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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

1PART THREE
THE NATIONAL SECL'"RITY COLOSSUS (1939-75)
The calendar recorded the completion of a decade, but the events of
1939 would mark the passage of an era. The world stood watching,
transfixed by what Winston Churchill called "the gathering storm,"
awaiting the final climactic acts in what he described as "another
Thirty Years' War." 1 Hitler had been tolerated; Der Fuehrer had
been appeased; and then, with the invasion of Poland on the first day
of September, the aggression of Nazism had to be halted. While England,
supported by the British empire, was destined to be Germany's
primary opponent for two years prior to American entry into the
European hostilities, His Majesty's Government had only recently
come to a wartime posture. Production of modern fighter aircraftthe
Spitfire and Hurricane types-had not g'otten underway until
1937; it has been estimated that, in 1938 and the initial months of
1$>39. "Germany manufactured at least double, and possibly triple, the
munitions of Britain and France put together, and also that her great
plants for tank production reached full capacity." 2 Conscription was
not effected in the United Kingdom until April 1939. Churchill did not
form a government until May 1940, approximately nine months after
the declaration of war.
The British did have some advantages, one of them being the development
and deployment of radio direction-finding techniques or radar.
Experimental stations were erected in March 1936, for aircraft detection
and efforts were also made to track ships at sea utilizing this
device. According to Churchill :
By 1939, the Air Ministry, using comparatively long-wave
radio (ten metres), had constructed the so-called coastal
chain, which enabled us to detect aircraft approaching over
the sea at distances up to about sixty miles. An elaborate network
of telephonic communication had been installed under
Air-Marshall Dowding, of Fighter Command, linking all
these stations with a central command station at Uxbridge.
where the movements of all aircraft observed could be plotted
on large maps and thus the control in action of all our own air
forces maintained. Apparatus called [.F.F. (Identification
Friend or Foe) had also been devised which enabled our
coastal chain radar stations to distinq:uish British aircraft
which carried it from enemy aircraft. It was found that these
long-wave stations did not detect aircraft approaching at low
1 For Churchill's own account of events leading- to the outbreak of World
War II see Winston S. Churchill. The Gathering Storm. Boston, Houghton Mifflin
Company. 1948.
2 Ibid.• p. 336.
(132)
133
heights over the sea, and as a counter to this danger a supplementary
set of stations called O.H.L. (Chain Stations Home
Service Low Cover) was constructed, using much shorter
waves (one and a half metres) but only effective over a short
range.3
In June 1938, Churchill was introduced to another detection technique,
the A8dw8, "the name which described the system of groping
for submarines below the surface by means of sound waves through
the water which echo back from any steel structure they met." 4 This
process also stood ready for application at the time when open warfare
erupted on the Continent.
But, while these technological innovations would soon be replicated
by Germany, Britain obtained one inestimable intelligence advantage
over the Nazis which has only recently been publicly revealed. In 1938,
through the intervention of a Polish mechanic just fired from the production
facility in eastern Germany, British intelligence learned that
the Nazis were developing an improved Enigma mechanical cipher
process. Soon the Polish Secret Service proved successful in purloining
one of the machines. By the eve of war, the British had mastered
the operation of the device and its resultant code. Simultaneously,
Germany, unaware of the British intelligence advantage, put the new
Enigma process into service and utilized it all during the war.5
J. Ne1ltral AmerWa
With the outbreak of hostilities on the Continent, the United States
remained in a state of peace and qualified neutrality. But a policy of
detachment from international conflict did not signify that American
officials were unaware that the nation's territory, resources, and politics
were subject to penetration and exploitation by the European belligerents.
During his first term as President, Franklin D. Roosevelt had
become sufficiently concerned about the traffickings of Fascists and
Communists in the country that he had urged Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director J. Edgar Hoover to begin probing the activities
of these ideologues.6
Latl'l in 1938, President Roosevelt had approved a $50,000
appropriation for the FBI to conduct espionage investigations
(a sum later raised by Congress to $300,000). Hoover
regarded this authorization of funds by the President as giving
primary responsibility in the civilian field to the FBI. No
similar appropriation was earmarked for any other nonmilitary
investigative agency. As a result. the FBI and the War
Department's Military Intelligence Division worked out a
coope:ative program, with approval of the Office of Naval
Intellu!'ence, to exchange information in subversive investigations.
This arrangement was approved in principle by the new
Attorney General, Frank Murphy. On February 7,'1939, the
• Ibid., pp. 155-156.
• Ibid., p. 163.
• Further details on the breaking of the Gf'rImm code and its use during the
war may be found in F. W. Winterbotham. The Ultra Secret. New York, Harper
and Row, 1974.
• See Don Whitehead. The FBI Story. New York, Pocket Books 1958' first pub.
lished 1956, pp. 188-197. ' ,
134
Assistant to the Attorney General, Joseph B. Keenan, informed
other investigative agencies of the agreement. He
asked that they send any information regarding espionage or
subversion to the FBI. Hoover advised his special agents that
Keenan's letter meant "all complaints relating to espionage,
counterespionage, and sabotage cases should be referred to
the Bureau, should be considered within the primary jurisdiction
of the Bureau, and should, of course, receive preferred
and expeditious attention." 7
Keenan's letter elicited angry reactions from the other various Federal
investigative agencies, protesting both the coordination plan and
the usurpation of aspects of their jurisdiction by the FRI. Assistant
Secretary of State George S. Messersmith called a conference with
War, Navy, Treasury, Post Office, and Justice Department (but not
FBI) representatives and announced that the President had selected
him to coordinate probes of foreign agents. When this assertion could
not be substantiated, Messersmith reversed his position, advocating
that espionage investigations be divided among the various agencies.s
Hoover felt that responsibility should be concentrated and
a pattern of close cooperation established. War and Navy
agreed: their intelligence units had already asked the FBI to
handle "within the United States and its territories" the civilian
aspects of such espionage investigations as they were
conducting from the military angle. The State Department,
however, felt that its Office of Security must keep unshared
control over "sensitive" information-because of its extreme
delicacy and its relationship to foreign-policy decisions.
One fact which appears to have weighted the scales in
favor of a coordinated plan was that nobody wanted a repetition
of the bungling which had, during World War I, resulted
from snarled lines of responsibility. Another was that,
without coordination, various federal bodies might all be
keeping tabs on the same individual. each from the angle
of its own work, without the pieces ever being put together to
form a pattern.9
Ultimately, it was the President who concluded that espionage,
counter-espionage, and sabotage information had to be coordinated.
Accordingly, the following directive was issued on June 26, 1939, to
members of the Cabinet.
It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage,
counterespionage. and sabotage matters he controlled and
handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department
of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the
War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the
Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are
to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.
7 Ibid., p. 198.
8 Ibid.
o Harry and Bonaro O"erstreet. The FBI In Our Open Society. New York,
W. W. Norton and Company, 1969, pp. 85-86.
135
No investigations should be conducted by any investigative
agency of the GovE'rnment into matters involving actually or
potentially any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage, except
by the three agencies mentioned above.
I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other
investigative agencies than the three named, to refer immediately
to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
any data, information or material that may come
to their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage,
counterespionage, or sabotage.
This was subsequently followed by another presidential directive
pertaining to F.B.I. intelligence responsibilities, issued September 6,
a few days after formal declarations of war had been made by the
European powers. It said:
The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct
the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department
of Justice to take charge of investigative work in matters
relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality
regulations.
This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and effective
manner on a national basis, and all information must be
carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion
and irresponsibility.
To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs, and all
other law enforcement officers in the United States promptly
to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation any information obtained by them
relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive
activities, and violations of the neutrality laws.
On September 8, President Roosevelt declared (54 Stat. 2643) a
national emergency within the nation, thereby granting extraordinary
powers to the Executive short of a condition of war.10
Four months later, on January 5, 1940, Hoover told the
[House] Subcommittee on Appropriations about the steps
he had taken to ready the Bureau for its intelligence function,
and also about the consequences of this new assignment
and the outbreak of war in Europe as measured in terms of
workload.
The field offices which had been requested earlier by Army
and Navy Intelligence had been opened in the Canal Zone,
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Field offices had been
opened, also, near six large shipping centers or military
bases: in Albany, Baltimore, Savannah, Grand Rapids,
Phoenix, and San Diego.
With an eye to preventing espionage and sabotage, the
Army and Navy had asked the FBI to assume jurisdiction
for them over "plant production activities" in places that
10 See Frank Mnrphy. Executive Powers Under National Emergency. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. 01'1'., 1939. (76th Congress, 2d section. Senate. Document
No. 133).
136
manufactured articles for their use. A procedure which involved
no policing, but which was educational and consultative,
was currently being applied in 540 plants; and it was
capable of expanding to reach as many as 12,000 in "a time of
greater emergency." Most plant owners had welcomed it and
were giving "excellent cooperation."
At Washington headquarters, a General Intelligence Division-
forerunner of today's Domestic Intelligence Divisionhad
been created to coordinate and supervise all work related
to "espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities and
violations of the neutrality regulations." Its Translation Section
made available for use the substance of subversive
foreign-language "communications, documents, and papers."
Its Code Section broke dm\n codes and decoded intercepted
messages.
Also, special investigations were being made of persons
reported to be active in "any subversive activity or in movements
detrimental to the internal security." With reference to
those who might have to be more fully investigated in the
event of an acute national emergency, the results of the special
investigations were being kept on file.H
Still, in many other regards, the American intelligence community
was insufficient to actual needs during the twilight prior to the nation's
entry into the "'orld war. As one authority has observed:
As late as 1938 army counterintelligence in the United
States and its possessions abroad consisted of no more than
three officers and eighteen agents, exactly one of whom spoke
a foreign language. Even worse, the limited numbers involved
in intelligence and counterintelligence included many
who had neither the qualifications nor the feel for intrigue.
Frequently career naval and air officers who demonstrated
no special aptitude in other branches of service life were
relegated to intelligence work simply to be got rid of. In 1939,
despite memories of the substantial American commitment in
the First World War and an awareness that a new war was
threatening to follow the earlier pattern, the national secret
services amounted to very littleY
On May 27, 1941, the President issued (55 Stat. 1647) a second
proclamation of national emergency, saying, in part:
I have said on many occasions that the United States is
mustering its men and its resources only for purposes of
defense-only to repel attack. I repeat that statement now.
But we must be realistic when we use the word "attack;"
we have to relate it to the lightning speed of modern
warfare.
Some people seem to think that we are not attacked until
bombs actually drop in the streets of New York or San Francisco
or New Orleans or Chicago. But they are simply
11 Overstreet, op. cit., PP. 89--90.
12 Richard Wilmer Rowan with Robert G. Deindorfer. Secret Service: ThirtyThree
Oenturie8 of E8pw1ULge. London, William Kimber, 1969, p. 613.
137
shutting their eyes to the lesson that we must learn from the
fate of every Nation that the Nazis have conquered.
The attack on Czechoslovakia began with the conquest of
Austria. The attack on Norway began with the occupation of
Denmark. The attack on Greece began with occupation of
Albania and Bulgaria. The attack on the Suez Canal began
with the invasion of the Balkans and North Africa, and the
attack on the United States can begin with the domination
of any base which menaces our security-north or south.
Nobody can foretell tonight just when the acts of the
dictators will ripen into attack in this hemisphere and us.
But we know enough by now to realize that it would be
suicide to wait until they are in our front yard.13
The watching and waiting were over. America was preparing for
war. Seven months later war was a reality.
II. Attack
On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, Japanese aircraft attacked
American military and naval installations at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.
The surprise engagement lasted approximately two hours; resolution
of the Pacific conflict would occur four years later with the arrival
of the atomic age. Simultaneous with the raid on Oahu, the Japanese
launched assaults on the Philippines, Guam, and Midway Island.
These events tragically condemned the pitiful condition of American
intelligence efforts. The following day Congress declared war on
Japan. Three days later, the United States extended the declaration
to Germany and Italy.
The initial months of the Pacific conflict were desperate and devastating
for American forces. At Pearl Harbor, 19 ships were sunk or
disabled; about 150 planes were destroyed; 2,335 soldiers and sailors
were killed and 68 civilians perished. The Japanese seized Guam
(December 13) and Wake Island (December 22). The Philippine
invasion (December 10) repelled the American defenders with Manila
and Cavite SOon falling to the Japanese (January 2). After a siege
of more than three months endurance, Bataan collapsed (April 9)
ll~nd American forces withdrew to Corregidor Island where 11,500
ultimately were forced to surrender (May 6) to the Japanese.
The costly Battle of the Java Sea (February 27-March 1) traded
vital naval war material and precious lives for time; having regrouped
its forces, the Navy halted the Japanese advance in the
Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7-8), the first engagement in history
in which surface ships did not directly destroy each other as all fighting
was done by carrier-based aircraft. A month later, in the Battle
of Midway, the Japanese suffered their first major defeat-4 aircraft
carriers sunk and 275 planes lost-and the tide of the Pacific war
began turning against Nippon.
American forces did not actively join in the offensive against Germany
and Italy until 1942. The first independent United States bomb-
.1 Samuel I. Rosenman, compo The Public Paper8 and Addre88e8 of Franklin D.
Ro08evelt: 1941 Volume, The Call to Battle Station8. New York, Harper and
Brothers, 1950, pp. 188-189.
138
ing raid in Europe was conducted (August 17) by the Eighth Air
Force from England in an assault upon the railroad yards at Rouen.
By autumn, British and American troops under the command of
General Dwight D. Eisenhower executed Operation Torch with
landings (November 8) in North Africa. By the new year, Eisenhower
was appointed (February 6) commander in chief of all allied
forces in Africa and by the spring (May 13) had succeeded in liberating
that continent. Out of this campaign came the strategic advantage
for the invasion of Italy (September 3-9) and recognition of Eisenhower,
soon transferred (January 16, 1944) to command of Allied
Expeditionary Forces in London, as a brilliant organizer and leader
of the diverse allied armies. Six months after assuming command of
the European Theater, Eisenhower was executing (June 6) Operation
Overload, the invasion of France along the Normandy peninsula. It
was the beginning of the end of the Nazi empire.
During the spring and summer months of 1945, '''"orld 'War II
came to a halt. On May 1 the provisional German government announced
Hitler was dead, a suicide in the ruins of Berlin. An instrument
of surrender was signed at Allied headquarters at Reim On
May 7; V-E Day, the formal end of the war in Europe, occurred
the following day; and the German surrender was ratified in Berlin
on May 9. Three months later, United States aircraft dropped atomic
devices on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 10). Agreement
as to the conditions for ,Japan's surrender was achieved on
August 14; V-J Day, the formal end of war in the Pacific, occurred
the following day; and the Japanese surrender was finalized on September
2. Official termination of the declaration of war against Ger·
many took place on October 19, 1951 (65 Stat. 451) ; official termination
of war with Japan came on March 20, 1952, with the Senate
ratification of the treaty of peace.
Ill. Office of Strategw S ervwes
Although various defense and civilian departments and agencies
of the Federal Government maintained units for intelligence purposes
during World War II, it was during this period of international
tumult that the first centralized intelligence structure came into
existence. The man proposing the new intelligence entity was William
J. Donovan, a much decorated hero of World War I, an attorney, a
Republican, an internationalist, and an ardent foe of totalitarianism.
President Roosevelt welcomed the suggestion of a single
agency which would serve as a clearinghouse for all intelligence,
as well as an organ of counterpropaganda and a training
center for what were euphemistically called "special
operations," and invited Colonel Donovan to be its head.
At first Donovan was reluctant. His 'Vorld "Tar I antipathy
to desk genHa]ship was still strong, and though he was now
fifty-eight he preferred to lead a combat division; but the
prospect of organizing a unified intelligence, sabotage and
subversive warfare unit, the first in American history, was
most tempting. After a lengthy discussion with the Presi139
dent, he agreed to form the new agency, under the somewhat
misleading title of Coordinator of Information.14
}3~rn in Buffalo, New York, on New Year's Day, 1883,
"dham .Joseph Donovan's paternal grandparents had immigrated
to the United States from Ireland in about 1840. His father sold real
rstate at one time and later operated an insurance business. After
attending St. .Joseph's Collegiate Institute and Niagara University
(B.A., 1905), William studied at Columbia University (LL.B., 1907)
and was admitted to the New York bar in 1908. Four years later he
formed his first law partnership and began his military'career, enlisting
in the 1st Cavalry of the New York National Guard. He saw nine
months of active duty along the Rio Grande during the Mexican
campaign in 1916. 'When the United States entered the European
hostilities the following year, Donovan was assistant chief of staff
of the 27th Division of the New York National Guard. With the
formation of the 42nd "Rainbow" Division, he was assigned to the
165th Infantry and subsequently became a colonel with the Fighting
69th Regiment. ",Vounded three times during twenty-one months of
active service overseas, Donovan became one of the most decorated
soldiers of the Great War. His own government awarded him the
Congressional Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, and
the Distinguished Service Medal. He was the only member of the
armed forces to receive these three cherished decorations during
World War I.
In the summer of 1919, returned to civilian life and about to resume
his law practice in Buffalo, Donovan and his wife of five years left
the United States on a long-deferred honeymoon to Japan. It was
then that he began his intelligence activities.
They had relaxed in Tokyo but a few days when the American
ambassador, Roland Morris, called Donovan on urgent
business. Morris was about to depart for Siberia to evaluate
the reportedly unstable status of the White Russian government
at Omsk, headed by Admiral Alexander Kolchak, and
advise the State Department whether the Kolchak regime
should be supported by the United States. He needed someone
with Donovan's background and training to accompany
him on his confidential mission. Ruth Donovan reconciled
herself to what would become a pattern of similar missions
over the next forty yearsY
A variety of other government positions soon beckoned Donovan.
He became a U.S. Attorney for the ",Vestern District of New -r:ork
in 1922. Shortly thereafter he served as a delegate to a CanadlanAmerican
customs conference held in Ottawa, which produced a
treaty of cooperation in preventing international crimes. In 1924
Donovan was appointed Assistant Attorney General in charge of
Federal criminal matters; the following year he became the assistant
U Corey Ford. Donovan of 088. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1970.
p.108.
111 Ibid., p. 59.
70-890 0 - 76 - 10
140
to Attorney General John G. Sargent, a position he held until 1929.
Ret.u~ning to New York, Donovan acted as counsel for the panel
revIsmg the state laws pertaining to the Public Service Commission.
During the 1930's he traveled to Ethiopia as an impartial observer
of the invasion by Italy; next he was in Spain scrutinizing the
development of the civil war in that land. Through friends and contacts
in Europe, he kept well informed on the progress of totalitarianism
on the Continent. 'With the outbreak of war in 1939, Donovan
became a valuable operative for neutral America. In July, 1940, he
went to Great Britain to observe the Blitz for Secretary of the Navy
Frank Knox. Upon his return he made a vigorous effort to publicize
England's ability to survive the German assault and to secure aid
for the embattled British. In December he was again on a reconnaissance
mission, touring Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Greece, Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia, Turkey, Cyprus, Palestine, Spain, Portugal, and again
to Great Britain.16 'Vith his observations on the military, political,
and economic conditions in these nations he also offered the suggestion
for creating a centralized intelligence agency. The impetus for
such an organization derived not only from felt need for such an
entity at the Federal level, but also from a close familiarity with
the Special Operations structure of the British governmentY Once
the American counterpart to the British intelligence office was established,
Donovan became its chief, but served from the fall of 1941
to the spring of 1943 without a government salary or an active duty
military rank.I8
In the summer of 1941, four months before the Japanese struck
Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued a directive (7 F.R. 34223423)
designating a Coordinator of Information which said:
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the
United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
1. There is hereby established the position of Coordinator
of Information, with authority to collect and analyze all
information and data which may bear upon national security;
to correlate such information and data, and to make
such information and data available to the President and to
such departments and officials of the Government as the
President may determine; and to carry out, when requested
by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate
the securing of information important for national security
not now available to the Government.
2. The several departments and agencies of the Government
shall make available to the Coordinator of Information all
and any such information and data relating to nation!!,l
security as the Coordinator, with the approval of the PreSIdent,
may from time to time request.
3. The Coordinator of Information may appoint such committees,
consisting of appropriate representatives of the vari-
,. On Ixmovan's overseas observation missions see Ibid., pp. 78-107.
17 Hid., p. 107.
18 Ibid., p. 174.
141
ous departments and agencies of the Government, as he may
deem necessary to assist him in the performance of his
functions.
4. Nothing in the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator
of Information shall in any way interfere with or impair
the duties and responsibilities of the regular military
and naval advisers of the President as Commander in Chief
of the Army and Xavy.
5. ,Vithin the limits of such funds as may be allocated to
the Coordinator of Information by the PI~esident. the Coordinator
may employ necessary personnel and make provision
for the necessary supplies. facilities, and services.
6. ,Vi1liam .J. Donovan is hereby designated as Coordinator
of Information.
Dated July 11, 1941, this purposely vague directive provided Donovan
with an intdligence function, which might include special actions
requested by the President, and a propaganda mission. After a year of
operations, it \vas felt that the propaganda duties of the Coordinator
were inappropriate to his intelligence activities. Subsequently, on
June 13, 1942. these propaganda responsibilities were transferred to the
newly created (E.O. 9182) Office of War Information established
within the Office for Emergency )Ianagement. By military order (7
F.R. 4469-4470) of the same date, the Coordinator"s office was renamed
the Office of Strategic Services and placed under the jurisdiction of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Donomn's new charter said:
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the
United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
1. The office of Coordinator of Information established by
Order of July 11, 1941, exclusi\-e of the fOrl'\ign information
activities transferred to the Office of ,Val' Information by
Executive Order of .June 13. 1942, shall hereafter be known as
the Office of Strategic Serdces. and is hereby transferred to
the jurisdiction of the United States .roint Chiefs of Staff.
2. The Office of Strategic Services shall perform the following
duties:
a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as
may be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
b. Plan and operate such special services as may be
directed by the United States .Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. At the head of the Office of Strate.~ic Services shall be a
Director of Strategic Services who shall be appointed by the
President and who shall perform his duties under the direction
and supervision of the United States Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
4. William .J. Donovan is hereby appointed as Director of
Strategic Services.
5. The Order of.ruly 11, 1941 is hereby revoked.
Although this directive clarified the duties of Donovan's organization,
it did not insure the gadfly agencis operational status.
142
Executive Order 9182 [divesting Donovan of propaganda
production responsibilities] had insured, at least for the
moment, the continuance of Donovan's controversial experiment
in organized intelligence and paramilitary service; but
the transfer of its jurisdiction from the President to the tToint
Chiefs of Staff (which Donovan had personally requested)
posed even more critical problems. Now the struggling Cal
had a new supervisor as well as a new name, and its functions
and th~ ~xt€nt of its authority were entirely dependent upon
the deCISIon of the JCS. This meant that all funds to operate ass must come from Congress, primarily the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees, and its budget requests
must first be submitted to and approved by the gimlet-eyed
Bureau of the Budget. The immediate problem of maintaining
ass during the transition period was temporarily
bridged by instructions from the JCS that it should carry
on as usual, pending further study of its wartime functions;
but Donovan and his top staff were keenly aware that ass
faced a critical struggle to convince the Joint Chiefs and
other ranking officials of the government not only that ass
should be given adequate written authority and manpower
and supplies, but in fact that it should exist at all.19
Preparing his own case, Donovan, with staff assistance, drafted and
redrafted a proposed ass directive establishing the agency's operational
authority. He was adamant that ass should never be absorbed
by or subject to the control of any other government office or the armed
forces. In brief, ass would assist and serve all se~ments of the Federal
structure but would be subservient to none. His painstaking effort
completed, Donovan forwarded the model directive and an explanatory
memorandum to the .Toint Chiefs.20 His time was then consumed
by preparations for Operation Torch-the invasion of North
Africa-and the execution of this first assualt against the totalitarian
forces holding the Old World captive. Among other triumphs deriving
from the incursion, the
pre-invasion charts and estimates, and the aSS-pioneered
technique of keeping commanders informed of conditions
ashore up to the very moment of landing, had clearly.dem.onstrated
the new agency's value; but Donovan's draft dIrectlve,
submitted to the JCS before Torch, was still being debated in
committee hearings. Early in December Donovan had an informal
chat with his old friend Frank Knox, Secretary of the
Navy. Knox was surprised to learn that so long a period had
elapsed without any formal or comprehensive instructions
from the .Toint Chiefs, and he took up the matter with President
Roosevelt, who told General George C. Marshall, chairman
of the JCS : "I wish you would give Bill Donovan a little
elbow room to operate in." Shortly afterward the Joint
Chiefs appointed committees of high-ranking officers. including
Admiral Frederick Horne and Generals Joseph T.
