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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

V. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE WARREN COMMISSION
Before the Warren Commission issued its report on the assassination
of President Kennedy on September 24, 1964, both the CIA and the
FBI had assured the Commission that they would never close the
case. \Vhen appearing before the \Varren Commission, CIA Deputy
Director for Plans Hichard Helms stated:
Q.... after the Commission completed its report you
would keep the matter opcn if thcrc was anything ncw that
deYcloped in the future that could be properly presented to
the authorities?
A. Yes. I would assume the casc will ncvcr be cloS€cU
FBI Director Hooycr made a similar statemcnt before the \Yarren
Commission:
... so far as the FBI is concerned, the case will be continued
in an opcn classification for all time.2
A. 1.965: ]'cl'lninatioll of the All!LASH Operation
Although 1965 developments in thc AMLASH operation should
have raised questions about the possibility of a connection between
that operation and the President's assassination, there is no evidence
that either the FBI or the CIA innstigated such a possibility.
As the Select Committee's Assassination Report noted:
Toward the latter part of 196-1. AMLASH became more insistent
that the assassination of the Cuban leadership was a
necessary initial step in a successful COUp.3
A fall 1964 memorandum states:
AMLASH was told and fully understands that the United
States Goyernment cannot become involved to any degree in
the "first step" of his plan. If he ne.eds support, he realizes
he will have to get it elsewhere.
FYI: This is where B-1 could fit in nicely in giving any
support he would request.4
AMLASH and B-1 were then put in contact with one another, and B-1
kept the CIA informed of their plotting.5
In early 1965, the Agency began receiving indications that the
AMLASH operation was not secure. By that time a number of other
1 Helms testimony, 5/14/64, Vol. V, Warren Commission Hearings, p. 124.
2 Hoover testimony, 5/14/64, Vol. V, Warren Commission Hearings, p. 100.
• Assassination Report, p. 89.
'Ibid.
"Ibid., pp. 89-90.
(77)
78
individuals outside the CIA had been brought into the operation,
and the Agency learned that one of these individuals was in clandestine
conbaet with Cuban intelligence.6
Several months later, "A," a Cuban exile who had been involved
in transporting explosives to New Orleans in 1963, contacted the
Immigration and Naturalization Service with information about the
AMLASH operation. This information was turned over to the FBI
which informed the CIA. Representatives from both agencies interrogated
"A" jointly in June 1965.7 The interrogation established that
the Cuban exile knew that (1) AMLASH and others were planning
a coup which involved the assassination of Castro, and (2) the CIA
had been involved with AMLASH and others in the plotting.
Although "A" claimed that he and AMLASH were lifelong friends,s
the reports of the interrogation do not indicate that he knew of the
fall1V63 AMLASH-CIA meetings.9 The 1967 I.G. Report noted that
informat,ion given by "A" suggested a link between the AMLASH
operation and the 1960-1962 CIA plots to assassinate Castro using
underworld contacts. In other words, the information "A" provided
raised the possibility that underworld figures who were aware of the
assassination plots in which 'William Harvey participated, may have
also been aware of the AMLASH operation.10
On .Tuly 2. 1965, the FBI sent some of the details obtained from the
interrogation to the 'White HousC'. thC' AttornC'y GC'neral, and then DCI,
Admiral Rabom.ll The CIA reaction tQ the information was to
terminate the C'nti!'e A~ILASH operation. It cabled its stations:
Convincing proof that entire x~n....\SH group insecure and
that further contact with key members of group constitutes a
menace to CIA operations.... Undpr no circumtances are
newly assigned staff personnel or newly recnlited agents to
be exposed to the operation.C12
In an undated memorandum, the Chil'f of SAS Counterintelligl'nce
wrote:
The AMLASH circle is wide and each new friend of whom
we learn seems to have knoweldge of plan. I believe the problem
is a more serious and basic one. Fidel reportedly knew
that this group was plotting against him and once enlisted
its support. HencC', ,ve cannot rule out the possibility of
provocationY
In mid-1965, the CIA interrogated AMWHIP one of the Cuban
exiles who had been involved with the AMLASH operation from the
• Gable from European station to CIA Headquart.ers. 3/18/65.
