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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

APPENDIX A
THE FBI AND THE OSWALD SECURITY CASE
A. OS1{)ald's Defection
On October 31, 1959, after learning that Lee Harvey Oswald had
defected to the Soviet Union and informed officials at the American
Embassy in :Moscow that he intended to provide "radar secrets" to the
Soviet Union, the FBI opened a "security case" with Oswald as the
subject.1 As part of the investigation, the Bureau made inquiries of the
Navy and discovered that Oswald did not have knowledge of strateg;.c
information that would benefit the Soviets. The FBI concluded that a
stop should be placed against Oswald's fingerprints to prevent him
from obtaining a passport and entering the United States under any
name.2
About six months latBr, the Bureau interviewed Oswald's mother
who believed that he had taken his birth certificate with him to the
Soviet Union." In a memorandum suhsequently sent to the State Department,
the FBI raised the possibility that an imposter might
attempt to return to the United States using Oswald's identity.4
B. OS10ald's Return to the United States
Despite this concern that an imposter might attempt to enter the
United States using Oswald's identity. the FBI did not intervie,,,,
Oswald until almost three weeks after his return on .Tune 10, 1962.5
There is no indication that any of the FBI agents assigned to the
Oswald case were ever warned that an imposter might attempt to
assume Oswald's identity. In particular, Special Agent .Tanws Hooty.
the FBI arrent responsible for the Oswald case at the Dallas Field
Office, testified that he had neither seen a copy of the June 3, 1960
memorandum, nor attempted to determine whether someone had assumed
Oswald's identity.6
On .Tune 26, 1962. Special Agpnts .Tohn ,V. Fain and B. Tom Carter
interviewed Oswald in Fort Worth, Texas. According to SA Fain's
report, Oswald was cold, arrogant, and difficult to interview. Oswald
denied that he told State Department officials at the American Embassy
in Moscow that he was going:
(1) was going to renounce his American citizenship;
(2) apply for Soviet citizenship; and
(3) reveal radar secrets to the Soviets.7
1 Memorandum from Belmont to Soviet Section Supervisor, 11/4/59.
• Ibid.
S Report from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/12/60.
• Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Department of State, 6/3/60.
• Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/26/62.
Oswald was interviewed at the dock by an Immigration and Naturalization
Service Inspector on his return to the United States.
6 Hosty, 12/12/75, p. 119.
The Committee has found no evidence that an imposter entered the United
States in Oswald's stead.
7 John W. Fain testimony, Warren Report, Vol. IV, p. 418.
(87)
88
'When Fain asked Oswald to take a polygraph test, Oswald refuseAl to
even be polygraphed on whether he had dealings with Soviet intelligenc£.
8
Oswald also denied he had traveled to the Soviet Union because "of
a lack of sympathy for the institutions of the United States." 9 A
second interview on AUQ'ust 16, 1962, yielded similar denials. Despite
Oswald's attitude and demonstrable lies, the Bureau closed the Oswald
security case on August 20, 1962. It was not to be reopened until
March 26, 1963.10
The only additional action taken by the Bureau before March 26,
1963, consisted of: reviews of the Oswald file at the Department of
State, inquiries of two low-level Dallas Communist Party informants
as to whether they knew of Oswald (with negative responses), and
interviews with three of Oswald's relatives.ll Although wide-ranging
interviews were a basic investirrative technique commonly used by the
Bureau to develop background information on subjects of security
investigations, no neighborhood or employment sources were checked
in Oswald's case, nor was his wife interviewedY
The FBI did not interview Marina Oswflld prior to the fls'las.<;ination.
Although Marina Oswald was considered in .Tune 1962 for a
Bureau program which monitored the activities of Soviet immigrants
and repatriates to detect possible foreign intelligence ties, the Dallas
Field Office supervisor postponed consideration of her for the program
on .Tuly 25, 1962, noting that "her activities could be sufficiently
monitored in connection with the security case on Lee Harvey Oswald."
13 Hoove.r as noted above, the FBI security case on Lee Harve.y
Oswald was closed less than a month later.
'Vith respect to Oswald's marriage to Marina, and her return to
the United States, the 'Varren Commission stated:
Oswald's marriage to Marina Prusakova on April 30, 1961,
is itself a fact meriting consideration. A foreigner living in
Russia cannot marry without the permission of the Soviet
Government. It seems unlikely that the Soviet authorities
would have permitted Oswald to marry and to take his wife
with him to the United States if they were contemplating
using him alone as an agent. The fact that he had a Russian
8 Memorandum from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/10/62. The
Warren Commission apparent'ly was not provided with 'the administrative cover
pages of SA Fain's report which discussed Oswald's rl'fusal to be polygraphro.
Nor did Fain report Oswald's refusal to be polygraphro when he testifiro lwfore
the Warren Commission on :\Iay 6. 1964, despite detailed questioning 'by Commission
members Ford and Dulles as to the discrepancips in Oswald's statements Ilnd
Fain's reaction to them. (Fain testimony, Warren Report, Vol. IV, p. 418.)
• Memorandum from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/10/62.
10 Memorandum from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
11 Memorandum from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
.. Assistant Director Gale commented upon this failure in his memorandum of
December 10, 1963, where he wrote: "No neighborhood or employment sources
developed, wife not interviewed. no mail covers or other techniques were used
to determine whom Oswald in contact with or whether he had an intelligence
assignment. Inspector feels this limited investigation inadequate. Dallas agent
responsible for delinquencies now retired and no explanations obtainro from
him."
1.8 Memorandum from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/25/62.
89
wife would be likely, in their view, to increase any surveilancc
under which he would lw kept by American security
agencies, would make him even more conspicuous to his
neighbors as "an ex-Russian", and would decrease his mobility.
