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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS
IV. THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE WARREN COMMISSION:  JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER 1964
Legally, the assassination of President Kennedy and the subsequent
murder of Lee Harvey Oswald were within the jurisdiction of Texas
state authorities. However, in the days immediately following the
assassination, many Americans questioned how a President could be
assassinated despite the vast U.S. intelligence apparatus. Many ,,,ere
also openly skeptical of the FBI findings that Oswald was the lone
assaSSlll.
Congre&s and the President felt that public concern could only be
assuaged by a thorough and independent investigation of the assassination.
Two resolutions were submitted in Congress calling for
congressional investigations into the circumstances surrounding the
assassination. The State of Texas established 'a Commission for the
same purpose. The 'Warren Commission, established by President
.Tohnson's Executive Order on ~ovember 29, 196~, preempted the field,
The President stated that he established the Commission to ensure
a thorough and independent investigation of the circumstances surrounding
the assassination.! Because the only previous investigations
of the assassination were those conducted by tIl(' Dallas Po!iC'e Department
anel HlP Federal Bureau of Investigation, and recognizing public
criticism and skepticism directed toward these agencies. it would appear
that the Commission's investigation was to be independent from
the Bureau's. As t,he 'Varren Commission's report noted: "Because of
the numerous rumOl's and theories, the Commission concluded that the
publiC'. interest in insuring that tbe trutb was ascertained could not be
met by merely by accepting the reports or the analyses of Federal or
State agencies.2
'Vhen it began its substantive work in mid-December. the Commission
received a tremendous number of reports from various Federal
and State agencies. By far the largest number of repOl'ts were supplied
the Commission by the FBI. The FBI forwarded a five-volume December
9,196:1 report summarizing the Bureau's investigation immediately
after the assassination. Subsequently, the Commission requested and
received the report of the field investigation from which the December
9, 1963, report, had been derived. The 'Warren Commission noted
in its report:
As these investigative reports were received, the staff began
analyzing llnd summarizing them, The members of the legal
staff, divided into teams, proceeded to organize the facts
revealed by these investigations, determine the issues, sort out
the unresolved problems, and recommend additional investigation
by the Commission. .
1 Warren Commission RepOlt. p. ix.
2 'Varren COlllmission Report. p. x.
(45)
46
After reviewing the accumulating materials, the Commission
directed numerous additional requests to Federal and
State agencies.
Because of the di1igenc~, cooperation, and facilities of Federal
investigati"e agencies, it was unnecessary for the Commission
to employ lllvestigators, other than the members of
the Commission's legal staff.3
·With only minor isolat~d exceptions, the entire body of factual
material from which the Commission derived its findings was supplied
by the intdligence community, primarily, the FBI. Even when material
was provided by an agency other than the FBI, that agency
usually checked with the Bureau before supplying information to the
Commission. Moreover, CIA and Secret Service personnel reviewed
Director Hom'er's testimony before the Commission prior to the appearance
of CIA Director McCone and DDP Helms and Se,eret Sen-ice
Director Rowley to ensure that there were no conflicts in testimony.
Thus, the Commission was dependent upon the intelligence agencies
for the facts and preliminary analysis. The Commission and its staff
did lanalyze the material and frequently requested follow-up agency
investigations; but if evidence on a particular point was not supplied
to the Commission, this second step would obviously not be reached,
and the Commission's findings would be formulated without the benefit
of any informa60n on the omitted point.
On the crucial question of whether Oswald was involved in a conspiracy
to assassinate the President, the "~arren Commission noted
that the Secret Service, CIA and FBI and Treasury, Justice, State
and Defense Departments independently anived at the same conclusion,
that there was no evidence of a conspiracy.5
It lllust be remembered that the purpose of the Committee's inquiry
was to allow for an evaluation of the intelligence agencies (both
prior and subsequent to the assassination) and the process by which
information was provided to the 'Varren Commission. The following
section discusses the FBI's and the CIA's relationship to the 'Yarren
Commission.
A. The Relatio1"/,~hip Be!1ocen the FBI and the Warren Commi881on
Director Hom'cr initially opposed President Johnson's decision to
create the 'Van'en Commission; 6 but once the Commission was established
by Executive Order, he had to accept that decision and respond
to thc Commission's requests.7 Nevertheless, he repeatedly told
others in the Bureau that the 'Varren Commission was "looking for
ga.ps in the FBI's investigation" and was "seeking to criticize the
FBI." 8 The memoranda of other senior Bureau officials also reveal a
3 Warren Commission Report. pp. xii, xiii.
5 'Warren Commission Rep0rt. p. 374.
• Memorandum from Hoover to Messrs. Tolson. Belmont. Mohr, DeLoach.
Rosen and Sullivan. 11/29/63.
7 Cover Sheet, 11/29/63. with attached memorandum from Hoover to Messrs.
Tolson. Belmont. Mohr. DeLoach. Rosen and Sullivan. 11/29/63.
• Memorandum from Hoowr to Tolson, Belmont. :\Iohr. Sullivan. Rosen. FBI
Inspector and DeLoach, 1/31/64; Hoover handwritten note on memorandum from
Rosen to Belmont, 4/4/64.
47
deep concern that the FBI might be charged with some dereliction in
connection with the President's death.9 Thus, although the Commission
had to rely on the FBI to conduct the primary investigation of
the President's death. their relationship was at times almost adversariaJ.
1° Such a relationship was not conducive to the cooperation
necessary for a thorough and exhaustive investigation.
1. The FBI's Perception of the Warren OO111lm;UJsion as an
Adversary
In the days immediately following the assassination of Pr~sident
Kennedy. the Bureau was subjected to its first major public criticism
in ypars for its handling of the Lee Han"ey Oswald security case before
the assassination. :\fany Americans were skeptical of the Bureau's
investigative findings that Oswald was the assassin and that he acted
alone. If the 'Varren Commission reported that the Bureau's handling
of the assassination investigation or the Oswald sec,urity case
was deficient in some manner, the FBI would have been open to embrurrassment
and criticism. Gi,-en this possibility, and FBI Director
Hoover's known hostility to criticism or embarrassment of the Bureau,
it is not at all surprising that from its inception, the Commission was
perceived as an adversary by both Hoover and senior FBI officials.
After the \Varren Commission had been established, each time
Hoover received word that a particular person was being considered
for the Commission staff. he asked "what the Bureau had" on the
individual. Although derogatory information pertaining to both
Commission members and staff was brought to l\fr. Hom"er's attention,
the Bureau has informed the Committee staff that there is no documentary
evidence which indicates that such information was disseminated
while the 'Varren Commission was in session.12
On December 10, 1963, Hoover informed Assistant Director Alan
Belmont that he would be "personally responsible for reviewing every
piece of paper that went to the '''aITen Commission." Hoover also
designated the FBI Headquarters inspector who had previously been
assigned to supervise the Dallas fi('ld investigation as the Bureau
liaison with the 'Varren Commission. In a memorandum recounting
the December 10th meeting, where this inspector was briefed on his
new assignment, the Director wrote:
I told [the inspector] that I wanted him to establish the
closest and most amiable working relationship with Mr. Ran-
• Memorandum from Section Chief to Sullivan, 2/18/64; memorandum from
Section Chief to Sullivan, 4/3/64.
'0 Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, DeLoach, Rosen, FBI
Inspe<Jtor and Sullivan, 1;31/64, p. 4; Hoover handwritten note on memorandum
from Rosen to Belmont. 4/4/64.
12 The Committee and the Bureau defined their terms. such that "dissemination"
includes informing the person himself of the derogatory information. Additionally,
in order to ensure the protection of individual privacy, the Committee
did not request access to any derogatory information.
48
kin. I told him that I had personally known Mr. Rankin quite
well since he had served as Solicitor General under Attorneys
General Brownell and Rogers.
I also alerted [the inspectorJ that there were indications
that the Chief Justice, who headed the Presidential Commission,
was endeavoring to find fault with the FBI and certain
information had been leaked by the Ohief Justice to [a newspaperman]
whi('h was critical of the FBI's functioning in
Dallas prior to the assassination.
I told [the inspector] and Mr. Belmont that the Ohief Justice
had now demanded all of the so-called "raw" reports
upon which the FEI report of the assassination was predicated,
and in doing so that Chief Justice had oharacterized
the FBI report as bein.g in "skeleton form." I stated the Chief
Justice had further adcled in his statement to the pres.'>: "In
order to evaluate it we have to see the materials on which the
report was prepared."
I stated that this statement by the Ohief .Justice I felt was
entirely unwarranted and could certainly haye been phrased
better so as not to leave the impression, at least by innuendo,
that the FBI had not done a thorough jobY
On January 28,1964, Lee Rankin met with Hoover at the Commission's
direct,ion to discuss the allegation that Oswalrl was an FBI informant.
According to a Hoover memorandum of January 31, 1964:
Rllinkin statrAl that the Commission was coneerned as to
how this matter could be resolyed, and it \Va." for this reason
that they asked him to see me. He stated that the Commission
did not desire to initiate an inyestigation on the outside
... as it might appear the Commission was inyestigatin~
g the FBI. .
I told Mr. Rankm that Lee Harvey Oswald was never at
any time a confidential informant, undercoyer ag-ent, or eyen
a source of information for the FBI, and I would like to see
that clearly stated on the record of the Commission and I
would be willing to so state under oath.
I commented to him that I had not appreciated what I interpreted
as carping criticism by the Chief Justice when he
referred to the Bureau's report originally furnished to the
Commission as being a "skeleton report." 14
Throughout the Warren Commission's existence, Alan Belmont
kept Hoover informed daily on :
1. the internal Commission meetings and decisions;
2. the areas in whioh the Commission was requeBting- information,
or further FBI investigation; and
13 Memorandum from HOO"er to TolRon. 12/26/63.
1< Memorandum from Hoover to MeRRrR. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, Sullivan,
Rosen, FBI Inspector and DeLoach, 1/31/64.
.]
