CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

The facts with respect to Cuba are divided into three broad sections.
The first describes the plots against Fidel Castro's life without addressing
the question of authorization.

The second deals with whether or not the successive Directors of
Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles and John McCone, authorized or
knew about the various plots. (Although we have separated the evidence
relating to the DCI's from that relating to other high administration
officials, it is important to remember that the Director of
Central Intelligence is the principal advisor to the President on
intelligence matters and a member of major administrative policymaking
councils,as well as hell.d of the Central Intelligence Agency.)

The third section covers the evidence concerning whether or not
other high officials-including the various Presidents-authorized or
knew about the plots. This section also considers the evidence relating
to whether or not the CIA officials involved believed the plots to be consistent
with the general policy objectives of the various administrations
even if those officials had no personal knowledge as to whether
the plots were or were not specifically authorized by higher authority.

1. THE ASSASSINATION PLOTS

We have found concrete evidence of at least eight plots involving
the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965.[1] Although some
of the assassination plots did not advance beyond the stage of planning
and preparation, one plot, involving the use of underworld figures, reportedly
twice progressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba
and dispatching teams to commit the deed. Another plot involved furnishing
weapons and other assassination devices to a Cuban dissident.
The proposed assassination devices ran the gamut from high-powered
rifles to poison pills, poison pens, deadly bacterial powders, and
other devices which strain the imagination.

The most ironic of these plots took place on November 22, 19G3-the
nrv day that President Kennedy was shot in Dallas-when a CIA
official offered a poison pen to a Cuban Tor use against Castro while
at the same time an emissary from President Kennedy wa£ meeting
with Castro to explore the possibility of improved relations.

The following narrative sets forth the facts of assassination plots
against Castro as established before the Committee by witnesses and
documentary evidence. The question of the level and degree of authorization
of the plots is considered in the sections that follow.

(a) Plots: Early 1960

(i) Plots to Destroy Castro's Public Image

Efforts against Castro did not begin with assassination attempts.

From ~1irch through August 1960, during the last year of the
Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered plans to undermine
Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches. According
to the 1967 Report of the CIA's Inspector General, an official in the
Technical Services Division (TSD) recalled discussing a scheme to
spray Castro's broadcasting studio with a chemical which produced
effects similar to LSD, but the scheme was rejected because the chemical
was unreliable. During this period, TSD impregnated a box of
cigars witil a chemical which produced temporary disorientation,
hoping to induce Castro to smoke one of the cigars before delivering a
speech. The Inspector General also reported a plan to destroy Castro's
image as "The Beard" by dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong
depilatory that would cause his beard to fall out. The depilatory was to
be administered during a trip outside Cuba, when it was anticipated
Castro would leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room to be
shined. TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals, but
apparently abandoned the scheme because Castro cancelled his trip.
(I.G. Report, pp. 10-13)

(ii) Accident Plot

The first action against the life of a Cuban leader sponsored by the
CIA of which the Committee is aware took place in 1960. A Cuban who
had volunteered to assist the CIA in gathering intelligence informed
his case officer in Havana that he would probably be in contact with
RanI Castro. (:Memo to Inspector General, 1/17/75) CIA Headquarters
and field stations were requested to inform the Havana Station of
any intelligence needs that the Cuban might fulfill. The caSe officer
testified that he and the Cuban contemplated only acquiring intelligence
information and that assassination was not proposed by them. [2]

The cable from the Havana Station was received at Headquarters
on the night of .Tuly 20. The duty officer, who was summoned to Headquarters
from his home, contacted Traey Barnes, Deputy to Richard
Bissell, CIA's Deputy Director for Plans and the man in charge of
CIA's covert action directorate. The duty officer also contacted J. C.
King, Ohief of the Western Hemisphere Division within the Directorate
for Plans. [3]

Following their instructions, he sent a cable to the Havana Station
early in the morning of July 21, stating: "Possible remoV'a1 top three
leaders is receiving serious consideration at HQS." The cable inquired
whether the Cuban was sufficiently motivated to risk "arranging
an accident" involving Raul Castro and ,advised that the stJation could
"at discretion contact subject to determine willingness to cooperate
and his suggestions on details". Ten thousand dollars was authorized
as payment "after successful completion," but no advance payment
was permitted because of the possibility that the Cuban was a double
agent. According to the case officer, this cable represented "quite a
departure from the conventional activities we'd been a.-;ked to handle."
(Casp Officer interview, 8/4/75, p. 2) [4]

The case officer contacted the Cuban and told him of the proposal.
The case officer avoided the word "assassinate" but made it clear that
the CIA contemplated an "accident to neutralize this leader's [Raul's]
influence." (Case Officer interview. 8/4/75, p. 2) After being assured
that his sons would be given a college education in the event of his
death, the Cuban agreed to take a "calculated risk," limited to possibilities
that might pass as accidenta1. (Cable, Havana to Director,
7/22/60)

Immediately after returning to the station the case officer was told
that a cable had just arrived stating: "Do not pursue ref. Would
like to drop matter." (Cable, Director to Havana, '[/22/60; Memo
to 1. G., 1/17/75) This cable was signed by Tracy Barnes.

It was, of course, too late to "drop the matter" SInce the Cuban
had already left to contact Raul Castro. When the Cuban returned, he
told the case officer that he had not had an opportunity to arrange an
accident.

(iii) Poison Cigars

A notation in the records of the Operations Division, CIA's Office
of Medical Services, indicates that on August 16, 1960, an official was
given a box of Castro's favorite cigars with instructions to treat them
with lethal poison. (I. G. Report, p. 21) The cigars were contaminated
with a botulinum toxin so potent that a person would die after putting
one in his mouth. (1. G. Report, p. 22) The official reported that the
cigars were ready on October 7, 1960; TSD notes indicate that they
were delivered to an unidentified person on February 13, 1961. (1. G.
Report, p. 22) The record does not disclose whether an attempt was
made to pass the cigars to Castro.

(b) Use of Underworld Figures-Phase I (Pre-Bay of Pigs)

(i) The Initial Plan

In August 1960, the CIA took steps to enlist members of the criminal
nnden,orld with gambling syndicate contacts to aid in assassinating
Castro. The origin of the plot is uncertain. According to the 1967
Inspector General's Report,

Bissell recalls that the idea originated with cr. C. King, then Chief of W. H.
Division, although King now recalls having only had limited knowledge of such
a plan and (It a much later date-about mid-lW2. (1. G. Report, p. 14)

Bissell testified that:

I remember a conversation which I would have put in early autumn or late
summer between myself and Colonel Edwards [Director of the Office of Security),
and I have some dim recollection of some earlier conversation I had had with
Colonel J. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, and the subject
matter of both of those conversations was a capability to eliminate Castro if
such action should be decided upon. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 19)

The earliest concrete evidence of the operation is a conversation
between DDP Bissell and Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of the
Office of Security. [5] Edwards recalled that Bissell asked him to locate
someone who could assassinate Oastro. (Edwards, 5/30/75, pp.
2-3) Bissell confirmed that he requested Edwards to find someone
to assassinate Castro and believed that Edwards mised the idea of contacting
members of a gambling syndicate operating in Cuba. [6] (Bissell,
6/9/75, pp. 71-73)

Edwards assigned the mission to the Chief of the Operational Support
Division of the Office or Security. The Support Chief recalled
that Edwards had said that he and Bissell were looking for someone
to "eliminate" or "assassinate" Castro. (Operational Support Chief,
hereinafter "O.C.", 5/30/75, pp. 6-8,95-96) [7]

Edwards and the Support Chief decided to rely on Robert A. Maheu
to recruit someone "tough enough" to handle the job. (O.C., 5/30/75, p.
8) Maheu was an ex-FBI agent who had entered into a career as a
private investigator in 1954. A former FBI associate of Maheu's was
employed in the CIA's Office of Security and,had 'arranged for the
CIA to use Maheu in several sensitive covert operations in which "he
didn't want to have an Agency person Or a p:overnment person get
caught." [8] (O.C., 5/30/75, p. 158)Maheu was initially paid a monthly
retainer by the CIA of $500, but it was terminated after his detective
agency became more lucrative. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 13-14; I.G. Report,
p. 15) The Operational Support Chief had served as Maheu's case
officer since the Agency first began using Maheu's services, and by
1960 they had become close personal friends. (Maheu, 7/30/75, p. 6)

Sometime in late August or early September 1960, the Support
Chief approached Maheu about the proposed operation. (O.C. 5/30/
75, p. 9; Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 6) As Maheu recalls the conversation, the
Support Chief asked him to contact John Rosselli, an underworld figure
with possible gambling contacts in Las Vegas, to determine if he
would participate in a plan to "dispose" of Castro. [9] (Maheu, 7/29/75,
p. 8) The Support Chief testified, on the other hand, that it was
Maheu who raised the idea of using Rosselli. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 15-16)

Maheu had known Rosselli since the late 1950's. (Maheu, 7/29/75,
pp. 58-60) Although Maheu claims not to have been aware of the
extent of Rosselli's underworld connections and activities, he recalled
that "it was certainly evident to me that he was able to accomplish
things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemed to get the same kind of
attention." (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 60)

The Support Chief had previously met Rosselli at Maheu's home.
(Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 8) The Support Chief and Maheu each claimed
that the other had raised the idea of using Rosselli, and Maheu said
the Chief was aware that Rosselli had contacts with the gambling
syndicate. (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 8; O.C., 5/30/75, pp.15-16)

At first Maheu was reluctant to become involved in the operation
because it might interfere with his relationship with his new client,
Howard Hughes. [10] He finally agreed to participate because he felt that
he owed the Agency a committment. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 12--13, 103)
The Inspector General's Report states that:

Edwards and Maheu agreed that Maheu would approach Rosselli as the representative
of businessmen with interests in Cuba who saw the elimination of
Castro as the first essential step to the recovery of their investments. (I.G.
Report, p. 16)

The Support Chief also recalled that Maheu was to use this cover
story when he presented the plan to Rosselli. (O.C., 5/30/75, p. 16)
but Rosselli said that the story was developed after he had been contacted,
and was used as a mutual "cover" by him, the Chief, and Maheu
in dealing with Cubans who were subsequently recruited for the
project. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, pp.16-17) The Support Chief testified that
Maheu was told to offer money, probably $150,000, for Castro's assassination.
[11] (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 16,111; Memo, Osborn to DCI, 6/24/66)

(ii) Contact With the Syndicate

According to Rosselli, he and Maheu met at the Brown Derby
Restaurant in Beverly Hills in early September 1960. Rosselli testi-
fied that Maheu told him that "high government officials" needed his
cooperation in getting rid of Castro, and that he asked him to help
recruit Cubans to do the job. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 8) Maheu's recollection
of that meeting was that "I informed hIm that I had been
asked by my Government to solicit his cooperation in this particular
venture." (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 9)

Maheu stated that Rosselli "was very hesitant about participating
in the project, and he finally said that he felt that he had an obligtttion
to his government, and he finally agreed to participate." (Maheu,
7/29/75, p. 10) Maheu and Rosselli both testified that Rosselli insistea
Qn meeting with a representative of the Government. (Maheu,
7/29/75, p. 9; Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 9)

A meeting was arranged for Maheu and Rosselli with the Support
Chief at the Plaza Hotel in New York. The Inspector General's
Report placed the meeting on September 14,1960. (LG. Report, p. 16)
Rosselli testified that he could not recall the precise date of the meeting,
but that it had occurred during Castro's visit to the United
Nations, which the New York Times Index places from September 18
through September 28, 1960. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 10)

The Support Chief testified that he was introduced to Rosselli as a
business associate of Maheu. He said that Maheu told Rosselli that
Maheu represented international business interests which were pooling
money to pay for the assassination of Castro. (O.C., 5/30/75, p. 26)
Rosselli claimed that Maheu told him at that time that the Support
Chief was with the CIA [12] (Rosselli, 6/24/75, pp. 11. 85)

It 'was arranged that Rosselli would go to Florida and recruit Cubans
for the operation. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, pp. 11-12) Edwards informed
Bissell that contact had been made with the gambling syndicate.
(Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 20-21; I.G. Report, p.17)

During the week of September 24, 1960 the Support Chief, Maheu,
and Rosselli met in Miami to work out the details of the operation.
(O.C. 5/30/75, pp. 25-26; Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 12; LG. Report, p. 18)
Rosselli used the cover name "John Rawlston" and represented himself
to the Cuban contacts as fin agent of "* * * some business
interests of Wall Street that had * * * nickel interests and properties
around in Cuba, and I was getting financial assistance from them."
(Rosselli, 6/24/75, pp. 9, 17)

Maheu handled the details of setting up the operation and keeping
the Support Chief informed of developments. After Rosselli and
Maheu had been in Miami for a short time, and certainly prior to
October 18. [13] Rosselli introduced Maheu to two individuals on whom
Rosselli intended to rely: "Sam Gold," who would serve as a "back-up
man" (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 15), or "key" man (Maheu, 7/29/75,
p. 17), and "Joe," whom "Gold" said would serve as a courier to Cuba
and make arrangements there. (I.G., Report p. 19) The Support
Chief, who was using the name "Jim OIds," said he had met "Sam"
and "Joe" once, and then only briefly. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 26-29)

The Support Chief testified that he learned the true identities of
his associates one morning when Maheu called and asked him to
examine the "Parade" supplement to the MiaJrni Times. [14] An article on
the Attorney General's ten-most-wanted criminals list revealed that
"Sam Gold" was Momo Salvatore Giancana, a Chicago-based gangster, [15]
2 and "Joe" was Santos Trafficante, the Cosa Nostra chieftam
in Cuba. [16] (I.G., Report, p. 19) The Support Chief reported his discovery
to Edwards, (O.C. 5/30/75, pp. 31, 33) but did not know
whether Edwards reported this fact to his superiors. (O.C., 5/30/75,
pp. 32, 41) The Support Chief testified that this incident occurred
after "we were up to our ears in it," a month or so after Giancana had
been brought into the operation, but prior to giving the poison pills to
Rosselli. (O.C. 5/30/75, pp. 30,44)

Maheu recalled that it was Giancana's job to locate someone in
Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination. (Maheu,
7/29/75, p. 19) and that he met almost daily with Giancana over
a substantial period of time. (Maheu, 7/29/75, p.18) Although Maheu
described Giancana as playing a "key role," (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 34)
Rosselli claimed that none of the Cubans eventually used in the operation
were acquired through Giancana's contacts. (Rosselli, 6/24/75,
p.15)

(iii) Las Vegas Wiretap

In late October 1960, Maheu arranged for a Florida investigator,
Edward DuBois, to place an electronic "bug" in a room in Las Vegas.
(Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 36) [17] DuBois' employee, Arthur J. BaIletti, flew
to Las Vegas and installed a tap on the phone. (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 38)
The Support Chief characterized the ensuing events as a "Keystone
Comedy act." (O.C., 5/30/75, p. 68). On October 31,1960, BaIletti, believing
that the apartment would be vacant for the afternoon, left the
wiretap equipment unattended. A maid discovered the equipment and
notified the local sheriff, who arrested BaIletti and brought him to
the jail. BaIletti called Maheu in Miami, tying "Maheu into this thing
up to his ear." (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 36-37) BaIletti's bail was paid by
Rosselli. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 52) .

(1) CIA Involvement In The Wiretap. -- The Committee received
conflicting evidence on whether the Agency was consulted prior to
the installation of the tap. [18] The Support Chief testified that he had
called Edwards and cleared the placement of an electronic "bug" in
the apartment prior to the installation of the tap. (a.c., 5/30/75, pp.
Gr-71) ~faheu recalled that he had initially asked the Support Chief
if the CIA would handle the job, and that the Chief had told him
that:

He would call ~lr. Edwards and see if they would have the capability of
accomplishing this * * * and that subsequently he informed me that ~lr. Edwards
had said that they would not do it. but approved paying for it if we hired
an independent private detective to put it on, (~laheu, 7/29/75, p. 37)

On the other hand, Edwards, in a May 14, 1962 memorandum for
the Attorney General (discussed at length, infra, p. 131), stated that
"At the time of the incident neither the Agency nor the undersigned
knew of t11e proposed technical installation.' [19]

The Inspector General's Report accepted Edwards' assertion that
"the Agency was first unwitting and then a reluctant accessory after
the fact," but offered no further evidence to support that contention.
(I.G. Report, p. 67)

The Committee also received conflicting evidence concerning
whether the tap had been placed to keep Giancana in Miami or to
check on security leaks. The Support Chief testified that during the
early stages of negotiations with the gambling syndicate, Maheu informed
him that a girl friend of Giancana was having an affair with
the target of the tap. Giancana wanted Maheu to bug that person's
room; otherwise, Giancana threatened to fly to Las Vegas himself.
Maheu was concerned that Giancana's departure would disrupt the
negotiations, and secured the Chief's permission to arrange for a bug to
insure Giancana's presence and cooperation. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 6869)
Maheu substantially confirmed this account. (Maheu, 7/29/75,
pp.25-30) [20]

There is some evidence, however, suggesting that the CIA itself
may have instituted the tap to determine whether Giancana was leaking
information about his involvement in an assassination attempt
against Castro. [20] An October 18, 1960 memorandum from ,T. Edgar
Hoover to Bissell, stated that "a source whose reliability has not been
tested" reported:

[D]uring recent conversations with several friends, Giancana stated that
Fidel Castro was to be done away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed
regarding this statement, Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's
assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that
he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions. * * * Giancana
claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that
the "assassin" had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a "pill" in
some drink or food of Castro's. (Memo, Hoover to DCI (Att: DDP), 10/18/60)

Rosselli testified that Maheu had given him two explanations for
the tap on different occasions: First, that Giancana was concerned
that his girl friend was having an affair; and, second, that he had
arranged the tap to determine whether Giancana had told his girl
friend about the assassination plot, and whether she was spreading the
story. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, pp. 47-48) Maheu gave the second explanation
to the FBI when he was questioned about his involvement in the
tap (Summary File by FBI), and Edwards wrote in the memorandum
to the Attorney General:

Maheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that [Giancana's girl friend] might
know of the proposed operation and might pass on the information to * * * a
friend of [Giancana's girl friend]. (Memo Edwards to Attorney General, 5/14/62)

(2) Consequences Of The Wiretap. -- Edwards told Maheu that if he
was "'approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefed
that he was engaged in an intelligence operation directed at Cuba".
C~femo, Edwards to Attorney General, 5/14/62) FBI records indicate
that on April 18, 1961, Maheu informed the FBI that the tap involved
the CIA, and suggested that Edwards be contacted. (Memo 4/20/61)
Edwards subsequently informed the Bureau that the CIA would
object to Maheu's prosecution because it might reveal sensitive information
relating to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion. [21]

In a memo dated April 24, 1962, Herbert J. Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, advised the Attorney General that
the "national interest" would preclude any prosecutions based upon
the tap. Following a briefing of the Attorney General by the CIA, a
decision was made not to prosecute. [22]

(iv) Poison 18 Prepared And Delivered to Cuba

The Inspector General's Report described conversations among Bissell,
Edwards, and the Chief of the Technical Services Division
(TSD) concernino- the most effective method of poisoning Castro.
(LG. Report, pp. 23-33) There is so~e eviden?e tha~ G.ianc,ana ~r
Hosselli orio-inated the idea of deposltmg a pOlson pIll m Castro s
urink to giv~ the "asset" a chance to escape. (l.G. Report, p. 25) The
Support Chief re~alle.d Rosselli.'s request for something ."n~?e an?
dean without o-ettlllg llltO any kllld of out and out ambushlllg , prefprably
a poiso; that would disappear with~)lit a trac~. (O.C. 5(~0/75,
p. 116) The Inspector General's Repo~t cIted the Support el11ef. as
stating that the Agency had first consIdered a "g:angland-style kIlling"
in which Castro w0l!ld be gunne~ down. Glanc~na reportedly
opposed the idea because It would be (lIffic~lt to recrUIt someon~ for
such a dangerous operation, and suggested mstead the use of pOlson.
(LG. Report, p. 25)

Edwards rejected the first batch of pills prepared by T~I? because
they would not dissolve in water. A second batch, contalllmg botulinum
toxin, "did the job expected of them" when tested on monkeys.
(LG. Report, pp. 25-26; O.C. 5/30/75, p. 43) The SupP?rt Chief
received the pills from TSD, probably in February 1961, WIth assurances
that they were lethal, [23] and then gave them to Rosselli. (O.C.,
5/30/75,p.43)

The record clear~y establishes. that t~e pills were given. to ~ Cu~an
for delivery to the Island some tIme pnor to the Bay of PIgS lllvaSlOn
in mid-April 1961. There are discrepancies in the record, however, concerning
whether one or two attempts were made during that period,
and the precise date on which the passage[s] occurred. The Inspector
General's Report states that in late February or March 1961, Rosselli
reported to the Support Chief that the pills had been delivered to an
official close to Castro who may have received kickbacks from the
gambling interests. (LG. Report, p. 23) The Report states that the
official returned the pills after a few weeks, perhaps because he had
lost his position in the Cuban Government, and thus access to Castro,
before he received the pills. (I.G. Report, p. 28) The Report concludes
that yet another attempt was made in April 1961, with the aid of a
leading figure in the Cuban exile movement.

RossellI and the Support Chief testified that the Cuban official described
by the Inspector General as having made the first attempt was
indeed involved in the assassination plot, and they ascribed his failure
to a case of "cold feet." (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 24; O.C. 5/30/75, p.
44) Rosselli was certain, however, that only one attempt to assassinate
Castro had been made prior to the Bay of Pigs, (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p.
26) and the Support Chief and Mahen did not clarifv the matter. It
is possible then, that only one pre-Bay of Pigs attempt was made. and
that the Cuban exile leader was the contact in the United States who
arranged for the Cuban described in the Inspector General's Report
to administer the poison.

In any eve~t, Ros~elli told the Support Chief that Trafficante beheved
a certam leadll1g figure in the Cuban exile movement might be
able to accomplish the assassination. (LG. Report, p. 29) [24] The Inspec-
tor General's Report suggests that this Cuban may have been receiving
funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in securing
"gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies" in Cuba after the overthrow
of Castro. The Report speculated that the Cuban was interested
in the assassination scheme as a means of financing the purchase of
arms and communications equipment. (I.G. Report, p. 31)

The Cuban claimed to have a contact inside a restaurant frequented
by Castro. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 21) As a prerequisite to the deal, he
demanded cash and $1.000 worth of communications equipment. (I.G.
Report, pp. 31,32; O.C., 5/30/75, p. 23) The Support Chief recalled
that Colonel J. C. King, head of the Western Hemisphere Division,
gave him $50,000 in Bissell's office to pay the Cuban if he successfully
assassinated Castro. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 17-21) The Support Chief
stated that Bissell also authorized him to give the Cuban the requested
electronics equipment. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 20-24)

Bissell testified that he did not doubt that some cash was given to
the Support Chief, and that he was aware that the poison pills had
been prepared. Bissell did not recall the meeting described above,
and considered it unlikely that the Support Chief would have been
given the money in his office. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 40) The Inspector
General's Report, relying on an Office of Security memorandum to the
DDCI dated .Tune 24,1966, as well as on an interview with the person
who signed the voucher for the funds, placed the amount passed at
$10,000. (I.G. Report, pp. 31-32) If the Inspector General's conclusions
were correct, the funds which Bissell allegedly authorized were
probably the advance payment to the Cuban, and not the $150,000 that
was to be paid to him after Castro's death.

The record does clearly reflect, however, that communications equipment
was delivered to the Cuban [25] and that he was paid advance money
to cover his expenses, probably in the amount of $10,000. (LG. Report,
p. 32) The money and pills were delivered at a meeting between
Maheu, Rosselli, Trafficante, and the Cuban at the Fountainebleau
Hotel in Miami. As Rosselli recalled, Maheu:

* * * opened his briefcase and dumped a whole lot of money on his lap * * *
and also came up with the capsules and he explained how they were going to be
used. As far as I remember, they couldn't be used in boiling soups and things like
that, but they could be used in water or otherwise, but they couldn't last forever.
* * * It had to be done as quickly as possible. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 21) [26]

A different version of the delivery of the pills to the Cuban was
given to the Committee by Joseph Shimon, a friend of Rosselli and
Giancana who testified that he was present when the passage occurred.
Shimon testified that he had accompanied Maheu to Miami to see the
third Patterson-.Tohansson World Heavyweight Championship fight,
which took place on March 12, 1961. (Shimon, 9/20/75,pp. 6-8)
According to Shimon, he, Giancana, Rosselli, and Maheu shared a
suite in the Fountainebleau Hotel. During a conversation, Maheu
stated that he had a "contraet" to assassinate Castro, and had been
provided with a "liquid" by the CIA to accomplish the task. (Shimon,
9/20/75, p. 9) [27] Shimon testified that Maheu had said the liquid was to
be put in Castro's food. that Castro would become ill and die after two
or three days, and that an autopsy would not reveal what had killed
him. (Shimon, 9/:!O/75, pp. 9-10)

Shimon testified that the Cuban was contacted outside the Boom
Boom Room of the Fountainebleau Hotel. Shimon said that Rosselli
I. eft with the Cuban, and that Maheu said, ".Johnny's going to handle
everything, this is Johnny's contract." (Shimon, 9/20/75, p. 11)
Shimon testified that Giancana subsequently told him "I am not in it,
and they are asking- me for the names of some guys who used to work
in casinos. * * * Maheu's conning the hell out of the CIA." (Shimon.
9/20/75,p.12)

Shimon testified that a few days later, he received a ph?ne call
from Maheu, who said: "* * * did you see the paper? Castro's Ill. He's
going to be sick two or three days. Wow, we got him." (Shimon,
9/20/75. p. 12) [28]

Rosselli testified that he did not recall Shimon's having been present
when the pills were delivered to the Cuban. (Rosselli. 9/22/75. p. 5)
Maheu recalled having seen the fight with Rosselli and Giancana, but
did not recall whether Shimon had been present, and denied that the
poison had been delivered in the lobby of the Fountainebleau. (Maheu
9/23/75,pp.14-15)

The attempt met with failure. According to the Inspector General's
Report, Edwards believed the scheme failed because Castro stopped
visiting the restaurant where the "asset" was employed. Maheu suggested
an alternative reason. He recalled being informed that after the
pills had been delivered to Cuba, "the go signal still had to be received
before in faet they were administered." (Maheu, 9/23/75, p. 42)
He testified that he was informed by the Support Chief sometime after
the operation that the Cubans had an opportunity to administer the
pills to Fidel Castro and either Che Guevarra or Raul Castro, but that
the "go signal" never came. (Maheu 7/29175, pp. 43--44, 60-61) Maheu
did not know who was responsible for giving the signaL (Maheu, 9/23/
75, pp. 44-45) The Cuban subsequently returned the cash and the pills.
(O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 19-20; Memo, Osborn to DCI. 6/24/66)

The date of the Cuban operation is unclear. The Inspector General's
Report places it in March-April 1961, prior to the Bay of Pigs. (I.G.
Report, p. 29) Shimon's testimony puts it around March 12. 1961.
Bissell testified that the effort against Castro was called off after the
Bay of Pigs, (Bissell. 6/11/'i5, p. 52) and Maheu testified that he had
no involvement in the operation after the Bay of Pigs. (Maheu.
9/23/75, p. 50) The Support Chief however, was certain that it occured
during early 1962. (O.C.. 5/30175, pp. 47-48)

(c) Use of Underworld Figures: Phase IIl (Post Bay of Pigs)

(i) Change in Leadership

The Inspector General's Report divides the gambling syndicate
operation into Phase I, terminating with the Bay of Pigs, and Phase
II, continuing with the transfer of the operation to William Harvey
in late 1961. [29] The distinction between a clearly demarcated Phase I and
Phase II may be an artificial one, as there is eonsiderable evidence that
the operation ,vas continuous, perhaps lying dormant for the period
immediately following the Bay of Pigs. [30]

In early 1961, Harvey was assigned the responsibility for establishing
a general capability within the CIA for disabling foreign leaders,
including assassination as a "last resort." (BisselL 6/9/75, p. 73;
Harvey,' 6/25/75, pp. 34-35) The capability was called Executive
Action and was later included under the cryptonym ZR/RIFLK Executive
Action and the evidence relating to its connection to the
"VVhite House" and to whether or not it involved action as well as
"capability" is discussed extensively infra in Section (III) (c), p. 18l.

Harvev's notes reflect that Bissell asked him to take over the
gambling. syndicate operation from Edwards and that they discussed
the "application of ZR/RIFLE program to Cuba" on November 16,
1961. (I.G. Report, p. 39) Bissell confirmed that the conversation took
place and accepted the November date as accurate. (Bissell, 7/17/75,
pp. 12-13) He also testified that the operation "was not reactivated,
in other words, no instructions went out to Rosselli or to others * * *
to renew the attempt, until after I had left the Agency in February
1962." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 52-53.) Harvey agreed that his conversation
with Bissell was limited to exploring the feasibility of using the
gambling syndicate against Castro. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 60)

Richard Helms replaced Bissell as DDP in February 1962. As such,
he was Harvey's superior. The degree to which Helms knew about and
participated in the assassination plot is discussed in the section of this
Report dealing with the level to which the plots were authorized
within the Agency.

(ii) The Operation 18 Reactivated

In early April 1962, Harvey, who testified that he was acting on
"explicit orders" from Helms, (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 18), requested
Edwards to put him in touch with Rosselli. (Edwards memo,
5/14/62) The Support Chief first introduced Harvey to Rosselli in
Miami, where Harvey told Rosselli to maintain his Cuban contacts,
but not to deal with Maheu or Giancana, (G.C.. 5/30/75, p. 50; Rosselli.
6/24/75, pp. 27-30) whom he had decided were "untrustworthy"
and "surplus." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65) The Support Chief recalled
that initially Rosselli did not trust Harvey although they subsequently
developed a close friendship. (G.C.* 5/30/75, p. 52)

Harvey, the Support Chief and Rosselli met for a second time in
New York on April 8-9, 1962. (I.G. Report, p. 43) A notation made
during this time in the files of the Technical Services Division indicates
that four poison pills were given to the Support Chief on April 18,
1962. (LG. Report, pp. 46-47) The pills were passed to Harvey. who
arrived in Miami on April 21, and found Rosselli already in touch
with the same Cuban who had been involved in the pre-Bay of Pigs
pill passage. (LG. Report, p. 47) He gave the pills to Rosselli, explaining
that "these would 'York anywhere and at any time with anything."
(Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 31) Rosselli testified that he told Harvey
that the Cubans intended to use the pills to assassinate Che Guevara as
well as Fidel and Raul Castro. According to Rosselli's testimony.
Harvey approved of the targets. stating "everything is all right, what
they want to do." (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 34)

The Cuban requested arms and equipment as a quid pro quo for
carrying out the assassination operation. (O.C.. 5/30/75. pp. 53-54)
'Vith the help of the CIA's Miami station which ran covert operations
against Cuba (,TM/WAVE), Harvey procured explosives. detonatDrs,
rifles, handguns, radios, and boat radar costing about $8.000.
(LG. Report, p. 49) Harvey and the chief of the .TM/WAVE
station rented a U-Haul truck under an assumed name and delivered
the equipment to a parking lot. (Harvey. 6/25/75. p. 63) The keys
were given to Rosselli, who ,vakhed the delivery with the Support
Chief from across the street. (O.C.. il/30175, pp. 92-93) The truckload
of equipment was finally picked up by either the Cuban or Rosselli's
agent. (LG. Report, pp. 49-50; Roosclli, 6/24/78, p. 40) Harvey t{'stified
that the arms "could" have been for use in the assassination
attempt, but that they were not given to the Cuban solely for that
purpose. (Hai'vey. 7/11/75, p. 9)

Rosselli kept Harvey informed of the operation's progress. Sometime
in May 1962, he reported that the pills and guns had arrived in
Cuba. (Harvey, p. 64; Rosselli, 6/24/75, pp. 34. 42-43) On
.Tune 21, he told Harvey that the Cuban had dispatched a three-man
team to Cuba. The Inspector General's report described the team's
mission as "vague" and conjedured that the team would kill Castro or
recruit others to do the job, using tlw poison pills if the opportunity
arose. (I.G. Report. 6/2/7il, p. 51)

Harvey met Rosselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962. The
Cuban was reported to be preparing to send in another three-man
team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard. Haney was told that the pills,
referred to as "the medicine." were still "safe" in Cuba. (Harvey.
6/2il/7il. p. 103; LG. Report p. ill)

Harvey ~estified that by this time he had grave doubts about whether
the operatIOn would ever take place. and told Rosselli that "there's not
much likelihood that this is going anyplace, or that it should be continued."
(Harvey. 6/25/75, p. 104) TJw second tE'am never left for
Cuba. claiming that "conditions" in Cuba WE're not rie;ht. (LG. Report.
pp. ill-52) During early .Tanuary 1963. Harvey paid Rosselli
$2,700 to defray the Cuban's expenses. (LG. Report, p. 82). Haney
terminated the operation in mid-Febru~ry 1963. At a meeting
with Rosselli in Los AngE'JE's. it ,,'as agreed that Rosselli would taper
off his communications with the Cubans. (LG. Report. pp. fi2-53)
Rosselli testified that he simply broh off contact with thE' Cnbans.
Howeyer, he ne\-e1' informed them that the offer of $1;,)0,000 for
CastJ'O's assassination hall been withdrawn.[31] (Rosselli. G/24/i3, p. 45)

The agency personnel who dealt with Hosselli attributed his motivation
to patriotism [32] and testified that lw ,vas not paid for his sClTices.
According to the Support Chief, Rosselli "paid his way, he paid his
own hotel fees, he paid his own travel. * * * And he never took a
nickeL he said. no, as long as it is for the Gm'ernment of the United
States, this is the least I can do, because lowe it a 10L" (O.C.. 5/30/73.
p.27)

Edwards agreed that Rosselli was "nerer paid a ceuL" (Edwards,
il/30j7il, p. Hi) and .Maheu testified that "Giancana was paid nothing
at all, not even for expenses, and that JIr. Hosselli was given a pittance
that did not eyen begin to cover his expenses." (:'Iaheu,i/29/i;'), p. (8)
It is clear, howe\-er, that the CIA did pay Rosselli's hotel bill during
his stay in Jliami in October 1960. [33] The CIA's im-ol\"Cment \vith Hosselli
c~used the Agency some difficulty (luring Rosselli's subsequent
prosecutions for fraudulent gambling activities and liying in the
country under an assumed name. [34]

(d) Plans in Early 1963

Two plans to assassinate Castro ,vere explored by Task Force W,
the CIA section then concerned with cm-ert Cuban operations, in early
1963, Desmond Fitzgerald (now decpased). Chipf of the Task Force,
asked his assistant to determine ,vhether an exotic seashell, rigged
to explode, could be deposited in an area where Castro commonly went
skin diving. (Assistant. 9/18/7;'). p. 28) The idea ,vas explored by the
Technical Services Division and discarded as impractical. (Helms.
6/13/75, p. 1B;'); LG. Report, p. 77)

A second plan inYoh-ed haying .Tames Donovan (,vho was negotiating
with Castro for the release of prisoners taken during the Bay of
Pigs operation) present Castro with a contaminated diving suit. [35]
(Colby, 5/21/i5,pp. B8-39)

The" Inspector General's Report dates this operation m January
1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as Chief of Task Force W,
although it is unclear whether Harvey or Fitzgerald conceived the
plan. (LG. Report, p. 75) It is likely that. the acti."it.y took place
earlier, since Donovan had completed Ins negotIatIOns by the
middle of .January 1963. Helms characterized the plan as "cockeyed."
(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 135)

The Technical Services Division bought a diving suit, dusted the
inside with a fungus that would produce a cl~ronic skin disease. (Madura
foot), and contaminated the breathmg apparatus WIth a
tubercule bacillus. The Inspector General's Report states that the plan
was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different diving suit on
his own initiative. (LG., Report, p. 75') Helms testified that the diving
suit never left the laboratory. (Helms, 6/13/75 p.135)

(e) AM/LASH

(i) Origin of the Project

In early 1961, a CIA official met with a highly-placed Cuban official
to determine if the Cuban would cooperate in efforts against the
Castro regime. (LG. Report, p. 78) The Cuban was referred to by
the cryptonym AM/LASH. [37] The meeting was inconclusive, but led to
subsequent meetings at which AM/LASH agreed to cooperate with the
CIA.

The CIA regarded AM/LASH as an important "asset" inside
Cuba. As ,a high-ranking leader who enjoyed t:he confidence of Fidel
Castro, AM/LASH could keep the CIA informed of the internal
workings of the regime. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, pp. 23,40) It was also
believed that he mIght playa part in fomenting a coup within Cuba.
(Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 43) [38]

From the first contact with AM/LASH until the latter part of
1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba.
His initial requests to the CIA and FBI for aid in defecting were rebuffed.
(LG. Report, pp. 80, 82-83) When Case Officer 1 joined the
operation in .June 1962, his assignment was to ensure that AM/LASH
would "stay in place and report to us." (Case Officer 1, 8/11/75, p. 38)
At a meeting in the fall of 1963. AM/LASH 1 stated that
he would remain in Cuba if he "could do something really significant
for the creation of a new Cuba" and expressed a desire to plan the
"execlltion" of Fidel Castro. (Case Officer 1 Contact Report) The
subject of assassinating Castro was again discussed by AM/LASH
and the case officer at another meeting a few days hiter. The case
officer's contact report states that assassination was raised in discussing
AM/LASH's role in Cuba, and that AM/LASH was visibly
upset. "It was not the act that he objected to, but merely the choice of
the word used to describe it. 'Eliminate' was acceptable." (Case Oilicrl'
1, Contact Report)

Each case officeI' testified that he did not ask A)I/LASH to assassinate
Castro. The record clearlY reyeals. ho\ye\'er, that both officers
were aware of his desire to take such action. A cable to Hradquarters
reporting on a l!H>:3 meeting with A::\f/LASH stated:

Haye 110 illtPlltioll g-iYP A:\I/LASH physical elimination missioll as requirement
but recognize this something he could or might try to carry out on his own
illi tia t i \'(', [38]

At a meeting latf' in the fa11 of U)():). A::\1/LASH again raised the
possibility of defecting, but indicated that he would be willing
to continue \yorking against the Castro Regime if he received firm
aSSllrances of Amcricail support. According to Case Officer 2, AM/
LASH requested military supplies, a deyice with which to protect
himself if his plots against Castl'O were discovered. and a meeting
with Attorney Genel'al Hobert K('nnedy. (Case Officrr 2, 8/1/75, pp.
48--49)

DesllloJl(1 Fitzgerald. Chief of the Special Affairs Staff, [39] agreed to
meet A::\1/LASH and giye him the aSSUl'ances he sought. The Inspector
General's Heport states that Fitzgerald consulted with the DDP.
Hrlms, who agreed that Fitzgerald should hold himself out as a
personal rrpl'esentatiye of Attorney General Kennedy. (I.G. Report,
p. 89) [40]

Helms testified that he did not recall the conversation with Fitzgerald.
He also said that he had not consulted the Attorney General
and speculated that his reason for not having done so might have been
because "this \vas So central to the whole theme of what we had been
trying to do * * * (find someone inside Cuba who might head a government
and lU1\"e a group to replace Castro). This is obviously what
we had been pushing, what Ewerybody had been pushing for us to try
to do. and it is in that context that I would have made some remark
like this." (Helms, 6/1:)/75. p.1l7)

Helms recalled that he told Fitzgerald to "go ahead and say that
from the standpoint of political support, the United States government
will be behind you if you are successful. This had nothing to do
with killings. This had only to do with the political action part of it."
(Helms. 6/1:)/75, p.131)

Fitzgerald met "Dr/LASH in late fall 1963 anel promised him
that tll(', Fnited States would support a coup against Castro. (Case
Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 60) [41] When later interviewed for the Inspector
General's Report, Fitzgerald recalled that AM/LASH repeatedly requested
an assassination weapon, particularly a "high-powered rifle
with t.elescopic sights that could be used to kill Castro from a distance."
Fitzgerald stated that he told AM/LASH that the United
States ""ould have "no part of an attempt on Castro's life." (I.G. Report,
p. 90) Case Officer 2 recalled that AM/LASH raised the prospect
of assassinating Castro, but did not propose an explicit plan.
(Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, pp. 62, 85) AM/LASH was, however, "convinced
that Castro had to be removed from po\ver before a coup could
be undertaken in Cuba." (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 61)

AM/LASH also requested high-powered rifles and grenades. (Case
Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 77) A memorandum by Case Officer 2 states:

C/SAS [Fitzgerald] approved telling AM/LASH he would be given a cache
inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include * * * high-powered rifles
with scopes * * *.

AM/LASH was told on November 22, 1963 that the cache would be
dropped in Cuba. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 92)

(ii) The Poison Pen Device

Another device offered to AM/LASH was a ball-point pen rigged
with a hypodermic needle. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 110) The needle
was designed to be so fine that the victim would not notice its insertion.
Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 103)

According to the Inspector General's Report, when Case Officer 2
was interviewed in 1967, he stated that AM/LASH had requested the
Agency to "devise some technical means of doing the job that would
not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (LG. Report,
p. 92)

The Report concluded that: "although none of the participants so
stated, it may be inferred that they were seeking a means of assassination
of a sort that AM/LASH might reasonably have been expected
to have devised himself." (I.G. Report, p. 92)

Fitzgerald's assistant told the Committee that the pen was intended
to show "bona fides" and "the orders were to do something to get rid
of Castro * * * and we thought this other method might work whereas
a rifle wouldn't." (Assistant, 9/18/75, p. 26)

Helms confirmed that the pen was manufactured "to take care of
a request from him that he have some devic3 for getting rid of Castro,
for killing him, murdering him, whatever the case may be." (Helms,
6/13/75,p.113)

"* * * Lt ] his was a temporizing gesture." (Helms, 6/11/75, p. 133)  [42]

On November 22, 1963, Fitzgerald and the case officer met with
AM/LASH and offered him the poison pen, recommending that he use
Blackleaf-40, a deadly poison which is commercially available. (Case
Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 112) The Inspector General's Report noted that
"it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot, a
CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent * * * and giving him an
assassination device for use against Castro." (LG. Report, p. 94)

The case officer later recalled that AM/LASH did not "think much
of the device," and complained that CIA could surely "come up with
something more sophisticated than that." (LG. Report, p. 93a).