7 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/2/65.
8 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/2/65.
• Ibid.
10 I.G. Report, p. 103.
U Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 7/2/65.
12 Cable from CIA Headquarters to various European Stations and JMWAVE
Stfltion. 6!Z3/fi5 in AMWHIP fill'.
,. Undated memorandum from Chief. SAS/CI to Chief WHD.
"Provocation" in this context is the use of an agent by an intelligence agency
to induce a response from another intelligence agency.
79
beginning; a person who knew about the meetings between AMLASH
and the CIA case officers in the fall of 1963. The report of the interrogation
cautioned that analysis of the results was difficult since the
examination was conducted in English and the subject had difficulty
understanding the questions. The report recommended a second examination
be conducted in Spanish. Nevertheless, the report tentatively
concluded that the subject was deceptive during the interrogation and
withheld pertinent information in one or more relevant areas.H
The report noted that the subject apparently lied in response to
certain questions dealing with AMLASH and with both the subject's
and AMLASH's ties to Cuban intelligence.'5 During the examination,
the subject told the interrogator that AMLASH had no plan to overthrow
Castro and that the subject had never considered AMLASH's
various activities as constituting a plan for such an objective.I6 The
subject said AMLASH never controlled a viable group inside Cuba
which could attempt a coup against Castro.17 The subject said
AMLASH had strong connections with Cuban intelligence and was
probably cooperating with it in various ways. Although AMLASH
had not mentioned these connections to his CIA case officers, the subject
stated that AMLASH had mentioned them to him, and almost
everyone else AMLASH met.'8 There is no record of a second interrogation.
The last documents in the file on this individual are dated only
months after this interrogation, indicating that the CIA terminated
all contact with him.
Although the CIA had received information that the AMLASH
operation was insecure and the possibility that AMLASH was a "provocation,"
there is no evidence that the CIA investigated the possibility
of a connedion between its fall 1963 meetings with AMLASH, and
the assassinat:ion of President Kennedy. Moreover, CIA files contained
at least some FBI reports on "A" the Cuban exile who was involved
in transporting explosives to New Orleans in 1963. These reports detail
his involvement with anti-Castro exilaq and underworld figures who
were operating the guerrilla training camp in New Orleans in July
1963.
The FBI clearly made the connection between "A's" 1963 activities
and the fact that in 1965 he was knowledgeable of CIA
involvement in plans to a&qassinate Castro.'9 But there is no evidence
that either the FBI or the CIA made any investigation of this connection.
It was not until 1967 that both the AMLASH operation
and the President's assassination, including the facts developed in
1965, were reviewed by either agency.'9S
1< Report of Interrogation.
,. Report of Interrogation.
11 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Unaddressed memorandum from FBI Headquarters, 6/4/65.
'" It should be noted that the committee found no conclusive evidence that
Castro was aware of AMLASH's 1963 dealings with the CIA.
During Senator McGovern's recent trip to Cuba, he was provided with a
notebook containin~ details of nUIllProus assassination plots a~ainst Castro
which Castro believed were CIA inspired. AMLASH's 1963 meetings with the
CIA were not mentioned within this notebook.
