' supervisor testified that he never
70 Staff interview of William C. Sullivan, 4/21/76.
The Bureau, in response to a Committee request for documents in a letter
dated 4/28/76, stated that it had no documents pertaining to any FBI release of
the referenced prpliminary report. Other pprsons, possibly knowlpdgpable of the
allel!'ed "leak," han' not been questioned.
7' Memorandum for the record from J. Edgar Hoover, 5/10/62; memorandum
from Sullivan to Belmont, 12/4/63.
Sullivan told the Committpp Maff that "his initial view of his responsibility
in the investigation [as head of thp Intelligence Division] was to resolve question!"
of interna tional involypment in the con!"pirac~-." (Staff interview of William
C. Snllivan, 4/21/76.)
75 Memorandum from Miami Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/29/64.
This Cuban official is referred to as AMLASH in this report and in the COIllmittee'!"
Assassination Rf'port.
The FBI could not have characterized these meetings involving the Cuban
official as the .DILASH operation because they did not know the Cuban had
been code-named AMLASH by the CIA.
76 Rosen, 4/30/76, pp. 14, 21. For further discussion of the retaliat'on thrpat.
'11 Ibid., p. 23.
78 Testimony of Supervi!"or I, 4/27/76. p. 19; testimony of Supervisor II, 4/
27/76, p. 25; testimony of Supervisor III, 4/29/76, p. 9.
,. Testimony of Supervisor I, 4/27/76, p. 13.
36
attended any conference or meetings where there was discussion of
whether Castro or the Cuban government were responsible for the
rrssassination.80 According to one of these supervisors, the General Innstigative
Division's rrsponsibility was "primarily dealing with the
physical aspects of the case. the weapons. the bullets, the scientific approach
to it, circumstances of [Oswald's1 apprehension and subsequent
killing, and that 'Would be about it." 81 [Emphasis added]
3. The Domestic Intelligence Divi8ion
In November 1963, ",V"illiam Sullivan was the head of the Domestic
Intelligence Division, which was responsible for the "subversive
aspects of the assassination case." Sullivan told the Committee staff
that he had never been informed of any assassination plots after 1962,
including the AMLASH operation.82 Althoug:h he had been apprised
of earlier Agency efforts to use underworld figures to assassinate
Castro, by a memorandum detailing Director Hoover's May 10, 1962
conversation with Attorney General Kennedy, Sullivan's impression
wa.s that these plans had only been in the "discussion stage." 83 According
to Sullivan, the Bureau made an "all-out effort" to investigate,
"possible foreign conspiracy" in the President's assassination.
Sullivan could not recall specific measures the Bureau had taken and
stated that he beliend there were certain "gaps" in the FBI
investigation.84
",Vithin the Domestic Intelligence Division, the assassination in,'
estigation was supervised by a squad of seYeral Headquarters agents
in the Sm'iet Section.85 One of the Sm,iet Section supervisors who conducted
the im'estigation described it as follows:
... our investigation was primarily concentrated on Lee,
Harvey Oswald, was he the assassin and to get the complete
background investigation of him it was an investigation
of Lee Harvey Oswald, the man.
Question: But it didn't include Cuba?
Supervisor: "'VeIl, it included Oswald's contacts within the
Cuban area.86
This Soviet Section supervisor could not recall whether he had known
of the CIA plots against Castro or Castro's warning of Srptember 7,
1963.87 Although in late 1963 he had been assigned the "responsibility
of going through every file in the FBI to see whether any lead had
80 Supervisor testimony, 3/31/76, p. 24. The third case supervisor within
the General Investigative Division is deceased.
61 Supervisor testimony, 4/27/76, p. 12.
82 Staff interview of William C. Sullivan, 4/21/76.
83 Ibid.
.. Ibid.
'" The Domestic Intelligence Division had supervised the FBI security case on
Lee Harvey Oswald before the assassination. Within that Division. the Espionage
Section (which handled Soviet matters) and the Nationalities Intelligence
Section (which handled Cuban matters), had specific responsibilities in
this case.
... Soviet Section Supervisor testimony, 4/23/76, pp. 5, 22.