49
3. the matNials which the Bureau intended to provide to
the CommissionY
On various occasions. Hoover learned that the Commission members
or staff had stated that they ,,,ere impressed with the testimony of
Bureau personnel and the inve..'itigation conducted for the Bureau.~6
His handwritten notation on an April 4, 1964, memorandum succinctly
states his usual response to such complimentary remarks:
I place no credence in any complimentary remarks made by
'Varren nOl' the Commission. They were looking for FBI
"gaps" and having found none yet they try to get sympathyY
In an April 3, 1964 memorandum to 'William Sullivan, a Bureau
Supervisor ,vrote:
"Thile complimenting the Bureau for its cooperation, the
President's Commission, by letter dated 3/26/64, forwarded
what purports to be 30 questions (by actual count there are
52 as some of the enumemted questions have more than one
part) to which they request a reasoned response in reasonable
detail and with such substantiating materials as seem
appropriate.
The questions are those of a cross-examining attorney and
it is ev,ident that this is a cross-examination of the FBI or a
part of it in the case of the assassination of President
Kennedy."s
Mr. Hoover noted on the memorandum, "Their so-called compliments
of the Bureau's work 'are empty and have no sincerity." 19
Similarly, when he was informed that the Commission intended to
send two of its staff members to ~Iexico City, the Director "expressed
concern as to how lawyers on the Commission could spot gaps in our
investigation." 20
15 For example, memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to J. Mohr, 12/12/63; memorandum
from A. Rosen to A. Belmont, 4/4/64.
FBI documents also reveal that .James Angleton of the CIA passed information
he received about the Warren Commission investigation to the FBI. On
May 13, 1964, he contacted William Sullivan. stating "that it would be well for
both McCone and Hoover to be aware that the Commission might ask the same
questions, wondering wbetber they would get different replies from the beads of
the two agencies." Angleton then informed Snllh'an as to the questions he believed
McCone would be asked, and the "replies that will be given," two of which
series are set fortb below:
(1) Q: Was Oswald ever an agent of tbe CIA:
A: No.
(2) Q: Does the CIA have any evidence showing that a conspiracy existed
to assassinate President Kennedy:
A: No.
(Memorandum, W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 5/13/64.)
'·Memorandum from A. Rosen to A. Belmont. 4/4/64.
'7 Hoover's handwritten note on memorandum from Rosen to Belmont, 4/4/64.
18 :\Iemorandum from Section Chief to Sullivan, 4/3/64.
19 Hooyer's handwrittpn note on memorandum from Section Chief to Sullh'an,
4/3/64.
• 0 Memorandum from Section Chief to Sullivan, 2/18/64.
50
'2. The FBI's Handling of the Oswald Security Oase
Immediately after the assassination. J. Edgar Hoover ordered a
complete analysis of "any investigative deficiencies in the Oswald
case." 21 On December 10, 1963, Assistant Director J. H. Gale of the
Inspeetion Division reported that there were a number of investigative
and reporting delinquencies in the handling of the Oswald security
case. Gale wrote:
Oswald should have been on the Security Index; his wife
should have been interviewed before the assassination, and
investigation intensified-not held in abeyance-after Oswald
contacted Soviet Embassy in Mexico.22
In the paragraph immediately preceding Gale's rpcommendations for
disciplinary actions, he observes:
Concerning the administrative action recommended hereinafter,
there is the possibility that the Presidential Commission
investigating instant matt~r will subpoena the investigating
Agents. If this occurs, the possibility then exists that the
Agents may be questioned concerning whether administrative
action had been taken against them. However, it is felt these
possibilities are sufficiently remote that the recommended
action should go forward at this time. It appears unlikely at
this time that the Commission's subpoenas would go down to
the Agent level,23
Director Hoover responded. "In any event such gross incompetency
cannot be overlooked nor administrative action postponed." 24
Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach responded to Gale's report as
follows:
I recommended that the sugge."ted disciplinary action be hpld
in abeyance until the findings of the Presidential Commission
have been made public. This action is recommended inasmuch
as any "leak" to the general public, or particularly to the
communications media, concerning the FBI taking disciplinary
action against its personnel with respect to captioned
matter would be assumed as a direct admission that we are
responsible for negligence which might have resulted in the
assassination of the President. At the present time there are
so many wild rumors. gossip, ancl sppculation that even the
slightest hint to outsiders conc-erning disciplinary action of
this nature would result in considerable adverse reaction
against the FBI. I do not believe that any of our personnel
will be subpoenaed. Chief Justice Warren has indicated he
plans to issue no subpoenas. There is, however, the possibility
that the public will learn of disciplinary action being
21 The Bureau's handling of the pre-assassination Oswald case is discussed in
AppendiX A.
.. Memorandum from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
.. Ibid.
'" Hoover's handwritten note on memorandum from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
51
taken against our personnel and, therefore, start a bad, unjustifiable
reaction.25
Director Hoover, however, responded to DeLoach's recommendation,
"I do not concur." 26
On December 10, 1963, 17 Bureau employees (five field investigative
agents, one field supervisor, three special agents in charge, four headquarters
supervisors, two headquarters section chirfs, one insppctor.
and one assistant director) were censured or placed on probation for
"shortcomings in connection with the investigation of' Oswald prior
to the assassination." 27 Although the transfers of some of these agents
were discussed at that time, certain transfers were held in abeyance
until the issuance of the 'Yanen Commission's report on September 24,
1964.28
One of the specific shortcomings identified by Assistant Director
Gale was the failure to include Oswald's name on the Security Index.29
Indeed, of the seventeen agents, supervisors, and senior officials 'who
were disciplined, not a single one believed that Oswald met the criteria
for the Security Index. In this regard, Assistant to the Director Alan
Belmont noted in an addendum to Mr. Gale's December 10. 1963
memorandum:
It is significant to note that all of the supervisors and officials
who came into contact with this case at the seat of government,
as well as 'agents in the field, are unanimous in the
opinion that Oswald did 1Wt meet the criteria for the Security
Index. If this is so, it would appear that the criteria are
not sufficiently specific to include a case such as Oswald's
and, rather than take the position that all of these employees
were mistaken in their judgment, the criteria should be
changed. This has now been recommended by Assistant
Director Gale.30
Mr. Hoover made the following handwritten notations next to Mr.
Belmont's addendum: "They ,vere worse than mistaken. Certainly no
one in full possession of all his faculties can claim Oswald didn't
fall within this criteria.":n
On September 24. 1964, the same day the 'Varren Commission's
report was officially released, Assistant Director William C. Sullivan
wrote:
In answer to the question as to why Lee Harvey Oswald was
not on the Security Index, based. on the facts concerning
'" Memorandum from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
.. Hoover's handwritten note on memorandum from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
., Memorandum from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
28 Memorandum from Gale to Tolson, 9/30/64.
"" Memorandum from Gale to Tolson. 12/10/1'>3.
See Book II, "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," pp. 91-93
for a discussion of the Security Index. It is important to note, however, that
under the procedures then in effect, the inclusion of Oswald on Security Index
would not have resulted in the dissemination of Oswald's name to the Secret
Service.
.. Ibid.
81 Hoover's halldwritten llote on-memorandum from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
52
Oswald which were available prior to his assassination of the
President, it was the judgment of tIl(' agents handling the
case in Dallas and New Orleans, the field supervisor, and the,
SAC in Ne,,- Orleans, as well as supervisors at the Seat of
Gove,rnment. that such facts did not ,,-arrant the inclusion of
Oswald in the Security Index. The, matter has, of course" been
re-examined in the Bureau and Mr. Gale by memorandum
12/10/63 e,xpres.sed the, opinion that Oswald should have been
placed on the Security Index prior to 11/22/63. The Director
concurred wit;h Mr. Gale,'s opinion and administrative action
has been taken.32
Hoover wrote on this Su11ivan me,morandum that the Bureau pe,rsonnel
who failed to include Oswald on the Securitv Index, "could
not have been more stupid ... and now that the Bureau has been
debunhd publicly I intend to take additional administrative,
action." 33
Ce,rtain FBI agents testified before, the Warren Commission on
May 5, 1964. One of the age,nts had previously requested to talk to
Hoover, and he learned from Alan Belmont on the morning of May 6,
1964, that he, would be allowed to see the Director later that day.34 According
to t;he agent, the Director could not ha,-e been more pieasant ;
he quoted Hoover as saying that "Everything was in order" and that
he, had "nothing to worrv about." 35 Indeed, this is exactly what the
agent recounted to his s~ial agent in charge upon his return to
Dallas.36 Mr. Hoover's version of the meeting differs considerably
from the agents. According to the Director:
I discussed with him the situation whic.h had developed in
Dallas ... and of embarrassment which had been caused.37
On September 28, 1964, four days after the Commission's report had
been issued, eight of the Bureau employees against whom disciplinary
action had been taken in De,cember 1963 were again censured, or put
on probation, for reasons identical to those that led to action being
taken against them in December 1963. Some of the eight were also
transferred on this occasion.3s In addition to the above eight, three
other employees who had not been discipline,d in De,cember 1963 WHe
disciplined as follows:
1. A Special Agent in Dallas was censured and placed on
probation for failing to properly handle and supervise this
matter;
2. An inspector at FBI Headquarters was censured for not
e,xercising sufficient imagination and foresight to initiate
aetion to have Security Index material disseminated to Secret
Service;
'" Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 9/24/64.
33 Hoover's handwritten note on memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont.
9/24/64.
.. FBI Special Agent, 12/5/75, p. 71.
""/bid.
36 SAC testimony, 12/20/75, p. 19.
:rt Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, 5/6/64.
38 Memorandum from Gale to Tolson, 9/30/64.
53
3. An Assistant to the Director at FBI Headquarters was
censured for his overall responsibility in tlhis entire matter.39
In a memorandum disseminated to senior bureau officials on October 12,
1964, Hoover noted:
There is no question in my mind but that we failed in carrying
through some of the most salient aspects of the Oswald investigation.