80
B. 1967: Allegations of Ouban Involvement in the Assassination
In late January 1967, 'Vashington Post columnist Drew Pearson
met with Chief Justice Earl Warren. Pearson told the Chief .Tustice
that a Washington lawyer had told him that one of his clients said the
United States had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early
1960's,20 and Castro had decided to retaliate. 21 Pearson asked the
Chief Justice to see the lawyer; however, he declined. The Chief
Justice told Pearson that it would be necessary to inform Federal
investigative authorit.ies, and Pearson responded that he preferred
that the Secret Service rather than the FBI be notified.22
On January 31, 1967, the Chief .Tustice informed Srcrpt Service
Director James .J. Rowley of the allegations. Rowley testified:
The way he [the Chief Justice] approached it, was that he
said he thought this was serious enough and so forth, but he
wanted to get it off his hands. He felt that he had to-that it
had to be told to somebody, and that the 'Warren Commission
was finished, and he wanted the thing pursued, I suppose, by
ourselves or the FBI.23
According to Rowley, 'Varren and Pearson arranged for the lawyer
to see him on February 8, 1967.24 On February 10, 1967, Rowley told
the Chief .Tustice that neither Pearson nor the lawyer had called, and
that he would forward the information to the Bnreau.25
On February 13, 1967, Rowley wrote Hoover informing him of the
allegations. HoO\"er immediately sent the Rowley letter to six senior
Bureau officials on all "eyes only" hasis.26 FBI files contain no record
of internal meetings or discussions concerning the allegations. Super-
.. The Select Committee found concrete evidence of at least eight plots invoh"ing
the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965. Each of these plots is
described in detail in the Committee's Assassination Report.
21 Memorandum from Rowley to Hoover, 2/13/67.
Secret Service Director James J. Rowley confirmed the allegations detailed
in that memorandum in his testimony before the Committee on February 13,
1976. The Secret Service has informed the Committee that they do not have
copies of either the 2/13/67 Rowley memo or the 2/15/67 FBI response, or any
other materials pertaining to the Rowley-Warren meeting or the retaliation
allegation.
"" Memorandum from Rowley to Hoover, 2/13/67.
"" James J. Rowley testimony, 2/13/76, p. 17.
Rowley also testified that the Chief Justice did not state whether this was the
first time he had heard that the United States Government had plotted to assassinate
Castro. (Rowley, 2/13/76, p. 16.)
.. The lawyer testified that no such meeting was ever arranged or even discussed
with him.
25 :\fl'morandum from Rowll')' to Hoover, 2/13/67; ml'morandum from Rosen to
DeLoach, 2/14/67.
It was Rowley's understanding that either Pearson or the lawyer was to meet
with him on February R. 1967, or else contact him to arrange a meeting on
another date. Rowley still had not heard from either by February 10, 1967, and
he decided to forward the information to the FBI. (Rowley, 2/13/76, p. 20.)
Assistant FBI Dirl'ctor Cartha DI'Loach later informerl :\Iarvill Wat!'\on
that Rowley had "made several attempts to contact" the lawyer, hut the lawyer
rl'fllsl'd to kel'p the appointments. (:\femorandum from DI'I..oach to Tolson,
3/17/67. Neitlll'r Rowley nor the lawyer rl'called any !'\uch attempts.)
.. Bureau personnel have testified that use of the "eyes only" classification on
internally disseminated material was extremely rare. This classification was
employed only when material was extremely sensitive.