McNarney and Albert Wedemyer, to make a personal inspec-
19 Ibid.. pp. 128--129. ,., see Ibid., p. 131.
143
tion of OSS and recommend what should be done. The committee
promptly rendered reports (which were not made
available to OSS), and on December 23, 1942, six months
after it was created, the agency reCBived its long-awaited
directive. almost word for \vord the draft which Donovan
had prepared.
In the field of intelligence, OSS \vas given the independent
status which Donovan sought. climaxing the bitter feud with
the rival serviCB agencies. The Joint Psychological Warfare
Board, on which OSS had a minority of members, was
abolished by the JCS. Henceforth OSS was the sole agency of
the .rcs authorized to operate in the fields of intelligence,
sabotage, and counterespionage, to conduct guerrilla operations,
and to direct resistance groups in all enemy-occupied or
controlled territory. General Marshall stated in a personal
l~tter to ~olonel Donovan, written on the same day the directIve
was Issued:
"I regret that. after voluntarily coming under the jurisdiction
of the JCS, your organization has not had smoother
sailing. Nevertheless, it has rendered invaluable service,
particularly with reference to the North African Campaign.
I am hopeful that the new Office of Strategic Services' directive
will eliminate most, if not all, of your difficulties." 21
Donovan's original idea for a centralized intelligence agency had
derived from his exposure to the British intelligence structure during
his 1940 observation missions.22 Faced with the necessity of quickly
organizing an effective intelligence operation for the United States,
Donovan again relied upon the British.
William Stephenson had developed an undercover organization
in the United States, called British Security Coordinator
(BSC), which was staffed with experienced officers; and they
supplied the pioneer American agency at the outset with
much of its secret intelligence. Experts in counterespionage
and subversive propaganda and special operations were put
at Donovan's disposal, and he was shown their methods of
communicating with resistance forces behind the lines. In the
early days. cor agents were trained at a school near Toronto,
Canada, later a model for some of the training schools of
OSS. Donovan said after the war: "Bill Stephenson and the
British Intelligence Service gave us an enormous head start
which we could not otherwise have had." 23
With information and expertise being supplied by the British, the
next task involved structuring the new intelligence entity.
Colonel Donovan brought a trained legal mind to the task
of organizing his fast-growing agency----'OSS was to employ
some thirty thousand people by the war's end-and set it
up as he would prepare a trial case, with research experts to
analyze the evidence and skilled assistants to conduct the
21 Ibid.. pp. 162-163.
112 See Ibid., p. 107.
• Ibid., pp. 112-113.
144
prosecution. At the top of the chart were Donovan as director
and [G. Edward] Buxton as [assistant] director, and beside
them were the Planning Group and the Planning Staff. Under
Donovan were his three deputy directors, with staff but not
command status, who were charged with the duty of coordinating
the three main ass functions: intelligence (research
and analysis, secret intelligence, counterespionage, and collateral
offices), operations (sabotage, guerrilla warfare, psychological
warfare, and related activities), and schools and
training. A chief of services supervised the work of the offices
of budget, procurement, finance, and related problems. In
addition, there were some eighteen essential offices which
could not be assigned effectively to any subordinate command.
Thus the Security Office reported directly to Donovan,
since security involved all procedures and all personnel regardless
of rank. Other offices which sened the entire organization
were also placed under the director, including
medical services, special funds, field photographic, communications,
Navy and Army Commands which handled the
administrative problems of ass naval and military personnel,
and a liaison office to maintain relations with other government
agencies. The functions of the principal branches
were:
Research and Analysis (R&A) To produce the economic,
military, social and political studies and estimates
for every strategic area from Europe to the Far East.
Secret Intelligence (SI) To gather on-the-spot information
from within neutral and enemy territory.
Special Operations (SO) To conduct sabotage and
work with resistance forces.
Oounterespionage (X-2) To protect our own and
Allied intelligence operations, and to identify enemy
agents overseas.
Morale Operations (~IO) To create and disseminate
black [covert] propaganda.
Operational Groups (OG) To train and supply and
lead guerrilla forces in enemy territory.
Maritime Unit (MU) To conduct maritime sabotage.
Schools and Training (S&T) In overall charge of the
assessment and training of personnel, both in the United
States and overseas.
Not only did this departmentalization increase the agency's
effectiveness, but it helped to maintain security. Each branch
of ass had its own secret file of information, which was
available to members of other branches only on an official
"need to know" basis. Donovan himself was not told the
real names of some of his most successful agents, nor did he
seek to learn them. Complete anonymHy was the best safeguard
against detection by the enemy.24
.. Ibid., pp. 167-68.
145
With the establishment of the Office of Coordinator of Information
a recruitment of ne,v faces into the intelligence system was inaugurated.
Most would continue their service with OSS until the end of
the war.
Heading Donovan's early staff ,,'as Colonel Edward Buxton.
a close friend since 'Vorld 'Val' I days, who left his business
in Rhode Island to become the [assistant] director of the
COl. James Murphy, formerly Donovan's secretary when he
,vas Assistant Attorney General, ,,"as made his personal assistant.
Dr. William L. Langer, distinguished Coolidge professor
of history at Harvard, ,,'ho had seen action as a sergeant
in the Argonne and at St.-Mihiel, headed the key Research
and Analysis division, following the resignation of
Dr. James Phinney Baxter, president of 'Villiams College
and a brilliant administrator, who served briefly as the first
chief of R&A. Dr. Edward S. Mason, later director of Harvard's
School of Public Administration and a prominent
economist, Dean Calvin Hoover of Duke l~niversity, and the
late Dr. Edward Meade of Princeton's Institute for Advanced
Study, and Dr. Henry Field, curator of physical anthropology
at Chicago's Field Museum, joined Donovan's expanding
unit. David K. E. Bruce, later to be named U.S.
ambassador to the Court of St. James's, came to Washington
to head COl's Special Activities Bruce (SAB), the agency's
secret intelligence branch; and M. P. Goodfellm\' left his
newspaper business to head the sabotage branch (Special
Activities Goodfellow-or SAG). (Both of these branches
existed in the training stages only, since the U.S. was not yet
at war.) Robert E. Sherwood, noted American playwright
and an intimate of President Roosevelt assumed responsibility
for the Foreign Information Service (FIS).25
'Vhen OSS was created, Sherwood became director of overseas
operations at the Office of 'Val' Information. Most of the personnel
staying with OSS donned uniforms and held some type of rank in
the armed forces; nevertheless. they took their direction from Donovan
and were not subjected to the command of the Army and Navy.
From the beginnings of COl before Pearl Harbor to the
termination of OSS after V-J Day, the Research and Analysis
branch was the very core of the agency. The cloak-anddagger
exploits of agents infiltrated behind the lines captured
the public imagination: but the prosaic and colorless grubbing
of Dr. Langer's scientists, largely overlooked by the press,
pro,'ided far and away the greater contribution to America's
wartime intelligence. From the files of foreign newspapers,
from obscure technical journals. from reports of international
business firms and labor organizations, they extracted pertinent
figures and data. With infinite patience, they fitted the
facts together into a mosaic of information-the raw material
.. Ibid., pp. 110-111.
146
of strategy, Donoyan called it-on "hich the President and
his Chiefs of Staff could form their operational decisions. 26
The R&A branch gained sufficient prestige that other Federal agencies
sought its assistance. The Board of Economic vVarfare, for
example, asked R&A to determine if Soviet requests for American
goods under lend-lease were justified by the conditions of their
economy. On this particular matter, ass findings proved to be more
accurate than those of British intelligence.27
At the start, Donovan established an R&A Board of Analysts,
consisting of half a dozen scholars, each of whom took charge
of some major activity and played an important role III
recruiting further staff members. In this way, he was able to
secure the high classifications needed to get the very best
people for a general directorate. (Subsequently this Board
of Analysts provided the model for the CIA Board of National
Estimates, set up in 1950 by Dr. Langer for General
Bedell Smith.) Due to its many-sided and brilliant staff,
R&A was credited with producing the most accurate estimates
made by the Allies in World War IJ.28
In addition to its research and analysis achievements, ass was to
prove inventive and innovative in another capacity. These were the
products of the research and development unit (R&D) headed by
Stanley Lovell.
Dr. Stanley Lovell, in charge of the agency's calculated mischief,
was a sunny little nihilist, his spectacles twinkling and
his chubby face creasing with merriment as he displayed his
latest diabolic devices. This simple candle could be placed by
a female agent in the bedroom of an amorous German officer,
Lovell chuckled, and would burn perfectly until the flame
touched the high explosive contained in the lower half of the
candle. This innocent-looking plastic cylinder called the Fireflv.
clroDPed furtivelv into the gas tank of a car by a MaQuis
filling-station attendant, would explode after the gasoline
had swelled a rubber retaining ring. If the vehicle were a
German tank-Lovell had to pause to wipe his spectacles and
dab the tears of laughter from his eyes-the occupants would
he cremated lwfore thev could onen the escape hatch. This
anerometer. a barometric fuse attached to a length of hose
packed with explosive, could be slid into the rear of the fuselage
of an enemy aircraft; at five thousand feet altitude, he
.. Ibid., p. 148; popular accounts of ORS cloak-and-dagger acth-ities. which
were often heroic and valiant efforts, may he found in Steward Alsop and Thomas
Braden. Sub Rosa: Thr 0.8.8. and Amrrif'an E .•pionarw, New York, Reynal and
Hitchcock, 1946: and Corey Ford and Alastair McBain: Cloak and Daqger: The
Secret Story of OSS, New York, Random House, 1946. An excellent account of
OSS fieltl operntions may be founfl in R. Harris Smith. OSS: The Secr-ot Historll
Of America's First Central Intelligence Aqency, Berkeley, University of California
Press, 1972.
27 ReI' Ford, op. cit.. p. 1;')2: for an appreciation of the general approach of R&A
to intellig-ence analyses, see Sherman Kent. Strategic Intelligence for American
World Policy. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 19<19.
.. Ford, op. cit., p. 150.
147
explained gleefully, the entire tail section would blow off.
This limpet, fastened by a powerful magnet to the side of a
ship below waterline, would detonate when the magnesium
alloy was eroded by salt water, long after the saboteur had
left tho area. It was used effectively by the Norwcign underground
to sink Nazi troop-ships in the narrow fjords of Oslo
and Narvik-Lovell doubled up and slapped his knees at the
thought-and sent untold thousands of German soldiers to a
watery grave.29
In spite of the various intelligence accomplishments of OSS, not
everyone in ",Vashington was happy about the creation and existence
of Donovan:s organization.
J. Edgar Hoover, perhaps fearing that COl would steal the
spotlight long enjoyed by his FBI, was not satisfied until
he had Roosevelt's word that Donovan would be expressly
forbidden to conduct any espionage activities within the
United States, Nelson Rockefeller, Chairman of the State
Department's Committee to Coordinate Inter-American Affairs
(once called, even more pretentiously, the Committee on
Cultural and Commercial Relations Between North and
South America) echoed the FBI in seeking assurance that
Donovan would likewise be excluded from his established
bailiwick in the southern hemisphere. Major General George
V. Strong, later chief of Army G-2, could not understand
that G-2 represented tactical military intelligence and COl
strategic intelligence of all kinds; and Strong therefore felt
there was a definite conflict of interests. He vigorously fought
Roosevelt's proposal that Colonel Donovan should be returned
to active duty with the rank of major general-a grade more
commensurate with his new duties-and offered the irrelevant
argument that ~'Wild Bill" was too independent to be a
team player. "If there's a loose football on the field," Strong
protested, "he'll pick it up and run with it." Isolationist senators
such as Burton Wheeler and Robert Taft likewise opposed
Donovan's advance in rank, and Taft rose on the
Senate floor to warn his colleagues of the danger of White
House control of intelligence and investigative units. Realizing
that the sUf'"gested promotion might cause a prolonged
Congressional fight, Roosevelt yielded, at least for the
moment, and Donovan took over as head of COl in a civilian
capacity.so
Though the President granted the FBI exclusive intelligence jurisdiction
over South and Latin America, ass still made forays into the
region.31 The rivalry between the two agencies also exemplified itself
in other ways. .
29 Ibid.• p. 170; R&D also produced or nt least considerpd a numbt>r of bizarre
and totally impractical schemes and devices; see Stanley P. Lovell. Of Spies and
Stratagems. Engelwood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
... Ford. op. cit., p. 109.
S1 See Smith, op. cit., p. 20.
148
In January 1942 Donovan's officers secretly penetrated the
Spanish embassy in Washington and began photographing
the code books and other official documents of Franco's proAxis
government. Hoover learned of this operation and was
angered because the COl men were invading his operational
territory. The FBI did not bother to register a formal protest.
While the COl officers were making one of their nocturnal
entries into the embassy in April, two FBI squad cars
followed. When Donovan's men were in the building, the cars
pulled up outside the embassy and turned on their sirens. The
entire neighborhood was awakened and the COl interlopers
were sent scurrving. Donovan protested this incredible FBI
action to the White House. Instead of reprimanding Hoover,
Roosevelt's aides ordered the embassy infiltration project
turned over to the Bureau.32
OSS was also restricted from entering the Pacific Theater (but not
Asia) by General Dou,!!las MacArthur. The agency's intelligence materials
were utilized by MacArthur in his invasion of and return to the
Philippines; Admiral Chester Nimitz had It small OSS maritime unit
for underwater demolition action with his fleet; and another OSS
force delivered special weapons to the Tenth Army for the Olrinawa
landing, but Donovan's agents were otherwise unauthorized to operate
in MacArthur's command area.33
General MacArthur's intransigence is rlifficult to explain.
His personal relationship with Donovan was cordial, they
had served together in the Rainbow Division during the First
World War, and both were highly decorated heroes. Donovan
entertained the deepest regard for MacArthur's brillance as
a military strategist, and never offered any reason for his adamant
opposition to OSS; but members of the agency had
their private theories. Some speculated that reharles] Willoughby
rMacArthur's intelligence chief], anxious to insure
full credit for his intelligence unit, feared that "Wild Bill"
would grab the spotlight. Others held that MacArthur, a West
Pointer and firm believer in the chain of command, obiected
to the presence of a uniformed civilian acting independently
in his theater. A few intimates, who knew Donovan's own determination,
suspected that it was the inevitable clash between
two strong personalities, equally fixed in purpose.34
In spite of these jurisdictional limitations placed on OSS by the
FBI and the Army, the agency gathered its intelligence materials
from all over the globe by whatever means available. Agreements were
negotiated regarding "special operations" by OSS at the outset of
efforts to liberate Europe, beginning with the North African invasion.
In planning the invasion, political problems posed themselves
immediately. Roosevelt secured Churchill's agreement
.. Ibid.
03 See Ford, op. cit., p. 253.
M Ibi4., pp. 253-254; as commander of United Nations troops in Korea in 1951,
MacArthur also refused to allow the Central Intelligence Agency to operate in
his theater.
149
that the landings~ cod~-namrc1TORCH, should be a predominantly
American operation (\,ith the rnited States handlinO'
the diplomatic aspects). The Pl'esidpnt and his ad,isol's he':'
liend that anglophoic French commanders in Xorth Africa
would offer less resistance to a landing led by American
troops "ith British forces remaining in the background.
At the secret senice len], a similar agreement had been
reached in .Tune 19-12 as part of a comprehensiYe operational
accord with the British SOE rSpeeial Operations Executi\"
eJ~ negotiated in London by OSS Colonels Preston Goodfellow
... and Garland ,Yilliams, an official of the New York
Xareoties Commission. In the first of srypral war-time delineations
of "spheres of influence" for clandestine actiYity, OSS
took primary responsibility for subversion in North Africa
(as well as China, Korea, the South Pacific, and Finland).
The British, in turn, assumed temporary predominance in
India, West Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Western
E'urope was considered joint territory.3s
Such agrrements~ of course, \,ere of momentary importance and required
renegotiations as 11e\, areas came under librration and whenever
the grand strategists shifted their attack objectives and designs
for routing the enemy. In the midst of such planning, old jealousies
and new antagonism flared against OSS.
Back in the early days of cor, London had been most cooperatiYe,
sharing its training facilities and operational techniques
"ith the struggling new agency. As OSS grew
stronger, howeYer, SIS [the British Secret Intelligence Service]
showed an increasing reluctance to accept its American
counterpart as a full and equal partner.
Britain's position "as enhanced by the Theater Command's
lack of sympathy with OSS objectives. Throughout 194~-43,
the practice of ETOUSA (European Theater of OperatIOns)
was to rely mainly on British Intelligence and ignore OSS
offers of assistance, thus inadvertently aiding SIS efforts to
subordinate the vounger American organization. The U.S.
Theater Comma~d staff based their policy on Britain's
greater experience in the field; but they overlooked the fact
that OSS could provide new and different information to
supplement or even refute the intelligence from other sources,
and would serve long-range U.S. strategic needs best if it remained
independent.
The issue came to a head in September of 1943 when
ETOUSA refused to giYe OSS authority to conduct espionage
on the European continent unless it operated under
British supenision. General Donoyan insisted that freedom
from the knowledge and influence of any outside power was
essential to the success of his Secret Intelligence branch, and
he strongly opposed the SIS efforts to force an amalgamation.
In an appeal to the .Toint Chiefs of Staff, he pointed out
that Britain's proposal "suggests 'coordination' and 'agree-
.. Smith, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
150
ment,' but as employed here the word 'coordination' means
'control' and 'agreement' means 'dependence.' ... This attempt
of the British, by reason of thrir physiral control of
territory and communication, to subordinate the American
intelligence and connterintelligrnce service is shortsighted
and dangerous to the ultimate interests of both countries."
As a result of his arguments. a new .rcs directiye on October
27, 1943 gave ass fun and nnqnalified authority to operate
on the Continent, ETOUSA accordingly reversed its
position, and the independence of American long-range espionage
was assured. Rather than engage in destructive
competition, the British yielded. ass Special Operations
(SO) and Counterintelligence (X-2) greatly strengthened
their ETa and 'were given access to the extensive files which
Britain had taken decades to develop. In turn, ass provided
funds, manpower, resistance supplies, three sub-chasers for
Norwegian operations, and a sqnadron of Liberator bombers
for airdrops to occupied countries. Thenceforth, throughout
the war American and British intelligence worked in productive
though discreet partnership.36
On occasion, unusual organization schemes facilitated Donovan's
efforts at maintaining an effective intelligence operation. Early in the
war, influential German emigres to the United States were recruited
by Shortwave Research, Inc., a Cal front, to broadcast anti-Nazi
messages to their homeland.37 To retain an OSS foothold in China,
Donovan found it necessary to agree to creating the Sino-American
Cooperative Organization, headed by Chiang Kai-shek's feared and
hated secret police chief, Tai 1.i, described by one ass report as "not
the Admiral Canaris of China, but the Heinrich Himmler."
The deputy director of the unit was Captain Milton "Mary" Miles
who, while chief of ass Far Eastern operations and commander of
Navy Group/China, had befriended Tai Li. The scheme was harshly
criticized by the theater commander, General Joseph Stilwell and his
highly experienced State Department political advisors, John Paton
Davies, Jr. and John Service. The new organization soon began to
disintegrate; Miles became hostile toward ass headquarters and
autocratic in terms of controlling ass field operations in China.
Eventually, Donovan personally intervened, fired Miles, and challenged
Tai Li to try and halt ass agents operating in his country.
Donovan also enlisted the help of General Claire Chennault in establishing
independence for ass operations in China and championing
the agency's activities.3s
And in the middle of neutral Switzerland, attached to the American
Legation at Bern as a Special Assistant to the Minister, was Allen
Dulles, an ass master agent literally surrounded by the Nazi regime.
Dispatched in November 1942, Dulles was instrumental in intelligence
gathering and directing special operations within enemy territory.
From February to May 1945. he served as the negotiator and conciliator
in efforts which led to the unconditional surrender of close to a
3. Ford, op. cit., pp. 165-166.
31 Smith, op. cit., p. 405n.
38 See Ford, op. cit., pp. 265-275; Smith, op. cit., pp. 242-285.
151
million men occupying Northern Italy and the termination of hostilities
on that front. 39
In the autumn of 1944, as Allied troops continued to roll across
Europe and press closer to Japan in the Pacific, President Roosevelt
sought Donovan's thinking on the matter of a permanent intelligence
organization for the period after the end of the war. In r.esponse ~o
the Chief Executive's request, Donovan offered the followmg classIfied
memorandum:
NOVE1\IBER 18, 1944.
Pursuant to your note of 31 October 1944:. I have giYen consideration
to the organization of an intelligence service for
the post-war period.
In the early days of the war, when the demands upon intelligence
services were mainly in and for military operations,
the ass was placed under the direction of the JCS.
Once our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally
pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems
of peace.
This will require two things:
1. That intelligence control be returned to the supervision
of the President.
2. The establishment of a central authority reporting directly
to you, with responsibility to frame intelligence objectives
and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material
required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying
out national policy and strategy.
I attach in the form of a draft directive (Tab A) the
means by which I think this could be realized without difficulty
or loss of time. You will note that coordination and
centralization are placed at the policy level but operational
intelligence (that pertaining primarily to Department action)
remains within the existing agencies concerned. The creation
of a central authority thus would not conflict with or limit
necessary intelligence functions within the Army, Navy, Department
of State and other agencies.
In accordance with your wish, this is set up as a permanent
long-range plan. But you may want to consider whether this
(or part of it) should be done now, by executive or legislative
action. There are common-sense reasons why you may desire
to lay the keel of the ship at once.
The immediate revision and coordination of our present
intelligence system would effect substantial economies and
aid in the more efficient and speedy termination of the war.
Information important to the national defense, being gathered
now by certain Departments and agencies, is not being
used to full ad,-antage in the war. Coordination at the stratefIT
level would prevent waste. and avoid the present confusion
that leads to waste and unnecssary duplication.
Though in the midst of war, we are also in a period of
transition which. before we are aware, will take us into the
3tl See Ford. op. cit .• pp. 291-295; also see Allen Dulles. The Secret Surrender.
New York, Harper and Row, 1966.
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, Director.
152
tumult of rehabilitation. An adequate and orderly intelligence
system will contribute to informed decisions.
We have now in the Government the trained and specialized
personnel needed for the task. This talent should not be
dispersed.
TAB A
Substantive Authority Necessary in Establishment of a
Central Intelligence Service
In order to coordinate and centralize the policies and actions
of the Government relating to intelligence:
1. There is established in the Executive Office of the President
a central intelligence service, to be known as the
----,at the head of which shall be a Director appointed
by the President. The Director shall discharge and perform
his functions and duties under the direction and supervision
of the President. Subject to the approval of the President,
the Director may exercise his powers, authorities and duties
through such officials or agencies and such manner as he may
determine.