81 Ibid, p. 25.
37
been overlooked in the case." to his knowledgp. the Bureau never
conducted an investigation to determine whether the Cnban government
was responsible for the assassination of President Kennedy. The
Supervisor noted that if such an investigation had been conducted,
it would have been the responsibility of the Nationalitips Intelligence
Section of the Domestic Intelligence Diyision.88
The Select Committee also examined former FBI officials who had
been in the Nationalities Inte11igence Section in the early 19605. These
officials were the Bureau personnel most familiar with Cuban mattel'S
and the activities of anti-Castro groups at the time of the assassination.
The Chief of the Nationalitips Intelligence Sect,ion testified
the inwstigation of the assassination was not in the division
and I "'asn't privy to any of the discussions.... even the
phases that spilled over to the di,'ision were handled in the
[SovietJ Section.89
Another official in the Nationalities Intelligence Spction, repntpd
to be the leading Cuba expert within the Bureau. teBtified that he was
never informed of any CIA assassination attempts against Fidel
Castro.90 This snpervisor had no re,collection of any Bureau investigation
of Cuban involvement in the assassination.
Q. ",Vere there ever any meetings that you recan where
there were discussions as to whether or not the Cubans were
involved in the assassination of President Kennedy?
A. No. I don't recall. I would say no.
Q. Do you know if that possibiiity was investigated?
A. "'VeIl, I can't even say that for sure. no, I can't.
Q. Do you recall at any time ever seeing any memoranda
or instructions that Cuban sources he contacted to see if there
was any Cuban involvement in the assassination of President
Kennedy?
A. There were no such communications, to my knowledge,
m'er sent out from Headquarters.
Q, If they were sent out, in all likelihood you would have
known about it?
A. Yes, I think I would have. It's-that would have been a
normal way of handling this kind of thing.91
This supervisor does not recall ever being infonued of Castro's warning
of retaliation. He did testify that had he been informed, he would
have conducted the investigation differently.
Q. We have here a copy of an article from the New Orleans
Times-Picayune on September 9, 1963, which I think has recently
been in the press again. I will read a portion of it to you.
It says "Prime l\Iinist~r Fidel Castro turned np today at a
reception at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana and submitted
to an impromptu interview by Associated Press Correspondent
Daniel Harker."
.. Ibid, p. 19.
If> Former Section Chief, testimony, 5/11/76, p. 36.
.. Supervisor testimony, 5/5/76, p. 33.
01 Ibid., p. 34.
38
Now, we have been told by CIA experts that Castro giving
an interview at that time was somewhat unusual.
'Would you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. And it was also unusual that he would go to a reception
at the Brazilian Embassy?
A. Uhhuh.
Q. And the first paragraph of the article says, "Prime
~finister Castro said Saturday night U.S. leaders would be
in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away with leaders
of Cuba." Then it goes on from there.
Do you re,call ever seeing that art,icle or hearing that statement
from Castro?
A. No, I don't. In retrospect that certainly looks like a
pointed signal, ... If it had come to our attention-you
know. if this article had been Ironted to ns. it would have been
a typical reaction by headquarters. to instruct the hy field
offices handling Cuban matters to alert their sources and be
aware, you know, be. particularly aware of anything that
might indicate an assassination attempt but there was no such
communication, to my knowledge, ever sent ont from headquarters.
92
The Committee also took test.imony from the Nationalities Intelligence
Section expert, on anti-Castro exiles in the United States. This
snpenisor testified that he was never asked to conduct an investigation
of whether anv Cuban exile group was involved in the as.<;assination.93
and stressed that he was "not part of the assassination team." He
noted,
If there wonld be anything of interest to me, they may have
given it to me. I don't recall any specific incident abont that.
hnt they were handling the assassination; I was handling the
exiles. W'e were pretty much apart. I had little contact with
them on the assassination, per se.94
The Dor:wmentary Reeord.-The Committee's review of FBI instructions
to its field offices in the United States, and to legal attache
offices around the world. confirms that FBI Headquarters did not
inform field agents involved in the investigation of the CIA plots
or Cast.ro's warning.95 Additionally, no instructions were ever issued
by FBI Headquarters authorizing an intelligence investigation to
determine whether there ha.d been foreign involvement in the assassination.
For examnle, the FBI had sources in the field who might have been
able to provide relevant information on possible Cuban involvement in
.. Ibid., pp. 32--34.
... Supervisor I, 4/27/76, p. 16.
.. Ibid., p. 6.
This supervisor also testified that he could not recall any occasion where the
issue of possible foreign involvement in the assassination was raised. (Ibid, p.
25.)