The case officer recalled offering the pen to AM/LASH, but could
not remember whether AM/LASH threw it away then or took it with
him. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, pp. 105, 110) He did recall that AM/
LASH said he would not take the pen back to Cuba, but did not
know \vhat AM/LASH in fact did with the pen. (Case Officer 2,
8/1/75, pp. 110-111)

An ent.ry in the CIA AM/LASH files written in 1965 states:

Although Fitzgerald and the case officer assured AM/LASH on November 22,
1963 that CIA would give him everythinK he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all
the money he wanted) the situation changed when the case officer and Fitzgerald
left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because
of this fact, plans with AM/LASH changed and it was decided that we
could have no part in the assassination of a government -leader (including
Castro) and would not aid AM/LASH in this attempt * * *. AM/LASH was not
informed of (this decision) until he was seen by the case officer in November,
1964.

In fact, however, assassination efforts involving AM/LASH continued
into 1965.

(iii) Providing AM/LASH with Arms

CIA cables indicate that one cache of arms for AM/LASH was delivered
in Cuba in March 1964 and another in June. An entry i'n the
AM/LASH file for May 5, 1964 states that the case officer requested
the Technical Services Division to produce, on a "crash basis," a
silencer which would fit an F AI., rifle. The contact report of a meeting
between the case officer and a confidante of AM/LASH states that
AM/LASH was subsequently informed that it was not feasible to
make a silencer for an F AI., rifle.

Toward the latter part of 1964, AM/LASH became more insistent
that the assassination of the Cuban leadership was a necessary initial
step in a successful coup. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, pp. 129-133) A
memorandum written in the fall of 1964 stated:

AM/LASH was told and fully understands that the United States Government
cannot become involved to any degree in the "first step" of his plan. If he
needs support, he realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This is where
B-1 could fit in nicely in giving any support he would request.

Documents in t~e AM/LASH file establish that in early 1965, the
CIA put AM/LASH in contact with B-1, the leader of an anti-Castro
group. As the Case Officer explained to the Inspector General:

* * * What had happened was that SAS had contrived to put B-1 and AM/
LASH together in such a way that neither of them knew that the contact had
been engineered by OIA. The thought was that B-1 needed a man inside and
AM/LASH wanted a silenced weapon, which OIA was unwilling to furnish to
him directly. By putting the t\VO together, B-1 might get its man inside Ouba
and AM/LASH might get his silenced weapon-from B-1. (I.G., Report p. 101)

A report of a meeting between a case officer and B-1 states that B-1,
in his initial contacts 'with AM/LASH, discussed plans for assassinating
Castro. AM/LASH suggested that guerrilla raids against Cuha
should be stepped up one month before the "attempt on Fidel Castro"
to "prepare the pubhc and raise the morale and resistance spirit of the
people." B-1 reported that:

A~f/LASH believed that the only solution to the problems in Ouba would be
to get rid of Fidel Oastro. He is able either to shoot him with a silencer or
place a bomb in some place where Fidel will be. He might use, for example, >t
small bomb, that he can carry and place, or with his gronp attack the residence
where Fidel lives * * * B-1 is going to pro\'ide AM/LASH with escape routes and
places where B-1 is able to pick him up. He will memorize these points and
escape routes * * * Next, B-1 is to provide AM/LASH either a silencer for a FAL
or a rifle with a silencer.

A CIA document dated January 3, 1965 states that B-1, in a lengthy
interview with a case officer, said that he and AM/LASH had reached
firm agreement on the following points:

1. B-1 is to provide AM/LASH with a silencer for the F AL; if this is impossible,
B-1 is to cache in a designated location a rifle with a scope and silencer
plus several bombs, concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp or some other concealment
device which he would be able to carry, and place next to Fidel Castro.

2. B-1 is to provide AM/LASH with escape routes controlled by B-1 lind
not by the Americans. The lack of confidence built up by the Bay of Pigs looms
large.

3. B-1 is to prepare one of the western provinces, {'ither Pinar del Rio or
Havana, with arms caches and a clandestine underground mechanism. This
would be a fall back position and a safe area where men and weapons are available
to the group.

4. B-1 is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination of Fidel, but no
one, inclUding AM/LASH, will know B-1's location.

5. B-1 is to arrange for recognition by at least five Latin American countries
as soon as Fidel is neutralized and a junta is formed. This junta will be established
even though Raul Castro and ChI' Guevara may still be alive and may
still be in control of part of the country. This is the reason AM/LASH requested
that B-1 be able to establish some control over one of the provinces so that the
junta can 'be formed in that location.

6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel, B-1 will increase
the number of commando attacks to a maximum in order to raise the spirit and
morale of the people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio messages,
in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate that the raid was possible
thanks to the information received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and
from the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "P·'. This will be
AM/LASH's war name.

A CIA cable dated in early 1965 stated that B-1 had given AM/
LASH a silencer and that AM/LASH had "small, highly concentrated
explosives." Shortly afterwards, a CIA station' cabled that
AM/LASH would soon receive "one pistol with silencer and one F AI.,
rifle with a silencer from B-1's secretary." A subsequent cable reported
that "B-1 had three packages of special items made up by his
technical people and delivered to AM/LASH." (LG., Report p. 103)

In June 1965, CIA terminated all contact "With AM/LASH and
his associates for reasons related to security. (I.G., R.eport pp.
104-105)

2. AT WHAT LEVEL WERE THE CASTRO PLOTS KNOWN ABOUT OR AUTHORIZED
WITHIN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY?

(a) The Question Presented

As explained in the preceding section, Richard Bissell clearly
authorized the two attempts to assassinate Cuban leaders that occurred
during his tenure as Deputy Director of Plans--the incident
involving a Cuban in contact with Raul Castro and the attempt involving
undenvorld figures that took place prior to the Bay of Pigs.
It is also clear that Bissell's successor, Richard Helms, authorized
and was a,,-are of the attempt on Castro's life involving underworld
figures that tDok place the year following the Bay of Pigs, although
the degree of Helms' participation in the details of the plot is not
certain. [43]

Helms also authorized and was aware of the AlVl/LASH operation,
although it is not certain that he knew that AM/LASH intended to
assassinate Castro.2 [44]The evidence indicates that the exploding seashell
and diving suit schemes were abandoned at the laboratory stage
and that no authorization was sought for their development or eventual
use.

This section deals with whether the Director of Central IntBlligence,
Allen Dulles, and his successor, .John McCone, authorized or were
aware of the assassination plots. Dulles served as DCI from 1953 to
Kovembel' 1961. }fcCone ,vas DCI from November 1961 to April 1965. [45]
General Charles Cabell served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
under Dulles and continued into the early months of McCone's
term. He was replaced as DDCI in April 1962 by General Marshall
Carter.

In summary, the evidence relating to Dulles and McCone (and their
respective Deputy DCrs) is as follows:

(i) Dulles. -- Bissell and Edwards testified that they were certain
that both Dulles and his Deputy General Cabell were aware of and
authorized the initial phase of the assassination plol involving underworld
figures. They acknowledged, however, that Dulles and Cabell
were not told about the plot until after the underworld figures had
been contacted. The words said to have been used to brief the Director
and his Deputy-"an intelligence operation"-do not convey on their
face that the plot involved assassination, although Bissell and Edwards
insist that the real meaning must have been understood. Certain
other evidence before the Committee suggests that Dulles and Cabell
did know about the assassination plots; other evidence suggests that
tlu';y did not. (See subsection (b) below.)

(ii) McCone. -- McCone testified that he did not know about or
authorize the plots. Helms. Bissell and Harvey all testified that they
did not know whether McCone knew of the assassination plots. Each
said, however, that he did not tell McCone of the assassination efforts
either when McCone assumed the position of DCI in November 1961
or at any time thereafter until August 1963, when Helms gave McCone
a memorandum from which McCone concluded that the operation
with underworld figures prior to the Bay of Pigs had involved
assassination. The Inspector GeneraFs Report states that Harvey received
Helms' approval not to brief McCone when the assassination
efforts were resumed in 1962. Harvey testified this accorded with his
recollection. On other occasions 'when it would have been appropriate
to do so, Helms and Harvey did not teU McCone about assassination
activity. Helms did not recall any agreement not to brief McCone,
but he did not question the position taken by Harvey or the Inspector
GeneraFs Report. Helms did say that McCone never told him not
to assassinate Castro. (These matteI'S, as wen as the various reasons
put forward by Haney and Helms for not briefing McCone, are set
forth in Section (c) below.)

(b) Did Allen Dulles Know of or Authorize the Initial Plots Against
Castro. [46]

Both Allen Dulles and General Cabell are deceased. The Committee's
investigation of this question relied on the available documents
and the testimony of those who served under Dulles and Cabell who
are still living. [47]

(i) Dulles' Approval of J. C. King's December 1959 Memorandum. --
On December 11, 1959, J. C. King. head of CIA's Western
Hemisphere Division, wrote a memorandum to Dulles observing that
a "far left" dictator'Ship now existed in Cuba which, "if" permitted
to stand, will encourage similar actions against U.S. holdings in other
Latin American countries.

One of King's four "Recommended Actions" was:

Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None
of those close of I<'idel. such as his brother Raul or his companion ChI' Guevara.
have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe
that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present
Government.

A handwritten note indicates that Dulles, with Bissell's concurrence,
approved the recommendations. [48]

(ii) Dulles' January 1960 Statement to the Special Group. -- On January
Ii), IHGO, Allen Dulles, in what was apparently the first Special
Grollp discussion of a covert program to overthrow Castro, emphasized
that "a quick rlimination of Castro" ,,-as not contemplated by the CIA.
(Spccial (iroup ~linutes, 1/1a/(j(l) According to the minutes, Dulles
first. "lJotpd tIIP possibility that over the long run the r.s. will not be
able to toleratp the Castro regime, in Cuba, and sugge,stBd that cove,rt
eontingency planning to accomplish the fall of the Castro governnwnt
might bc in order." Then in response to the State De,partme,nt
rpprpsentati H\'s eomment that "timing ,vas \-ery important so as to
permit a solidly base(] opposition to take over," Dulles "* * * e,mphasized
that ,,-e do not haye in mind a quick e,limination of Castro, but
rather actions designed to enable responsible opposition leaders to get
a foothold."

(iii) Meetings in March 1960. -- According to a memorandum of a
mpeting on ~Iarch D, 1D60, ,T. C. King, Chief of CIA's 'Western Hemisphere
Division, told the Task Force which was in charge of Cuban
operations:

That the DCI is presenting a special policy paper to the NSC 5412 representatin's.
He mentioned growing evidence that certain of the "Heads" in the Castro
government have been pushing for an attack on the U.S. Navy installation at
(;Ilantanamo Bay and said that an attack on the installation is in fact, possible.

3. Col. King stated * * * that unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara
could he eliminated in one package--Whicll is highly unlikely-th~soperation can
be a long, drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown
by the use of force." [Memo for the Record, March 9, 1960. (Emphasis added.)]

A lengthy meeting of the National Security Council on the following
day involved a discussion of American policy to "bring another
government to po,ver in Cuba." The minutes of that meeting report
that:

Admiral Burke thought we needed a Cuban leader around whom anti-Castro
elements could rally. Mr. Dulles said some anti-Castro leaders existed, but they
are not in Cuba at present. The President said we might have another Black
Hole of Calcutta in Cuba, and he wondered what we could do about such a
situation * * * Mr. Dulles reported that a plan to effect the situation in Cuba
was bcing worked on. Admiral Bu.rke su.ggcstcd that any plan tor the removal ot
Cuban ll?aders should bc a package deal, since many ot the leaders around Castro
were C7'cn worse than Castro. (1d.,9) (Emphasis added.)

On March 14, Dulles and ,T. C. King attended a Special Group meeting
at the vVhite Honse. The minutes state that:

'l'here was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban
scrnp if Fidcl and Raul Castro and Che Gue,,;ara .~hould disappea'r simultaneously.
Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were the
COlllmunists and t'lere was therefore the danger that they might move into control.
Mr. Dulles felt this might not be disadvantageous because it would facilitate
a lllultilatpral action hy OAS. Col. King said tlwre were few leaders capable of
taking over so far identified. [Memo for the Record, March 15, 1960 (Emphasis
added.) ]

Participants in these National Security Council and Special Group
nlPetings tpstified that assassination ,,-as neither discussed nor considered.
That testimony and details concerning the context of those
meetings is set forth fully in the section dealing with whether President
Eisenhower was a,,-are of the plots against Castro.

(iv) Rescission of Accident Plot in July 1960. -- A8 discussed above
(pp. 72-Jn~), in .Tnly 1060, Bissell's assistant, Tracy Barnes, approved
spndilw a cablp. to CIA's Hanllla station stating that "possible removal
of top three leaders receiving serious consideration at Head
quarters," and giving instruCtions to carry out a plan to kill Raul
Castro. J. C. King was the authenticating officer on the cable. A few
hours later a s~ond cable, bearing only Barnes' signature, rescinded
the first.

King told the Committee that he remembered nothing of this event,
and Barnes is deceased. Bissell testified that he did not remember the
incident and that he did not know whether Dulles had known about
the cable. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 74) When asked why the cable might
have been rescinded, Bissell speculated that

It may well have embodied a judgment on Dulles' part that this effort COllcerning
Raul Castro was altogether too risky, and technically not sufficiently
likely of success (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 76)

He speculated further that Headquarters might have been considering
the elimination of all three Cuban leaders, and that the cable authorizing
the assassination of Raul was rescinded because it fell short of
that broader objective. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 76--77)

The Executive Officer to the Chief of the Cuba covert action project
sent the cables and testified that he had "heard" that Dulles had
countermanded the plan and had indicated that "assassination was not
to be considered." (Duty Officer, 8/11/75, p. 29) [49]

The officer added, however, that he had no personal knowledge of
the reason for calling off the plan, or even if Dulles had been the one
who called it off. He further testified that:

[Dulles] indicated that assassination was not to be considered * * * This would
be conforming with what I had understood the general practice was. (Duty
Officer, 8/11/75, pp. 29-30)

(v) Briefing of Dulles on Use of Underworld Figures in September
1960.

(1) Evidence concerning what Dulles Was Told. -- Bissell recalled
that "in the latter part of September" there was "a meeting in which
Col. Edwards and I briefed Mr. Dulles and General Cabell" about
the plan to assassinate Castro. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 20) Bissell testified
that "Colonel Edwards outlined in somewhat circumlocutious terms
the plan that he had discussed with syndicate representabves." (Bissell,
6/9/75, p. 22) He stated that Edwards had said:

'I'hat eontad had heen made with [the underworld], that a plan had been
prepared for their use, and I think he either said in as many words or strongl~'
inferred that the plan would he put into effect unless at that time or subsef\uentl~'
he \I'as tnld by :\Ir. Dulles that it should not be." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 22) [50]

The CIA~s ID(j7 Inspector General's RBport, based on in~erviews
with Ecl\vards and Bissell, said Dulles and Cabell were bl'lefed as
follows:

The discussion was circumspect. Edwards deliberately avoided the use of any
"bad words." The descriptive term used was "an intelligence operation." Edwards
is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of
the operation he was discussing. He recalls describing the channel as being
"from A to B to C." As he then envisioned it, A was Maheu, B was Rosselli, and
C was the principal in Cuba. l<Jdwards recalls that :\Ir. Dulles merely nodded,
presumably in understanding and approval. Certainly there was no opposition.
}~dwards states that, while there was no formal approval as such, he felt that
he dearly had tacit approval to use his OWll judgment. (LG. Report, pp. 17-18)

Bissell testified that the description sounded "highly plausible."
(Bissell, H/D/75, p. 24) Edwards said it was "accurate." (Edwards,
5/;10/7;"), p. 11)

In light of the manner in which Bissell and Edwards described briefin"
Dulles, the question arises as to whether Dulles in fact would have
m{'derstood that the operation involved assassination. The Inspector
General, in attempting to "conjecture as to just what the Director did
approve," decided:

It is safe to conclude, given the men participating and the general subject of
the meeting, that there was little likelihood of misunderstanding---even though
the details were deliberately blurred and the specific intended result was never
stated to unmistakable language. It is also reasonable to conclude that the
pointed avoidance of "bad words" emphasized to the participants the extreme
sensitivity of the operation. (LG. Report, p. 18)

Bissell testified that:

I can only say that I am quite sure I came away from that meeting-and there
was, I think subsequent occasions when this came up between Mr. Dulles and
myself, and I am quite convinced that he knew the nature of the operation.
Q. What were the subsequent conversations you had with Mr. Dulles in which
you concluded that he knew that this was an assassination effort?

BISSELL. * * * it's really a guess on my part that such Conversations occurred
* * * I do believe they did occur in that during the entire autumn I
suppose I must have spoken to Mr. Dulles practically daily about some aspect of
the whole Cuban operation and I am virtually certain that he would in one or
another of those conversations and probably more than once have asked if
there was anything to report about the Sheffield Edwards' operation. He also
may have been in direct contact with Edwards at that time. (Bissell, 6/9/75,
pp. 24-25)

When asked by the Chairman why, in this context, persons within
the Agency talked "in riddles to one another," Bissell replied that:

* * * I think there was a reluctance to spread even on an oral rerord some
aspects of this operation.

CHAIRMAN. Did the reluctance spring from the fact that it simply grated
agalllst your conscience to have to speak more explicitly?

BISSELL. I don't think it grated against my conscience. I think it may have been
a feeling that the Director preferred the use of the sort of language that is deseribed
in the Inspector General's Report. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 25)

Bissell, in a subsequent appearance before the Committee, again
addressed the issue of whether he and Edwards had made it clear to
Dulles that what was involved was an assassination operation:

I thought I made clear that it was my impression-and I believe the impression
incidentally that I thought was confirmed in the [I.G. Report]-that in discussing
this with Dulles and Cabell * * * the objectiH' of the operation was made
unmistakabl~- clear to them. The terms "an intelligence operation," I think someone
said, was that not a cover designation? But we would not under any circumstances
have told Allen Dulles that this was an intelligence collection operation.
If I said that on :Monday, I must have given a wrong impression. (Bissell,
6/11/75, p. 24)

On the other hand, the only author of the Inspector General's Report
still with the CIA testified that in his opinion a "pointed avoidance of
'bad words' " would have made it less likely that an "intelligence operation"
would have been understood as an assassination attempt, and
that "it was open to question how clearly this was stated to Mr. Dulles
and whether or not Mr. Dulles understood." (Colby/I.G., 5/2:1/75,
p. 10)

Sheffield Edwards was quite infirm when examined by the Committee
and has since died. [51] Edwards testified before the Oommittee as
follows:

* * * [T]his possible project was approved by Allen Dulles, Director of CIA,
and by General Cabell, the Deputy Director. They are both dead.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you know, Colonel, that the project bad been approved
by these two gentlemen?

Edwiards. I personally briefed Allen Dul'les * * * and CalleN (Edwards,
5/30/75, pp. 5-6)

In his interview with the Rockefeller Commission, Edwards testified:

Q. Now, who inside the Agency besides Bissell did you have any contact with
on the top echelon?

A. Very important. The plan was approved by Allen Dulles and General Cabell.
(Edwards, Rockefeller Comm., 4/9/75, p. 5.)

The Support Chief who had been the case officer for the operation
involving underworld figures testified that when he and Edwards discussed
the matter in 1975, prior to giving evidence to the Rockefeller
Commission, he was sure that Edwards had told him Dulles had approved
the plot. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 58-59) He added that he was
"reasonably sure" Or "knew" in the "back of my mind" that either
Edwards or Bissell had also told him of Dulles' knowledge when the
plot was underway in 1960....:62. (O.c., 5/30/75, pp. 33-34; 36; 60) [52]

A review of Dulles' calendar for August through December 1960
showed no meeting involving Dulles, Cabell, Bissell and Edwards. [53]
Of course, such a meeting could have occurred without having been
noted on Dulles' calendar.

(2) Evidence Concerning When the Briefing Occurred. -- Bissell
and the Inspector General's Report (which relied on Edwards) placed
the briefing of Dulles in "the latter part of September 1960."

Bissell did not have a clear independent recollection of the dates involved,
but recalled that discussions concerning the possible use of
syndicate members against Castro began "in the autumn of 1960." [54]
He recalled initial discussions alllong himself, Edwards, and Colonel
J. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, which ~e
said occurred before Dulles and Cabell were approached about assassInating
Castro. According to Bissell,

those conversations, the subject matter was a capability to eliminate Castro if
such action should be decided upon.

It is, therefore, accurate to say that my best recollection of those conversations
(with Edwards and King) is that they addressed themselves to the existence
or non-existence of the capability. They were not conclusive or decisive
conversations * * * nor would they have revealed a prior decision to implement
such a plan by anybody. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 19)

The testimony regarding the dates during \vhich assassination planning
was undertaken was inexact, and the Committee cannot place
those events precisely. According to the Inspector General's Report,
the Support Chief contacted Rosselli in early September 1960, and
during the week of September 25, the Chief, Maheu, and Rosselli met
with Giancana and Trafficante in Miami. (I.G. Report" pp. 18-19)
Bissell testified about the sequence of events:

Q. Well, before we came to the meeting [with Dulles], you had been informed
prior to that, had you not, that contact had been made with the Mafia?

1Ir. BISSELL. I had.

Q. Now were you informed that the Mafia had been given the go ahead to
proceed with actual efforts to assassinate Castro?

BISSELL. Not that early, to my best recollection. I cannot date that at all
well. I would suppose that it was within the next two or three weeks. (Bissell,
6/9/75, pp. 20--21.)

On the other hand, Rosselli's testimony suggests that prior to the
"latter part of September" 1960, Maheu had indicated that a large
sum of money would be paid for Castro's death. (Rosselli, 6/28/75
p. 17) And in a memorandum dated May 14,1962, Edwards indicated
that the briefing of "senior officials" took place after the money had
been offered.

It is clear, then, that even if Dulles was informed about the use of
underworld figures to assassinate Castro, subordinate agency officials
had previously decided to take steps toward arranging for the killing
of Castro, including discussing it with organized crime leaders.

(vi) Edwards' Communications to the Justice Department in 1961
and 1962. -- As fully described suprd, pp. 77-79, the FBiI disoovered in
late 1960 that Maheu had been involved in an illegal wiretap in Las
Vegas. In April 1961, Maheu told the FBI that the tap had been
placed in connection with a CIA operation, and suggested that. the
FBI contact Edwards to verify this fact.

An FBI report of a May 3, 1961 interview with Edwards (in which
Edwards vaguely described the use of Giancana as relating to "clandestine
efforts against the Castro Government" with no mention of
aSR2ssination, and a copy of which was given to the Attorney General)
stated:

Col. Edwards advised that only )Ir. Bissell (Director of Pla'ns, CiA) and
two others in OIA were aware of the Giancana-)Iaheu activity in behalf of
CIA's program an4 Allen Dulles was completely unaware ot Edwards contaot
with Maheu in this ccmneotion. He added that ",Ir. Bissell, in his recent briefings
of Gen. Taylor and the Attorney General in connection with their inquiries
into CIA relating to the Cuban situation, told the Attorney General that some
of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and t~e u;lderworld
against Castro. (FBI memorandum entitled, "Arthur James B'alletti, et al.,"
May 22, 19(1) (Emphasis added.)

Bissell said he was certain, h0wever, that the statement regarding
Dulles' knowledge about the operation was wrong, and testified:

Now it (the FBI memorandum) is just flatly contrary to my recollection that
Allen Dulles was unaware of these contacts, as I have testified several times.
Also, I submit it is quite implausible that I would have briefed General Taylor
and the Attorney General-and incidentally, I have no recollection of briefing
those two gentlemen except as memlJers of the Board of Inquiry that I have described,
of which Allen Dulles himself was a member-it is quite implausible
that I would have briefied them on a matter which had been going on for some
months, and about which the Director, Mr. Dulles himself, had never been informed.
(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 27)

'When asked to speculate on why Edwards would have told the FBI
that Dulles was unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu, Bissell
replied:

I can only surmise that he believed he could secure the cooperation of the
Justice Department that he required without in any way involving his superior,
Mr. Dulles, and simply did this in a protective fashion. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 20)

A year later, on May 7, 1962, Edwards and CIA's General Counsel
met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy. (That meeting is discussed
extensively below at p. 131 et seq.) Edwards" memorandum of
the meeting indicated that he had said that after Rosselli and Giancana
had been offered $150,000, Edwards had "then briefed the proper
senior officials of [the] Agency" (without specifying whom) and they
had "duly orally approved." [55] It further states that "knowledge" of
the project had been "kept to a total of six ,Persons."  [56]

Dulles had left the Agency before the trme of Edwards' second
statement.

(vii) General Cabell's Remarks to the Special Group in November
1960. -- Bissell and Edwards testified that Cabell was aware of the
Castro plots (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 22; Edwards, 5/30/75, pp. 5-6) [57]

The evidence indicates that the meeting between Dulles, Bissell,
Edwards, and Cabell oceurred sometime "in the autumn" of 1960,
probably in late, September. The minutes of a meeting of the Special
Group on November 3, 1960, reflect the following remarks:

Finally, Mr. [Livingston] Merchant [Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs] asked whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive
action against F'idel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three
the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded
that it would be neces~;ary to act against all three simultaneously. General Cabell
pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous
in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt
that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have
to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities. (Special
Group Minutes, 11/3/60)

Exactly what the term "direct positive action" meant to the speaker
or those listening is uncertain. Merchant was ill and unable to testify.;
others present at the meeting could not recall what the words meant
at the time they were uttered, although some have testified that they
could refer to assassination. [58]

Bissell was also asked about the minutes of the November 3 meetin~.
After reading the reference to "direct positive action," Bissell
saId, "I find it difficult to understand." (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 18) He
then was asked,

Q. Do you, in light of the November 3 minutes remain firm that Cabell was
knowledgeable (of the assassination plots)?

A. It casts some doubt on that in my mind.

When asked if it cast "some significant doubt in light of (Cabell's)
character," Bissell answered, "Yes." (Bissell, 7/17/75, pp. 22-23)

(c) Did John McCone Know of or Authorize Assassination Plots
During His Tenure as DCI?

The CIA considered several assassination plots against Castro during
McCone's tenure as Director. Harvey initiated his contact with
Rosselli in April 1962, and that operation continued into early 1963.
In early 1963 the CIA looked into the possibility of assassinating
Castro \vith an explodin~seashell and contaminated diving suit. AM/
LASH was offered a pOlson pen device in November 1963, and caches
of arms were delivered to Cuba for his use in the following years.

(i) McCone's testimony. -- McCone testified that he was not aware of
the plots to assassinate Castro which took place during the years in
which he was DCI, and that he did not authorize those plms. (McCone,
6/6/75, pp. 33, 44-45)  [59] He testified that he was not briefed about the
assassination plots by Dulles, Bissell, Helms, or anyone else when he
succeeded Dulles as Director in November 1961 (McCone, 6/6/75, pp.
6-7, 17), and that if he had ever been asked about the plots, he would
have disapproved. McCone testified:

I had no knowledge of any authorized plan or planning that might lead to a
request for authorization. Of course, during those days it was almost common
for one person or another to say, "we ought to dispose of Castro" * * * [b]ut at
no time did anyone come to me, or come to other authorities to my knowledge,
with a plan for the actual undertaking of an assassination. (McCone, 6/6/75,
p.3)

McCone also testified:

Senator Hart of Colorado: Did you ever discuss the subject of assassinations
with your predecessor, Mr. Dulles?

McCone: No, I did not. [60]

(ii) Testimony of Helms, Bissell, and other Subordinate Agency
Employees. -- Bissell was DDP under )fcCone for three months, from
November 1961 until February 1962. Helms assumed the duties of
DDP from Bissell and served throughout the balance of McCone's
terms as Director.

Bissell testified about McCone's knowledge as follows:

Q. Your testimony is that you never discussed assassinations with Mr.
McCone?

A. That is correct.

Q. * * * [D]id you tell McCone anything about that conversation with Mr.
Harvey in which you at least told him to take over the relationship with the
criminal syndicate?

A. I don't remember so doing. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 19)

Helms testified that he did not recall ever having discussed the
assassination plots with McCone while the plots were continuing. [61]
When asked whether McCone was aware of the assassination plots
against Castro, Helms testified:

No, it isn't my impression that I told him, at least I don't have any impression,
unfortunately * * *. Mr. McCone is an honorable man. He has done his own
testifying, and all I can say is that I do not know specifically whether he was
aware or not. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 00,101-102)

Helms further testified:

Senator MONDALE. I believe Mr. McCone testified that he never heard of any
of these attempts when he was Director. Would you have any reason to disagree
with his testimony?

HELMS. Sir, I have always liked McCone and I don't want to get into an altercation
with him. He had access to Harvey and everybody else just the way I had
and he had regular access to the Attorney General.

* * * * * * *

Senator MONDALE. If you were n member of this Committee wouldn't you assume
that Mr. McCone wns unaware of the assassination attempts while they
were underwny?

HELMS. I don't know how to answer that, Senator Mondale. He was involved
in this up to his scuppers just the way everybody else was that was in it, and I
just don't know. I have no reason to impugn his integrity. On the other hand,
I don't understand how it was he didn·t hear about some of these things that he
claims that he didn't. (Helms, 7/17/75, pp. 32-33)

* * * * * * *

HELMS. I honestly didn't recall that Mr. McCone was not informed and when I
was told that there was evidence that he wasn't informed, I was trying to scratch
my head as to why I didn't tell him at the time and my surmises are the best I
can come up with. I am really surprised I did not discuss it with him at the
time. )'ly relations with him were good, and so my surmises are just the best
I am able to do in H)7i) over an episode that took plaee that many years ago.
(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 90)

Several other Agency officials who were aware of the assassination
plots testified that they had not told McCone of the plots. William
Harvey testified that he never spoke with McCone about the operation
involving underworld figures or assassination and that, to the best
of his knowledge, McCone had not been told about the project.
(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 66)

Sheffield Echvards, when asked whether he had informed McCone
about the plot, replied:

EllWARllS. :'\0, I did not inform Mr. MeCone.

Q. "'as there a reason for why you did not inform Mr. McCone?

EDWARDS. Well, I did not want to drag ::\lr. MeCone into this thing that in my
opinion had petered ont, and I did not want to involve him. (Edwards, 5/30/75,
1'. 18)

The Support Chief who had been the case officer for the operation
under Edwards, testified that he recalled that Edwards had told him
during a discussion about the plots in 1965 that Edwards had not
briefed McCone on the operation.

As a matter of fact, I don't think he ever knew about it. From later CQnversations
with Colonel FAwards, not recently, we talked about it, and he said that
he was convinced that Mr. McCone never knew about it, it wasn't on his watch,
so to speak, and he didn't want to get him involved. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 37, 39)

George McManus, Helms' Special Assistant for Cuba during the
relevant period, testified that he had not been told about the assassination
activities, and gave his opinion that if McCone had been asked
to approve an assassination, he "would have reacted violently, immediately." [62]

Walter Elder. McCone's Executive Assistant, testified that he had
not known of the underworld operation until August 1963, after it
had been terminated, and that in his opinion McCone did not learn of
the operation prior to that time. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 15) [63]

With respect to the Cuban assassination matters, where his knowledge
was only se~olHlhand, "William Colby said "Mr. McCone did not
know of it." (Colby, 5/21/75, p. 101)

(iii) Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About the Assassination
Plots. -- McCone assumed the position of DCI in November
1f)(i1. It was also ill Xoycmber 1U(i1 that Bissc>ll asked Harvey to assume
operational control over the Castro plot involving underworld
figures. Richard Helms replaced Bissell in February of 1962 and was
subsequently briefed by Harvey on the existence of the assassination
plots. Helms mlS Harvey~simmediate superior and the person to whom
he reported about the Castro plot activities.

Harvey testified that ill the spring of If)(i:2, when he was preparing
to contact Rosselli:

* * * r lJriefed Helms generally on the takeover of Rosselli, on the doulJts
about the overation, on the possible * * * future of it, and to the extent it had
then been possilJle, the assessment of Rosselli and the <"utting out of various
individuals. (Haney, 6/25/75, p. 65) [64]

Harvey testified that after so informing Helms

[T]here was a fairly detailed discussion between Illyself and Helms as to
whether or not the Director sllOuld at that time be briefed concerning this. For
a variety of reaHOUS which were tossed back and forth, we agreed that it was
not necessary or advisable to brief him at that time.

r then said, as I recall, to Mr. Helms, if you decide in the future that he should
be briefed, I would like to know about it in advance to which, to my best
recollection, he agreed. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 66)

Harvey offered the following explanation for why he and Helms had
decided not to discuss the matter with McCone at that time:

There were several reasons for this. One, this operation at that stage had not
been assessed. It was obviOUSly questionable on several grounds. It obviously
involved knowledge by too many people. 'We were not even sure at that point it
had any remote possibility or rather any real po,;silJiHty for success. It had
arisen with full authority insofa'r as either of us knew long before I knew anything
about it, and before the then-Director lJecame Director of the Agency.

I saw no reason at that time to charge him with knowledge of this, at least
until we reached the point where it appeared it might eome to fruition or
had a chance to assess the individuals involved and determine exactly the problem
we faced, including the possible problem-and it was 'a very, or it appeared
to lJe, and in my opinion was, at that time, a very real possibility of this government
heingblackmailed either by Cuhans for political purposeH or by figures in
organized crime for their own self-protection or aggrandizement, which, as it
turned out, did not happen, but at that time was a very pregnant possibility.
(Harvey, 6/2;;/75, pp. 67-68)

r am definitely lIot saying that there was any eft10rt to hide or conceal any
information from the Director. There was not. This was a discussion as to
whether or not it was even necessary or appropriate at this point to take details
of this particular operation in an unassessed form to the then-Direcbor at that
time. (Harvey, 6/2i:i/75, p. (9)

Harvey state,d that he did not have any reason to believe that the
assassination activities would have been "disapproved by the Director"
had McCone been advised of the project. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 69)
Harvey said that he had thought the plots "were completely authorized
at every appropriate level within and beyond the Agency.': (Harvey,
7/11/75, p. 66) 'Vhen asked why McCone had not been gwen an
opportunity to consider the plot~ Harvey replied:

One of the things that I don't know from my own * ** knowledge * * * is who
was hripf('(1 in pxaetly what terIlls at the time of the ><0 called Las Vegas flop that
inyolyed attempts to place a technical surveillance * * * in the Das Vegas hotel
room. (Ha ney, 7/11/7;;, p. 4G)

Harvey was queried on whether the reasons he hOO given for not
briefing McCone were actually "reasons why he s'hould [have been]
brirfed forthwith." Harvey rrplir(l:

Well, :,jenator Huddleston. it will be quite easy in looking at it now to say, well
I ean see your arg-ument. All I can say to you in answer is at that time I didn't
fpel that it was necessary or advisable. I did not make this decision except in
eonsultation, and had I heen disagreed with, that would have been it. And I am
not off-loading" this on Riehard Helms or attempting to at all. It isn't all that easy
for IIll' to go back this IIlany years and sort of recast all of the reasoning and be
sure I aIll aecuratl'. And I don't also want to evade it by saying, well, it seemed
like a good idea at the time. But actually it did. In other words, this was not
something that eitllPr Helms or myself felt that at that stage there was any point
in attempting to brief the Director on it until, at least, ,ve had a somewhat better
handle OIl it * * *. (Han-ey, 7/ll/7ii, pp. 67-68)

* * * * * * *

And I might also add, if I may, * * * as far as either one of us knew at that
point he [~IcCone] might have been or Rhould have been briefed, if you want it
that way, by eitllPr Allen Dulles or Richard Bissell. (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 67-71)

The 1967 report. prepared hy the Inspector General for Helms,
states that Harvey said: "When he briefed Helms on Rosselli, he obtained
Helms' approval not to brief the Director." (I.G. Report, p. 41)

Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation, but that
he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of Harvey's testimony and the
Inspector General's Report. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 32, 106)

Helms, 'vhen asked about Harvey's testimony that he and Harvey
had agreed not to brief McCone, statDd "I frankly don't recall having
agreed to this."

My reeollection is that I had very grave doubts about the wisdom of this * * *.
And as I reeall it, we had 1"0 fl'w assets inside Cuba at that time that I was
willing to try almost anything. But the thing did not loom large in my mind at
that time. I was enormously busy with a lot of other things, taking over a new
job [as DDP]. ~Ir. McCone was relatively new in the Agency and I guess I must
have thought to myself, ,yell this is going to look peculiar to him and I doubt
very lUuch this is going to go anyplace, but if it does, then that is time enough
to bring him into the picture. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 33)

Helms also stated:

It was a Mafia connection and 1\Ir. McCone was relatively new to the organization
and thiR was, you know, not a very savory effort. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 92)

Helms later testified that he did not "recall ever having been convinced
that any attempt was really made on Castro's life."

He said:

I am having a very difficult time justifying before this Committee, because
there is something in here that doesn't come together, even for me, I am sorry
to say. Because if this was all that clear, as everybody seems to think it was,
that there were those pills in that restaurant in Cuba and Castro was about to
die, I certainlJ· would have talked to McCone about it. And this never was that
clear, I am sorry to say, but it never was, not at that time. (Helms, 7/17/75,
p.34)

On May 7,1962, Edwards and the CIA's General Counsel, Lawrence
Houston, briefed Attorney General Robert Kennedy on the operation
involving underworld figures, deseribing it as terminated. [65]

Harvey told the Inspector General that:

* * * on 14 May he briefed Helms on the lllef'ting \Yith the Attorney General,
as told to him b~' Edwards. Harvey, too, advised against briefing ~Ir. ~IcConp
and General Carter and states that Helms concurred iu this. (1.G. Heport, II. 65)

Harvey testified that he had probably told Helms:

Any briefing of the Director on the discnssion with the Attorney General concerning
this should come from Colourl Ed\vanls and Larry Houston, the General
Counsel. and not from the DDP unless we are asked. (Han-ey, 6/:!J/i5, p. 99)

Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation and remarked:

It seems odd to me only because, if the Attorney General had been briefed on
something it would seelll very logical that it would be vpry important to brief the
Director at that time on the same thing. (Helms, 6/1;l/i5, II. 107)

Harvey supplied poison pills and weapons to RO&'ielli and his Cuban
associates during 11 trip to .Hiallli in late April lU62.  [66] At a Special
Group meeting on April 26, General Taylor requested that Harvey
"attend the next meeting and report on agent activities." (Memo from
)IcCone,4/27/62) On April 2G, HalTPY ,vas SPl1t a memoranclum informing
him of General Taylor's request and l\IcCone's wish to meet
with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately on your return to discuss
the Task Force Activities." (Memo. Elder to Harvey, -1/27/72)

Harvey testified that upon his return, he reported to the Special
Group on the "status of the active and potential sources inside
Cuba * * *":

Q. Did you report on the passage of the pills to Rosselli ?

HARVEY. ::\0, I did not.

Q. 'Vhich you had just accomplished in ;\Iianli * * * for the purpose of assassinating
Fidel Castro.

HARVEY. ;.\0.

Q. And did you report that to :'111'. ::\IcCone when he asked yOU to tell him
what you had done inl\Iiami '?

HARVEY. No, I did not. (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 16-17.)

Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone or the Special Group
about the operation at that time because:

I did not consider either, (a) that this should be in any sense in this amorphous
stag-e, surfaced to the Special Group, nor, as I have attempted to explain before
that it should be briefed to .101m :\Ic(~one at that point in the state that it was
in with as little as we knew about it, and with all of the attendant background
which at that point, and I was not personally cognizant of all of this, had been
going on for approximately, as I recall, two to two-and-a-half years. (Harvey,
7/11/75, p. 18)

Harvey attended an August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group
Augmented. [67] He testified that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
suggested at that meeting that the Special Group "consider the
elimination or assassination of Fidel." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 30)
Harvey said that on the day following this Special Group meeting.

In connection with a morning briefing of John McCone, the question again
came up and I expressed some opinion as to the inappropriateness of this having
been raised in this form and at that forum [Special Group meeting], at which
point l\1r. McCone stated in substance that he agreed and also that he had
felt so strongly that he had, I believe, the preceding afternoon or evening, personally
called the gentleman who made the proposal or suggestion and had
stated similar views as to the inappropriateness and that he [McCone] said in
addition * * * if I ~ot myself involved in something like this, I might end up
getting m~'self excommunicated. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 71)

Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone on that occasion about
the actual assassination operation involving Rosselli.

I would like to recast the time that this took place. This was August of '62.
This was at the start of the so-called Missile Crisis * * *.

A tentative decision had been made at that point that the only sensible thing
to do with [the Rosselli operation] was to terminate it as rapidly and cleanly as
it could be done * * * I am sure that I had discussed with Rosselli, at least on
a tentative basis, by August, the probable necessity of terminating this * * *.

According to the Inspector General's Report, the "medicine" was reported
to be still in Cuba at this time. (LG. Report, pp. 51-52) Harvey
testified that the report was referring to the poison pills. (Harvey,
6/25/75, p. 105)  [68]

In relation to the August 10 meeting, Helms was asked whether
he believed McCone would have stopped an assassination attempt if
he had known that one was underway. Helms stated :

HELMS. The reason I say I don't know * * * is that elsewhere Mr. McCone
states that he went to see Mr. McNamara in connection with this August
1962 affair and told Mr. McNamara that he wouldn't have anything to do with
this, that I have no recollection, that I don't believe he ever said anything to me
about his not wanting to have anything to do with it.

Q. And you were close to Mr. McCone in that period? You are his Deputy
for Plans?

HELMS. I saw him almost daily.

Q. And is it your belief that if he had made any such statement to Mr. McNamara
that he would have come to you and told you about it at some point'!

HELMS. I just don't know why he didn't but I don't recall any such statement.
As I said, and I would like to repeat it, Mr. McCone had given me my job,
he had promoted me, I felt close to him, I felt loyal to him, and I would not have
violated an instruction he gave me if I could have possibly helped it.

Q. But in any event, it is your judgment that he did not indicate that he was
opposed to assassinations '!

HELMS. Not to me.

Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, test.i~ed, howeve~,
that he had personally told Helms of McCone's opposItIon to assaSSInation
after the August 10 meeting. [69]

(iv) The Question of Whether General Carter, McCone's Deputy
Director Learned About the Underworld Plot and Informed McCone. --
As fully described .in other sec~ions of ~his report, the f~ct
that Giancana and RossellI had been lIlvolved 1Il a CIA operatIOn
directed against Cuba was brought to the attention of the F~n ~ome-.
time in mid-1961 although the FBI was not told that the obJectIve of
the operatior~ had been to assassiI~atc CastI:o. '~he CIA oPP?sed prosecution
of Gwncana and Rosselh for theIr lIlvolvement 1Il the Las
Vegas wiretap because of a concern that the Agen~y's.association with
them might be revealed. In the c<?urse,of ~ommulllcatlOnsbetween the
CIA and law enforcement agenCIes, CIA s general counsel, La,vrence
Houston, wrotc in a memorandum dated April 26, 1962:

I * * * briefed the nDCI in view of the possibility that the Attorney General
might call him or the Director in the ease. General Carter understood the situation
and said in due time we might brief the Director. (Memo, Houston to
Edwards, 4/26/62)

The Attorney General was subsequently briefed by Houston and
Sheffield Edwards; a memorandum of that meeting written by Edwards
states that the Attorney General was told that the operation
had been terminated.

The Inspector General's Report inquired into precisely what Houston
had told Calier and concluded:

Edwards states that the briefing of the Attorney General and the forwarding
of a memorandum of record was carried out without briefing the Director (John
McCone), the DDCI (General Carter), or the DDI' (Richard Helms). He felt
that, since they had not been privy to the operation when it was underway, they
should be protected from involvement in it after the fact. Houston had briefed
the DDCI on the fact that there was a matter involving the Department of
.Justice, but Houston had not given the DDCI the specifies. He feels it would have
been normal for him to have briefed the DCI in view of the Attorney General's
interest, but he also feels quite sure that he would have remembered doing it
and does not. He suggested that Edwards' deliberate avoidance of such briefings
may have led him also to avoid making any briefings. He reealls no disagreements
with Edwards on this point and concludes that he must have accepted
Edwards' decision not to brief. (1. G. Report, pp. 63-64)

When testifying before the Committee, Houston could not recall
whether he had told Carter that the operation had involved assassination.
(Houston, 6/17/75, p. Hi) Houston testified that he had learned
from Edwards "within a matter of days before we went to see the
Attorney General." that the purpose of the operation had been to
a~sassi~ate,Castro. (Houston. 6/17/75.. p. 6) Since Houston's discusSIOn
WIth (arter took place. at tllP earhest. nearly two weeks prior to
the Attorney General's briefing, [70] it is possible that he did not know at
the time of that conversation that assassination was involved.

General Marshall S. Carter was appointed Deputy Director of the
CIA in mid-April 1962. When shown the Houston memorandum by
the Committee, Carter testified that he did not recall the meeting- with
Houston, that he had not been told about the assassination plot during
his tenure in the Agency, and that he had never briefed McCone on
either the assassination plot or the CIA's use of Giancana and
Rosselli. (Carter, 9/19/75, pp. 61, 63)

After reading the sentence of Houston's memorandum stating that
Carter had said "in due time we might brief the Director," Carter
testified "it is surely contrary to every operational procedure that I've
ever followed." (Carter, 9/19/75, p. 61) [71] When asked to explain what
might have occurred, he testified:

Memorandums for the record have very little validity in fact. When you sit
down after the fact and write it down, as I say, he could have very easily have
come to me and said this is the kind of problem we're faced with. We've had it
before. I think you ooght to know that we're asking the Department of Justice
not to prosecute this character because he's been trying to do a job for us. I think
under those circumstances, if it were presented In that way, then I might very
well have said, well, you know what you're doing, it's your baliwick, you've done
it before, go ahead and do it. (Carter, 9/19/75, p. 67)

(v) The August 1963 Briefing of McCone. -- An August 16, 1963, Chicago Sun Times article claImed that the CIA had had a connection
with Giancana. [72] McCone asked Helms for a report about the article.
McCone testified that 'when Helms came to see him, he brought the
following memorandum:

1. Attached ts the only copy in the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the
ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May of 1962. I was
vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that
it had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and
Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year..

2. I spoke with Colonel Edwards on the telephone last evening, and, in the
absence of Mr. Bannerman on leave, I was with Colonel Edwards' assistance
able to locate this copy. As far as I am aware, this is the only written information
available on Agency relationships with subject. I hope that this will serve your
purpose.

3. I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation discussed in the attachment.
(Memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence, re: Sam Giancana, from
Helms, 8/16/63) [73]

Attached to Helms' memorandum to the DCI was the May 14, 1962,
memorandum from Sheffield Edwards to the Attorney General which
described the operation as having been ~rminated before McCone
became DCI. (See discussion, infra. p. 132.)

Neither McCone nor Helms was able to remember ,,-hat precisely was
said at the meeting. '''alter Elder, who ,vas then )'fcConels Executive
Assistantl recalled-:

Mr. Helms came in with [the memorandum]. He handed it to [McCone] who
read it and * * * handed it back without any particular comment other than
to say, "Well, this did not happen during my tenure."

* * * * *

Q. Was anything else said?

A. No, he had very little to say about it.

Q. Did Mr. Helms then leave?

A. Mr. Helms left. (Elder, 8/13/75, pp. 16-17, 58)

Elder t~stified that he had concluded that the operation involved
assassination from reading the two memoranda that were given to
McCone. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 60) Elder "further concluded that
[McCone] was perfectly aware of what Mr. Helms was trying to
say to him." (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 60) Elder further testified:

Q. Other than that conversation that you just described between yourself and
;\lr. McCone, did he have anything else to say about that memorandum?

Mr. ELDER. No.

Q. I take it then he did not tell either you or Mr. Helms that we absolutely
could not have this activity going on in the future?

Mr. ELDER. No. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 61)

McCone testified that he could not recall whether Helms had told
him that, the operation referre~ to in the memorandum had involved
assassination, but he did remember that the part of the memorandum
stating that $150,000 was to be paid to the prmcipals on completion of
the operation had indicated to him when he first saw the memorandum
that the aim of the project had been to assassinate Castro.
(McCone,10/9/75,pp.35-36)

The Inspector GeneraPs Report concluded that:

This is the earliest date on which we have evidence of Mr. McCone's being
aware of any aspect of the scheme to assassinate Castro using members of the
gambling syndicate. (I.G. Report, p. 70)

3. AT WHAT LEVEL WERE THE CASTRO PLOTS AUTHORIZED OR KNOWN ABOUT
OUTSIDE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY?

The ensuing section sets forth evidence bearing on whether officials
outside the CIA in either the Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson Administrations
knew about or authorized the attempted assassination of
Fidel Castro. The reader is reminded that the early phases of the assassination
effort against Castro occurred during the same time as the plot
to assassinate Patrice Lumumba (August 1960 through January 1961)
and the CIA's involvement with dissidents bent on assassinating
Raphael Trujillo (February 1960 through May 1961). The evidence
discussed here must be read in conjunction with evidence relating to
those other plots to fully understand the authorization and knowledge
issues and the milieu within which the various plots occurred.

The first part of this section reviews evidence relating to whether
officials of the Eisenhower Administration were aware of or authorized
the assassination efforts against Castro undertaken by the CIA
during that time-the abortive 1960 "accident" plot and the initiation
o.f the plo~ invoh:ing underw?rld figures. The second part of this sechon
exanunes eVIdence relatmg to whether officials of the Kennedy
Administration were aware of or authorized the continuation of the
plot involving the underworld and sending poison to Cuba prior to the
Bay of Pigs. Also eonsidered in that part IS evidence bearing on events
which occurred after the Bay of Pigs that sheds light on whether
Kennedy Administration officials subsequently learned of that attempt.
The third part of this section examines evidenCB relating to whether
offieials of the Kennedy Administration authorized or knew about the
second att€mpt to assassinate Castro involving John Rosselli which
began in April Hl62. This part closely examines the Administration's
effort to overthrow the Castro regime-Operation MONGOOSE-for
any bearing it might have on the pereeption of Agency officials that
assassination mIS "'ithin the sphere of permissible activity.

The final parts examine evidence relating to whether the assassination
activity during the last year of the Kennedy Administration and
in the .Tohnson Administration-Operation AM/LASH-was authorized
01' known about by top Administration officials outside the CIA
and whether that plot was consistent with general efforts sanctioned
by the Administrations to overthrow Castro's government.

(17) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside The Central Intelligence
Agency in The Eisenhower Administration

(i) Summary

The evidence as to whether Allen Dulles, CIA Director during the
Eisenhower Administration, was informed of the Castro assassination
operation is not clear.

Even assnming that Dulles was informed. authorization outside the
CIA for a Castro assassination could, according to the testimony, only
have come from President Eisenhower, from someone speaking for
him, or from the Special Group. At issne, then is whether PresIdent
Eisenhower, his close aides, or the Special Group authorized or had
knowledge of the Castro assassination plots.

The Committee took testimony on this issue from Richard Bissell
and from President Eisenhower's principal staff assistants. In summary,
the evidence was:

(a) Bissell t€stified that he did not inform the Special Group or
President EisenhO\Yer of the Castro assassination operation, and that
he had no personal knowledge that Allen Dulles had informed either
President Eisenhower or the Special Group. However, Bissell expressed
the belief that Allen Dlllles would have advised President
Eisenhower (but not the Special Group) in a "circumlocutious" or
"oblique" way. Bissell based this "pure personal opinion" on his understanding
of Dulles' practice regllrding other particularly sensitive
('overt operations. But Bissell testified that Dulles never told him that
he had so advised President Eisenhower about the Castro assassination
operation, even though Dulles had told Bissell when he had employed
this ','circumlocutious" approach to the President on certain other
occasions.

(b) Gordon Gray, EisenhmwT's Special Assistant for Xational Security
Affairs and the President's representative on the Special Group,
testified that the Special Group never approved a Castro assassination,
and that President Eisenhower had charged the Special Group with
the responsibility of authorizing all important covert operations. A
review of the records of Special Group meetings shows that a query
concerning a plan to take "direct positive action" against Castro
caused Allen Dulles' Deputy, General Cabell, to advise that such action
was beyond the CIA's capability. Gray, Andrew Goodpaster (the President's
staff secretary responsible for national security operational
matters) and.John Eisenhower (Assistant Staff Secretary) each stated
that he believed that President Eisenhower "'ould not have considered
such a matter in a private mepting with Dulles, would not have approved
Castro's assassination, and would not have discussed such a
matter "'ithout telling him. Each concluded as a matter of opinion that
President Eisenhower was never told, and each denied having heard
anything about any assassination.

(c) In addition to the Inspector General's Report (which concluded
that it could not say that any assassination activity carried on
during this period was responsive to Administration pressure), the
documentarv evidence sho,,'s that Castro's removal was discussed at
two meetings of the National Security Council and the Special Group
in March 1960. The minutes of these meetings indicate that the discussions
involYed a general consideration of a proposal to train a
Cuban exile force to invade Cuba and an assessment that Castro's overthrmv
might result in a Communist takeover. Gray and Admiral
Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 through 1961,
testified that these discussions of Castro's removal did not refer to
assassination, but rather to the problem of creating an anti-Castro
exile force strong enough to ensure a non-Communist successor to the
Castro regime. Apparently there was no assassination activity steming
directly from those meetings. Another Special Group document
stated that planning for "direct positive action" against Cuban leaders
was raised at a meeting in the Fall of 1960, shortly after Phase I of the
CIA/underworld assassination operation was initiated. The DDCI
told the Special Group, however, that such action was beyond the
CIA's capability.

(ii) Richard Bissell's Testimony

(1) Lack of Personal Knowledge

Bissell testified that he knew nothing of authorization outside the
CIA for the Castro assassination effort. (BisselL 6/9/75, p. 30) Bissell
testified that he met frequently with the Special Group in the fall of
1960 to discuss Cuban operations, but that he never informed the
Special Group or any Administration official that there was a plot
underway involving the use of underworld figures to assassinate Castro.
(Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 25-29) Bissell said he did not do so because as
Deputy Director of Plans, he reported to the Director, and under
Agency procedures, relied on the Director to inform the appropriate
persons outside the Agency.

(2) Assumptions Concerning Dulles

Based on his belief that Dulles had been briefed about the operation
involving underworld figures and understood that it involved assassination,
Bissell testified that:

I went on the assumption that, in a matter of this sensitivity, the Director
would handle higher level clearances. By clearance, I mean authorization [74]
(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 26)

Bissell stated that although he believed that Dulles "probably"
talked with President Eisenhower:

the :\Iafia operation was not regarded as of enormous importance and there
were much more important matters to talk about with the President. (Bissell,
7/17/75,p.25)

Bissell testified that he was only "guessing" that Dulles had informed
Eisenhower, and that the President had then given his authorization,
"perhaps only tacitly." (Bissell, 7/17/75, pp. 38-39; 6/11/75,
p. 6) Bissell said that this guess was "not based on hard evidence,"
but was "pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 61), derived from
his knmdedge of "command relationship, of Allen Dulles as an indidual,
and of his [Dulles'] mode of operations." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6)

Bissell emphasized, however:

I still want to be quite clear, I do not have any recollection of the Director
telling me that on this specific operation he had made such an approach and
received assent, approval, tacit or otherwise. (Bissell, 6/11/75; p. 11)

In describing the manner in which Dulles might have informed the
President of the assassination plot involving underworld figures, Bissell
said circumlocution would have been used "to protect the President"
in accord with the concept of "plausible deniabIlity." [75]

My guess is that indeed whoever informed him, that is Dulles di'rectly or Dulles
through a staff member, would have had the same desire ... to shield the President
and to shield him in the sense of intimating or making clear that something
of the sort was going forward, but giving the President as little information about
it as possible, and the purpose of it would have been to give the President an
opportunity, if he so elected, to cancel it, to order it cancelled, or to allow it to
continue but without, in effect, extracting from him an explicit endorsement of
the detailed specific plan. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 61)

On other occasions involving sensitive covert operations, Bissell
said that Dulles had used just such a "circumlocutious approach" with
President Eisenhower. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 10)

(iii) Testimony of White House Officials

(1) Gordon Gray

Gordon Gray served as President Eisenhower's Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs from July 1958 to January 20, 1961.
(Gray, 7/9/75, p. 4) Gray was also the President's representative on
the Special Group. (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 4) President Eisenhower instructed
Gray that all covert actions impinging on the sovereignty
of other countries must be deliberated by the Special Group. (Gray,
7/9/75, p. 6) Gray testified that from .Tldy 1958 to .January 20, 1961,
the Special Gronp never approved an action to assassinate Castro
(Gray,7/9/75, p. 6) and that no such suggestion was made by Bissell.
(Gray,7/9/75,p.37)

Gray testified that:

I find it very difficult to believe, and I do not believe, that Mr. Dulles would
have gone independently to him [PreRident Eisenhower] with Ruch a propoRal
without, for that matter, my knowing about it from :\Ir. Dulles. (Gray, 7/9/75,
p. 35) [76]

Gray further testified that his relationship with President Eisenhower
was such that President Eisenhower "would discuss with me
anything that came to his attention independently of me." (Gray,
7/9/75, p. 7) And Gray testified that President Eisenhower never discussed
with him the subject of a Castro assassination or of the usc of
the underworld figures and Cubans in such an effort. (Gray, 7/9/75,
p. 7)

(2) Andrew Goodpaster

Goodpaster sened as President Eisenhower's Staff Secretary and
Defense Liaison Officer during the last two years of the Eisenhower
Administration. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 3) In addition to responsibility
for the President's schedule and supervision of the 'White House
staff, Goodpaster was responsible for handling with the President "all
matters of day to day operations" in the foreign affairs and national
security field. including the activities of the CIA and the Departments
of State and Defense. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 3) Goodpaster testified
that he had a "very close personal relationship" "'ith President Eisenhower
and saw the President "essentially eYery day "hen [President
Eisenhower] was in ·Washington." (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 4) Gordon
Gray and Goodpaster served as the channels between the CIA and the
President, and Goodpaster had particular responsibility for "operations
in which [President Eisenhower] might take a personal part."
(Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 4) .

Goodpaster testified that he never heard any mention of assassination
efforts. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 5) He said that President Eisenhower
neYer told him about any assassination effort and that it was
his belief, under 'White House procedures and by virtue of his close
relationship with President Eisenhower, that if an assassination plan
or operation had ever been raised with the President, he (Goodpaster)
"'ould have learned of it. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 5)

That was simply not the President's way of doing business. He had made it
very clear to us how he wanted to handle matterR of this kind, and we had set
up procedures to see that they were then handled that ,,·ay. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75,
pp.6-7)

General Goodpaster testified that he found Bissell's assumption of
a "circumlocutious" personal conversation bebvcen Dulles and the
President "completely unlikely."

According to Goodpaster, after the collapse of the Paris Summit
Conference between President :Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev
as a result of the U-2 incident in the spring of 1960, the Eisenhower
Administration reviewed its procedures for approval of CIA operations
and tightened them. Goodpaster said that this review was carried
out

with the aim in mind of being sure we had full and explicit understanding of
any proposals that came to us and we knew from [President Eisenhower] that
in doing that we were responsive to a desire on his part. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75,
p. 7)

Goodpaster also said John Foster Dulles was a confidant of the
President while Allen Dulles was not. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 8)

(3) Thomas Parrott

Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer, served as Secretary of the Special
Group from 1957 until October 1963. (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 4) Parrott
stated that by virtue of this assignment, he was Allen Dulles' assistant
in the Special Group. He came to know Dulles well, and gained an
understanding of the Director's method of expression and his practice
in dealing with the President. [77] (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 13-14)

Parrott testified that early in 1959, President Eisenhower directed
the Special Group to meet at least once a week to consider, approve,
or reject all significant covert action operations. (Parrott, 7/10/75,
p. 4) He said that:

as evidenced in his '" '" '" revitalization '" '" '" of this Committee [the Special
Group], [President Eisenhower was] highly conscious of the necessity to be
protective '" '" '" in this field, and I just cannot conceive that [President Eisenhower]
would have gone off and mounted some kind of covert operation on his
own. This certainly would not have been consistent with President Eisenhower's
staff method of doing business '" '" '" [78]

(4) John Eisenhower

John Eisenhower was Goodpaster's Assistant Staff Secretary from
mid-1958 to the end of his father's Administration. (Eisenhower,
7/18/75, pp. 5, 9) Eisenhower testified that his father had confided
in him about secret matters "to a very large extent." (Eisenhower,
7/18/75, p. 3) For example, he said that after the Potsdam Conference
in July 1945, his father had told him that the United States had
developed the atomic bomb (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 3) and that as
early as 1956, President Eisenhower had told him of the secret U-2
flights. (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 4)

.Tohn Eisenhower said that President Eisenhower never told him
of any CIA activity involving an assassination plan or attempt concerning
Castro and it was his opinion that President Eisenhower
would have told him if the President had known about such activity.
(Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 5) He also said that President Eisenhower
did not discuss important subjects circumlocutiously. (Eisenhower,
7/18/75, p. 8) He told the Committee that President Eisenhower believed
that no leader was indispensable, and thus assassination was
not an alternative in the conduct of foreign policy. (Eisenhower,
7/18/75,p.14)

(iv) Documentary Evidence

(1) The Inspector General's Report. -- The concluding section of the
Inspector General's Report advanced several possible responses to
Drew Pearson's public charges about CIA links with the underworld. [79]
One question posed in the Inspector General's Report was: "Can CIA
state 0: imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?" The answer
given was:

Not in this case. While it is true that Phase Two (the attempt commencing in
April 1962) was carried out in an atmosphere of intense Kennedy Administration
pressure to do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier phase.
(I.G. Report, p. 132)

(2) The Contemporaneous Documents. -- The Committee also examined
records of the National Security Council, the Special Group,
and other relevant 'Vhite House files bearing on the question of authorization
for the period from Castro's rise to power to the end of
the Eisenhower Administration. Three documents were found which
contained references arguably related to the subject of assassination.

In March 1960, the National Security Council and the Special Group
focused on America's Cuban policy. President Eisenhower had just
returned from a foreign trip in which:

Latin American Presidents had counseled further forbearance by the U.S.
in the hope that the members of the Organization of American States would
finally see the potential danger in Cuba and take concerted action. ( Memorandum
of ~Iarch 10. 1960 NSC Meeting)

Castro was characterized as hostile. but his Communist ties were
apparently then unclear. [80] The minutes of the March 10, 1960, NSC
meeting stated:

There is no apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro
disappears. Indeed the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist
takeover.

The general covert action plan against Cuba came out of these
March 1960 meetings of the NSC and Special Group. [81]

The record of the KSC meeting of March 10, 1960 (at which President
Eisenho,ver was present) . states that Admiral Arleigh Burke, in
commenting on Allen Dulles' statement that the Cuba covert action
plan "'as in preparation, "suggested that any plan for the removal of
Cuban leaders should be a package deal, since many of the Cuban
leaders around Castro were even worse than Castro." According to the
minutes of the Special Group meeting on March 14, 1960 (which
President Eisenhower did not attend), "there was a general discussion
as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and
. Raul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously."

Admiral Burke stated in an affidavit [82] that although he did not
recall the March 10,1960, NSC meeting, he did have a clear recollection
of discussions of Cuba policy in the spring of 1960. (Burke affidavit)

Burke stated that the reference to his suggestion at the March 10
meeting "clearly refers to the general covert action plan reported
by Allen Dulles at that meeting and to the general consideration
given at that time in the U.S. Government to identify Cuban groups
with which the U.S. might work to overthrow the Castro regime."
(Burke affidavit) Burke continued:

In this connection, it was my view that the U.S. must support those Cuban
groups who would have a sufficient power base among the Cuban people, not
merely to overthrow Castro, but to be able to cope with and dismantle his organization
as well. It was my firm belief at the time that many people in Castro's
organization were Communist and that Castro was probably a Communist. I
therefore advocated that any effort to support groups so as to achieve Castro'~
overthrow must focus, not merely on the leaders at the top of the Castro regime,
but on the very strong organization that had been the key to Castro's rise to
power, and was the basis for his power.

* * * * * * *

The question of a Castro assassination never arose at the March 10, 1960 NSC
meeting or at any other meeting or discussion that I attended or in which I pare
ticipated. It is my firm conviction based on five years of close association with
President Eisenhower during my service as Chief of Naval Operations, that
President Eisenhower would never have tolerated such a discussion, or have
permitted anyone to propose assassination, nor would he have ever authorized,
condoned, or permitted an assassination attempt. (Burke affidavit)

Gordon Gray testified that the March 10 and March 14, 1960 meet~
ings dealt with plans to overthrow the Castro government, rather
than with assassinating Castro. He said that Admiral Burke's comment
at the March 10 NSC meeting was part of a lengthy and general
discussion about Cuba. Burke's reference to a "package deal" for the
removal of Cuban leaders was in direct response to a comment by
Allen Dulles that "a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being
worked on." (Gray, 7/9/75, pp. 13-14) Gray said he believed that
Dulles "was certainly referring to" the Eisenhower Administration's
plan to train Cuban exiles for an invasion, rather than to a targeted
attempt on Castro's life. [83] (Gray, 7/9/75, pp. 14-, 45) Gray testified
that viewing Burke's remarks in context, he believed it was clear that
"Admiral Burke * * * was expressing his opinion that if you have any
plan [for the overthrow of Castro] it ought to take these factors into
consideration, that you might end up with a Communist government."
(Ciray,7/9/75,p.45)

Adm~ral Burke stated that the "general discussion" at the March 14
SPecial Group meeting "clearly did not involve a discussion of assassination
of Cuban leaders, but to the possible effects should only those
leaders be overthrown by a group not powerful enough to also master
the organization those leaders had established in Cuba." [84] (Burke
affidavit) Burke added:

Thus, it was consistent with my views then that I should have been. recorded
in the record of the March 14 meeting as warning in this discussion that the
Communists might move into control even if these three top leaders should be
overthrown. As stated above, I strongly believed that a strong, organized group
must be in the forefront of any effort to overthrow the Castro government. (Burke
affidavit)

When the question of "whether any real planning had been done for
taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Ciuevara"
was subsequently raised at a Special Ciroup meeting on November 3~
1960, Cieneral Cabell reportedly said:

that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in concep'
tion and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, par·
ticularly because of the necessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be
concluded that (such action) is beyond our capabilities. (Minutes Special Group
Meeting, November 3, 1960)

The reference to "direct positive action" is ambiguous and subject
to different interpretations, including a suggestion that assassination
be explorea. [85]

However, it is clear that at most a question was being asked. Moreover,
assuming that "direct positive action" meant killing, it is significant
that shortly after assassination plots were begun, the CIA
Deputy Director told the Special Group that such action was "beyond
our capabilities."

(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside The
Central Intelligence Agency during the Kennedy Administration

We have divided the evidence on whether or not assassination plots
were authorized during the Kennedy Administration into three sections.
The first primarily relates to the assassination operation involving
underworld figures prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion in
April 1961. The second deals with the post-Bay of Pigs period, and
the Rosselli operation in the spring of 1962. That section also discusses
Operation Mongoose. A third section discusses the 1963 laboratory
schemes and the AM/LASH plot.

(i) Pre-Bay Of Pigs Assassination Plot

The testimony was essentially the same as for the Eisenhower Administration.
BIssell again said he assumed and believed that Dulles
had met with President Kennedy and informed hIm, in a circumlocutious
fashion, that the operation had been planned and was being
attempted. Bissell also testified that he (Bissell) informed neither
the President nor any other officials outside the CIA about the assassination
efforts. Each Kennedy Administration official who testified
said that he had not known about or authorized the plots, and did not
believe the President would have authorized an assassination.

(1) Bissell's Testimony Concerning His Assumption That Dulles
Told The President. -- Richard Bissell continued as DDP, the
principal agency official responsible for efforts against the Castro
regime, including both the Bay of Pigs operation and the assassination
plots, when Kennedy became President in January, 1961. Bissell
is the only surviving CtA policy maker with first hand knowledge
of high-level decisions in the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the Castro
assassination plot involving underworld figures. Although Bissell testified
that Allen Dulles never told him that Dulles had informed Presi"
dent Kennedy about the underworld plot, Bissell told the Committee
that he believed Dulles had so informed President Kennedy and that
the plot had accordingly been approved by the highest authority. [86]

Senator BAKER. * * * you have no reason to think that he [Dulles] didn't or
he did [brief the President]. But the question I put was whether or not in the
ordinary course of the operations of the CIA as you know them under their traditions,
their rules and regulations, and their policies in your opinion-was the
President, President-elect briefed or was he not?

BISSELL. I believe at some stage the President and the President-elect both
were advised that such an operation had been planned and was being attempted.

Senator BAKER. By whom?

BISSELL. I would guess through some channel by Allen Dulles.

The CHAffiMAN. But you're guessing, aren't you?

Mr. BrssELL. I am, Mr. Chairman, and I have said that I cannot recollect the
giving of such briefing at the meeting with the President-elect in November or
in any meeting with President Eisenhower. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 3S--39)

Bissell characterized his belief that the President had been informed
as "a pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 60-61) ; on another
occasion the following exchange occurred:

'Senator MORGAN. Mr. Bissell, it's a serious matter to attribute knowledge of
this sort to the President of the United States, especially one who cannot speak
for himself. Is it fair to assume that out of an abundance of caution you are
simply telling us that you have no knowledge unless you are absolutely certain?
* * * I gather that you think * * * it [assassination plot information] came out
but because of the seriousness of the accusation you are just being extremely
cautious· * * is that a fair assumption to make?

BISSELL. That is very close to a fair assumption, sir. It's just that I have no
direct knowledge, first-hand knowledge of his [President Kennedy's] being advised,
hut my 'belief is that he knew of it [assassination plans]. (Bissell, 6/9/75,
pp.55-56)

Bissell said that he had not personally informed White House officials
or the President of the assassination plot because he "left the
question of advising senior officials of the government and obtaining
clearances in Allen Dulles' hands." (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 29, 33) As
with President Eisenhower, Bissell once again "assumed" that Dulles
"had at least intimated [to President Kennedy] that some such thing
was underway." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 33) [87]

Bissell speculated that Dulles would have engaged in a "circumlocutious"
conversation using "rather general terms," although Dulles did
not mention such a briefing to Bissell, as he had on some past occasions
when he had circumlocutiously briefed President Eisenhower on sensitive
matters. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 6, 10-14)

Bissell repeatedly coupled Eisenhower and Kennedy when he speculated
that the Presidents would have been advised in a manner calculated
to maintain "plausible deniability." (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 38, 57;
6/11/75, pp. 5-6) :

In the case of an operation of high sensitivity of the sort that we ·are discussing,
there was a further objective that would have been pursued at various
levels, and that was specifically with respect to the President, to protect the
P,resident. And, therefore, the way in which I believe that Allen Dulles would
have attempted to do that was to have indicated to the vwo successive Presidents
the general objective of the operation that was contemplated, to make that sufficiently
clear so that the President---either 'President IDisenhower or President
Kennedy---eould have ordered the termination of the operation, hut to give the
P,resident just as little information about it as possible beyond ·an understanding
of its general ,purpose. Such an approach to the President would have had as its
purpose to leave him in the position to deny knowledge of the operation if it
should surface.

My belief-a belief based, as I have said, only to my knowledge of command
relationship of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his mode of operationsis
that authorization was obtained by him in the manner that I have indicated.
I used the word on Monday "circumlQCutious," and it was to this approach
that I referred.

Assuming for the moment that I am correct, since the effort would have
been to minimize the possibility of embarrassment to the President, it is, I
think, understandable that neither I nor anyone else in the Agency would have
discussed this operation on our own initiative with, for instance, members of
the White House staff.

The effort would have been to hold to the absolute minimum the number of
people who knew that the President had been consulted, had been notified and
had given, perhaps only tacitly, his authorization. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6)

(2) Bissell's Testimony Regarding His Own Actions. -- When Bissell
was asked if he had informed anyone outside the CIA that
Bissell was asked if he had informed anyone outside the CIA that
an effort to assassinate Castro was underway, he replied, "not to my
recollection." He added that he was never told that any official outside
the Agency had been made aware of such an effort. (Bissell,
6/9/75, pp. 28-30)

Bissell had ample opportunity to inform appropriate officials outside
the CIA of the plot. He worked closely with McGeorge Bundy, the
White House liaison for Cuban affars and formerly one of Bissell's
students at Yale University. Bissell and Bundy were also personal
friends, but Bissell testified that he never told Bundy about the plot,
a fact Bundy confirmed. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 16,28-29; 7/22/75, p. 31)
(Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 41) Bissell testified that:

* * * almost from the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, the President
himself and a number of Cabinet members and other senior officials took a
very active interest in the operation(s) concerning Cuba. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 16)

Bissell was "'almost invariably" present at meetings on Cuba
in which the President and other senior officials took an "active interest."
(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 17) Bissell testified that he did not then
inform any of them of the assassination plot. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 39)

(3) Kennedy Administration Officials Testimony. -- The Committee
has taken testimony from all living officials high in the Kennedy Administration
who dealt with Cuban affairs. [88] The theme of their testimoney
was that they had no knowledge of any assassination plan or
attempt by the United States government before or after the Bay of
Pigs invasion, and that they did not believe President Kennedy's character
or style of operating would be consistent with approving
assassination.

Secretary of Senate Dean Rusk testified, "I never had any reason
to believe that anyone that I ever talked to knew about had any
active planning of assassination underway." (Rusk, 7/10/75, p. 65)

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that he had "no
knowledge or information about * * * plans or preparations for a
possible assassination attempt against Premier Castro." (McNamara,
7/11/75,p.7)

Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense under McNamara,
said that killing Castro was not within the mandate of the Special
Group, which he construed as having been only to weaken and undermine
"the Cuban economy." (Gilpatric, 7/8/75, p. 28)

General Maxwell Taylor, who later chaired Special Group meetings
on Operation MONGOOSE, stated that he had "never heard" of
an assassination effort against Oastro, and that he never raised the
question of assassination with anyone. (Taylor, 7/9/75, pp. 7-8,72,19)

McGeorge Bundy stated that it was his "conviction" that "no one
in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House, or in the cabinet,
eVer gave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind
for any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA." (Bundy, 7/11/75,
p. 54) Bundy said that he was never told that assassination efforts
were being conducted against Castro. (Bundy, 7/11175, p. 63)

Walt W. Rostow, who shared national security duties with Bundy
before moving to the Department of State. testified that during his
entire tenure in government, he "never heard a reference" to an intention
to undertake an assassination effort. (Rostow, 7/9/75, pp. 10,
12-13,38)

Asked if he had ever been told anything about CIA efforts to assassinate
Castro, Richard Goodwin, Assistant Special Counsel to the President,
replied, "No, I never heard of such a thing." (Goodwin, 7/18/75,
p.13) [89]

Theodore Sorensen, who said that his "first-hand knowledge" of
Cuban affairs was limited to the post-Bay of Pigs period, stated that
his general opinion, based on his close contact with President Kennedy,
was that

* * * such an act [as assassination] was totally foreign to his character and
conscience, foreign to his fundamental reverence for human life and his respect
for his adversaries, foreign to his insistence upon a moral dimension in U.S.
foreign policy and his concern for this country's reputation abroad and foreign
to his pragmatic recognition that so horrendous but inevitably counterproductive
a precedent committed by a country whose own chief of state was inevitably
vulnerable could only provoke reprisals and inflame hostility. * * * (Sorensen,
7/21/75, p. 5)

Sorensen stated that President Kennedy "would not make major foreign
policy decisions alone without the knowledge or participation of
one or more of those senior foreign policy officials in whose judgment
and discretion he had confidence." (Sorensen, 7/21/75, p. 6)

Sorensen concluded his testimony with the following exchange:

Q. Would you think it would be possible that * * * the Agency, the CIA
could somehow have been under the impression that they had a tacit authorization
for assassination due to a circumspect discussion that might have taken place
in any of these meetings?

SORENSEN. It is possible, indeed, I think the President on more than one
occasion felt that Mr. Dulles, by making rather vagne and sweeping ref"rences
to particular countries was seeking tacit approval without ever asking for it,
and the President was rather concerned that he was not being asked for explicit
directives and was not being given explicit information, so it is possible.
But on something of this kind, assassination, I would doubt it very much. Either
,y{)U are for it or you are not for it, and he was not for it. (Sorensen 7/21/75,
pp.32-33)

(4) The Question of Whether Assassination Efforts Were Disclosed
in Various Briefings of Administration Officials.

a. Briefing of the President-Elect

In the latter part of November 1960, after the Presidential election,
Dulles and Bissell jointly briefed President-elect Kennedy on "the
most important details with respect to the operation which became
the Bay of Pigs." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 34) Bissell testified that he
did not believe the ongoing assassination efforts were mentioned to
the President-elect at that meeting. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 27, 35-36)
Bissell surmised that the reasons he and Dulles did not tell Kennedv
at that initial meeting were that they had "apparently" thought it
waf: not an important matter, [90] and that they "would have thought that
that was a matter of which he should be advised upon assuming office
rather than in advance." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 35) Bissell's latter comment
led to the following exchange:

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it a strange distinction that you draw that on the one
nand (as) a Presidential designate, as President-elect, he should have all of
the details concerning a planned invasion of Cuba, but that he should not be
told about an ongoing attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. BISSELL. { think that in hindsight it could be regarded as peculiar, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. * * * (l)t just seems too strange that if you were charged with
briefing the man who was to become President of the U.S. on matters so important
as a planned invasion of a neighboring country, and that if you knew at the
time in addition to the planned invasion there was an ongoing attempt to -assassinate
the leader of that country, that you would tell C\olr. Kennedy about one
matter and not the other.

Mr. BISSELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is quite possible that Mr. Dulles did say
something about an attempt to or the possibility of making use of syndicate
characters for this purpose. 1 do not remember his doing so at that ,briefing. My
belief is tJJat had he done so, he probably would have done so in rather general
terms and that neither of us was in a position to go into detail on the matter.
(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 35)

However, Bissell also testified generally that pursuant to the doc~
trine of "plausible denial," efforts were made to keer> matters that
might be "embarrassing" away from Presidents. (BIssell, 6/11/75,
pp.5-6)

b. Discussion with Bundy on "Executive Action Capability"

Sometime early in the Kennedy Administration, Bissell discussed
with Bundy a "capability" for "executive action"-a term Bissell said
included various means of "eliminating the effectiveness" of forei~
leaders, including assassination. [91] (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32) Bissell dId
not tell Bundy about the plot against Castro during their discussion
of Executive Aotion capability. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 31; Bundy;
7/11/75, p. 41) However, Bissell did say that Castro, Trujillo, and
Lumumba might have been mentioned in connection with a discussion
of "research" into the capability. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 50-51)

c. Taylor/Kennedy Bay of Pigs Inquiry

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy
convened a "court of inquiry" which reviewed "the causes of '" '" '"
[the] failure" of the operation. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 42, 45) Robert
Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor, Allen Dulles, and Admiral Arleigh
Burke comprised the Board. The "Taylor Report," issued on June 13,
1961 after the panel had examined the matter for several weeks, makes
no mention of the assassination plot.

Bissell was questioned extensively by the Taylor/Kennedy Board.
General Taylor considered Bissell to have been the principal government
official in the Bay of Pigs operation. He thought Bissell much
more knowledgeable than Dulles, who had deliberately removed himself
from the planning and had delegated responsibility to Bissell.
(Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 73)

Bissel said he had not disclosed the assassination plot to the Taylor/
Kennedy Board and advanced several reasons for not having done so.
First, "the question was never asked;" second, Dulles already knew
about the operation; third, "by that time the assassination attempt had
been called off;" fourth, the assassination effort was "not germane"
because it did not contribute to the failure of the Bay of Pigs. (Bissell,
6/9/75, pp. 44-46; 6/11/75, p. 39) Bissell added that he had "no
reason to believe" that Allen Dulles did not discuss the plot with one
or more of the other Board members. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 46) However,
both General Taylor and Admiral Burke, the only other members of
the Board still living, stat~d that neither Bissell nor Dulles had informed
them of the assassination plot. (Taylor, 7/9/75, pp. 72-73;
Burke affidavit, 8/25/75) [92]

Bissell's testimony that he had not disclosed the assassination plot
to the Kennedy/Taylor Board is consistent with his statement that
"I have no knowledge that Robert Kennedy was advised of this rthe
plot to kill Mr. Castro]." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 41)

The Committee tested this stat~ment against other parts of Bissell's
testimony. FBI Director Hoover sent the Attorney General a
memorandum about the Las Vegas wiretap on May 22, 1961. [93] An
attachment to that memorandum quoted Sheffield Edwards as saying
that Bissell, in his "recent briefings" of Taylor and Kennedy "told the
Attorney General that some of the associated planning included the
use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro."

When Bissell was first shown this document by the Committee,
he said: "I have no recollection of briefing those two gentlemen except
as members of the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of which
Allen Dulles himself was a member." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 27)

In a subsequent appearance before the Committee, Bissell again
said that he had no recollection of the conversation referenced in the
May 22 memorandum. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 56) He was sure that if
such a conversation had occurred it was not before the Kennedy/
Taylor Board. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 64)

Bissell speculated, however, that the memorandum quoted language
which "I might very well have used, that is, the use of the underworld
against Castro." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 21)

The examination of Bissell on whether he had discussed a pre-Bay
of Pigs plot with the Attorney General or General Taylor and, if
so, why he used such obscure and indirect language, elicited the following
testimony:

Q. Did you, sometime in May of 1961 communicate the state of your awareness
to the Attorney General in your briefing to him?

BISSELL. Well, there is a report which I was shown, I think it was last week,
I believe it also came from the FBI, but I could be wrong about that, or indicating
that I did, at that time in May, brief the Attorney General, and I think
General Taylor to the effect that the Agency had been using-I don't know
whether Giancana was mentioned by name, but in effect, the Underworld against
the Castro regime.

Q. Did you tell them-them being the Attorney General and General Taylorthat
this use included actual attempts to assassinate Mr. Castro?

BISSELL. I have no idea whether I did [.] I have no idea of the wording. I
think it might quite possibly have been left in the more general terms of using
the underworld against the Castro regime, or the leadership of the Castro regime.

Q. Mr. Bissell, given the state of your knowledge at that time, wouldn't that
have been deliberately misleading information?

BISSELL. I don't think it would have been. We were indeed doing precisely
that. We were trying to use elements of the underworld against Castro and the
Cuban leadership.

Q. But you had information, didn't you, that you were, in fact, trying to kill
him?

BISSELL. I think that is a way of using these people against him.

Q. That's incredible. You're saying that in briefing the Attorney General you are
telling him you are using the underworld against Castro, and you intended that
to mean, Mr. Attorney GeneraI, we are trying to kHl him?

BISSELL. I thought it signaled just exactly that to the Attorney General, I'm
sure.

Q. Then it's your belief that you communicated to the Attorney General that
you were, in fact, trying rto kill Castro?

BISSELL. I think it is best to rest on that report we do have, which is from a
source over which I had no influence and it does use the phrase I have quoted here.
Now you can surmise and I can surmise as to just what the Attorney General
would have read into that phrase. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 53-54)

Q. Was it your intent to circumlocutiously or otherwise, to advise the Attorney
General that you were in the process of trying to kill Castro?