It ought to be a lesson to all, but I doubt if some
even realize it now.40
J. Edgar Hoover did not believe that these disciplinary actions
would ever become known outside the Bureau, and they did not until
October 1975. Although none of the information made available to the
Commission by the FBI suggests the, slightest investigative deficiency
in the Oswald security ease, Bureau officials were continually concerned
with the possibility that the FBI might be regarded as "responsible
for negligence that resulted in the assa&'iination of President
Kennedy because of pre-assassination investigative deficiencies in the
Oswald case." 41
S. The Bureau's Reaction to the Warren Oommission Report
On September 25, 1964, when the FBI received a copy of the Warren
Commission's Report, tlU' Director noted: "I want this carefully
reviewed as it pertains to FBI shortcomings by Gale. Chapter 8 tears
UR to pieces." 42 On September 29, 1964, Mr. Hoover, after reading a
Washington Post article captioned "PraiRe is Voiced for Staff Engaged
in 1Varren Report," directed that the Bureau's file.'; on the 84
staff members listed in the article "be checked." 43 On October 2, 1964,
the Director was informed that "Bureau files contain derogatory infor'mation
concerning the following individuals and their relatives." 44
On September 30, 1964, Assistant Director Gale presented Associate
Director Clyde Tolson with a memorandum captioned "Shortcomings
in handling of Lee Harvey Oswald matter by FBI pm'S(mnel." Gale
wrote:
The Commission has now set forth in a very damning manner
some of the same glaring weaknesses for which we previously
disciplined our personnel such as lack of vigorous investiga-
.. Ibid .
• 0 Administrative Cover Shel't to memorandum from FBI Supervisor to Gale.
10/12/64.
<l Memorandum from A. Belmont to C. Tolson, 10/1/64.
•• Hoover's handwritten note on memorandum from DeLoach to Mohr, 9125/64.
.. Hoover's handwritten note on a 9/29/64 Washington Post article, "The Federal
Diary."
.. Memorandum from Rosen to Belmont, 10/2/64.
On November 8, 1966, memoranda were furnished to Presidential Assistant
Marvin Watson, setting forth background information, including derogatory materials
on seven private citizens who wrote unfavorable articles concerning the
Warren Commission findings. A February 3, 1975, FBI memorandum which discusses
these memoranda and their dissemination in 1966 to the White House
recounts:
No information was developed or furnished to the White House concerning
immoral conduct on the part of the seven above listed critics of the
Warren Commission with the exception of the information furnished
regarding [identity of individual deleted for reasons of privacy].
54
tion after we had established that Oswald visited the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico.45
Gale notes several instances where the testimony of FBI agents makes
the Bureau "look ridiculous and taints its public ima~e." These instances
include:
One agent testified that conditions in the Dallas police station
at the time of detention and interrogation of Oswald were not
"too much unlike Grand Central Station at rush hour, maybe
like, Yankee Stadium during the 'World Series games." It is
questionable whether the agent should have desc.ribed conditions
in such an editorializing and flamboyant manner but
rather should have indicated conditions were crowded.46
More importantly, Gale's memorandum reveals a dichotomy between
the Bureau's "public position" and what Bureau officials regarded as
the tmth:
The Commission report indicates that we did not have a stop
on Oswald's passport with the Department of State and did
not know Oswald applied fora paSspOlt. in .June 1963. to
travel to W'estern European countries, Soviet Union, Fihland
and Poland. This is anothe,r specific example of how this case
was improperly investigated. The same personnel a.re responsible
for this example as were previously criticized for not
using appropriate teohniques and making a more vigorous
and thorough imoestigation, to determine with whom Oswald
in contact or whether he had intelligence assignment. The
Bureau by letter to the Oommission indicated that the fMts
did not 10arrant placin(l a stop on the paswrJOrt as our inmestigation
disclosed no evidence that Oswald 1cas acting under
the in.'ttructi011s or on behalf of any foreign Government or
or instrumentality thereof. Inspector feels it was proper at
that time to take this "public" position. H 010el'er, it is felt
that with Oswald's background 1ce should have had a stop
on his passport, particularly since 1ce did not know definitely
1.J'hether or not he had any intelligence agsignments at that
time. [Emphasis added.]47
Not surprisingly, Gale states in the "observations" section of this
memorandum:
'Ve previously took administrative action against those responsible
for the investigative shortcomings in this case some
of which were brought out b~' the Commission. It is felt that
it is appropriate at this time to consider further administrative
action against those primarily culpable for the derelictions
in this case which have now had the effect of
publicly embarrassing the Bureau. [Emphasis added.] 48
.. Memorandum from Gale to Tolson. 9/30/64.
•• Ibid.
., Ibid.
'" Ibid.
55
After reviewing the Gale memorandum, Alan Belmont forwarded
a one-page memorandum to Clyde Tolson on October 1, 1964. Belmont
argued that:
I think we are making a tactical error by taking this disciplinary
action in this case at this time. The 'Varren Commi&
sion report has just been released. It contains criticism of
the FBI. We are currently taking- aggressive steps to challenge
the finding-s of the Warren Commission insofar as they
pertain to the FBI. It is most important, therefore, that we
do not provide a foothold for our critics or the general public
to serve upon to say in effect, 'See. the Commission is right,
Mr. Hoover has taken strong action against personnel involved
in this case and thus admits that the Bureau was in
error.' 49
Mr. Hoover disagreed with Belmont's observations, writing:
'Ve were wrong. The administrativE' action approved by me
will stand. I do not intend to palliate actions whi0h have
rE'sultE'd in forevE'r destroying the Bureau as the top le\"el investigative
organization.50
By letter dated September 30, 1964, the Bureau informed the White
House and Acting Attorney General Katzenbach that "the Commission's
report is seriously inaccurate insofar as its treatmE'nt of the FBI
is concerned." 51 In an October 1, 1964 memorandum to Clyde Tolson,
Alan Belmont considered whether a copy of this letter shollid be sent
to the Warren Commission. Belmont wrote:
It is noted that this letter is an indictment of the Commission
in that we charge that in the Commission's approach,
instead of adopting a realistic and objective attitllde, the
Commission was more interested in avoiding possible criticism.
Bearing- this in mind, if we send a copy of this letter to
the Commission now, it will probably make the letter public
together with a definite answer.
I suggest we may want to wait a few davs before we consider
sending a copy of this letter to the Commission. Certainly
we owe no courtesy to the Commission.52
After reviewing the October 1, 1964 Belmont memorandum, Hoover
wrote:
We might as well lay down and let anybody and everybody
kick us around and not defend nor 1'etaliate.53
•• Memorandum from Belmont to Tolson. 1011/64.
.. Hoover's handwritten note on memorandum from Belmont to Tolson. 10/1/64.
Mr. Tolson also disagreed with Mr. Belmont. In an addenrlnm to the Gale
memorandum Tolson wrote: "Most of the administrative rlirections with respect
to the Security Index. the prompt suhmission of reports. etc.. and not the Oswald
case per se." (Memorandum from Gale to Tolson. 9/30/64.)
In Letter from Hoover to .Jenkins, 9/30/64.
III Memorandum from Belmont to Tolson. 10/1/69.
.. Hoover's bandwritten note on tbe memorandum from Belmont to Tolson.
10/1/64.
56
On October 1. 1964, a senior Bureau official instructed the FBI Inspector,
who had handled the Bureau's liaison with the 1Yarren Commission,
to telephonically contact Commission General Counsel .T. I..€e
Rankin and inform him that "he did the Bureau a great disservice and
had out-McCarthyed McCarthy." 54 A memorandum dated October 2,
1964, reflects that this request was carried out.
On October 6, 1964, Cartha D. DeLoach forwarded to Assistant
Director .Tohn Mohr a memorandum captioned "Criticism of the FBI
Following the Assassination of the Pre."ident," in which he wrote :
The criticism concerning the FBI and its role in events surrounding
the assassination of President Kennedy raises three
questions which merit consideration at this time.
(1) What is the public image of the FBI at the present
time?
Certainly, it cannot be denied that the public image of the
FBI has been affected in certain areas by the criticism made of
the Bureau and its role in the events taking place prior to the
assassination of the President. It is believed this situation
reached one stage during the days immediatdy following this
event and was climaxed by Dallas Chief of Police Curry's
statements which left the implication this Bureau was seriously
derelict in discharging its responsibilities as an intelligence
agency.
The second stage, the most acute, followed the issuance of
the 1Varren Report.
Wl1ile there is admittedly no absolute way to assess a public
image, it is believed the image of the FBI improved steadily
since the week following the assassination, and it improved
immeasurably up until the release of the Warren Report. At
the time we suffered a rough setback. Following the release
of the Director's testimony, we have been well on the road
back to good prestige. There is every indication this improvement
will continue if we follow our current program regarding
this situation.
(2) What has been done to counteract this criticism of
the FBI?
Immediately following the assassination, we undertook a
program designed to eliminate the misunderstanding as to
the statutory responsibilities of the Secret Service and the
FBI which existed among the uninformed ... Every appropriate
medium such as the news media, radio scripts,
FBI tours, correspondence, speeches and police tra,ining was
used to clear the air concerning our responsibility.
For the more educated group, those who were not necessarily
biased, and who were aware of the statntoryauthority
of the FBI we furnished full explanations for our actions
prior to the assassination with respect to Lee Harvey Oswald.
'" Memorandum from Rosen to Belmont, 10/2/64.
The FBI Inspector could not recall the identity of the Bureau official who instructed
him to make the phone call. (Staff Interview of FBI Inspector, 3/20/
76.)
57
This was designed to convince them that this Bureau did not
fail to properly evaluate the information available on Oswald
prior to November 22, 1963, and that, in light of the facts
available and the authority granted within which to act, we
were not derelict in disseminating pertinent information to
proper authorities.
(3) What should be our future course in this matter?
The liberal press, with the exception of the "Ne,,- York
Times." and its friends will continue to make [\ determined
effort to place the FBI on the defensive; however. it is not
felt we should engage in any prolonged debate with them.
By keeping the argument going. we are d,iverting public
attention from Secret Senice and the State Department and
their culpability.
The Director has said that "nothing is more devastating
to a smear than an offensive of real outstanding accomplishments."
Our attention and energies should be directed toward
this end in the coming months.55
At the bottom of the last page of this DeLoach memorandum, Mr.