A wife's presence in the United States would also
constitute a continuing risk of disclosure. On the other hand,
Marina Oswald's lack of English training and her complete
ignorance of the United States and its customs would
scarcely recommend her to the Sm'iet authorities as one member
of an "agent team" to be sent to the United States on
a difficult and dangerous foreign enterprise.14
In contrast, a retired Bureau Soviet Section Supei'visor told the
Committee that of greatest concern to him in the Oswald case was the
fact that the Soviets had allowed Marina to return to the United
States with Oswald. He felt that if they desired to "tap Oswald on the
shoulder and make use of him at some future date, Marina's presence
would give them 'a great deal of leverage." The supervisor explained,
"The Russians might try to exert leverage, possibly through her relatives
or threats to her relatives in Russia and that sort of thin~?/5
However, it should lw emphasized that the Supervisor testified that
he is not aware of any evidence which establishes that the Soviets in
fact used or attempted to contact Oswald.>6
O. The Oontinued Inve8tigati01L' Dallas
On September 28, 1962, the New York Field Office learned that
Oswald subscribed to The Worker, which the Bureau characterized as
"an east coast Communist Newspaper," and subsequently informed
the Dallas Field Office. From the FBI's perspective, Oswald's subscription
to this newspaper contradicted his interview statements that
he was "disenchanted with the Soviet Union." '17 Oswald's subscription
was noted in his field office security file but FBI Headquarters was
not informed of the subscription until September 10, 1963, and then
only after it had requested information on Oswald from the Dallas
office.1s Assistant Director Gale eritically commented on this aspect
of the Bureau's handling of the Oswald case: "In light of Oswald's
defection, the case should have lwen reopened at the first indication of
Communist sympathy or activity (i.e., September 1962)."19
14 Warren Commission Report, p. 274.
15 Staff summary of interview with former FBI Headquarters Supervisor,
1/16/76; FBI HE"adquar'ters Supervisor 'testimony, 3/15/76, 'P. 21.
,. The Committee has dil'Woverl'd no f'u('h eviden('e.
17 ~Iemorandum from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63.
See, e.g., testimony of SA .Tames P. Hosty, Jr., 12/13/75, p. 111, who previously
recommended on March 25, 1963, that the Oswald case be reopened on the basis
of this contradiction.
'·Memorandum from Dallas Field Office 'to FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63.
,. Memorandum from Gale to Tolf'on, 12/10/63.
Director Hoover noted on November 29, 1963, that, "In Oswald's case there
was no indication of repentance hut only one of openly avowed hostility, and
contacts with suhversive elements." (Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H.
Belmont, 11/29/63.)
None of the Bureau's intl'rnal criticism of its own handling of the Oswald
security case. or even the fact that there was such criticism, was ever made
known to the Warren Commission.
90
In October 1962, SA Hosty was assigned the Marina Oswald security
case, which was then in a "pending inactive" status. The file was reviewed
by Hosty in March 1963, when he also located Marina Oswald,
but he did not intBrview her because of her alleged marital difficulties.20
Hosty reviewed the Dallas security file on Oswald -a.nd, on the basis
of Oswald's subscription to The Worker, requested approval to
reopen the case.21 On March 26, 1963, Hosty received approval. Hosty
stated that he did not interview Marina Oswald because he had developed
information that Oswald had been drinking to excess and
beating his wife, and the relevant FBI manual provision required that
he allow a "cooling oft''' period.22 FBI Director Hoover later commented
on the December 10, 1963, Gale memorandum that "this was
certainly an asinine excuse" and "I just don't understand such solicitude."
Inspector Gale had written that:
this entire facet of the investigation was mishandled. Mrs.
Oswald definitely should have been interviewed and the best
time to get information from her would be a,Iter she was
beaten up by her husband.
The Director added the following notation next to Gale's conclusion:
"This certainly makes sense." 23
On April 21, 1963, the New York Field Office learned that Oswald
had written a letter to the Fair Play for Cuban Committee. This was
the first indication in Bureau files that Oswald had a relationship
with this pro-Castro organization.23a Oswald's letter stated that he
had passed out FPCC literature in Dallas with a plMard around
his neck reading "Hands Oft' Cuba-Viva Fidel." This information was
not reported to Dallas until June 27,1963,24 and not reported to Headquarters
until September 10, 1963.25 Once again, Oswald's activities
contmdicted his interview statements.
On May 27, 1963, Hosty returned to the Oswalds' Neely Street
residence to interview Marina and was informed that the Oswalds
had moved from the Dallas area without leaving a forwarding address.
In response to an SAC memorandum issued by the Dallas
office seeking information on the Oswalds' whereabouts, the New
Orleans office informed Dallas on .July 17, 1963, that the Oswalds were
living in that city.26 The Bureau apparently learned of Oswald's
presence in New Orleans from a letter he had written to The lVorh:er
on June 26, 1963. Oswald claimed in the letter to be a long-time
subscriber and stated that he was forming an FPCC chapter in
New Orleans. He enclosed honorary membership cards for "those
.0 Hosty, 12/12/75, p. 119.
2l. Hosty, 12/13/75, p. 111.
.. Ho~ty, 12/12/75, p. 119.
The Committee has verified that f'ince such a manual provision was in effect,
it appears that Hosty's decision to allow "a cooling off" period prior to interviewing
Marina was entirely in accordance with FBI regulationf'. Neither the
documents nor the tef'timony of knowledgeable FBI Officers provides any explanation
for either Hoover or Gale's critical comments.
23 :\Iemorandum from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
""Memorandum from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63.
,. :\Iemorandum from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
"" :\Iemorandum from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarterf', 9/10/63.
'" Memorandum from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters and New Orleans
Field Office, 8/23/63.
91
fighters for peace," Mr. Gus Hall (Secretary General of the Communist
Party, USA) and Benjamin Davis (National Secretary of
the Communist Party, USA).21 On September 10,1963 New Orleans
became the offiee for the Oswald case.2B
D. The Continued Investigation: New 01'leaJl.8
Oswald was arrested on August 9, 1963, in New Orleans in connection
with his FPCC activities and charged with "disturbing the peace
by creating a scene." 29 On the morning of Augnst 10, Oswald asked to
see a Bureau agent, and he was interviewed at length by SA .John L.