81
yisory prrsonncl assigned to the assassination inn'stigation have uniformly
testified that they do not recall el'eJ' discussing 01' re,'iewing
mrmol'ancla. ,,'hich touch upon Cuban invol n>mrllt in the assassination,
OJ' the possibility of Cuban rrtaliation for C1.\ assassination attempts,
TIll' f-'llprlTisol' in the (jpnrl'al Inn>stigatin> Di,'ision ,,'ho ,,'as
assigned rrsponsibility for the assassination caSe in ~rarch HHi4 drafted
tlIP FBI n'sponsc to thr Rowlry kttpl'. AIthough srniol' Hurrau officials
harl bppn tolrl of CL\ assassination attempts against Fidrl
Castro in 1$162 this slllwnisor har] lwver lwfore lward eH>n allrgations
of sllch attrlllpts. 27 The sup(>lTisor tpstifird that when thr Rowley
lrttrr came to his attrntion~ he asked the DOl1lPstic Intplligrnce Diyision
whrther there was any Cuban inHll\'pmrnt in the assassination,2~
He SUlllll1arizpd its response as follows:
In connection with the allegation regarding the alleged Castro
conspiracy~ the Domestic Intelligence Division advised that
during the im'estigation of Lee HalTey Oswald no evidence
,,'as uncoyercd indicating the Cuban Government had any
involvement in the assa.ssination. Sensitive and reliable
sources of the Bureau and CIA reported Oswald was unknown
to Cuban Goyernlllent officials "'hen he yisited the
Cuban Consulate in ~rpxico City on fl/2i /{m~ and attempted"
without success~ to ;!:pt a visa for travel to Cuba, Secretary
of Stat(' Dean Husk testified before the Commission on
6/10/64, anr] stated there was ",'erv considerable concel'll" in
Cuba il1ll11ediatelv follmvin!! the a~sassination as to whether
Cuba would be he'ld respons~ble for the assassination and what
effect the assassination might havp on Cuba~s position and
security.29
The supenisor t('stified that ~ on the basis of this response ~ he believed
the possibility of Cuban ill\'olvPlllent in the assassination had been
thoroughly innstigatpd, nnr] that t]l('J'(' ,,'as no substnul'P to t]l(' alh'gations
Rowley hadl'ecein>(1.30
On Febr]'lUlT Hi, 1!J67, Cartha DeLoach rpcpi,'er] a Il1PIl10ralHlulll
with a propose~l FBI n>ply to Rowh'y's lettpr. The nl('1l10ralHIlllll staterl
that "no ill\'pstigation will be condncted regarding the allegations
made .. , to Chid .Jnstice "Tal'ren," 31 Both the llIemOralH]HlIl and
letter were drafterl by the General Investigatin Di"ision sUI)('rvisor,
TIll' lpttpl' thnnkrd Rowlry for the inforll1ation fnrnislwrl. and noted:
In connection with the allegation that a Castro Conspiracy
,vas involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, onr
investigation \\llcoYered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro
'Z1 Gellcl'lll Inn'~ti~atiYe Diyi~ion SuperYi~or testimony, 3/31/76, p. R.
~, Ibid., p. 18.
'" Memorandum from ROi'en to DeLoach, 2/15/67.
30 General In,,ei'ti~ati,,eDiyision Super"isor, 3/31/76, PP. 19-20.
31 Memorandum from Roseu to DeLoa('h. 2/15/67.
Alex Rosen. then Assistant Dire('tor in dlllr~p of the General Im'e~ti~ative
Diyision tei'tified hefore the Committee Oil April 30. 1976. It should he noted that
~1r, Ro~t>n infornl1'rl the COlllmittt>t> that 1l1' \Ya" ho"pitalizt>d in tll1' Sprin~ of
1$)67 alHl tht>reforp hllll no lmo\Yle!l~p of the ~pf[uel]('e of eYent~ !les('rihp!l in thi~
"ection of the Report. In thi" regard :\1r. Ro"en testified that thi~ memorandum
would haye been written oyer his name by one of his subordinates.
82
or officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee
Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy.
This Bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding
this matter. However, should Mr. Pearson, [the lawyer],
or [his] source of information care to volunteer any information
to this Bureau, it would be accepted. Thereafter, consideration
would be given as to whether any additional
investigation is warrantBd.32
The supervisor testified:
Everyone in the higher echelons read this and there was a
decision made apparently some place along that line as to
whether there was any basis in fact for [these allegations]
or not. And to this day I don't reooll how or what decision
was made or who was involved in it but I had the responsibility
then [upon orders from superiors] of concluding it by
preparing this and stating that no' further investigation was
going to be conducted.33
When asked why the FBI did not investigate such a serious allegation,
particularly in light of Director Hoover's testimony before
the Warren Commission that the assassination case would always
remain open,34 the supervisor responded:
I understand your thinking and I can't truthfully and
logically answer your question because I don't know.3s
The letter was approved and sent to Rowley on February 15, 1967.