Mr. BISSELL. [U]nless I remembered the conversation at the time, which I don't,
I don't have any recollection as to whether that was my intent or not. (Bissell,
7/22j75,p.56)

Bissell speculated further that a "proper" briefing might have
omitted any reference to the assassination plot. (Bissell, '7/22/75,
p. 59) As bases for his speculation, Bissell suggested first that even if
he had "thoroughly briefed" the Attorney General he would have
chosen "circumlocutious" language to tell him about the activity involving
Giancana. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 53-56) ; and second that the
assassination effort had been "stood down by them." (Bissell, 7/22/75,
p. 59) Bissell concluded by reiterating that he had "no knowledge"
that the Attorney General was "specifically advised" of the assassination
plot against Castro. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 62) [94]

(5) Conversation Between President Kennedy and Senator George
Smathers

George Smathers, former Senator from Florida, testified that
the subject of a possibleassassinatioR of Castro arose in a conversation
Smathers had with President Kennedy on the White House lawn
in 1961. [95] Smathers said he had discussed the general Cuban situation
with the President many times. (Smathers, 7/23/75, p. 6) Smathers
had many Cuban constituents and was familiar with Latin American
affairs. He was also a long-time friend of the President. (Smathers,
7/23/75, p. 6)

It was Smathers' "impression" that President Kennedy raised the
sullject of assassination with Smathers because someone else "had ap-
parently discussed this and other possibilities with respect to Cuba"
with the President. (Smathers, 7/23/75, pp. 16,25) Smathers had no
direct knowledge of any such discussion, or who might have been involved.
(Smathers, 7/23/75, pp. 18-19,25) The President did not indicate
directly that assassination had been proposed to him. (Smathers,
7/23/75, p. 18)

According to Smathers:

* * * [President Kennedy] asked me what reaction I thought there would be
throughout iSouth America were Fidel Castro to be assassinated * * * I told the
President that even as much as I disliked Fidel Castro that I did not think it
would be a good idea for there to be even considered an assassination of Fidel
Castro, and the President of the United States completely agreed with me, that
it would ,be a very unwise thing to do, the reason obviously being that no matter
who did it and no matter how it was done and no matter what, that the United
States would receive full credit for it, and the President receive full credit for it,
and it would work to his great disadvantage with all of the other countries in
Central and South America * * * I disapproved of it, and he completely disapproved
of the idea. (Smathers, 7/23/75, pp. 6-7)

Smathers said that on a later occasion he had tried to discuss Cuba
with President Kennedy and the President had made it clear to
Smathers that he should not raise the subject with him again. [96]

Senator Smathers concluded his testimony by indicating that on
Cuban affairs in general, he felt he was "taking a tougher stance than
was the President." (Smathers, 7/23/75, p. 24) Smathers said he was
"positive" that Kennedy opposed assassination. (Smathers, 7/23/75,
p.16)

(6) The Question of Whether the President or the Attorney General
Might Have Learned of the Assassination Effort from the Cuban
Participants

A memorandum for the record in CIA files dated April 24, 1961,
reflects that on April 19-20, in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, President
Kennedy and other Administration officials, including Secretary
of Defense McNamara and General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with a translator and several members
of Cuban groups involved in the Bay of Pigs. One of those Cuban exile
leaders had been involved in the passage of poison pills to Cuba in
March or April of that year;  [97] there is no evidence that any of the
other Cubans at the meeting were involved in or aware of the assassination
plot, and it is unclear whether that particular Cuban realized that
the plot in which he was involved was sponsored by the CIA. [98] The
April 24 memorandum states that the atmosphere of the meeting reflected
depression over the failure of the Bay of Pigs.

On May 18, 1961, the Taylor/Kennedy Board interviewed several
Cuban exile leaders who had been involved in the Bay of Pigs, including
the leaders who had cooperated in the assassination plot. The
summary of that session states that the subject of the inquiry was the
Bay of Pigs operation. Attorney General Robert Kennedy was present.

The Cuban exile leader involved in the assassination plot may have
seen the Attorney General on one further occasion shortly after the
Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. Rosselli testified that this Cuban
then was being used by the United States Govel'llment to aid in intelligence
gathering and covert operations directed at Cuba. Rosselli said
that he met that Cuban and other Cuban leaders in Washington,
D.C., and that the Cubans told him they "were here meeting with the
Attorney General and that they were waiting for an appointment from
the White House." (Rosselli, 9/22/15, p. 6) They did not tell Rosselli
their reasons for seeing the Attorney General, indicating only that
the meeting involved the Cuban situation generally. Rosselli said that
he did not discuss the assassination operation with the Cuban leaders
"because I did not want [the second leader] to hear of it, because he
was not part of it." (Rosselli, 9/22/15, p. 10)

(7) The Question of Whether or not the Assassination Operation
Involving Underworld Figures was Known about by Attorney General
Kennedy or President Kennedy as Revealed by Investigations of
Giancana and Rosselli.

Beginning in the fall of 1960 and continuing throughout the Bay
of Pigs and MONGOOSE periods (through 1962), the CIA undertook
an assassination operation against Castro involving underworld
figures. Following the discovery of the wiretap in a Las Vegas hotel
room on October 31, 1960. [99] the CIA began disclosing aspects of its
involvement with underworld figures to the FBI, to certain Justice
Department officials, and after the advent of the Kennedy Administration,
to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. [100] This section sets
forth evidence bearing on what Attorney General Robert Kennedy
did or did not know about the use of underworld figures by the CIA
as revealed by FBI and Justice Department investigations surrounding
the discovery of the Las Vegas wiretap.

This section also discusses evidence bearing on whether or not
President Kennedy knew prior to April 1962, or at any time thereafter
about the pre-Bay of Pigs plot involving underworld figures.
There are two issues. The first is whether the President was made
aware, through either the FBI or the Attorney General, of the CIA's
use of Rosselli and Giancana. The second is whether the President
learned that the CIA had used Rosselli and Giancana in an attempt
to assassinate Fidel Castro.

a. 1960. -- On October 18, 1960, FBI Director Hoover sent a memorandum
[101] to DDP Bissell with copies to some other members of the
intBlligence community [102] stating that an informant had reported
that "* * * during [a] recent ~conversation with several friends.
Giancana stated that Fidel Castro ,vas to be done away with very
shortly. 1Vhen doubt was expressed regarding this state·ment. Giancana
reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination
would occur in November." [103] (Memo, Hoover to Bissell, 10/18/69)
According to the memorandum Giancana claimed to have met with
the assassin-to-be on three occasions and said that the assassination
could be accomplished by dropping a pill in Castro's food. The memorandum
did not specifically reveal CIA involvement.

After discovering the Las Vegas wiretap on October 31, 1960, the
FBI commenced an investigation which quickly developed that Maheu
and Giancana were involved in the case. In April 1961, Rosselli's involvement
was discovered.

b. 1961. -- The first documentary evidence indicating alleged CIA
involvement with the wiretap case is an FBI report dated April 20.
1961. The report stated that on April 18, 1961, Maheu informed the
FBI that the tap had played a part in a project "on behalf of the CIA
relative to anti-Castro activities," a fact which could be verified by
Sheffield Edwards, CIA's Director of Security. [104]

Bissell testified that he knew during the spring of 1961 that Edwards
was seeking to persuade the Justice Department, via communications
to the FBI, not to prosecute the parties-including Maheu, Rosselli,
and Giancana-who were involved in the Las Vegas tap. Although
Bissell believed that Edwards had told the Bureau the truth, he did
not expect that Edwards would have revealed that the CIA operation
involved assassination. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 63-65) [105]

According to a May 22, 1961, FBI memorandum, on May 3, 1961,
Edwards told the FBI [106] that the CIA had relied on Giancana because
of Giancana's contacts with gambling figures who might have sources
for use "in connection with CIA's clandestine efforts against the Castro
government". Edwards reportedly said that "none of Giancana's efforts
have materialized to date and that several of the plans still are
working and may eventually 'payoff'''. Edwards also stated that he
had never been furnished details of the methods used by Giancana and
Maheu because this was "dirty business" and he could not afford to
know the specific actions of Maheu and Giancana in pursuit of any
mission for the CIA.

Although Edwards did not reveal the specific objective of the Giancana
operation to the FBI, he was referring to the Agency's recent
assassination attempt involving the passage of poison involving a
Cuban exile leader sometime between mid-March and mid-April 1961.[107]

The summary of Edwards' statements to the FBI that was sent
by Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy on May 22, 1961, stated, in
part that :

Colonel Edwards advised that in connection with CIA's operation against
Castro he personally contacted Robert Maheu during the fall of 1960 for the
purpose of using Maheu as a "cut-out" in contacts with Sam Giancana, a known
hoodlum in the Chicago area. Colonel Edwards said that since the underworld
controlled gambling activities in Cuba under the Batista government, it was
assumed that this element would still continue to have sources and contacts in
Cuba which perhaps could be utilized successfully in connection with CIA's
clandestine efforts against the Castro government. As a result, Maheu's services
were solicited as a "cut-out" because of his possible entree into underworld
circles. Maheu obtained Sam Giancana's assistance in this regard and according
to Edwards, Giancana gave every indication of cooperating through Maheu in
attempting to accomplish several clandestine efforts in Cuba. Edwards added
that none of Giancana's efforts have materialized to date and that several of
the plans still are working and may eventually "pay off."

Colonel Edwards related that he had no direct contact with Giancana; that
Giancana's activities were completely "back stopped" by Maheu and that Maheu
would frequently report Giancana's action and information to Edwards. No
details or methods used by Maheu or Giancana in accomplishing their missions
were ever reported to Edwards. Colonel Edwards said that since this is "dirty
business", he could not afford to have knowledge of the actions of Maheu and
Giancana in pursuit of any mission for CIA. Colonel Edwards added that he
has neither given Maheu any instruction to use technical installations of any
type nor has the subject of technical installations ever come up between Edwards
and Maheu in connection with Giancana's activity.

Mr. Bissell, in his recent briefings of General Taylor and the Attorney General
and in connection with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban
situation [the Taylor Board of Inquiry] told the Attorney General that some
of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld
against Castro. [108]

The summary of Edwards' conversation with the FBI was accompanied
by a cover memorandum from Hoover stating that Edwards
had acknowledged the "attempted" use of Maheu and "hoodlum elements"
by the CIA in "anti-Castro activities" but that the "purpose
for placing the wiretap * * * has not been determined * * *." (FBI
memo to Attorney General, 5/22/61) The memorandum also explained
that Maheu had contacted. Giancana in connection with the
CIA program and CIA had requested that the information be handled
on a "need-to-know" basis. [109]

Hoover's memorandum to Attorney General Kennedy was stamped
"received" and a marginal notation in Kennedy's handwriting said:
"Courtney I hope this will be followed up vigorously." [110] Carbon copies
were sent to Deputy Attorney General Byron R. White and Assistant
Attorney General Herbert J. Miller' Jr,

A memorandum from Evans to Allen Belmont, Assistant to the
Director (FBI) dated June 6, 1961, stated:

We checked with CIA and ascertained that CIA had used Maheu as an intermediary
in contacting Sam Giancana, the notorious Chicago hoodlum. This was
in connection with anti-Castro activities. CIA, however, did not give any instructions
to Maheu to use any technical installations. In connection with this information
received from CIA concerning their attempted utilization of the hoodlum
element, CIA requested this information be handled on a "need-to-know" basis.

We are conducting a full investigation in this wiretap case requested by the
Department and the field has been instructed to press this investigation vigorously.
Accordingly, 'the Attorney General will be orally assured that we are following
up vigorously and the results of our investigation will be furnished to the
Department promptly.

Entries in the FBI files indicate that the FBI vigorously pursued its
investigation of the wiretap case. However, on August 16, 1961, the
Assistant United States Attorney in Las Vegas reported his reluctance
to proceed with the case because of deficiencies in the evidence and his
concern that CIA's alleged involvement might become known. The
Department of Justice files indicate no activity between September
1961, when the FBI's investigation was concluded, and January 1962,
when the question of prosecution in the case was brought up for
reconsideration.

An entry in the Justice Department files dated October 6, 1961,
stated:

Yesterday 'P.M. told me that A.G. had inquired as to status of this case and
think Harold [Shapiro] got it taken care of OK.

With the exception of this briefing, the FBI and Justice files indicate
no other activity in the BaIletti wiretap case from September
1961 through January 1962. There was no activity in the assassination
effort mvolving underworld figures from April 1961 until midApril
1962.

c. 1962. -- A note of January 29, 1962, from the head of the Administrative
Regulations Division to the first and second assistants in
the Criminal Division stated:

Our primary interest was in Giancana * * * apparently detective (Maheu)
hasjlome connection with Giancana but he claims was because of CIA.assignment
in connection with Cuba-CIA has objected, may have to drop.

Assistant Attorney General Herbert Miller then asked the FBI to
again speak with Edwards about the prosecution of Maheu. (Memo
from Miller, 1/31/62)

An FBI memorandum dated February 24, 1962, set forth Miller's
request that Edwards be reinterviewed about possible prosecutions in
the BaIletti case. A reply memorandum from the FBI to Miller on
February 7, 1962, stated that Edwards had been contacted and that·
he objected to the prosecution.

(1) Did President Kennedy Learn Anything About Assassination
Plots as a Result of the FBI Investigation of Giancana and Rosselli?

As elaborated in the previous sections of this report] all living CIA
officials who were involved in the underworld assassmation attempt
or who were in a position to have known of the attempt have testified
that they never discussed the assassination plot with the President.
By May 1961, however, the Attorney General and Hoover were aware
that the CIA had earlier used Giancana in an operation against Cuba
and FBI files contained two memoranda which, if simultaneously reviewed,
would have led one to conclude that the CIA operation had
involved assassination. [111] There is no evidence that anyone within the
FBI concluded that the CIA had used Giancana in an assassination
attempt. The Committee has uncovered a chain of events, however,
which would have given Hoover an opportunity to have assembled
the entire picture and to have reported the information to the
President.

Evidence before the Committee indicates that a close friend of President
Kennedy had frequent contact with the President from the end
of 1960 through mid-1962. FBI reports and testimony indicate that
the President's friend was also a close friend of John Rosselli and Sam
Giancana and saw them often during this same period. [112]

On February 27, 1962, Hoover sent identical copies of a memorandum
to the Attorney General and Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant
to the President. The memorandum stated that information
developed in connection with a concentrated FBI investigation of John
Rosselli revealed that Rosselli had been in contact with the President's
friend. The memorandum also reported that the individual was maintaining
an association with Sam Giancana, described as "a prominent
Chicago underworld figure." Hoover's memorandum also stated that a
review of the telephone toll calls from the President's friend's residence
revealed calls to the White House. The President's secretary ultimatBlv
received a copy of the memorandum and said she believed she would
have shown it to the President.

The association of the President's friend with the "hoodlums" and
that person's connection with the President was again brought to
Hoover's attention in a memorandum preparing him for a meeting
with the President planned for March 22, 1962. Courtney Evans testified
that Hoover generally required a detailed summary of information
in the FBI files for drafting important memoranda or preparing for
significant meetings. (Evans, 8/28/75, pp. 70, 72) The FBI files on
Giancana then contained information disclosing Giancana's connection
with the CIA as well as his involvement in assassination plotting.
(Memoranda of 10/18/60 and 5/22/61)

On March 22, Hoover had a private luncheon with President Kennedy.
There is no record of what transpired at that luncheon. According
to the White House logs, the last telephone contact between the
White House and the President's friend occurred a few hours after
the luncheon.

The fact that the President and Hoover had a luncheon at which one
topic was presumably that the President's friend was also a friend of
Giancana and Rosselli raises several possibilities. The first is, assuming
that Hoover. did in fact receive a summary of FBI information
relating to Giancana prior to his luncheon with the President, whether
that summary reminded the Director that Giancana had been involved
in a CIA operation against Cuba that included "dirty business" and
further indicated that Giancana had talked about an assassination
attempt against Castro. A second is whether Hoover ·would then have
taken the luncheon as an opportunity to fulfill his duty to bring this
information to the President's attention. [113] What actually transpired
at that luncheon may never be known, as both participants are dead
and the FBI files contain no records relating to it.

On March 23, 1962, the day immediately following his luncheon
with the President, at which Rosselli and Giancana were presumably
discussed, Hoover sent a memorandum to Edwards stating:

At the request of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, this
matter was discussed with the CIA Director of Security on February 7, 1962,
and we were advised that your agency would object to any prosecution which
would necessitate the use of CIA personnel or CIA information. We were also
informed that introduction of evidence concerning the CIA operation would
be embarrassing to the Government.

The Criminal Division has now requested that CIA specifically advise whether
it would or would not object to the initiation of criminal prosecution agains~
the SUbjects, BaIletti, Maheu, and the individual known as J. W. Harrison for
conspiracy to violate the "Wire Tapping Statute."

An early reply will be appreciated in order that we may promptly inform the
Criminal Division of CIA's position in this matter. [114]

As a result of this request, the CIA did object to the prosecution of
those involved in the wiretap case, thereby avoiding exposure of
Giancana's and Rosselli's involvement with the Agency in an assassination
plot. We now turn to events which occurred during April
and May 1962 which culminated in the formllil decision to forego
prosecution in the wiretap case.

(2) The Formal Decision to Forego Prosecution.

(a) Events Leading up to a Formal Briefing of the Attorney
General.

A memorandum for the record of April 4, 1962, reflects that Edwards
met with Sam Papich, the FBI liaison to the CIA, on March 28
or 29 and told Papich that:

Any prosecution in the matter would endanger sensitive sources and methods
used in a duly authorized intelligence project and would not be in the national
interest. (Edwards' memorandum, 4/4/62)

A memorandum for Assistant Attorney General Miller from
Hoover dated April 10, 1962, stated that Edwards:

Has now advised that he has no desire to impose any restriction wbich might
hinder e1forts to prosecute any individual, but be is firmly convinced that prosecution
of Maheu undoubtedly would lead to exposure of most sensitive information
relating to the abortive Cuban invasion in April 1961, and would result
in most damaging embarrassment to the U.S. Government. He added that 'in
view of this, his agency objects to the prosecution of :\faheu. (Memo, Hoover to
Miller, 4/10/62)

On April 16, 1962, Lawrence Houston, CIA General Counsel, met
with Miller. [115] Houston reported to Edwards that Miller envisioned
"no major difficulty in stopping action for prosecution." Houston
offered to brief the Attorney General, but said that he "doubted
if we would want to give the full story to anyone else in the Department,"
and Miller did not desire to know the "operational details."
On April 20 Houston told Miller's first assistant that he was requesting
Justice not to prosecute "on grounds of security," and asked to
be mformed if it was necessary to brief the Attorney General. (Memo,
Houston to Edwards, 4/26/62)

In the latter half of April 1962 William Harvey, head of the CIA's
anti-Castro effort, gave poison pHIs to Roselli for use in the post-Bay of
Pigs assassination effort against Fidel Castro using underworld
figures.

(b) Briefing of the Attorney General on May 7, 1962.

An entry in Attorney General Kennedy's calendar for May 7, 1962,
states "1 :Oo--Richard Helms." [116] At 4:00 the Attorney General met
with Houston and Edwards to be briefed on the CIA operation involving
Maheu, Rosselli, and Giancana. The briefing was at the Attorney
General's request. (I.G. Report, p. 62a)

On May 9, 1962, the Attorney General met with Director Hoover.
Hoover prepared a memorandum for the record dated May 10, 1962,
recounting what was said at that meeting. On May 11 the Attorney
General requested Edwards to prepare a memorandum of the May 7
briefing. Edwards, with Houston's assistance, prepared a memorandum
dated May 14, 1962, relating what had transpired at the May 7
briefing. Also, on the same day, Edwards had a telephone conversation
with William Harvey. As a result of that conversation, Edwards
prepared an internal memorandum for the record dated May 14, 1962,
which falsely stated that the operation involving Rosselli was then
being terminated.

(aa) The Attorney General Was Told That the Operation Had
Involved an Assassination Attempt

Houston testified that the operation was described to the Attorney
General as an assassination attempt. (Houston, 6/2/75, p. 14) When
interviewed for the Inspector General's Report in 1967, Edwards
said he briefed Kennedy "all the way." (I.G. Report, p. 62a) A memorandum
by Hoover of a conference with Kennedy on May 9, two days
after the briefing states:

The Attorney General told me he wanted to advise me of a situation in the
Giancana case which had considerably disturbed him. He stated a few days ago
he had been advised by CIA tbat in connection with Giancana, CIA had hired
Robert A. Maheu, a private detective in Washington, D.C., to approach Giancana
with a proposition of paying $150,000 to hire some gunmen to go into Cuba and
to kill Castro. (Memorandum from Hoover, 4/10/62)

(bb) Evidence Concerning Whether the Attorney General Was
Told That the Operation Had Been Terminated

Houston, who said that he was told about the use of underworld
figures for the first time by Edwards a few weeks before the briefing
of the Attorney General, testified that it was his "understanding that
the assassination plan aimed at Castro had been terminated completely,"
and that Kennedy was told "the activity had been terminated
as of that time." (Houston, 6/2/75, pp. 13, 15) Edwards testified that
he had also believed at the time of the briefing that the operation had
been concluded and that he had so informed Kennedy. (Edwards,
5/30/75, p. 16) [117] The memorandum of the briefing prepared by Edwards
describes the operation as having been "conducted during the
period approximately August 1960 to May 1961." It further states:

After the failure of the invasion of Cuba word was sent through Maheu to
Rosselli to call off the operation and Rosselli was told to tell his principal that
the proposal to pay one hundred fifty thousand dollars for completion of the
operation had been definitely withdrawn. (Memo from Edwards, 4/14/62)

Based upon interviews with Houston and Edwards, the Inspector
General's Report concluded that:

The Attorney General was not told that the gambling syndicate operation had
already been reactivated, nor, as far as we know, was he ever told that CIA had
a continuing involvement with U.S. gangster elements. (LG. Report, p. 65) [118]

Houston and Edwards recalled that Kennedy was upset that the CIA
had used Giancana. Houston testified:

If you have seen Mr. Kennedy's eyes get steely and his jaw set and his voice
get low and precise, you get a definite feeling of unhappiness. (Houston, 6/2/75,
p.14)

In his memorandum of the meeting with the Attorney General two
days after the briefing, Hoover recalled:

I expressed great astonishment at this in view of the bad reputation of Maheu
and the horrible judgment in using a man of Giancana's hackground for such a
project. The Attorney General shared the same views. (Memo from Hoover,
5/10/62) [119]

Hoover's May 10 memorandum further states that the Attorney General
said that "CIA admitted that they had assisted Maheu in making
this installation and for these reasons CIA was in a position where it
could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana and
:Maheu." [120]

According to Edwards, at the end of the briefing, Kennedy said: "I
want you to let me know about these things," or words to that effect.
(Edw'ards, 5/30/75, p. 17) Houston recalled that Kennedy said:

In very specific terms that if we were going to get involved with Mafia personnel
again he wanted to be informed first * * *. I do not remember his commenting
about the operation itself. (Houston, 6/2/75, p. 14) [121]

Hoover recorded that two days after the briefing, the Attorney General
told him that:

He had asked CIA whether they had ever cleared their actions in hiring Maheu
and Giancana with the Department of Justice hefore they did so and he was advised
by CIA they had not cleared these matters with the Department of Justice.
He stated he then issued orders to CIA to never a~ain in the future take such
steps without first checking with the Department of Justice. (Memo from Hoover,
5/10/62)

Edwards testified that at the time of the Kennedy briefing, he did
not know that the CIA was still utilizing its underworld contacts,
(Edwards, 5/aO/75, p. 16) even though the operation had been reactivated
under the Directorate of Plans, and in early April 1962.
poison pills had been given to Rosselli.

As concluded by the CIA itself in the Inspector General's Report,
Edwards' statement that he was not aware of these developments is
implausible. In the memorandum of May 14, 1962, prepared for the
Attorney General, Edwards stated that Harvey had asked him to arrange
a contact with Rosselli, and that a meeting had been set for
April 9. The Inspector General's Report observed:

When the Attorney General was briefed on 7 May, Edwards kl'l~w that Harvey
had been introduced to Rosselli. He must also have known that his subordinate,
the Support Chief, was in Miami and roughly for what purpose (although }<jdwards
does not now recall this). (I.G. Report, p. 65) [122]

Harvey testified that Edwards knew the operation was still in effect
and that Edwards told Harvey about the briefing of the Attorney
General shortly afterwards. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 98-100)

In the internal memorandum for the record dated May 14, 1962,
written the same day as the memorandum of the Attorney General's
briefing, Edwards stated:

On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any
plans for the use of Subject (Rosselli) for the future.

Harvey testified that the memorandum "was not true, and Colonel
Edwards knew it was not true." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 97) Edwards
confirmed that he was aware at that time that Harvey was "trying"
to assume control of the operation. (Edwards, 5/30/75, p. 19)

Harvey testified that Edwards' entry would cause the record to show
incorrectly that the operation had been terminated, when in fact it had
not been. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 102) Harvey's reasons explaining the
decision to "falsify" the record were:

" " " if this ever came up in the future, the file would show that on such and
such a date he was advised so and so, and he was no longer chargeable with
this. " " " (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 100)

This was purely an internal document for use in closing out this operation as
far as the Office of Security and its Director, that is its Chief, personally, was
concerned. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 102)

To bring this operation under some sort of sensible control, determine what
it was, and attempt to insulate against what I consider a very definite potential
for damage to the agency and to the government. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 101)

When questioned about the fact that the Attorney General had been
told that the operation had been terminated when in fact it was continuing,
Helms testified:

" " " I am not able to tell you whether this operation was ongoing, whether
it had really been stopped, whether it had been fairly stopped, whether there
was fun and games going on between the officers involved as to, we will create
a fiction that it stopped or go ahead with it. I just don't recall any of those
things at all" " *. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 109)

(ii) Post-Bay Of Pigs Underworld Plot -- MONGOOSE Period

This section discusses evidence bearing on whether the post-Bay of
Pigs operation to assassinate Castro involving underworld figures -- which
began in April 1962. and continued at least through the Cuban
missile nisis in October of that year-was authorize<l or known about
by Administration officials outside of the CIA.

o. This issup mllst bp considerpd in light of the differing perceptions
of Helms and his subol'{li!latpso on the O!lP hand. and of other memlwrs
of the Kennedy "\<lministratioll, including the Director of tIl(' CIA,
on the otl1Pro "While Hplms testified that he never received a direct
order to a:;sassinate Castro. he fullv beliE'ved that the CIA was at aJl
times acting "'ithin the SCOpE' o{ its authOl'ity and that Castro's
assassination came within the bounds of the Kennedv Administration's
effort to owrthow Castro and his regime. Helms sa{d that he inherited
the Rosselli program from Bissel1. and. due to its sensitive and unsavory
character. it was not the type of program one would discuss in
front of high officials. He stated that he never informed McCone or
any other officials of the Kennedy Administration of the assassination
plot. Howevu. )lcCone and the sUI'viving members of the Kennedy
Administration testified that th~y believed a Castro assassination
was impermissible without a direct order. that assassination was outside
the parameters of the Administration's anti-Castro program, and
each tpstified that to his knowledge no such order was given to Helms.

An understanding of the Kennedy Administration's 1962 covert action
program for Cuba is essential to an evaluation of the testimony
on the issup of authorization. That program, which was designed to
overthrow the Castro regime. and the events in 1~61 leading up to it
are discussed below. A rletailed exposition of tllP testimony then
follows.

(1) EVENTS PRECEDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MONGOOSE

A. THE TAYLOR/KENNEDY BOARD OF INQUIRY

On April 22, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs failure, the President
l'equested General Maxwell Taylor tQ conduct a reevaluation of "our
practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary,
guerilla and anti-guerilla activity which fall short of outright war."
Taylor was to give special attention to Cuba (Letter to Maxwell
Taylor. 4/22/61) and Robert Kennedy was to be his principal colleague
in the effort.

The resulting review concluded:

We have been ~truck with the /{eneral feeling that there can be no long-term
living with Castro a~ a neighbor. Hi~ continued presence within the hemispheric
community as a dangerously effective exponent of Communism and anti-Amero
icanism constitutes a real ml'uace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected
~ovl'rnments in anyone or more of weak Latin American republicI';. * * *

It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light of all
present!y known factors and new guidance be provided for political, military,
economIC and propaganda action against Castro. (Report to the President.
6/13/61, Memo No.4, p. 8)

It is clear from the reeonl, moreover, that the defeat at the Bay of
Pigs had been regarrled as a humiliation for the President person'ally
and for the CIA institutionally.

. By July 1961, the Special ~roup had agreed that "the basic objectIve
t~,,,:aI'd Cuba was to prOVIde support to a F.S. program to develop
oppOSItIon to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the
U.S." (Memo for the Record, 7/21/61) Occasional harassment operations
,vere mounted during the summer but there was no overall
strategy and little activity.

b. NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 100 OF OCTOBER 5, 1961, AND
THE CIA INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

In the fall of 1961 the Kennedy Administration considered the consequences
of Castro's remo\'al from power and the prospects for United
States military intervention if that occurred. Two studies were prepared.
National Security Action Memorandum 100 (NSAM 100) directed
the State Department to assess the potential courses of action
open to the United States should Castro be removed from the Cuban
scene, and to prepare a contingency plan with the Department of Defense
for military intervention in that event. The CIA prepared an
"Intelligence Estimate" on the "situation and prospects" in Cuba. The
focus of these studies was on the possible courses of action open tothe
United States in a post-Castro Cuba, rather than on the means that
might bring about Castro's removal. It does not appear, however, that
assassination was excluded from the potential means by which Castro
might be removed.

On October 5, 1961, McGeorge Bundy issued NSAM 100 entitled
"Contingency Planning for Cuba." It was addressed to the Secretary
of State and stated in full :

In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State
Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency.

The Special Group Minutes of October 6, 1961, state that the
Group was told that in addition to an overall plan for Cuban
covert operations, "a contingency plan in connection with the possible
removal of Castro from the Cuban scene" was in preparation. (Memorandum
for the Record or Special Group meeting, 10/6/61) An
October 5, 1961 Memorandum for the Record by Thomas Parrott, Secretary
to the Special Group, states that Parrott informed the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs that "what was wanted
was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or
other be removed from the Cuban scene." Parrott's memorandum
stated that in preparing the plan, "the presence and positions of Raul
(Castro) and Che Guevara must be taken into account," and that
General Taylor had told Parrott he preferred "the President's interest
in the matter not be mentioned" to the Assistant Secretary. This
memorandum also said that "on the covert side, I talked to Trac:"
Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be Furnished as
soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned."

The CIA's Board or National Estimates (which was not part of
the Directorate of Plans) prepared a study entitled "The Situation and
Prospects in Cuba." [123] The CIA estimate was pessimistic about the
success of a Cuban internal revolt, and found that Castro's assassination
would probably strengthen the Communist position in Cuba.

After reviewing the economic, military, and political situation in
Cuba, the CIA estimate concluded that the Castro regime had sufficient
popular support and repressive capabilities to cope with any
internal threat. The concluding paragraph of the estimate, entitled
"If Castro Were to Die," noted that:

His [Castro's] loss now, b~' assassination or by natural causes, would have
an unsettling effect, but would almost certainly not prove fatal to the regime
* * * [I)ts principal surviving leaders would probably rally together in
the face of a common danger. (Estimate, p. 9)

The CIA study predicted that if Castro died, "some sort of power
struggle would almost certainly develop eventually," and, regardless
of the outcome of such a struggle, the Communist Party's influence
would be "significantly" increased. [124] (Estimate, p. 9)

Bundy testified that the contingency referred to in NSAM 100 and
the related documents was "what would we do if Castro were no longer
there," and that "clearly one of the possibilities would be assassination."
(Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 77) However, Bundy emphasized that
NSAM 100 represented an effort to assess the effect should Castro
be removed from power by any means (including assassination) but
"without going further with the notion [of assassination] itself." [125]
(Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 77) Bundy contended that the President was not
considering an assassination, but rather "what are things going to
be like after Castro1" (Bundy. 7/11/75, p. 81) [126]

Taylor testified that he had no recollection of NSAM 100 or of the
events described in the relat~d documents. (Taylor. 7/9/75, p. 18)
Based on his review of the documents, Taylor testified that "it sounds
like purely a political consideration of the sequence of power in
Cuba" [127] and he emphasized that "never at any time" did he raise the
question of assassination with Parrott, or with anybody else. (Taylor,
7/9/75, p.19)

Special Group Secretary P:lrrott testified that the request for a
plan reflected in his memorandum of October 5, 1961, and the refel'ence
in that memorandum to the "contingency that Castro would in
some way or another be removed from the Cuban scene", reflected
interest in a contingency study for Castro's removal, but by meallS
"short of heing killed." (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 83)

C. PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S NOVEMBER 9, 1961 CONVERSATION WITH TAD SZULC

In early November 1961 Tad Szulc [128] was asked by Richard Goodwin,
a Special Assistant to President Kennedy, to meet with Attorney
General Robert Kennedy on November 8 to discuss the situation in
Cuba. The meeting was "off-the-record." Szulc attended as a friend
of Goodwin's, and not as a reporter. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 24) During
the meeting with Robert Kennedy, the discussion centered on "the
situation in Cuba following the [Bay of Pigs] invasion [and] the
pros and cons of some different possible actions by the United States
Government in that context." (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 25) According to
Szulc the subject of assassination was not mentioned during this
meeting. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 31)

At the close of the meeting, Robert Kennedy asked Szulc to meet
with the President. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 25) The next day Szulc,
accompanied by Goodwin, met with President Kennedy for over an
hour in the Oval Office. [129] (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 25) Szulc recalled that
the President discussed "a number of his VIews on Cuba in the wake
of the Bay of Pigs, asked me a number of questions concerning my
conversations with Premier Castro, and * * * what the United States
could [or] might do in * * * either a hostile way or in establishing
some kind of a dialogue * * *" (Szulc, 6/10/75, pp. 25-26)

Szulc testified that after this general discussion, the President asked
"what would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated?" [130]
(Szulc, 6/10/75, pp. 26,27; Szulc Noteso£ conversation with President
Kennedy, 11/9/61) Szulc testified that he replied that an assassination
would not necessarily cause a change in the Cuban systpm, and
that it was Szulc's personal view that the United States should not be
party to murders and political assassinations. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 26)
Szulc said that the President responded, "I agree with you completely."
Szulc stated:

He [President Kennedy] then went on for a few minutes to make the point
how strongly he and his brother felt that the United States for moral reasons
should never be in a situation of having recourse to assassination. (Szulc, 6/10/
75, p. 27)

Szulc's notes of the meeting with the President state:

JFK then said he was testing me, that he felt the same way-he added "I'm
glad you feel the same way"-because indeed U.S. morally must not be part
[sic] to assassinations.

JFK said he raised question because he was under terrific pressure from
advisers (think he said intelligence people, but not positive) to okay a Castro
murder. sed [sic] he was resisting pressures. (Szulc note of conversation with
President Kennedy, 11/9/61)

Szulc stated that it is "possible" and he "believed" that President
Kennedy used such words as "someone in the intelligence business,"
to describe the source of the pressure for a Castro assassination. (Szulc,
6/10/75, p. 29) The President did not specifically identify the sourer
of the pressure. (Szulc, 6/10/75. p. 27)

There is no evidence other than Szulc's testimony that the President
was being pressured. This lack of evidence was particularly
troublesome since everyone else questioned by the Committee denied
ever having discussed assassination with the President, let alone having
pressed him to consider it.

Goodwin recalled that, after President Kennedy asked Szulc for
his reaction to the suggestion that Castro be assassinated, President
Kennedy said, "well, that's the kind of thing I'm never going to do."
(Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 3) Goodwin said that several days after the
meeting he referred to the previous discussion of assassination and
President Kennedy said "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we
would all be targets." (Goodwin, 7/18/75. pp. 4, 11)

D. PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S SPEECH OF NOVEMBER 16, 1961

A few days after the meeting with Szulc and Goodwin, and some
~ix weeks after the issuance of NSAM 100, Pl'esident Kennedy delivered
a speech at the University of Washington, in which he stated:

We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adversaries in tactics of terror,
assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs and crises. (Public Papers of the
Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 724)

(2) OPERATION MONGOOSE

A. THE CREATION OF OPERATION MONGOOSE

In November 1962 the proposal for a major new covert action program
to overthrow Castro was developed. The President's Assistant.
Richard Goodwin, and General Edward Lansdale, who was experienced
in counter-insurgency operations, played major staff roles in
creating this program, which was named Operation MONGOOSE.
Goodwin and Lansdale worked closely with Robert Kennedy, who
took an active interest in this preparatory stage, and Goodwin advised
the President that Robert Kennedy "would be the most effective
commander" of the proposed operation. (Memo, Goodwin to the President,
11/1/61, p. 1) In a memorandum to Robert Kennedy outlining
the MONGOOSE proposal, Lansdale stated that a "picture of the situation
has emerged clearly enough to indicate what needs to be done
and to support your sense of urgency concerning Cuba." (Memo,
11/15/61)

At the end of the month, President Kennedy issued a memorandum
recording his decision to begin the MONGOOSE project to "use our
available assets * * * to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime."

(Memo from the President to the Secretary of State. et a1.. 11/30/61 )
The establishment of Operation MONGOOSE resulted in important
organizational changes.

(1) The Special Group (Augmented) (SGA)

A new control group, the Special Group (Augmented) (SGA) was
created to oversee Operation MONGOOSE. The SGA comprised the
regular Special Group members (i.e., McGeorge Bundy, Alexis .Tohnson
of the Department of State, Roswell Gilpatric of the Department
of Defense, John McCone, and General Lyman Lemnitzer of the .Toint
Chiefs) augmented by Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General
Maxwell Taylor. Although Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary
of Defense McNamara were not formal members of the Special Group
or the Special Group (Augmented). they sometimes attended
meetings.

(2) General Lansdale named Chief-of-Operations of MONGOOSE

As a result of the Bay of Pigs failure, PresIdent Kennedy distrusted
the CIA and believed that someone from outside the Agency was required
to oversee major covert action programs. Rather than appoint
his brother, Robert Kennedy, to head MONGOOSE, as nroposed by
Goodwin, President Kennedy gave General Edward Lansdale the task
of coordinating the CIA's MONGOOSE operations with those of the
Departments of State and Defense. Lansdale had developed a reputation
in the Philippines and Vietnam for having an ability to deal with
revolutionary insurgencies in less developed countries. Kennedy appointed
General Taylor Chairman of the Special Group Augmented.
Robert Kennedy played an active role in the MONGOOSE Operation,
a role unrelated to his position as Attorney General.

(3) CIA Organization for MONGOOSE

In late 1961 or early 1962, William Harvey was put in charge of
the CIA's Task Force W, the CIA unit for MONGOOSE Operations.
Task Force W operated under guidance from the Special Group
(Augmented) and employed a total of approximately 400 people at
CIA headquarters and its Miami Station. McCone and Harvey were
the principal CIA participants in Operation MONGOOSE. Although
Helms attended only 7 of the 40 MONGOOSE meetin~. h(' was significantly
involved, and he testified that he "was as interested" in
MONGOOSE as were Harvey and McCone. (Helms, 7/18/75, p. 10)

B. LANSDALE'S THEORY AND OBJECTIVE FOR MONGOOSE

In the fall of 1961, Landale was asked by President Kennedy to
examine the Administration's Cuba policy and to make recommendations.
Lansdale testified that he reported to President Kennedy that
"Castro * * * had aroused considerable affection for himself personally
with the Cuban population * * *" (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 4),
and that the United States "should take a verv different course" from
the "harassment" operations that had been directed against Castro
up to that time. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. ~) Lansdale informed the
President that these prior United States operations were conceived
and led by Americans. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 5) In contrast. Lansdale
proposed in Operation MONGOOSE that the United States work
with exiles, particularly professionals, who had opposed Batista and
then became disillusioned with Castro. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, pp. 4,
10-11) Lansdale's ultimate objective was to have "the people themselves
overthrow the Castro regime rather than U.S. engineered
efforts from outside Cuba." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 41)

Lansdale's concept for Operation MONGOOSE envisioned a first
step involving the development of leadership elements and "a very
necessary political basis" among the Cubans opposed to Castro. (Lansdale,
7/8/75, p. 11) At the same time, he sought to develop "means to
infiltrate Cuba successfully" and to organize "cells and activities inside
Cuba * * * who could work secretly and safely." (Lansdale,
7/8/75, p. 11) Lansdale's plan was designed so as not to "arouse premature
actions, not to bring great reprisals on the people there and
abort any eventual success." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 11)

C. BISSELL'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO ACT
MORE VIGOROUSLY

According to the Assistant to the head of Task Force W, sometime
early in the fall of 1961, Bissell was "chewed out in the Cabinet Room
of the White Rouse by both the President and the Attorney General
for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting
rid of Castro and the Castro regime." (Assistant, 6/18/75, p. 8)

The Assistant said Bissell told him about the meeting and directed
him to come up with some plans. (Assistant, 6/18/75, pp. 8, 36-37)
Bissell did not recall the White House meeting described by the Assistant,
but agreed that he had been, in essence, told to "get off your ass
about Cuba." (Bissell, 7/25/75, pp. 37-38)

Bissell was asked whether he considered that instruction authority
for proceeding to assassinat~Castro. He said, no, and that "formal and
explicit approval" would be required for assassination activity (id.,
38-39). Bissell also said that there was in fact no assassination activity
between the pre-Bay of Pigs/Rosselli operation and his departure
from the Agency in February 1962.

D. THE JANUARY 19, 1962 SPECIAL GROUP MEETING

On January 19, 1962, a meeting of principal MONGOOSE participants
was held in Attorney General Kennedy's office. [131] (McManus,
7/22/75, p. 6) Notes taken at the meeting by George McManus, Helms'
Executive Assistant, contain the following passages:

Conclusion Overthrow of Castro is Possible.

". * * a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority in U.S. Gov[
ernmen]t. No time, money, effort---or manpower is to be spared."
"Yesterday * * * the President had indicated to him that the final chapter
had not been written-it's got to be done and will be done." (McManus memo
1/19/62, p. 2)

McManus attributed the words "the top priority in the U.S. Gov[
ernmen]t-no time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared" to the
Attorney General. (McManus. 7/22/75, pp. 8-9)

Helms stated that those words reflected the "kind of atmosphere"
III WhICh he had perceived that assassination was implicitly authorized.
(Helms, 7/17/75, pp. 60-61) McManus agreed that Robert Kennedy
"was very vehement in his speech" and "really wanted action," but
McManus disagreed with Helms' perception, stating that "it never
occurred to me" that Kennedy's exhortation included permission to
assassinate Castro; Nor did the spirit of the meeting as a whole leave
McManus with the impression that assassination was either contemplated
or authorized. (McManus, 7/22/75, pp. 9-10) [132]

E. GENERAL LANSDALE'S MONGOOSE PLANNING TASKS

On January 18, 1962, Lansdale assigned 32 planning tasks to tIll.'
agencies participating in MONGOOSE. In a memorandum to the
working group members, Lansdale emphasized that "it is our job to
put the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively.
This demands a change from the business as usual and a hard
facing of the fact that we are in a combat situation-where we have
been given full command." (Lansdale memorandum, 1/20/62)

The 32 tasks comprised a variety of activities, ranging from intelligence
collection to planning for "use of U.S. military force to
support the Cuban popular movement" and developing an "operational
schedule for sabotage actions inside Cuba." [133] In focusing- on
intelligence collection, propaganda, and various sabotage actions,
Lansdale's tasks were consistent with the underlying strategy of
MONGOOSE to build gradually towards an internal revolt of the
Cuban people.