2. There is established in the an Advisory
Board consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
War, the Secretary of the Navy, and such other members as
the President may subsequently appoint. The Board shall
advise and assist the Director with respect to the formulation
of basic policies and plans of the .
3. Subject to the direction and control of the President,
and with any necessary advise and assistance from the other
Departments and agencies of the Government, the----shall
perform the following functions and duties:
(a) Coordination of the functions of all intelligence agencies
of the Government, and the establishment of such policies
and objectives as will assure the integration of national
intelligence efforts;
(b) Collection either directly or through existing Government
Departments and agencies, of pertinent information,
including military, economic, political and scientific, concerning
the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign nations,
with particular reference to the effect such matters may
have upon the national security, policies and interests of the
United States;
(c) Final evaluation, synthesis and dissemination within
the Government of the intelligence required to enable the
Government to determine policies with respect to national
planning and security in peace and war, and the advancement
of broad national policy;
(d) Procurement, training and supervision of its intelligence
personnel;
(e) Subversive operations abroad;
153
(f) Determination of policies for an coordination of facilities
essential to the collection of information under subparagraph"
(b)" hereof; and
(g) Such other functions and duties relating to intelligence
as the President from time to time may direct.
4. The shall have no police or law-enforcement
functions, either at home or abroad.
5. Subject to Paragraph 3 hereof, existing intelligence
agencies within the Government shall collect, evaluate, synthesize
and disseminate departmental operating intelligence,
herein, defined as intelligence required by such agencies in
the actual performance of their functions and duties.
6. The Director shall be authorized to call upon Departments
and agencies of the Government to furnish appropriate
specialists for such supervisory and functional positions
within the as may be required.
7. All Government Departments and agencies shall make
available to the Director such intelligence material as the
Director, with the approval of the Presirlent, from time to
time may request.
8. The shall operate under an independent
budget.
9. In time of war or unlimited national emergency, all
programs of the in areas of actual or projected
military operations shall be coordinated with military plans
and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Parts of such programs which are to be executed in a
theater of military operations shall be subject to the control
of the Theater Commander.
10. 1Vithin the limits of such funds as may be made available
to the , the Director may employ necessary
personnel and make provision for necessary supplies, facilities
and services. The Director shall be assigned, upon the
approval of the President, such military and naval personnel
as may be requirerl in the performance of the functions and
duties of the . The Director may provide for the
internal organization and management of the in
such manner as he may determine.40
Three months later, on February 9, 1945, the isolationist press
triumvirate-the Chicago Tribune, 'the New York Daily News, and
the Washington Times-Herald-carried an article by Walter Trohan
characterizing the proposed agency as an "all-powerful intelligence
service to spy on the postwar world" and one which "would superceJe
all existing Federal police and intelligence units." The column continued
with full quotations from the memorandum and draft dirertire
prepared by Donovan. The effect of the story was to raise a
multiplicity of fears about such an entity being established and to
also unleash a profusion of jealousies among the existing FedeTill
intelligence and investigative units. The source of the leak regard-
.0 Ford, op. cit., pp. 340-342.
154
ing Dono\'an's communique to the President was thought to be FBI
Director Hoonr.41
A second b]O\y \yas deliypred to ass in Apri] \yhen the man \yho
had urged its creation and had remained appreciative of its mission
vis-a-vis the other intelligence functionaries died suddenly in 'Warm
Springs, Georgia. In many \yays, the war, due to end in four months,
claimed one more fatality in the case of Franklin D. Roosenlt. Rut
it also seized a President who understood and championed the unique
intelligence activities of ass. The new Chief Executive would be
far less appreciative.
It must be conceded, in fairness to Harry Tmman, that he
had never b~n taken into the full confidence of President
Roosevelt. Their relationship was less than full or intimate;
and, deliberately or due to carelessness, he had failed to brief
his Vice-President on the dangers of an intelligence gap in the
dawning atomic age. Whether it would have saved Donovan's
plan for a centralized and independent postwar intelligence
service is questionable. Tmman was a practical politician;
and he saw ass as a political liability because it gave the
opposition, both extreme right and extreme left, a chance to
attack the administration. The cry was on to cut the military
expenditure, to disarm, to bring the boys home. Roosevelt
might have refused to yield to public pressure, but Tmman
could not count on the same support of the American
people.42
Without consulting Donovan 01' the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President
Truman, on September 20, directed (E.O. 9621) that ass terminate
operations effectin October 1, 1945. The Bureau of the
Budget, prompted by Secretary of State .James F. Byrnes, insisted
on relocating the R&A section of ass within the State Department
to facilitate research needs there. "At Secretary Byrnes's request,
Dr. Langer came to State in 1946 for six months, to set up the intelligence
unit, but the regional desks were not particularly interested
at the time." 43 Established as the Interim Research and Intelligence
Branch. the unit became the Office of Intelligence Research in 1947
and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research a decade later.
The Secret Intelligence (SI) and Counterespionage (X-2) sections
were transferred to the War Department where they formed the
Strategic Services Unit which, in one expert's view, "was nothing
more than a caretaker body formed to preside over the liquidation
of the ass espionage network." 44
Only after the integrated mechanism of ass had been
scrapped, and the majority of its trained personnel, who
would have liked to continue, had drifted away in disgust,
did the truth dawn on Truman that he was no longer able to
obtain overseas information of the type available during
., See Ibid., pp. 300-305 ; Smith, op. cit., pp. 363-365.
' .. Ford, op. cit., p. 312.
43 Ibid., p. 314n.
.. Smith, op. cit.• p. 364.
155
World War II. As General Donovan had predicted, a critical
intelligence gap had developed, leaving the United States far
behind the other major powers. So urgent was the need for
knowledge that in January, 1946, at far greater expense and
effort than would have been necessary if Donovan's advice
had been followed, Truman set up an intermediate National
Intelligence Authority, made up of the Secretaries of State,
War and Navy, and the Chief of Staff to the President,
Under this agency was a so-called Central Intelligence Group
(CIG), headed by Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, an acquaintance
of Truman's from Missouri whose intelligence background
consisted of a tour as deputy director of O~I [Office
of Naval Intelligence] and who is said to have been instrumental
in persuading Truman to set up the NIA and the
CIG. He was to be succeeded less than six months later by
Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenburg, a capable Air Force
strategist but equally laeking in intelligence experience, who
in less than a year returned to the Air Force.45
While one authority credits OSS with a wartime budget of $135
million,46 another expert source has written: "From 1942 through
1945, excluding the salaries of members of the armed forces on active
duty with the agency, and a substantial part of overseas logistics
support, the cost of OSS averaged less than thirty-seven million a
year." 47 'While much of the agency's money was provided in unvouchered
funds, there was apparently close accounting of its
expenditure.
"Donovan was the first man to whom Congress made a grant
of twenty-five million dollars without requiring an accounting,"
Dr. Langer notes. "I recall the morning when the
General announced this at a staff meeting, and at once turned
a cold douche on our elation. This does not mean, he said, that
a single dollar is going to be spent irresponsibly, because I
know ",vhen the war is over this agency will be in a very exposed
position unless its record is spotless. For this reason I
have asked one of the leading New York accountants to join
the OSS, and he will see to it that all expenditures are accounted
for to me, even though I am under no such obligation
to Oongress." 48
However, the vigilant bookkeeping applied to OSS expenditures
does not seem to have extended to the maintenance of its membership
list.
No one can even guess the actual size of OSS at its wartime
peak. Over thirty thousand names were listed on the agency's
roster; but there were countJess Partisan workers in the occupied
countries whose identities Were never known, who
were paid OSS money and armed with OSS weapons and
.. Ford, or;. cit., pp. 314--315.
.. Rowan and Deindorfer, op. cit., p. 619.
<7 Ford, op. cit., p. 173.
.. Ibid., p. 173n.
70-890 0 - 76 - 11
156
perfonned OSS missions, yet for the most part were unaware
that their direction came from \Vashington. Each field agent
employed several local subagents, and they in turn recruited
anonymous friends from the surrounding countryside, sometimes
numbering in the thousands. One lone parachutist,
Ernst Floege of Chicago, "'ho (lropped into the Hprironrt
distriet of Franee, wound up the war in cOlllllland of an
underground force of thirty-five hundred; another FrenehAmerican
agent named Duval organized and personally
led an estimated seven thousand resistance fighters in the
L~'ons area. Altogether, the Maquis in Franee, the Kachin
tribesmen in Burma formed a worldwide shadow aI1lW ~\Yhich
sen-ed under OSS in close snpport of the Allied ~ilitary
effort, and whieh faded back into obscurity when the fighting
ceased.49
Once he left the directorship of OSS, Donovan also began fading
baek into obscurity. In the years immediately after the war he devoted
much of his time to the cause of European federalism as chairman
of the American Committee on United Europe. He v,as also a strong
advocate for wrestling the initiative from the U.S.S,R. in the so-called
cold war. After serving as ambassador to Thailand during 1953-1954,
he worked, as national chairman of the International Rescue Committee,
to assist refugees coming from North Vietnam to South Vietnam
and later, in 1956, he organized a campaign to raise a million dollars
for Hungarian refugee relief. Never again was he called into service
as an intelligence leader. Speculation ran high in 1947, with the creation
of the Central Intelligence Agency, that Donovan would be
selected to direct the new organization, but the position went to Rear
Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the last head of the Central Intelligence
Group. And again, in 1953, when President Eisenhower was
searching for a new CIA Director to replace the departing Bedell
Smith, Donovan's name was prominent among the candidates; but,
once again, and for the final time, the eall went to someone else-on
this occasion to his old friend and OSS colleague, Allen Dulles. Six
years later, on February 8, 1959, William ,T. Donovan died in the
nation's capital.
IV. Air Intelligence
The dawning of world war in 1939 found the United States rather
unprepared in another area of intelligence operations, a relatively new
field, but, nevertheless, a function which Japan and the principal
European powers had greatly refined at that time. Air intelligence
had been inaugurated in the American armed forces at the outbreak
of the Civil 'War with balloonists or aeronauts serving both with the
field armies and with the Signal Corps.50 The loosely organized balloon
corps of the Union Forces, disbanded in June 1863, did not exceed
seven balloons and nine trained aeronauts during its period of opera-
•• Ibid., pp. 203-204.
50 Generally, see F. Stansbury Haydon. iteronautics in the Union and Confederate
Armies. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1941.
157
tion.51 Its mission was observation, a most rudimentary int~lligence
task.
During the Spanish-American ,Val', the Signal Corps dispatched
its only available balloon and two aeronauts to Cuba where they apparently
saw two brief, but effective days of service in the attack on
San Juan Hill. Although a second balloon unit was organized at
Tampa, Florida, to accompany a new expeditionary force to Puerto
Rico, the armistice rendered their departure unnecessary.52
Almost four years after the Wright brothers success'fully demonstrated
the ability of a machine-powered heavier-than-air apparatus
to carry man aloft, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, Brigadier
General .James Allen, established, on August 1,1907, an Aeronautical
Division in his office, Two years and one day later, after a number of
trial tests, approval was granted for the purchase of the first Army
flying machine from the Wrights.53
By the time of the long-delayed recognition of the Wright
brothers in 1909, the Army's interest in aviation had been
primarily for the purpose of improving reconnaissance, The
first heavier-than-air craft, as well as lighter-than-air craft,
was evaluated by the military solely in terms of collecting information.
It took only a few years of Army experimentation
with airplanes to conclude that there was a greater development
potential for military reconnaissance in the airplane
than in captive or dirigible balloons; therefore, practically
all available funds for aeronautics in the Signal Corps, beginning
with fiscal year 1912, ,,-ere de\-oted to the purchase and
maintenance of heavier-than-air craft. This was a bold decision
because limited airplane performances by that time had
not demonstrated any military nlue other than that the Army
could extend its range of vision. Airplanes were valued for
their relatively passive role of spying out the enemy's disposition
and not as actively aggressive weapons in themselves.
Despite experiments made in shooting machine guns, taking
pictures, and dropping explosives from planes, the Signal
Corps decided to adopt two types of airplanes and both for
reconnaissance missions, The "Scout" was desired for service
with ground troops, for carrying two pilots and radio and
photographic equipment, and for travelling at least 45 mph
for four hours. The "Speed Scout" was designed to carry
only one pilot at a minimum speed of 65 miles [sic] for three
hours.54
51 U.S. Air Force Department. Air University Research Studies Institute.
"Development of Intelligence Function in the USAF, 1917-1950" by Victor H.
Cohen. Typescript, January 1, 1957, Chapter I, p. 16. Copies of this study bear
the marking "Secret;" the copy utilized in this study was declassified and supplied
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
" Ibid., Chapter I, pp. 24-26.
5.'; Ibid., Chapter I, pp. 2&--27.
54 Ibid., Chapter I, p. 28.
158
In 1913, the House Military Affairs Committee explored the possibility
of creating an air unit apart from the Signal Corps, but found
little favor for the idea.55
Three years later, Army airmen were afforded their first opportunity
to operate under combat conditions when the First Aero Squadron
was deployed in support of Brigadier .rohn J. Pershing's Mexican
border campaign. 'While a number of missions were successfully
completed,
the most significant lesson which was brought forcibly to the
attention of the Government and the people, especially in the
face of the rapid development of aviation during the European
war, was the need for increasing and properly equipping
an air force to accomplish the missions assigned to it. Consequently,
Congress appropriated $500,000 and over $13,000,000
in March and August of 1916 to expand the Aviation Section
of the Signal Corps, which had been established in 1914.
The total of these sums was thirteen times greater than all the
money that hitherto had been appropriated for Army aviation
purposes.56
As generous as these appropriations were, they proved insufficient
to significantly improve the air corps for immediate participation in
hostilities when the United States entered World W"ar I the following
year,
[T]he United States entered World War I without a, single
pursuit or combat type airplane; hardly a single flying officer
was adequately familiar with aircraft machine guns, bombing
devices, aerial photography, or other aviation instruments
well known to the aviators of England. In all respects, the
nation was several years behind European aviation development.
In fact, the Director of Military Aeronautics reported
that in contrast to European developments "the United States
at the time of its entry into the war stood very little ahead of
where it had been before the world war broke out." If the
United States had a doctrine for aerial employment, it
centered on the use of the few aircraft for the support of
ground forces as observation and courier vehicles. At the time
of America's declaration of war, the Aviation Section consisted
of 65 officers, two flying fields with 224 airplanes, mostly
training types, "nearly all obsolete in type when compared
with the machines then in effective service in France. In addition,
there was little combat experience or knowledge of
European war lessons upon which to base an adequate statement
of aerial mission and a plan for aerial production to
implement that mission; for a long period, European nations
guarded certain things, especially about airplanes, from
American observers. Ullforhmately, actual American participation
in war "was necessary before the concept of aviation as
55 See u.s. Congrpss. House. Committee on Military Affairs. Acronautics in thc
Army. Hearings, 63rd Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1918.
.. Cohen, op. cit., Chapter I, p. 31.
159
a flexible and mobile instrument of war, and not merely as an
intelligence collecting agent, could be given a preliminary
trial.51
Once the declaration of war had been made, efforts got underway to
organize air intelligence activities.
Prior to America's entry into vVorld vVar I, military aviation
was considered nothing more than an information collecting
service performed by lighter and heavier-than-air craft for
the use of individual ground commanders. Adequate intelligence
organizations for the systematic collection, collation,
evaluation, and dissemination of information to all commanders
concerned did not exist. It was the prevailing concept
that troop commanders in combat should use their own
available means and resources for securing information about
the enemy. Higher commanders would get what they needed
by means of their own agencies or by direct request to commanders
in contact with the enemy.58
At no time during the war did the Military Intelligence Division in
'Washington have a sub-section responsible for air intelligence matters.
59 Such was not the case in France. "Under the general theory of
intelligence prevailing among the associated powers, intelligence units
in the AEF [American Expeditionary Force] were established in all
organizations beginning with the battalion, and each echelon was responsible
for intelligence on its own front." 60
The task of obtaining, assembling, weighing, an<;J. distributing
information on all phases of the enemy's aviation-including
its organization, materiel, personnel, operations, and
the location of its units-was the responsibility of the office
of air intelligence, G-2-A-7, the [AEF] Military Information
Division's seventh sub-section which had been organized
in March 1918 by Lt. Prentiss M. Terry, who was later succeeded
by Maj. C. F. Thompson.
As officers in charge of the air intelligence sub-division,
they were responsible for furnishing the General Staff on
GHQ, the staff of armies and corps, and the Air Service, with
intelligence concerning the enemy air arm. The first three
months of G-2-A-7's existence were consumed in organizing
the work of the office, in collecting intelligence information
from French and British Intelligence Offices, and in visiting
Air Service Headquarters for the purpose of determining how
best it could be served.61
The sub-section ultimately established five units for performing its
duties: an interrogation of prisoners section (staffed by one officer),
the air order of battle section (responsible for tracking the size,
organization, markings, location, duties, equipment, and personnel of
'1 Ibid., Chapter I, pp. 35-36.
., Ibid., Chapter II, p. 1.
,. Ibid., Chapter II, p. 2.
60 Ibid., Chapter II, p. 2A.
01 Ibid., Chapter II, PP. 3-3A.
160
enemy air units), a bomb targets section, a technical section (responsible
for assembling and disseminating information on the production,
performance, and maintenance of enemy aircraft), and an
enemy air activity section (responsible for collecting, assembling, and
disseminating intelligence on enemy air strategy and tactics, enemy
f1viation training, and the effects of Allied air operations.) 62
In view of the limited air operations during 'Vorld "'War I, the
list of air intelligence functions to be performed by approximately
7 officers and 16 enlisted men in G-2's Office of Air
Intelligence sounded more imposing than they actually were.
Before the office could gain much experience in the new
branch of military intelligence dealing with air matters, the
war ground to a halt. Xevertheless, G-2-A-7 was destined
to become a prototype of the air intelligence organization of
the next "'World 'Var.6a
Liaison between the AEF/MID air intelligence subsection and
units of the air service was conducted by Branch Intelligence Officers
who were under the supervision of G-2-A-7 and had staffs consisting
of a clerk, two draftsmen, and an orderly.64 Sent to air groups and
squadrons by the Office of Air Intelligence, the Branch Intelligence
Officers did not merely confine themselves to obtaining intelligence information
about the enemy air arm, they, in fact, acted as the intelligence
officers of the air unit to which they were assigned.
But the control over intelligence operations in air units by
BIO's, who were detached officers from the Military Intelligence
Division of the GHQ, AEF, was objectionable to the
Air Service and its predecessor organization which had been
headed by Lt. Colonel William Mitchell, Aeronautical Officer,
AEF. The work of air intelligence was believed to belong
properly to the Air Service, and that such intelligence would
be made available to G-2 at Headquarters AEF through
channels and liaison activities. The thesis of the supporters
of this idea was that air intelligence officers required a technical
knowledge of aviation for the proper performance of
their duty; if possible, intelligence officers should be qualified
aerial observers so that they could better appreciate the problems
of observation and be better able to interrogate observers
returning from intelligence gathering missions. It was impossible,
they said to get good results from a system which
gave prominent place to intelligence officers detailed to the
Air Service as representatives of G-2, but not responsible to
the Air Service. If squadron intelligence officers were integral
parts of the air squadrons, they could be selected from among
candidates for pilots and observers and they could be partially
trained during the squadron's organization and training
period. During that time, the air intelligence officer would
be able to build up comradeship and a sense of responsibility
which could not be expected from a General Staff representa-
.. Ibid., Chapter II, pp. 3B-3F, 29-32.
.. Hid., Cbapter II, p. 3G.
.. Ibid., Cbapter II, p. 5A.
161
tive who did not join a unit until it was at the front. Inasmuch
as corps and army aviation commanders were responsible
for the actual collection of air intelligence by
means of visual and photographic reconnaissance, they should
be better able to exercise closer supervision over the collection
and dissemination of air intelligence by lower units
than any Branch Intelligence Officer. Moreover, adherents to
the doctrine of air force control over air intelligence believed
that such control would make the Air Service more independent
and freer in its effort to be progressive and efficient.
65
Because of this sentiment, the flying corps sought some vehicle to
serve its needs regarding intelligence production and placed its trust
for this function in the Information Section.
The Information Section of the Air Service could be considered
a quasi-air intelligence organization which duplicated
G-2-A-7 operations for the avowed purpose of disseminating
air intelligence and information more quickly and widely
throughout the Air Service. ISAS had its origin in General
Order 21, Headquarters AEF, 13 August 1917, which directed
departments and corps, including the Air Service, to designate
an officer specifically charged with the collection and dissemination
of military information relating to his organization.
Early in September an Information Department was inaugurated
in the Air Service. It was charged with the "collection,
preparation, and distribution of all information of
special interest to the Air Service; liaison with the Intelligence
Section, General Staff, A.E.F; and the organization
and supervision of air information officers attached to Air
Service units." Little information of the personnel and records
of that Department are available; evidently it passed
through different commands until February 1918, at which
time its duties were· absorbed by the Intelligence Division of
the Training Section, Air Service, A.E.F.66
The Training Section's intelligence unit had been inaugurated in
Paris in December, 1917. A month later efforts were being made by
the section chief, Captain Ernest L. Jones, to expand his unit from
training responsibilities to central intelligence operations for the entire
Air Service. On March 28, 1918, the Intelligence Division was given its
mandate to serve the intelli,gence needs of the entire air corps and was
renamed Information Section, Air Servite. "By the end of the war,
the ISAS had grown into six subdivisions: Statistics, Library, General
Information, Editorial and Research, Production, and History; its
personnel had increased from an original staff of two officers and one
enlisted man to 10 officers, 30 enlisted men, and three civilians." 67
The trials and tribulations of the ISAS in finding its place
in a new service under wartime conditions were essentially repeated
by its comparable organization in America. The genesis
8G Ibid., Chapter II, PP. 8-9.
.. Ibid., Chapter II, pp. 13-13A.
67 Ibid., Chapter II, W. 13A-15A.
162
of the first air intelligence office in the Army Air arm appears
to be early in March 1917 when Lt. Col. John B. Bennet, officer
in charge of the Aeronautical Division of the Signal
Corps, recommended on the basis of a General Staff memorandum
that his division be expanded in functions and personnel;
his plans included the establishment of an air intelligence
unit. The reorganization of the Aeronautical Division, approved
on 16 March by Gen. George O. Squier, Chief Signal
Officer, provided for an air intelligence office under the Personnel
Sub-division which was redesignated Correspondence
Subdivision shortly after the United States declared war. The
functions of the small intelligence office, headed by Capt.
Edgar S. Gorrell, were to collect, codify, and disseminate
aeronautical information. 68
A few months later, in June, the unit was renamed the Airplane
Division and a reorganization placed the intelligence section on a par
with the other three new major sub-divisions for Training, Equipment,
and Organization. Placed in charge of the new intelligence unit was
Major Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold, destined to become World War II
Chief of Staff for Air, assisted by Ernest L. Jones, long time owner,
editor, and publisher of Aeronautic8 magazine.
The duties of the Intelligence Section at this time consisted
largely of collecting and filling military aeronautical data of
every nature and from all sources, and making digests of pertinent
information for interested officials. Intelligence material
from military attaches and other representatives abroad
had been flowing into the OCSO since the early days of aeronautics
in the Signal Corps, but after the United States entered
the war, the British, French, and Italian governments
released information of greater value and volume. The pressures
of war caused further expansion and changes in the Airplane
Division. On 1 October the Air Division succeeded the
Airplane Division; Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois continued
as Chief, with colonel Arnold as Executive in charge of the 15
sections constituting the entire Air Division of the Signal
Corps. The Intelligence Section was redesiWlated the Information
Section and Capt. Harold C. Candee succeeded
Lieutenant Jones as officer in charge. The latter was soon
promoted to captain and order overseas to continue similar
work in the AEF [Training Section, Intelligence
Division].69
Although further organizational alterations occurred, there was little
variation in the Information Section's functions until President
Wilson, by an Executive order of May 20, 1918, designated the Division
of Military Aeronautics, which had been created within the Signal
Corps during the previous month.
an independent agency with the duty of performing every
aviation function heretofore discharged by the Signal Corps,
.. Ibid., Chapter II, p. 23.