... Each of the field a~ents involved in the assassination investigation who testified
before the Committee confirmed this fact.
39
the assassination, hut those sources ,,'pre nen'r utilized. 9
r, The instructions
from FBI IIeadqual'tprs were yery general in nature and did not
focus on such a pos!"Jihility. The only Bureau comlllllnication which
eould haye been constnwcl as an instruction to intervimy security informants
,,'as rescinded hy an instruction issued on the following day.
Those security informants wonld han> inelm]pd indiyiduals familiar
with Cuba an~l Cnban exile matters.
At 9 :40 p.m. on NOYembPr 22, 19(m. the Hnreau dispatdwd a tplrtype
to all of its field offices whieh read:
All offiees immediately contact all informants. security. racial
and criminal. as welI'as other sourees. for information bearing
on assassination of President Kennedy. All offices immediately
establish whereabonts of bombing suspects, all
known Klan and hate group members, known racial extrE'mists,
anti any other in<liyi<]nals who on tIm basis of information
ayailable in your files may possibly have bE'en
inyohed.97
At about 11 p.m. on NoyembH 22, H163, the Bureau sent another
telE'type to its field offices:
T,he Bureau is conducting an im'estigation to determine who
is responsible fOl' the assassination. You arc thercfore in8truded
to follOlI' alld 1'(,8011'e all allegations pertaining to the
a.~8a88inatioll.This matter is of utmost urgency and should be
handlPd accordingly keeping the Rnreau and Dallas. the office
of origin, apprisl'd fully of all tlevelopments.9R [Emphasis
added.]
However. at 11: 20 a.m. on NOYelllber 23. H163. the Bureau dispatched
the follo"l'ing telctypp to a11 of its fipld offices:
Lee Harvey Oswahl has 1)('en <lewloped as the prineipal suspect
in nle assassination of Prpsitlent Kel1lH'cly. He has been
formally charged with the Presiclpnt's mnrder along with the
murder of Dallas Te,xas patrolman .J. n. Tipprtt by Texas
state anthoritiE's. Tn view of devE'lopments all offices should
resume nOTlnal cOl/lact8 'with informant8 and other 801l1'CeS
with respect to bombing suspects. hate group members and
known racial extremists. Daily teletype summaries may be
discontinued. All invE'stigation hearing directly on the President's
assassination should be afforded most expeditious handling
and Bureau and Dallas advised.99 [Emphasis added.]
.. It is also instructive to note that CIA Director .John McCone telephoned FBI
Director Hooyer on thp morning' of XOYf'mher 26. 1963. and after noting' that the
President wanted to make sure the CIA was g'iying' the FBI full support. specifically
offered to make "CIA's operational resources in Mexico" available to the
Bureau.
The Committee has seen no evidence that the FBI asked the CIA to conduct an
investigation or g'ather information on the assassination case, but middle-level
CIA personnel did routinely provide the Bureau with information that came to
their attention in the assassination case.
• 7 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all Field Offices, 11/22/63.
911 Ibid.
lllJ )'Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to all Field Offices, 11/23/63.
40
Thus, the Committee found that FBI Headquarters never instructed
field agents to contact informants or sources familiar with
Cuban matters to determine whether they had any information concerning
Cuban involvement in the assassInation. Those Cuban issues
which were explored related solely to Oswald and OSl()ald's contacts,
rather than the larger issue of determinin~whether subversive activities
of the Cuban government or Cuban exile community were relevant
to the assa&<;ination. No eounterintdligenee program, operation, or
investi~ation. \Vas ever initiated or discussed. to pursue this question.
The FBI In1Jestigatiol1 in Mexico Oity.-The FBI Lega,l Attache
(Legat) in Mexieo is the highest ranking Bureau official in that country.
thus, the Bureau's assassination investigation there was under his
direction. The Legat stated that while eonducting the investigation,
he proceeded under the "impression" eonveyed to him by Bureau Headquarters,
that Oswald was the lone assassin.loo He further stated:
Our investigation was dedicated or directed toward establishing
Oswald's aetivities in Mexieo and looking toward trying.
to establish whether he had been aecompanied by anyone
whIle he was in l\fexico.
'Ve were able to get him in, get him out, where h~ stayed. I
don't recall that we were able to establish where he was everv
day in Mexico.101 [Emphasis added.] .