Quigley. Oswald also repeatedly lied to this FBI agent. For example,
he told Quigley that he had met and married his wife in Fort Worth,
Texas.""
The New Orleans office learned on August 22, 1963, that Oswald
participated in a radio program where he stated that he was a Marxist
and that "Cuba is the only real revolutionary country in the world
today.,,:n On August 23, 1963, the New Orleans office was instructed
by Headquarters to "submit results of their Oswald investigation to
the Bureau." 32 On September 24,1963, the New Orleans office advised
the Bureau that the investigation 'vas continuing and that a report
detailing the investigative findings would be furnished. 33 An investigative
report was subsequently sent to the Bureau on October 31, 1963,
but it did not contain any significant information that was not already
in Oswald's Headquarters file. The report reveals that only two informants
in the New Orleans area were asked about Oswald and that
neither had heard of him.34
On October 2, 1963, agents of the New Orleans office attempted to
ascertain Oswald's residence and place of employment. They learned
that the Oswalds had left New Orleans. Leads to locate Oswald were
sent to Dallas, Fort Worth, and Malvern, Arkansas.35
27 Memorandum from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/31/63.
28 Memorandum from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63.
29 There is no indication in FBI documents or the Warren Commission's record
that Oswald was in New Orleans on any ()ccasion between October 1959 and
April 24, 1963. However, an Immigration and Naturalization Sen'ice Inspector
testified before the Committee that he is absolutely certain that he interviewed
Lee Harvey Oswald in a Xew Orleans jail cell sometime shortly before his April
I, 1963, transfer out of New Orleans. Although the Inspector is not now certain
whether Oswald was using that particular name at that time, he is certain
that Oswald was "claimin~ to be a Cuban alien" and that he "interviewed Oswald
to verify or disprove this status." The Inspector neither recalls what Oswald
said nor what language or languages he conversed in. He does not recall
anything- unusual about Oswald's dress or demeanor, and believes that he quicldy
ascertained that Oswald was not a Cuban alien, at which time he would have
left Oswnld in his jail ce'll. (l&NS Inspector 1:~timony, 12/11/75.)
On January 6, 1976, the Committee staff telephonically contacted the New
Orleans Police Department and requested that they reYiew their Oswald arrest
records to see if he had been arrested other than on August 9, 1963. On Jannary 7,
the staff was informed that there ~'as no record of another Oswald arrest, and
that the New Orleans Police Department, in fuct, had no information on Oswald
prior to August 9,1963.
3' ~lemorandum from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, R/15/63.
'" Memol"andum from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/31/63,
p.11.
32l\femorandum from FBI Headquarters to New Orleans Field Office, 8/23/63.
"" Memorandum from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/24/63.
M Memorandum from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/31/63.
35 Ibid.
72-059 0 - 76 - 7
92
The evidrncB indicatrs that Lee Hal'vrv Oswalrl ,vas in Mexico
City from September 27,1960, through October 2, Hl6:3. On October 10,
1960, Bureau Headquarters was provided with a copy of a CIA cable
which stHted that "Lee Henry Oswald" (sic) had been in contact
with the Sovirt Embassy in Mexico City on Srptemher 28,1960.36
It ,vas not until October 22, 1963, that information pertaining to
Os,,,ald's Mexico City trip was provided to the ~ew Orleans office.37
SA Hostv in Dallas had bv chance ascertained similar information
from the" local I&NS office" and coincidentally, his report detailing
this information was receiyed in New Orleans on October 22. 1963.38
Thus, despite the fact that both the Dallas and New Orleans field
offices were aware that Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City, there is no evidence that either of these
field offices intensified their "efforts" to locate and interview Oswald.
Most surprising, however, is that the "Soviet experts" at FBI Headquarters
did not intensify their efforts in the Oswald caSe after being
informed that Oswald had met with Vice Consul Kostikov at the
Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.39 Not only were these experts familiar
with Soviet activities in general, but they knew that Kostikov was a
member of the KGB. Further, the Bureau's Soviet experts had reason
to believe he was an agent within the KGB's Department which carries
out assassination and sabotage.40 They were also aware that
American citizen contacts with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City
were extremely rareY Ironically, the teletype which informed the
Bureau of Oswald's Mexico City activities was sitting on a pile of
documents on 11 Headquarters supervisor's desk awaiting initial action
on November 22, 1960. That portion of the Gale memorandum
which discusses Oswald's Mexico City trip reads as follows: .
The SOG rSeat of Government] supervisor failed to take any
action on the teletypes, stating it did not appear to him any
action was warranted. Inspector (i.e., Gale) feels . . . the
field should haye been instructed to intensify investigation
... and Oswald placed on Security Index.42
E. Oontinued Investigation: Dall(J)5
On October 26, 1963, the New Orleans Field Office advised the
Dallas office that the Oswalds had left a forwarding address in Irving,
so CIA Cable from Mexico Station to FBI Headquarters 10/10/63; memorandum
from LEGAT, Mexico City to FBI Headquarters, 10/18/63.
All the information that the FBI had orior Po November 22. 1963, on Oswald's
activities in Mexico City came from the CIA. On October 3, 1963, the CIA Mexico
Station reported to Headquarters that Oswald had been in contact with the
Soviet Embassy. On October 10, 1963, CIA Headquarters passed this information
with some background material to the Navy, the State Department, and the
FBI. The Mexico Station made a similar distribution to FBI and State Department
officials in Mexico. Since Oswald was an American citizen, and since FBI
was the responsible agency, disseminating this information ended CIA's responsibility
in this matter.
31 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to LEGAT, Mexico City, 10/22/63,
copy to New Orleans Field Office.
38 Memorandum from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/22/63, copy
to New Orleans Field Office.