.. Ibid., Chapter II, pp. 24-24A.
163
except those pertaining to the production of aircraft and aircraft
equipment. The newly established and independent Bureau
of Aircraft Production (BAP), created on 24 April
1918, was given complete control over the production of airplanes,
airplane engines, and aircraft equipment for the use of
the Army. In August, Mr. John D. Ryan, then 2nd Assistant
Secretary of War, was appointed Director of Air Service in
charge of both the BAP and DMA. As a result of these reorganizations,
the Information Section on 21 May became the
Intelligence Branch of the Executive Section of the DMA.
About two months later it was redesignated the Aeronautical
Information Branch, which, by the end of August had been
organized into seven sub-branches: Procurement, Confidential
Information, Publicity and Censorial, Statistics, Clerical
Detail, Auxiliary, and Headquarters Bulletin.
Throughout the war, the functions of the air intelligence or
information sections in the Signal Corps, and their successor,
the Aeronautical Information Branch of the DMA, primarily
consisted of the collection and dissemination of information
pertaining to domestic and foreign aviation activities, including
those of the enemy; the maintenance of a library and
complete files, properly cross-indexed, of all information and
statistics on hand; the continuance of a liaison system with
the AEF, foreign governments, and other U.S. government
departments; and the censoring of articles and photographs
for publication submitted through the Committee on Public
Information. The American information unit exchanged bulletins
and other material with its counterpart in the AEF, the
Information Section of the Air Service. The general information
and technical bulletins published on both sides of the
ocean pertained to every phase of aviation. Indeed, the Washington
air information office, like its analogous section overseas,
was a quasi-intelligence organization concerned in part
with knowledge about the enemy.'o
One other wartime structure is of interest at this juncture, the Research
Information Committee.
The RIC, with branch committees in Paris and London,
had been organized in the early part of 1918 by the joint
action of the Secretaries of War and Navy, and with the approval
of the Council of National Defense. In cooperation
with the offices of military and naval intelligence, the RIC
was to secure, classify, and disseminate scientific, technical,
and industrial research information,especiaUy relating to war
problems, between the United States and its allies. By this
plan, the Government endeavored to establish a central clearing
exchange information service by means of which the
Army General Staff, the various bureaus of the Army and
Navy, the committees of the Council of National Defense, and
the scientific organizations in the United States working on
70 Ibid., Chapter II, pp. 26-27.
164
war production and inventions, could be kept posted on technical
and scientific developments at home and abroad. The
RIC in 1Vashington consisted of a civilian member representing
the National Hesearch Council, a technical assistant, the
Chief of the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), and the Director
of Naval Intelligence. As a result of its membership on
the RIC, the Military Intelligence Section was made responsible
for securing and disseminating scientific and technical
research information for all branches of the Army. The MIS
was assisted in its duties by the liaison representatives to the
RIC from the DMA, RAP, and other military bureaus. In certain
instances when information could only be obtained by
sending experts to Europe, the individuals so designated were
sapposed to clear through the RIC, which would check to see
if the information ,vas available in this country or if the research
was necessary. Those cleared for travel were instructed
to contact the RIC's Paris or London committee through
which any information collected would be dispatched to the
RIC in Washington; this was to be done even though different
communication channels were employed at the same time by
those sent abroad. The overseas committees each consisted of
the military, naval, and scientific attaches and a technical assistant.
In addition to serving as the clearing house for information
flowing from both sides of the Atlantic, those
committees were designated to serve the commander-in-chief
of the military and naval forces in Europe, and to cooperate
and render assistance to the offices of the military and naval
attaches in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of scientific
and industrial research information.71
With the end of World War I came the exhaustive task of reorganizing
the Air Service for peacetime operations. In January. 1919, the
Director of the Air Service was made more directly responsible for the
supervision and direction of the Division of Military Aeronautics and
the Bureau of Aircraft Production. By mid-March, it was decided that
the Air Service would adopt the structure of its AEF operation in
France, thereby causing it to gain direct control over both DMA and
BAP.72
The Information Group in the ODAS was designated to receive
its intelligence information primarily through the
Military Intelligence Division of the WDGS [War Department
General Staff] and from foreign missions. Information
on military and commercial aeronautics in the United States
came from information officers at military posts and from
liaison officers with other governmental and civilian air activities.
A Special Division was added to the Information Group
toward the latter part of 1919 for the purpose of collecting
and disseminating meteorological information and for handling
such special activities as publicity, and correspondence
71 Ibid., Chapter II, pp. 33-35.
72 Ibid., Chapter IV, pp. 1-2.
165
relative to congressmen and municipal landing fields for
airplanes.73
The Army Reorganization Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 759) had little
impact upon the intelligence structure of the military organ~zation:
the Air Service became a coordinate combat branch of the lme and
the Division of Military Aeronautics was formally abolished. "The
Director of Air Service was henceforth known as the, Chief of Air
Service (CAS), similar to the title of 'Chief' held by the other heads
of the combatant arms of the Army." 74
On May 29, 1919, the Research Information Committee, renamed
the Research Information Service, was reorganized for peacetime
operations under the National Research Council.
It was not until shortly after Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick
succeeded General [C. T.] Menoher as CAS on 5 October 1921
that another reorganization of the Air Service was adopted.
The new structure was patterned after General Pershing's
1921 reorganization of the War Department General Staff
(WDGS) into the following five divisions: Personnel (G-1),
Military Intelligence (G-2) , Operations and Training (G3),
Supply (G-4), and War Plans; it was natural that the
WDGS be organized along the lines of Pershing's AEF. General
Patrick's reorganization of 1 December 1921 abolished
the groups and created the Personnel, Information, Training
and War Plans, Supply, and Engineering Divisions. It was
not surprising that General Patrick, who had been Pershing's
Chief of Air Service, AEF, should follow the organizational
model of his war and peace time commander.
The new Information Diyision was assigned a more practical
mission than its predecessor, the Information Group.
Instead of trying to collect "every kind of information" on
aeronautics, the primary function of the Information Division
was the collection of "essential aeronautical information
from all possible sources." Greater concern was shown for the
collection of information of an intelligence nature by the requirement
that one of the three general classes of information
should be concerned with "the uses of aircraft in war, including
the organization of the Air Forces of the world, tactical
doctrines, types of aircraft used, organization of the personnel
operating and maintaining aircraft." The other two
classes of information dealt with technical matters and information
relative to other phases of military aviation. Because
of reduced military appropriations and the lack of personnel,
Collection and Dissemination Divisions were abolished
during the reorganization and their duties were assumed by
the Library and Reproduction Sections, respectively.75
In 1925, the Information Division created a military intelligence
section which worked in liaison with the Collection Section of the
73 Ibicl., Chapter IV, p. 6.
.. Ibid., Chapter IV, p. 7.
715 Ibid., Chapter IV, PP. 8-9.
166
Militarv Intelligence Division of the General Staff. This MID unit
(M.L 5) administered the military attache system, maintained official
contact with State, Commerce and other Executive Departments involved
with foreign matters, and functioned as adviser to the Foreign
Liaison Officer on questions concerning the distribution of aeronautical
information to foreign countries. However, very little could be
accomplished by the understaffed unit,76
With the passage of the Air Corps Act (40 Stat. 780) on July 2,
1926, "the Information Division remained on the coordinating staff
level of the newly designated Office of thr Chief of the Air Corps
(OCAC) as the counterpart to the Military Intelligence Division of
the 'VDGS." 77
In placing the Air Corps Act into effect, the organizational
changes made in December 1926, among other things, divided
the Information Di\"ision of the OCAC into four sections and
re-named them to indicate their major functions: The Air
Intelligence Section became the succeSSor to the MID Section
and inherited the responsibility for maintaining liaison with
the MID of the 'Var Department General Staff; the new section
was also charged with the procurement, evaluation and
dissemination of foreign and domestic aeronautical information,
and with the maintenance and supervision of the Air
Corps Library. The Photographic Section was made responsible
for collecting, filing, and distributing all photographs
taken by the Air Corps; a voluminous file of negatives of
scientific, historical, and news value was maintained. The
Publications Section received the duties of printing, reproducing,
and distributing all publications and documents such
as Information Circulars, Airport Bulletins, Air Navigation
maps, etc. The Press Relations Section, replacing the Special
Section, was charged with the preparation and release of all
news items, and with Air Corps publicity matters.78
These efforts at reorganization, however, did not necessarily result
in a better air intelligence capability.
Functionally . . . the Information Division, in the early
part of the thIrties, had reached a new low. The Plans DiVIsion,
OCAC, took over part of the Information Division's
functions of collecting, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence
information because of the latter's failure to send out
copies of important reports to the Tactical School and to various
Air Corps instructors and individuals. When Lt. Col.
Walter R. Weaver became Chief of the Information Division
in June of 1933, his first moves were to protest vigorously
against this usurpation of functions and to strengthen his
organization. His actions were backed by the Chief of the Air
qO~I?s.who then confirmed the Information Division's responSIbIlItIes
for (1) the collection and dissemination of air intelligence
information concerning foreign countries; (2) the
7. Ibid., Chapter IV. Pp. 9-10.
77 Ibid., Chapter IV, p. lOA.
78 Ibid., Chapter IV, pp. 10B-ll.
167
compilation and distribution of information on military aviation;
and (3) the coordination of matters of interest between
the Air Corps, and the State Department and the Military
Intelligence Division of the WDGS.
Under Colonel Weaver's guidance, the Information Division
increased its effectiveness, and by mid 1934 it had added
a number of additional duties, including the collection of comparative
data on plane and personnel strength, air budgets,
and general organization of the air arms of England, France,
Italy, Japan, and the United States. This function was assumed
by the Intelligence Section, which for many years was
staffed by one officer and from two to five civilian employees.
Nevertheless, the Section during fiscal year 1935 not only
made comparative studies of national air forces, but it also
was able to initiate a digest of foreign aviation information.
The evaluation and distribution of such air intelligence, the
Chief of the Air Corps said later "has been of vital importance
and interest. Owing to the increased aviation activIties
abroad the volume of this particular type of work within the
Intelligence Section has materially increased." 79
Recalling his thoughts on the eve of war in Europe, General "Hap"
Arnold, appointed Chief of Air Corps on September 29, 1938, wrote:
Looking back on it, I think one of the most wasteful weaknesses
in our whole setup was our lack of a proper Air Intelligence
Organization. It is silly, in the light of what we came
to know, that I should still have been so impressed by the
information given me in Alaska by that casual German who
called my hotel and told me about their "new bomber." I know
now there were American journalists and ordinary travelers
in Germany who knew more about the Luftwaffe's preparations
than I, [then] the Assistant Chief of the United States
Army Corps.
From Spain, where our Army observers watched the actual
air fighting, reports were not only weak but unimaginative.
Nobody gave us much useful information about Hitler's air
force until Lindbergh came home in 1939. Our target intelligence,
the ultimate determinate, the comp.ass on whieh all
the priorities of our strategic bombardmentcampaign against
Germany would depend, was set up only after we were actually
at war. Part of this was our own fault; part was due to
the lack of cooperation from the 'Val' Department General
Staff's G-2; part to a change in the original conception of the
B-17 as a defensive weapon to a conception of it as a weapon
of offense against enemy industries.8o
And what had Arnold learned from the Lone Eagle which neither
military nor air intelligence could supply ~
Lindbergh gave me the most accurate picture of the Luftwaffe,
its equipment, leaders, apparent plans, training meth-
,. Ibid., Chapter IV, pp. 12-12B.
so H. H. Arnold. Global MisaWn. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1949, pp.
168-169.
168
ods, and present defects that I had so far received. Chief of
the German Air Force's shortcomings at that time seemed
to be its lack of sufficient trained personnel to man the equipment
already on hand, a fact which might make unlikely
powerful sustained operations through 1940.
Goering's neglect of strategic bombardment and logistics
was not yet apparent. On the contrary, German industrial
preparations were enormous, and bombers with a range for
strategic attacks almost anywhere in Europe made up a large
part of his force, though these same DO-17's and HE-l1l's
could also be employed for direct support of ground troops.
Lindbergh felt that Hitler held the destruction of any major
city on the continent, or in Britain, in his hands.s1
Arnold had been made aware of the deficiencies of air intelli,g-ence
operations from other quarters, including the chief of his Plans
Section, Lt. Co1. Carl Spaatz. As war plans were developed by the
,Yar Department and the strategic employment of air power applied,
accurate air intelligence became essential for the execution of those
plans. But, as Spaatz informed Arnold in August of 1939, such intelligence
data was "not being maintained ready for issue in the Office of
the Air Corps, or elsewhere." 82
As a result of Spaatz's counsel, an Air Corps Board was
convened a week before Hitler's attack on Poland to determine
the nature, scope, and form of intelligence required for
aerial operations; also, the Board was to make recommendations
as to the methods and procedures for obtaining and
processing that intelligence. After meeting daily for several
days, the Board, composed of intelligence representatives
from the OCAC, ACTS, and GHQ AF, made what was
doubtless the most comprehensive analysis for air intelligence
requirements to that time.
The intelligence needed by the Air Corps, the Board stated,
fell into three categories: (a) that required by the C/AC for
strategic planning in connection with the preparation or revision
of Joint Basic W·ar Plans and the employment of air
power in any theater, (b) that required for technical planning
to insure American leadership both in the production of
planes and equipment and in the development of adequate
tactics and techniques for aerial operations, (c) that required
for tactical planning and execution of plans.
The Board recognized G-2's responsibility for collecting
and processing all intelligence information. Except for the
processing required for War Department estimates, however,
the Board believed the Air Corps to be better qualified to
handle intelligence information on certain phases of foreign
aviation. Accordingly, the Board recommended that the Air
Corps should continue its current task of preparing air technical
intelligence and should assume the responsibility for
81 Ibid.. pp. 18S-189; Cpo Leonard Mosley. How the Nazis used Lindbergh, New
York. v. 9. :\farch 3. 1976: 32-38.
"Cohen, op. cit., Chapter VII, p. 7.
169
processing information pertaining to tactical operations and
to the use of aircraft in antiaircraft defense. For strategic
intelligence required by the Air Corps, G-2 was considered to
be in a better position not only to prepare economic, political,
and combat estimates, but also to determine the vulnerability
of potential air objectives and systems of objectives, together
with an estimate of the probable effect of the destruction
thereof.
The Board also suggested that General Arnold, as Chief of
the Air Corps and principal adviser on air matters to the
Chiei' of Staff, WDGS, be allowed to establish in his office an
air intelligence agency considerably larger than the existing
Information Division's Intelligence Section....83
Never submitted for or otherwise given ""Val' Department approval~
this report marked the beginning of. a controversy, continuing into the
time of United States entry into the war, between the Military
Intelligence Division, ·War Department, and the Air Corp's Intelligence
organization over air intelligence activities and responsibilities.
When the Infornlation Division, OCAC, started collecting intelligence
information outside of G-2 channels, the MID directed that
this activity cease and that requests for such data be routed through
the Military Intelligence Division. This action occurred in the autumn
of 1939; relenting somewhat in May of the following year, G-2 permitted
the Air Corps' Information Division to make dIrect contacts for
intelligence information with all Federal agencies except the Navy
and State Department.B4
The War Department's G-2 had been cognizant for some
time of the incompetency of the personnel in his Intelligence
Branch to maintain digests of aviation information. Moreover,
as the Branch was organized on a geographic basis with
each geographic section being responsible for all phases of intelligence
for the countries assigned, it became obvious that a
separate unit was needed to evaluate and interpret the voluminous
amount of air intelligence being received. Shortly after
Hitler's attack on Poland, a separate Air Section was established
in the Intelligence Branch of the MID for the pur~ses
of coordinating all air intelligence activities, of maintaming
a current summary of air operations, and of supervising the
preparation of air intelligence.
The Air Section, apparently. was not formally established
until March, 1940 when Maj. Ennis C. Whitehead, who was
Chief of the Southern European Section of the Intelligence
Branch and the only Air Corps officer on duty with G-2, was
named Chief of the new Air Section. For the first four months
he was assisted only by Lt. Marvin L. Harding; in July, Mrs.
Irma G. Robinson was transferred to the Air Section from the
Air Corps' intelligence office. When Whitehead, who had been
promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, was replaced by Lt. Col.
Jack C. Hodgson in the late summer of 1941, the total person-
83 Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 8-9.
.. Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 12-13.
170
nel in the Air Section consisted of five officers, three analysts,
and four clerk-stenographers. Attempts were made to enlarge
the Section by acquiring more airmen, but the AAF
itself had an urgent need for personnel to fill its numerous
vacancies and made a counteroffer for the removal of G-2's
Air Section to the Intelligence Division of OCAC where it
would operate on behalf of G-2. Of course, the offer was declined
and the extension of air intdligence activities in the
MID was retarded. Until Pearl Harbor Day, the Air Section
could only process the air files for the British Empire, Germany
and satellites, France and Italy; eventually, as personnel
became available, full responsibility was assumed for the
G-2's air files of all countries.85
Not only were air intelligence activities hampered by jurisdictional
disputes but the security procedures of MID also impeded operations
in this sphere.
In an early effort to clarify one phase of the jurisdictional
problem relating to [intelligence] dissemination, the War Department
on 15 November 1939 formally stated the functions
of the MID and the arms and services. Unless documents
were marked "No Objection to Publication in Service Journals"
reproduction and redistribution of G-2 reports by arms
and services required the consent of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2. Each document permitted to be reproduced also
had to contain a statement of sources and its classification
could not be lower than the original document.
For the Air Corps, such a policy meant that G-2 information
could be circulated, but not reproduced even for dissemination
to the limited number of Air Corps Headquarters
Agencies. Hence, intelligence was sometimes stale by the time
it was circulated to an interested user. Security, not economy,
was the basis for limiting distribution. The MID, highly security
conscious because of the character of its work, was especially
desirous that the intelligence currently being supplied
be carefully safeguarded.
But the necessity for securing G-2's approval before reproducing
and distributing each intelligence report emanating
from his office hampered the Air Corp's efforts to keep
pace with aviation developments arising from the experiences
in the European war. Consequently, General Arnold secured
blanket authority on 1 March 1940 to reproduce and disseminate
one or two copies of G-2 materials to major operating
Air Corps agencies, but they were prohibited from making
additional copies. G-2 thought the exception granted Arnold
was justified so long as Europe was at war and while the Air
Corps was engaged in an expansion program. Shortly thereafter,
reproduction restrictions were further modified by
G-2's permission to the OCAC to make as many as five copies
of any confidential or restricted MID document.86
.. Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 13:-15.
.. Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 17-18.
171
Still the intelligence dissemination problems continued in spite of
G:-2'~ relucta?t grants of approval for increased copy distribution
w.lthm. the. AIr 90rps.. In an effort to further ameliorate intelligence
dISSe~lnatlOn dIfficultIes, a conference of OCAC intelligence representatIves
and MID personnel was held in the spring of 1941. Among
the various views expressed at this meeting,
. Brig. Gen. SherJ?an Miles, Acting ACjS, G-2, was espeCIally
fearful that If the CjAC were to determine what MID
intelligence should be disseminated to his units then it would
be possible for the Air Corps to authorize the reproduction of
verbatim secret reports from military attaches or Executive
departments of the Government, from strategic studies required
in war planning, and from papers prepared in compliance
with specific requests of the 1Var Department and other
government agencies.
Although the air arm would have been limited in its reproduction
and redistribution by regulations on safeguarding
military information, protecting the source of information,
and limiting distribution to those with a need-to-know, General
Miles refused to permit any exceptions to existing rules.
Moreover, he advised "intelligence agencies under control of
the Chief of the Army Air Forces [to] confine their dissemination
of information to the Air Forces generally to tactical
and technical matters directly affecting the Air Forces, and
that no dissemination be made by those agencies, without the
consent of this Division, of any secret or confidential information
regarding the present disposition, strength or effectiveness
of foreign forces, ground or air."
Such a restriction, along with the others requiring approval
of G-2 prior to reproducing and disseminating intelligence,
hampered air intelligence operations not only at the
AAF Headquarters level but also down to and including
the commands. A-2 [Air Force intelligence] obviously knew
the intelligence needs of air units better than an outside
agency and he continued his efforts to secure exemptions from
the irksome prohibition placed upon him by the WDGS. But
freedom for the AAF to reproduce and redistribute G-2 material
did not come until Independence Day in.1942 when the
Chief of the Military Intelligence Service, MID, authorized
the commanding generals of the AAF and the air commands
to reproduce and distribute to lower echelons any and all
classified military information received from G-2 unless the
document contained a specific prohibition against reproduction.
Formal War Department approval of G-2's action came
the following month.87
Still the major jurisdictional question, the rivalry for control over
air intelligence between G-2 and A-2, persisted. Seeing no other course
of action open to him on the matter, Arnold, with AAF intelligence
needs continuing to mount, placed the issue before the Chief of Staff,
General George C. Marshall, and asked for a command decision on his
87 Ibid., Chapter VII, PP. 23-25.
70-890 0 - 76 - 12
172
recommendation for the removal of all restrictions thought to limit
the reliability and efficiency of air intelligence operations.88
On September 10, 1941, Arnold had his decision: the War Depa.rtment
supported G-2's position for continuing the unity of strategic
intelligence responsibilities, saying:
~he responsibility imposed on the Military Intelligence DiviSIOn,
'V.D.G.S., by par. 9, AR 10-15, for the collection, evaluation
and dissemination of military information includes
that which pertains to the Army Air Forces as well as to
other Arms. In carrying out this responsibility, the Military
Intelligence Division is charged with the compilation of all
information for the purposes of formulation of comprehensive
military studies and estimates; it will prepare those
studies and estimates. Intelligence agencies of the Chief of
. the Army Air Forces will be maintained for the purpose of
the compilation and evaluation of technical and tactical information,
received from the Military Intelligence Division
and other sources, plus the collection of technical air information
(from sources abroad through cooperation with the
M.I.D.), all or any of which is required by the Air Forces
for their development and for such operations as they may
be directed to perform.89
In fact, however, the decision was not as devastating to Air Force
intellig-ence objectives as might be presumed.
As General Arnold stated: "we are getting what we want and that
we will simply tryout the whole scheme." This cryptic remark meant
that a quiet and amicable settlement between G-2 and A-2 had been
reached. As recorded in the minutes of an Air Staff meeting on 11
September 1941 :
. . . General Scanlon stated that G-2 had agreed to practically
everything we had asked for. Much of it will not be
written but is understood. Permits us to obtain information
ourselves but first, we must check through G-2 to determine
if they have the information desired. If not, then our personnel
can be assigned to obtain it. Personnel, so assigned, will
work through G-2's organizations. In regard to studies G-2
has been working on reports received from their sources,
arrangements have been made that G-2 will furnish us the
complete report and we will make our own study. We are authorized
to contact direct, foreign military attaches on duty
in this country and other government departments.90
During this particular period of conflict with G-2 over air intelligence
jurisdiction, the Air Corps, of course, continued to undergo
expansion, administrative adjustment, and reorganization. During
the autumn of 1940 General Arnold began making some changes, including
the re-designation of the Information Division as the Intelligence
Division, effective December 1, 1940. New components added to
the unit included a Domestic Intelligence (counter-intelligence) Sec-
88 See Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 39-41.
.. Ibid., Chapter VII, p. 48.