Bureau documents and testimony of knowledgeable officials rpvpalpd
that the investigation was as circumscI,ibed as the Le~at testified. ,o2
On November 23. 1963, the Mexico Legat informed Headquarters:
[The] Ambassador ... is greatly concerned that Cubans
behind subject's assassination of President. He feels that
both we and CIA doing everything po&<;ible there to establish
or refute Cuban connection.lo3
On November 24, 1963, the Legat eabled FBI Headquarters:
Ambassador here feels Soviets much too sophisticated to participate
in direction of 'assassination of President by subject,
but thinks Cubans stupid eilough to have partieipated in sueh
direction even to extent of hiring subject. If this should be
case, it would appear likely that the contract \Vould have been
made with subject in U.S. and purpose of his trip to Mexico
was to set up get away route. Bureau may desire to give
considerat,ion to polling an Cuban sources in U.S. in effort
to confirm or refute this theory.104
100 Legat testimony, 2/4/76, p. 23.
101 Ibid, pp. 22, 24.
lOll The evidence alRo eRtahliRheR that there waR confuRion aR to which U.S.
agency was conducting the invl'stigation in Ml'xico. Although thl' AmhasRador
and high-level government officials in WaRhington helieved that the FBI waR
conducting the inveRtigation in Mexico. thl' FBI'R pORition waR that, although the
FBI would cooperate, only the "State Department and CIA have juriRdiction in
gl'tting investigative results ahroad." (Memorandum to A. Belmont, 11/27/63.)
Ironically, neither the Legat nor the Bureau supervisor sent down to "dir('ct
and coordinate the investigation" knew whether the State Department or the
CIA was in fact investigating in Mexico.
,,,, FBI cable, Mexico Legat to Headquarters, 11/23/63.
106 FBI cable, Mexico Legat to Headquarters, 11/24/63.
41
The Committee found no indication that the Bureau ever attempted
to confirm or refute this theory. Indrcd. a FBI Headquarters supervisor's
handwritten notation on the cablegram states: "Not desirable.
",Vould serve to promote rumors."
Richard Helms' sentiments coincided with this Bureau supervisor's.
I n his Xovemoor 28, 1963. cable to the CIA'", ~Iexico Station chief,
Helms stated:
For your private information, there distinct feeling here in
all three agencies [CIA. FBI, State,] that Ambassador is
pushing this case too hard . . . and that we could well oreate
flap with Cubans which could have serious repercussions.105
On November 27,1963, the Legat sent an urgent cablegram informing
Bureau Headquarters that a press release had been made by a
fonner Cuban diplomat and noting:
At one point in the lengthy release he was quoted as saying
that they do not. have the slightest doubt that assassination of
President Kennedy and snb5equent elimination of his assassin
is ,vork of Communist direction. To back up this statement he
alleged that Fidel Castro in his speech made at the Brazilian
Embassy in Havana on September 7, 1963, accused CIA and
President Kennedy of planning attempt against Castro and
that Castro stated "Let Kennedy and his brother Robert take
care of themselves since they too can be the victims of an attempt
which will cause their deat.h." 106
One of the major areas of investigation soon after Kennedy's
assassination involved an allegation made by a Latin American, "D".107
"D" walked into the American Embu.'isy in :Mexico City on November
25, 1963, and alleged that on September 18, 1963, he had observed
Oswald receive $6,500 from a Cuban consulate employee. "D" eventually
admitted that he fabricated the allegation.108 The Warren Commission
reviewed "D's" original claim and concluded it was false, since
overwhelming evidence indicated Oswald was in New Orleans on September
18, 1963.109
Cable traffic discussing investigative responses to "D's" allegation
indicates problems of coordination, especially in the area of possible
Cuban involvement. ",Vhen the American Embassy learned of "D's"
allrgation, the Ambassador requested that a Bureau representative
"come down from ",Vashington to Mexico City." no CIA cables reflect
the Ambassador's belief that he was not being fully informed on all
100 CIA cable, Headquarters to Mexico Station, 11/28/63.
100 FBI cable, Mexico Legat to Headquarters, 11/27/63.
The Committee has seen no indication that any action was taken upon receipt of
thiR cahle.
107 Memorandum from Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, DeLoach, Sullivan, Belmont,
Mohr and Rosen, 11/29/63. According to this memorandum, the Director advised
tlw president that the FBI hoped "to have the investigation wrappE'd up today
hut prohahly won't have it hefore the first of tIll' week aR an augle in l\Iexiro if;
g-iving trouhle-the matter of Oswald'f; getting $6,500 from the Cuban Embassy."