A copy was also sent to the Acting Attorney General and the Deputy
Attorney General, but the internal FBI memorandum from Rosen
to DeLoach stated:
Consideration was given to furnishing this infol1llation to the
White House, but since this matter does not concern, nor is it
pertinent to the present Administration, no letter was being
sent.36
Although the General Investigative Division supervisor testified
that he was instructed to put this language in the memorandum, he
cannot recall who issued these instructions, or their basis,37
President Johnson subsequently learned of the allegations and the
Bureau's decision not to investigak On :March 17, 1967, Cartha
DeLoach received a telephone call from Presidential Assistant Marvin
'Watson, who informed him that, "The President had instructed that
32 Letterfrom Hoover to Rowley, 2/15/67.
33 Gpnl'ral Invp~ti/!ativl' Divi~ion Supl'rvi~or. 3/31/76, pp. 11-12.
.. Hoover testifil'd before the Warren Commis~ion:
Well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned the case will be
continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information
coming' to us or any report comin/! to us from any source will be thoroughly
investlgatl'd. so that we will be able to either prove or disprove
the allegation. (J. Edgar Hoover testimony, 5/6/64, Warren Commission,
Vol. I, p. 100.)
35 General Inve~tigative Division Bupen-isoT, 3/31/76, p. 16.
30 Memorandum from Rosen to DeLoach, 2/15/67.
37 General Investigative Division Supervisory, 3/31/76, pp. 46-47.
83
the FBI interview [the lawyer] concerning any knowledge he might
have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy." 39 "\Vatson
stated that. "This request stemmed from a communication which the
FBI had sent to the "\Vhite House some weeks ago." 40 DeLoach explained
that he beliewd this communication was actually supplied by
Secret Service. According to DeLoach. he briefed "\Vatson on Drew
Pearson's discussion with Chief .Justice "\Varren and then,
told 'Vatson that, under the circumstances, it appeared that
[the lawyer] did not want to be interviewed, and even if he
was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity
of his sources who apparently were clients. 'Vatson stated that
the President still desired that the FBI conduct the interview
in question. I told 'Vatson that, under the circumstances, we
had no alternative but to make this attempt; however, I hoped
he and the President realized that this might be putting the
FBI into a situation with District Attorney Garrison, who
was nothing more than a publicity seekerY
DeLoach concluded:
Under the circumstances it appears that we have no alter"
native but to interview [the lawyer] and then furnish the
results to 'Vatson in blind memorandum form. 42
The responsibility for interviewing the Washington lawyer was
assigned to the General Investigative Division. This assignment is
itself somewhat puzzling, because the Dome.<;tic Intelligence Division
had been assigned responsibility for possible foreign involvement in
the assassinationY
The lawyer was interviewed by two agents from the FBI's Washington
Field Office, 'both of whom had had supervisory responsibility
on theassassinat.ion case within their office. These agents testified
that they were briefed at FBI Headquarters prior to the interview,
but neither could recall the details of that briefing or who waS present.
44 Both agents testified that they 'were "surprised" during the
interview when the lawyer recounted United States' assassination
efforts targeted at Fidel Castro.45 These agents stated that they could
not evaluate the lawyer's allegations or question him in detail on
them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts.46
39 Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 3/17/67.
.. Ibid.
<1 Ibid.
co Ibid .
.... The FBI Headquarters supervisor in the General Investigative Division, who
wa~ responsible for the interview with the lawyer, could not explain why it was
assigned to his division, stating "I've often wondered about that myself." (General
Investigative Divi~ion Superyi!';or, 3/31/76. p. 30.)
"FBI Agent I testimony, 5/3/76, p. 8; FBI Agent II testimony. 4/13/76,
p.10.
The Bureau's response to the Committee'~March 18, 1976 request for documents
reflects that there are no memoranda in Bureau files relating to said briefing.
.. FBI Agent I testimony, 5/3/76, p. 24; FBI Agent II testimony, 4/13/76,
p.18.