Hoover made the following handwritten notation:
The FBI will never live down this smear which could have
been so easily avoided if there had been proper supervision
and initiative.56
B. Relationship B,dween the OfA and the lVorren Oommission
After the CIA's initial review of the assassination was completed by
the'Vestern Hemisphere desk officer in December 1963, Helms assigned
responsibility for investigative matters related to the President's
assassination to the Counterintelligence Division headed by James
Angleton.57
'Vhen the 1Varren Commission began to request information from
CIA, Angleton directed one of his subordinates to become the "point
of record" for coordinating research undertaken for the Commission.
This CIA analyst said it was his responsibility to know what materials
the CIA harl on the assassination and to know what research was being
conducted.58
This analyst chose three others from the Counterintelligence Staff
to work with him. They were experts in the KGB and Soviet matters,
and were not affiliated with the CIA Cuban affairs staff. Cuban operations
were uniquely compartmented within CIA. As one witness
described the Special Affairs Staff, it was "sort of a microcosm of the
Agency with emphasis on Cuban matters." 59 SAS had its own counterinteIligenee
staff which coordinated with Angleton's, but was not
subordinate to it.
"" Memorandum from DeLoach to Mohr, 10/6/64.
56 Hoover's handwritten note on memorandum from DeLoach to Mohr, 10/6/64.
57 See Chapter III, p. 81.
68 Staff summary of interview of CIA analyst, 3/15/76.
a Chief SAS/CI testimony, 5/10/76, p. 6.
58
Files on this phase of the CIA imestigation reflect the SO\"ipt
orientation of the inrestig-ation. The CIA staff exhaustirely analyzed
the significance of Oswald's adirities in the Soriet Union, but therr
is no corresponding CIA analysis of the significance of Oswald's contacts
'Yith pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in the. United States.
During the 'Varren Commission inYestigation, the Commission
worked directly with designated CIA officials. TIlE' Commission staff
was given access to CIA files on the assassination, including material
obtained from sensiti,"e sources and mrthods.
Rowewr, the 'Varren Commission staff did not work directly with
anyone from SAS. Although the CIA centered its work on the assassination
in its Counterintelligence Division, the Chief of SAS
Counterintelligence testified that the SAS had no "direct" role in the
investigation ;;f the assassination.60
SAS was not completply removed from investigative work on the
assassination. The Counterintelligence Staff occasionally requested a
name check or similar information from SAS, but there is no C\"idence
whatsoe,"er that SAS was asked or e,'er volunteered to analyze
Oswald's contacts with Cuban groups. The Chief of SAS/CI testified
he could recall no such analyses.61
Moreowr, SAS capabilities to obtain information from Cuba, and
from Cuban exiles, were not fully utilized. The CIA JMWAVE Chief
of Station in Florida was asked what his station's capability in this
regard was:
'Well, in relationship to Cubans living in the United States,
I would say that our capability was quite good. Now if you
are referring to our capability to conduct an investigation in
Cuba, I would have to say it was limited.52
He summarized his station's participation in the investigation in the
following testimony:
We felt tlhat the nature of our capability was to simply respond
to what we were able to obtain in the Miami area, and
from our sources in a passive way, because this was an investigation
that was being conducted in the United States with
the primary responsibility with agencies other than CIA.
We had no reason at the particular time to feel that there
was any kind of a case, hard information, that the Cubans
were behind the assassination .... But we had no persuasion
that this was being mounted by the Cubans at that particular
time.63
Indeed all t,he evidence suggests that the CIA investigation into any
Cuban connection, whether pro-Castro or anti-Castro, was passive in
nature. The Special Affairs Staff did conduct name traces on the
request of the CIA investligators. The J~IWAVEstation passed a.}ong
any information its intelli~gencenetwork collected on the assassination.
SAS did interrogate one defector from Cuban intelligence about his
00 Chief. SAS/CI testimony, 5/10/76. p. 9.
61 Chief, SAS/CI testimony, 5/10/76. pp. 9-12.
G2 Chief. nIWAVE testimony, 5/6/76, p. 13.
.... Ibid, p. 14.
59
knowledge of Cuban inyolwment, but. there is no eTidence that. the
CIA made any affirmatin' dfort to collrct such information. Indeed,
A~fLASII hil;lsrlf had accrss to high gOyel'lllllrllt officials in Cuba. Hr
,vas nryrr askrd about the assassination of Pn'sidrnt KpllllPdy in mrrtings
with tIl(' CIA in H)G4 and Hl6;j. .
Some CIA witnrssrs ]w{orr thr Se]rct Committee haw argurd that
an intrnsiw inwstigation into Cuban ill\'oln'mrnt was not' warranted
by the {'aets kno"'!l at tllP time, and in any ewnt tIll' FBI ha(l primary
responsibility for the inwstigation. Yet ill view of Os,,'ald's prpOCCl1pation
with Cuba, and his visit to ~Ipxico City ostensibly to obtain
visas to Cuba an(l the Soyipt Fnion, it would apprar that potential
involypment with pro-Castro or anti-Castro groups should have been
investigated.
Even if CIA investigators did not know that the CIA ,vas plotting
to kill Castro, they certainly (lid 1010\V that the Agency had been operating
a massive covert operation against Cuba sincr 1960. The conspiratorial
atmosphere of violence which developed oypr the course of
threr years of CIA and rxile /ll'Ol1p oprrations, should have led CIA
investigators to ask whether Ler Hal'Yry Oswald and .Jack Rl1by,
who were known to haye at Ipast tOl1ched tIl(' hinges of the Cuban
community were influpnced by that atmosphpre. Similarly that arguments
that the CIA domrstic jurisdiction was limited belie the fact
CIA Cuban opprations had creatpd an enormous donw8tic apparatus,
\vhich the Agpncy uspd both to /lathrr intelligpnce domestically and to
run operations a/lainst Cuba.
CIA records relat.in/l to its inyest.igat.ion of Prpsident Kennedy's
assassination, including docl1ments acquired after issuance of the
",Yarren Commission Report, arr contained in approximately 57 file,
folder'S. The SpIed Committee staff has revipwed those records and
taken testimony from key figurrs in the CIA investigation. All of the
rvidence reviewed by the Committee sU/lgpsts that these investigators
conducted a thorough, professional investigation and analysis of the
information they had. So far as can be determined, the CIA furnished
the ",Yarrrn Commission directly, or through the FBL all significant
informat.ion CIA investigators had, except as otheI'\vise noted in this
report.
For example, one of the CIA mail surveillance operations did acquire
at least some of Oswald's correspondence from the Soviet Union.
Despite. the fact that this operation was of the highest sensitivity at
that time, the CIA did furnish the FBI with the information the
Agency had acquired.65 Similarly, the CIA interrogated a former
KGB officer who had acce",,; to Oswald's KGB dossier. Despite the
extraordinary sensitivity of this defector, t.he CIA furnished the ",Varren
Commission the details of his knowledge and an assessment of his
reliability.
The CIA investigation of Cuban matters for the ",Varren Commission
was not comparable to its effort in the Soviet area. The CIA staff
for Cuban affairs was not in dired contad with the ",Varrpn Commis-
«; CIA Letter to Rockefeller Commission. 5/7/75.
The Agency reg-ularly supplied information gathered by this mail surveillance
program to the Bureau. See the Select Committee staff report, "Domestic CIA
and FBI Mail Opening."
72 -059 0 - 76 - 5
60
sion, and the counterintelligence chief of that staff never met with the
Commission or its staff.66
Apparently. neither t,he 'Varren Commission as a bodv nor its staff
was given details of CIA Cuban operations. Although CIA manpower
in Florida far surpassed the FBI, the 'Vanen Commission and its
staff relied completely on the FBI for reports about the Cuban exile
communitv in Florida. Apparently, unaware of the fact that the CIA
maintained a sizeable book on all Cuban exile organizations. their
leadership. and activities. the 'Varren Commission asked the FBI to
provide information on all such organizations. The Commission was
informed by the FBI that the CIA could provide "pertinent information"
on certain exile organizations. but there is no e.vidence that the
'Warren Commission either asked the CIA about that interest or
pursue.d the matter in any way with the CIA.61 There would seem to
have been some obl1~Q'ation for the CIA to disclose the general nature
of its operations which might affect the Commis.qion's investigation.
In any event. the Warren Commission did not pursue with the CIA
the questions of Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro contacts. Of the
t'hirty-four requests to the CIA from the Warren Commission on file
at the Archives of the "Fnited States. fifteen deal with the Soviet Fnion
or with Oswald's stay in the Soviet Fnion. but only one re,{Juests information
on a Cuban matte.r. That is a request for the CIA to furnish
information about .Jack Ruby's alleged visit to Cuba in 1959.
O. Unpursued Leads
In the course of its inn·stigation. the Select Committee noted several
instances where detailed knowledge of the intelligence agencies'
operations with respect to Cuban matters would have been of assistance
to the "Tarren Commission in its invPstigation. It is possible that
the 'Varren Commission and its staff either received briefings on
Cuban operations or were told informally about these operations.
However, the Committee has necessarily relied on the documentary
record to determine whether the ,Yarren Commission or its staff was
aware of specific details. The following discussion is based on a comparison
of the documents located in CIA files with those in 'Yanen
Commission files.
Given the thorough investigation the CIA and the FBI conducted
of most of the leads they received, their failure to follow significant
leads in the Cuban area is surprising. These leads raise significant
questions, and there is no evidence the Warren Commission staff was
ever provided information which would have allowed it to pursue the
leads.
On December 1, 1963. CIA received information that a November 22
Cubana airlines flight from Mexico City to Cuba was delayed some
~ve ~ours, from 6 :00 p.m. to 11 :00 p.m. E.S.T., awaiting an unIdentlfied
passenger.68 This unidentified passenger arri"ed at the air-
.. Ohief, SASICI. 5/10/76. p'p. 7, 8.
61 The index of Warren Commission documents contain no such request.
... Cable from CIA Headquarters to MeXICO Station. 12/1/63.
The CIA also received highly reliable information that many of the Cuban
diplomatic personnel in Mexico City had gOlle to the airport at about this time
on November 22. Again, there is no evidence CIA checked on this information.