00 Ibid., Chapter VII, p. 52.
173
t~on ~nd an E.valuation Section;. continued were the Administrative,
ForeIgn IntellIgeJ.lce, Pre~s RelatIOns, and Maps Sections. The Library
and PhotographIc SectIOns were transferred to a )1iscellaneous
Division.91
Prior to the creation of a Counter Intelligence [or Domestic
Intelligence] Section, the functions assigned to it including
the collection and dissemination of information ~oncernir~
g espionage, sabotage, subversion, disloyalty, and
dIsaffection, had been performed by the Information Division's
Intellig~nce Section. By .January 1940, a separate
Counter Intellrgence Branch had been established, but for
many months no officer was available to head it and the work
was supervised by the Chief of Intelligence Section, ~Iaj.
J. G. Taylor. By the time of the Air Corps reorganization in
December the volume of counter intelligence operations had
mounted to [a] point warranting the establishment of a
Domestic Intelligence Section, with a force of two officers and
three enlisted men, as one of the principal components of the
Intelligence Division.
The establishment of an Evaluation Section grew out of
the suggestion madc to General Arnold on 23 October 1940
by Col. George E. Stratemeyer, Acting Chief, Plans Division,
OCAC. Noting the vast amount on [sic] intelligence material
flowing into the OCAC and then being reproduced and distributed
without being digested, Colonel Stratemeyor recommended
the creation of an evaluation unit in the Information
Division, not only to summarize and analyze the material for
busy commanders and staff personnel but to dig out lessons
indicating necessary policy changes and new projects ,requiring
attention. The then current system for evaluating information
and securing the necessary action was in the hands of
the Air Corps Board at Maxwell Field, Alabama. Within
personnel limitations, the Board had been evaluating and
studying wartime lessons in order to prepare and reVIse air
tactical doctrine,and to provide educational and training
material for combat personnel. 'Vith the establishment of an
Evaluation Section, the Board was to continue its past functions,
but in its evaluation of war information it was to report
any foreign development and trends which might become
apparent. It was the Evaluation Section, hCHvever, which
was given the primary responsibility for detecting foreign
developments, and trends and for summarizing all .r;>ertinent
foreign intelligence appearing in periodic air bulletms.92
Because of the hostilities in Europe, the Foreign Intelligence Section
was the largest and fastest growing unit within the Intellige!1ce
Division. It consisted of a Current Intelligence Branrh. a ForeIgn
Liaison Branch, and an Operations Planning Branch. While the first
of these components was responsible for processing information pertaining
to current military developments, "very little actual collec-
91 Ibid., Chapter VIII, PP. 1-2.
.. Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 3--5.
174
tion, other than from such open sources as the New York Times, was
involved because the Military Intelligence Division was suppose to do
all the collecting and then to forward to the OCAC whatever concerned
air intelligence." 93
The Operations Planning Branch of the Foreign Intelligence
Section, created as the result of an Executive directive
issued in December 1939, had developed into a significant element
of the Air Corps, which was emphasizing strategic
offensive operations against enemy airpower and enemy national
structures. The Branch had been initially designated
the Air Force Intelligence Branch of the Information Division's
Intelligence Section and it brought to that Section some
specific duties and planning functions never before assigned
to the Air Corps. In general, operations planning intelligence
fell into two categories: first, to provide the C/AC with air
intelligence upon which he could base air estimates for various
\var plans; secondly, to compile air intelligence upon
which to conduct initial air operations under each established
war plan. Specifically, the duties included such functions as
analyzing foreign national structures to determine their vulnerability
to air attack; preparing objective folders of specific
targets in connection with war plans; maintaining current
data on the strength, organization, and equipment of foreign
air forces. including detailed technical data on performance
and construction of foreign airplanes; keeping a complete file
of airports and flying facilities throughout the world; and
preparing air route guides for the movement of air units to
potential theaters of operation. At the time of the OCAC's
reorganization in December of 1940, the Operations Planning
Branch was manned by five officers and ten civilians under
Capt. H. S. Hansel1.94
In April, 1941, as a consequence of a formal study conducted by
the Plans Division of the operations and functions of the Office of the
Chief of the Air Corps, a Special Assignment Unit was established
in the Public Relations Section of the Intelligence Division and the
name of the Foreign Liaison Branch became the Air Corps Liaison
Unit.95
Further changes were evident in the air arm in August, with three
sections within the Intelligence Division being renamed: the Domestic
Intelligence Section again became the Counter Intelligence unit, the
Foreign Intelligence Section was retitled the Air Intelligence Section,
and a Foreign Liaison Section was created from the renamed Air
Corps' Liaison Unit previously located within the old Foreign Intelligence
Section.96 By the summer of 1941, the Intelligence Division
consisted of 54 officers awl 127 civilians (see Table I regarding
distribution).97
.. Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 6-7.
.. Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 9-10.
os Ibid., Chapter VIII, p. 16.
to Ibid., Chapter VIII, p. 18.
91 Ibid., Chapter VIII, p. 26.
175
TABLE I.-ARMY AIR FORCES INTELLIGENCE DIVISION PERSONNEL, AUGUST 1941
Officers Civilians Total
Section On duty Vacant Total On duty Vacant Total On duty Vacant Total
Division chie'--_~~~~~~~~ 1 0 1 ~ ~- -- --i4-----~ --ii ------is- 1 0
Executive __ ~ ___________ 4 0 4 18 11
Air intelligence _________ 24 59 83 67 178 245 91 237
Foreign liaison__________ 5 4 9 8 6 14 13 10
Counter intelligence ____ ~ 3 12 15 8 65 73 11 77
Public relations ___ ~ _____ 11 9 20 16 10 26 27 19
Maps__________________ 6 3 9 14 35 49 20 38
TotaL ___________ 54 87 141 127 305 442 181 392
1
29
328
23
88
46
58
573
Note: Corrected version adopted from U.S. Air Force Department. Air University Research Studies Institute. "Development
of Intelligence Function in the USAF, 1917-50" by Victor H. Cohen. Typescript, ch. VIII, p. 26.
1:£ air intelligence personnel were able to hurdle the stumbling
blocks imposed by mounting organizational charts and
changes, and time consuming preparations of budget requests
and justifications for money and personnel, they were confronted
with jurisdictional obstacles. The delineation of
intelligence responsibilities between the air arm and the
MID was a continuing one, and when the Army Air Force
(AAF) \vas created on .Tune 20,194:1 the problem of clarifying
responsibilities of the air arm became an internal one as
well as an external one.
The AAF had been created to substitute unity for coordination
of command thus making it superior to hoth the Air
Corps, which was the service element headed by Maj. Gen.
George H. Brett, and the Air Force Combat Command
(AFCC)-formerly the GHQ Air Force-which was the
combat element headed by Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons. General
Arnold had the responsibility for establishing policies
and plans for all Army aviation activities, and the Chief of
Staff, WDGS, was the person to whom he was accountable.
Arnold also retained his position as Deputy Chief of Staff
for Air, and thus in his two positions he was able to pass on
air matters brought up by the members of the WDGS, as well
as the commanding generals of the AAF's main components.
To assist the Chief of the AAF in the formulation of
policies, an Air Staff was established by using as its core the
OCAC's Plans Division, which had been organized into sections
corresponding to the divisions of the WDGS. The air
sections were renamed A-I, A-2. A-3, A-4. and AW'PD (Air
War Plans Division). Thus, by lifting the Plans Division out
of the Air Corps, the Chief of the AAF had a ready-made
air staff. All papers, studies. memoranda, etc., pertaining to
purely air matters, which hitherto had been processed by the
WDGS. were to be prepared for final War Department action
by the Chief of the AAF. The exceptions were those papers
pertaining to the Military Intelligence and War Plans Divisions
of the WDGS.
The Air Staff was to assume the air planning functions
formerly performed by the WDGS. Its operating functions
were confined to the preparation of policies and instructions
176
essential to directing and coordinating the activities of the
two major AAF elements. Thus, in theory, the Air Staff was
the policy agency, with the Air Corps and the Combat Command
performing operating functions.98
However, because the relationships between the AAF and the War
Department were not clearly defined, old difficulties between the air
arm and the general Staff continued in many instances. In addition,
friction developed between the AAF Headquarters and the Office of
the Chief of the Air Corps, which had been the principal administrative
unit of the air arm. Between June of 1941 and March of 1942,
various activities were withdrawn from OCAC and relocated with the
Air Staff but with a view to maintaining separate operating and
policymaking entities.99
The strained relationship between the air staffs of the AAF
and the OCAC could not endure for long. The crisis created
by the Pearl Harbor attack, together with the subsequent prohibition
imposed by the OCAC against informal communication
between its divisions and the Air Staff, undoubtedly accelerated
the transfer of operating activities out of the
OCAC. Not until the elimination of that office by the War
Department reorganization of March 1942 was air intelligence
planning and operating completely consolidated into
one office, that of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A_2.100
tTntil the collapse of France in June, 1940, air intelligence liaison
with Great Britain was cautious, formal, and conducted with the
customary restrictions on the release of classified information. As
German armies overran Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands,
traditional military and naval attache contacts were the conduits
for the exchange of intelligence information between the United States
and embattled England. Then came the fall of the Fifth French
Republic.
All that seemed to stand between Hitler and American security
was Great Britain. This alarming condition erased all
pretenses at observing neutrality. The new American policy
became assistance to the democracies bv "All Methods Short
of War." Obviously realizing that "Knowledge is Power,"
especially in warfare, President Roosevelt approved in July
a British proposal for the interchange of scientific data. In a
swift follow-up, the British dispatched to Washington a commission
of technical experts headed by Sir Henry Tizard,
Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
The mission was authorized to exchange secret data on such
things as radar, fire control, turrets, rockets, explosives, communications,
etc.. which items obviously interested the American
military services.
Initially, the British. as they expected, gave more scientific
information than they received. but the general result
of the conversations of the Tizard Mission with representaos
Ibid., Chapter VIII. pp. 27-29.
.. Ibid., Chapter VIII, p. 33.
100 Ibid., Chapter VIII, p. 35.
177
tives of the American armed services and the newly created
American National Defense Research Committee (NDRC)
was "a great stimulus to I'cfiearch on new weapons on both
sides of the Atlantic.~' 101
By .January. 1941, aft£'r some British hesitation on the idea, an
XDRC office was opened in London and, durinlr that month, the
United States gave the British the means for deciphering the .Japanese
code.'o2
The policy of close collaboration afforded a broad base for the
exchange of general military information as well as scientific,
Early in August 1940, about the time Hitler began his air
blitzkrieg on the lfiland Kingdom. the British and American
Governments had agreed secretly for a full exchange of military
information. The ~IID, as coordinating agency for such
an exchange desired all requests for military information
from abroad to be specifically worded and routed through
G-2 channels, But G-2's radio and mail requests to England
did not always secure the information desired, especially on
technical matters. It was found extremely difficult to phrase
specific questions, even for technical personnel, when there
was very little data upon which to base precise queries. Sending
officers to England was considered by G-2 and the Chief
of the Air Corps' Intelligence Division as the best means for
gaining information which was not readily available through
attache channels or not at the disposal of the Tizard Mission
or other British delegations sent to the United States.l03
Thus, a bevy of Air Corps officers were dispatched to Great Britain
during 1940-41 as individual air observers in supplement to the regular
military attaches. When, in March of 1941, joint Anglo-American
war plans were perfected (called ABC-I), they provided for the
creation of Special Observer Groups of American officers to ostensibly
function as neutral observers but to also prepare for conversion into
an advance staff element for a theater of operations should the United
States enter the war.104
Under ABC-I, the SPOBS [Special Observation Groups]
was to become the official care of the United States Army
Forces in the British Isles, which later actually became the
European Theater of Operations. SPOBS' air staff section
eventually evolved into the Air Technical Section, ETO
Headquarters, and then re-designated Directorate of Technical
Services of the Air Service Command, United States
Army Air Forces in Europe, with the functions of providing
for the inspection and evaluation of captured enemy aircraft
and directing the activities of air intelligence field teams.
The entire SPOBS groups wore civilian clothes and to the
casual obserYer it would seem that the American Embassy was
expanding its staff. Each officer in SPOBS had contacts with
101 Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 36-37.
10. Ibid., Chapter VIII, p. 38.
102 Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 39-40.
104 Ibid., Chapter VIII, PP. 43-44.
178
a section of the British Army or Royal Air Force which corresponded
most nearly to his own. Lt. Co1. Homer Case,
SPOBS G-2, for example, conferred with the British Ministryon
methods of training photo interpreters and then he
recommended that American personnel be permitted to take
advantage of the RAF's photo-interpretation school and
units. Compared to British developments in that field, the
United States was in the elementary stages. Also, while get·
ting acquainted with British operations and making war
plans, the SPOBS "provided the ·War Department with a
listening post which relayed intelligence concerning the
world's war fronts." 105
Meanwhile, on the homefront, efforts continued at easing the way for
the exchange of technical data with the British.
In the interests of economy, efficiency, and simplicity for all
arms and services, the Secretary of War designated the AC/S,
G-2, to coordinate the exchange of information with British
representatives in America. In matters of aeronautical equipment
and technical information, the Air Corps in the fall of
1940 was authorized by G-2 to divulge data to authorized
representatives of the British Empire on unclassified, restricted,
or confidential information, but secret documents
which could not be reclassified to a less restricted category
had to be cleared by G-2 prior to release. Requests for information
from the British Air and Purchasing Commissions
in America normally were made through the Foreign Liaison
Branch of the Intelligence Division, OCAC. Directed negotiations
by the Air Corps with the British representatives
were permitted for the interchange of technical information
with the understanding that G-2 would be advised in the
form of receipt copies, of information secured and released.lOG
On another matter, when the Air Corps in May, 1941, indicated a
desire to establish a branch intelligence office in New York, it was
repulsed by the A~istant Chief of Staff, G-2, on the basis that such
a request infringed upon his exclusive responsibility for collecting
intelligence information and would duplicate an MID effort as that
agency already maintained a field facility in New York. Since MID
did not have an air operation expert in the branch office, an OCAC
Intelligence Division analyst was loaned for this purpose.lOT
By 1 AUgLlst 1941 the branch office's new project of producing
target folder [sic] for the Air Corps was in progress. The
ori¢nal folder program involving single targets was extended
to cover increasingly large areas until the Air Corps
sectionalized and numbered the various theater areas; from
then on area target folders were produced. Air target materials
were collected from files of trade data, records of financial
transactions, engineering reports, travel diaries, field
notes of scientists, and other similar items existing in the New
100 IWd., Chapter VIII, pp. 45-46.
100 Ibid., Chapter VIII, p. 49.
10'7 IWd., Chapter VIII, pp. 5~1.
179
York area. This material could not be shipped to Washington
for processing and had to be examined at the sources.
Fortunately, the New York office was locatecl contiguous to
and worked closely with the Army Map Service thus enabling
the office to produce a bonus in the form of topographical ancl
geographical intelligence.
The MID proposed to expand its branch in New York so
as to increase the production of objective folders. But in light
of the current international situation and the great magnitude
of the task involved in ferreting out available data existing
within the United States, General Scanlon on the day
before Pearl Harbor told G-2 that the proposal was modest
in the extreme. The outbreak of war of course became the
signal for acck'lerating all expansion plans into high gear and
the branch office, for example, was gradually assigned sufficient
personnel to enable it to provide essential intelligence
for A-2's targeting operations for German and Japanese
areas. But it was the San Francisco Branch which concentrated
on collecting available intelligence information on
Japanese industries.t08
Then came the debacle of Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941.
A-2 was a madhouse, recalled one of the first officers assigned
to air intelligence in AAF Headquarters after Pearl
Harbor Day. Sitting at a desk cluttered with ringing telephones
connecting important air installations, the intelligence
officer who valiantly attempted to handle the large number of
incoming calls during the hectic first days of war reminded an
observer of an old fashioned movie. In those days a newly
assigned officer would see red upon entering an office of A-2:
With ever-increasing demands for intelligence, desks in a
crowded small room were frequently piled high with documents,
and as almost everything was classified, the prevailing
red security cover sheets seemed to lend a reddish hue to the
room. A new officer could see red both literally and figuratively.
In one instance, for example, an officer was rushed
from his pistol patrol of Bolling Field, Washington,. D.C.,
to A-2 only to wait days before someone could find tIme to
assign him specific duties. Even then the young and inexperienced
intelligence officer had to use his own judgment and
imagination as to how his tasks should be accomplished.109
Efforts were soon made to restore order to military operations in
the aftermath of the Japanese attack. The only truly functional air
intelligence entity was the Air Corps Intelligence Division and it
was quickly sought by A-2 in a centralized intelligence plan.
After a period of negotiations, the views of the higher
headquarters finally prevailed and the Chief of the Air Staff
on 23 January 1942 directed the ChieJ of the Air Corps to
transfer to A-2 all the functions, personnel, and equipment
of the Foreign Liaison Section and the Air Intelligence Sec-
'''' Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 62-63.
100 Ibid., Chapter XII, p. 4.
180
tion. The latter was the heart and soul of the Air Intelligence
Division because it was composed of: the Current Unit containing
the file of technical intelligenctl collected over a
period of years, the Evaluation Unit charged with correlating
and evaluating intelligence, and the Operation's Unit,
which translated intelligence into air estimate and target
objectives.
A small number of officers and civilians of the Air Intelli~
ence Section were permitted to remain in the Intelligence
Division so as to allow the CAC to continue his command
functions and responsibilities. The sections remaining in the
Intelligence Division were Maps, Counter Intelligence, and
Air Intelligence School. Furthermore, copies of all intelligence
matters received by A-2 were to be sent to the OCAC.
A sufficient amount of air intelligence functions remained
in the OCAC to prevent the attainment of the goal of centralization
of intelligence authority. Further complication
and duplications resulted from the operations of an air
intelligence office in the Military Intelligence Division of
the WDGSYo
The importance of the air arm in the prosecution of the war soon
became evident and, accordingly,
the War Department through Circular 59, issued on 2 March
1942 and effective on 9 March, decided that the most effective
organization which would give the desired freedom of
action for all services and at the same time ensure the necessary
unity of command, was one having three autonomous
and co-ordinate commands under the Chief of Staff: Army
Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply
(later, renamed Army Service Forces).
The overall planning, coordinating, and supervisory role
of the WDGS was reaffirmed, but enough air officers were to
be assigned to the War Department to help make strategic
decisions. The goal of 50 percent air officers on duty with the
WDGS was never reached principally because qualified Air
Corps officers were so scarce. Thus G-2 was not only able to
enlarge his air unit, but he was reassured of this responsibility
for collecting all intelligence, both air and ground.
Nevertheless, the reor~anized office of A-2 was to make the
most of the grant of autonomy to the AAF.
As the result of the reorganization of March 1942, the
intelligence functions of the OCAC and Combat Command
were transferred to A-2, headed by Col. R. L. Walsh who
had replaced General Scanlon on' 21 February 1942. A-2,
however, lost the activities and personnel of its Foreign
Liaison Section to G-2's newly established Military Intelligence
Service (MIS). About the same time, the Intelligence
Service (IS), the air intelligence operating agency comparable
to the MIS, was established under the supervision
and control of A-2. The first Director of the IS, Lt. Col.
110 Ibid., Chapter XII, pp. 5-6.
181
C. E. Henry, was assigned the -functions of collecting,
evaluating, and disseminating technical and other types of
intelligence, training air intelligence officers, and operating
the security services. To accomplish these duties the Administrative,
Operational, Informational Intelligence (less
the Current Unit), and the Counter Intdligence Sections
were transferred from the A-2 Division to the IS.
The Administrative Section served both the IS and A-2.
With the IS as the major operating agency, the other sections
under A-2 were Executive and Staff. Combat Intelligence,
and Current Intelligence. A Plans Section was also
established in A-2 for the purposes of formulating plans
for collecting and disseminating air intelligence, training
intelligence officers, establishing air intelligence refluirements,
coordinating projects with the Air Staff and the
WDGS divisions, and establishing liaison with other American
and foreign intel1igEmce agencies. The section was short
lived as a separate entity as a result of A-2's order for its
absorption into the Executive and Staff Section.1ll
Three months after the March reorganization took place, a formal
survey was conducted to deal with weaknesses in the new arrangements.
A-2 had little criticism of the scheme except for a dearer
relationship between the counterintelligence groups of the MIDI
WDGS and those of the Air Intelligence Service.l12
Slight changes were made and in a few instances some
offices were re-shifted. In A-2, an Office of Technical Information,
with a nucleus of four officers transferred from the
public relations branch, was created as a part of the Current
Intelligence Section. Col. E. P. Sorensen, who had assumed
the position of ACIAS, A-2, on 22 June 1942, used the newly
acquired Office to prepare the weekly brief for Gpneral
Arnold's use in the meetings of the 'Val' Council. By the
beginning of the following year the Office of Technical Information
had become an independent section in A-2's office.
In addition to preparing weekly summary reports for General
Arnold, the Office also handled the AAF's public relations
activities and helped prepare for publication the office
service journal, Air Force, which on 6 September superseded
the Air Force News Letter.
Other newly established units included an Intelligence
Training Unit within the Air Intelligence Sprvice. By early
1943 training functions had been incorporated into a Training
Coordination Section and transferred from the AIS to
the A-2 level. The Special Projects Section in the AIS was
also moved to A-2 where it was eventually incorporated into
the Staff Advisors Section. In general the main divisions in
the Office of the ACIAS, A-2, remained fairly well stabilized
from the time of the War Department reorganization of
III Ibid., Chapter XII, pp. 9-11.
112 Ibid., Chapter XII, p. 20.
182
March 1942 until the AAF streamlined its own structure in
the following March by abolishing the Directorates.ll3
This "was the last major reorganization of the air arm's intelligence
structure during the period of the war.
After an adjustment and reconciliation of the various
plans and ideas that had been presented during the previous
months, a streamlined organization went into effect on 29
March 1943. Many offices devoted to the planning or execution
of specific functions were telescoped into the offices of
assistant chiefs of staff and special staff. In the Office of the
Assistant Chief of Air Staff. Intelligence. all the functions
assigned to air intelligence were divided among five principal
divisions: Operational Intelligence, Counter Intelligence,
Intelligence Information, Historical, and Combat
Liaison and Training.
The last named Divisions combined the Combat Liaison
Section of the Air Intelligence Service and the Training
Coordination Section, which had been on the A-2 staff level.
The Current Intelligence Section was also removed from its
A-2 staff status and made part of the Informational Intelligence
Division. The only units left out of the five main
divisions because of their service to the entire intelligence
office were the Office Services, Office of Technical Information
(to handle public relations), and Special Projects
(formerly Staff Advisors). Two sections of Counter Intelligence'
Safeguarding of Military Information and Training
Clearance, were transferred to the Facilities Security and
Personnel Security Branches in the Air Provost Marshal's
Division in AC/AS, Material, Maintenance, and Distribution.
By June 1943, the Combat Liaison and Training Division
became the Training Plans Division and given the functions
of making studies in and formulating policies and practices
for intelligence training in AAF schools and units. At about
the same time, the Operational Intelligence and Intelligence
Information Divisions were renamed Operational and Informational
Divisions, respectively. By October 1943 a few
minor changes had been made within the divisions and two
new agencies were added: The Air Intelligence School section
was created to operate the Air Intelligence School at
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for the training OT AAF officers
in combat and base intelligence, photo interpretation, and
prisoner of war interrogation,114
While certain post-war changes would be effected in the air intelligence
institution immediately aTter the cessation of hostilities in
1945, the next significant restructuring of this intelligence orv.:ani7ation
would occur with the establishment OT the independent United
States Air Force in 1947.
ua Ibid., Chapter XII, pp. 22-23.
n·Ibid., Chapter XII, pp. 24-25.
183
V. Military Intelligen<:e
The military intelligence organization of ",Vorld ",Yar II consisted
of a variety of field units, ranging from groups serving with combat
commll:nds to the special staffs designed to assist allied combined
operatlOns councils at the highest levels of armed services leadership.