89 Memorandum from LEGAT. Mexico City to FBI Headquarters, 10/18/63.
•• Information regarding Vice Consul Kostikov was made available to the
Warren Commission. (Letter from CIA to the Warren Commission, 1/22/64. 1
n li'ormer FBI Mexico City Leg-al Attache testimony, 2/4/76, p. 17.
.. Memorandum from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
93
Texas. Dallas was asked to verify the new residence,43 and on October
30,1$163, SA Hosty reported that although Oswald's family was living
with the Paine family in IITing, Oswald was not living there. On
November 1, 1963, Hosty went to the Paine residence to "find out where
Oswald was residing." H Ruth Paine informed Hosty that she did not
know where Oswald lived; however, she did state that Oswald was
employed at the Texas Book Depository. Toward the end of the interview,
~[arina Oswald came into the room. According to Hosty, she
expressed fear of the Bureau and their brief conversation, with Ruth
Paine translating, was an attempt to re-assure her.45
.AJtf'l' the assassination, the DaJIas office explained to FBI Headquart~
rs that tIw ill\'estigation had been delayed to "be sure that it
was in possession of all information from Xew Orleans." Inspector
Gale commented on this explanation in his December 10, 1963.
memorandum:
Inspector definitely does not agree. Xew Orleans submitt~d
sixtern-page report, 10/31163, and only leads outstanding in
Xe,v Orleans were to ascertain Oswald's whereabouts. No
indication New Orleans had any further data.... Even if
New Orleans had not reported all information in their possession.
Dallas should ha,'r intensified investigation in light of
Oswald's contact with Soviet Embassy in Mrxico City and not
held investigation in abeyance.46 • •
Finally, it should be noted that farts publicly disclosed by the Bureau
in OctDher HI7;>,47 establish that some two we~ks prior to the assassInation
Lee Harvev Oswald visited the FBI's Dallas Field Office and
left a note for Sp'eeial Agent .Tames P. Hosty, .Jr., and that the note
was subsequently destroyed. The circumstances surrounding the receipt
and destruction of the Osw'ald note are discussed in Appendix B.
<3l\lemorandum from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/25/63,
copy to Dallas FiE'ld Office.
«It should be noted that under the relevant FBI manual provisions then in
effect, any contact such as Oswald'R with the Soviet EmbaRsy in Mexico City
required that immediate inyeRtigative acti~m at the appropriate field office be
nndertaken. Howeyer, it should be further notE'd that other proviRionR precluded
the field office's interviewing Oswald without the express written approval or
direction of Headquarters.
<5 Hosty, 12/13/75, p, 54.
.. )lemorandnm from Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63.
<1 D('puty ASRociate FBI Director .James B. AdamR teRtimony, before the HOURI'
.Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 10/21/75,

APPENDIX B
THE FBI AND THE DESTRGCTION OF THE OSWALD NOTE
In early .July 1975\ a Dallas newsman met with former FBI Special
Agent-in-Charge for Dallas\ J. Gordon Shanklin. The newsman informed
Shanklin that an unidentified source had told him that Lee
Haney Oswald had yisited the FBI office in Dallas sometime prior to
the assassination and had left a threatening note for Special Agent
James Hosty\ who had been conducting the FBI investigation of
Oswald. The newsman stated that neither Oswald\s Yisit, nor the note,
were reported to FBI Headquarters officials. Shanklin suggested that
the newsman contact Deputy Associate Director James Adams 'at FBI
Headquarters.!
On July 7, 1975\ the newsman met in 'Washington\ D.C., with Adams
and Director Kelley and informed them of these allegations. The Attorney
General was adyised on July 8, 1975, that the Bureau intended
to conduct an inquiry regarding these allegations.2 Later that day,
Director Kelley held a conference with Adams, Shanklin, the Headquarters
agent assigned to the assassination case\ the Assistant Director
in charge of the Inspection Division, and the Dallas SAC. The
Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division was as.<;igned
personal responsibility for directing the FBI inquiry of the circumstances
surrounding the delivery and duplication of the note.3
The Bureau's initial file review failed to develop any information
indicating that Oswald had ever yisited the FBI field office in Dallas
or that he had left a note.4 FBI interviews with personnel assigned to
the Dallas field office in 1963 established that:
(1) Lee Harvey Oswald did visit the office some two or
three weeks prior to the assassination;
(2) Oswald asked to see SA .James Hasty, and upon being
informed that he was not in, left a note for Hasty; and
(3) the note was destroyed after the assassination.5
The evidence developed by the Bureau contained sharp conflicts.
The investigation failed to establish:
(1) whether the note was threatening in nature; and
(2) at whose instruction the note was destroyed.
Rather than attempting to draw conclusions from an evidentiary
record replete with factual discrepancies, the Committee has decided
to set forth in summary fashion the evidence developed by the Bureau
and the committee\ highlighting those areas where discrepancies
exist.
1 J. Gordon Shanklin testimony, 12/19/75, p. 10.
• Memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General 7/29/75.
• Ibid.
• Memorandum from the Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 7/29/75.
I Ibid.
(95)
96
The Wording of the Note
Approximately one week or ten days prior to Xonmber 22. 1!}63,
Lee HarYpy Oswald apppared at the rpcrption drsk in thr Dallas
field officp and askPd to see Sppcial Agpnt .James Hosty. Aftrr being
informed that he ,,'as not ayailable, Oswald left an envelope with
a note inside for Hosty. The envelope was unsealed and the notp was
paJ,tly visible. According to the receptionists, the note read as follO\vs:
Let this be a warning. I will blow up the FBI and the Dallas
Police Department if you don't stop bothering my \yife.
Signed-Lee Haryey Oswald.
Sometime later in the day the receptionists personally gaye the note
to Hosty.6
Hosty reealled the note's wording as:
If you have anything you want to learn about me, come
talk to me directly. If you don't cease bothering my wife,
I will take appropriate action and report this to proper
authorities. 7
Hosty's supervisor said he recalled that the note eontained some
kind of threat, but could not remember specifics.8
Aside from the receptionist, Agent Hosty, and the supervisor, no
one else interviewed by the FBI recalled having seen the note. Some
other individuals indicated that from conversations they had had
with the receptionist after the assassination, they understood that the
note contained a threat.