61
port in a twin-engined aircraft at 10 :30 p.m. and boarded the Cubana
airlines plane without passing through customs, where he would have
needed to identify himself by displaying a passport. The individual
tl'aYelled to Cuba in the cockpit of the Cubana airlines plane, thus
again avoiding ident'ification by the passengers.60
In response to a Select Committee request of .January 9, 1976, the
CIA wrote it had no information indicating that a follow-up investigation
was conducted to determine the identity of the passenger and
had no further information on the passenger. and no explanation for
why a follow-up investigation was not conducteeJ.7°
In early December 1963, enn more intriguing information was received
by the CIA. and passed almost immediately to FBI. In the case
of the Cuban-American, a follow-up investigation was conducted.
Although the infonnation appeared to relate to the President's assassination
and one source alleged the Cuban-American was "involved"
in the assassination. the follow-up investigation was not conducted as
part of the FBI's work for the lVarren Commission.
The CIA leamed that this Cuban-AmPrican crossed the border from
Texas into Mexico on November 23.71 and that the border had been
closed by Mexican authorities immediately after the assassination and
reopened on November 23.72 The Cuhan-A.merican arrived in Mexico
City on Novemher 25. He stayed in a hotel until the evening of N0vember
27, when he departed on a late evening regularly scheduled
Cubana airlines flight to Havana, using a Cuban "courtesy visa" and
an expired U.S. passport. He was the only passenger on that flight,
which had a crew of nine.73 •.
In March 1964. the CIA I'ecein>d a report from a source which
alleged the Cubal~-Americanhad recei\'ed his permit to enter ~fexico
on November 20 in Tampa, Florida.74 The same source also said the
Cuban-American was somehow "involved in the 'assassination." 75
There is no indication that CIA followed-up on this report, except
to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban-American's
activities.76
The FBI did investigate this individual after receiving the CIA
report of his unusual travel. However, by the time the 'Warren Report
was published, the Cuban-American was still residing in Cuba and
therefore outside FBI's jurisdiction. Before the FBI terminated the
case, it had developed the following confusing and incomplete
information.
The Cuban-American applied for a U.S. passport at the U.S. Consul
Office in Havana in .Tune 1960.77 In .Tuly 1960, he was issued a passport,
but it was only valid nntil .Tanuary 1963, when he would become
23 years old.78
.. CIA cable from Headquarters to Mexico Station, 12/1/63.
70 Letter from CIA to Select Committee, 2/4/76.
71 CIA cable from Mexico Station to Headquarters, 12/3/63.
".. CIA cable from Mexico Station to Headquarters, 12/3/63.
'1:l CIA cable from Mexico Station to Headquarters, 12/5/63.
7. CIA cable from Mexico Station to Headquarters, 3/19/64.
7S Ibid.
7. Memorandum from CIA analyst to Helms, 5/11/64, attachment.
17 Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/63.
"Ill MemorandUm from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/63.
62
In May 1962 the Cuban-American requested that Cuban authorities
permit him to return to Cuba.80 The Cuhan-American's cousin said the
Cuban-American apparently did travel to Cuba sometime after May
1962, and spent sewral weeks there.8! In August 1962, the CubanAmerican
married an American woman. They lived in Key "Test until
June 1963, when they moved to Tampa. In August 19'63, his wife
moved back to Key ,:Vcst because of marital problems. His wife and
others characterized the Cuban-American as pro-Castro.82
The Cuhan-American allegedly told FBI sources that he had
originally left Cuba to evade Cuban military service. Nevertheless,
some sources told the FBI that the Cuban-American had ,returned to
Cuba in 1963 because he feared being drafted in the United States,
while others attributed his return to his worry about his parents or
about his own health.83
It was also reported to the FBI that the Cuban-American had a
brot/her in the Cuban military who was studying in the Soviet Union.84
On November 17, 1963, according to several sources, the CubanAmerican
was at a get-together at the home of a member of the Tampa
Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, where coloI' slides of
Cuba were shown.
There was some talk about the Cuban-American having been
at the reside,nee ror some time waiting for a telephone call
from Cuba which was very important. It was understood that
it all depended on hi.s getting the "go ahead order" for him to
leave the United States. He indicated he had been refused
travel back to his native Cuba ....85
On November 20, 1963. the Cuban-Anwrican obtained a Mexican
tourist card at the Honorary Consulate of Mexico in Tampa and on
November 23 crossed the border into Mexico at Nuevo Laredo.86 Since
the Cuban-American '"\"'as apparently not listed 'as the driver of any
vehicle crossing the border that day. the FBI concluded he crossed in
a privately owned automobile owned by another person.87
At a regular monthly meeting of the Tampa FPCC in December
1963, a woman told the group that she had telephoned Cuba at 5: 00
a.m. and was informed that the Cuban-American had arrived there
safely via Texas and Mexico.88 Another source reported that as of
September 1964, the Cuban-American was not working in Cuba hut
spent a great deal of time playing dominoes.89
The preceding was the extent of the FBI and the CIA investigation.
90 So rar as can be determined, neither the FBI nor the CIA told
80 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 6/7/62.
81 Memorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/26/64.
.. Memorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/64.
.. Memorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/64.
.. Memorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/31/64.
Il6 Memorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/31/64. Pref1ident
Kennedy made several public appearances in Tampa on November 18.
'" Memorandum from Mexico Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/5/63.
'" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to ~Iexico Field Office. 11/31/64.
'" Memorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/31/64.
.. Memorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/26/64.
DO A CIA employee did check the U.S. Paf1sport Office's file on this individual in
early December 1963, after the Mexico Station cabled a request for a check. In
May 1964, a defector from Cuban intelligence was asked if he knew anything
about this individual and he responded in the negative.
63
the 'Yarrrn Commission about the Cuban-American's strange travel.
'Yarrcn Commission files contain an excf'rpt of the FBI check on the
Cuban-American at the PasspOli, Officr. but nothing else. In responding
to tIl('. Commission's request for information on the ::\Iiami chapter
of the FPCC, FBI repOlied that the Tampa chapter had 16 members
in !flEi1 and was actin>, in ~fay !flEi3. The FBI response did not discuss
tIl(' Cuban-American or the Sovember and December 1963 meetings.91
~IoreoveT. a possible connection between Oswald and the Tampa
chapter of FPCC had alrrady been indicated. Oswald appli'ed to V. T.
T.Re. national prpsident of tIl(' FPCC. for a charter for a Kew' Orleans
chapt{'r. Lp,e wrote Oswald on May 29, 1963. suggesting Oswald get in
touch with tIl(' Tampa chapter. "'hich Lee had prrsonally organized 92
Thus, the suspicious travel of this individual coupled v,ith the possibility
that Oswald had contacted the Tampa chapter certainly should
have prompted a far more thorough and timely investigation than the
FBI con(lucte(l and the rpsults should have been volunteered to the
'Yarren Commission. regardless of its failure to request such infonnation.
In the two preceding cases tbr """arren Commission staff was apparently
not furnished with what now seems to be significant information
rrlating to possible Cuhan involvement. In other instancrs. thr
'Yarren Commission staff levied rC'quirrmrnts on the FBI for information
on pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups. apparently unaware
that othrr agencies could make a significant contrihution to the Commission's
work.
On March 26, 1964.•r. Lee Hankin. tIl(' GC'ncral Counsrl of thr
'Yarrrn CDlllmission. wrotr Director Hoover requesting the FBI to
furnish thr, Commission v,ith information on ceri,ain pro-Castro and
anti-Castro organizations which ,vere then actin' in the United
States."" In a letter of :May 20. 19M, R.ankin agaiu wrote Hoover:
As a result of my lettpT of ~Iarch 26. 1964. "'ith respect to
background materials on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee
and certain other subversive groups. it was agreed that your
Agency would await furi,hrr instructions from this
Commission.
The Commission would now appreciate yonI' providing tlhe
following infol1nation on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee,
".JUR.E." "DRE." Alpha 66. and 30th of November
~fovement."4
Rankin's letter went on to detail the natnre of the requested
infonnation :
1. all reporis from Dallas and Fort 'Vorth in 1963 on active members
of the groups;
2. summaries of tIl(' groups' activities in Texas in 1963; and
3. a general summary of tIl(' activities of such groups outside Texas
in 1963 with particular reference to activities in certain parts of the
country.9S
'" ~lpmorandum from Hoovrr to Rankin, 6/11/64.
.. Warren Commission Report. Yo1. XX, pp. 514-516.
ro Memorandum from Rankin to Hoover, 3/26/64.
.. Memorandum from Rankin to Hoover, 5/20/64.
Il6 Ibid.
64
FBI Director Hoover responded to this request on .Tune 11, 1964.
Enclosed with this letter were 15 reports on named individuals and 46
memoranda on the identified organizations.96 All 46 memoranda were
prepared by FBI field offices in various cities and all were dated after
~ray 20, 1964.97 In other words, it appears that FBI Headquarters
simply direet~d its field officp8 in identified cities to pr~pare the
responses. The individual responsible for preparing this response at
FBI Headquarters has not bf'Rn questioned by the Select Committee
on this matter. However his superior was asked whether he thought
the FBI response provided a fair and accurate picture of the information
FBI held on these groups.
Q. "Would you have received that corrrspondence rof June
11, 1964J and be asked whether it was an accurate or fair portrayal
of these [Cuban] groups?
A. ~0, because this correspondence would have been the results
of investigations we had conducted, regularly submitted
by investigative reports or by lett~rhead memos, and there
would be no need for me to review that and say this was a fair
portrayal of t,he investigation.98
In addition, Hoover's letter directed the Commission's attention to
the fact that the CIA and tIlE', Department of the Army "may have
pertinent infoI1uation concerning these organizations." 99 On the copy
of the letter not provided the W'arren Commission. but kept in FBI
files, tl1('re is a note which states that the CIA and the Department of
the Army in fact had "operational interests" in identified organizations
and ceriain individuals involved with these groups.l00 This FBI
letter alerted the 'Varren Commission to the fact that the Army and
CIA might provide "pert,inent information" on these groups and individuals,
hut it did not disclose the fact that those other two agencies
actually had an "operational interest," e.g., that those agencies might
be using the groups or individuals for intelligence collection or in
covert, operations. The Select Committee was unable to locate any documentary
evidence that the Commission pursued this mlttier with either
the CIA or the Army.