Lansdale transmitted a copy of the tasks to Attorney General Kennedy
on January 18, 1962, with a handwritten note stating: "my review
does not include the sensitive work I have reported to you; I felt
you preferred informing the President privately." Lansdale testified
that this sensitive work did not refer to assassinations and that he
"never took up assassination with either the Attorney General or the
President." He said that he could not precisely recall the nature of this
"sensitive work" but that it might have involved a special trip he made
under cover to meet Cuban leaders in Florida to assess their political
strengths. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 30)

In a memorandum to the Attorney General on ,January 27, 1962,
Lansdale referred to the possibility that "we might uncork the touchdown
play independently of the institutional program we are spurring."
(Memo, Lansdale to Attorney General, 1/27/62) Lansdale
testifi~ that the phrase ·'touchdown play" was a "breezy way of
referrmg to a Cuban revolt to overthrow the regime" rather than to
Castro's ass!\,ssination. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 4;"») [134] The examples of
such plays cited in the memorandum (e.g.. "stir up workers in Latin
America and Cuba," work through "ethnic language groups," "youth
elements," or "families through the Church") do not contain an~'
indication of assassination. [135] (Memo. Lansdale to Attorney General,
1/27/62, p. 1)

On January 19, 1962, Lansdale added an additional task to those
assigned on .January 18. "Task ;);3" im'oh-ed a plan to "incapacitate"
Cuban sugar ,vorkers during the han-est by the USe of chemical warfare
means. I.Jansdale testified that the plan im'olved using nonlethal
chemicals to sicken Cubans temporarily and keep them away from the
fields for a 24-48 hour period "without ill effects." The task was
initially approved for planning purposes with the notation that it
would require "policy determination" before final approval. After a
study showed the plan to be unfeasible, it was cancelled without ever
being submitted to the SGA for debate. (Lansdale, 7/8/75 p. 29; SGA
~finutes, 1/BO/62, p. 1)

The SGA approved Lansdale's HH tasks for planning' purposes 011
.January HO, 1962. (SGA Minutes. 1/BO/62, p. 1) On February 20,
Lansdale detailed a six-phase schedule for MONGOOSE. designed to
culminate in October, 1962, with an "open revolt and overthrow of the
Communist regime." (Lansdale ~femorandum, 2/20/62. p. 2) As one
of the operations for this "Resistance" phase. Lansdale. listed "attacks
on the cadre of the rpp-ime, including key leaders." (Landsdale. 7/8/75,
p. 1;>1) Lansdale's plan stated:

This should II{' a "Special Target" operation * * * Gangster elementi' might
provide the hest recruitment potential for actions against police--G2 [intelligence]
officials. (ld., p. 151) [136]

Lansdale testified that early in the MONGOOSE operation he had
suggested that working level representatives OT the MONGOOSE
agencies get in touch with "criminal elements" to obtain intelligence
and for "possible actions against the police structure" in Cuba. (Lansdale,
7/8/75, p. 104) Lansdale conceded that his proposal to recruit
gangster elements for attacks on "key leaders" contemplated the
targeted killing of individuals, in: addition to the casualties that might
occur in the course OT the revolt itself. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 107)

Lansdale's 33 plans were never approved for implementation by the
SGA. As discussed below, the SGA tabled Lansdale's six phase plan
altogether in February 1962, and directed him to plan for and conduct
an intelligence collection plan only. (SGA Minutes, 3/5/62)

F. LANSDALE'S REJECTION OF A SUGGESTION THAT A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN,
INCLUDING REWARDS FOR ASSASSINATION, BE EXPLORED

On January 30, 1962, the representative of the Defense Department
and the Joint Chiefs on the MONGOOSE Working Group
forwarded for Lansdale's consideration "a concept for creating distrust
and apprehension in the Cuban Communist Hierarchy." (Memo,
Craig to Lansdale, 1/30/62) The concept titled Operation Bounty, was
described as a "system of financial rewards, commensurate with position
and stature, for kUling or delivering alive known Communists."
Under the concept, leaflets would be dropped in Cuba listing rewards,
which ranged from $5,000 for an "informer" to $100,000 for "government
officials." A reward of '''2¢'' was listed for Castro. Lansdale
testified that the 2¢ bounty was designed "to denigrate * * * Castro
in the eyes of the Cuban population." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 26) Lansdale
said that he "tabled" this concept when he received it because "I
did not think that it was something that should be seriously undertaken
or supported further." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 26) He never
brought Operation Bounty before the SGA.

G. THE CONTROL SYSTEM FOR MONGOOSE OPERATIONS

In establishing the MONGOOSE Operation on November 30,1961,
President Kennedy had emphasized that the SGA should be "kept
closely informed" of its activities. (Memorandum by the President,
11/30/61)

In practice, as Harvey's Executive Assistant on the CIA MONGOOSE
Task Force W testified, this resulted in the submission of
"specific detailed plans for every activity carried out by the task force."
(Assistant, 6/18/75, p. 16) The Assistant testified that those plans were
submitted "in nauseating detail :"

It went down to such things as the gradients on the beach, and the composition
of the sand on the beach in many cases. Every single solitary thing was in
those nlans, full details, times, events, weaponry, how it was /{oing to happen,
who was going to do what * * * the full details of every single thing we did.
(Assistant, 6/18/75, p. 17)

Harvey also characterized the control process as requiring the submission
of "excruciating detail." It was understood that the SGA
was to be given an opportunity to debate proposals and to decide
after weighing their strengths and weaknesses. (Harvey, 6/25/75,
pp. 114, 123-124)

The documentary evidence further illustratBs the SGA's tight control
procedures for MONGOOSE. For example, after Lansdale submittBd
his 33 tasks and his overall concept for ;\10NGOOSE for
SGA consideration in January, he was ordered to cut back his plan
and limit it to an intelligence collection program for the March-May
1962 period, rather than the five-stage plan culminating in an October
"popular revolution," as originally conceived by Lansdale. (Memo
3/2/62, by Lansdale) In approving the modified intelligence collection
plan, the SGA pointed out that:

* * * any actions which are not specifically spelled out in the plan but seem
to be desirable as the project progresses, will be brought to the Special Group
for resolution. (SGA Minutes, 1962)

In addition, the Guidelines for the ;\IOXGOOSE program emphasized
the SGA's responsibility for control and prior approyal of impOl
·tant operations:

The SGA is responsible for providing policy guidance to the [MONGOOSE]
project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress. (Guidelines
for Operation MONGOOSE, }Iarch 14, 1962)

The SGA request for Helms to estimate "for each week as far into
the next twelve months as possible * * * the numbers and type of agents
you will establish inside Cuba * * * [and] brief descriptions * * * of
actions contemplated," is another example of the close control the SGA
exercised over Operation MONGOOSE. (Memo, Lansdale to Helms,
3/5/62) Any proposal to supply arms and equipment to particular
resistance groups inside Cuba was also required to "be submitted
to the Special Group (Augmented) for decision ad hoc." (Lansdale
Memo to the Special Group, 4/11/62, p. 1) These procedural
requirements were operative at the time of Harvey's meeting with
Rosselli in Miami.

The Guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE stated:

During this period, General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations,
calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and
implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of these departments and agencies are
responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority. [137]
(Guideline for Operation MONGOOSE, 3/14/62)

Harvey complained to McCone about the SGA control requirement
for advance approval of "major operations going beyond the collection
of intelligence." He stated that:

To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism for a maximum operational
effort against Cuba, the tight controls exercised by the Special Group and the
present time-consuming coordination and briefing procedures should, if at all
possible, be made less restrictive and less stultifying. (:\Iemo, Harvey to McCone,
4/10/62)

Even as the Cuban Missile Crisis approached, and the increasing
pressure to act against the Castro regime led to a "stepped-up" MONGOOSE
plan, the SGA continued to require that all sensitive operations
be submitted to it for advance approval. For example, when the
SGA approved in principle a proposed set of operations on September
14, 1962, Bundy

* * * made it clear that this did not constitute a blanket approval of every
item in the paper and that sensitive· ones such as· sabotage, for example, will
have to be presented in more detail on a case by case basis. (Memo of SGA Meeting,
9/14/62, p. 1)

Helms and the members of the SGA differed on whether or not
these control requirements were consistent with Helms' perception that
assassination was permissible without a direct order. That testimony
is discussed in subsection (3), infra.

H. THE PATTERN OF MONGOOSE ACTION

The Kennedy Administration pressed the MONGOOSE operation
with vigorous language. Although the collection of intelligence information
was the central objective of MONGOOSE until August 1962,
sabotage and paramilitary actions were also conducted, [138] including a
major sabotage operation aimed at a large Cuban copper mine. Lansdale
described the sabotage acts as involving "blowing up bridges to
stop communications and blowing up certain production plants."
(Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 36) During the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962,
sabotage was increasingly urged.

Despite the Administration's urgings, the SGA shied away from
sabotage and other violent action throughout 1962, including the
period of the Missile Crisis. Helms noted in a memorandum of a meeting
on October 16, 1962, that Robert Kennedy, in expressing the "general
dissatisfaction of the President" with MONGOOSE, "pointed out
that [MONGOOSE] had been underway for a year * * * that there
had been no acts of sabotage and that even the one which had been
attempted had failed twice." (Memo by Helms, 10/16/62) A memorandum
to Helms from his Executive Assistant (who spent full time
on Cuba matters) reviewed the MONGOOSE program in the aftermath
of the Missile Crisis, and stated:

During the past year, while one of the options of the project was to create
internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual U.s. intervention, a review
shows that policymakers not only shied away from the military intervention
aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals. (Memo to Helms,
10/16/62)

Harvey concurred in this SGA assessment. MONOOOSE documents
bear out the operation's emphasis on intelligence gathering. The
only phase of Lansdale's six-phase plan approved for January through
August 1962 was described by Lansdale as "essentially an intelligence
collection" effort. (Lansdale Memo 4/11/62) The MONGOOSE
Guidelines approved on March 5, 1962, stated that the acquisition of
intelligence was the "immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts in
the coming months." (Guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE,
3/14/62) While the Guidelines did state that covert actions would
be undertaken concurrently with intelligence collection, these were
to be on a scale "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire
a revolt" in Cuba.  The SGA stipulated that MONGOOSE action
beyond the acquisition of intelligence "must be inconspicuous." (Lans-
dale Memo, 3/2/62)

After the intelligence collection phase ended in Augnst 1962. the
SGA considered whether to adopt a "stepped-up Conrse B plus,"
which, in contrast to Phase I, was desi!:,"lled to inspire a revolt against
the Castro regime. C~Ielllo for the SGA from Lansdale. 8/8/(2) The
SGA initially decided against this COllrse and in favor of a "CIA
variant" on August 10, 1962. (Minntes of SGA Meeting, 8/10/(2)
The "CIA variant," which was proposed by McCone, posted limited
actions to avoid inciting a revolt and sought a split between Castro
and "old-line Communists" rather than Castro's overthrow.

On August 20, Taylor told the President that the SGA saw no likelihood
that Castro's Government wonld be overturned by internal
means without direct United States military intervention, and that the
SGA favored a more aggressive MONGOOSE program.[139] (Memo,
Taylor to the President, 8/20/62.) On August 23, ~IcGeorge Bundy issned
NSC Memorandum No. 181, which stated that, at the President's
directive, "the line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE
Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed." On Angust
80, the SGA instructed the CIA to submit a list of possible
sabotage targets and noted that: "The Group, by reacting to this
list, could define the limit.<; within which the Agency could operate
on its own initiative." (Minutes of 8/30/62)

The onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis intially caused a reversion to
the stepped-up Course B plan. At an SGA meeting on October 4,
1962, Robert Kennedy stated that the President "is concerned about
progress on the MONGOOSE program and feels that more priority
should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations." The Attorney
General urged that "massive activity" be undertaken within the
MONGOOSE framework. In response to this proposal, the SGA
decided that "considerably more sabotage" should be undertaken, and
that "all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches
with the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime."
(Minutes of SGA Meeting, 10/14/62, p. 3) [140] However, on October 30,
1962, the Special Group (Augmented) ordered a halt to all sabotage
operations. (Lansdale Memo for the record, 10/30/62) [141]

Theodore Sorensen, a member of the Executive Committee established
to deal with the Missile Crisis, testified that Cuba was the "No.
1 priority" during the Crisis. He said that although "all alternatives,
plans, possibilities were exhaustively surveyed" during that time, the
subject of assassination was never raised in the National Security
Councilor the Executive Committee. (Sorensen, 7/21/75, p. 11)

(3) EVIDENCE BEARING ON KNOWLEDGE OF AND AUTHORIZATION FOR
THE ASSASSINATION PLOT, PHASE II

As discussed below, both Helms and the high Kennedy Administration
officials who testified agreed that no direct order was ever given
for Castro's assassination and that no senior Administration officials,
including McCone, were informed about the assassination activity.
Helms testified, however, that he believed the assassination activity
was permissible and that it was within the scope of authority given
to the Agency. McCone and other Kennedy Administration officials
disagreed, testifying that assassination was impermissible without a
direct order and that Castro's assassination was not within the bounds
of the MONGOOSE operation.

As DDP, Helms was in charge of covert operations when the poison
pills were given to Rosselli in Miami in April 1962. Helms had succeeded
to this post following Bissell's retirement in February 1962.
He testified that after the Bay of Pigs:

Those of us who were still [in the Agency] were enormously anxious to try
and be sllccessful at what we were being asked to do by what was then a
relatively new Administration. We wanted to earn our spurs 'Yith the President
and with other officers of the Kennedy Administration. (Helms, 7/17/75, p. 4)

A. HELMS' TESTIMIONY CONCERNING AUTHORITY

Helms testified that he doubted that he was informed when Harvey
gave poison pills to Rosselli and that he did not recall having authorized
Castro's assassination by that means. He said, however, that he
had authorized that assassination plot because "we felt that we were
operating as we were supposed to operate, that these things if not
specifically authorized, at least were authorized in general terms."
(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 61)

(1) Helms' Perception of Authority

Helms testified that the "intense" pressure exerted by the Kennedy
Administration to overthrow Castro had Jed him to perceive that the
OIA was acting within the scope of its authority in attempting
Castro's assassination, even though assassination was never directly
ordered. [142] He said:

I believe it was the policy at the time to get rid of Castro and if killing him
was one of the things that was to be done in this connection, that was within
what was expected. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 137)

I remember vividly [the pressure to overthrow Castro] was very intense.
(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 26)

Helms stated that this pressure intensified during the period of
Operation MONGOOSE and continued through much of 1963.
(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 27) As the pressure increased, "obviously the
extent of the means that one thought were available * * * increased
too." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 26)

Helms recalled that during the MONGOOSE period, "it was made
abundantly clear * * * to everybody involved in the operation that the
desire was to get rid of the Castro regime and to get rid of Castro'" * *
the point was that no limitations were put on this injunction." (Helms,
7/17/75,pp.16-17)

Senator MATHIAS. Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas
Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said who will rid
me of this man. He didn't sa:r to somebody, go out and murder him. He said who
will dd me of this man, and let it go at that.

Mr. HELMS. That is a warming reference to the problem.

Senator MATHIAS. You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?

Mr. HELMS. I think it does, sir.

Senator MATHIAS. And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said,
which might be taken by the Director or by anybody else as Presidential authorization
to go forward?

Mr. HELMS. That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that one sort of
grows up in [the] tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have
found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I
just think we all had the feeling that we're hired out to keep those things out of
the Oval Office.

Senator MATHIAS. Yet at the same time you felt that some spark had been
transmitted, that that was within the permissible limits?

,Mr. HELMS. Yes, and if he had disappeared from the scene they would not have
been unhappy. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 72-73)

Helms said that he was never told by his superiors to kill Castro,
(Helms, 7/17/75, p. 15) but that:

No member of the Kennedy Administration'" '" '" ever told me that [assassination]
was proscribed, [or] ever referred :to it in that fashion'" '" "'. Nobody ever
said that [assassination] was ruled out'" '" '" (Helms, 7/17/75, pp. 18, 43) [143]

Helms said that the delivery of poison pills for assassinating Castro :

"with all the other things that were going on at that time'" '" '" seemed to be
within the permissible part of this effort '" '" "'. In the perceptions of the time and
the things we were trying to do this was one human life against many other
human lives that were being lost." (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 64, 99) [144]

(2) Helms' Testimony Concerning the Absence of a Direct Order and
Why He Did Not Inform Administration Officials

Helms testified that there was no direct order to assassinate Castro.
He said that his perceptions of authority did not reach the point where
he could testify that he had specific instructions to kill Castro. Helms
told the Committee:

I have testified as best I could about the atmosphere of the time, what I
undel'lStood was desired, and I don't want to take refuge in saying that I was
instructed to specifically murder Castro" * *. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 88)

When asked if President Kennedy had been informed of any assassination
plots, Helms pointed out that "nobody wants to embarrass a
President of the United States by discussing the assassination of foreign
leaders in his presence." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 29) He added that
the Special Group was "the mechanism that was set up * * * to use as a
circuit breaker so that these things did not explode in the President's
face and that he was not held responsible for them." (Helms, 6/13/75,
p. 29) He said that he had "no knowledge that a Castro assassination
was ever authorized" by the SGA. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 28-29)

Helms testified that he never informed the SGA or any of its members
that Harvey had given the pills to Rosselli in Miami "because to
this day I do not recall Harvey ever having told me they were passed."
(Helms, 7/18/75, p. 22)

(3) Helms' Perception of Robert Kennedy's Position on Assassination

Helms emphasized that Robert Kennedy continually pressed for
tangible 'results in the MONGOOSE effort. [145] He testified:

I can say absolutely fairly we were constantly in touch with each other in
these matters. The Attorney General was on the phone to me, he was on the
phone to Mr. Harvey, to Mr. Fitzgerald, his successor. He was on the phone even
to people on Harvey's staff, as I recall it. (Helms, 7/17/75, p .13)  [146]

During one appearance before the Committee, Helms ,vas asked by
the Chairman:

The CHAIRMAN. Since he [Kennedy] was on the phone to you repeatedly did
he ever tell yon to kill Castro?

MR. HELMS. ::"0.

The CHAIRMAN, He did not?

Mr. HELMS. ::"ot in those words, no. (Helms, 7/17/75, p. 13) [147]

Helms testified that he had never told Attorney General Kennedy
about any assassination activity. He assumed that "he wasn't informed
by anyone," and added that "Harvey kept phase 2 [the
Rosselli plot] pretty much in his back pocket" (Helms, 6/13/75, pp.
57-58). Helms also said that the Attorney General had never told him
that assasination was ruled out. (Helms, 7/17/75, p. 13) He added
that he did not know if Castro's assassination would have been morally
unacceptable to the Attorney General, but he believed that Robert
Kennedy "would not have been unhappy if [Castro] had disappeared
off the scene by whatever means," (Helms, 7/17/75, pp, 17-18)

(4) Helms' Testimony as to Why he Did Not Obtain a Direct Order

Helms testified that assassination "was not part of the CIA's policy"
and was not part of its ",armory." (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 87-88)
Helms said that he "never liked assassination," and banned its use five
years after he became Director of Central Intdligence. (Helms,
6/13/75, p. 166) Helms also testified to his "very grave doubts llibout
the wisdom" of dealing with underworld figures when Harvey proposed
contacting Rosselli to see if gangster links to Cuba could be
developed, (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 33; 7/18/75, p. 31)

Despite these reservations, Helms did not seek approval for the
assassination activity. He said this was because assassination was not
a subject which should be aired with higher authority. (Helms,
7/18/75, pp. 31-32) Specifically, he said he did not seek SGA approval
because:

I didn't see how one would have expected that a thing like killing or murdering
or assassination would become a part of a large group of people sitting around
a table in the United States Government. (Helms, 7/17/75, p. 14)

His unwillingness "to embarrass a President of the United States
[by] discussing the assassination of foreign leaders in his presence"
has already been noted. (Helms, 6/13/75, p, 29)

Helms gave additional testimony in response to questions concerning
his failure to seek explicit authorization for assassination
activity.

Senator HUDDLESTON. * * * it did not occur to you to inquire of the Attorney
General or of the Special Group or of anyone that when they kept pushing and
asking for action * * * to clarify that question of whether you should actually
be trying to assassinate?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know whether it was in training, experience, tradition or
exactly what one points to, but I think to go up to a Cabinet officer and say, am
I right in assuming that you want me to assassinate Castro or to try to assassinate
Castro, is a question it wouldn't have occurred to me to ask.

* * * * * * *

Senator HUDDLESTON. * * * [because assassination has such serious consequences]
it seems to fortify the thwgh't that I would want to be dead certain, I
would want to hear it from the horse's mouth in plain, simple English language
before I would want to undertake that kind of activity." (Helms, 7/17/75,
pp. 51-52)

* * * * * * *

"Senator MORGAN. In light of your previous statement that this is a Christian
country and that this Committee has to face up to the prime moral issue of
whether or not killing is * * * acceptable * * * don't you think it would have
taken affirmative permission or authority to kill, rather than just saying it was
not eliminated from the authority or you were not restricted ***?

"Mr. HELMS. * * * killing was not part of the CIA's policy. It was not part
of the CIA's armory * * * but in this Castro operation * * * I have testified as
best I could about the atmosphere of the time, what I understood was desired
[and] that this was getting rid of Castro, if he had been gotten rid of by this
means that this would have been acceptable to certain individuals * * * I was
just doing my best to do what i thought I was supposed to do." (Helms, 6/13/75,
pp.87-88)

When asked why he had not sought clarification from the Special
Group, its members, or Robert Kennedy as to whether it was "in fact,
the policy of the Government to actually kill Fidel Castro," Helms
answered,

I don't know * * * There is something about the whole chain of episodes in
connection with this Rosselli business that I am simply not able to bring back in a
coherent fashion. And there was something about the ineffectuality of all this, or
the lack of conviction that anything ever happened, that I believe in the end made
this thing simply collapse, disappear. And I don't recall what I was briefed on at
the time. Maybe I was kept currently informed and maybe I wasn't, and today
I don't remember it * * * But I do not recall ever having been convinced that
any attempt was really made on Castro's life. And since I didn't believe any
attempt had been made on Castro's life, I saw no reason to pursue the matter
further. (Helms, 7/18/75, pp. 31-32)

(5) Helms' Perception of the Relation of Special Group Controls to
Assassination Activity

Helms stated that the SGA's control system for MONGOOSE was
not intended to apply to assassination activity. (Helms, 7/18/75, p. 21)
Helms stated that the SGA's decision on March 5, 1962, that major operations
going beyond the collection of intelligence must receIve advance
approval referred to "rather specific items that the Special
Group had on its agenda" from the outset of MONGOOSE (Helms,
';/18/75, p. 21) Helms said that since assassination was not among those
items, the SGA would not have expected assassination activity to come
within its purview. (Helms, 7/18/75, p. 21) As to the SGA's stated
desire to "keep its hands tightly on preliminary actions" leading
towards sabotage and other covert activity, Helms characterized it as
the kind of iniunction "that appears in all kinds of governmental
minutes of meetings." (Helms, 7/18/75, pp. 16-17)

Helms stated that although there were "no limitations" on actions
to remove Castro during MONGOOSE, there were restraints on sabotage
operations. He did not understand the absence of specific limitations
to allthorize more drastic actions, such as committing the United
Statas military to an invasion of Cuba. (Helms, 7/18/75, p. 9) [148]

B. HARVEY'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING AUTHORITY

(1) Harvey's Perception of Authority

Harvey stressed that he was a line officer reporting to the DDP, his
immediate superior within the Agency. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 83) He
pointed out that his information about authorization from outside the
agency came from the DDP :

[A]t no time during this entire period * * * did I ever personally believe or
have any feeling that I was either free-wheeling or end-running or engaging
in any activity that was not in response to a considered, decided U.S. policy, properly
approved, admittedly, perhaps, through channels and at levels I personally
had no involvement in, or first-hand acquaintance with, and did not consider it
at that point my province to, if you Will, cross-examine either the Deputy Director
or the Director concerning it. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 83)

Harvey stated that he believed that authorization for the 1962 assassination
activity carried over from the period when Allen Dulles
was DCI. He based his belief on statements made to him by Bissell.
On the question of McCone's knowledge or authorization, the following
exchange occurred between Harvey and the Chairman:

The CHAIRMAN. That doesn't necessarily mean that because the previous director
had knowledge that Mr. McCone had knowledge. It is not like a covenant that
runs in the land.

Mr. HARVEY. No, of course not, and they don't always brief their successors.
(llarvey, 6/25/75, p. 85)

(2) Harvey and the Special Group (Augmented)

During the MONGOOSE period, Harvey attended many SGA
meetings as the CIA's representative. He testified that he never informed
the SGA or any of its members of the ongoing assassination
plots and that at no time was assassination discussed at any meetings,
except the one on August 10, 1962. [149]

Early in 1962, Harvey was appointed chief of Task :Force W,
CIA's action arm for MONGOOSE activities. In the latter part of
April 1962, Harvey went to Miami where the CI~ had its JMIWAVE
station. Harvey testified that in addition to meeting with Rosselli and
delivering the poison pills, his trip had other purposes totally unrelated
to assassination:

" * * * this was one of a number of periodic trips for the purpose of reviewing
in toto * * * the actual and potential operations at the Miami basl! * * * and this
covered the whole gamut from personnel administration, operational support in
the way of small craft [and] so on * * *." (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 15-16)

The SGA expected to receive a report from Harvey on his April
trip to Mi'ami. While Harvey was still in Miami, Lansdale told the
SGA that:

"Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit, more specific
information on the status of agent training and operations should be made
available." (Memorandum for the SGA, 4/19/62, p. 2)

On April 26, 1962, Lansdale told the SGA that Harvey was in
Florida "initiating a new series of agent infiltrations" and would
return to Washington on April 30. (Memo for the SGA, 4/26/62, from
Lansdale) At an SGA meeting on April 26, General Taylor requested
that Harvey "attend the next meeting and report on agent activities."
(Memo for the Record, April 26, 1962, by McCone) The next day, McCone's
assistant sent Harvey a memorandum informing him of General
Taylor's request and notifying him that McCone wanted to meet
with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately on your return to discuss the
Task Force activities." (Memo for Action, Elder to Harvey, 4/27/62)

Harvey reported to the SGA as requested. He testified that he did
not inform the SGA, or any individual outside the Agency, that he
had given the poison pills to Rosselli. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 16) Harvey
said he did not tell McCone about the poison pills when he briefed the
Director because he did not believe it was necessary. (Harvey, 7/11/75,
p.17) [150]

Harvey gave a progress report to the SGA on "agent teams" and
the "general field of intelligence" when he reported to them following
his trip to Miami. (Memo of SGA Meeting, 5/3/62) AccordinO' to the
minutes, Harvey reported that three agent teams had been infiltrated
and that 72 actual or potential -reporting sources were also in the place.
The minutes of the May 3, 1962, SGA meeting make no mention of
Harvey's assassination activities.

Shortly after the May 3 meeting, General Taylor gave the President
what Taylor called a "routine briefing." (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 27) General
Taylor's memorandum of that briefing makes no reference to
Harvey's contacts with Rosselli or the delivery of pills and guns.
(Memo for Record, May 7, 1962, by General Taylor) Taylor testified
that he had never heard of Harvey's delivering pills to poison Castro,
or of any assassination attempts. (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 42)

C. TESTIMONY OF KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

The Committee took testimony from the Kennedy Administration
officials principally involved in the MONGOOSE operatjon, all of
whom testified that the assassination plots were not authorized. Their
testimony focused on whether any authority for a Cast.ro assassination
existed, whether they had knowledge of any Castro assassination activity,
and whether it was probable that Robert Kennedy might have
given Helms an assassination order through a '~back channel." [151]

McCone, who testified that he had never been informed of the
assassination plots, said that neither President Kennedy, Attorney
General Kennedy, nor any of the Cabinet or White House staff ever
discussed with him any plans or operations to assassinate Castro.
(Mo()one,6/6/75, p.44)

McCone said that although the Cuban problem was discussed in
terms of "dispose of Castro," or "knock off Castro," those terms were
meant to refer to "the overthrow of the Communist Government in
Cuba," and not to assassination. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 44; Memo to
Helms, April 14, 1967)

McCone told the Committee that "it is very hard for me to believe"
that Robert Kennedy would have initiated an assassination effort
against Castro without consulting the SGA. (McCone, 1975, p. 52)

Taylor served as Chairman of the SGA during the MONGOOSE
Operation (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 12), and as President Kennedy's Mili-
tary Representative and Intelligence Advisor after the Bay of Pigs
until his appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
November 1962. (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 11; Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 25) He
testified that a pIau to assassinate Castro was "never" submitted to
the Sn~\. either orally or in writ.ing. (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 41) He said
the SGA was never told of the poison pills given to Rosselli in April
196~. and that the passage of those pills without the knowledge of the
SGA was "entirely, eompletely out of [the] context and eharaeter of
the way the [SGA] operated or the way it would accept" that an
operation was properly authorized. (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 43) Taylor
testified that although the SGA was "certainly anxious for the downfall
of Castro," an" assassinaton never eame up" at its meetings.
(Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 62)

Taylor stated "the President and the Attorney General would neve!
have gone around" the SGA to deal with Helms or other CIA officials
in planning an assassination. (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 49) To have
done so would have been "entirely contradictory to every method 0:(
operation I ever saw on the part of the President and his brother."
(Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 45) Taylor acknowledg-ed that Robert Kennedy
frequently pushed for more direct action during- MONGOOSE, but
said that "there was no suggestion [of] assassination." (Taylor, 7/9/75,
p. 67) He testified that Robert Kennedy dealt directly with Lansdale
outside SGA channels "only for the purpose of imparting his own
sense of urgeney," but "never" would have done so on substantive
issues.[152]

In General Lansdale's appearanc.e before the Committee, the following
exehange occurred:

The CHAIRMAN. You do not recall ever having discussed with the Attorney
General a plan or a proposal to assassinate Fidel Castro?
General LANSDALE. No. And I am very certain Senator, that such a discussion
never came up * * * neither with the Attorney General nor the President." (Lansdale,
7/8/75, p. 18) [153]

Lansdale said that he had not discussed assassination with the President
or the President's brother because he "had dou'bts" that assassination
was a "useful action, and one which I had never employed in
the past, during work in coping with revolutions, and I had con-
siderable doubts as to its utility and I was trying to be very pragmatic."
[154] (Lansdale ( 7/8/75, p. 31)

When asked if he thought the President was aware of efforts to de-.
pose Castro and his government, Lansdale answered:

I am certain he was aware of efforts to dispose of the Castro regime. I am
really not one to guess what he knew of assassinations, because I don't know.
(Id., p. 32.)

With regard to the Castro assassination att~mpts, Lansdale testified
that Harvey "never" told him that Harvey was attempting to assassinate
Castro. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 24) Lansdale stated:

I had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order or permission for such
a thing and I was given no information at all that such a thing was going on by
people who I have now learned were involved with it. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 58)

When asked if Robert Kennedy might have by-passed the SGA and
Lansdale to deal directly with Agency officials on a Castro assassination,
Lansdale testified:

I never knew of a direct line of communication between the President or the
Attorney General and Harvey apart from me on this ***. [155]

Bundy served as President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs throughout the Kennedy Administration
(Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 2) and participated in the planning that led
to the creation of Operation MONGOOSE. He was also a member of
the SGA. (Bundy, 7/11/75, pp. 34, 87) Bundy worked on an intimate
basis with the President and the Attorney General during the entire
Kennedy Administration.

Bundy testified that it was his conviction that "no one in the Kennedy
Administration, in the White House * * * ever gave any authorization,
approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort to
assassinate anyone by the CIA." (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 54) He said that
Castro's assassination was "mentioned from time to time," but "never
that I can recall by the President." (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 73) Bundy
emphasized that the question came up "as something to talk about
rather than to consider." (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 73)

The CHAIRMAN. Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you believe, under
any of the circumstances that occurred 9uring that whole period, either one
of them would have authorized the assassination of Fidel Castro?

Mr. BUNDY. I most emphatically do not * * *. If you have heard testimony
that there was pressure to do something about CUba, there was. There was
an effort, both from the President in his style and from the Attorney General
in his style to keep the government active in looking for ways to weaken the
Cuban regime. There was. But if you, as I understand it, and not even those
who pressed the matter most closely as having essentially been inspired by the
White House can tell you that anyone ever said to them, go and kill anyone.

Let me say one other thing about these two men, and that is that there
was something that they really wanted done, they did not leave people in doubt,
so that on the one hand, I would say about their character, their purposes, and
their nature and the way they confronted international affiairs that I find it
incredible that they would have ordered or authorized explicitly or implicitly
an assassination of Castro. I also feel that if, contrary to everything that I know
about their Character, they had had such a decision and such a purpose, people
would not have been in any doubt about it. (Bundy, 7/11/75, pp. 98-99)

Bundy said that he could not explain Helms' testimony that Helms
had believed the CIA had been authorized to develop and engage in
assassination activity. (Bundy, 7/11/75, pp. 99-100) He said that
despite the extreme sense of urgency that arose during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, Castro's assassination was never discussed, and it would
have been "totally inconsistent" with the policies and actions of the
President and the Attorney General during that crisis. (Bundy, 7/11/
75, pp. 95, 97-98) [156]

Bundy testified that he was never told that assassination efforts
against Castro had been undertaken or that the CIA had used underworld
figures for that purpose. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 63) He said that
he had heard about "Executive Action * * * some time in the early
months of 1961" (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 4), but that since it had been
presented to him as an untargeted capability, he did not "discourage
or dissuade" the person who briefed him. [157] (Bundy, 7/11/75, pp. 4, 7,
10)

When asked if he recalled any specific covert plans against Cuba
involving poisons, Bundy stated:

I have no recollection O'f any specific plan. I do have a very vague, essentially
refreshed recollection that I heard the word poison at some point in connection
with a possibility of action in Cuba. But that is as far as I have been able to
take it in my own memory. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 42)

Bundy recalled that the proposal had seemed "impractical" because
it was going to kill "a large group of people in a headquarters mess, or
something of that sort." (Bundy, 7/11/75, pp. 42-43)

Bundy stated that although Robert Kennedy did spur people to
greater effort during MONGOOSE, "he never took away from the
existing channel of authority its authority or responsibility." (Bundy,
7/11/75, pp. 47-48) He said that Roberl Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor
(SGA Chairman) had "a relation of real trust and confidence." It was
Bundy's opinion that Robert Kennedy would not have by-passed
Taylor to develop a "back-channel" with someone else to assassinate
Castro. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 87)

McNamara served as Secretary of Defense throughout the Kennedy
Administration. He represented the Department on the Special Grou-p
and the SGA during the MONGOOSE operations.

McNamara stated that he had never heard either the President or
the Attorney General propose Castro's assassination. (MeNamara,
7/11/75, p. 4) He noted that: "We were hysterical about Castro at
the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter, and that there was pressure
from [President Kennedy and the Attornl:'Y General] to do
something about Castro. But I don't believe we contl:'mplated assassination.
We did, however, contemplate overthrow." '(McNamara,
7/11/75, p.93)

An exchange that occurred during McNamara's testimony captures
thl:' dilemma posed by the evidence:

The CHAIRMAN. We also have received evidence from your senior associates
that they IJPver participaterl in thp authori7..ation of an assassination attempt
against Castro nor ever diN'cted the CIA to undertake suchltrtempts.

'We haw much testimony establil';hing the chain of command where covert
action was concerned, and all of it has been to the effect that the Special Group
or the Special Group (Augmentt-'d) had full charge of covert operationI';, and that
in that chain of command any proposal of this character or any other propol';al
having to do with covert operations being directed against the Castro regime, or
against Castro personally, were to be laid before the Special Group (Augml'nt£'d)
and were not to be undertaken except with th£' authority of that~oup and at thp
direction of that group.

Now, at the same time we know from the evidence that the CIA was in fact
pngaged during the period in a series of attempts to assassinate Castro.

Now, you see what we are faced with il'; this dilemma. Either the CIA was a
rogue elephant rampaging out of control, over which no effective dir{'('tion was
being given in this matter of assassination, or there was some secr£'t channel
circumventing the whole structure of command by which the CIA and certain
officials in the CIA were authorized to proceed with assassination plots and
assassination attempt<; against Castro. Or the third and final point that I can
think of is that somehow these officials of tho? CIA who were so engaged misunderstood
or misinterpreted their scope of authority.

Now it is terribly important, if there is any way that we can find out which of
these three points represented what actually happened. That is the nature, that
is the qURndry.

Now, is there anything that you can tell us that would assist us in finding an
answer to this central question?

Mr. McNAMARA: I can only tell you what will further your uneasiness. Because
I have stated before and I believe today that the CIA was a highly disciplined
organization, fully under the control of senior officials of the government, so
much so that I f·eel as a senior offidal of the government I must assume responRibility
for the 'actions of the two, putting aSRassination aside just for the moment.
But I know of no major action taken by CIA during the time I was in the gov!'rnment
that was not properly authorized by senior officials. And when I say that I
want to emphasize also that I believe with hindsight we authorized actions that
were contrary to the interest of the Republie but I don't want it on the record
that the CIA was uncontrolled, was operating with its own authority and we
can be a:bsolved of responsibility for what CIA did, again with exception of
assassination, again which I say I never heard of.

The second point you say that you have, you know that CIA was engaged in a
series of :att!'mpts of 'assassination. I think to lL<;e your words. I don't know that.
I accept; the fact that you do and that you have information I was not aware of.
I find that impossible to reconcile. I just can't understand how it could have
happened and I don't 'accept the third point, that they operated on the basis of
misunderstanding, because it seems to m!' that the McCone position that he was
opposed to it, his dear recollection and his written memo of 1967 that I was
strongly opposed to it, his statemE'nt that Murrow opposed, all should pliminat·?
any point of misunderstanding. So I frankly can't reconcile. (McNamara, 7/11/75,
pp.38-41)

MeNamara concluded:

I find it almost inconceivable that the assassination attempts were carried on
during the Kennedy Administration days without the senior members knowing
it, and I understand the contradiction that this carries with respect to the facts.
(McNamara, 7/11/75, p. 90)

He emphasized that approval of an assassination by the President or
his brother would have been "totally inconsistent with everything I
know about the two men." (McNamara. 7/11/75, p. 4)

Roswell Gilpatric served as Deputy Secretary. of Defense throughout
the Kennedy Administration and represented the Department on
the Special Group and the SGA during the MONGOOSE operation.
(Gilpatric, 7/8/75, p. 5) .

Gilpatric testified that he understood the mandate of the SpecIal
Group during ;\fOXGOOSE was not to kill Castro, but to "so undermine,
so disnlpt the Cuban system under Castro that it could not be effective. [157]
(Gilpatric. 7/8/75, p. 28) Gilpatric emphasized that "it
was the system we had to deal with," and that words such as "get rid
of Castro" were said "in the context of the system, of the * * * government
he had installed and was presiding over, but of which [Castro]
was only one part,'· (Gilpatric. 7/8/75, p. 29)

Gilpatric said he knew of no express restriction barring assassination.
but that it was understood that "there were limits on the use of
power." and that those limits precluded assassination. (Gilpatric.
7/8175. p. ;31) While he belieYed that it was "perfectly possible" that
someone might reasonably haw inferred that assassination was authorized,
the limits imposed by the SGA would have required anyone
receiving general inptructions to make specific efforts to determine
whether those instructions authorized assassination. [158]

Gilpatric testified that "within our charter, so to speak, the one
thing that was off limits was militarv invasion." (Gilpatric, 7/8/75,
p. 45) When asked whether the "ki'lling of Castro by a paramilitary
group rwouldl have been ,vithin bounds," Gilpatric responded, "I
know of no restriction that would have barred it." (ld.) 'Vhen asked
if there was any concern that the raids and infiltration efforts were
too limited, Gilpatric said:

No, to the contrary. The complaint that the Attorney General had, if we
assume he was reflecting the President's views on H, [was that] the steps taken
hy the CIA up to that point, [and] their plans were too petty, were too minor,
they weren't massive enough, they weren't going to be effective enough. (Gilpatrie,
7/8/75,p. 47)

Contrary to the opinion expressed by other witnesses, Gilpatric
testified that "it waE not unusual" for the President and the Attorney
General to deal directly with people at various levels in the Executive
Branch. (Gilpatric. 7/8/75, p. 58) He described Robert Kennedy
as the "moving spirit" of MONGOOSE (Gilpatric, 7/8/75, p. 11)
whose role was "principally to spur us on, to get going, get cracking."
(Gilpatric, 7/8/75, p. 47.) Although Robert Kennedy frequently complained
that the plans of the CIA and MONGOOSE were not "massive
enough," and that "we should get in there and do more," Gilpatric
said that the Attorney General was not urging specific proposals, and
that he had desired only "to limit the Castro regime's effectiveness."
(Gilpatric, 7/8/75, p. 47)

Dean Rusk served as Secretary of State throughout the Kennedy
Administration and participated in a num'ber of SGA meetings duringthe
MONGOOSE operation. (Rusk, 7/10/75, p. 7)

Rusk testified that he had never been informed of any Castro
assassination plans or undertakings and had no knowledge of any
such activity. (Rusk, 7/10/75, p. 52) He found it "very hard to believe"
that in the course of urging action against Castro. President
Kennedy or Robert Kennedy would have sanctioned any measure
against Castro personally. [159] He believed that while it was "possible"
that someone mIght have thought that specific courses of acti(>ll were
authorized by the emphasis in SGA meetings, permission to ~mmit
an assassination could not have been reasonably inferred.

It would have been an abuse of the President and the Attorney Q-{'neral if
somebody had thought they were getting that without confirming that this was,
in fact, an official, firm .policy decision. (Rusk, 7/10/75, PIP. 97-98)

Rusk testified that he could not imagine the President or dIe Attorney
General having circumvented the SGA by going directly to
Helms or Harvey about assassinating Castro. [160]

Theodore Sorensen served as a Special Assistant to President Kennedy
during the entire Kennedy Administration. He was a member
of the National Security Council Executive Committee that deldt with
the Missile Crisis, but was not involved with MONGOOSE.