Circu1n.stances Surrounding the Destruction of the Note
After reading the note, Hosty placed it in his workbox, where it
remained until the day of the assassination. On the day of the assassination,
Hosty participated in an interview of Oswald at the Dallas
Poliee Department. 'Vhen he returned to the field office about an hour
later, Hosty was ealled into Shanklin's office where he met with his
supervisor and Shanklin. One of them displayed the note and asked
Hosty to explain its contents.9 Hosty told them he had interviewed
l\farina Oswald at the residence of Ruth Paine on November 1, 1963.
According to Hosty, during the post-assassination interview at the
Dallas Police Department, Oswald eommented that Hosty was the
FBI agent who had bothered his wife, and that if the agent wanted
to know something about Oswald, he should have come and talked to
Oswald himself.1O
Aecording to Hosty, Shanklin ordered him to prepare a memorandum
detailing facts pertaining to the note and his interview with
Marina Oswald and Ruth Paine. Hosty testified that he did prepare
such a memorandum and delivered it to Shanklin on the evening of
November 22, 1963,11
• Affidavit of receptionist, 7/15/75.
• Affidavit of James P. Hosty, Jr., 7/17/75.
8 Affidavit of supervisor, 9/8/75.
The supervisor stated that the note was on plain paper, was either handwritten
or handprinted. and was threatening in nature.
9 Hosty affidavit, 7/17/75 ; Hosty, 12/13/75, p. 147.
10 Hosty affidavit, 9/22/75; Hosty, 12/13/75, p. 148.
11 Hosty, 12/13/75, p. 153.
97
Hosty's supervisor said that he had found the note in Hosty's workbox
very soon after the assassination of President Kennedv. He stated
that he'took the note to Shanklin's office., but had no re.rol1edion of
what happened to the note or who mav have had it thereafter.1e
According to Hosty, approximately two hours after Oswald had
lX'en pronounced dead on November 2+, his supenisor told him that
Shanklin wanted to see him, Hasty testified that he was .instrurted
by Shanklin to destroy both the ]lote and the Noycmber 22 memorandum
regarding iL and that he complied with these instructions,I3
Shanklin denied any knowledge of Oswald's visit to the Dal1as Office
and the note. He also maintained that he did not issue any orders to
destroy the note. In fact, Shanklin claimed that he had no'knowledge
of this entire matter until July 1975,14
The personnel assigned to the Dallas Office. in Noyember 1963, do
not know whether anyone at FBI Headquarters was eyer informed of
the Oswald visit, note, or subsequent events. However, 'Wi11iam Sullivan,
who was an Assistant Director of the Bureau at the time of the assassination,
has stated that he discussed the Oswald case many times
with Shanklin; and that Shanklin stated "he had an internal problem
inyolying one of his Agents who had received a threatening message
from Oswald because the Agent was investigating Oswald." Sullinm
recalls that Shanklin seemed disinclined to discuss the matter
other than to say he ,vas handling it as a personnel problem with Assistant
to the D'irector, .John P. Mohr.15 Mohr has denied under oath
any knowledge of the note or its destrnction.16 Similarly, each of the
other living Bureau officials in the chain of command of the two inyestigative
di,-isions which superyised the Kennedy assassination case
furnished the Bureau with a sworn statement denying any knowledge
of this matter.
12 Affidayit of Supervi~or.9/15/75,
13 Hosty affidavit, 9/22/75; Hosty, 12/13/75, p. 183.
Deputy Associate FBI Director James B. Adams testified before the Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 10/21/75, that the agent who destroyed the note did so to "avoid
embarrassment to the Bureau."
"Shanklin affidavit, 9/24/75; Shanklin. 12/19/75, p. 10.
Howe\-er. a recently retired Special Agent. in an affidayit submitted to the
Bureau. stated that he mentioned the note and the destruction to Shanklin while
driving with him in a car in AUg"ust 1974. (Snecial Agent affidavit, 7/23/75.)
15 Affidavit of William C. Sullivan, 9/16/75; Staff interview of Sullivan,
4/21/75.
Sullivan added that he did not know whether other Headquarters officials were
aware of the note, or that the note had been destroyed.
10 Affidavit of John P. Mohr, 9/12/75.
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I
APPENDIX C
CHRONOLOGY
1959
January 1-Fidel Castro takes over the Cuban government. Batista
and his pe,rsonal aide,s le,ave, Cuba.
December ll-Dulles approves "thorough consideration be given to
the elimination of Fidel Castro."
1960
Late Septembe1'--Bissell and Edwards brief Dulles and Cabell
about operations against Castro.
Initial meeting between Rosselli, Maheu and CIA Support Chief.
A subsequent meeting takes place in Florida.
1961
January f2f2-President Kennedy succeeds President Eisenhower.
March-President Kennedy raises subject of assassination with
Senator Smathers, indicating his disapproval.
April-Rosselli passe,s poison pills to a Cuban in Miami.
April 15-17-Bay of Pigs invasion fails.
May 22-Hoover memorandum to Attorney General Robert
Kennedy noting CIA had used Giancana in "clandestine efforts"
against Castro.
November 16-Pre,sident gives speech mentioning opposition to
assassination.
November 29-John McCone succeeds Allen Dulles as Director,
CIA.
Novembe1'--Operation MONGOOSE is created.
December-FBI meets with Lansdale re: MONGOOSE.
1962
February 19-Helms succeeds Bissell as Deputy Director, Plans,
CIA.
April-Haney establishes contact with Rosselli.
Late April-Harvey passes poison pills to Rosselli in Miami.
lIfay 7-Houston and Edwards brief Attorney General on pre-Bay
of Pigs undenvorld assassination plot.
May lO-Attorney General Kennedy tells Hoover that the CIA has
used underworld figures in an effort to assassinate Castro.