At this time the CIA was in fact funding and sponsoring the activities
of several anti-Castro groups.10l Although most CIA contacts with
these groups in the Fall of 1963 were for gathering intelligence and
issuing propaganda, paramilitary operations of these groups may
have received Agency support.
The Department of the AI1ny was in contact with the members and
leadership on one group. Apparently, the Army attempted to use individuals
assooiated with the group to collect intelligence on Cuba.102
W'hether pursuing these connections to the CIA and the Army would
have affected the 'Varren Commission's investigation is difficult to
til Memorandum from Hoover to Rankin, 6/11/64, with attachment.
., Ibid.
•• Section Chief, 5/11/76, p, 45,
.. Memorandum from Hoover to Rankin. 6/11/64, with attachment,
100 Memorandum from Hoover to Rankin. 6/11/64.
101 Memorandum from Hoover to Rankin, 6/11/64.
102 Letter from Department of Defense to Select Committee, 4/30/76.
65
determine. The ,Varren Commission might han' ashd the Army and
the CIA to usc their sources in t1ws(' groups to obtain additional information
on the groups' activities. More importantly. such infol'lnation
might have ginn the ,YalTen Commi"sion a brtte]' understanding
of the background of the individuals it was inwstigating. For
example, one Cuban in the Dallas area \Va" in\"estigated by the FBI
at the request of the ,Varren Commission. hecanse he \vas allPged to
be an agent of the Cuban gowrnment,"0'l The FBI agent who interviewed
the individual \vas apparently Ill] a\va re that this Cuban exile
was an approved, though nnnsed. source of Army inteJJigence in 1963
in an operation centered in the ~Iiami area and that he had been nsed
as a sonrm in 19G2 in ~iiami.iol
'The FBI reports on .\lpha 66 furnished the Commission did note
that Alpha 66 was responsible for an attack on a Soviet vessel in
~iarch 1963/°;; hnt di(I not (Ietail t:he fact that it had continued
planning paramilitary operations against Cuba.iOG These reports did
not include information. scattered through se\"eral other FBI reports.
that Alpha 66 had held discussions with other anti-Castro groups in
an attempt to unite their efforts.io' 'The FBI reports did not include
the fact that the Alpha 66's leaders in September 1963 had been negotiating
for the usc of aircraft with which to conduct raids against
Cuba, with tho8(\ involwd in a Xew Orleans anti-Castro training
camp.i08
Although the FBI informed the ,Van"en Commis;;;ion that the CIA
and the Army had "pertinent information" on some of these groups.
the Select Committee has been unahle to find any evidence to indicate
that the FBI itself contacted these otl1('r agem:ies. The Selrct Committee
has been unable to find evidence that either' the CIA or the
Army independently contacted their sources in these groups to determine
what they might be able to contrihute to the investigation.
The CIA also took an interest in the Fair' Plav for Cuha Committee
with which Os,va1cl \vas associated. According to the FBI documents.
on September 16.1963, the CIA advised the FBI that the "Agency is
giving some consideration to countering the activities of [the FPCC]
in foreign countries." 109 The memorandum continued:
CIA is also giving some thonght to planting deceptive information
which might embarrass the Committee in areas
where it docs have some support.
Pursuantto a discussion \"ith the Liaison Agent, [a middle
level CIA official working on anti-Castro propaganda] advised
that his Agency will not taJu. action without first consulting
with the Bureau, bearing in mind that we wish to
make certain t,he CIA activity will not jeopardize any Bureau
investigation.110
"" Memorandum from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/14/63.
10< Army Intelligence Dossier.
1<>; Memorandum from Miami Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 6/3/64.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
".. Ibid.
109 Memorandum from FBI liaison to Liaison Section Chief, 9/18/63.
110 Memorandum from"FBI liaison to Liaison Section Chief, 9/18/63.
66
The CIA specifically wanted the FPCC's foreign mailing list and
other documentB.l11 On September 26, 1963, FBI Headquarters wrote
its New York office about the proposed CIA operation, concluding:
Xew York should promptly advise whether the material requested
by CIA is available or obtainable, bearing in mind the
confidential nature and purpose of CIA's request. Ifavailable,
it should be furnished by cover letter with enclosures suitable
for dissemination to CIA by liaison.1l2
At the bottom of the Headquarters copy of this directive is the note:
'Ve have in the past utilized techniques with respect to
countering activities of mentioned organization in the U.S.
During Decpmber 1961, New York prepared an anonymous
leaflet which was mailed to selected FPCC members throughout
the country for purpose of disrupting FPCC and causing
split between FPCC and its Socialist 'Vorkers Party (SWP)
supporters, which technique was very effective. Also during
May 1961, a field survey was completed wherein available
public source data of adverse nature reagrding officers and
leaders of FPCC was compiled and furnished Mr. DeLoach
for use in contacting his sources. .
It is noted, with respect to present status of FPCC during
.July and August, 1963, several New York sources reported
FPCC was "on the ropes for lack of funds" and in danger of
being taken over by Progressive Labor members.ll3
By Airtel of October 4, 1963, the New York office responded to the
Headquarters directive saying: "The NYO plans to contact an (informant)
on about 10/27/63 amI it is believed possible that this source
will be able to furnish both of the above mentioned items." 114
By Airtel of October 28, 1963, the Xew York Office reported to
Headquarters:
"On 10/27/63, [the informantl was contacted by agents of
the New York office. This source furnished approximately 100
photographs of data pertaining to the current finances and
general activities of the FPCC. In addition, the source furnished
other documents and information regarding the
FPCC mailing list. After processing the photographs,
prompt dissemination will be affected and the material of
interest to CIA per referenced Bureau letter will be immediately
forwarded to the Bureau."
The FBI documentB indicate processing of the 100 photographs
was not completed before the asslLssination. The New
York office began an ex]wdited review of the material so obtained
on tIll' afternooll of the assassination to determine
whether it contained anything-about Oswald. This ,,-as mentioned
in a ~oYember 23 memorandum to 'Villiam Sullivan.
111 Ibid.
110 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office. 9/26/63.
113 Ibid.
11' Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,10i4i63.
67
That memorandum also reported the New York office's expedited
review uncovered a letter Oswald had "Titten Ted Lee
about Oswald's FPCC activities in Xew Orleans.ll5
By letter of November 27, the Xe,v York office wrote Headquarters
:
On 10/27/63, [the informant] furnished the above material
to agents of the NYO. Enclosed for Bureau are suitable for
dissemination, dated and captioned as above. containing information
furnished by [informant].ll6
Enclosed with this letter was a copy of "the foreign mailing list of
FPCC as of October 1963." 117
It should be noted that there is no reason to believe that any of this
FBI or CIA activity had any direct connection with Oswald. The
CIA could not have received the information it requested the FBI to
obtain until after the assassination, so there is no reason to think the
CIA propaganda program was underway before the assassination.
Although the FBI liaison was told by the CIA that any action the
CIA took against the FPCC would be cleared first with FBI,118 Bureau
documents do not indicate any reqllC'st for such clearance.
D. Knowledge of Plots to AS8m5sinate Oastro
The 'Varren Commission was concerned with the general subject
of political assassination. For rxample. the Commission requested information
from the State Department 1Hl on alleged attempts at political
assassination in other countries. However, none of these requests
involved the plots conceived by the CIA: and tIl(' 'Yan'en Commission
did not ask if the United States govemmrnt had sponsored assassination
attempts.
'Vith the exception of Allen Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on
the Warren Commission knew of CIA assassination efforts. Former
Senator .Tohn Sherman Cooper, a nwmher of the Commission. adYised
the Select Committee that the subject never came up in the Commission's
deliberations.12O Lee Rankin, Chief Counsel for the 'Yarren
U5 ~Ipmorandum from Xew York Fipld Office to FBI Headquartprs, 10/28/63.
A copy of what prohahly is the samp letter was turned oypr to the Warren Commission
hy Ted Lee. 'Varren Commission files at. the Archivps contained information
that may have corne from these photog'raphs of documents. However,
Warren Commission files contain no reference to any CIA interest in FPCC or
to the FBI operation which yiplded thp mailing' list.
u6Memorandum from Xew York Field Office' to FBI Headquarters, 11/27/63,
w/attachment.
117 Ibid.
118 Memorandum from FBI liaison to Liaison Sf'ction Chif'f. 9/18/63.
119 State Department Information Report 2/1/55. rf': Assassination of President.
Remon of Panama. Commission Document. #279; State Department Information
Report, 5/10/57, re: Attemptpd Assassination of Vice President Chang
Myon, Repuhlic of Korea. Commission Document #280; State Department Information
Report, 5/24/62, re: Attempted Assassination of President Sukarno,
Indonesia, Commission Document #283; Statp Dppartmpnt Information Report.
6/14/62, re: Attempted Assassination of Presidpnt Sukarno. Indonpsia. Commission
Document #284; Statf' Departnwnt Information Rf'port. 9/27/62, re: Attempted
Assassination of President deGaulle. Commission Document #2R5:
State Df'partment Information Rf'port. 1/25/63. re: Presidpnt Olympio, Togo,
Commission Document #2R6.
12<) Staff discussion with Ambassador John Sherman Cooper. 5/24/76.
68
Commission, and Burt Griffin, Howard 'Willens, and David Belin of
the Commission staff have all stated they were not aware of the CIA
plots.m
Manv government officials, hm,'ever, were aware that the CIA used
the lm;lerworld in attempts to assassinate Castro. Attorney General
Kennedv had bern informed of these plots,122 and FBI Director Hoover
knew O;ere had hepn such o]wrations,"" Allen Dulles, who had heen
Dirrrtor of Central Intrlhgencr until Xowm]wr 1061, was a member
of tl)(' ,Vancil Commission, and knew of the CIA plots ,vith underworl(
l figures which had taken place during his tenure at the Agency.'"