The core or hub of this complex of overseas intelligence entities was
the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General
Staff, an agency which, in the twilight peace of 1938, consisted of 20
officers and 48 civilians.ll5
When the United States entered the war, the Military Intelligence
Division was ill prepared to perform the tasks
which were to be thrust upon it. The war in Europe and the
increasingly critical world situation had increased the number
of persons employed in the Division and had added a
few new activities. Despite the expansion, there were real
deficiencies, which indicate the condition of the Division at
the end of 1941. There was no intelligence on enemy air or
ground order of battle; there was no detailed reference material
on enemy army forces such as weapons, insignia, fortifications,
and documents; there was no detailed topographic
intelligence for planning landing operations; there were insufficient
facts-but plenty of opinion-on which to base
strategic estimates; and there were no trained personnel for
either strategic or combat intelligence. The production and
planning of intelligence was proceeding, but on a limited
scale and to an insignificant degree. Fortunately most of this
material could be obtained from our allies, but it no more than
satisfied current intelligence equirements and was completely
inadequate for long range requirements. Before V-J Day,
the Division had developed into a large and efficient intelligence
organization, but this development, like the building
of Rome, did not take place overnight. Present estimates
indicate that an efficient intelligence machine was not developed
until late 1944.116
Appointed chief of the Operations Division (successor to the War
Plans Division) of the War Department General Staff in March, 1942,
Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the man destined to command
Operation Torch and serve as Supreme Commander of the European
Theater, made the following observation with regard to intelligence
operations and capabilities during the period of America's entry into
world war.
Within the ",Var Department a shocking deficiency that impeded
all constructive planning existed in the field of Intelligence.
The fault was partly within and partly without
115 U.s. Army. Military Intelligence Division. "A History of the Military
Intelligence Divi~ion. 7 December 1941-2 September 1945." Typescript. 1946.
p. 3. Copies of this study bear the marking "Secret;" the copy utilized in this
study was declassified and supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
[Hereafter referred to as MID History.]
114 Ibid., p. 2; with regard to the staff growth in MID, see Tables II and III
in this chapter.
184
the Army. The American public has always viewed with repugnance
everything that smacks of the spy: during the years
between the two ",Vorld tVars no funds were provided with
which to establish the basic requirement of an Intelligence
syst€m-a far-flung organization of fact finders.
Our one feeble gesture in this direction was the maintenance
of military attaches in most foreign capitals, and since public
funds were not available to meet the unusual expenses of this
type of duty, only officers with independent means could
normally be detailed to these posts. Usually they were estimable,
socially acceptable gentlemen; few knew the essentials
of Intelligence work. Results were almost completely negative
and the situation was not helped by the custom of making
long service as a military attache, rather than ability, the
essential qualification for appointment as head of the Intelligence
Division in the War Department.
The stepchild position of G-2 in our General Staff system
was emphasized in many ways. For example the number of
general officers within the War Department was so limited
by pea.cetime law that one of the principal divisions had to
be headed by a colonel. Almost without exception the G-2
Division got the colonel. This in itself would not necessarily
have been serious, since it would have been far preferable to
assign to the post a highly qualified colonel than a mediocre
general, but the practice clearly indicated the Army's failure
to emphasize the Intelligence function. This was reflected also
in our schools, where, despite some technical training in battlefield
reconnaissance and Intelligence, the broader phases of
the work were almost completely ignored. 'We had few men
capable of analyzing intelligently such information as did
come to the notice of the War Department, and this applied
particularly to what has become the very core of Intelligence
research and analysis-namely, industry.
In the first winter of the war these accumulated and glaring
deficiencies were serious handicaps. Initially the Intelligence
Division could not even develop a clear plan for its own organization
nor could it classify the type of information it
deemed essential in determining the purposes and capabilities
of our enemies. The chief of the division could do little more
than come to the planning and operating sections of the staff
and in a rather pitiful way ask if there was anything he could
do for us.1l7
The chronology of organizational developments in the military
intelligence structure necessarily focuses upon the Military Intelligence
Division, beginning with the final months before the Pearl Harbor
attack.
111 Dwight D. Eisenhower. (JrUiJade in Europe. New York, Doubleday and Company,
1948, p. 32.
185
TABLE II.-MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION PERSONNEL, 1938-45
Officers in Civilians in Officers Civilians
Year Washington Washington in field in field Total
1938_________________________________ 20 48 50 73 191
1939_________________________________ 22 68 65 75 220
1940_________________________________ 28 167 95 88 362
1941.________________________________ 200 656 119 120 1,095
11991423_________________________________•_____________________•_____ 564099 1t,,100769 214977 227331 22,,004438
19IL______________ ----------- 581 1,009 260 618 2,468
1945 _______________ ----------------- 575 931 247 776 2,529
Note: Adopted from U.S. Army. Military Intelligence Division, "A History of the Military Intelligence Division, Dec. 7,
1941-Sept. 2,1945." Typescript, p. 380n.
TABLE III.-MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS, 1942-44
Organization
Jan. 31, 1942
Civilians and
Officers enlisted clerks
Apr. 30, 1942
Civilians and
Officers enlisted clerks
June 30, 1943
Civilians and
Officers enlisted clerks
June 30, 1944
Civilians and
Officers enlisted clerks
Nov. 30, 1944
Civilians and
Officers enlisted clerks
G-1, personneL___________________________ 67 81 13 22 15 26 35 33 56 44
~i~i~~i~~\~~a~:iic;lserVi~e:::::: ::::::::::: ~~~ ~~~_ 3l~ I, o~~ ------- ---388 - -- -- ---1:149-----------583 ---------1:158---. ------ -621 ---- ------I:169
G-3, organization and tralnlng_______________ 88 107 16 35 17 29 34 41 44 39
G-4, supply_______________________________ 149 138 11 26 16 38 35 42 37 45
OPD,operations___________________________ 75 57 121 204 154 329 203 333 217 34
Bureau of Public Relatlons__________________ 58 105 317 135 346 142 ._
Legislative liaison_____________________________________________________ 9 14 11 20 18 25 31 34
~i~fle;~~ir~e~~~!o;,_ ::::::::::::::::::::: ~~_::::::::::::::_. •• :~.:::::::::::::: I~~ IU I~~ ~~ 11~ ~~
New developments division•• • • • • • ._ ____ _________________ 7 11 10 12
~~~1;1~~E~~~~~~i~:r:~~~~~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::ij::: :::::::::i~: H n H n Army Air Forces' .____ 664 885 3,309 1,936 3,843 2,395 5,521 2,561 5,403
Army ground forces' • ••• •••• ••• __ ••• 212 512 267 973 335 978 350 935
Army service forces' • • .__________ 4,177 33,067 5,381 32,294 5,683 30,133 5,636 29,743
I Includes Washinilon staff and departmental sections but no field agencies.
Source: Adopted from Otto t. Nelson, Jr., "National Security and the General Staff". Washington,
Infantry Journal Press, 1946, p. 468.
187
In September 1941 the Military Intelligence Division was
organized vertically [and] prepared not only to produce intelligence,
but also to expand in case war came. The Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, was
chief of the Division and was assisted by an Executive. Reporting
directly to him was the Special Study Group (later
the Propaganda Branch). Reporting to him through the Executive
\vere the chiefs of the Administrative, Intelligence,
Counterintelligence, Plans and Training, and Censorship
Branches.
The Administrative Branch included two types of functions.
Such sections as Finance, Personnel, Records, and Coordination
comprised the first type. By this consolidation
of administrative functions the remaining branches of the
Division were free to devote their full energies to their primary
functions. This branch also was charged with the administrative
supervision of the Military Attache system, the
Foreign Liaison and Translation Sections.
The heart of [the] Military Intelligence Division was in
the Intelligence Branch, the largest of the branches. Organized
along geographic lines, it controlled, in a large measure,
all of the processes of intelligence. Information was gathered
and evaluated [and] intelligence produced by the following
seven sections: the Balkans and Near East, the British
Empire, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Far East, Latin
America, and ",Vestern Europe. It will be noted that the lines
of demarcation were entirely geographical and that there
was no attempt to separate information and intelligence topically
according to political, economic, scientific, and so on.
The Air section and later the Order of Battle Branch were exceptions
to this rule. Intelligence was disseminated by the
Dissemination Section and by the G-2 Situation section which
maintained the G-2 Situation Room. The information gathering
activities of military attaches, observers and others
working "in the field" were directed by the Field Personnel
section. This included directives concerning the types of
information desired but did not embrace administrative matters
which were left to the Military Attache Section of the
Administrative Branch. In other words, the attaches looked
to the Administrative Branch for their administration, to
the Intelligence Branch for their directives, and reported
their findings to the geographic sections. To assist the Chief
of [the Intelligence] Branch in administrative matters there
was a small administrative group within the Branch. It will
be noted that the Branch controlled all of the processes of intelligence,
and that it was devoted entirely to positive intelligence,
as opposed to negative or counter-intelligence.l18
Organized functionally, the Counter Intelligence Branch, composed
of Domestic Intelligence, Investigation, and Plant Intelligence sections,
probed subversion and disloyalty matters, supervised defense
118 MID History, op. mt., pp. 6-7.
70.8900_ 76 _ 1.<:1
188
plant security, produced intelligence relative to the domestic situation,
was responsible for safeguarding military information and took
on such special assignments as were given to it. '
TI~e Plan and Training Branch "prepared plans for intelligence
reqUIrements and developed policies for militarv and combat intelligpncp,"
while also being "responsible for the Zlevelopment and supervision
of training doctrine in the fields of military and combat
intelligence." 119
lJntil the United States actually entered the v>ar, the Censorship
Branch (renamed the Information Control Branch on December 5,
1£)41) remained small and confined itself to preparing plans for future
censorship. Because national censorship in wartime was not assigned
to the War J)epartment, G-2 mlS responsible only for military
censorship policy though liaison with the Office of Censorship which
provided ~IID with valuable information uncovered by that agency.12O
In early 1942, a reorganization occurred within the ·War Department,
a restructuring which "'ould prove functionally troublesome for
MID.
The new organization was announced to the Army in Circular
# 59. As it affected the army its changes were far reaching
and fundamental. The most striking feature of the
proposed reorganization was the distinction made between
operating and staff functions. The latter were to be retained
by the general staff division, hut the former were to be placed
in operating agencies. This entailed the separation of the
larger part of the organization of each staff division from the
small policy making group who performed truly staff functions.
The policy groups would remain in the General Staff
as a small policy making and advisory staff divorced from
the operating functions of their organizations. By ruthlessly
regrouping many old offices and functions and integrating
them into the new organization, smoother functioning was
expected.
The language of the Circular did not make a clear distinction
between the [old policy making] Military Intelligence
Division and the [newly created operating] Military Intelligence
Service. From the present point of vantage the
intentions of the circular seem clear. This distinction was not
made completely clear until Circular 5-2, September 1944,
was issued, although some progress had been made in the
n9 Ibid., p 8.
,." The censorship of communications between the United States and foreign
nations was authorized by the First War Powers Act (55 Stat. 840) approved
December 18, 1941. Pursuant to this statute, President Roosevelt, on December 19,
established (E.O. 8985) the Office of Censorship, a civilian agency located within
the Xational Defense Program tangentially attached to the Executive Office
of the President. The director of the Office of Censorship and its program was
Byron Price, who headed the unit until its demise by a presidential directive
(E.O. 9631) iSSUed September 28, 1945 and effective on November 15 of that
year. See Elmer Davis and Byron Price, War Information and Oen.'<(ffship. Washington,
American Council on Pub'ic Affairs, 1943: also see Byron Price, Governmental
Censorship in ·Wartime. American Political Science Review, v. 36,
October, 1942: 837-850.
189
.ruly 194-2 revision of AR 10-15. Circular # 59 charged the
Military Intelligence Division, G-2, "with those duLies of the
\Var Department General Staff relating to the collection,
evaluation and dissemination of military information." The
Military Intelligence Service was established "under the
direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence
Division, War Department General Staff . . . [toJ
operate and administer the service of the collpC'tion, compilation
and dissemination of military intelligence." Here \vas a
verbal paradox. In the vocabulary of G-2 intelligence is
based upon the eYaluation of information. Information is the
raw product from which intelligence is produced. [TheJ Military
Intelligence Division \vas charged, then, with duties
relating to the evaluation and dissemination of information;
while [theJ Military Intelligence Service was not charged
with the evaluation but with the dissemination of
intelligence.121
Subsequent discussions and attention to this verbal dilemma contributed
to a clarification of the functions of MID and MIS, but the
initial confusion and lack of an authoritative decision on the matter
did little to ameliorate ill feelings over the dichotomous organization
and subsequent rivalry between the two units.
A series of office memoranda implemented the reorganization
directed by Circular # 59. The Military Intelligence
Service was created and all personnel, except certain commissioned
officers, were transferred to it from [theJ Military
Intelligence Division. An examination of the personnel
assignments in the memoranda and of assignments listed on
a Chart of 15 January 1942 reveals few essential changes.
Colonel Hayes A. Kroner, the new chief, Military Intelligence
Service, had been Chief of the Intelligence Branch.
Col. Ralph C. Smith, the new Executive Officer, Military
Intelligence Service, had been Executive Officer and Chief,
Administrative Branch. The latter function was assigned to
Col. T. E. Roderick, formerly Assistant Executive. He likewise
retained his assignment as assistant executive officer. The
new Chief, Intelligence Group, Col. R. S. Bratton, had formerly
been assigned to the Far Eastern section of the Intelligence
Branch. Chief of the Training Branch, Lt. Col. P. H.
Timothy, had been chief of the Plans and Training Branch.
Col. Oscar Solbert, now chief of the Psychological Warfare
Branch, was a past member of that Branch. Col. Black, its
former chief, had been transferred to the Military Intelligence
Division staff section. Other members of the Staff were
either newly assigned members of [theJ Military Intelligence
Division, detailed from the AAF, or former members of [theJ
Military Intelligence Division.
The Military Intelligence Service was divided into four
groups, each reporting to the Chief, Military Intelligence
Service, through his executive. The Foreign Liaison Branch
12l :MID History, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
190
and the 1Ii1itary Attache Section reported independently to
the Chief, 1Iilitary Intelligence Service, and not through a
Deputy. The Administrative group v,'as divided into five
house.keeping sections. The Intelligence group was divided
into parallel Air and (iround sections, organized according to
theaters. In addition, an administrative Branch and a Situation
and Planning Branch assisted in the supervision and
planning for the group.
The Counter Intrllrgence Group was divided into parallel
ail' and ground sections. de\'oted to Domestic. Plant Intelligence,
Military Censorship, and Security of 1Iilitary Information.
They, too, were coordinated by an Administrative
and a Counter Intelligence Situation and Evaluation Branch.
Psychological warfare. training and dissemination ,,'ere assigned
to the Operations Group.122
Three months after Circular #59 was implemented, the new Assistant
Chief of Staff. G-2, Major General George V. Strong, whom
Eisenhower described as "a senior officer possessed of a keen mind,
a driving energy, and a ruthless determination," 123 indicated his
dissatisfaction ,vith the reorganization as it affected MID and offered
an altel'11ate plan of structure to the Chief of Staff.124
It was essentially the same organization as before, except
that the office of Chief, Military Intelligence Service, had
been established between most of the branches and the G-2.
The 1Iilitary Intelligence Division Staff, aside from [the]
Military Intelligence Service, was new. The most apparent
difference between the old and new plan was the separation
of ground and air intelligence into parallel sections within
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. As before, a group was
established which met in the Situation Room to make the
final evaluation and to conduct broad planning and policy
making. Preliminary w'ork of this sort was also done in the
Situation and Planning sections and the Evaluation section
of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence groups. Because
the final evaluation process was entrusted to the G-2, General
Staff, there was no clear break between [the] Military Intelligence
Division and rthe] Military Intelligence Service.
General Strong believed in organizing the Division functionally
and sought therefore to place evaluation in the Intelligence
Group. In July, according to present evidence, the
Dissemination Branch was combined with certain other func-
1.22 Ibid., pp. 15-16; another account comments that "after March 1942 there
was a small ~Iilitary Intelligence Diyision of the War Department General Staff
totalling 16 officers with 10 clerical assistants, and a Military Intelligence Service
consisting of 342 officers and 1005 ciyilian and enlisted assistants. The Service
was to carry out the operational and administrative actiyities for the General
Staff section, and while there were to be two distinct agencies, some of the key
officers were members of both organizations. This differentiation tended to be
an artificial distinction and in practice there was but one organization." From
Otto L. :Kelson, .Tr. National Security And The General Staff. Washington,
Infantry Journal Press, 1946, p. 525.
123 Eisenhower, ap. mt., p. 34.
124 MID History, ap. cit., p. 19.
191
hons and designated the Evaluation and Dissemination
Branch, probably in the Intelligence Group. The date is uncertain,
but the G-2 telephone directories for June and July
ind.icate that this must have been the date. It was an agency
whIch e\"aluated the O\'eran information collected within the
gronp and disseminated it as intel1igence. In October its name
\vas changed to the Dissemination Group and it was placed
in the Intelligence Group. At the same time the Intelligence
Group was divided into the ne\vly created North American
and Foreign Intelligence Command and the American Intelligence
Command. The two commands gave [the] Military
Intelligence Sen'ice the means to handle on the one hand all
intelligence affecting Latin America (American Intelligence
Command) and all other types of foreign intenigence (North
American anfl Foreign Intelligence Command) on the
other.125
Other changes in the intelligence structure were effected, such as
the decentralizing of the American Intelligence Command and relocating
it in :Miami.
By 29 Kovember 1942 arrangements were sufficiently stable
to issue a chart showing the various changes. The G-2 Staff
was retained, and the Chief, Military Intelligence Service,
was also rlesignated as Deputy, G-2. The Executive office now
appeared to supenise the Message Center. The Chief, Military
Intelligence Service, \vas given four Assistant Chiefs
for Intelligence, Training, Administration, and Security.
The Intelligence Group was divided into the two commands
mentioned above. North American and Foreign Intelligence
Command \ns organized geographically with a separate air
section further subdivided into general geographic sections.
American Intelligence Command was organized more functionally
with Branches devoted to Special Activities, "American,"
Air Control. Communications Control, and Hemisphere
Studies. The dissemination Group was so placed that its
Cable, Collection, Theater. Intelligence, and Publications
Branches received reports from both commands. At the top
of this pyramid with fsic] the Evaluation Board which reported
to the Assistant Chief, Military Intelligence Service,
Intelligence, and could receive reports from the aforementioned
commands and groups.
The Training agency was divided into two groups: one for
intelligence schools and the other for liaison with other
schools and agencies concerned with intelligence training.
The Assistant Chief. Military Intelligence Service, Administration
was O"iven certain operational Branches in addition
to his housekeeping branches. These included Foreign Liaison,
Military Attache. Psychological W"arfare, Prisoner of
1Var. and Geographic Branches. The latter was announced
25 November 1942 as the coordinating and policy making
,.. Ibid., pp. 18--19.
192
agency fo~ "Var Department procurement, preparation and
reproductI~n of ,map~. The Assistant Chief, Military In'telligen~
e SerVIce, Secul'lty, the old Counterintelligence Group,
retamed the same essential organization, beina divided into
domestic intelligence (counterintelli <Yence) al~d SafeQUarding
Military Information (or Special). b
Not shown on the chart was the Special Branch, which
handled all matters relating to cryptographic security and
communications, interception and analysis of cryptographic
and coded messages, and measures rplating to the use and secnrity
of radar and signal intelligence. This branch reported
directly to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, because the
nature of its activities prevented a wholesale circulation of
its efforts.12G
The Evaluation Board, established on November 3,1942, in accordance
with General Strong's particular wishes, was directly responsible
to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Chief of the Military
Intelligence Senice. It maintained close liaison with both the North
American and Foreign Intelligence Command and the American
Intelligence Command; in addition, foreign country experts were
added to its membership, indicating increasing importance for country
specialists.12
'
General Strong next proceeded to announce a new organization
which more closely met his demands for an intelligence
division. Although he disapproved of a separate Military
Intelligence Senice, he retained it and attempted to fashion
his organization to produce the desired effect. The new
organization was announced 25 .January 1943. The General
Staff section was divided into a Policy Section charged with
the study and review of policies and their coordination in the
General' Staff and 'War Department. The remainder of the
Staff ,vas transferred to the Evaluation and Dissemination
Staff of the Intelligence Group. This staff was charged with
evaluation, interpretation, dissemination, and planning of
intelligence. Specifically, it was charged with the determination
of the intelligence requirements of the Chief of Staff and
Operations Division. Current intelligence production and
planning were, therefore, taken out of the hands of the staff
where General Strong apparently felt it never should have
been placed. A policy group was left behind to study and coordinate
policy matters. X0 mention is made of strategy and
task force operations. but presumably these problems were
discussed by the Evaluation and Dissemination Staff. The
mission of 'the Staff had been stated even morc fully on
8 .January 1943, when an interim organization was announced.
It was to "control policy on evaluation, supervise
its execution in the several levels of the Intelligence Group,
and give final and superior evaluation. from the Operations
viewpoint to military information for the application of
1W Ibid., pp. 2()-21.
l27 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
193
intellig-ence locally and for its dissemination ~wherever necess~
ry." Thus. it not only set the policy for evaluation. but revlewed,
in its supervisory capacity, the products of the various
branches of the Intelligence Group.l2S
Th~ .four. major units of the Military Intelligence ServiceAdm~
mstratIon, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Trainingremamed
as they "'ere but new subdivision entities were created at
the discretion of the heads of these offices. The North American and
Foreign Intelligence Command was abolished at this time and the
American Intelligence Command beeame the American Intelligence
Service. later the Latin American Unit.
Further alterations in the structure of the organization
were effected three months later. The Foreign Liaison and
Prisoner of ",Yar Branehes were ordered to report directly
to the Chief, Military Intelligence Service. The Administrative
Group was abolished and its sections transferred to the
Executive. A "Chart of Functions and Personnel" dated
17 April 1943. re\'eals that the Chief, ~Iilitary Intelligence
Service, was also Deputy G-2. Four sections appear as part
of the ""'Val' Department General Staff, G-2": the Policy
Section, the Evaluation and Dissemination Section, the
Administrative Section and the ,Toint Intelligence Committee
Section. At the same time, an Evaluation and Dissemination
Staff is included in the structure of the Intelligence
Group. A study of its functions and personnel reveals an
interesting situation.
As a part of the G-2 General Staff, the Evaluation and
Dissemination Section's functions are listed first as those
assigned to the Evaluation and Dissemination Staff, and then
as a section to study: "physical, economic, political, and
ethnologieal geography in order to advise on measures of
national security and assist in assuring continued peace in
the post-war world; and ... conducted studies of a broad
nature to assist in the prosecution of the war." Its other functions
were to advise the Chief, Intelligence Group, on the
Intelligence requirements of [the] Military Intelligence Division's
customers and to assign priority to their requests.
They would also evaluate and synthesize information and
intelligence produced. and make sure that there was always
careful and complete consideration of all information in
[the] Military Intelligence Service. Finally, they were to
review and give final e\'aluation of intelligence before it was
disseminated. and exercise general supervision over Military
Intelligence Service publications and reports. Now the !irst
function quoted abO\'e is exactly the same. except for slIght
chanues in verbiage. as the mission of the Geopolitical Branch
as st~ted in .Tune 1942. Nowhere else in the chart is there a
reference to the Branch. nor had there ever been any mention
of it on any chart, because of a desire to keep its activities
12B Ibid., pp. 22-23.
194
secret. In February or March, the Branch's title had been
changed to the less alarming "Analysis Branch." 129
Xext came renewed efforts to abolish the Military Intelligence Service
and centralize intelligence operations under a new organization.