(99)
100
September 7-Rosse11i trlls HarYey the pills are still in Cuba.
October 2:2-i28-Cuban mif'sile crisis.
November-Opeiration MONGOOSE ends.
1963
Eady 1/)03-,Villiam HarYey tells underworld figures the CIA is
no longer interested in assassinating Castro.
March 18-Attack on a Soviet yessrl off the northern coast of Cuba
by members of Alpha 66, assisted by members of the Second National
Front of Escambray reportedly occurs.
111arch .:e6-Attack on a Soviet vessel by members of Commandos
L-66, another anti-Castro group, reportedly occurs.
April-Special Group discusses the contingency of Castro's death.
May-September-Lee Harvey Os,,'alcl moves to New Orleans; becomes
involved with FPCC. He contacts anti-Castro Cubans as well.
Mid iD6S-Series of meetings among major leaders of the antiCastro
movement.
June-Special Group decides to step up covert operations against
Cuba.
July 934-Ten Cuban exiles arrive in New Orleans from·Miami and
join th£l "training camp" north of New Orleans. This "training camp"
is directed by the same individuals who were previously involved in
procuring dynamite. "A", a life-long friend of AMLASH, had helped
procure the dynamite,
Late July-Carlos Bringuier is requested to assist exiles at the
"training camp" in returning to Miami.
July 31-The FBI seizes more than a ton of dynamite, 20 bomb casings,
napalm material and other devices at a home in the New Orleans
ar£la. Articles appear in the New Orleans Time Picayume on August 1,
2, 'and 4, 1963.
August 16-0hicago Sun Times carries an article that reports CIA
had dealings with the underworld figure Sam Giancana.
Helms informs McCone of the CIA operation involving Giancana,
and tells him it involved assassination.
August-According to FBI report. a Latin American military officer
attends a Cuban exile group meeting and talks of assassination.
Early September-Talks between the Cuban delegate to the United
Nations, La Chuga, and a U.S. dplegate, ,Villiam Atwooel, are proposed
by the Cubans.
September 'I-CIA case officers, after their first meeting with
AMLASH since prior to the OctobpJ' ]lJ62 missile crisis. cable headquarters
that AMLASHis interestrd in attempting an "inside job"
against Castro anel is awaiting a U.S. plan of action.
Castro gives an impromptu, three-hour interview with AP repOlier
Daniel Harker. He warns that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to
eliminate Cuban leaders will themselves not be safe.
September i~-Cllban Coordinating Committee meets to conduct a
broad review of the U.S. Gm'ernment's Cuban contingency plans. They
agree there is a strong likelihood that Castro would retaliate in some
101 -
way against the rash of covert adivity in Cuba; however, an attack on
U.S. officials within the U.S. is comidered unlikely.
Late September-Oswald is in Mexico City and visits both the
Cuban and Soviet Consulates.
September 27-The coordinator of Cuban Affairs circulates a memorandum
listing assignments for contingency papers relating to possible
retaliatory actions by the Castro regime. No responsibility is assigned
for attacks on U.S. officials within the United States.
October 6-FBI Headquarters learns of Oswald contacts in Mexico
City.
October iO-The FBI is told by an informant that the CIA is
meeting with AMLASII.
OCtObCl' 934-Jean Daniel, the French reporter, conducts a brief
interview with President Kennedy before setting off on an assignment
in Cuba. President Kennedy expresses his feeling that Castro had
betrayed the revolution.
October !2.9-Desmond Fitzgerald, a senior CIA officer, meets
AMALSH. Fitzgerald tells AMLASH that a coup would receive U.S.
support. Fitzgerald is introduced to AMLASH as a personal representative
of Attorney General Kennedy.
Nm'ember l-Diem is assassinated following a coup.
November-Case Officer is told by Fitzgerald that AMLASH may
he told the rifles. teleS('opic sights and explosives will he provided.
N(YI)ember 17-According to FBI reports, the Cuban-American is at
the home of a member of the 'I'ampa FPCC. He is there awaiting a
telephone call from Cuba which is to give him the "go-ahead order"
to leave the U.S.
November i8-President Kennedy makes a public appearance in
Tampa and delivel'S a speeeh on Cuba policy in :Miami.
November i.9-Castro contacts Daniel and spends six hours talking
to him about U.s.-Cuban relations.
November .~W-CIA officers telephones AMLASH and tells him there
will be a meeting on November 22. AMLASH is told that it was the
meeting he has requested.
According to FBI reports, the Cuban American obtains a Mexican
tourist card at the Consulate in Tampa.
November 22-President Kennedy is assassinated.
The Case Officer meets 'with A·MLASH. He refers to President
Kennedy's speech of Xovember 18 in ~fiami and indicates that Fitzgerald
helped write the speech. He tells AMLASH the explosives and
rifles with telescopic sights will be provided. The Case Officer also
offers AMLASH the poison pen device but AMLASH is dissatisfied
with it. As the meeting breaks up, they are told President Kennedy
has been assassinated. .
Daniel spends the day with Castro and later reports his reaction to
news of the assassination.
McCone requests all Agencv material on Oswald.
Mexico Station cables'·CIA Headquarters, 1730 hours, to inform
them of Oswald's October visit to Mexico City.
102
FBI Headqua.rters dispatohes a teJetype at 9 :40 p.m. to all field
offiCBs requesting; contact of all informants for information bearing on
the assassination.
FBI Headquarters dispatches a teletvpe at 11 :00 p.m. to all field
offices requesting t,hey resolve all allegations pertaining to the
assassination.
November 923-Director McCone meets with President Johnson and
McGeorge Bundy and briefs them on information CIA Headquarters
had received from Mexico Station.
CIA Headquarters cables the AMLASH Case Officer and orders
him to break contact with AMLASH because of the President's assa..<;
sination and to return to Headquarters.