The lawyer testified he had no recollection of having been interviewed by any
FBI agent about the information he gave to Drew Pearson. ('Vashington Lawyer
testimony, 3/17/76, p. 53.)
•• FBI Agent I testimony, 5/3/76, p. 25; FBI Agent II testimony, 4/13/76, p. 16.
84
Neither the agents, nor FBI Headquarters personnel could explain
why they were dispatched to conduct an interview without the benefit
of all relevant backgronnd material in FBI files.
On ~Iarch 21, 1967, the Washington Field Office sent FBI Headquarters
ten copies of a blind memorandum reporting on the interview.
This memorandnm can be summarized as follows:
1. The lawyer had information pertaining to the assassination,
but that it was necessary for him in his capacity as an
attorney to invoke the attorney-client privilege since the information
in his possession was derived as a result of that
relationship.
2. His clients, who were on the fringe of the underworld
were neither directly nor indirectly involved in the death of
President Kennedy; lmt they faced possible prosecution in a
crime not related to the assassination and through participation
in such crime they learned of information pertaining to
the President's assassination.
3. His clients were called upon by a governmental agency to
assist in a project which ,vas said to have the highest governmental
approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination
of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made; including
the infiltration of the Cuban government and the placing of
informants within key posts in Cuba.
4. The project almost reached fnlition when Castro became
aware of it; by pressuring captured subject.,> he was able to
leam the full details of the plot against him and decided "if
that was the way President Kennedy wanted it, he too could
engage in the same tactics."
5. Castro thereafter employed teams of individuals who
were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of
assassinating President Kennedy. The lawyer stated that
his clients obtained this information "from 'feedback' furnished
by sources close to Castro," who had been initially
placed there to carry out the orig-inal project.
6. His clients were a"'are of thr identity of some of the
individuals who came to the United States for' this purpose
and he understood that two such individuals were now in the
State of New .Tersey.
7. One client, upon hearing the statemrnt that Lee Harvey
Oswald ,,'as the sale assassin of President Kennedy "laughs
with tears in his eyes and shakes his head in apparent
disag-reement. "
8. The lawyer stated if he were free of the attorney-client
privilege, the information that hp would be able to supply
would not directlv identify the alleged conspirators to kill
President Kennedy. However, because of the project to kill
Fidel Castro, those participating in the proieet, "'hom he
represents. neveloped through feedback information that
would identify Fidel Castro's counterassassins:in this country
who could very well be considered suspects in such a
conspiracyY
'1 Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/21/67.
85
The transmittal slip accompanying thi:'i memorandum noted, "Xo
flll'thrr investigation is bring conducted by the 'Washington Field
Office unles:'i it is advised to the contrary bv the Burrau." 48 Had the
inteniewing agents knmYll of the CiA-imderworld plots against
Castro, they would have, bc.en aware that the lawyer had clients who
had bren active in the assassination plots.
The 'Yashington Field Office memorandum of the interview was
rewritten at FBI Headquarters before it was sent to the 'Yhite House,
the Attorney General, and the Secret Service.50 The cover letter sent
with this memorandum did not reCOlllIIW]Hl any FBI investigation of
the lawyer's allegations. As rewritten, this memorandum varies from
the original field version in two significant respects. Three new paragraphs
were added summarizing FBI file materials about CIA-underworld
plots to assassinatr Castro.51 In addition the rewritten version
of the mrmoran(lum twicr deletes thr words "in place" from the
phrase "sources in place close to Castro." 52 The supervisor who rewrote
the memorandum could provide no explanation of the omission.53
Neither the Field agents who interviewed the lawyer nor the Headquarters
supervisory agents assigned to the assassination case, could
provide any explanation for the Bureau's failure to conduct any £01lowup
investigation.51 'Vhen they were informed of the details of CIA
assassination efforts against Castro, each of these agents stated that
the allegations and specific leads provided should have been investigated
to their logical conclusions.55
Although the Select Committee has not been able to establish
through direct evidence that President Johnson asked CIA officials
about the lawyer's allegations, CIA Director Helms met with the President
at the White House on the evening of 'March 22, 1967. Earlier
that day, the President had been furnished the FBI memorandum
which summarized CIA use of underworld figures in plots against
Castro and the la,vyer's interview. On March 23, Director Helms
.. Memorandum from Washington Field Office to I<'BI Headquarters, 3/21/67.