On 30 August 1943, it was announced that General Hayes
Kroner, then Chief, Military Intelligence Service, would
become Deputy for Administration, G-2. Col. Thomas J.
Betts was announced as Deputy for Intelligence, G-2. No
new chief was announced for the Military Intelligence Service.
All of the old agencies of [the] Military Intelligence
Division and [the] ~Iilitary Intelligence Service were
grouped under these two deputies. This was done in recognition
of the fact "that all G-2-Military Intelligence Service
activities, regardless of allocation, are concerned fundamentally
with military intelligence and security." It was
further provided than an intelligence producing agency
stripped of all administrative and operational functions
should be established. All other functions were to be handled
by another agency. Thus two deputies were established, the
one responsible for administrative and "other" functions,
while the other was responsible for intelligence.13O
A second stage of the MIS abolition plan came on September 22,
1943 in a memorandum announcing a further reorganization around
three deputies, one for Administration, one for Air, and one for
Intelligence. The first of these remained with General Kroner, who
was also given responsibility for the operation of the Services Group,
the Training Group, and the Historical Branch.
The mission of the Deputy for Intelligence was defined in
the same terms as in the previous memorandum. He was to
direct not only the Policy and Strategy Group and Theater
Group, but also the Collection Group, the Prisoner of War
Branch, and the Order of Battle Branch. Thus, the function
of collection was returned to the Deputy for Intelligence.
The Deputy for Air was made responsible for the reestablished
Air Unit which was charged with the same liaison
function formerly assigned to the Air Liaison Section. The
Deputy for Air was also charged with the supervision of
Air Corps personnel assigned to G-2 and who were to be
integrated into the various sections of the Theater Group.
Their functions were not elaborated, but they presumably
remained the same as before. The "new" organization was not,
in point of fact, so new as it appeared to be. The memorandum
had merely recalled the earlier one [by General Strong
protesting the creation of MIS], and then accomplished the
same purpose. The primary difference was the return of the
collection function to the Intelligence group. It represents
General Strong's ideal organization of an intelligence agency.
He believed the separation of [the] Military Intelligence
Service from [the] Military Intelligence Division had been
l2ll Ibid., pp. 25-26.
130 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
195
"unfortunate," therefore, it was abolished. He believed the
organization should rest on functional bases, therefore, intelligence
planning and policy, screening and evaluation, and
dissemination ,vere brought' together under one roof. The
many miscellaneous functions of G-2 (services, training,
rnapping, history, etc.) were left outside the key organization.
In a sense, [the] Military Intelligence Service had become
the organization of the Deputy for Intelligence, except
that policy and planning was not left in the intelligence
producing agency.
Paradoxically, the organization charts of the ",Var Department
and the Army continued to show a separate Military
Intelligence Service, although it had been abolished. The bulk
of the personnel allotted to the Military Intelligence Division
were allotted to a Military Intelligence Service. :Many
papers prepared in G-2 continued to carry signatures indicating
that [the] Military Intelligence Service existed and
functioned. This situation was deliberate. The reorganization
memorandum stressed the fact that its det.ails were to
be ret.ained in [the] Military Intelligence Division. Outside
the Division, an effort was made to maintain the appearance
of a separate Military Intelligence Service.13l
When General Strong's tenure at G-2 came to an end and, on
February 7, 1944, he was replaced by :Major General Clayton Bissell,
the reinstatement of MIS, in accordance with the Chief of Staff's
original wishes, was assured.
The preliminary study for another reorganization was
already in progress. Three days after General Strong was
relieved as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Adjutant General
issued a letter order establishing two boards of officers
to study, recommend, and supervise the reorganization of the
Military Intelligence Division. The first board consisted of
Brigadier General Elliot D. Cooke, the "steering member,"
Col. John H. Stutesman, Lt. Col. Francis H. Brigham, Jr.,
Capt. Jerome Hubbard, and Mr. George Schwarzwalder
(Bureau of the Budget). This Board was directed to make
a detailed study and to submit recommendations for the reorganization
of [the] Military Intelligence Division. They
were further ordered to supervise the implementation of
these recommendations under the supervision of a second
board. It consisted of John J. McCloy (Assistant Secretary
of War), Major General John P. Smith, :Major General Clayton
L. Bissell, and Brigadier General Otto L. Nelson, Jr.
They were directed to "consider, approve, and supervise" the
implementation of the recommendations submitted by the
Cooke Committee.132
The work of these two panels came to a conclusion within two
months from their creation.
131 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
133 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
196
On 23 March 1944, Mr. McCloy reported to the Chief of
Staff the proposals of his committee, based upon the study of
the Cooke Committee. A revision of AR 10-15 was suggested,
which would give to [the] Military Intelligence Service the
responsibility of securing pertinent information and converting
it into intelligence for the USe of the Chief of Staff,
the General Staff, and the Military Intellig-ence Service. The
'policy Staff would state and carry out all policies governmg
intelligence and counter-intelligence within the Army.
The G-2 was responsible for the interior security of the Army
and the production of intelligence necessary to the operation
of the 'Yar Department. The purpose of the proposed change
was clear. It not only separated [the] ~Iilitary Intelligence
Service from the Policy Staff and delineated the responsibilities
of each, but it also clarified the relationship between
the Division and the Service. This recommended revision was
not adopted.
McCloy next outlined the proposed reorganization of G-2.
It emphasized the fact that the Policy Staff must not be
merged or integrated with [the] Military Intelligence SerYice.
The work of the Policy Staff was divided into four groups
of related subjects. A later regrouping and rephrasing of
these subjects integrated and reduced the number of functIOns.
The aim of both allocations was to enable a small body of experts
to prepare policies, each in his particular speciality.
The broad outlines of [the] Military Intelligence Service
were likewise sketched, but it was emphasized that within the
organization, rigid compartmentalization would be avoided.
The Chief, Military Intelligence Service, was charged with
two responsibilities: the collection of information :from all
sources, and the production of intelligence. The Director of
Information was to discharge the first function assisted by a
supervisor of information, gathering personnel, liaison
groups, etc., and a supervisor :for receiving, classifying and
distributing information. The Director of Intelligence would
be assisted by an editorial group, intelligence specialists, and
a chief of research. Finally, an executive for administration
was to be created to relieve the Chie:f, Military Intelligence
Service, and his two Directors of administrative problems. He
was not to be a channel of communication between the Directors
and the Chief of [the] Military Intelligence Service.133
Ultimately,' there came the implementation of the proposals of the
Cooke-McCloy panels.
The Reorganization Committee had recommended that AR
10-15 be revised so that the distinctions between the Military
Intelligence Division and the Military Intelligence Service
would be properly stated and made clear for all. This recommendation
was not accepted. In September, however, a General
Staff Circular, 5-2, 27 September 1944, was issued which
superseded the Regulation and achieved the desired end. It
133 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
197
carefully listed the responsibillties and functions of the Military
Intelligence Division and its subdivisions. The responsibility
of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was defined and
the preparation of plans and policies concerning military
intelligence and counterintelligence. The functions of the
Division were listed and it was made plain that it was to
formulate plans and policies and to supervise the execution of
the eleven functions listed. The Circular was prepared by the
Policy Staff and there was, therefore, no confusion of language
between information and intelligence. One factor, however,
was added which had not been made explicit before.
This was the supervisory responsibility of the Division.
The list of functions is clear and speaks for itself. It is
therefore quoted in full :
"The Military Intelligence Division formulates plans
and policies, and supervises:
1. Collection of information and intelligence at
home and abroad, to include interrogation of prisoners
of war.
2. Evaluation and interpretation of information
and intelligence.
3. Dissemination of intelligence.
4. Terrain intelligence, including coordination of
producing agencies.
5. Intelligence and counterintelligence training.
6. Military liaison with representatives of foreign
governments.
7. Safeguarding military information, to include
censorship and communications security.
8. Counterintelligence measures, to include evasion
and escape.
9. Army participation in propaganda and psychological
warfare.
10. Army historical activities.
11. The Military Intelligence Service, which is
charged with appropriate operational functions
concerning matters within the purview of the Military
Intelligence Division."
For the first time, then, the distinction between the Military
Intelligence Division and the Military Intelligence Service
was clearly stated. It made a fact of the efforts of the last few
years to make the Military Intelligence Service the operational
agency and the Military Intelligence Division the
policy and planning agency. The normal staff duty of supervision
was assigned to the Military Intelligence Division. No
less important was the fact that the Circular provided the
Division with an up-to-date statement of its mission, responsibilities,
and functions. In effect, it was the statement of
functions described in the report of the reorganization
committee.lSi
134 Ibid., pp. 57-59.
198
Before leaving the evolution of the Military Intelligence Division,
brief attention should be given to its operational units and their general
activities. The first consideration in this regard is the intelligence
collection function.
As of 7 December 1941, the collection of intelligence information
was the responsibility of the Intelligence Branch of
the Military Intelligence DIvision. This Branch also evaluated
and distributed intelligence information; maintained
digests of information of foreign countries; prepared combat,
political, and economic estimates; and prepared special
studies on foreign countries. Its geographical subsections
directed and coordinated the collection of information by
military attaches, by means of Index Guide and direct
communication.
The Index Guide was a broad, general outline, covering the
various aspects of information to be reported on a foreign
country. It was too general to be considered an Intelligence
Directive from which timely intelligence information could
be expected. Specific direction to the military attaches in regard
to collecting intelligence information was spasmodic
and, therefore, incomplete. The geographic sections tended to
depend on the ingenuity and clairvoyance of the military attache
to forward desired information.
The first step toward centralization came in March, 1942,
when a Collection Section was established in the Situation and
Planning Branch of the Intelligence Group. Although the
primary function of collecting information remained with
the geographic and subsections of the Intelligence Group,
the Collection Section maintained liaison with other government
agencies to secure information. It was essentially a liaison
section until in November when the Collection Branch
was placed in the Dissemination Group. Its new directive
made it the agency to receive and requisition all information,
except routine emanating from the Field Services. It obtained
special information for the geographic branches and
other divisions of the Military Intelligence Service, and from
time to time it issued such intelligence directives as the Chief
of the Intelligence Group might direct. The emphasis here
was on non routine reports: routine reports were still the
responsibility of the ~ographic branches. In securing its information,
the branch used personal interviews, maintained
contact with governmental and civilian agencies, and contacted
field representatives.13s
Field intelligence was gathered for battle commanders and strategists
with a view to its immediate use bv them and then subsequent
forwarding to the Military Intelligence Division.136 The intelligence
,. Ibid., pp. 63-65. .
1101 On the collection of field intelligence for immedate combat purposes, see:
Robert R. Glass and Phillip B. Davidson. InteZUqeMe Is For Commanders.
Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Company, 1948; also see Oscar W. Koch
with Robert G. Hays. (J....!i: InteJUgence tor Patton. Philadelphia, Whitmore
Publishing Company, 1971.
199
needs of the General Staff in Washington were dictated by global
strategy; commanders closer to specific operations required detailed
intelligence of a more particularistic type. In many ways, MID
sought to collect and maintain information which would serve both
levels of intelligence need.
The functions of the Collection Branch were redefined 29
January 1943 by the Chief Intelligence Group after the reorganization
outlined in Memorandum # 18. The Branch was
designated as the agency to requisition, receive and allocate
all material coming into the Intelligence Group. Nevertheless,
the individual units of the Group could still correspond
with the Military Intelligence Service field representatives
in the area of the special interest, but henceforth, were required
to keep the Chief of the Collection Branch informed
of this correspondence. A system of weekly reports to the Collection
Branch were inaugurated, which itemized the types
of information desired, assigned a priority rating, and distinguished
new from old or repeated requests. These reports
helped the branch coordinate collection activities with
the requirements of other agencies. It did not yet have
complete control over the collection of information, but a
procedure by which a large portion of the requests were
cleared through the Branch was established. The responsibility
for liaison and the development of new sources increased
the degree of its control over the collection of
information.
On 18 March 1943 the Foreign Branch (actually the Field
Services Branch at this period) was transferred to the Collection
Branch. By this transfer, the Collection Unit gained
administrative control of the Military Attache system. On 2
April 1943 the organization of the unit was described and its
functions redefined. No new functions were added. except
those acquired through the incorporation of the Foreign
Liaison Branch, but the overall statement of responsibility
designated the unit as the agency to requisition, receive and
allocate all material coming mto the Intelligence Group. The
regional branches were still authorized to communicate directly
with our representatives abroad.137
Next came the reorganization of 1944 and its effects upon the collection
of intelligence information.
The reorganization plan of the "McCloy Committee" recognized
the importance of the collection of information to the
production of intelligence. An agency, separate from the Research
branches, was created to exploit all possible sources
and to collect timely, useful information. The production of
information (the raw material of intelligence) was placed
under the Director of Information and more specifically in
the Source Control Unit.
The Supervisor of Source Control processed, trained, and
assigned information gathering personnel; it advised them of
... MID History, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
200
the types of information required; it assured the timely receipt
of useful information; it weeded out useless information;
and develoyed new sources. As established, it was
largely an admimstrative and supervisory office, but it soon
acquired other functions.
In October 1944 a War Department Intelligence Collection
Committee was established under the Supervisor of Source
Control. It was formed to coordinate and integrate all War
Department intelligence target objectives for the exploitation
in Germany and other rehabilitated areas, formerly occupied
by the AXIS. The Committee coordinated and compiled the
requirements of the research branches of the Military Intelligence
Service, the Technical Services, and the Air Forces into
Target Objective Folders. The Folders were sent overseas
to the'Combined Intelligence Objectives sub-committee which
coordinated all allied intelligence requirements so as to prevent
duplication of investigation and to promote the most
efficient use of specialist personnel. The committee also sent
out investigative teams from the United States to exploit intelligence
targets. In November 1944, the Committee began to
turn its attention to objectives in Japan and Japanese occupied
territory. The first of these folders was dispatched in
May 1945.
The formal charter of the committee was not issued until
June 9, 1945, but it had already been in operation for some
time before this. Its secretariat was created September 23,
1944 to do the actual writing and coordinating of intelligence
requests. The secretariat worked under the supervision of the
Supervisor of Source Control who had been performing this
work. Reports from the theaters were received in the Reading
Panel which determined the reproduction and distribution to
be given all incoming material. The secretariat filed new information
in the Target Objective Folders as received. Documents
of basic army interest were sent to the Pacific Military
Intelligence Research Section ... , Camp Ritchie, Maryland,
and those of basic navy interest were sent to the Navy Document
Center. Both agencies maintained accession lists of
documents received.138
This committee marked an important pinnacle in centralized coordination
of intelligence information collection. To further facilitate
this organizational system, a monitoring control procedure for processing
information requests was created. This practice allowed the
Supervisor of Source Control to assign requests to the appropriate
unit responsible for developing the type of information desired, to
supervise response time and quality, and to otherwise remain apprised
of the status of such inquiries. The Source Control United continued
to issue general directives, as well, regardi~ the collection of information,
thereby setting priorities and establishing a degree of quality
control as well.1S9
us Ibid., pp. 68-69.
118 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
201
Another important entity within MID was the military attache
structure.
The group which administered this system during the war
changed its name from time to time. It was known as the
Military Attache Section (and Branch) until April 17, 1943,
and thereafter as the Foreign Branch. The function and mission
of the organization remained about the same throughout
the period. The relation of the Branch to the military
attache system was purely administrative. It processed personnel
assigned to these offices. It brought them to the Military
Intelligence Division where passports were arranged,
innoculations procured, and intelligence indoctrination was
completed. Thereafter the branch handled all administrative
correspondence between them and the War Department, and
supervised the administration of their offices. Finally, it was
responsible for assisting the collection of intelligence by
transmitting specific requests and general directives, such as
the I ndew Guide.
In December of 1941 the section was composed of six officers
and nine civilians under the direction of Captain (later
Colonel) W. M. Adams. In the field, there were fifty-two
offices~ staffed by 129 officers. Coincident with the reorganization
of the War Department, :March 9, 1942, an Air Section,
made up of an increment of officers from the Foreign Liaison
Section A-2, was added to administer the air attache system.
In early 1942, there were twelve Assistant Military Attaches
for Air, each with an airplane and a crew chief. By Dec. 1,
1945 this number had grown to include 48 Military Air Attaches
and Assistants in 38 Military Attache offices abroad.140
Another mechanism developed for coordinated intelligence collection
was the Joint Intelligence Collection agencies.
After the North African invasion, it was found that in
areas where a theater commander was actually present, the
flow of intelligence stopped. The Theater intelligence organizations
were interested in combat intelligence, rather than intelligence
and information necessary for training and strategic
planning. The solution was the formation of the Joint
Intelligence Collection Agency in North Africa (Algiers) by
an agreement with General Eisenhower, dated Jan. 26, 1943.
This agency was expanded on May 30, 1943 to include, not
just Algiers, but all of North Africa and became known as the
Joint Intelligence Collection Agency North Africa. A second
Joint Intelligence Collection Agency was established as Joint
Intelligence Collection Agency Middle East for the Middle
East Theater, April 23, 1943. On August 5, 1943, the system
was placed on a world wide basis by direction of the Joint
Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The third was established in the
China Burma India Theater, August 19, 1943, and from this
a separate one was established for China, April 27, 1945, when
:uo [bill., pp. 74-75.
202
that theater was established. The Pacific Ocean Area was
served by the Joint Intelligence Collection, Pacific Ocean
Area, which was operated under the direction of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.l4l
In a~dition to supplying administrative support and guidance for
the Jomt Intelligence Collection agencies, the Foreign Branch of the
~nD Collection Unit also supervised two special missions. Organized
m the summer of 1943, the first of these entities gathered all information
available regarding the latest developments and capabilities of the
pnemy in the field of bacteriological warfare. The second, called the
ALSOS Mission, was operational by the autumn. It sought scientists
llnd 'Scientific information which might reveal the progress of the
enemy in atomic research and allied subiects.142
As of June 1944, liaison between MID and other Federal agencies
was centralized in a Washington Liaison Branch but, even after that
time, informal liaison persisted beyond the new unit's control.
The roots of the branch are to be found in the Contact Section,
existing in the Intelligence Branch on December 5, 1941.
It was charged with contacting State, Office of Naval Intelligence,
etc. for Military information. Subsequent charts and
reorganization memoranda do not mention it, but a chart of
May 15, 1942, lists one of the functions in the Dissemination
Branch as interviewing returning observers, a task later assigned
to the W·ashington Liaison Branch. Mention ofa Contact
and Liaison Section is made October 23, 1942 in a
discussion of Intelligence possibilities in the interviews of returning
observers, officers, and civilians by Major Edward F.
Smith in Oct. and Nov. 1942. As we have seen in the discussion
of the Collection Branch, this function was included in the
directive of Dec. 9, 1942. Nevertheless, there seems to have
been at least three agencies doing this type of work independently
and without coordination (War Department Liaison,
State Department Liaison, and Domestic Branch)-all in rthe] collection unit. In Feb 1944 there were 150 Liaison functions
performed in Military Intelligence Division, but they
were not coordinated or controlled. Many offices whose functions
were normally liaison acted independently of their
superiors and on their own initiative. As Col. H. H. Mole,
Chief of the North American Branch, said, "There were too
many people running too many contacts for successful
work." 143
·While the coordination of liaison was a persistent and continuous
problem in "\V"ashington for MID, it was less so in field contacts .with
private business enterprises due largely to the good efforts of regIonal
offices.
At one time there were four such offices in New York, San
Francisco, Miami and New Orleans. They were established to
1<1 Ibid., p. 76; for a view of coordinated intelligence operations within General
Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters in London, see Kenneth Strong. Intelligence
At the Top. New York Doubleday and Company, 1969, pp. 72-299.
1.. MID History, op. cit., p. 79.
1<3 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
203
collect information of intelligence value to the War Department
from sources peculiar to their location. In addition, they
~rformed such functions as liaison with foreign personnel,
dIctated by the characteristics of the industries and traffic of
their locations. Only the Miami Office survived the war all of
the rest having been closed before the end of hostilities.'
The Branch offices originated in 1940. At that time, most of
the information coming into the division came in the form of
Military Attache reports. It was recognized that there was a
considerable amount of information to be had in the principal
ports of entry and in the metropolitan centers of the nation.
Files of trade data, insurance maps, and related data, records
of financial transactions, engineering reports, travel diaries
and field notes of scientists, and other similar items existed in
these centers. This material could not be shipped to Washington
for processing, so that it was necessary to go to the
sources.l44
The first such field office to be established by MID was in New York.
Opened on July 8, 1940, it initially concentrated on Latin American
intelligence but by August, 1941, the product had shifted to target
folders on Europe and, subsequently, on Japan. Before being closed
on December 31, 1944, a satellite of the New York office was opened
in Chicago sometime between January and March of 1943. A New
Orleans unit operated between April 17, 1941, and February 2, 1943.
The San Francisco office was inaugurated on July 31, 1941, and initially
devoted its attention to interviewing evacuees from the Asiatic and
Pacific areas of conflict. Later, the intelligence interest of the unit
shifted to business and educational sources familiar with the Orient.
"While in operation, the office cooperated closely with representatives
of the Office of Naval Intelligence; it ceased functioning on June 30,
1944. The Miami office, the longest lived and last to open, commencing
operations on April 7, 1942. Its principal focus was upon Latin and
South American developments and the trafficking of foreign visitors
toihe United States via the "Miami Gateway." 145
The Foreign Liaison Office was created 31 August 1941 to
facilitate the work of foreign military 'attaches and other
foreign officers in this country on official business. It made
arrangements to see that proper courtesies were extended to
them and systematized and controlled the military information
furnished them. At the beginning of the War it was a
part of the Administrative Branch. In March of 1942 it was
directly under the Executive, Military Intelli~ence Service,
but later was placed under the G-2. In March It consisted. of
twelve officers and twenty-four civilians, but the same month
received an increment of personnel from the Foreign Liaison
Section of the Air Staff. After the reorganization of June
1944 it was placed in the Washington Liaison Branch where
it rpmained for the n'st of the war.
Throughout the war, then, it was concerned with the problem
of satisfying the needs of the diplomatic military repre-
'" Ibid" pp. 87-88.
1.. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
70-890 0 - 76 - 14
204
sentatives of foreign governments. The basic directives and
decisions which related to the release and exchange of both
technical and military information were made outside of the
section. The results of these decisions flowed through
it. 1453
The policies adopted in regard to the exchange of information
and intelligence with the British and our other allies
were develoJ>6d on a higher level than the Military Intelligence
DiviSIOn, but it took part in the discussions. Once the
general policy was adopted there then remained the task of
unplementing it and working out the details on the "working
levels." In general this was done not in broad general agreements
but in a series of specific arrangements, sometImes
verbal and informal.
The background of these agreements lies in the pre-war
period when the military staffs of the two nations met to
discuss .plans for strategy and to prepare for eventualities.
Beginning in January 1941 Staff conversations were held to
this end. Throughout the American representatives were careful
not to commit the nation to a line of action which might
later prove embarrassing. Agreements were made and conversations
held not on the basis of when the United States
entered the war, but if it should be forced to enter it. After
7 December 1941 further conversations and meetings were
held and more definite agreements were made.us
One of the devices developed to facilitate cooperative intelli~ence
arrangements between the United States and Great Britain was a
special panel called the Combined Intelligence Committee. It was part
of a progression of intelligence coordinating units created during the
war. First, a .Toint Army and Navv Inteni~ence Committee was created
under the Joint Army and Navy Board on December 3, 1941.1.U Organized
in 1903, the Joint Board made recommendations to the Secretaries
of War and Navy on matters involving cooperation of the two
armed services. Its Rubordinate agencies included the .Joint Planning
Committee (established in 1919), the Joint Economy Board (established
in 1933), and the intelligence unit. The Joint Board was
abolished in 1947 with the inRtitution of the Department of Defense.