CIA personnel on the CI Staff prepare a memorandum suggesting
that Oswald's contacts in Mexico City with Soviet personnel mirrht
have sinister implications. This information is transmitted to CIA's
liaison with FBI by telephone at 10 :30 a.m.
Desk officer is put in charge of CIA investigation of the
assassination. .
CIA Headquarters telephones the Mexico Station to get the planned
arrest of Duran called off, but learns the arrest could not be called off.
Karamessines Rends a cable to Mexico Station saving, the arrest "could
jeopardize U.S. freedom of action on the whole question of Cuban
responsibilitv."
Legat informs FBI Headquarters that the U.S. Ambassador to
Mexico is concerned that Cubans were behind Oswald's assassination
of President Kennedy. The Ambassador requests both the CIA and
FBI do everything possible to establish or refute this Cuban connedion.
FBI Headquarters dispatches a teletype to all field offioes rescinding
the early teletype of November 22, 1963.
November 924-Mexico Station dispatches a cable to HeadCluarters
with the names of all known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in
~fexico Citv. Among the names in the cable is that of AMLASH.
At 10 :00 a.m., Director McCone meets with the President and briefs
him ahout CIA's operational plans against Cuha.
Cahlegram is sent from Mexico to CIA Headqnarters stating that
the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico feels that the Soviets are too sophisticated
to participate in a direct assassination of Pre"ident Kennedy,
but the Cubans would be stupid enough to ,have participated wit;h
Oswald.
Oswald is murdered at 12: 21 p.m. EST.
November 25-The Case Officer prpp~I,rPS a "contact rp,nort" on the
November 22 meeting with AMLASH. On Fitzgerald's orders, no
mention is mafle of the poison pen heing offered to AMLASH.
At noon, "D" shows up at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. He
tells Emhassy personnel that he was in the Cuban Consulate on September
18 and saw Cuhans pay Oswald a sum of money and talk about
Oswald's assassinating sompone. .
At 12:00 p. m.. Mexico clispatche$ a cflble to ('T;\ Hp'adcnlfl rtprs remindinf"
Headclllartprs of Castro's September 7,1963 statement threatening
U.S. leaders.
A senior U.S. Embassy official in Mexico City tells a senior Mexican
Government official known facts!' hont Oswald's visit to Mexico City
and raises questions of Cuban involvement. ..
103
November 26-McCone again meets with President Johnson. The
President tells him the FBI has responsibility for the inyestigation of
the President's death and directs him to make CIA resources available
to assist the FBI's inyestigation.
The American Ambassador in ~fexico sends a cable to the State
Department through CIA channels. He giYes his opinion that the
Cubans were inyolved in the assassination.
CIA Headquarters cables CIA stations in Europe and Canada for
all information on the assassination issue, noting they should carefully
examine material obtained from a specified resource.
Deputy Attorney General Katzenbaeh writes Presidential Assistant
Bill ~foycrs, stating "that the facts shonld be made pnblic in such
a way as to satisfy the people of the r.s. and abroad, that the facts
have been told alld a statement to this effect be made now." The
public should be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin and speculation
about his motive ought to be cnt off.
November 27-Legat cables FBI Headquarters and notes a press
release referencing to Castro's speech of September 7, 1963.
One CIA Station cables information received from the specified
resources that AMLASH had been indiscreet in his conversations.
FBI sends a supervisor to Mexico City to coordinate the investigationand
to pursue it yigoI'Ously until the desired results are
obtained.
November 28-CIA Headquarters cables a reminder to the Mexico
Station to "follow all leads" and to continue to inyestigate the possibility
of Cuban or Soviet im'olvement.
CIA Headquarters warns the Station Chid in Mexico that the Ambassador
was pushing the case too hard and his proposals could lead
to a "flap" with the Cubans.
November 2.9-President Johnson announces formation of the
"Tarren Commission after discussing other possibilities with Director
Hom'er.
November 30-Director McCone meets with President Johnson at
11 :00 a.m. and they discnss the Cuba qtlPstion. "D" is mentioned.
December i-McCone meets with both Bundy and President Johnson.
McCone's memorandum indicates they discussed "D's" story.
CIA Headquarters cables Mexico Station indicating it has received
information from a sensitive source that a Cubana Airlines flight to
Hamna had been delayed in Mexico City from 6 :00 p.m. until 11 :00
p.m. on the day of the assassination. It was awaiting an unidentified
passenger who arrived in the twin engine aircraft and failed to go
through customs. The passenger rode in the cockpit on the flight to
Havana.
December 2-At 10 :00 a.m., McCone meets with the President and
Bundy.
At 3:00 a.m., McCone's ealendar reveals he attended a meeting at the
CIA with the snbject being Cuba.
December 3-CIA Headquarters receives information from Mexico
that the Cuban-Ameriean left the U.S. on November 23 and flew from
Mexico City to Havana on November 27.
104
Decembel' 4-CIA receives a report from one of its Cuban agents
that he thought he had met Oswald in Cuba, Mexico City or the United
States. This agent believes that the Cuban gOYernment employed
assassins and had carried out at least one assassination in Mexico.
FBI memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont indicates there is no
evidence that Oswald's assassination of the President was inspired
or directed by [pro-Castrol organizations or by any foreign country.
December .5-Mexico Station cables that someone who saw the
Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana on November 27 reported
that he "looked suspicious."
December 6-Warren Commission holds its first meeting, as the
FBI and CIA are completing their own investigations.
December 8-CIA Headquarters cables its Miami Station ordering
a halt to an operation to supply weapons to AMLASH, pending a highlevel
policy review.
December 9-A memorandum to Director McCone discusses U.S.
operations against Cuba, but does not mention the AMLASH operation.
or any other specific operation.
FBI's 5-volume report, on the assassination is completed.
Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach writes the 'Varren Commission
and recommends that the Commission immediately state that the
FBI report clearly shows Oswald was a loner. •
December IO-Hoover receives report on the investigative deficiencies
in the handling of the pre-assassination Oswald case. Results in
disciplinary action against 17 Bureau officials.