Sorensen testified that in all his daily personal meetings with the
President and 'at NSC meetings he attended. there was "not at any
time any mention-much less approva,l by [the President]-of any
U.S.-sponsored plan to assassinate any foreign leaders." (Sorensen,
7/21/75, p. 4)

(4) THE AUGUST 10, 1962 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) MEETING

The question of liquidating Cuban leaders \Vas raised ata meeting
of the SOA on August 10, 1962. On Augtlst 13, 1962, Lansdale direded
Harvey to include in a proposed plan for Phase II of MONGOOSE,
an option for the "liquidation of leaders."

At the outset, it should be noted that the documents and testimony
about the meeting indicate that the discussion of assassination on
August 10 \Vas unrelated to the assassination activity undertaken by
Harvey and Rosselli, or to any other plans or efforts to assassinate
Castro. The Inspector General's Report states:

The subject (of a Castro assassination) was raised at a meeting at State on
10 August 1962, but is unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination. It did
result in a MONGOOSE action memorandum by Lansdale assigning to CIA
action for planning liquidation of leaders. (I.G. Report, p. 118)

This finding of the Inspector General is supported by both the
chronolo~ of the Castro assassination efforts and the testimony of
Harvey. Harvey gave Rosselli the poison pills for use against Oastro
(and shortly thereafter was informed that the pills were inside Cuba)
three months before the August 10 meeting. There was no Castro
assassina60n activity during the remainder of 1962.

Harvey attended the August 10 meeting and recalled that the question
of a Castro assassination was raised. He testified that the assassination
discussion was not related to his activities with Rosselli.
(Harvey, 7/11/75, pI>. 48-50) He said that he did not regard the
SGA discussion as authorization for his Rosselli operation because
"the authority, as I understood it, for this particular operation went
back long before the formation of the SGA." (Harvey, 7/'11/75, p. 49)

A. THE CONTEMPORANEOUS DOCUMENTS

(1) Lansdale's August 13, 1962 Memorandum

Lansdale's August 13 memorandum was sent to Harvey and to
the other members of Lansdale's interagency working group. [161] The
Memorandum stated:

In compliance with the desires and gnidance expressed in the Au~st 10 policy
meeting on Operation MONGOOSE, we will produce an outline of an alternate
Course B for submission.

I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of
implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the heading of:
Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

Lansdale's memorandum then assigned to Harvey preparation of
papers on the following subjects:

Mr. HARVEY. Intelligence, Political, [words deleted], Economic, (sabotage,
limited deception), and Paramilitary." (ld.)

According to a memorandum from Harvey to Helms on the following
day, the words deleted from the quoted passage were "including liquidation
of leaders." (Memo, Harvey to Helms, 8/14/62)

(2) Harvey's August 14, 1962 Memorandum

After receiving Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, Harvey wrote
a memorandum to Helms. He attached a copy of the Lansdale memorandum,
and noted that he had excised the words "including liquidation
of leaders." Harvey's memorandum explained that:

The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by
Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in
Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that
meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject
which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the
comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is
not expecting any written comments or study on this point." (ld.)

Harvey's memorandum further stated that he had called Lansdale's
office and pointed out "the inadmissability and stupidity of putting
this type of comment in writing in such a document." (Id.) He also
told Lansdale's office that the CIA "would write no document pertaining
to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it."
(Id.)

(3) The Minutes of the August 10, 1962 Meeting

The minutes of the August 10 meeting contain no reference to
assassination. (Memo for Record, Special Group Augmented Meeting,
August 10, 1962, hereaftBr "August 10 Minutes") Thomas Parrott,
who authored the August 10 Minutes, testified that he did not recall
a discussion of assassination at that meeting, but that the fact that
the minntes reflect no such discussion does not necessarily indicate
that the matter had not come up. (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 34)
Parrott pointed out that his minutes "were not intended to be a
verbatim transcript of everything that was said," since their purpose
was "to interpret what the decisions were and to record those and to
use them as a useful action document." [Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 34-35.J
Parrott testified: "we had 15 or 16 people [at the August 10, 1962 meetingJ
* * * all of them well informed, all of them highly articulate.
This meeting, as I recall, went on for several hours. * *' * Now I'm
sure that particularly in a group like this that there were a great many
proposals made that were just shot down immediately." (Parrott,
7/10/75, pp. 34-35)

Parrott testified that he did not record proposals that were quickly
rejected. (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 35) He said that, although he had no
recollection of a discussion of Castro's assassination at the meeting, he
would infer from the related documents [the Lansdale and Harvey
Memoranda of August 13 and 14, respectivelyJ that the subject was
raised but "it never got off the ground * * * Therefore, I did not
record it." (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 35)

(4) The August 10 Meeting

The purpose of the August 10 Meeting was to decide on a course of
action to succeed the intelligence collection phase of MONGOOSE,
scheduled to conclude in August. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 34) Because it
was a policy meeting, a larger number of officials than usual attended.
The Meeting was chaired by Secretary of State Rusk and those attending
included the principals of the other agencies taking part in MONGOOSE,
i.p., Secretary of Defense McNamara, CIA DIrector McCone,
and rSIA Director Murrow.

General Lansdale submitted a MONGOOSE proposal for a
"stepped-up Course B" that would involve operations to "exert all
possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other overt pressures
to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without overt employIllent
of U.S. military." (Lansdale Memo for Special Group Augmented,
8/8/62)

The SGA decided against the "stepped-up Course B." In discussing
Lansdale's proposal, Rusk "emphasized the desirability of attempting
to create a split between Castro and old-line C<>mmllnists." McNamara
questioned whether the practice of building up agents in Cuba would
not lead to actions that "would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion."
[162] The minutes state that McNamara's concern "led to the suggestion
by General Taylor that we should consider changing the overall
objective [of MONGOOSE] from one of overthrowing the Castro
regime" to one of causing its failure. (SGA Minutes, 8/10/62, p. 2)

Instead of Lansdale's "stepped-up Course 13," the SGA chose a plan
advanced by McCone which assumed Castro's continuance in power
and had the more limited objective of splittin~ off Castro from "oldline
Communists."  [163] (SGA Minutes, 8/10/62, 'p. 2) The decision and
"action" were described as follows:

The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that
the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's
meeting of the Special Group. McCone was asked to stress econvrnic sabotage,
and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split.

* *

Action to be taken: CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance
with the a'bove-flummarized discussion. This should be ready by Wednesday,
August 15. (SGA Minutes Memo, 8/10/62, PP. 2-3)

The discussion which follows treats testimony bearing on whether
Lansdale's request to Harvey for an assassination plan reflected the
wishes of the SGA or was contemplated by the SGA's decision to proceed
with a plan of "reduced effort" that posited Castro's continuance
in power.

B. THE TESTIMONY

Harvey, McCone, and Goodwin recalled that the question of assassinating
Castro was raised at the August 10 meeting. [164] Their testimony
is discussed first with regard to the meeting itself, and second, with
regard to the action that followed.

(1) Testimony About the August 10 Meeting

(a) McCone

McCone testified that "liquidation" or removal of Castro and other
Cuban leaders arose at the August 10 meeting in the context of "exploring
the alternatives that were available" for the next phase of
MONGOOSE. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 34) He did not recall who made
this suggestion, but remembered that he and Edward Murrow took
"strong exception" to it. A memorandum written by McCone in 1967
states: [165]

I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was
completely out of bounds as far as the USG [U.S. Government] and CIA were
concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any
papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds.

McCone testified that there was no decision at the meeting not
to include assassination in the program, and that "the subject was
just dropped" after his objection. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 37) McCone's
1967 memorandum stated that: "At no time did the suggestion receive
serious consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) nor by any
individual responsible for policy."

(b) Harvey

It was Harvey's recollection that the question of assassination was
raised by Secretary McNamara as one of "shouldn't we consider the
elimination or assassination" of Castro. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 30)
Harvey testified:

I think the consensus of the Group was to sweep that particular proposal or
suggestion or question or consideration off the record and under the rug as rapidly
as possible. There was no extensive discussion of it, no discussion, no back and
forth as the whys and wherefores and possibilities and so on. (Harvey, 7/11/75,
p.30)

(c) Goodwin

Goodwin testified that he had a recollection of "limited certainty"
that the subject of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10
meeting, [166] but he was unable to say "with any certainty" who raised the
subject. (Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 8)  [167]

(d) McNamara

McNamara testified thllit although he did not recall assassination
being discussed at the SGA meetmg, he did remember having expressed,
opposition to any assassination attempt or plan when he spoke
with McCone several days later. (McNamara, 7/11/75, pp. 7, 8)

(2) Testimony about Events After the August 10, 1962 meeting

(a) McCone

McCone testified that he called McNamara after receiving Lansdale's
August 13 Memorandum and:

* * * insisted that that Memorandum be withdrawn because no decision was
made on this subject, and since no decision was made, then Lansdale was quite
out of order in tasking the Central Intelligence Agency to consider the matter. [168]

McCone said that McNamara agreed that Lansdale's Memorandum
shonlrl be withdrawn [169] for the same reason. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 39)

(b) Harvey

Harvey's demand that the words "liquidation of leaders" be excised
from Lansrlale's memorandum and his further statement that "the
Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments
or study on this point," raise an important question. Did Harvey mean
that the SGA was not considering assassination or merely that the
subject should not be put in writing? When Harvey was asked "was it
understood in an unwritten way that [assassination] was to proceed,"
he replied:

Not to my knowledge, no * * *. If there was any unwritten understanding
on the part of the members of the Special Group concerning this, other thall
what was said at the meeting, I do not know of it * * *. (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp.
30-31)

Harvey said that shortly after the meeting, McCone informed him
that he had told McNamara that assassination should not be discussed.
McCone also told McNamara that involvement in such matters might
result in his own excommunication. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 25)

(c) Elder

Walter Elder. McCone's Executive Assistant, was present when McCone
telephoned McNamara after the August 10 meeting. Elder testified
that ~IcCone told McNamara "the subject you just brought up, I
think it is highly improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It is
1I0t an action that should ever be condoned. It is not proper for uS to
discuss, and I intend to have it expunged from the record." (Elder,
8/13/75, p.23)

Elder testified that this was the eSsence of the conversation but
that he distinctly remembered "several exact phrases, like 'would not be
condoned' and 'improper'." (Elder, 8/13/75, pp. 23, 24) [170]

McCone spoke with Harvey in Elder's presence after receiving
Lansdale's August 13 memorandum. According to Elder, "McCone
made his views quite clear in the same language and tone * * * that
he used with Mr. McNamara." (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 25) Elder testified
that Harvey did not then tell McCone that Harvey was engaged in a
Castro assassination effort. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 25)

Elder also described a meeting held in his office with Helms shortly
after the McCone/Harvey/Elder meeting. Elder stated:

I told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed his feeling to Mr. McNamara
and ~fr. Harvey that assassination could not be condoned and would not be
approved. Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's statement that it would be
unthinkable to record in writing any consideration of assassination because it left
the impression that the subject had received serious consideratiun oy goverumental
policymakers, which it had not. Mr. Helms responded, "I understand."
The point is that I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr. McCone's opposition
to assassination. I know that Mr. Helms could not have been under any misapprehension
about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation. (Elder
Affidavit. 8/26/75. p. 2)

Helms, after reading Elder's affidavit, told the Committee that he
had no recollection of the meeting. (Helms. 9/16/71). p. 16)

(d) Lansdale

Lansdale recalled that the subject of Castro's assassination had surfaced
at the AUf..,I'ust 10 meeting. He testified that the "consensus was
* * * hell no on this and there was a very violent reaction." (Lansdale,
7/8/75, p~ 20) Lansdale waR questioned as to why he subsequently
asked Harvey for a Castro assassination plan:

Renator BAKER. Why did you, three days later if they all said, hell no, [gol
ahead with it?

General LANSDALE....... the meeting at which they said that was still on a
development of my original task, which was a revolt and an overthrow of a
regime. At the same time, we were getting intelligence accumulating very quickly
of something very different taking place in Cuba than we had expected, which
was the Soviet technicians starting to come in and the possibilities of Soviet
missiles being placed there" .... At that time, I thought it would be a possibility
someplace down the road in whicb there would be some possible need to take
action such as that [assassination) [171] (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 21)

Lansdale stated that he had one brief conversation with Harvey
after the August 1:3 memorandum in which Harvey stated "he would
look into it * * * see about developing some plans." Lansdale said that
was the last he ever heard of the matter. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 124)
Lansdale stated that as the Cuban Missile Crisis developed, MONGOOSE
"was being rapidly shifted out of consideration" and thus
"I wasn't pressing for answers * * * it was very obvious that another
situation was developing that would be handled quite differently in
Cuba." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 124)

Lansdale testified that he was "very certain" that he never discussed
a Castro assassination plan or proposal with Robert Kennedy or with
President Kennedy. He said that he had asked Harvey for a plan
without having discussed the matter with anyone:

Senator BAKER: ...... did you originate th~s idea of layingon the CIA a requirement
to report on the feasibility of the assas,;ination of Castro or did someone
else suggest that?

General LANSDALE: I did, as far as I recall.

Senator BAKER: Who did you discuss it with before you laid on that requirement?

General LANSDALE: I don't believe I discussed it with anyone.

.senator BAKER: Only with Harvey?

General LANSDALE: Only with Harvey.

Senator BAKER: Did you ever discuss it with Helms'!

General LANSDALE: I might have, and I don't believe that I did. I think it was
just with Harvey.

Senator BAKER: Did you ever discuss it with Robert Kpnnedy?

General LANSDALE: No, not that I recall.

Senator BAKER: With the President'!

General LANSDALE: No. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, pp. 19-20)

(3) Testimony of Reporters About Lansdale's Comments on the August
10 Meeting

During the Committt>e's investigation, reports concerning the
August 10 meeting and Landsdale's request for a Castro assassination
plan appeared in the press. One report was based on statements made
by Lansdale to David Martin orthe Associated Press and another
on Lansdale's statements to Jeremiah O'uary of the Wa8kington
8tar-News. Because there was conflict between Lansdale's testimony
to the Committee and what he was reported to have told Martin and
O'Leary, the Committee invited both reporters to testify. Martin
testified under subpoena. O'Leary appeared voluntarily but stated
that the policy of his newspaper against disclosing news sources precluded
him from elaborating on the contents of a prepared statement,
which he read under oath. O'Leary stated that his news report "represents
accurately my understanding of the relevant information I
obtained from news sources." (O'Leary, D/25/75, p. 5)

(a) The Martin Report

The lead paragraph of Martin's report stated:

Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale said Friday that acting on orders
from President John F. Kennedy delivered through an intermediary, he developed
plans for removing Cuban Premier Fidel Castro by any means including
assassination.

Martin testified that this paragraph was an accurate reflection of
his conclusion based on the totality of his interview with Lansdale
on xIay 30,1975. (Martin, 7/24/75, pp. 19-20) Lansdale testified that,
after reading Martin's story, he told the reporter that "your first
sentence is not only completely untrue, but there is not a single thing
in your story that says it is true." (Lansdale. 7/8/75. p. 65)

In view of Martin's testimony that the report's lead paragraph was
a conclusion based on his total interview with Lansdale, it should
be noted that the remainder of Martin's story does not state that Lansdale
was ordered by President Kennedy or the Attorney General to
develop plans for Castro's assassination. The report quotes Lansdale
as stating "I was working for the highest authority in the land * * *
the President." and then states that Lansdale said he did not deal
directly with the President, but "worked through" an intermediary
who was more intimate with the President than Bundy. [172] The Committee
notes that the phrases "working for" and "working through"
(10 not carry the same meaning as the lead paragraph's conclusion that
Lansdale was "acting on orders" to develop a Castro assassination
plan. Subsequent paragraphs in the Martin report indicate that Lansdale
told the reporter that the decision to undertake assassination planning
was his own; Lansdale so testified before the Committee. According
to the ~Iartin artieIe. Lansdale said that a,sassination ,,-as "one of
the means he considered." that he believed assassination would not have
been "incompatible" with his assignment. and that he "* * * just
wanted to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities." Martin said he
did not ask Lansdale specifically if Lansdale had acted on orders
regarding an assassination plan. nor did Lansdale volunteer that information.
Rather, Martin asked Lansdale """Vho were you workirig
for?" [173]

In a subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975, Martin said he asked
Lansdale specifically, "1Vere you ever ordered by President Kennedy
or any other Kennedy to draw up plans to assassinate Castro?"
()[artin, 7/24/75, p. 21) Martin testified that Lansdale replied "no"
and that his orders were "very broad." (Martin, 7/24/75, p. 21)
Martin further testified that in the .Tune 4 conn'I"sation he asked Lansdale
whether "any assassination planning you did was done on your
own initiative," and that Lansdale replied "yes." (Martin 7/24/75,
p. 21) Martin stated his belief that Lansdale's statements on .Tune 4
were at variance with his prior statements on May ;10. (Martin 7/24/75,
p. 21) It is, of course. possible that since Martin posed different questions
in the two corn'ersations, he and Lansdale may have misunderstood
each other.

(b) The O'Leary Report

O'Leary's report began:

Retired :Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale has named Robert F. Kennedy as the
administration official who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project to
work out all feasible plans for "getting rid of" Cuban Prime Minister Fidel
Castro.

Lansdale, in an interview with the 'Vashington Star, never used the word
"assassination" and said it was not used by Kennedy, then the attorney general.
But he said there could he no douht that "that project for disposing of Castro
envisioned the whole spectrum of plans from overthrowing the Cuban leader to
assassinating him."

O'Leary's report contained the statement that "Lansdale said he was
contacted by Robert Kennedy in mid-summer of 1962 * * *." O'Leary
told the Committee that this reference modified the reference in the
lead paragraph of his report. (O'Leary, 9/26/75, p. 13)

Lansdale testified that he had s;]bmitted a statement to the WMh·
1:ngton Star N e108 stating that O'Leary's report was "a distortion of
my remarks." (Lansdale, 7/8/75. p. 61) Lansdale said he told the
newspaper that: "perhaps someplace in the planning there is something
about what to do with a leader who would threaten the lives of
millions of Americans [with Soviet Missiles] * * * but I can say I
never did receive any order from President Kennedy or from Robert
Kennedy about taking action against Castro personally." (Lansdale,
7/18/7fl.pp.61--'62)

Lansdale testified that he told O'Leary that he did take orders from
Rohert Kennedy. but made clear that "'Kennedy's orders to him were
on a very widp-ranging type of thing." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 62)

After the story appeared, the * * * Washington Star asked me what wideranging
things were yon talking about?

I said there were economic matters and military matters and military things
and they were very wide-ranging things. I said perhaps all O'Leary was thinking
of was assassination. I was thinking of far wider than that. (Lansdale
7/R/75, PD. 62-63)

The O'Leary report states:

Lansdale said he is certain Robert Kennedy's instructions to him did not include
the word "assassination." He said the attorney general, as best he could
recall. spoke in more general terms Qf exploring all feasible means and practicalities
of doing something "to get rid of" Castro.

(iii) THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE AM/LASH PLOT (1963-1965)
WAS KNOWN ABOUT OR AUTHORIZED BY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
OUTSIDE THE CIA

This section examines evidence relating to whether officials in the
Kennedy or Johnson Administrations were aware of or authorized
the CIA's use of AM/LASH as a potential assassin. The question i~
examined in light of the policies of those Administrations toward
quba. as well as the evidence bearing more directly on thp authorizatIOn
Issues.

The eyidence falls into a pattern similar to that described in the
discussion of post-Bay of Pigs activity in the Kennedy Administration.
Administration officials testified that they had never been informed
about the plot and that they never intended to authorize
assassination. Richard Helms, on the other hand, testified that he had
believed that assassination was permissible in view of the continuing
pressure to overthrow the Castro regime exerted by the respective
Administrations and the failure of either Administration to place
limits on the means that could be used to achieve that end.

(1) KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD CUBA IN 1963

a. Organizational Changes

The MONGOOSE Operation was disbanded following the Cuban
Missile Crisis, and an interagency "Cuban Coordinating Committee"
was established within the State Department with responsibility for
developing covert action proposals. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148) The
SGA was abolished, and the Special Group, chaired by McGeorge
Bundy, reassumed responsibility for reviewing and approving covert
actions in Cuba. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148)

United States policy toward Cuba in 1963 was also formulated in
the National Security Council's Standing Group, the successor to the
Executive Committee which had been established for the Missile
Crisis. Members of the Standing Group included Robert Kennedy,
Robert MeNamara, John McCone, McGeorge Bundy and Theodore
Sorensen.

Four aspects of the Kennedy Administration's 1963 Cuba policy
are discussed below: (1) the Standing Group's discussion of possible
developments in the event of Castro's death; (2) the Standing
Group's discussion of policy options; (3) the covert action program
approved by the Special Group; and (4) the diplomatic effort to
explore the possibility of reestablishing relations with Castro. The
first three took place in the spring or early summer of 1963; the
fourth-the effort to communicate with Castro--occurred at the same
time the CIA offered AM/LASH the poison pen device for Castro's
assassination.

b. Discussion of the Contingency of Castro's Death

In the spring of 1963. Bundy submitted to the Standing Group a
memorandum entitled "Cuba Alternatives" which discussed "possible
new directions" for American policy toward Cuba. (Bundy Memorandum,
4/21/6a) The memorandum distinguished between events
which might occur independently of actions taken by the United
States, and those which the United States might "initiate." Listed
under the first category was the possibility of Castro's death. In May
1963, the Group discussed this contingency and found that the possibilities
for developments fa,vorable to the United States if Castro
should die were "singularly unpromising." (Summary ~cord of
Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63)

When Bundy's memorandum was first discussed by the Group in
April, Robert Kennedy proposed a study of the "measures we would
take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting
down of a U-2." (Summary Record of Standing Group Meeting,
4/23/63) Bundy's follow-up memorandum, an agenda for a future
Standing Group discussion of Cuban policy, listed contingency
planning for Castro's death under a category comprising events not
initiated by the United States, e.g., "occurrence of revolt or repression
in the manner of Hungary," "attributable interference by Castro in
other countries," and "the reintroduction of offensive weapons."
(Bundy Memorandum, 4/29/63)

After the Standing Group's meeting on April 23, 1963, the CIA's
Office of National Estimates was assigned the task of assessing possible
developments if Castro should die. (Memorandum for Mem'bers
of the Standing Group, 5/2/63) The resulting paper analyzed the
forces likely to come into :play in Cuba after Castro's death, including
the roles of his top aIdes, Raul Castro and Che Guevara, and
possible Soviet reactions. (Draft Memorandum by Office of National
Estimates titled "Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in
the Event of Castro's Death," pp. 2-5) The paper concluded that "the
odds are that upon Castro's death, his brother Raul or some other figure
in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help, take over control"
[174] The paper warned: "If Castro were to die by other than natural
causes the U.S. would be widely charged with complicity, even though
it is widely known that Castro has many enemies."

The paper also identified several courses of action open to the United
States in the event of Castro's death, ranging from no United States
initiatives, action to support a government in exile, quarantine and
blockade. and outright invasion.

On May 28. 1963, the Standing Group discussed this paper. The
Group decided that "all of the courses of action were singularly unpromising".
(Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting
No. 7/63, May 28. 1963)

Bundy testified that the Standing Group "certainly posed the question"
in the Spring of 1963 of what would happen if Castro died or
were killed. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 130) However, he said that he had
no recollection of Castro's assassination being considered by the Standing
Group when that contingency was discussed. (Bundy, 7/11/75,
p. 14) [175]

Bundy said that one reason for having requested the estimate was
to make a record establishing that the United States should not be
"fussing" with assassination, and that assassination was not a sound
policy. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p.142)

Bundy said that it was not unusual to assess the implications of a
foreign leader's death, and named Stalin and De Gaulle as examples.
In the case of Castro, Bundy said he felt it was only prudent to attempt
to assess a post-Castro Cuba since Castro was such a "dominant
figure." (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 145)

c. The Standing Group's Discussion of United States Policy Toward
Cuba

The Standing Group's documents indicate it continued to assume
the desirability of harassing Cuba, but recognized that there were
few practical measures the United States could take to achieve Castro's
overthrow.

In his April 21 memorandum on "Cuban Alternatives" Bundy
identified three possible alternatives: (1) forcing "a non-Communist
solution in Cuba b,v: all necessary means," (2) insisting on "major but
limited ends," or (3) moving "in the direction of a gradual development
of some form of accommodation with Castro." (Bundy Memorandum,
4/21/63, p. 3) These alternatives were discussed at the Standing
Group meetings on April 23 and May 28, 1963.

Sorensen participated in these meetings. He testified that the
"widest possible range of alternatives" was discussed, but that
"assassination was not even on the list." (Sorensen, 7/21/75, p. 4)
He said that options such as forcing "a non-Communist solution in
Cuba by all necessary means"

* * * could not have included or implied assassination. Instead, it expressly
referred to the development of pressures and gradual escalation of the confrontation
in Cuba to produce an overthrow of the regime, including a willingness
to use military force to invade Cuba. Such a course was obviously not
adopted by the President, and in any event expressed an approach far different
from assassination. (Sorensen affidavit, 7/25/75) [176]

The record of the first Standing Group discussion of Bundy's
memorandum shows that a number of alternatives (none of which
involved assassination) were considered but no conclusions were
reached.

The Standing Group again met on May 28, 1963. McCone argued
for steps to "increase economic hardship" in Cuba, supplemented by
sabotage to "create a situation in Cuba in which it would be possible
to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting to overthrow
Castro." (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting,
5/28/63) McNamara said that sabotage would not be "conclusive"
and suggested that "economic pressures which would upset
Castro" be studied. Robert Kennedy said "the U.S. must do something
against Castro. even though we do not believe our actions would bring
him down." (id.) Bundy summarized by stating that the task was
"to decide now what actions we would take against Castro, acknowl-
edging that the measures practical for us to take will not result in his
overthrow." (id.)

d. The Special Group's Authorization of a Sabotage Program
Against Cuba

During the first six months of 1963, little, if any, sabotage activity
against Cuba was undertaken. [177] However, on June 19, 1963, following
the Standing Group's discussion of Cuba policy in the spring, President
Kennedy approved a sabotage program. [178] (Memorandum for the
Special Group, 6/19/63) In contrast to the MONGOOSE program,
which sought to build toward an eventual internal revolt, the 1963
covert action program had a more limited objective, i.e., "to nourish a
spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant
defections and other byproducts of unrest." (id)

After initial approval, specific intelligence and sabotage operations
were submitted to the Special Group for prior authorization. On October
3, 1963, the Special Group approved nine operations in Cuba, several
of which involved sabotage. On October 24, 1963, thirteen major
sabotage operations, including the sabotage of an electric power plant,
an oil refinery, and a sugar mill, were approved for the period from
November 1963 through January 1964. (Memorandum, 7/11/75,
CIA Review Staff to Select Committee, on "Approved CIA Covert
Operations into Cuba")

e. The Diplomatic Effort to Explore an Accommodation with Castro

As early as .January 4,1963, Bundy proposed to President Kennedy
that the possibility of communicating with Castro be explored.
(Memorandum, Bundy to the President, 1/4/63) Bundy's memorandum
on "Cuba Alternatives" of April 23, 1963, also listed the
"gradual development of some form of accommodation with Castro"
among policy alternatives. (Bundy memorandum, 4/21/63) At a meeting
on June 3, 1963, the SJ?ecial Group agreed it would be a "useful
endeavor" to explore "varIous possibilities of establishing channels
of communication to Castro." (Memorandum of Special Group meeting,
6/6/63)

In the fall of 1963, William Atwood was a Special Advisor to the
United States Delegation to the United Nations with the rank of
Ambassador. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 3) Atwood testified that from
September until November 1963, he held a series of talks with the
Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations to discuss opening negotiations
on an accommodation between Castro and the United States.

Atwood said that at the outset he informed Robert Kennedy of these
talks and was told that the effort "was worth pursuing." (Atwood,
7/10/75, pp. 5-9) Atwood said he regularly reported on the talks to the
·White House and to Adlai Stevenson, his superior at the United
Nations. (Atwood, 7/10/75, pp. 6--7) Atwood stated that he was told
by Bundy that President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing towards
an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet fold and
perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back to
normal." (Atwood, 7/10/75,pp. 5-9)

Atwood said he believed that the only people who knew about his
contacts with the Cubans were the President, Ambassador AvereB
Harriman, Ambassador Stevenson, Attorney General Kennedy,
McGeorge Bundy, Bundy's assistant, and journalist Lisa Howard. [179]
Atwood also testified that he arranged for a French journalist,
Jean Daniel, to visit the 'White House prior to Daniel's scheduled trip
to see Castro. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 19) (According to an article by
Daniel in December 1963, Daniel met with President Kennedy on
October 24, 1963. They discussed the prospects for reestablishing
United States-Cuba relations and President Kennedy asked Daniel to
report to him after seeing Castro.) [180]

On November 18, 1963, Atwood spoke by telephone with a member
of Castro's staff in Cuba. (Atwood, 7/10/75, ~. 8) Pursuant to White
House instructions, Atwood informed Castro s staff member that the
United States favored preliminary negotiations at the United Nations
(rather than in Cuba as proposed by the Cubans) , and that the United
States desired to work out an agenda for these talks. (Atwood, 7/10/
75, pp. 8-9) Atwood reported this conversation to Bundy who told
him that after the Cuban agenda was received, President Kennedy
wanted to see Atwood to "decide what to say and whether to go or
what we should do next." (id., p. 9) Jean Daniel, the French journalist,
met with Castro four days later on November 22, 1963, the
same day AM/LASH was given the poison pen. On that same day,
President Kennedy was assassinated. [181] With the change of Administrations,
Atwood's talks with the Cubans became less frequent, and
eventually ceased early in 1964. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 10)

(2) TESTIMONY ON THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION FOR THE AM/LASH
POISON PEN DEVICE

a. The October Meeting with AM/LASH and the Use of Robert
Kennedy's Name Without Obtaining His Approval

Desmond Fitzgerald met AM/LASH in October 1963, and represented
to AM/LASH that he was the personal representative of Robert
Kennedy. He gave AM/LASH assurances of full support should
AMjLASH succeed in overthrowing Castro.

The 1967 Inspector General's Report states that, according to Fitzgerald,
Helms and Fitzgerald discussed the planned meeting with
AM/LASH, and Helms decided "it was not necessary to seek approval
from Robert Kennedy for Fitzgerald to speak in his name." (I.G.
Report, pp. 88-89) When he testified before the Committee, Helms
said he did not recall such a discussion with Fitzgerald. He stated
however, that he believed he had pre-existing authority to deal with
AM/LASH regarding "a change in government" (as opposed to
assassination) and that authority would have obviated the need to
obtain Robert Kennedy's approval. [182] Helms testified: "I felt so sure
that if I went to see Mr. Kennedy that he would have said yes, that I
don't think there was any need to." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 132)

Helms said he had considered AM/LASH to be a political action
agent, not a potential assassin, and that Fitzgerald's meeting with
AM/LASH and Helms' decision not to contact Robert Kennedy
should be viewed in that light.

* * * given this Cuban of his standing and all the history * * * of trying to
find someone inside Cuha who might head a government and have a group to replace
Castro * * * this was so central to the whole theme of everything we had
been trying to do, that I [found] it totally unnecessary to ask Robert Kennedy
at that point [whether] we should go ahead with this. This is obviously what
he had been pushing, what everybody had been pushing for us to try to do * * *
let's get on with doing it." (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 117-118) [183]

b. The Delivery of the Poison Pen on November 22, 1963.

Helms testified that while the delivery of a poison pen to AM/LASH
was not part of an assassination plot, he believed Castro's assassination
was within the scope of the CIA's authority. As in the case of the
1962 plots, Helms based his belief on the vigor of the Administration's
policy toward Cuba and his perception that there were no limits on
the means that could be used in the effort against Castro. (Helms,
9/11/75, pp. 11-12) When asked whether it was his opinion that the
offer of the poison pen to AM/LASH was authorized because it came
within the scope of the 1963 program against Castro, Helms
responded:

I think the only way I know how to answer that is that I do not reeall
when things got cranked 'lip in 1963 any dramatic changes OT limitations being
put on this operation. There was !ltill an effort being made by whatever device,
and perhaps slightly differently oriented at this time, to try to get rid of Castro
* * * But I do not recall specific things being said now, [we are not] going to do
this, we're not going to do that, and we're not going to do the other things, and
we will do just these things. (Helms, 9/11/75, 11-12)

Each Kennedy Administration official who testified on AM/LASH
agreed that he had never been informedaibout any assassination plot
and that he knew of no order to assassinate Castro. Their statements
are consistent with Helms' testimony that he did not know that the
AM/LASH operation involved assassination, but they again disagreed
with Helms' view that an assassination plot could be undertaken without
express authority. Running against the possibility that Administration
officials intended an assassination of Castro was testimony
that it was inconceivable that the President would have approved an
assassination at the same time that he had authorized talks to explore
the possibility of improved relations with Castro. [184]

(3) THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION IN THE JOHNSON
ADMINISTRATION

a. Summary of the Assassination Activity

The CIA delivered arms to AM/LASH in Cuba in March and June
of 1964. Early in 1965, after AM/LASH had become more insistent
that Castro's assassination was necessary and had asked for a silenced
weapon, the Agency put AM/LASH in contact with the leader of an
anti-Castro group, "B-1," with the intention that AM/LASH obtain
his desired weapon from that group. The Agency subsequently learned
that AM/LASH had received a silencer and other special equipment
from B-1 and was preparing to assassinate Castro.

b. The Issue of Authorization

The issue of authority in the Johnson Administration is similar to
that in the Kennedy Administration. The principal officials of the
Kennedy Administration [185] (and DDP Helms) continued in their
positions during the relevant period of the Johnson Administration
(Robert Kennedy left the Administration in September 1964). Helms
testified that he believed Castro's assassination was within the scope
of the CIA's authority in view of Administration policy toward Cuba
reflected in the AM/LASH operation in both 1963 and 1964-65.
(Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 137-138) Again, there was no direct evidence that
McCone or anyone outside the Agency authorizoed or knew about the
AM/LASH plot.

The Committee examined four events that may shed light on the
perceptions of the Administration and CIA officials about assassination
during the early years of the Johnson Administration: (1) the
covert action program against Cuba in 1964-1965; (2) the Special
Group's action in investigating reports of Cuban exiles/underworld
plots to assassinate Castro; (3) Helms' report to Rusk that CIA was
not involved with AM/LASH in a Castro assassination plot; and (4)
Helms' briefing of President Johnson on the 1967 Inspector General's
Report on alleged CIA assassination plots.

c. The Covert Action Program Against Cuba in 1964-1965

According to the minutes of a Special Group meeting on April 7,
1964, President Johnson decided to discontinue the use of CIA-controlled
sabotage raids against Cuba. [186] (Memorandum of Special Group
Meeting, 4/7/64) A McCone memorandum indicateli that in reaching
that decision, President Johnson had abandoned the objective of
Castro's overthrow.

At the April 7 meeting, Rusk opposed sabotage raids because they
were unproductive and had a "high noise level" that called attention
to them. Rusk added he suspected the "Cuban exiles who actually conduct
the raids of possibly wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U.S.
involvement in order to increase that involvement." (ld, p. 2) McCone
disagreed noting that the covert action program relied on a "wellplanned
series of sabotage efforts. Bundy said that since the .Tune 1963
approval of the current sabotage program "policy makers * * * had
turned sabotage operations on and off to such an extent that [the sabotage
program] simply does not, in the nature of things, appear feasible."
(ld, p. 2) [187]

d. The Special Group Investigation of Reported Castro Assassination
Plots by Cuban Exiles

On June 10, 1964, Helms sent McCone a memorandum stating that
Agency officials had learned of several plots by Cuban exiles to
assassinate Castro and other Cuban leaders. (Memorandum, Helms to
McCoUl', 6/10/64) According to the memorandum, several of the plots
involved "people apparently associated with the Mafia" who had been
offered $150,000 by Cuban exiles to accomplish the deed. Helms' memorandum
stated that the sources of the reports were parties to the plots
who had presumably given this information to CIA officials with the
expectation that they would receive legal immunity if the plots
succeeded. (Id.)

Helms' memorandum, however, did not mention any of the CIA
assassination plots against Castro. [188] To the contrary, it stated that
"Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that the United
States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the
planned actions." (Id., p. 1)

McCone said in a Special Group Meeting on June 18, 1964. that he
was "somewhat skeptical" and opposed additional investigation, but
"others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being
put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain
promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention."
(Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, 6/18/64) McCone made a
Mrmorandum of the .Tune 18 meeting which indicated that he had
dissented from the Special Group's decision. He had expressed his
bt'lief that the Special Group was "overly exercised," and that he was
inclined to dismiss the matter as "Miami cocktail party talk." McCone
noted, howevE'!". that the Special Group "was more coneerned than I
and therefore planning to discuss the subjeet with the Attorney General
anrl possibly Mr. Hoover." (Memorandum, 6/18/64, p. 1)

The Special Group decided to transmit the reports to the Attorney
General "as a matter of law enforcement," and when Robert Kennedy
was so informed a few days later, he stated that the Justice Department
would investigate. (Memorandum of Meeting, 6/22/64) The
FBI then eonducted an investigation and its results were submitted
by McCone to the Special Group on August 19, 1964.[189] (McCone to
Bundy Memorandum, 8/19/64)

e. Helms' Report to Rusk

In 1966 Helms sent a memorandum to Rusk reporting the CIA's relations
with AM/LASH. The memorandum stated that the CIA's contact
with AMjLASH was for "the express 'purpose" of intelligence
collection. (Id. ) Noting allegations that had come to his attention that
AM/LASH had been involved with the CIA in a Castro assassination
plot, Helms stated:

The Agency was not involved with [AM/LASH] in a plot to assassinate Fidel
Castro. * * * nor did it ever encourage him to attempt such an act.

Helms' memorandum made no mention of the fact that CIA officers,
with Helms' knowledge, had offered a poison pen to AMjLASH on'
November 22 1963. that the CIA had supplied arms to AMjLASH in
1964, or that the CIA had put AM/LASH in touch with B-1 to obtain
a silenced weapon to assassinate Castro.

Helms told the Committee that this memorandum to Rusk was
"inaceurate" and not factual. (Helms, 6/13/75, p.115)

The CIA's copy of the memorandum contains a typed notation
reeommending that Helms sign the document. That notation was by
Thomas Karamessines, who had beeome DDP. (Rusk, 7/10/75, p. 2)
Helms testified that the day before his .Tune 13, 1975,testimony to the
Committee he had asked Karamessines why the memorandum to Rusk
had been written in the way that it was. Helms stated he and Karamessines
had concluded that they did not know the reason but Helms
speculated that "it may be until we conducted the Inspector General's
Investigation somewhat later we didn't have the faets straight, or
maybe we had the facts straight then but we did not have them
straight later." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 115)

f. Helms' Briefing of President Johnson on the 1967 Inspector General's
Report

Drew Pearson's newspaper article in the spring of 1967 alleging
United States involvement in plots to assassinate Fidel Castro
prompted President Johnson to direct Helms, who was then DCI, to
conduct an investigation. The result was the Inspector General's Report
of May 23, 1967. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 35-36) After receiving
the Report, Helms briefed the President "orally about the contents."
(ld., p. 36.) During his testimony, Helms was shown his handwritten
notes which appeared to have been made in preparation for his briefing
of the President. Those notes carried the story of CIA's involvement
in assassination through mid-1963. When asked if he had told
President Johnson that the Inspector General had concluded that
efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro had continued into Johnson's presidency,
Helms replied, "I just can't answer that, 1 just don't know. 1
can't recall having done so." (ld., p. 38.) He did note that it would
not have occurred to him to brief President Johnson on the 1964
AM/LASH gun deliveries because "1 don't think one would have approached
the AM/LASH thing as an assassination plot against
Castro." (Id., p. 39) [190]

(4) Helms' Testimony on Authorization in the Johnson Administration.

Helms was asked if the Agency regarded "whatever marching
orders they had obtained prior to the death of President Kennedy as
still being valid and operative" when President Johnson succeeded
to the office. Helms replied:

This is not very clear to me at this stage. A lot of the same officers were
serving President Johnson as they served President Kennedy, and * * * I can't
recall anymore whether there was any specific issue about whether this was
taken up with President Johnson at any meeting or any session. If it had been,
I would have thought there woul4l have been records someplace. (Helms, 6/13/75,
p. 139.)

Helms testified that with respect to the AM/LASH operation in the
period 1964-1965, he had no knowledge or recollection that assassination
was involved in the CIA's relationship with him. (Helms,
9/11/75, pp. 20-21) Helms said: "[t ]he policy making and policy
approval mechanism in President Johnson's Administration has to
have gone through some changes in shifts 1 don't remember exactly
what they were." (Id., p. 22)

So if these things [placing AM/LASH in contact with a Cuban exile leader
who would supply him with an assassination device] were happening after
President Kennedy was assassinated, I don't know what authorization they're
working on or what their thought processes were, whether these were simply low
level fellows scheming and so forth, on something that didn't have high level
approval. I honestly cannot help you. I don't recall these things going on at the
time. (Id.)

When asked whether President Johnson had been informed of or
had authorized continuing efforts to assassinate Castro, Helms replied:

The Special Group would have continued to consider these matters, and I
would have assumed that whoever was chairing the Special Group would have in
turn reported to the President, which was the usual practice. (l d.) [191]

The records of the Special Group do not show any consideration
of Castro's assassination or of the A)I/LASH plot during the .Johnson
Administration (or earlier) and there was no other evidence that
McCone or anyone above the Agency was informed of or specifically
authorized the A)I/LASH plots.

_______________

Notes:

1. In August 1975, Fidel Castro gave Senator George McGovern a list of twenty-four
alleged attempts to assassinate him in which Castro claimed the CIA had lx>en involved.
The Committee forwarded this list to the CIA and requested it to respond to those allega•
tions. The CIA's fourteen-page response concluded:
"In summary, of the • • • incidents descrilx>d in Castro's report, the files reviewed
indicate that CIA had no involvement in fifteen of the cases: i.e., never had any contact
with the individuals mentoned or was not in contact with them at the time of the alleged
incidents. In the remaining nine cases, CIA had operational relationships with some of
the individuals mentioned but not for the purpose of assassination. • • • Of the cases
reviewed, nothing has been found to substantiate the charges that CIA directed its agents
to assassinate Castro.
The Committee has found no evidence that the CIA was involved in the attempts on
Castro's life enumerated in the allegations that Castro gave to Senator McGovern. The
CIA's Involvement in other plots against Castro and the top figures in his Government
are set forth below.