50 There was no dissemination to the CIA.
51 According to the FBI Headquarters agent who wrote the memorandum, this
information was given directly to him by the Domestic Intelligence Division.
62 General Investigative Division Supervioor. 3/31/76, p. 20.
M Supervisor testimony, 3/31/76, p. 20. It is unclear whether the identity of
"the sources in place c'ose to Castro" was known to the FBI or whether the
Bureau attempted to nevelop information concerning them in either 1963 or 1967.
'" It should be noted that neither the President, nor the Attorney General
ordered a follow-up investigation after receiving this memorandum.
It was during this time period that New Orleans District Attorney .James
Garrison was conducting his own probe of the Kennedy assassination. Although
there is no evidence that the Bureau's avoidance of any activity in support of,
or interference with Garrison's investigation was the reason for its refusal to
follow up on the lawyer's allegations, certain documents suggest that this might
have been at least one of the factors that influenced the determination. For
example, DeLoach cautioned:
The agents interviewing [the lawyer] should make it quite clear that the
FBI is not interfering with any current investigation being conducted
by local authorities in New Orleans. (Memorandum from DeLoach to
Tolson, 3:15/67.)
"" The Select Committee questioned the lawyer and the clients who were the
sources of the allegations, The "clients" told the Committee they had no recollection
of either rc(~l'iving information that Castro retaliated or oiscus,ing it
with the lawyer. (Client No.1, 4/23/76, pp. 12, 13 j client No.2, 4/28/76, p. 4.)
86
ordered the CIA Inspector General to prepare a report on the CIA
assassination plots.
On April 24, 1967, the I.G. began submittin~ portions of his report
to Director Helms. The May 2~ draft report which was the only draft
retained by the CIA, refers to the Drew Pearson columns and the
lawyer's contacts ,,,ith Chief .Justice Warren, Rowley and the FBI,
but does not analyze the retaliation allegations.
Sometime hebYeen April 24 and Mav 22, the Director met and orally
briefed President .Johnson on the I.G.'s findings.56 'Vhen questioned
during the course of the Committee's investigation into CIA assassination
plots, Helms was not asked specifically whether he briefed the
President about the fall 1963 Al\fLASH operations. Helms did testify
that he did not brief President .Johnson about the 1964 and 1965 pha-'>es
because he did not regard Al\fLASH as an assassination agent.57
Althongh a note in Dirf',ctor Helms' handwriting, which apparently
was prepared for use in briefing the President 58 only refers to covert
actions against Cuba through mid-1963, the I.G. Report treated the
AMLASH project from 1963 through 1965 as an assassination
operation.
Even before work began on the Hl67 I.G. Rf'port. the CIA amtlvst
on the counterintelligence staff who had been the "point of record" for
the CIA work for the 'Varren Commission was asked to analyze
public allegations of conspiracy. This analyst was not furnished a
copy of the 1967 LG. Report and was not a-c;ked to determine whether
there were any connections between CIA assassinat,ion operations and
the assassination of President Kennedv. CIA records disclose that
he did request a name check on "A," the'individual who had been tangentially
connected with an anti-Castro training camp in New
Orleans. Althongh "A's" file at the CIA notes that he was aware of the
AMLASH operation in 1965, the response to the name check did not
disclose that fact. Indeed, it was not until 1975, during the Rockefeller
Commission's study, that this analyst learned of the CIA assassination
plots.59
.. Assassination Report, p. 179.
57 Richard Helms testimony, 6/13/75, p. 135.
M Assassination Report, p. 179.
.. Staff summary of interview of CIA Analyst, 3/15/76.

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