'''' Cable from Legat. Mexico City. to FBI Headquarters, 11/30/63.
100 Warren Commission Report, pp. 307-309.
110 CIA cable from Mexico Station to Headquarters, 11/26/63.
42
developments in the FBI investigation in the United States. The
Ambassador was also concerned about the gravity of "D's" allegation
and requested that the investigation of "D's" claim be given the highest
priority.111.J. Edgar Hoover shared the Ambassador's concern over
the allegation, noting:
Ambassador ... may be one of the psuedo-investigators, a
Sherlock Holmes, but he has made a lot of statements which,
if true, throw an entirely different light on the whole
picture.u2
The supervisor's presence in Mexico City was short-lived. He arrived
on November 27, and returned to FBI Headquarters on December
1, 1963. The supervisor testified that on the morning after his
arrival in Mexico City that he, the Legat and the CIA Station Chief
met with the Ambassador. At this meetrug, the Ambassador
expressed his opinion that he felt that this was definitely a
conspiracy and that we must turn over the last stone to find
out if there is any overt conspiracy on the part of the Cubans.
He also made reference, I believe, to previous boasts by
Castro that he would endeavor to get back at attempts by
American forces to assassinate him.
At that time we tried to stress to Ambassador that every bit
of information that we had developed in Washington, at
Dallas, and elsewhere, indicated that this was a lone job.ll3
The supervisor also testified that he "knows of no investigation in
Mexico to determine if there was Cuban involvement in the assassination
of President Kennedv," other than disproving the "D" allegation,
u4 Once "D" admitted he had fabricated his story, the Ambassador
"advised that it was no longer necessary for [the supervisor]
to stay." 115 Sullivan's previous statement that the supervisor was
"selected to go to Mexico to direct and coordinate the entire investigation
there and pursue it vigorously until the desired results are obtained,"
U6 cannot be reconciled unless the thorough investigation and
desired results were to discredit "D's" allegations.ll7
Q. 'Vhat I am trying to understand is what was
done other than what ended up being the disproving of the
"D" allegation. It looks like a negative investigation . . .
well, let's get down there and wash it out and get this ambassador
off our backs and we will all be happy and gay.
'1U Ibid.
m Memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont, 11/27/63.
One former FBI official told the Committee that Hoover's labeling the Amhassador
a "Sherlock Holmps" had the effect within the Bureau, of causing FBI
personnel "to disrel!:ard what thp Amhassador was saying."
:wi FBI supervisor testimony, 4/8/76. p. 10.
The supervisor subseQuently testified that he had no knowledge of American
attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.
m Ibid, p. 38.
m Memorandum from Belmont to Sullivan, 12/3/63.
ua William e. Sullivan, while admitting that this was a "poor choice of words,"
denied that he sent the supervisor to Mexico specifically to placate the Ambassador
and "disprove "D."
U7 Select Committee staff interview of W. C. Sullivan, 4/21/76.
43
SuperV'isor: "'Yell, possibly on one hand you could say yes,
we wanted definitively to protect the Bureau from any futurc
allegations that the investigation was shoddy.
I believe there was a feeling that "'c had an outsider here,
possibly a Sherlock Holms, who wanted to insert himself
on this . . . so we went down there certainly to cover ourselves,
to pacify the Ambassador, but in no way were we
going to try to water it down.ll8
The supervisor also testified that he nevcr had the opportunity to
question "D." On the morning hc arrin>d in ~fexico City, the CIA
turned "D" over to the )fcxican police and denied the supervisor's
repeated requests to interrogate "D".ll9 He learned that the Mexican
police had exhaustively interrogated "D"and that he had recanted
his allegations. The supervisor testified:
Q. There could have been a feeling of gratitude to the
Mexican police's interrogation that resulted in this guy's
recanting his story, that you wouldn't have thc change to get
it out of him.
A. That could be very definitely, I know the pressure was
off when the Mexican police came and told us this was 11
complete rabrication.12O
118 Supervisor, 4/8/76, p. 43.
119 Ibid., p. 57.
~ Ibid., p. 58.
However, the FBI Mexico City Legat later had access to HI)" and interrogated
him.
72-059 0 - 76 - 4

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