Since CIA, FBI, and .Tustice Depalimrnt files all contained information
about these plots wit h the underworld, any number of government
officials may haY(' known that the CIA had attempted to assassinate
Castro. '
~en>Ttl1('less, it might haw appearerl to t!wse gov('rnn1Pnt officials
that there was no clear reason to connect th('se underworld plots to
the President's assassination. Most government officials who were
aware of them probably assumpd they had pnded in 1962, Since that
time, the Cuban missile crisis had occurred and U.S,-Cuban hostility
had cooled. Officials at both the CIA and the FBI were aware that
,Villiam Harvey had told his underworld contacts in early 1963 that
the CIA was no longer interested in Castro's assassination.1M So these
unsuccessful plots were officially terminated well before President
Kennedy's assassination.
Moreover, Fidel Castro probably would not have been certain that
the CIA was behind the underworld attempts. Elements of the underworld
and of the Cuban exile community which were not affiliated in
any way with CIA were also interested'in assassinating Castro. It is
unlikely that Castro could have distinguished the CIA plots with the
underworld from those plots not backed by the CIA, In fact, the
methods the CIA used in these attempts were designed to prevent the
Cuban government from attributing them to the CIA.126
The AMLASH operation was clearly different. CIA case officers,
not underworld figures, were in direct contact with AMLASH
and told him they ,,,ere with the CIA. rpon meeting A~ILASH, ~Ir.
Fitzgerald, a senior CIA official, told him that he was the personal
representatiw, of Attornev Genernl Robert Kennedv.127 Fitzgoerald
and the case officer assured AMLASH that his proposed coup had the
support of the United States government128 Thus, if anyone learned
of the operation, he would have known that the CIA was clearly
responsible for it .
In addition, the A"MLASH operation was nndrrway at the time of
the President's assassination. ,VJ1i1r the assassinatioil plots against
Castro, whioh im'olved the underworld, may not have been considered
121 Letter from Burt Griffin to David Belin. 4/7/75. p. 3: staff interview with
Howard Willins, 5/12/76; memorandum from Belin to the Rockefeller Commission
5/20/75, p. 1. ! =Assassination Report, pp. 130-131.
t>:llliid.
'"" Assassination Report, pp. 91-92.
," Memorandum of FBI liaison to CIA, 6/20/63.
12Al1967 I.G. Report, p. 55.
127 1967 LG. Report, pp. 88-91.
12Al Ibid.
69
relevant to the President's assassination, the A~[LASHoperation had
particular sig·nificance.
Vrry few indiyiduals in the rnited States gOH'rllmrnt knew of the
A~[LASH plot. Mr. ~[cCone, who ,vas then Director of Central Intellig-
e,nce, testified he did not know of the AMLASH operation.
Q. ",Vere you aware of any effort to assassinate ~fr. Castro
through an agent known as AMLASH?
A. No.
Q. I would like to draw your attention to rthe fact that]
at thr nry moment President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer
was meeting- with a Cuban ag-ent ... and offering him
an assassination device for use ag-ainst Castro.
I take it you didn't hear anything about that operation?
A. [Indicates "NO"].129
)[r. Helms, who was Deputy Director for Plans. knew of the operation.
althoug-h he would not charactprize the operation as an assassination
plot.130 The casp officer. ,,-ho met "ith A~[LASH on Non>
mber 22. similarly rejectpd such a charaeterization.l3l
Srveral indiyiduals on the CIA Special Affairs Staff knew of the
operation. but they were not in direct contact with the ",Varren Commission.
Desmond Fitzgerald, Chief of SAS. knew of the operation,
as did his executi,-e officer who has testified that he reg-arded it as an
assassination plot.132 The Chief of SAS Counterintelligence also knew
of thr opprntioll. aIHI trstified that he rrg-arded it as an assassination
plot.133 Others "'ithin thr SAS who hail access to the AMLASH file
obYiously kne,v about the operation but, since there is no record of the
poison pen in that file. they may not ha,-e known that key fact. Those
CT:\ trchnicians who fabricated the pen would have been aware of its
c\:istence, but probably would not haye known anything else about the
operation.
•Tanws Ang-leton, whose Counterintelligence Division conducted
CTA research for the ",Varren Commission, has testified that he was
not a,varp of the A:~ILASH operation. although he did suggest that
Ill' had reason to susppct there was something to Harvey's meetings
with "underworld figures." 134 His a,<;sistant, who was made "point of
record" for the ",Varren Commission, has stated he did not know of any
assassination plots against Castro.135 In 1975, after being questioned
129 .Tohn McCone testimony. 6/6/75, p, 59; Assassination Report. pp. 99-100.
130 Helms' testimony, 6/13/75, pp. 133, 135; See Assassination Report, pp.
174-176, for further discussion.
Ln Case Officer testimony. 2/11/76, p. 22. =Executive Officer testimony, 4/22/76, p. 15.
l3'l Chipf, SAS/CI testimon~-. ;'/10/76, p. 24.
"" Angleton testimony, 2/6/76. pp. 31-34. It is important to note that Mr.
Angleton testified he was often in contact with Dulles after the latter had left
thp Agency. Angleton testified that Dulles consulted with him bpfore agreeing to
President .Johnson's request that he be on the Commission and that he was in
frequent contact with Dulles. Angleton has also indicated that hI' and Dulles
informally discussed the progress of the Commission's investigation and that
Dullps consulted with him about what further investigation the CIA could do.
So if Dulles relied solely on Angleton to discretely check matters, which Dulles
did not feel the entire Commission should know about, he would not have learned
of the AMLASH operation.
,.. Staff interview of CIA analyst, 3/15/76.
70
by the Rockefeller Commission on this point, he noted knowledge of
an ongoing assassination plot might have changed his thinking about
Oswald's Mexican trip.u6
Thomas Karamessines. who had some contact 'Yith the Commission,
has testified that he was nnaware of t:he CIA assassination plotsY7
TIllis, according to the testimony, Mr. Helms was the only CIA
official who was both in contact wit.h the 'Varren Commission and
knowledgeable of the A~ILASH operation. On sen~ral occasions Mr.
Helms has been CjnestiOlll'd about whether he informed the 'Varren
Commission of the CIA assassination plots.
CnAIRl\L\X CHURCII: Since vou had knowledge of the CIA
involvement in these assassination plots against Castro rfrom the context the question is not specifically focused on
the AMLASH plot], and knew it at the time ... I would
haye thought ... that ought to haye been related to the
Commission. because it does bear on the motives whatever
else. .
]\fR. HELMS: ... Mr. Allen Dulles was a member of the
'Yarren Commission. And the first assassination plot happpned
during his time as director. 'Vhat he said to the Warren
Commission about this ... I don't know. But at least he
was sitting right there in fthe Commission'sJ deliberations
and knew about this. and I am sure that the same t.hought
that occurred to you must have occurcd to him.138
SENATOR MORGAN: ... fin 1963J you were not just
an employee of the CIA. You were in the top echelon, the
management level, were you not?
MR. HELl\IS : Yes, I was Senator ~Iorgan....
SENATOR MORGAN: ... you had be~n part of an assassination
plot against Castro?
MR. HELMS: I was aware that there had been efforts made
to get rid of him by these means.
SENATOR MORGAN: ... you weI';> charged with furnishing
the Warren Commission information from the CIA, information
that you thought was relevant?
MR. HELM : No sir. I was instructed to reply to inquiries
from the 'YflITen Commission for information from the
Agency. I ,yas not asked to initiate any particular thing.
SENATOR }IORGAN: ... in other words if you weren't
asked for it, you didn't give it.
~1R. HELMS: That's right, sir.139
~Ir. Helms also stated that he thought the 'Varren Commission
could have relied on public knowledge that the United States wanted
"to get rid of Castro."
I don't recall that I ,,'as either instructed or it occurred to me
to cover with the 'Varren Commission the precise ddails of
the Agency's operations not because I made n significant
,..., Memorandum from CIA analyst, 4/2/75.
137 Karamessines, 4/18/76. p. 32.
138 Helms testimony, 7/18/75, pp. 3e--37.
130 Helms testimony, 7/17/75, pp. 118-119.
71
judgment not to do this, but . my recollection at the time
was that it was public knowlrdge that the Unitrd States was
trying to get rid of Castro.140
In trstimony before tlw Rorkrf(']]er Commission. MI'. Helms was
directly askrd' wh('tlwr he linkrd Os\yald's pro-Cuban activity with
the possibility that Castro had retaliated for CIA attempts against
him.
Q. Now, after President K('nnedy was assassinated iIi.
Novemb<.'r 1963. and after it became known to vou that the
individuaL Lee Harvev Oswald. was believed {-erv broadly
to have dOlH'. the shootiilg, that Oswald had had some actiyity
in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee ... did yon hold any
conversations \vith anybody about the possibIlity that th'r
assassination of Prrsident Krnnrdv was a retailiation by
Oswald against the actiYity. thr talk~ and plans to assassinat'r
Castro?
A. No, I don't rrcall discussing that with anybody. I don't
recall the thought ever having occurred to m(' at the time.
The first time I ey('r lward such a theory as that enuniciated
was in a very peculiar way by Pr('sidrnt .Johnson....
Q. I am not asking you about a story. Ambassador. I am
asking yon whetlwl' or not there was a relationship between
Oswald's contacts with thp Cuban's. and his support for the
Castro government. his attempts in Septrmber 1963 to get a
passport to Cuba. to trawl to Cuha. his attrmpts to penetrate
anti-Castro groups. Did this connection en'r enter your mind?
A. I don't recall its having done SO.141
Mr. Helms also testified he did not believe the A~IL.ASH operation
was relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's
assassination.112
The testimony of the AMLASH Case Officer is similar. He stated.
"I find it wry difficult to link the A~fLASH operation to the assassination.
I find no wav to link it. I did not know of anv other CIA
assassination attempts against Fidel Castro, so I han: nothing to
link." 143
Director HoO\-er knew of CIA effort to assassinate Castro using
underworld contacts. "Thill' Hoover may have assumed that those
plots terminated in 1(Hl2. in .June 1963. the FBI learned that William
Harvey had told his underworld contacts that the CIA was no longer
interested in assassinating Castro. In OctObel' 1963, an informant reported
to the FBI that the CIA had recently been meeting with a
Cuban official (Al\ILASH). but there is no evidence the FBI then
had actual knowledge of the assassination aspect of the operation invol\-
ing the Cuban.144
After receiving a report of an assassination plot against Castro in
.January 1964. the FBI liaison to the CIA checked to see if the CIA
was involved in the plot.l45 According to a memorandum prepared by
1<0 Helms testimony, 6/13/75, p. 82.
m Richard Helm>; te>;timony. Rockefeller Commi>;~ion, 4/24/75. lIP. 3Sfl--3!H.