2. A cable to Headquarters requesting any intelligence needs supports this account.

3. The duty officer testified that he must have spoken with King because he would not
otherwise have signed the cable "by direction, J. C. King." (Duty Officer, 8/11/75, p. 16)
He also would "very definitely" have read the cable to Barnes before sending it, because
"Barnes was the man to whom we went ... for our authority and for work connected
with the [Cuban] project." (Duty Officer. pp. 4, 25) Since King at that time was giving
only "nominal attention" to Cuban all'airs, the officer concluded that a proposal of the
gravity of an assassination could only have "come from Mr. Barnes". (Duty Officer,
8/11/75, p. 24)

4. The duty officer remembered the cable and some of the surrounding facts for precisely
that reason: "[Ilt was an unusual type of [cable], and I say this because I can remember
It 15 years later." (Duty Officer, 8/11/75, p. 14.) The case officer recalled that when he
saw the cable, he "swallowed bard." (Case Officer interview. 8/4/75, p. 3)

5. The Inspector General's Report placed the conversation between Edwards and Bissell
In August 1960. Bissell testified that he would not have remembered the exact month
without having been shown the Inspector General's Report, but that "I would have remembered
Initial conversations early In the autumn of 1960" (Bissell, 6/9/75. p. 18).

6. Although Castro closed the gamhllng casinos In Cuha when he first came to power.
theY were reopened for use by foreign tourists In late Fehruary 1959, and remained open
until late September 1961.

7. Howard Osborn. who became Director of the Office of Security In 1964. told the Committee
that the DDP often drew upon personnel of the Office of Security. which was
within a different directorate, because of the contacts and expertise that Security personnel
developed In the field. This Is an example of operations being carried out across formal
organization Ilnes. The fact that Bissell called on Edwards might Indicate that Bissell
had already formulated a plan and was relylnl! on Edwards to put It In to practice.

8. During 19154-1955, Maheu cooperated with the CIA In attempting to undermine
It contract with the Saudi Arabian government that wonld have given one person virtually
comnlet.. control over Rhlpplng of 011 from Saudi Arahla. Although he was employed bf a
competitor of the perRon who held the contract, Maheu worked closely with the C A.
:llaheu teRtified that, after consulting with the Agency, he arranged for a listening device
to be placed In the room of the contract holder: and tbat he provided the Impetus for the
termination of the contract by publicizing ItR terms In a Rome newspaper which he said he
had purchaRed with CIA funds. (Maheu. 7/30/75. pp. 14-25)
The Support Chief testified that at the CIA's request Maheu had also previously arranc:ed
for the production of a film in Hollywood pnrportlng to depict a foreign Jeader with a
woman in the Soviet l'nlon. The CIA planned to circulate the film. ren~esentlng It to hnve
been produced by the So,iet Union. The film was n..ver URM. (O.C.. 5/30/75. Pp. 15ll, 162163.)
:llaheu testified that he had located an actor resemhllng the leader and had arranged
for the production of thE' film. (:llaheu, 7/30/75, pp. 3H2)

9. 1 Maheu testified that he was told that the plan to assassinate Castro was one phase of
a larger project to invade Cuba. (Maheu, 7/29/75, pp. 7, 13, 47)

10. Maheu told the Committee that at that time, Hughes was becoming an important
client, and that devoting time to the CIA's assassination plot was hindering his work
•for Hughes. He testified that shortly before the election in November 1960, while he was
in Miami working on the assassination project, Hughes phoned and asked him to return
to the West Coast. Maheu testified that since he did "not want to lose" Hughes as a
client, he "definitely told him that the project was on behalf of the United States
Government, that it included plans to dispose of Mr. Castro in connection with a pending
Invasion." (Maheu, 7/29/75, pp. 22-23)

11. The Inspector General's Report states that "Maheu was authorized to tell Rosselli
that his clients' were willing to pay $150,000 for Castro's removal." (I.G. Report, p. 16)
The evidence varies, however, with respect to the amount that was oll'ered.

12. The weight of the testimony indicates that Rosselli realized the CIA was behind the
assassination attemnt at an early stage. Mahue substantially confirmed his account (Mahue,
7/29/75, p. 111) The support chief recalled that about three weeks after the New York
meeting, Rosselli told bim, "I am not kidding, I know who you work for." (O.C., 5/30/75,
p.26.)

13. Maheu recalls that he first met "Sam Gold" (Giancana) after November 1960, when he
was staying at the Fountainebleu Hotel. (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 17). Other evidence indicates
that the meeting took place earlier. When they first went to Miami, Maheu and RosselIi
stayed at the Kennilworth Hotel (Maheu, 7/29/75, pp. 15-16) ; FBI records reveal that
Mahen and Rosselli (alias J. A. Rollins) were registered at the KenniIworth from October
11-30. (FBI summary, p. 10). Giancana must have been Involved In the operation during
the October period at the Kennllworth hecause (1) the Wiretap of the apartment,
discussed infra, was made on October 30; (2) on October 18, the FBI sent a memorandum
to Bissell stating that Giancana had been telling several people that he was involve<,
In an assassination attempt against Castro. No reference is made to the CIA in thl'
memorandum. (See infra, p. 79)

14. A search of supplements to all Miami papers during this period did not reveal the
article described by the Support Chief.

15. Sam Giancana was murdered in his home on June 20 1975.

16. Tratllcante made regular trips between Miami and Cuba on gambling syndicate business.
(LG., Report, pp. 19-20)

17. According to the Support Chief and Rosselll. Du.Bois had been requested to place what
they characterlzl!d as a "legal" electronic bug against the wall from an adjacent apartment.
BaIletti instead installed an electronic tap on the phone. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 67-68;
Maheu, 7/29/75, pp. 36--37)

18. Regardless of whether the CIA lnltially authorized the tap, it is apparent that the
CIA paid for the tap. DuBois told FBI agents that Maheu had paid him a retainer of
$1,000. (File R-505, p. 14). The SUPPQrt Chief confirmed that CIA "Indirectly" paid for
the tap because "we paid Maheu a certain amount of money, and he just paid it out of
what we were giving him."
"Q: But it was understood, or you understood, that out of the money the CIA made
available to Maheu, DuBois would be paid for the tap?
"A: Yes,
* • • • • • *
"Q: And Colonel Edwards • • • knew somebody was being employed In order to accomplish
a tap?
"A: That Is right." (O,C., 5/30/75. p. 69)

19. However, a memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover states that the Attorney General said
he had been told by Edwards in 1962 that the "CIA admitted that they had assisted
~Iaheu In making the Installation." (Memo from Hoover, 5/10/ij2)
3 An acquaintance of Glancana's, Joseoh Shimon, testified that Giancana had told him
that Glaucana had asked Rosselli to request Maheu to arrange for surveillance of the
room to determine the occupaut's relationship with Glancana's girl friend. (Shimou,
9/20/75, p, 21) Shimon stated that G1ancana had told him that G1ancana had paid
Mahen $5,000 for the tap. that the CIA had not known about the tap in advance, and
that )Iaheu subsequently decided to use his connection with the CIA operation to avoid
prosecution for his Involvement In the tap. (Shimon, 9/20/75, p. 23) Maheu testified that
he did not recall having been paid for the tap. (Maheu, 9/23/75, p. 7)

20. When Rosselli talked with Glancana after the wiretap had been discovered, Glancana
"laughed • • • I remember his expression, smoking a elgar, he almost swallowed It laughIng
about It" (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 52). Rosselli claims that he was "perturbed" because
"It was blowing everything, blowing every kind of cover that I had tried to arrange to
keep quiet" (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 52).
Rosselli said that he told Glancana that the CIA was Involved In the operation "In
order to have him keep his mouth shut" (Rosselli, 6/24/75, pp. 26-27).

21. Details of the discussions between the CIA and FBI are described fUlly infra at pp.
125-135.

22. Mahen subsequently drew on his Involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before
Senator Edward Long's Committee Investigating Invasions of privacy In 1966.. According
to the Inspector General's Report, when Maheu learned that the Committee Intended to
call him, "he applied pressure on the Agency In a variety of ways-suggesting that publicity
might expose his past sensitive work for the CIA." (I.G. Report, pp. 73-74) Lawrence
Houston. General Counsel for the CIA, met with Mahen and his attorney, Edward P.
Morgan, and Informed Senator Long that Maheu had been InVOlved In CIA operations
(Houston, 6/2/75, pp. 58-60). As a result, the Long Committee did not caU Maheu to
testify.

23. Records of the TSD still extant when the I.G. Report was written In 1967
Indicate that the pills were tested on February 10 and delivered to the Support Chief sometime thereafter.

24. The Support Chief testified that he met this Cuban only once and that after the
meetIng the Cllb"n tolel Rosselli:
, "Look, l don't know [Ric) like the CIA and you can't tell me that this guy isn't a
CL\ man. The Rupport ChIef recalled, "I don't know whether I showed it or- what but
he suspected that I wasn't what I was represented to be." (O.C., 5/30/75. p. 22).

25. The Supoort Chief testified that a man from the communications office delivered the
communications equipment that the Cuban had requested to MiamI. (O.C.. 5/30/75. p. 20)
Maheu recalled delivering an automobile which he had been told contained communications
equipment to an empty lot. (Maheu. 7/29/75, p. 52)

26. Maheu denied that this dramatic event ever occurred. and did not recall being present
at a meeting at which the pUis were passed. (Maheu, 7/29/75, pp. 40-41). Maheu die
recall that the Support Chief showed him the pills In an envelope and told him that th,
pllls would be given to a Cuban. (Maheu, 7/'29/75. p. 40)

27. Maheu said that the polson. which he was shown on one occasion by the Support Chief.
consisted of five or six gelatin capsules filled with a IIquid. (Maheu. 9/23/75. pp. 35-36)
RosseIl1 described the poison as "capsules." (Rosselli. 9/22/75. p. 4)

28. The Committee has been unable to locate the newspaper account described by Shimon.

29. Harvey had a long background in clandestine activities. At the time the gambling
syndlca teoperatlon was moved under Harvey'S supervision, he was responsible for a
nnmber of Important actlvltles and soon thereafter was selected to head of Task Force
W. the CIA component of the Kennedy AdmInistration's cover ell'ort to oust Castro.

30. Harevy said that he took over a "going operation" from Edwards (I.G. Report, p. 42;
Harvey, 6/25/7'5, p. 67) and emphasizerl that: "I would like to make as clear as I call
th!'t the!e was no Phase 1. Phase 2 In this. This Is an ongoing matter which I was
Injected mto * * *. (Harvey, 6/25/75" p. 90)
Continuity was provided by refuin;ng the SUDPort Chief as the case officer for the
project well into May 1962. During- interviews for the Inspe<>tor General's Report, the
Rupport Chief recalJed that there was "something going on" between the Bay of Pigs and
Harvey's assumption of control (I.G. Report. p. 43). When testifying before the Com
mittel'. the Runport Chief f1rml~' recalled several trips to Miami In the fall of 1\\1\1. an'
~'right "up to the time I turned It over to Harvey I was In and out of Mlam!." (O.C
,,/30/7.1. pp. 89-90)

31. "Q: As far as those Cubans knew, then the offer which they understood from you to
come from Wall Street was still outstanding?
"A : I don't know if they still think so • • • I didn't see them after that to tell them
that. (RosseJ1i. 6/24175, p. 45)"

32. Rosselli claims that he was mOtlyated by "honor and dedication." (Rosselli, 6/24/75,
p. ,,!l)
In 1943, Rosselli had been conYlcted of extorting money from motion picture producers
to Insure studios against labor strikes, and during the period of his contacts with the CIA,
Rosselli was dppplr involved in hotpl and gamhllng operations in Las ,"pgas. (File R-505,
Summary of FBI Documents) It is possible that he believed cooperating with the government
in the assassination operation might serve him well in the future.

33. FBI reports renal that Rosse11l's expenses at the Kennilworth Hotel, where he was
rpgistpred from October l1-:lO, 1960. under the name of J. A. Roll\ns, were paid by :'.Iaheu.
FBI file summan' p. 10) :'.Iaheu's expenses were reimbursed by the CIA.

34. In May 1966. the FBI threatened to deport Rosselli for \lving in the United States
under an assumed name nnless he cooperated In an innstigation of the :'.Iatia. (Rossen!.
whosp true name is Filippo Saco. was horn In Ital~' and was anegpdl~' brought megan;.- Into
the r-nIterl Statps while still a child.) Rosselli contacted Edwards. who Informed the
FBT that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the Burean," but was afraId that gangsters
might kill him for "talking." plpmo. Osborn to FBI. 5/27/116) Aftpr Rossplli was
arrestpo for fra"onlent gambling activities at the Friar, Club In Beyerly Hills In 1967.
he reqnesteo Han•e)'. who had left the Agency. to represent him. (:'.Iemo for Recoro by
Osborn. 12/11/67) HarYe~- contacted the Agenc.I' and suggested that It prevent the prosecution.
(Oshorn :\Iemo. ""pra) Rossell\ was suhsequentl~' conyicteo of violating l'nited States
interstatp gambling Inws. In 1971. the CIA appr01cheo the Immigration and Xatnralization
~pryi<'e. npnartment of Jus-tiee. to "forestnll public disclos.nre of Rossplli's pnst
onerational actil'lt)' with CIA" that might occur If oeportatlon nroceedlngs were brought.
II,etter, CIA to Select Committee. 7/21/7;";) It was agreed that CIA wonld be kept Informed
of (leyplopments in that easp. The deportation order is presentl~' being litigated In the
conrts::.

35. Donovan was not aware of the plan.

36. Thp Commlttpe has taken the testimony of thp two casp officers Involved In thp
AM/LASH project. Case officer 1 dealt with AM/LASH through September 1963" Casp
officer 2 continued until mld-1965. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75. p. 11) The Committee has
agreed not to divulge their names as they are stili In active servlcp with the AgencJ".

37. AM/LASH was the major "asspt" In thp A~I/LASH operation. During this period the
CIA also sponsored a separate operation to "penetrate the Cuban military to encouragp
plther defections or an attempt to produce Information from dissidents, or perhaps
even to forming a group which would be capable l'f replacing the then present govern•
ment In Cuba. (Case Officer 1. 8/11/75, pp. 18, 22) The case officers for AM/LASH we,,•
also Involved In this second related program.

38. Case Officer 1 testified thnt A~I/LASH discussed "eliminating" Castro, although he
attritmted sueh remarks to A:\I/LASH's "mercurial" nature, and stated thnt no specific
plans for assassinations were ever discussed, (Case Officer 1. 8/11/75, PI', 39-41. 62)
Th" Case Offic('r who took oYer the A:\I/LASH project in September 1963 recalle(j being
hrif'fp(} by Ca~p Ottiepr 1 on A~I/LARH'i:' hplipf that Castro's arssassination was a necessary
lirst sl"p in a coup, (Case Officer 2,8/1/75, p. 28)
Th(' s('['owl A:\I/LASH Case Offieer ueseribed the context in which A:\I/LASH generall~'
raispd the topic of assassination:
"You also must recoguize that A:\I/LASH was a rather temperamental man whose temp"
rament was of a mercurial nature anu whereas he may have said something like this in one
tit of pique, he would settle down and talk abont organizing a regular military coup in the
next hreath," (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 2(1)

39. The Special Affairs Staff (SAS) was the name j::IHn to Task Force W in early 1963
wh"l1 F'itzj::erald replacp(j Harny as hp.a(j of thp conrt Cuban opprations. The AM/LASH
Casp Officprs rpported directly to Fitzgerald.

40. The contact plan for tlw propospd meeting state(j; "Fitzgerald will represent self as
persoual reprpsentat!Ye of Rohert F. Kennedy who travelled to (foreign city) for sperifle
purpose m"et!ng A:\I/LASH and giYlng him assurances of full support with a change
of the present government in Cuba,"

41. Case Officer 2 was present at the meeting. He did not recall whether Robert Kennedy's
name was used. (Case Officer 2,8/1/75, p. 60)

42. In his testimony before the Committee, Case Officer :2 offered a conflicting story. He
said that the purpose of the pen was "to provide AM/LASH with a device which would
serve him to protect him In case he was confronted with and charged with being Involved
In a military coup against Castro." (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 107)
According to the case officer, AM/LASH had requested an "esoteric device" which could
easily be concealed which he could use in self-defense. ('Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, pp.
98-99) The device was not Intended for offensive use against any person, but was
rather "a kind of Psychological crutch ... to help him think that we were interested
in his own protection, his own security. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, pp. 104-105) This
version Is wholly inconsistent with documents in the CIA files, some of which were
written by the AM/LASH case officer, which estabIlsh that AM/LASH Intended to
kill Castro, and that the CIA )mew his desire and ende-ayored to supply the means
that he needed. These documents are set forth in the following text.

43. William HarveJ' testified that he kept Helms Informed of the operation involving the
undprworld at all Htages. (Han'ey, 6/25/75, pp. 65~66) When Interviewed for the Inspector
General's Report, Harvey said that he briefed Helms on his first meeting with RosselIl,
and "thereafter he regularlJ' briefed Helms on the status of the Castro operation." (I.G.
Report. p. 41).
Helms' recollection was less certain. Helms did recall that he was briefed by Harvey
when Han-ey first eontacted Rosselli in April 1962. He remembered that he "reluctantly"
had approved the operation, but that he had no confidence that it would sueeeed. (Helms,
7/17/7G, p. 2H)
When asked If he authorized sending the poison pills to Florida, Helms testified:
"1 hl'!lne theJ' were poison pllls. and 1 don't rpeall necessarily approving them, but
HI nee Harypy alleges to have them and says that he took them to ~f!aml, 1 must have
authorized them in some faHhlon." (Helms, li/13/75. p. 44)
Helms confirmed that Harvey waS "reporting quite regularly what was j:(olng on. Whether
he reported everything or not, I do not know." It was Helms' expectation that Harvey
would have r"ported to him a matter such as the pills. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. lOG) However,
Helms also testified:
"You saw the I.G. Report says that I was kept currently informed. Maybe I was and
maybe 1 wasn't. and today I don't remember It, as I have said. But I do not recall ever
having been convinced that any attempt was really made on Castro's life." (Helms, 7/18/75,
p. :{2)

44. Whether Helms was aware of AMLASH's intention specifically to assassinate Castro. as
opposed to A~I/LASIl's potential for leading a eoup against Castro, is discussed infra,
pp. 114-17,).

45. Bissell served as DDP from January I, 1959. to February 17, 1962. (President Kennedy
decided to replace Dulles and Bissell hecause of the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Hissell.
1\/\1/75, pp. I\-S)] Helms, who had heen Bissell's Deputy. succeeded Bissell In
Fehruary 1962 as DDP. He was appointed DDCI in April 1965, and DCI in June 1966.

46. This evidence relates to the aborted Incident In July 1960 and what the Inspector
General's Report referred to as the Initial phase of the assassination effort InvolVing the
underworld. With respect to the "schemes" prior to that operation, the I. G. Report
concluded it could "find no evidence that any of the schemes were approved at any level
higher than division. If that." (I. G. Report, p. 10)

47. The Inspector General questioned neither Dulles nor Cabell In preparing his Report
In 1967, although both were then alive.

48. The Committee received this document on November 15, 1975, after printing of this
Report had begun. As a consequence, there was no opportunity to question either King
or Bissell concerning the meaning of "elimination", what consideration was in fact given
to Castro's "elimination", and whether any planning resulting from this document In fact
led to the ae1"nl plot". In this regard it should be noted that Bissell had a "dim recollection"
of a conversation prior to early autumn or late surnmer 1960 with King (the author
of the above memorandum) concerning a "capability to eliminate Castro If such action
should be decided upon". (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 19) See p. 74.

49. The countermanding cable to the Havana station, which was "Operational Immedlat~,"
was sent the morning after the cable of the previous night. The officer who sent that cable
testified:
.... • I saw the cable and was told that, to the best of mJ' knowledge, my memon' is
that the Director [Dulles], not the Deputy Director [Bissell] • • * had countermanded
the cable and had directed that-had Indicated that assassination was not to be considered."
(Duty Officer. 8/11/75, p. 29)
The officer stated that he did not talk to either Dulles or Bissell about the countermanding
cable, but that he did see the cable and in alI likelihood heard of the reason for
Dulles' reaction In discussions the same morning with his superior, the Chief of the CUba
project. (Duty Officer, 8/11/75, pp. 30-32)

50. Bissell testified that he was relying on the dating provided in the Inspector General's
Report. but that his statements concerning what was said at the meeting were based on
his unaided recollectiou. (Bissell, 6/9/75, PP. 20-22)

51. As Its Investigation proceeded, the Committee sought to reexamine Edwards but he
died before this could be accomplished. The Committee was unable to examine Edwards
concerning either the claimed briefing of Dunes and Cabell, or his confilctlng statements
about DUlles In two memoranda. Those conflicting memoranda are set forth, -infra, at p.
97-98.

52. In June 1966. Howard J. Osborn, Edwards' successor as Director of Security, wrote
a memorandum for Helms on the Las Vegas tap stating that "the DCI was briefed and ga,•e
his approval." When questioned about this memorandum. Osborn stated that he had no firsthand
knowledge of the briefing, and that he had most likely obtained this statement from
Edwards or the Support Chief.

53. The calendar also refiects no meetings during the period between Dulles, Edwards
and Bissell, or between Dulles and Edwards.

54. Q. When did ~'ou first become aware of any plan or ell'ort to assassinate Mr. CastroBISSELL.
Well, I became aware of planning a contingency basis for such an operation.
My recollection is August • • •
Q. August of 1960?
BIS~ELL. '60. coned • * • but without reading [the I.G. Report], I would have remem•
bered rnltial conversations early in the autumn of I960. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 17-18)

55. On the same day he wrote the memorandum for the Attorney General, Edwards
wrote another memorandum for his own files Indicating that after putting Harvey In
contact with Rosselll In early Aprll, he had "cautioned him [Harvey] that I felt that
any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central
Intelllgence." (5/14/62. Memorandum for the Record) This memorandum, which contained
other Information which Harvey and Edwards had agreed to Include to "falsify" the
record, Is discussed intra, p. 134.

56. The 1967 Inspector General's Re,llOrt surmised that thirteen people knew of the plot,
Including Dulles. based upon Bissell s and Edwards' account of the Dulles briefing.

57. The Inspector General's Report stated, "'Vlth Bissell present, Edwards brlefied the
Director (Dulles) and the DDCI (Cabell) on the existence of a plan Involving members
of the syndleate. • • • Edwards Is quite sure that the DCI and the DDeI clearly understood
the nature of the operation he was discussing." (I.G. Report. p. 17)
The Support Chief testified that prior to the Support Chief's testifying before the
Rockefeller Commission, Edwards told him that Cabell had been aware of and authorized
the project. (O.C., 5/30/75, p. 64)

58. '”Q. Do you read • • • direct, positive action • • • as meaning kllIlng (Fidel Castro.
Raul Castro and Che Guevara)?
"A. I would read It that way, yes. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p, 103)
"Q. • • • would you agree that the words 'direct positive action' appear to question
whether there's been any planning In connection with assassinating (the Castros and
Guevara) ?
"A. I think the phrase 'positive action' could inclUde assassinations, but • • • I'm uot
sllre what was in Mr. Merchant's mind." (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 9.)

59. McCone testified that he first learned of the Rosselli operation in August 1963, long
after It had been terminated. See dlscUSBlon infra, pp. 107-108.

60. Walt Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, testified that Dulles gave McCone from ten
to twelve Informal briefings between September and November 1961. He also said that
Dulles and McCone travelled togetber on a briefing trip to Europe to enable McCone to
get "up to speed" on CIA activities. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 13)

61. Helms testified that he first Informed McCone about the plot using underworld figures
In August 1963. See discussion supra at p. 107.

62. McManus advanceol two reasons for this opinion: (1) "McCone had a great love for
thl' I'rE'sidE'nt of the United States and he sort of looked at him as an older son or a
brothE'r, a very protE'ctlvE' sense he had about the President, President Kennedy, and
)IeCone would have ImmedlatE'ly said ,Tesus, this is a no win ball'l(ame.
(2) "Second. as an individual, he would have found It morally reprehensible." (Mc)
IanuH. 7/22/75, p. :l:l)
~[dlannH also tE'stlfied : "I always assnmed that Mr. Helms would keep the Director fully
Informed of any aetlvity that he thought was sensitivE'.• • • Under most clrcumstanceH,
and Indeed nndE'r all e1rcumstances you can ImaginE', Helms would have told McCone. with
thE' exepption of a situation in which Hplms had been told by higher authority not to tE'll
him." ()Ic)Ianus, pp. :l2-34)
~Id[anus told the Committee that he had had no knowledge of the assassination plots
prior to reading about them in the newspaper. However, the Inspector General's Report
stated In 1967 that )Ie)lanus was aware of such plots. (I.G. RE'port, pp. 75-76)

63. In August 1!J6:l Helms I(ave MeCone a copy of Edwards' )Iay 14, 1962 memorandum
to thE' Attorney General. See discussion infra at p. 107.

64. Harvey testified that when he took over the RosseUioperatlon, he had "cut out" both
Maheu and Giancana because "regardless of what I may have thought of their trustworthiness
* * * they were surplUS to the operation." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65)

65. The briefing' is described 81/pm at p. l:n.
Accorrling' to the Inspector General's Report, Harvey and Rosselli had a farewell 'Jinnpr
bf'fore Harvey went on another assig'nment in .Tune 1963. The meeting' was obsprved
by thp FBI. and Sam PapiPh, thp PBI liaison with the CIA. notified Han'e~' that FBI Direp,
tor Hool'er would be informed. Haney askerl Paplch to. call him if he felt that Horn'er
would inform the Director about the Incident.
"Hal'Ypy said that he then told 3[r. Helms of the incident and that Helms ag'l'eed that
there was no need to brief McCone unless a call from Hoover was expected." (I.G. Report.
p. 54)

66. Harvey described the trip to Miami as: "one of a number of perioulc trips for the pur,
pose of re"iewlng In toto • • • the actual and potential operations at the Miami base
• • • and this poypred the whole g'itlllUt from personnel administration. operational sup,
port in the way of small craft (and) so on • • .,. (Haryey, 7/11/75. pp. 15-16)

67. This meetin~ and the raising of the suggestion of assassination Is dlscnssed In depth
at pages 161-169.

68. Harvey said: "I may have deferred for a period of a few weeks giving an actual order
to terminate this as soon as possible • • ... (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 74)

69. Eldl'r told thl' Committee :
"I told lIIr. Hl'lms that lIIr. lIIcCone had expressed his feeling • • • that assassination
could not be condoned and would not be approved. Furthermore, I com'eyed Mr. McCone's
statement that it would be unthinkable to record in writin!( any consideration of assasslIt.'
ltton because It left the Impression that the subject had recelYl'd seriou" considemtion
by !(oyernmental policy makers, which it had not. lIfr. Helms responded. 'I understand.'
The point Is that I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of lIfr. 'IeCone's opposition
to assassination. I know that lIIr. Helms could not han been under 'lll~' misapprehension
about 'fro lIfcCone's feeling after this conyersation," (BIder Affidavit)
Helms. after readin!( Elder's affidavit, testified: "I do not have any recollection of such
a conversation * * * let me Ray that in not recalling- this conversation, I verv seriouslY
doubt that it eYer took place" (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 16,19) ..

70. The memorandum Is dated April 26, 1962. The Attorney General was briefed on
May 7.

71. Carter further observed that, since he was new In the Agency at that time. he would
have Immediately brought the matter to the Director's attention If he had believed It was
Important and If It had been presentetl to him by Houston as requiring the Director's
consideration. After reviewing otber memoranda Involved In the case, Carter testified tbat
"this would have appeared to have been a matter that the staff, In the light of the past
activities. had been well able to handle." (Carter, 9/19/75, p. 65)

72. The 8/16/63 Chicago Sun Times article stated th"t ".Tustlce Department sources"
believed that ,ilancana never did any spying for tbe CIA. but pretended to go aIonl:' with
the Agency "In the hopes that the .rustlce Department's drive to put him behind bars
mll:'ht be slowed-or at least affected-by his ruge of cooperation with another government
agency,"

73. When asked whether this entry In the memorandum suggested that he had preViouslY
heen aware of the operation. McCone testified that Helms had oraBy Informed him "on
that day In August" that It Involved assassination. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 9)

74. Bissell reiterated this "lew In a subsequent appearance: ". • • I felt that the responsibility
for obtaining necessary authorization should remain with the Director."
(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 4)

75. Bissell explained the "plausible denlablllty" practice as follows:
"Any covert operations. but especially covert operations ... that If successful, would
have very visible consequences, It was of course. an objectivp to carry out In such a way
that they could be plausibly disclaimed by the U.S. Government." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 5.)
Bissell apparently assumed that a corollary to that doctrine required the use of "oblique,"
"clrcumlocutlous" language.

76. Gray pointed out "that r was not with President Eisenhower twenty•four hours a day.
It was a few minutes every day. practically ever;;' day." (Gray. 7/9/75. p. 35)
According to the records of the Eisenhower Library. Dulles was aione with President
EispnhowPr on onp occasion in the fall of 1960. That meeting lasted ten minutes and
oecurred on Nonlllber 25. 1960. The record of the previous portion of the meeting attended
by Gra;;' indicates only that. in addition to discussion of operations in another country,
"thcre was also some discussion of Cuba." ()1ernorandum. XO\'ember 28. 1960. by Gordon
(;ray. of -'feeling with the President, Xovernber 25,1960, at 10 :40 a.m.)

77. Parrott testified:
"I saw him [Allen Dulles] several tirneg It week for hours at a time. I had known
him somewhat before ... but I got to know him very well Indeed during these four
years." (Parrott, 7/10/75. p. 13)

78. Parrott further tc'tified that Allen Dulles followed a practice of Insisting upon speclfic
orders rather than "taclt approval" and he also found Bissell's assumptions regarding a
clrcumlocutlous cOll"e""ation between President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles "hard to
believe." (Parrott. 7/10/75, p. 14)

79. On ~[arch ~. 1!H17. Dre,Y Pearson stated in his newspaper column that there was a
United States "plot" to assassinate Castro, and that "one version claims that underworld
figures actuall~- were recruited to carry out the plot." (Pearson. Washington Merry GoRound,
~Iarch 3, 1967)

80. 2 Castro apparently first announced publicly that he was a "~rarxlst-Lenlst" on December
2, 1901. (Dayld Larson. Cuba Cri8i" of 1962, p. 304)

81. As Gray testified, this plan co,'ered four areas; sabotage, economic sanctions, propagamla,
and training ofa Cuban exile force for a possible im'asion. Gray stated that this
plan had nothing to do with assassination. (Gray, i /9/i5, p. 17) .

82. Admiral Burke was unable to testify In person because he was hospitalized.

83. The memorandum of an Internal CIA meeting shows that the first meeting of the
CIA task force established to pran the training of a Cuban exile force was held on
March 9, 1960, the day• before the March 10, NSA meeting. The CIA task force discussed
"an operation directed at the overthrow of the Castro regime" and described that
operation as one In which a Cuban exile force would be trained for "6-7 months." In
the discussion of this operation, It was noted that a principal problem was the weakness
of the Cuban exile groups which "had no real leader and are divided Into many parts,"
but It was hoped that during the long training period the "opposition groups will have
been merged and will have formed a government-in-eXile to which all trained elements
could be attached." (Memorandum March 9, 1960)
According to the memorandum of the meeting, J. C. King, Chief of the CIA's Western
Hemisphere Division, had stated, "unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could
be eliminated in one package---which is highly unlikely-this operation can be a long,
drawn-out affair and .the present government wll1 onl~' be overthrown by the use of
force." (ld., p. 1)

84. The record of the March 14 meeting states: "Admiral Burke said that the organized
group within Cuba today was the Communists and there was therefore the danger they
might move into control."

85. Testimony varied as to the meaning of the phrase "direct positive action" and of General
Cabell's response in the November 3, 1960 memorandum.
Gray testified that it could be taken to include assassination, but he did not know
whether Mr. Merchant Intended to refer to assassination or not. (Gray, 7/9/75, p, 9)
Parrott, the author of the memorandum, testified that, ahhough he had no recollection
of the November 3, 1960 meeting, It was his opinion, based on the context of weekly Special
Group meetings and discussion in the fall of 1960, that this discussion centered on
the possibility of a palace coup, as opposed to a paramlUtary operation mOunted from
outside Cuba: General Cabell was Indicating that "we sim8ly do not have agents Inside
of Cuba to carry out this kind" of a coup. (Parrott, 7/1 /75, pp, 19-21) Parrott also
testified tbat the phrase "direct positive action" was not a euphemism, and that he did
not employ euphemisms in Special Group records, except fOr references to the Presiden t,
(Parrott, 7/10/7<5, pp. 19-21)
Bissell testified that he found it "difficult to understand" that General C.abell would
have told the Special Group that it was beyond the CIA's capabilities to take "direct positive
action" (if that referred to assassination) in light of Bissell's assumption that General
CabeB was informed of the CIA/underworld assassination effort, (Bissell, 7/17/75,
pp. 15-18)
Mr. ~Ierchant was unable to testify because of ill health and orders of his physician.

86. Bissell never asked Dullps whether Dulles had Informed President Kennedy's National
Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy about the plot. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p, 34.)

87. Prior to the Bay of Pigs, there were many meetings at which both the President and
Dulles were present. The Presidential logs from the Kennedy Administration Indicate only
one meeting before the Bay of Pigs Invasion at which the President and Allen Dulles may
have met privately. This meeting took place on March 25, 1961. (There Is no record of the
meeting. We feel compelled to state that the fact of this meeting, on the evidence avallable,
Is of little, if any significance or relevance.)

88. Most of the testimony from ofllclals hll\'h In the Kennedy Administration covered the
period after the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Involvlnl\' Operation MONGOOSE and related activIties.
(See following Section) It was during this period that high officials In the White
House State Department Defense Department. and the CIA were drawn into the detailed
planning of Cuban operations. Their testimony concerning the question of authorization
for the assassination plots is extensively discussed infra, pp. 148-161.

89. Goodwin did hear about assassination on two occasions. One involved a meeting betWl'Cn
the President and reporter Tad Szulc in November 1961 (see discussion pp. 138-139)
and the other involved the Special Group (Augmented) meeting of August 10, 1962. (See
pp. 164-165)

90. This reason was also given by Bissell in response to the Committee's questioning of his
assumption that Dulles probably told President Eisenhower about the assassination operatlon:
". • • the Mafia operation was not regarded as of enormous Importance and ther..
were much more important matters to talk about with the President." (Bissell, 7/17/75.
p. 25)

91. The evidence concernIng who initiated the conversation, when It occurred, and what
was saId, Is discussed extensively in sectIon III-C.

92. When asked If BIssell had ever Informed him that underworld figures had been offered
a large sum to assassiuate Castro. General Taylor respond..d : "No. I n"ver heard that. and
It amazes me" (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 72) Taylor saId that during hIs revIew of the Bay of
PI/:s operation no mentIon was made of an assassInation effort a/(Rlnst Castro. (Taylor.
7/9/75, p. 72) Taylor noted that Dulles met with the Board of Inquiry some thirty or forty
times. (Tayor, 7;'9/75, p. 73)

93. A handwritten note from the Attorney General to his assIstant on the face of the
memorandum IndIcates that the Attorne;v General had seen the document. ThIs memorandum
Is discussed In detail at Section (7) (b), infra.

94. If the FBI quotation of Edwards Is to be accorded significant weight, then It Is Important
to note that another section of It contradicts Bissell's assumption that Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy had been c1rcumlocutlonsly advised by Dulles of the assassination
plot. Edwards told the FBI that "Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards' conta<!
t with Meheu" In connection with Cuban operation.
Bissell's explanation for Edwa~ds' statement was that Edwards was being "protective"
of the DCI. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 20) But this testimony mnst be reconclled with Bissell's
previous testimony that Dulles knew of the operation and probably would have told the
President about it.

95. Smathers' testimony about this conversation referred to the transcript of an Oral
History Interview he gave on March 31, 1964. That Interview Indicates tha the conversation
probably took place In 1961. before the Bay of PIl\'s Invasion In mld-Aprll.
White House logs of Presidential meetings Indicate only two occasions In 1961 when
Senator Smathers met alone with the President. Both of those meetings took place In
March.

96. One night at dinner with Senator Smathers, the President emphasized his point by
cracking his plate at the mention of Cuba. (Smathers, 7/23/75, p. 22)

97. According to FBI memoranda dated December 21, 1960, and ,January 18, 1961. the
Cuban was ,associated with anti-Castro activities financed by United States racketeers, including
Santos Trafficante, who hoped to secure illegal monopolies In the event of Castro's
overthrow. 'l'his same Cuban was subsequentlJ' used by Rosselli In the second passage of
plJls to Cnba In April 1962.

98. Rosselli testified that he represented himself to the Cubans as an agent of American
business Interests that desired the removal of Castro. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, pp. 17, 89)
Mahen testified that he and Rosselli held themselves out to the Cubans as representatives
of American Indnstrlallsts who had been financially hurt by Castro's regime. and that
"at no time had we Identified to them that the U.S. /:overument In fact was behinil the
project." (Mahen, 7/29/75, p. 34) The Support Chief testified that he had met the
Cnban exile leader with whom Rosselli had dealt only once. anil that he had then been
"put out as being somebody that had a client. commercial type." The Support Chief was not
certain that the Cuban hail not suspected his true IdentitJ•. however. because the Chief
testified that <>fter that meeting, Rosselli had told him that the Cuban had remarkeil. "You
'an't tell me this guy is not a CIA man." (O.C., 5/30/75. p. 22)

99. The wiretap w!\s placed on the telephone by Arthur J. Ballettl. Arrangements for the
tap were made by Maheu through his acquaintance, Edward DuBois. (FBI memo 3/23/62)
See discussion, supra, pp. 77-79.

100. Robert Kennedy was Attorney General from January 1961 until September 1964.
During his tenure as Attorney General he had close ties not only to law enforcement
agencies (FBI and Justice), but also to the CIA. He served on the Special Group (Augmented)
which supervised Operation MONGOOSE from December 1961 through October
1962.

101. This memorandum Is set forth In full, supra, p. 79.

102. The Octoher 18 memo was also distrlhuted to Assistant Attorney General J. Walter
Yeagley and to Army, Air Force, Navy and State Department intelligence offices. Bissell
testified that he did not recall this memorandum. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 40) He speculated
that the CIA's copy ordinarily would have been delivered to him and he would have
passed It on to Sheffield Edwards. The action copy was directed to Bissell but he surmised
that a copy would also have gone to the Director. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 40. 41)

103. The FBI copy of the memora'ndum contained a postscript stating:
"By separate alrtel (night cable), we have Instructed the field to 'be most alert for any
additional Information concerning alleged plots against Castro and to submit recommendations
for close surveillance of Giancana in the event he makes trip to the Miami
area or other trips which may be for the purpose of contacting people Implicated In
this plot."

104. Sam Papich. the FBI liaison with the CIA during this period, stated that the FBI
was furious when It learned of the CIA's use of Maheu, Rosselii and Giancana in the tRp
because it might inhibit possible prosecutions against them in the wiretap case and In
others.
An arranl(ement (which was informal with Edwards, but was formalized with William
Harvey) was subsequently made between the CIA and the FBI. The arrangement was
that Papich would be Informed by Al(ency personnel of any CIA contacts with underworld
figures, of their movements. and any Intelligence which directly or Indirectly
relRterl to organized crime activities in the United States. The CIA would not report to
the FBI any Information concerning the objectives of Agency operations.

105. Bissell also testified that the "cover story" for the operation mRy have been IntelllI(
ence gathering (i.d., p. 66).

106. Edwards apparently I(ave this inf~rmation to Sam Paplch.

107. See the preceding section for a discussion of this Cuban exile leader.

108. For a discussion of this part of the memorandum and Bissell"s testlmoIiy on It. see
pp. 121-123 supra.

109. At the time Hoover sent the May 22, 1961, memorandum to the Attorney General,
Indicating that there was a CIA/Glancana link, Bureau files already contained another
memorandum revealing that Glancana had earlier talked about an assassination attempt
against Castro. This earlier memorandum dated October 18, 1960, did not reveal any Glancana/
CIA connections, but anyone seeing the October 18 memorandum and knowing of
the CIA's association with Glancana In a project "against Castro" should have realized
the connection.
Courtney Evans, the FBI's liaison with the Attorney General, however, testified that
pursuant to Bureau procedure, Hoover would have received an Intra-bureau memorandum
giving him a detalled summary of the information that was In the files. (Evans, 8(28(75,
pp. 70,72) (footnote continued on p. 128) Evans also testified tnat he did not recall ever having seen the October 18 memorandum,
that he had never heard from any source of an assassination plot Involving the Central
Intelligence Agency ana members of the underworld during his tenure with the Bureau,
and that he never discussed assassination with the Attorney General. (Evans, 8/28/75,
pp. 55-57) However, he did have discussions with the Attorney General following the
May 22 memorandum. }j."vans testified that if the October 18 memorandum had been sent to
him, It would have been sent to him by Thomas McAndrews, who was Chief of the
Organized Crime Section of the Special Investigative Division of the Bureau. McAndrews,
Who was responsible for distributing Information from the FBI to the entire intelligence
community, could not recall e~er having given the October 18 memorandum to Evans.
When asked If he believed the information contained In that memorandum had ever
been brought to the attention of Attorney General Kennedy, McAndrews testified: "I
think he was briefed specifically on it, either In writing or orally • • • I think It was
done. But I can't say for sure." (~lcAndrews, 9/17/75, p. 27)
Ralph HlII was the Special Agent in charge of the investigation of Glancana. He testified
that he recalled the information In the October 18 memorandum, but that he did not
recall the memorandum Itself. He stated that because of the Attorney General's Interest
In organized crime figures, It was the practice for field reports concerning Glancana to
be given to Courtney Evans, who would then forward them to the Attorney General.
The only documents the Committee has seen indicating that the FBI reaI1zed the
October 18 memorandum related to the CIA/underworld figures operation, were two
memoranda, both dated March 6, 1967, and both entitled "Central InteIIlgence Agency's
Intentions to Send Hoodlums to Cuba to Assassinate Castro." The first memorandum to
Attorney General Ramsey Clark stated that "It appears that data which came to our
attention in October 1960 possibly pertains to the above-captioned matter." The second,
an internal FBI memorandum used in the preparation of the memorandum for the Attorney
General, stated that there were two other references in the files to the overall Information
mentioned above, one of which was the statement made by Giancana that In
October 1960 he met with an individual who was to assassinate Castro in November 1960.