Director McCone meets with CIA staff and the subject of the meeting
is Cuba.
December 12-CIA Mexieo Station reports the FBI is pushing to
wind up the Mexican aspects of the case.
Late'December-CIA desk officer completes a brief report on his
investigation. which is submitted to the President.
The CIA decides to have the Counterintelligence Division continue
the investigation.
1964
January 2S-A subordinate to the Chief of Counterintelligence is
designated the "point of record" for all matters relating to the assassination
and the 'Varren Commission.
January 24-FBI liaison is told by CIA official that there are no
active plots against Castro.
January 28-Rankin meets with Hoover and they discuss the allegation
that Oswald was an FBI informant.
January 31-Hoover indicates in his memorandum of the January
28. 1964 meeting, that he did not appreciate the statement by
Chief Justice 'Varren that the Bureau's report was a "skeleton report."
March 26-The President's Commission requests the FBI to respond
to 52 questions. In a subsequent memorandum (4/3/64) by
a Bureau Supervisor to 'Villiam SuBivan, he states the Commission is
cross-examining the Bureau in regard to its investigation of the President's
assassination.
105
Rankin rpquests that the FBI furnish thp Commission with information
on certain pro-Castro and anti-Castro organizations.
lffay 14-Both Hoover and Helms testify the case will always be
open.
lffay BO-Rankin requests additional information on certain proCastro
and anti-Castro groups.
"une l1-\Varren Commission receives a summary of the organizations
from Ow field offices but not from FBI Headquarters. Hoover's
letter informs the Commission that the CIA and Department
of the Army "may have pertinent information concerning these
organizations."
"uly-The FBI learns some details of the CIA's AMLASH operation
from one of the FBI's informants.
September 9-The Bureau informs the White House and the Acting
Attorney General that "the Commission's report is seriously inaccurate
insofar as ,its treatment of the FBI is concerned."
September ~6-Bureau receives a copy of the 'Varren Commission's
Report.
September .S'O-Assistant Director Gale presents a memorandum
that. reviewed the Commission Report "as it pertained to FBI
shol"Womings." Bureau again disciplines agents.
October i-An FBI inspector telephonically contacts Rankin and
informs him that "he did the Bureau a great disservice and he'd outMcCarthy'd
McCarthy."
Late 1964-AMLASH becomes more insistent that the assassination
of Cuban leadership is a necessity. He is told that the U.S.
Government cannot become involved in the "first step." He is put in
contact with B-1 and the CIA through B-1 is kept informed of the
plotting.
1965
lIfay-"A" contacts I&NS with information about the AMLASH
operation. He is turned over to the FBI for handling. The FBI informs
the CIA about "A".
June-Both agencies interrogate "A" and establie-h that 'he knew
who ·was involved in the AMLASH operation, including the CIA.
.Tune ~3-CIA Headquarters cables its Stations stating the entire
AMLASH group is insecure and further contact constitutes a menace
to CIA operations.
"uhl 2-FBI writes that the details of the meeting with "A" and
the CIA were sent to the White House, the Attorney General and the
DCI.
1967
Late .Tanuary-Drew Pearson meets with Chief Justice \Varren and
informs 'Varren that a lawyer was told by an underworld contact
that Castro planned Kennedy's a&<;assination.
"anuary 3f-Rowley meets with \Varren, Rowley is informed of the
lawyer's story.
106
February 2-",Varren calls Rowley and informs Howley that he
spoke with Pearson who said the lawyer wanter to see ",Varren.
February 8-Tentative date set by Pearson with ",Varren for the
law,)'",r to meet with Secret Service. Neither Pearson nor the lawyer
contacted Secret Service.
February iO-Rowley arlYises ",Varren that neither Pearson nor
Warren haTe contacted Secret Service. Rowley teJJs ",Var.ren the information
would be passed to the FBI. .
Feb1'uary 13-FBI is informed by .James .T. RO\yley that Chief
.Justice Warren had recently been informed of P.S. attempts to assassinate
Castro in 1962 and 196~, that Castro had dpcided to utilize
the same procedure and that vVa,rren wants theseaJJegations looked
into.
February is-Hoover informs Rowley that the Bureau "is not conducting
any investigation" but would accept volunteered information.
jJfarch 4-Robert Kennedy's secretary calls Hoover and requests a
copy of Edward's memo of ~1:ay 7,1962 at which time Robert Kennedy
was briefed on assassination plots.
jJfarch 7-Drew Pearson's column is published.
March 17-Presidential Assistant Marvin ",Vatson advises DeLoach
that Pl.'esident .Johnson has instructed the FBI to interview the lawyer
concerning ar.y knowledge he had in the assassination of Kennedy.
vVatson says request "stemmed from a communication the FBI had
sent the White House some weeks ago."
March .~W-The lawyer intervie,yed by the ",Vashington Field Office
would not identify his source of the information that Castro plotted
to kill Kennedy. Agents interviewing the lawyer were instructed to
make it clear the FBI was "not interfering with any current investigatim.
in New Orleans,
March 22-The FBI fonyards results of the intervie,Y with the
lawyer to the ",Vhite House. The information indicates that the lawyer's
sources allegedly were used by the CIA in attempts against Castro.
The 'Vhite H~use also receives information originally from CIA relating
to CIA'~' use of Maheu and Giancana in a plot against Castro.
Material alS0 includes infoI1nation that Robert Kennedy advised on
May 9, 1962 l,hat CIA should never take such steps without first checking
with the Department of Justice. Helms meets the President at the
",Vhite House in early evening.
March £,)'-Helms assigns the Inspector General the task of reporting
on CIA assassination attempts against Castro.
April 4-Watson ~alls DeLoach and advises that the President is
convinced there was a plot in connection with Kennedy's assassination.
April £4-1.G. Report is 11elivered to Helms in installments.
May 22-Helms returns '_opy of report to I.G.
May £3-All notes and other derived source material of the I.G. "
Re-port are destroyed.

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