1... Helm>; testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 4/24/75, pp. 389---391-2.
1<3 Case Officer testimony, 7/29/75. p. 116.
1.. Memorandum from Miami Field Office to FBI Headqnarters. 10/10/63.
The FBI knew the true name of the Cuban official, but was unaware that he
had been code-named.
146.Memorandum from FBI liaison, 1/24/64.
72
the FBI liaison: "The Agency currently is not involved in any activity
whic:h includes plans to assassinate Castro." 146 This memorandum
was <listributed to two Section Chiefs, and to the Bureau supervisor
responsible for anti-Castro activities. In February, this information
was passed to at least one field office.
In late .July 1964, an FBI infonnant again reported that the CIA
had meetings wiNl the Cuban official (A~fLASI-I). This report indicates
that the purpose of those meetings had been to plan the assassination
of Castro.147 The informant repOlied that the Cuban official had
been unhappy with the CIA response and that Attorney General Kennedy
had refused to support the plan.148 He also reported that the
plan had not been completely put to rest.149 Because the informant requested
that tlhe Bureau not inform the CIA or the ,Yhite House about
this report, it was not disseminated outside the FBI. Headquarters
advised the field office in contact with the informant, to keep them advised.
15O The FBI supervisor involved noted on his copy of t,he communication
to the field office, that the Bureau, acting on orders from
the Attorney General, was investigating a reported underworld plot
against Castro, and that this might be the same as the alleged plot
involving the Cuban (AMLASH).
In hindsight, the. AMLASH operation seems very relevant to the
investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. It is difficult· to
understand why those aware of the operation did not t:hink it relevant,
and did not inform those investigating President Kennedy's assassination
of possible connections between that operation and the
assassination.
The Desk Officer who was in charge of the initial CIA investigation
of President Kennedy's assassination, first learned of the AMLASH
operation when he testified before the Sele,ct Committee:
Q. Did you know that on November 22, 1963, about the
time Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA case officer was passing
a poison pen, offering a poison pen to a high level Cuban to
use to assas.<;inate Castro ?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Would you have drawn a link in your mind between
that and the Kennedv assassination?
A. I certainly think that that would have been-become an
absolutely vital factor in analyzing the events surrounding
the Kennedy assassination,151
Several Warren Commission staff members have also stated that a
connection between CIA assassination operations and President
Kennedy's assassination should have been investigated. For example,
". Ibid.
'" Memorandum from )fiami Field Office to FBI Headquarter, 7/29/64.
,.. Ibid.
". Ibid.
]$) Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 8/8/63.
151 Desk Officer, 5/7/76, pp. 31, 32.
73
Mr. Belin, Executive Director of the Rockefeller Commission and
Counsel to the vVarren Commission wrote:
At no time did the CIA disclose to the 'Warren Commission
any facts "'hich pertained to alleged assassination plans to
kill Fidel Castro . . . .
The CIA withheld from the 'Van'en Commission information
whioh might have been relevant ... in light of the
allegations of conspiratorial contact betweRn Oswa.lc! and
agents of the Cuban government.'52
Another former 'Varren Commission staff counsel, .Judge Burt
Griffin, expressed his views on the matter. Judge Griffin wrote Belin
expre..%ing his opinion that assassination plots against Castro might
have a significant effect on the 'Yarren Commission findings:
As you can see, my questions are prompted by two underlying
theories: First, if Castro or Castro sympathizers, feared a
U.S. fostered effort on his life, it is likely that they might
have tried to assassinate Kennedv first. Second. if the CIA
suspected that pro-Castro individ~Ials, in addition to Oswald,
were behind the assassination of .John F. Kennedy, they
would have considered retaliation against Castro. Those
theories lead not only to the issue aT possible conspirators
with Oswald, but also his motive.153
The Chief of SAS Counterintelligence was asked whether it was
reasonable to make a connection between AMLASH and President
Kennedy's assassination:
Q. 'Yould you quarrel with individuals who had the same
knowledge you did-and who have testified that they did not
draw such a connection?
A. That they did not draw a connection?
Q. Yes. .
A. I couldn't quarrel with them, no.
Q. In other words, you think knowledgeable officials,
knowledgeable of both the Kennedy assassination investigation
and of the AMLASH operation. . . .
A. I think it would have been logical for them to consider
that there could be a connection alld to have explored it on
their mvn.'54
The CIA Inspector General seemed to make a connection. Desmond
Fitzgerald's Executive Officer testified about being interviewed in 1967
by the Inspector General:
Q. Did [member of Inspector Grneral's staff] ask you
about any connections between the Kennedy as,'>assination and
CIA plots against Castro?
A. No. The only comment I think he made was something
to the effect that it was strange and ironic that the day
''''' Memorandum from David Belin to the Rockefeller Commission, May 20,
1975, p.l.
"" Letter from Burt Griffin to David Belin, 4/7/75, p. 3.
,.. Chief SAS/CI testimony, 5/10/76, p. 21.
74
Kennedy died the case officer was trying to give A~ILASH
a paison .pen. That is the only connection that I remember.':>:;
Finally. the CIA analyst, who was the "point of record" coordinating
the CIA research for the 'Varren Commission, prepared a memoranrlmn
stating he was unaware of the plots until 1$)75. and expressing
concern about the 'Vancn Commission's findings in light of this new
infonnation.m• . .
The conduct of the A~rLASH operation during the fall of 1()()~,
should have raisC'd major conceI1lS within the CIA about its possible
connection with the Kennedy assassination. The Chief of SAS Counterintelligence
has testified he was always concerned about the operation's
security.'·' Indeed, various reports received by the CIA during
the fall of 1963 contained informat'ion which should have raised questions
about the operation's security. In 1965, when CIA til'S to the
Cubans involved in the AMLASH operation were severed, the Chief
of SAS Counterintelligence pointed out the security problems in the
operation.'""
Among other things noted in that memorandum is the possibility
that AMLASH had been a provocation, i.e., an agent sent by Cuban
intelligence to provoke a certain reaction from the CIA.159
Until Select Committee staff informed officials at the CIA, the
Agency was unaware that in October 1963 the FBI had received a
report that the CIA was meeting with AMLASH.160 That report contained
information which indicates that the FBI informant knew the
date and location of one of the meetings.161 In July 1964, the informant
gave the FBI additional details about the AMLASH operation,
including the fact that the operation had involved assassination
plotting.162 Thus, an operation the, CIA felt to hf' extraordinarily
sensitive, perhaps so sensitive that its existenc(' could not b(' disclosed
to the Warren Commission, was known to at least one FBI informant
in the United States.
Finally, the oprration should have been of concern because Desmond
Fitzg-erald had personally met with AMLASH. The Chief of the CIA
JMWAVE station testified that Fitzgerald had asked him if he should
meet with AMLASH. The Chief told Fitzgerald that he should not
meet AMLASH because such a meeting could prove very embarrassing
for the CIA, if AMLASH was working for Cuban intelligence.
My recollection of this AMLASH case is as follows. At
some point in time, I had a conversation with Desmond Fitzgerald
in Washington during one of my periodic visits to
=Executive Officer, 4/22/76, p. 44.
'" J\femorandumfor the record from CIA analyst, 4/1/75.
157 Chief, SAS/CI testimony, 5/10/76, pp, 23-24,
1M Undated memorandum from Chief, SAS/CI to Chief, WHD Cuba.
159 Undated memorandum from Chief, SAS/CI to Chief, WHD Cuba.
160 In 1965 the FBI did pass to CIA information that they receivE'd from "A"
that he was aware of the AMLASH operation, Th4?Y offered til(' 'CIA thE' opportunity
to interrogate "A", but the FBI did not pass to the CIA infonnation reviewed
in OctobE'r 1963.
181 Memorandum from Miami Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/10/63.
162 Memorandum from Miami Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/29/64.
75
'Washington from Miami. 'VI' discussed at that meeting the
nature of our approach to the military establishment in Cuba.
In the context of that conversation, ~1r. Fitzgerald asked
me if whether I thought it ,,-ould be a good idea for him to
meet one of these Cuban military personalities, and he subsequently
identified to me the personality he was talking
about was A;\1LASII. ;\1y adYice to him was that it would
probably not be a good idea for him to meet him, am] the, only
thing that I could see coming out of that kind of contact
would be ... a personal feel for what makes some. of these
people tick, in human terms. and that that was too high a
price to pay for the prospect if anything went wrong....163
The Chief SAS/Counterintelligence had similar reservations. When
questioned about the security of the A~1LASH operation, he testified:
Q. Did you know back in November 1963 that the CIA was
meeting with A~fLASH?
A. Yes, and I had expressed my reseryations about such a
meeting. I didn't consider him to be responsible.
Q. Did you know that :\11'. Fitzgerald met with AMLASH
in late October of 1963?
A. I believe I did. I have yague recollections of that now,
yes.
Q. 'What was the purpose of that meeting?
A. I believe this was related to the assassination. an assassinat,
ion plot against Castro, and as to this I had reference
before. I couldn't recall the exact time frame, but I thought
it was nonsense. I thought it would be counterproductive
if it had been successful, so I opposed it.
Q. Did you know that ~f r. Fitzgerald went ahead with it?
A. Yes. :Mr. Fitzgerald and I did not always agree.
Q. But he told you he was going ahead with the operation?
A. I expressed my reservations about it. He went ahead.
He didn't ask my permission. He was my bossYH
Thus, information on the A;\fLASH operation, an operation which
those who investigated the assassination of President Kennedy now
believe would ha,-e been rele,-ant to their inquiries, was not supplied
to either the Warren Commission or the FBI. Even the CIA personnel
responsible for investigating the assassination were not informed of
the operation.
160 Chief, JMWAVE, testimony 8/19/75, pp. 79-80.
"" Chief, SAS/CI, 5/10/76, pp. 20, 21.
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