110. Courtnev Evans was the FBI's liaison with the Attorney General and the President.
Courtney Evans had worked closely with the then Senator John Kennedy and Robert
Kennedy on the McClellan Committee. which had investigated the relationship between
organized labor and organized crime. During the McClellan Investigation Sam G1ancana
was one of the major crime figures examined. After becoming Attorney General, Robert
Kennedy had singled out Giancana as one of the underworld leaders to be most Intensely
Investigated.

111. The two memoranda, whIch are dIscussed In consIderable detail supra, were the October
18, 1960, memorandum linkIng Glancana to an assasslnatl<ln plot (but not mentionIng
CIA) and the May 22, 1961, memorandum linking Glancana to a CIA operation
against Cuba InvolvIng "dIrty busIness" (but not mentionIng assassination).

112. WhIte House telephone logs show 70 Instances of phone contact between the WhIte
House and the PresIdent's frIend whose testimony confirms frequent phone contact with
the PresIdent hImself.
Both the PresIdent's frIend and RosseIIl testified that the friend dId not know about
either the assassInation operatIon or the wiretap ease. Gianeana was killed before he was
available for questionIng.

113. The President. thus nottified. mll!:ht then have Inquired further of the CIA. The
Presidential calendar Indicates that the President had meetings at which most CIA
officials witting of the assassination plot were present during the period from February 27
through April 2, 1962. All of those persons, however, have testified that the President
never asked them about the assassination plot.

114. This memorandum Is peculiar In two respects. First, the CIA had already orally
objected to prosecution on two occasions. Second, Hoover was quizzing the CIA on behalf
of the Department of Justice, a task that would normally be performed by the Department's
Criminal Division.

115. Houston testified that he did not remember these meetings. (Houston, 6/2/75, p. '3)
Miller recalled only that Houston had spoken to him about a wiretap and possible CIA
embarrassment. (MUler, 8/11/75, p. 16)

116. Helms testlfled that he did not recall meeting with the Attorney General on May 7
and his desk book does not reflect any such meeting. When asked if he had ever met with
the Atrorney General to set up a knowingly Inaccurate briefing. Helms testified that he
had not and that If he had, he would certaInly remember It because "I would have been
conlving or colluding, and I have no recollection of ever having done anything Uke that."
(Heims, 9/16/75, p. 8)

117. Harvey. who was Informed of the briefing by Edwards, eould not reeall whether
Edwards told him that the Attorney General had been briefed that the operation had been
terminated. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 99)

118. In a section entitled "The Facts As WP Know Them." the I.G. Report stated that
Attorney Genpral Kennedy "was brlefpd on Gambling- S~'ndicate--Phase One after It wa~
ovpr. Hpwas not briefed on Phasp Two." (I.G. Rpport. p. 118)

119. The Hoovpr memorandum Indicates two reasons for Attorney General Kennpdy's displeasure.
First. the CIA had put itself into a position wherp "It couln not alforo to hAve
"ny action taken against Glancana or Maheu." Spcond. Hoovpr: "Stated as he [Kennedy]
well knew the 'gutter gossip' w.~s that the reason nothlnll' had been done 8g-alnst GlaocanR
was because of Glaocana's close relationship with Frauk Sinatr" who, In turn. clalmen
to be a close friend of the Kennedy family. Thp Attorney Genpral stated hp reallzPd this
and It was for that reason that he was quite concerned whpn he recel.,.ed this InformatIon
from CIA about Giancana and Maheu." (Sinatra Is not the President's frlpnd discussed In
the precpdlng- subsection.)
Despite the Attorney General's concern that prosecutions of parties In.,.o!vell In thp hn
ml~ht be foreclosed In thp future, both Glancana and Rosselli WPfP In fact prospcuted loter
for crimes unrelated to the tap.

120. In the CIA mpmorandum of the brlpflng- prepared by Ellwards, Edwards wrote that "at
the time of the Incident, neither this AgencJ' nor the undersigned knew of thp proposPf1
technical Installation."

121. Houston testified that Kennedy Inslstpd "Thpre was not to be an~' contact of the
Mafia • * • without prior comultatlon with him." (Houston, 6/2/75. p. :l7) When Interviewed
10 1967 for the Inspector General's Report. Houston hall recal1en Kennpn,. as S""Ing:
"I trust that If you ever try to do business wIth orj?anlzpi\ crIme Hg-Aln-wHh
gangsters-you will let the Attorney General know." (I.G. Rpport, p. 62a)

122. Papich presumably continued to receive reports from the CIA on Harvey's subsequent
meetings with Rosselli.

123. The Inspector General apnarently had access to an earlier draft of this InteIllA'enee
estimate. II.G. Report. n. 4) In repnrtln!!' that many CIA officers Interviewed In the I.G.
Im"estl",atlon stressed that "elimlnatlnn of the dominant f1",ures In a ",overnment • • •
will not necessarily cause the dOW.nfall of the A'overnment." the Report stated: "This point
wn~ stressor! with respect to Castro and Cuha In an IntPrnal CTA draft naoer of October
'''/11. which was Initiated lu resoonse to General Maxwell Taylor's desire for q eontlnA'eney
nlan. The oaner took the nosltion that the demise "f FMel Castro. from whateve~ cause.
wOllld olfer little onnortunlt, for the liberation of Cuh'! from Communist "nr! Soviet Bloc
controL" (LG. Report. p. 4)
The CIA has been unahie to locate the draft paper referred to in the Inspector General's
Ronort.

124. A cover memorandum b)' Lausdale transmlttlnl( the CIA estimate to Robert Kennedy
criticized the estimate's assessment that "It Is hlghl)' Improbable that an extensive popul"r
IIprlslng could be fomented" against Castro as a "conclusion of fact quite outsltie th.. arpa
of Intelligence." I,ausdale stated that th.. estimate "seems to be the major evidence to Iw
"sed to oopos.. your program" (r..f ..rrlng to the proposed overall i\!ONGOOSE operation).
(Memo, Lansdale to Robert Kennedy. 11/62, p. 1) As discussed In detail at p. 140,
Lansdale's basic concept for the )IOXGOOSE program was to overthrow Castro throu.l(h
an Internal revolt of the Cuban people.

125. "If people were suggesting this to you and )'OU were curious about whether It was
worth exploring, one WilY of getting more light on It without goln/( an~' further with that
notion Itself would be to ask political people. not Intelligence peop~, what they thought
would happen If Castro were not there any longer." (Bundy, 7/11/75. p. 79)

126. Bundy explained: ". • • It was precisely to Insulate the President from any
false Inference that what he was asking about was assassination. It Is eas.v to confuse the
question. what are things going to be like aft..r Castro. with the other question. ann we
were trying to focus attentlou on the Informatlou he obviouslY want..d. which is. what
would happen If we did do this sort of thing. aud not l!'et one Into th.. frame of mlud of
thinking that h.. was considering doing It." (Bund)'. 7/11/75. n. 81)

127. Taylor ,aid he was puzzl..d bv the wording of NSA)! 100 and the related documents
and stated. "I just cannot tie In the language here with a plausible explanation." (Taylor.
7/9/75. p. lil)

128. Tad Szulc was a reporter In the Washington Burean of the New York Times. Szulc
had visited Cuba In May-.Tune 1961. folIowln~ the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Durln~ the course
of that trip, Szulc had a "series of very long conversations" with Castro. (Szulc, 6/10/75,
p.24)

129. Goodwin testified that President KennedY met frequently with members of the press
and others who were experts In various fields. but that It was "possible" that th.. m....tlngwith
Szulc may have been an occasion for the Pr..sldent to consider Szulc for a position
In the Administration. (Goodwin, 7/18/75, pp. 29--:10)
On November 2, 1961, Goodwin had addressed an "eyes only" memorandum to th..
President and the Attorney General outlining a suggested organization for what hecame
the MONGOOSE operation. Goodwin proposed five "staff components." Including "lnteIIlg-
ence colIectlon." "~uerrlIIa and under~round," and "propaganda." The memorandum
stated: "As for prona~anda. I thou~ht we might ask Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence
from the Times and work on this onl'--although we should cheek with [USIA Dlr..etorl
Ed Murrow and Dick BlsselI." (Memo, Goodwin to the President and the Attorney Genel"lll,
11/2/61, p. 2)

130. Zzulc made notes of the conversation with President Kennedy as soon as he returned
to his office. President Kennedy's question regard In/\, a Castro assassination nnnenrs In
quotation marks In Szulc's notes, which were made the same day from "reasonably fresh"
memory. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 30)

131. Those attendlng Included the Attorney General. Lansdale. McManus, General Craig,
representing the Joint Chiefs of Stall'. Don Wilson of USIA Major Patchel1 of the SecretarY
of Defense's office. and Frank Hand of CIA. It Is prob~ble that DDP Helms was als'"
present.

132. There was a great deal of evidence showing that Cuha had a high priority in the
Kennedy Administration, and the very existence of a high-level group like th.. Special
Group (Augmented) further demonstrated Cuha's Importance. McNamara stated that "we
were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter." (In the same
context, McNamara stated "I don't helleve we contemplated assassination.") (McNamara,
7/22/75. p. 93) Similarly. General Lansdale informed the memhers of his Interal(ency
committee that MONGOOSE "demands a change from buslness-as-usual and a hard facln"
of the fact that you're In a combat situation wh..re we have be..n given fUll command."
(Lansdale Memo. 1/20/62)
On the other hand, Theodore Sorensen testified that "there were lots of top priorities.
and It was th.. job of some of [us) to continually tell various agencies their particular
subject was the top priority" and although Cuba was "Important" It was "fairly w..ll down
on the list of th.. President's agenda." (Sorensen. 7/21/75, p. 12) For exampl.., when
President Kennedy was told that his first letter to Khruschev in the secret correspondence
which lasted two or three years would be "the single most Important document J'ou will
write durin!: your Presidency." President Kennedy said, "Yes, we get these every daJ'
over here." (Sorensen, 7/21/75, p. 12)

133. Parrott sarcastically characterized Lansdale's plans as follows:
"I'll I(lve you one example of Lansdale's perspicacity. He had a wonderful plan for getting
rid of Castro. This plan consisted of spreading the word that the Second Coming of
Christ was Imminent and that Christ was al(alnst Castro (who) was anti-Christ. And
you would spread this word around Cuba. and then on whatever date It was. that there
would be a manifestation of this thing. And at that time---thls Is absolutely true---and
at that time just over the horizon there would be an American submarine which would
surface off of Cuba and send up some starshells. And this would be the manifestation
of the Second Coming and t:astro would be overthrown • • •
Well, some wag called this operation-and somebody dubbed this-Elimination bJ'
I11umlnatlon," (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 49, 50)

134. The testimony was as follows:
The CHAIRMAN. What preclsel)' did you mean b)' "uncork the touchdown pia)' in,
df'pf'ndently of tbe Institutional pro~rams we arf' spurring?"
Gf'nf'ral LA"SDAI.E. Well. I was holding almost dall)' meetings with m)' working group.
and-In tasking. and finding how thf'Y werf' df'veloplng plans I was bf'comlng more and
more concerned that they kept going back to doing what I felt wer" pro forma American
types of actions rather than actively exploring how to get the Cubans Into this. and
to have them undertake actions.
To mf'. the touchdown play was a Cuban revolt to overthrow the regime. I did not feel
that we had gotten Into thf' real Internal part of getting Cubans Into the action. and
I was concernl'd about that.
Senator BAKER. In the same context. It Is fair to say that the nam" of the gamf' WIlS
to get rid of Castro or his regime and that touchdown play WIlS one of several methods
that might have been uSf'd for that purposf'?
General LANSDALE. Yes.
Senator BAKER. All right. now what was the touchdown play that )'OU had in mind
here?
Gf'neral LANSDALE. Well. It was 11 re\'olt by the Cubans themselves • •• a re,olutlon
that would break down the police controls of the state and to drive the top people out
of power and to do that. there needed to bf' political actions eells. ps)'chologlcal propaganda
action cells. and eventually when possible. guerrilla forces developed In the
country In a safe place for a new government to Sf't up and direct the revolution that
would eventu'llly move Into Hayana and take over. (Lansdale. 7/8/75, PI', 45-56)

135. Lansdale's memorandum described the "touchdown play" as follows:
"It may be a special effort which proff'Seional labor operatore can launch to stir 11[1
workers In Latin America and Cuba. It ma~' be through ethnlc-Iangllagf' groups: Spain
has an untapped action potential. It cOllld be a warmlng,up of the always IIvel)' YOllth
element In Latin Amf'rlca and Cuba. through some contacts specially USf'd. It could be
with the families through the Church. with families resisting the dlselpllned destruction
of eoelal justice by the Communists. It could be an Imaginative df'ff'ction projf'ct which
!"Tacks the ton echelon of the Communist gang now running Cuba." (Memorandllm.
Lansdalf' to Attorney General, 1/27/62)

136. An earlier reference to use of gangster-type elements had appeared in a CIA memorandum
for the SGA on January 24. 1962. Commenting on Task 5 of Lanedale's original
:12 taeks (which callf'd for planning for "defection of top Cuban government offielals").
the CIA mf'morandum notf'd that planning for thf' ta sk will "necessaril)' be baeed
upon an appeal made Inside the island by Intermedlarlee" and lIstf'd "crime syndlcatf's'
along with other groups as possible Intermediaries, (CIA Memorandum, 1/24/62)

137. The initial draft of these Guidelines had referred to the President. but was later
ampnded to read "hl!\,her authority." (Draft Guidelines. 3(5(62. p. 2) The minutes
of the consideration of these Guidelines wprp also amprHlpd with rpspert to the manner
In whlrh the Guidelines wpre appro,•pd. ,\ ~Ipmorandulll for Record. entitled "Discussion
of ODeration MOXGOORE with the President." statpd :
"In the presence of the Special Group (Aul!mented) the Prpsident was ",Inn a prol!ress
report on Operation MONGOOSE. The Guidelines dated March 14. 1962 were circulated
and were used as the hasls of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility,
noise level and risks entailed. General Lansdale and the Special Group (Aug-mented)
were Irtven taelt authorization to nroeeed in accordance with the Guidelines." (SGA
~[emo for the Reeord. 3(16(62) .
A note. dated March 22, 1962. appeared on the bottom of this memorandum and
stated :
"This minute was read to the Special Groun (Alll!mented) toda,'. The Group was
unanimous in feeling' that no authorization. f'itllf'r tacit Of othprwisp. wa~ goi\•PIl h.Y hig-hrf
authority. The members of the Group asked that tlw minute be amended to imlicate
that the Group Itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the Guidelines."

138. In early March 1962, the SGA recognIzed the need to begin "prelimInary actions • • •
InvolvIng shch thIngs as spotting, assessIng and traIning action-type alrents" but the
SGA agreed that It must "keep Its hand t1~htly" on these actions. The SGA saw,
however, that such control mIght not be completely effective and recognized 'that many
of the agents Infiltrated Into Cuba would be of an all-purpose type; that Is, they would
be traIned in paramilitary skills, as well as those of exclusIvely intelligence concern.' It was
uoted that once the agents are within the country, they cannot be effectively controlled
from the U.S., although every effort wllI be made to attempt such control." (SGA Minutes.
3/5/62)

139. There are references in the SGA records to attacks on Soviet personnel in Cuba. The
record of the SGA meeting on September 9. 1962. states: "It was suggested that the
matter of attacking and harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered."
(SGA ~I1nutes. 9/9/62)
Earlier. on Angust 31. 1962. Lansdale had included a task "to provoke incidents between
Cubans and Bloc personnel to exacerbate tensions" in a proposed projection of action:
for Phase II of ~10NGOOSE. (Memo to SGA. Action No. 47. /;/111/62) The Speci.
Group thereafter decided. as a means of "emphasizing such activity." to replace that tas'
with one to "cause actions hy Cubans against Bloc personnel." and to note that "con
sl"eration will he ldven to provoking and conducting physical attacks on Bloc personnel.'
Olemo to Taylor. Rusk. and McNamara. from Lansdale. !l112/62. pp. 1-2)

140. The SGA also decided on October 4. 1962. that Rob"rt Kennedy would chair the Group'
meetings "for the time being." ([d., p. 11.) Subsequently. at a meeting on October 16. 196Z
Rohert Kennedy stated that he was going to give MONGOOSE "more personal attention'
in view of the lack of progress and would hold dally meetings with the working grou
renresentatlves. i.e.. Lansdale. Harvey. and tpe other Agency members. (Memo of ~leetln
hv Helms. 10116/62. p. 1) Helms testilien that he di,l not recall .n~• such dail~' meetlnr
with the Attorney General. He had the lmnression there may have been several at lirs
hut that then they ceased. (Helms. 7/17/75. pp. 54-55)

141. Harvey testified that he had a "confrontation" with Robert Kennedy at the height of
the Missile Crisis concerning Harvey's order that agent teams be sent Into Cuba to
support any conventional U.S. military operation that might occur. Harvey stated that
Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to this order and, as a result. McCone
ordered Harvey to stop the agent operations (Harvey. 7/11/75. pp. 80-81). Elder, McCone's
assistant at the time, similarly described this Incident and stated that. although Harvey
had attempted to get guidance from top officials durlnl1 the Missile Crisis, Harvey "earned
another black mark as not being fully under control.' (Elder, 8/13/75, pp. 34-35)

142. The extent to which pressure In fact existed "to do something about Castro" Is discussed
In detal1 In the section Immediately above dealing with Operation MO:olGOOSE, Its
strategy of causing an Internal revolt of the Cuban people against Castro, the strict control
system established by the Special Group Augmented, and the pattern of Intelllgence
collection and sabotage activity actually authorized ana undertaken.

143. Helms testlfi{'d: "In my 25 years In the Central Intelligence Agency, I always thought
I was working within a"thorizatlon, that I was doing what I had been asked to do by
proper authority and when I was operating on my own I was doing what I believed to
be the legitimate business of the Agency as It would have been expected of me." (Helms,
6/13/75. pp. 30-31)

144. Helms elaborated: ... • • people were losing their lives In raids. a lot of people had
lost their life at the Bay of Pigs. agents were being arrested left and right and put
before the wall and shot." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 64)

145. Q. SO It was your impression that he was sort of setting the tone for the group's
action or activity.
"A. Oh, yes • • • there wasn't any doubt about that. He was very much interested in
this Rnd spent a great deal of time on it." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 2;!)

146. The telephone records of the Attorney General's office Indicate frequent contact between
the Attorney General and Helms. Helms stated that his conversations with Robert
Kennedy were "candid" and that "he and I used to deal in facts most of the time."
(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 63) Helms testified about the detail of his talks with Robert Kennedy:
"For example, we had projects to land sabotage teams. Well, (the Attorney General
would ask) have you got the team organized, did the team go? Well, no, we've been
delayed a week because the weather Is bad or the boats don't run, or something of this
kind. It even got down to that degree of specificity." (Helms, 7/17/75, p. 40)
An official In the Western Hemisphere Division of the Directorate of Plans who was
responsible for evaluating potential Cuban assets testified that In June or July 1962,
he was told by his superior [either Harvey or Harvey's assistant] "go see the Attorney
General, he has something to talk about" (Official. 9/18/75, p. 28). The official said that
he went to the Justice Department and was told by the Attorney General that: "He
wanted to see a man who had contact with a small group of Cubans who had a plan
for creating an Insurrection, or something like that • • *" (Official, 9/18/75, p. 30)
The contact recommended by the Attorney General, referred the official to five or six
Cubans who claimed to have connections within Cuba and who requested weapons, money,
and supplies to start an Insurrection. The official said he reported to the Attorney General
that the Cubans did not have a concrete plan: the Attorney General rejected the
official's evaluation and ordered him to go to Guantanamo Naval Base in CUba "using
whatever assets we could get to make contact with people inside Cuba.....!'nd start workinl':
and developlnl': this particular group." (Official, 9/18/75, p. 34) when the official
protested that the CIA had Rl':l'eed not to work out of Guantanamo, the Attorney General
responded, "we will see about that." The official said that he then reported his conversation
with the Attorney General to Harvey. who replied: "There was a meetinl': about
that this morning. I forgot to tell you about It. I will take care of It * • *" (Official,
9/18/75, p. 35) The official said that he had no further contact with the Attorney General
or the Cubans.

147. Helms immediately reiterated that his perception of authority for Castro's assassination
derived from the pressure exerted by the Administration against Castro. The exchange
between the Chairman and Helms continued as follows:
"The CHAIRMAN. Well, did he ever tell you in other words that clearly conveyed to
you the message that he wanted to kill Castro?
"HELMS. Sir. the last time I was here [before the Committee], I did the best I could
about what I believed to be the parameters under which we were working. and that
was to ~et rid of Castro. I can't imagine any Cabinet officer wanting to sign 011' On something
like that. I can't Imagine anybody wanting something in writing saylnl'( I have just
charged )11'. ,Tones to go out and shoot Mr. Smith." (Helms. 7/17/75, pp. 13-14)

148. Helms testified that, although loss of life was implicit inthe MONGOOSE operations.
"I think there was an e!fort made not to take tacks that would recklessly kill a lot of
people and not achieve very much. I thInk there was an e!fort. If )'OU had a sabota~e
oDeratlon, not to throw a lot of hand grenades Into a city, but rather take out the powpr
plant which would actually damage the economy of the country. There was an e!fort made
to find devIces that would seem to have a useful end." (Helms, 7/17/75, pp. 63-64)

149. This meeting and the testimony concernIng It Is treated In depth In the section, infra,
pp. 161-169.

150. Harvey explained his failure to brief the SGA In the following exchange:
"Q. * * * Did you believe that the White House did not want the Special Group to know?
"HARVEY. Well, I would have had no basis for that belief. but I would have felt that If
the White House [tasked] this [operation to the CIA] and wanted the Special Group to
know about It, it was up to the White House to brief the Special Group and not up to me
to brief them, and I would have considered that I would have been very far out of line
and would have been subject to severe censure." (Harvey. 7/11/75, p. 77)

151. In one of Helms' subsequent appearances before the Committee he testified that Robert
Kennedy never gave him such an order.

152. The evidence showed, however. that there were occasions when the Attorney General
dealt with officials Involved In MONGOOSE without consulting General Taylor, For example
(as discussed in detail In the section on MONGOOSE operations), on January 18,
1962, General Lansdale sent a copy of his MONGOOSE program review to Robert Kennedy
with a cover memorandum Indicating that other "sensitive work" not In the review was to
be dealt with by the President, the Attorney General, and Lansdale only. The nature of
that work, which Lansdale testified Involved political contacts In the Cuba exile community.
Is discussed at p, 142.

153. Lansdale was questioned about the term "touchdown plays" whleh appeared In one
set of SGA minutes:
"Senator BAKER: Now do you completely rUle out the possiblIlty that the touchdown
play had to do with the possible assassination elforts a~ainst Fidel Castro?
"General LANSDALE: Yes * * * I never discussed, nor conceived. nor received orders about
an assassination of Castro with my dealings with either the Attorney General or the President,"
(Lansdale, 7/8/75, p, 56)

154. "Senator BAKER: Is that the reason you didn't. because of the principle of denlablllty?
"General 1,.* N"I>ALE: No, It wasn't. The subject never came up and I had no reason to
bring It up with him." ,

155. "Senator Hr'DDLEHTON: You never had any reason to believe that the Attorney General
had dealt directly with Mr. Harvey?
"General I,ANSDALE : I hadn't known a'bout that at all. 110 * * *.
"Senator HUDDLESTON: * * * You have no reason to believe that he might have broached
[a Castro assassina t10n 1 with the A!torney General?
"General LANSDALE: I wouldn't know about that-I certainly didn't know it.
"Senator HUDDLESTON: You had no reason to believe that there was any kind of activity
going on in relation to Cuba outside of what you were proposing or what was coming before
the Special Group?
"General LANSDALE: No, I was supposed to know It all, and I had no Indication that I did
not know It all rexcept for one operation by Harvey unrelated to assassinations]." (Lansdale,
7/8/75, p. 48)
Bundy stated: "0 0 0 the most Important point I want to make 0 0 0 Is that I find the
notion that they separately. privately encoura~ed. ordered. or arranged ell'orts at aSRasslnatlon
totally Inconsistent with what I knew of both of them. And. as an example, I would
clte--and one among very many-the role played by the Attorney General In the ~lIsslle
CrisIs. because It was he who. most emphatically, ar~ued a~ainst a so-called sur~cal air
strike or any other action that would bring death upon many. in favor of the more careful
approach which was eventually adopted by the President In the form of a quarantine or a
blockade." (Bundv, 7/11/75, p. 98)

156. Executive Action is fully discussed in Section (III) (c).

157. When Gllpatrlc was first Interviewed by the Committee staff on July 7. 1975, he did not
rpcall the Operation :lfONGOOSE desll"nation and what It referenced. Nor did he recall
that Genpral Lansdale was Chief of Operations for the project. even though Gllplltrlc
had prevlousl~' rpcommended Lansdale for promotion to Brigadier General and had workp,]
closely with him earlier on a Vipt Nam operation. Gilpatric did l"enerally reeall the covert
activities In Cuba. GlIpatrlc attributed his failed recollections to the lapse of time (approximately
fiftpen years) since thp evpnts.
Robprt McNamara testified bpforp the Committee on July 11. 1975. that he had spokpn
with Gllpatric on :lfay 30. 1975. McNamara said: ... * * on :lfaJ' 30 In connpction with
my Inquiries to determinp pxactly who General Lansdalp was working for at thp time of
August 1962. I called * * * Ros Gilpatric * * *. and during my conversation with
Mr. Gllpatric I asked him specifically what Lansdale was working for In August '62 and
:lfr. GlIpatric stated that he was not working for plther himself. that Is Gllp"trlc. or mp
in August '62. but rather for the commlttep that was dealing with the :lfONGOOSE
oppratlon." (:I{cNamara. 7/11/75. p. 78)

158. Senator HUDDLESTON: * * * It's on the basis of these words that everybody admits
wl're used. like replace or get rleI of. on thp basis of these kluns of convPrsat'on alone thAt
[Helms] was firmly convinced and that apparently went rll"ht dowu through the whole
rank of command. firmly convinced that he had that authorltv to move all:ainst the life
of a head of statp. !';ow this eIlsturbs me. and I don't know whether our councils of Il:OVPrnment
operatp that way In all arpas or not. but If thpy do thpn it seems to me It would
ralsp a VPry sprlous questlon as to whpthpr or not the troons are getting the rll<ht or(lers.
~fr. GILPATRIC: * * * I thought there were limits on the use of power. and that was
one of thl'm.
Senator HUnnIJESTOX : And Il:oing beyond that would require that somebody make a specific
effort to make sure he understood precisely what they were talking about. would that
be your Interpretation?
Mr. GILPATRIC: It would." (GlIpatrlc. 7/8/75, p, 31)

159. "Senator HUDDLESTON: * * * [Dol your contacts with Robert Kennedy or President
Kennedy. Indicate to you that they were agitated to such an extent about ':::uba and
MONGOOSE progress tihat in a conversation with someone urging them to get oft' their rearend
and get something done that they mll','ht convey the message that they meant snythlng.
go to any length to do something about the Castro regime?
Mr. RUSK. I find it very hard to believe that Robert Kennedy standing alone, or particularly
Robert Kennedy alleging to speak for President Kennedy, would I ave gone
down that trail * * *. " (Rusk, 7/10/75, p. 96.)

160. "Senator MONDALE: * * * We asked General Taylor yesterday whether h,! thought
somethinl\' of InfoMllal, subterranean, whatever kinds of communications from the highest
level to Helms would have been possible without his knowledge, •and he said he felt that
was Incredible, he didn't think It was possible,
Do you think that it would be likely that an Informal order around channels, sar to
Helms or to Harvey--
The CHAIRMAN: Over a three-year period,
Senator MONDALE: Over a three-year period would have been possible withollt rOil\"
being Informed?
Mr. RUSK: Theoretically, Senator, one would have to say It Is possible.
Senator MONDALE: But based on your experience?
Mr. RUSK: In terms of practicality, probability and so forth, I don't see ho" It could
hll.ve bappened.
YOIl know those things, In these circles we were movlnl( In could not be IImlt,>d In that
way. You know the echoes would come back," (Rusk, 7/10/75, p. 99)

161. Lansdale sent copies of his memorandum to Robert Hurwltch (State Department).
General Benjamin Harris (Defense Department) and Donald WlIllon (United States Information
Agency).
When General Harris testified. he Identified a document drafted by the MONGOOl';E
WO'kln~ Group In the Defense Department shortly before the Au~st 10 meeting. The
document listed a number of ..teps that could be taken In the event of an Intensltl..d
MONGOOSE pro~ram that might involv.. United States military Intervention. One snch
step was "asSllssinate Castro and his handful of top men." General Harris stilted that this
was "not out of the ordinary In terms of contln~..ncy plannln... * * * It's on.. of the
things yon look at." (Harris. 8/18/75. p. 37) Th..re was no evidence that this document
was distributed outside the Defense Department's MONGOOSE Working Group.

162. That remark by McNamara eems to be inconsistent with his raising the question of
assassination In any sense of Ildvocacy at the same meeting.

163. The August 10 Minute. show that McCone pointed out that the "tened-un Cou....e B
"Will risk invitinll: an uprisinll:, which might result in a Hunll:arv-tvne blood bRth if Olnsupported."
McCone "emphasized that the stepped-up ulan .should not be undertaken unless
the TJ.~. is prepared to accept attributflbilitv for the necessary flctio,,". includinl! tl-e
eventual use of military force." The August 10 Minutes further stated thflt. In McCone's
view, the -CIA variant "would avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an
uprising." (SGA Minutes, 8/10/f>2, p. 2)

164. Other participants (Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, and Gllpatrlc) did not recall the August
10 discussion.

165. On April 14. 1967, after :\fcCone left the CIA, he dictated a memorandum stating his
recollection of the August 10, 1962 meeting. The memorandum was prompted by a
telephone call from the newspaper columnist, Jack Anderson, who at that time was preparing'
a column on Castro assassination attempts, Impllcatlng' President Kennedy and
Robert Kennedy. After talking with Anderson on the telephone at Robert Kennedy's
request, :\fcCone Illctated the April 14, 1967 memorandum, which stated. In DArt,
several MOXGOOSE meetings on August 8, 9, or 10. 1962, "I recall a suggestion belnl(
made to llquldate top people In the Castro regime, Including Castro."

166. In a staff Interview prior to his testimony, Goodwin recalled the date of the meeting
at whleh a Castro assassination was raised as falling in early 1961, after the Bay of Pigs.
(:\1emorandum of Staff Interview with Goodwin, "'/27/75, p. 2) After reviewing the
.\Ilnutes of the Au/:ust 10, 1962 meeting and the Lansdale and Harvey memoranda of
AUl(ust 13 and 14, respectively, Goodwin testified that he had "misplaced the date of the
meeting in my own memory." (Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 7.) In placing the Incident on August
10, 1962, GOOdwin stated "Now, of course, you know, It may not be. That's the best
recollection I now have. It's a little better tban the earlier one, but It's not certain."
(Goollwln, 7/18/7"', p. 8)

167. In a magazine article In June 1975, Goollwln was quoted as stating that at one of
the meetings of a White House task force on Cuba It was McNamara who said that
"Castro's assassination was the only productive way of dealing with Cuba." (Branch and
Crlle, "The Kennedy Vendetta," Harpers, July, 1975, p. 61). In his testimony on July 18,
1975, Goodwin salll: "that's not an exact quote" In the article, and explained: "I didn't
tell [the author of the ma/:azlne article] that It was definitely McNamara, that very
I)Osslbly it was McNamara. He asked me about McNamara's role, and I said It very well
eould have been .\IcNamara." (Goodwin, 7/18/75. p. 33)
Goodwin told the Committee: "It's not a light matter to perhaps destroy a man's
eareer on the basis of a fifteen year old memory of a single sentence that he might have
said at a meeting without substantial certainty In your Own mind, and I do not have
that" (Goodwin, 7/18/75, pp. 34-35). It Is difficult to reconcile this testimony with
Goodwin's testimony that he told the author of the article that McNamara might very
well have made the statement about assassination at the August meeting.

168. MCone's 1967 .\Iemorandum stated: "Immediately after the meeting, I called on
Secretary .\IcC'(amara personally and reemphasized my position, In which he heartily
agreed. I did this because Operation MONGOOSE--an Interdepartmental affair-was
under the operational control of [the Defense Department] * * *."

169. McNamara confirmed this testimony: "I agreed with Mr. .\Iceone that no such plan.
nlng' should be undertaken." (McNamara, 7/11/75, p. 8.) He added: "I have no knowledg'e
or Information about any other plans or preparations for a Castro assassination." (McNamara,
7/11/75, p. 7)

170. Elder said he heerd the entire telephone converRation via a speaker phone. He said
that ~lcNamara "just more or Jess accepted What Mr. McCone said without comment Or
rejoinder." (Elder. 8/1:l/75. p. 24)

171. "Q....... Why, if it is true that assassination idea was turned down on August 10, did
you send out your memo on August 13?
General LANSDALE....... I don't recall that thoroughly, I don't remember the reasons
whv I WOUld.
Q. Is it your testimony that the August 10 meeting turned down assassinations as a
subject to look into, and that you nevertheless asked Mr. Harvey to look into it?
General LANSDALE. I guess it is, yes. The way you put It to me now has me baffled about
why I did it. I don't know." ("Lansdale, 7/8/7'5, pp. 123-124)

172. 1 Lansdale refused to provide ~Iartin tile intermediar~"s name for tile record. Tile COIllmittee
did not 3:sk :lIartin about Lansdale's olI-the-record statements out of respect for
the confidentiality of news saurCleS (:lIartin. 7/24/7;'. p. 18)

173. Martin testified that his interview With Lansdale involved two questions: (l) "What
were you [Lansdale] doinll; in August 1962?" (Martin, 7/24/75, p. 16). and (2) "Who were
you working for?" (Martin 7/24/75, p. 17) Martin stated that in discussing Lansdale's
activities in August 1962. Lansdale stated, "r just wanted to see if the U.S. had any such
capahillties" and that this Included "assassination" as well as other means of disposinll;
of Castro. As to the second question "Who were yoU working- for?" Lam;:dale replied "on
that project r was working for the highest authority in the land." (Martin. 7/24(7;'.
p. 18)

174. The paper alRo saw little chance that a I\'overnment favorably dlRJl(lRed towarrl the
United States would be able to come to power without extensive United States military
support: "Anti-:Uoscow Cuban nationalists would require extensive U.S. help In order
to win. and probably U.S. military Intervention."

175. Bundy did recall that over the period 1961 to 1963 "the subject of a Castro assassln'ltlon
was mentioned from time to time by different Inrllvlduals." but he said that
he WAS not aware of "much discussion In the Spring of 1963 on that SUbject." (Bundy.
7 /11/75, p. 140)

176. The Bundy memorandum also used the phrase "alI necessary measures" to describe
the steps the American Government was willing to take to "prevent" a direct military
threat to the United States or to the Western Hemisphere from Cuba. Sorensen explained
the meaning of this phrase In the context of the April 23 dlscu~slon of Kennedy Administration
polley. "[this phrase] could not by any stretch of semantics or logic have included
assassination or any other Initiative. It reflected the purely defensive posture
implemented six months earlier when long-range missiles and other olfenslve weapons
were placed in Cuba." (Sorensen affidavit, 7/25/75)

177. At an Aprll 3, 1963 meeting on Cuba, Bundy stated that no sabotage operatlons were
then underway because the Special Group "had decided * * * that such activity Is not
worth the effort expended on It." (Memorandum of Meeting <.>n Cuba, 4/3/63)

178. The sabotage program was directed at "four major segments of the Cuban economy,"
(1) electric power; (2) petroleum refineries and storage facUlties; (3) railroad and
highway transportation and (4) productlon and manUfacturing. (Memorandum for the
Special Group, June 19, 1963, p. 1.) Operations under this program were to be conducted
by CIA-controlled Cuban agents from a United States Island off }<'lorlda and were to
complement a similar effort designed to "develop Internal resistance elements which
could carry out sabotage." (id)

179. Howard had Initially placed Atwood In contact with the Cuban Ambassador after reportln~
to Atwood that during a trip to CUba, she had learned Castro was anxious
to establish communications with the United States. 'rhereafter Howard served as an
Intermediary in arranging Atwood's meetings with the Cubans. (Atwood, 7/10/75 pp. 4,
18.)

180. Daniel, "Unofficial Envoy: A Historic Report from Two Capitals," (New Republic,
December 14, 1963).

181. Daniel was with Castro when Castro received the report of President Kennedy's
assassination. Daniel, "When Castro Heard the News," (New Republic, December 7, 1963)

182. The following exchange occurred In Helms' testimony.
Sen. HART of Michigan. Dealing with respect to what? A change In government, or
assassination?
Mr. HELMS. A change In government, Senator Hart. This Is what we were trying to do."
(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 132.)

183. As discussed above (see pp. 88), there was conflicting testimony from CIA officers
concerning whether or not they viewed AM/LASH as an assassin and the purpose for
giving him the polson pen. The documentary evidence, however, Indicates that In 1963
AM/LASH was Intent on assassinating Castro, that the CIA officers knew this, and that
In addition to offering him Ii polson pen, the officers told AM/LASH they would supply
him with high DOwered rifles with telescopic sights.
Helms testified that because AM/LASH "was the asset we were looking for, [w]e didn't
want him to blow himself or blow anything else by getting Involved In something like
this [assassination] and have It fall. We wanted him to stay In place." (Helms, 6/13/75,
p. 131) Helms stated that "at no time was It the Idea of [the AM/LASH] case officers,
or those people In the chain behind, to use [AM/LASH] to assassinate Castro." (Helms,
6/13/75, p. 135)
Helms further stated: ". * * there was an enormous amount of temporizing with this
fellow to keep him on the team, to keep him working away at this job, but to try and
persuade him that this was not ,the way to go about it." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 133.) Helms
testified that AM/LASH was given the polson pen "because he was Insisting on something
and this was a temporizing gesture rather than giving him some kind of a gun he had
asked for * * '." (Helms, 6/13/75. p. 133)

184. Rusk testified that "I find It extraordinarily difficult to believe" and that "I just can't
conceive" President Kennedy would have authorized the passa~e of an asassinatlon device
tor use against Castro whlle Atwood was exploring the possib111ty of normalizing relations
with Castro. (Rusk, 7/10/75, pp. 85-86) Similarly, Bundy testified he "absolutely" did
not bel1eve President Kennedy would have authorized or permitted an assassination device
to have been passed at the same time a possible rapprochment with Castro was being
pursued. (Bundy, 7/11/75, pp. 150-151.1
On the other hand when the POBsib1l1ty of exploring better relations with Castro was
Initially raised \but before any talks were begun) Bundy indicated that accommodation
could be explored on a "separate track" while other proposed actions, such as sabotage.
were ~olng on. (Agenda for Special Group meeting of 4/29/63, p. 2)

185. Rusk (Secretary of State), McNamara (Secretary of Defense), McCone (Director of
Ceutral Intell1gence), and Bundy (Special Assistant for National Security and Chairman
of the Special Group).

186. A memorandum by Bundy on April 7, 1964, listed seven aspects of the covert action
program which had been in effect. These were: (1) collection of Intel1lgence; (2) covert
propaganda to encourage low risk forms of active and passive resistance; (3) cooperation
with other agencies in economic denial (4) attempts to Identify and establish contact with
potential dissident elements inside CUba; (5) indirect economic sabotage; (6) CIA-controlled
sabotage raiding; and (7) autonomous operations. (Memorandum for the Record
of the Special Group, 4/7/64)

187. In a memorandum the day after President Johnson's decision to stop CIA-controlled
sabotage operations, McCone stated: "the real issue to be considered at the meeting and
by the President was a question of whether We wished to implement the polley (outlined
In certain memoranda) or abandon the basic objective of bringing about the liqUidation
of the Castro Communist entourage and the elimination of Communist presence
in Cuba and thus rely on future events of an undisclOSed nature which might accomplish
this objective". (Memorandum by McCone, 4{,8/64)
In the context of the Special Group's dscussion, McCone's use of the words "liqUidation"
and "elimination" appears to be another example of Inartful language. A literal Interpretation
of these words leaves one with the Impression that assassination was contemplated.
But the context of the discussion does not bear out such an interpretation.
Thus In specifying what he meant by "future events of an undisclosed nature" McCone
pointed to "extreme economic distress caused by a sharp drop In sugar prices:' anrl "other
external factors." (Id., p. 8) McCone testified that such references as the "elimination" or
"liQuidation" of the Castro regime may not refer to assassination. (McCone, 6/6/7(;,
p.32)

188. Moreover, according to Bundy, no one Informed him at the meetings that "In earlier
years there had been a relationship with * * * persons alle/{edly Involved with the criminal
syndlcate--in order to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castro." (Bundy, 7/11/75,
p.71)

189. McCone's memorandum summarized seVl'n FBI reports on Its Investigation. The FBI
said tha t sl'vl'ral of the persons Interviewed stated they had knowled~e of the exUeg' plot
and had reported the Information to the CIA. Others Interviewed denied knowledge cif
the plans.

190. Helms earlier testified that A~ILASH was an intelligence and political action agent.
The Inspector General Report, however, treated the A~ILASH operation as an assassination
plot.

191. In an interview with Leo Janis in 1971. former President Johnson was reported to
have said that when he had taken office. he had discovered that "we had been operating a
damned :lIurder. Inc.. in the Caribbean." (L. Janis. "The Last Day.* Of the President," Atlantic,
July 1973. pp. 35, 39. Janis was interviewed by the Committee staff and affirmed the
accuracy of this remark.) The Committee has not ascertained who related this statement
to .Johnson. It should be noted that Johnson attended post-Trujillo assassination meetings
which assessed United States Involvement In that killing. His reference to Murder. Inc..
maJ' have derh'ed from his knowledge of that episode or from general knowledge he had
of otber violent covert activities conducted during the Kennedy Administration.

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