Next came the Joint Intelligence Committee organized under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This Committee. known also as .TIC. was a continuation
and enlargement of the Joint Board committee of the same
name, whioh had been authorized in 1941. It received no
charter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff until May 1943, but it
was given a directive and was reorganized early in March
1942. Even before this, on February 11. 1942. a Combined
Chiefs of Staff paper had defined the duties and membership
of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Its primary functions
throughout the war period were to furnish intelligence in
uSa Ibid., pp. fl8-R9.
1" Ibiit., pp. 00-93.
141 Ibid., p. 94.
2Q5
various forms to other agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and to represent it on the Combined Intelli~ence Committee.
As originally constituted, the Joint Intelligence Committee
was composed of the directors of the intelligence services
of the Army and Navy and representatives of the State
Department, the Board of Economic Warfare (later the
Foreign Economic Administration) and the Coordinator of
Information (later the Director of Strateg-ic Services). The
charter of May 1943 added the director of the Intelligence
Staff of the Armv Air Forces. This membership remained unchanged
throughout the remainder of the war.
The Joint Intelligence Committee was assisted by a fulltime
subcommittee and some ten or more special subcommittees.
The permanent working staff was organized by the Committee
early in 1942 as the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee
(JISC). Its status was formalized in the charter of the Committee
on May 1943. Two months later, the Joint Intelligence
Subcommittee was renamed the Joint Intelligence Staff
(JIS). The latter agency was given a charter by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in May 1944 and operated under it throughout
the remainder of the war.148
Then came the Combined Intelligence Committee.
Provision for this Committee, known also as CIC, was made
in the agreement to create the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but
it does not appear to have met before May 1942. Its working
subcommittee, however, known first as the Combined IntelliI-!
ence Subcommittee (eISC) and from August 1943 as the
Combined Intelligence Staff (CIS), met as early as February
19, 1942. This subcommittee was composed of the Joint
Intelligence Subcommittee, later the Joint Intelligence Staff,
and the British Joint Intelligence Committee'in Washin~n.
The Combined Intelligence Committee consisted of the Joint
Intelligence Committee and representatives of the British
Joint Intelligence Subcommittee in London. Both the Combined
Intelligence Committee and the Combined Intelligence
Staff continued throughout the war. The former was responsible
for collecting and disseminating military inten~gencefor
the use of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Combined
Staff Planners.149
Other units of the Military Intelligence Division with specialized
intelligence collection functions included a prisoner interrogation
group.
The Captured Personnel and Material Branch was originally
known as the Prisoner of War Branch. It was not established
until 22 October 1942, although one of its functions,
the Interrogation Center, had been established a few months
.... oeneral Ser'vices Administration. National Arehives and Record Service. The
National Al'Chives. Federal Records of WorU War II: MiUta,." Agencies (Vol.
2). Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1951, p. 9.
110 IfJid., p. 4.
206
earlier. Thus, the origins of the branch go back almost to the
beginning?f th~ war. .
The OrlgInallmpetus for the estabhshment of the interrogation
centers came from the Navy. The Office of Naval Intelligence
had studied an interrogation center near London
during the period from 25 June to 17 December 1941. It found
that such a center, where selected prisoners were interrogated,
offered many advantages over a system of interrogation which
stopped with the initial questionings at the time of the capture.
The Navy and War Departments had agreed that the
Army would, be responsible for all captured personnel, and
that the Navy would turn them over to the Army as soon as
possible after capture. Upon completion of the study, the
Secretary of the Navy recommended the idea to the Secretary
of War. After study by the Military Intelligence Division,
the plan was agreed to. It was agreed that two interrogation
centers would be established: one in the East near Washington
and the other in California. On 15 May 1942, Fort Hunt,
Virginia, was selected as the east coast center, and construction
was completed by the end of July.ls0
Activated in April, 1942, the Fort Hunt Interrogation Center was
allotted 68 officers and 61 enlisted men; in September of the following
year, these personnel were reduced to 41 officers and 61 enlisted men.
The West Coast Center, opened at the end of December, 1942, was located
at Byron Hot Spring, but had a mailing address of Tracy, California,
thereby causing it to be geographically referred to by two
different names.
The interrogation centers, Fort Hunt and Tracy, were subject
to a dual command. They were under the control of the
Provost Marshal General, who designated the Commanding
Officers for the two camps. These officers were responsible for
procurement of equipment and overhead personnel upon requisition
from the Corps areas. Interrogation personnel were
supplied by the Military Intelligence Division and the Office
of Naval Intelligence and their activities, coordinated by the
senior interrogating officer. The camps were classified as Temporary
Detention Centers. Within the compound of the camps,
the areas known as the interrogation center was operated by,
and was the responsibility of, the Chief of the Military Intelligence
Service. This arrangement was not satisfactory. G-2
requested a unified control be established as more efficient and
conducive to improved morale. The request was disapproved
as contrary to existing regulations. The Adjutant General was
then asked to establish a new regulation similar to that governing
the harbor defenses. This was accomplished and on
14 April 1943 when the Post Commanders of Fort Hunt and
Byron Hot Springs were ordered reassigned [sic]. This
marked the end of the dual control system and the transfer of
these operations to the Chief, Military Intelligence Service.
110MID History, op. cU" pp. 99-100.
207
The senior interrogating officer was, thereafter, post commander.
151
The last of the intelligence collection units of MID was the Map
and Photograph Branch which began as the Geographic Section of
the Plans and Training Branch in 1941 before reorganization into a
separate branch in the spring of the next year. Subunits included a
Photo Section, Still Picture Section (enemy motion picture film, military
technical photography), Photographic Division (processing),
Terrain Photo Section, Military Technical Photo unit (indexing and
filing), and Motion Picture Unit. There was, of course, close liaison
with the Army Map Service and Army Pictorial Service. Materials
were also drawn from the Aeronautical Chart Service, Navy Hydrographic
Office, Coast and Geodetic Survey, U.S. Geological Survey,
Office of Strategic Services, and several commercial firms including
the National Geographic Society.152
Generally speaking, the Division followed a traditionally
geographic approach to the problem of intelligence production.
There were those who found that the functional divisions
of the McCloy Committee were sound. In certain specialized
subjects, as Order of Battle, Air, and Topographical
intelligence, a functional grouping was more desirable.
Shortly after the war, the Division again embraced the geographic
arrangement which would seem to settle the matter,
at least for the moment, but a post war opinion of wartime
operations states that the Division was not operating efficiently
until the end of 1944-by which time the geographical
arrangement had been abandoned.153
Whichever approach was operative in intelligence production, the
core element of the research sections was their filing systems. According
to the Basic Intelligence Directive, numbers and subjects served
to indicate the most probable subdivisions into which information
might be placed.
Intelligence was produced by other means than merely filing
incoming reports. Careful studies were made from minutiate
collected from the files of business concerns. Thus, a laborious
study of the organization and production techniques used in
the manufacture of an essential item might point out those
places where the disruption of a simple process would halt
production with only a modest expenditure of bombs. Thus,
manufacturing, processing, and transportation bottlenecks
were sought as targets. Captured orders were examined to discover
the formation of new types of outfits, for clues to future
plans. The who's who files were especially useful in turning
up new and special type organizations. All available information
on the enemy was studied because eventually it was
grist for the mill.15'
161 Ibid., pp.100-101.
1D See Ibid., pp. 108-113.
1158 Ibi4., pp. 123-124.
116 Ibid., pp. 1~126.
208
Under the geographic arrangement, the principal research units
were British Empire, Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe,
the Far East, and Latin America. This 1941 structure gave way
the following year to the Eur-African, Far Eastern, and American
Intelligence Service Groups, the Air Unit, and Special Branch, the
last named being the larest intelligence producing agency in MID at
the time.155 The 1944 reorganization saw the establishment of the Military,
Topographic, Political, Economic, Sociological, Scientific, and
Who's Who Branches. But this scenario, too, was due for alteration.
Under the terms of the reorganization of June, 1944, Political
and Economic intelligence was to be produced by two branches
devoted to these subjects and working on a world wide basis.
To this end they were separated and personnel and equipment
were brought in from the geographic branches and the Special
Branch. In November the Far Eastern Section of the Political
Branch was separated and transferred to the Economic
Branch, and the European functions of the Economic Branch
were transferred to the Political Branch. Each became, in
fact, a Political-Economic Branch, responsible for the production
of intelligence on these matters, according to a geographic
area. The old Political Branch being responsible for
Europe, Latin America, and North America; and the Economic
Branch being responsible for the Far East.156
The personalities of leaders and organized groups opposed to the
Allies' cause were of interest to the War Department and this
prompted the collection of intelligence material pertaining to such
individuals.
Originally, this information had been filed in the Record
Section by relatively unskilled clerks who composed and filed
the cross reference sheets. Later, this function was removed
from the Record Section, and in January, 1943, Counterintelligence
was removed from the Military Intelligence Division
and decentralized to the Service Commands under the
direction of the Army Service Forces. It was necessary, then,
to find a substitute whereby central files could be established
for the recording of biographical information needed in the
Military Intelligence Division. It should also be borne in
mind that the information which was secured by the Counterintelligence
Group had been concerned largely with subversive
personnel and, thus, left out a large segment of the
world's population who did not fall, automatically, into this
category. The Geographical Branches had maintained files
of persons of interest to them in their particular area, but
these files were, of course, decentralized and suffered from the
limitations of decentralization. Persons shifting from area
to area could not easily be followed then unless proper inquiries
were made between the geographic branches. In January,
1943, the Special Branch began a name file of persons or
persons of interest to it, and since it was not bound by geo-
IlllI Hid., p. 126.
,.. Ibid., p. 146.
209
graphical limitations, a nucleus of a central file was established
with trained personnel to operate it.157
In June, 1944, the Who's Who Branch became the recipient of
Name File of the Special Branch and received, as well, the relevant
personality files of the geographical branches.
An offshoot of the Geographic Section of the Plans and
Training Branch (later Map and Photo Branch) was the
Topographic Branch, which was formed in June, 1944, by
separating the Map Service, Photo Intelligence, and Interpretation
Reports Sections from the remainder to form the
Map and Photo Branch. That which remained became the
Terrain (previously the Geographic Research) Section, the
Cartographic Section, and the Transportation Section. As a
result, it became more of a research section. The intelligence
which it produced was provided not only to the vVar Department
General Staff, but also to such agencies as the Joint
Intelligence Committee, the Joint War Plans Committee and
the Joint Logistics Plan Committee. It produced intelligence
concerning terrain, vegetation, routes of movements and
drainage, but also supplied intelligence concerning landing
beaches, climate, and soil trafficability, which was generally
produced by other agencies. The Chief of the Branch represented
the Military Intelligence Division on the Joint Intelligence
Committee to obtain topographic intelligence. He also
represented the War Department General Staff on the United
States Board on Geographical Names. The terrain section
procured, selected, evaluated, and integrated information
concerning terrain and climate. It also prepared written reports
and manuscript maps which interpreted terrain and
climate intelligence.
The Transportation Section was a new function7 or a
specialization, which appeared after the reorganizatIOn. It
was designed to handle the demand for information and intelligence
concerning the classifications and locations of rail
networks and terminals, roads, trains, bridges, and tunnels,
and the depths, widths, and currents of navigable rivers. It
also prepared manuscript maps, as directed, of transportation
networks. By V-J Day, this objective was only partially
satisfied. The following sections of the Far East were completed:
Burma, China proper, Netherlands Indies, Indo
China, Malaya, and Thailand; with Formosa, Japan, Korea,
Manchuria, and the Philippines partially completed. The
Cartographic section produced maps and graphic material
required by the other sections to present topographic intelligence
in its final form.158
The Scientific Branch maintained liaison with Federal agencies in
an effort to keep abreast of the latest developments in American and
Allied war research and also sought to produce intelligence regarding
ll511bid., pp. 150-151; on counterintelligence activities in the field see John
Schwarzwalder.We·Oaught Spies. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946.
Ull'Iliid., pp. 156-157.
210
enemy progress in such diverse subjects as radar and related electronic
matters, rocketry, jet propulsion, atomic energy production,
and conventional weapons improvements. Its subunits consisted of a
Chemical and Biological Warfare Section, Electronics Section, New
Weapons Section, and subsequently a Physics Section.
The Sociological Branch was a new agency in the Military
Intelligence Service, but its work had been foreshadowed in
the activities of other Branches. Under the new functional
organization, most of these dispersed activities were combined
and enlarged, and coordinated effort provided. The Geographic
branches had done some of the work which the new
branch would perform; as well as the Propaganda Branch,
which had attempted some surveys of morale and propaganda,
which duplicated the later work of the branch. The
Geopolitical Branch had undertaken some population
studies during its brief existence and these were now taken
over by the Sociological Branch.
The main effort of the Branch was directed toward the discovery
of sociological trends of military importance. Population
and manpower data was studied for clues to vital statistics
as well as the migrations and occupational characteristics
of groups and types. Manpower and labor problems
were studied to discover the availability of manpower for
military and industrial service and the effect of legislation
and organizations on the availability of manpower. Both
civilian and military morale was studIed in enemy countries.
Social Groups and classes were studied to discover how their
deavages and tensions might be used to serve military ends.159
Organized in June, 1944, the Military Branch produced intelligence
on all aspects of foreign ground and air forces, with an emphasis
upon order of battle data but including, as well, weapons, fortifications,
air industry, and some translation activities assigned to the
unit. The functions of the branch were not new, but 'had appeared during
the war and had suffered ineffective execution due to dispersed
administration and treatment.
At the top of the pyramid of intelligence [production] personnel
were the Specialists. While the rest of the Division
was organized functionally [in 1944], the Specialists were
organized geographically. In theory, they drew upon the resources
of the other branches for the types of information
which they required. To the material received from the research
sections, they gave the final evaluation and approval
before it was disseminated, thus inheriting some of the functions
of the Evaluation Staff. By means ofthe G-2's Morninp;
Conference, they presented the latest information from all
corners of the world with their evaluation of its meaning and
importance. Thereafter, durinp; the day they sent him such
other reports as were required. They worked with the- Director
of Intelligence and assisted him'ingiving directives to
the Supervisor of Source Control to gather information,
UII 1bia., p. 161.
211
which they required, a.nd ga.ve direction and supervision to
the resea.rch sections for the sa.me purpose.160
This, then, generally describes the MID intelligence production
orga.niza.tion. But once intelligence information had been collected,
analyzed, and a product was produced, one general function remained
to be served-dissemination.
Throughout the war there were efforts to centralize the dissemination
of intelligence. Prior to 1944, the Dissemination
Unit had achieved the greatest degree of centralization so far
attained. At no time, -however, did it or the Reports Unit establish
complete control of a.11 phases of this activity. Indeed,
this would have been impossible. Dissemination included, not
only the preparation of printed periodical publications of intellIgence,
but also the means by which intelligence was presented
to the G-2, the Chief of Staff, and the various Staff
Division[s]. Intelligence was disseminated by periodic publications,
special reports, conferences, and so on; besides the
usual types of reports and memoranda, maps, photographs,
charts, and tables were used to present the material at hand.
The normal dissemination functions were the responsibility
of the Dissemination Unit in early 1944. Its antecedents
include the Dissemination Section of the Intelligence Branch,
which became the Dissemination Branch in April, 1942. Meanwhile,
the Situation Branch, created early in 1942, was performing
dissemination functions. In August, 1942, the
Evaluation and Dissemination Branch was created to include
the work of the Dissemination and Situation Branches in the
Dissemination Section, along with other sections devoted to
Communications, Theater Intelligence, and Order of Battle.
A Project and Review Board reviewed all completed projects
before they were sent out. In November, 1942, the designation
of these sections was changed to Dissemination Group under
Col. G. S. Smith. It included Cable Branch, Collection
Branch, Theater Intelligence Branch, and Publications
Branch. In April, 1943, after a number of minor changes, the
Dissemination Unit was created to be responsible for the format
and appearance of any publication produced in the Military
Intelligence Service. It also disseminated intelligence
approved by the Evaluation and Dissemination Staff. This
last group had been established as the final evaluation and review
authority for intelligence before it was disseminated to
the Army. It passed on periodical items, monographs, studies,
and similar reports.161
This was the pattern of reorganization and growth in the military
intelligence establishment duringWorId War II.
In 1941, G-2 was a small organization. Under the impact of
wartime expansion and development, it grew. In 1942 a new
factor entered the picture in the form of a separate- operat-
"'Ibid., p. 197,
fA I1ii4.; pp. 204-,.205.
212
ing agency, and during the next two years, an effort was made
to mold the organizatIOn into a single intelligence producing
and policy making agency. In the course of these efforts. the
Military Intelligence Service tended to lose its identity. In
1944, it re-emerged as an intelligence operating and producing
agency with definite functions and responsIbilities. At the
same time there was a struggle over the best method of
organizing to produce intelligence. Thus, evaluation was, for
a time, turned over to a Board which had as an additional
function policy making. In 1944, a new method was devised
by which intelligence was produced by supervised specialists
who were aided by the research groups. All of the policy
making activities were allocated to the Military Intelligence
Division. But one fact must be borne in mind. This.method
was more easily devised in 1944 than at any {'revious time because
by then the Military Intelligence DiVIsion had lost its
counterintelligence functions. Prior to that time, the structure
of the organization must include [sic] a provision for
counterintelligence. With the loss of this function, it was possible
to greatly simplify the organization and emphasize the
importance of teamwork in the new Military Intelligence
Division.'62
While there was a War Department reorganization effective June
11,1946, "the Intelligence Division (G-2) did much the same work as
always." 163 As with the other armed services, the next great revision
of military intelligence functions and organization would occur in
1947 with the establishment of the Department of Defense, the National
Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
Two other outstanding units within the military intelligence network
should be examined at this juncture: the Si,gnal Corps' cryptology
g-roup and the Allied Intelligence Bureau. The great importance
of the former of these entities derived, of course, from the successful
decipherment of the Japanese code.
A trickle of MAGIC in 1936 had become a stream in 1940.
Credit for this belongs largely to Major General Joseph O.
Mauborgne, who became Chief Signal Officer in October
1937.
Mauborgne had long been interested in cryptology. In
1914, as a young first lieutenant, he achieved the first recorded
solution of a cipher known as the Playfair, then used
by the British as their field cipher. He described his technique
in a 19-page pamphlet that was the first publication on cryptology
issued by the United States Government. In World
War I, he put together several cryptographic elements to
create the only theoretically unbreakable cipher, and promoted
the first automatic cipher machine, with which the
unbreakable cipher was associated.
,.. Ibid., pp. 59-60. .
1113 Ray S. Cline. U.S. Army in World War II. The War Dep<I;r~ment: Washift{1to,.
Command Post: The OperatiQ1lS Division. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print; Ott.,
1951, p. 359.
213
When he became head of the Signal Corps, he immediately
set about augmenting the important cryptanalytic activities.
He established the S.I.S. [Signal Intelligence 'Service] as an
indep~ndent division reportin~ directly to him, enlarged its
functIons, set up branches, started correspondence courses,
added intercept facilities, increased its budget, and put on
more men. In 1939, when war broke out in Europe, S.I.S.
was the first agency in the War Department to receive more
funds, personnel, and space. Perhaps most important of all,
Mauborgne's intense interest inspired his men to outstanding
accomplishments. More and more codes were broken, and
as the international situation stimulated an increasing flow
of intercepts, the MAGIC intelligence approached flood
stage.16•
When Mauborgne retired in September, 1941, being succeeded by
Major General Dawson Olmstead, the cryptanalytic capability he had
nurtured was commendable but, of course, in need of expansion and
further refinement when war engulfed the nation two months later.
It multiplied its communications-intelligence manpower
thirtyfold from its strength December 7, 1941, of 331--44
officers and 137 enlisted men and civilians in Washington and
150 officers and men in the field. Ever-growing requirements
quickly dwarfed early estimates, such as the early one in 1942
that a staff of 460 would suffice, and kept up a relentless pressure
for more and still more workers. Yet the agency faced
stiff competition for them in manpower-short Washington.
Moreover, the necessity for employees to be of unquestionable
loyalty and trustworthiness, because of the sensitive nature
of cryptanalytic results, and the importance of their
being temperamentally suited to the highly specialized nature
of the work, .greatly reduced the number of prospects.
To fill its needs, the agency launched a series of vigorous but
discreet recruiting drives. It snatched people out of its school
even though they were only partially trained: during the
school's entire time at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, not one
student completed the full 48-week course. It brought in
members of the Women's Army Corps-almost 1,500 of them.
These measures enabled the agency to grow to a strength of
10,609 at its peak on June 1, 1945-5,565 civilians, 4,428 enlisted
men and W.A.C.'s and 796 officers. (This figure excludes
cryptologic personnel serving under theater commanders
overseas. ) Nevertheless,.the personnel supply never
caught up to the demand. In April, 1944, for example, the
agency had more than 1,000 civilian positions empty.165
Personnel growth, new functions, and the pressures of war also
dictated new structure of the cryptological unit.
In June of 1942, owing to a reorganization in the Offi.ce of
the Chief Signal Officer, the outfit shedits old name of SIgnal
'"'l)aVjd Kahn. The Oodebrea'kers. New York, New American Library, 1M3 ;
ortglnaUy publlsb,ed<W67, p. 7.
. -:I1M.; p.316.
214
Intelligence Service and gained and lost three new ones within
two months. Then from July, 1942, to July, 1943, it was
called the Signal Security Service, and from July, 1943, to
the end of the war, the Signal Security Agency. Lieutenant
Colonel Rex Minckler, chief since before Peari Harbor, was
replaced in April, 1942, by Lieutenant Colonel Frank W.
Bullock. In February, 1943, Lieutenant Colonel W. Preston
(Red) Corderman, tall, husky, quiet, pleasant, who had
studied and then taught in the s.r.s. school in the 1930s, became
chief. He remained in the post to the end of the war,
rising to a brigadier general in .June, 1945.
Its population explosion and its voluminous output strained
its administrative structure, and this was realigned several
times. As of Pearl Harbor it was divided into four sections:
the A, or administrative; the B, or cryptanalytic; the C, or
cryptographic, and the D, or laboratory.166
While the B section broke ciphers and decoded messages, the C section
devised new codes, ciphers, and related materials for the American
military forces. In August of 1942 an E or Communications
section was created by upgrading the "traffic" subsection of the cryptanalytic
unit. In March, 1943, the six sections were elevated to branch
status and by the following year a Machine Branch (mechanized coding/
decoding operations) and an Information and Liaison Branch
were added.161
In June of 1942, the Navy ceded all supervision and responsibility
for Japanese diplomatic code solutions to the Army, surrendering
both files and machinery at this time.168 In addition to its central
coding/decoding operations in Washington, the Signal Intelligence
Service established cryptanalytic units in various theaters of the war,
received tactical, combat-level communications intelligence via the Signal
Corps radio intelligence companies in the field, and maintained
an active radio intercept program through the 2nd Signal Service
Battalion (later the 9420th Technical Service Unit).
Though this set-up held until the war ended, operational
control of the agency passed on December 15, 1944, to G-2,
the military intelligence section of the War Department General
Staff, which was the agency's major customer and which,
as such, for many months had indirectly guided its activities.
The Signal Corps merely retained administrative control.
This confusing arrangement--complicated further by the
agency's having both staff and command functions-ended
in August, 1945, when the War Department transferred all
signal intelligence units to agency control. On September 6,
four days after the war ended, the War Department ordered
the creation within G-2 of a new cryptologic organization by
merging the Signal Security Agency, the field cryptanalytic
units, and Signal Corps cryptology. This was the Army
'08 Ibid., p. 317.
187 Ibid., p. 318.
1e8 Ibid., p. 315.
215

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