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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

C. INSTITUTIONALIZI~G ASSASSINATION: THE
"EXECUTIVE ACTION" CAPABILITY
In addition to investigating actual assassination plots, the Committee
has examined a project known as Executive Action which
included, as one element, the development of a general, standby
assassination capability. As with the plots, this examination focused
on two broad questions: What happened? What was the extent and
nature of authorization for the project?
1. INTRODUCTION
Sometime in early 1961, Bissell instructed Harvey, who was then
Chief of a CIA Foreign Intelligence staff, to establish an "executive
action capability," which would include research into a capability
to assassinate foreign leaders.! (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51; Harvey, 6/25/75,
pp. 36-37) At some point in early 1961 Bissell discussed the Executive
Action capability with Bundy. The timing of that conversation and
whether "the White House" urged that a capability be created were
matters on which the evidence varied widely, as is discussed in section
(2) below.
Bissell, Harvey and Helms all agreed thllit the "generalized" capability
was never used. (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 87; Harvey 6/25/75; p. 45;
Helms 6/13/75, p. 52)
1 During the late spring or early summer of 1960, Richard Bissell had requested hi.
Science Advisor, Mr. Joseph Scheider, to review the general "capab1l1ty of the clandestine
service in the field of Incapacitation and elimination." Scheider testified that
assassination was one of the "capabilities" he was asked by Bissell to research.
(Scheider, 10/9/7a, pp. a-6, 24-25)
Scheider indicated that Bissell turned to him because he was knowledgeable about
"substances that might be available In CIA laboratories" and because Bissell would
have considered it part of my job as his technical aide." (id., 6).
Also prior to this time, there had been an Internal CIA committee which passed on
proposals involving the operational use of drugs. chemicals and biological agents. The
purpose of this Committee is suggested by the following incident:
In February 1960. CIA's Near East Division sought the endorsement of what the
Division Chief called the "Health Alteration Committee" for its proposal for a "special
operation" to "incapacitate" an Iraqi Colonel believed to be "promoting Soviet bloc
political Interests In Iraq." The Division sought the Committee's advice on a technique,
"which while not likely to result In total disablement would be certain to prevent the
tarv:et from pursuing his usual activities for a minimum of three months," adding:
"We do not consciously seek subject's permanent removal from the scene; we also
do not object should this complication develop." (Memo, Acting Chief N.E. Division to
DC/CX, 2/25/60.)
In Aprfi, the Committee unanimously recommended to the DDP that a "disabling
operation" be undertaken, noting that Chief of Operations advised that it would be
"highly desirable." Bi8sell's deputy, Tracy Barnes, approved on behalf of Bis8ell. (Memo,
Denllty Chief CI to DDP, 4/1/62)
The approved operation was to mall a monogrammed handkerchief containing an
incapacitating agent to the colonel from an Asian country. Scheider testified that, while
he did not now l'ecall the name of the recipient, he did remember malllnll' from the Asian
country. during the period in question. a handkerchief "treated with some kind of
material for the purpose of harassing that person who received It." (Scheider Atlldavlt.
10/20/75; Scheider, 10/9/75, pp. 52-55; 10/18/75, pp. 55-a6.)
DUring the conrse of this Committee's investigation, the CIA stated that the handkerchlel
was "in lact never received (if. indeed, sent)." It added that the colonel:
"l'lulfered a terminallllne88 before a flrinv: squad in Bal(hdarl (an event we ha<i nothing
to do with) not very lonl!' after our handkerchief nroposal was considered." (Memo,
Chief of Operations, N.E. Division to Assistant to the l'lA/DDO. 9/26/75.)
(18I)
182
"Executh'e Action" was a CIA euphemism, defined as a project for
research into developing means for overthrowing foreign political
leaders, including a "capability to perform assassinations." (Harvey,
6/25/75, p. 34) Bissell indicated that Exe,cutive Action covered a
"wide spectrum of actions" to "eliminate the effectiveness" of foreign
leaders, with assassination as the "most extreme" action in the spectrum.
(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32) The Inspector General's Report described
executive action as a "general standby capability" to carry out
assassination when required. (LG. Report, p. 37)' The project was
given the code name ZR/RIFLE by the CIA.!
A single agent ("asset") was given the cryptonym QJ/WIN, and
placed under Harvey's supervision for the ZR/RIFLE project. He
was never used in connection with any actual assassination efforts.
Helms described QJI'VIN's "capability":
If you needed somebody to carry out murder. tI guess you had a man who
might be prepared to carry it out. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 50)
Harvey used QJ/WIN, to spot "individuals with criminal and
underworld connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use."
(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 50) For example, QJ/WIN reported that a
potential asset in the Middle East was "the leader of a gambling
syndicate" with "an available pool of assassins." (CIA file, ZR/
RIFLE/Personality Sketches) However, Harvey testified that:
During the entire existence of the entire ZR/RIFLE project * * * no agent
was recruited for the purpose of assassination. and no e,en tentative targeting
or target list was ever drawn. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 45)
In general, project ZR/RIFLE involved assessing the problems
and requirements of assassination and developing a stand-by assassination
capability; more specifically, it involved "spotting" potential
a(1"e,nts ann. "researching" assassination techniques that might be used.
(BIssell, 7/17/75, p. 11 and 6/9/75, p. 73; Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A,
45) Bissell characterized ZR /RIFLE as "internal and purely preparatory."
(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32) The 1967 Inspector General's Report
found "no indication in the file that the Executive Action
capabilitv of ZR/RIFLE-Q.J/WIN was ever used," but said that
"after Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one
aspect of ZR/RIFLE." (I.G. Report, pp. 40--41)
2. THE QUESTION OF WHITE HOUSE INITIATION, AUTHORIZATION, OR
KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXECUTIVE ACTION PROJECT
Harvey testified that Bissell had told him that "the White House"
had bvice urged the creation of such a capability and the Inspector
General's Report quoted notes of Harvey's (no longer in existence)
to that effect. Bissell did not recall any specific conversation with the
"vVhite House," but in his initial testimony before the Committee he
assumed the correctness of Harvey's notes and stated that, while he
could have created the capability on his own, any urgings would have
come from Bundy or vValt Rostow. In a later appearance, however,
Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of the capability and that
1 ZR/RIFLEJ was a crJ'ptonym relatlnK to two areas. One was the Executive Action
assassination capability. The other ZR/RIFLE area is not part of the subject matter of
this report. This second program was genuine. but It was also meant to provide a cover
for anJ' Executive Action operation, William Harvey had been in charge of the CIA sec·
tlon with general responsibility for such programs. (Harvey. 6/25/75. p. 49)
183
the context was a briefing by him and not urging by Bundy. Bundy
said he received a briefing and gave no urging, though he raised no
objections. Rostow said he never heard of the project.
William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain" that on January
25 and 26, 1961, he met with two CIA officials : Joseph Scheider,
who by then had become Chief of the Technical Services Division,
and a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility of creating a
capability within the Agency for "Executive Action." (Harvey, 6/25/
75, p. 52) After reviewing his notes of those meetings,t Harvey testified
that the meetings occurred after his initial discussion of Executive
Action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early
January." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52) When Bissell was shown these
notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion.
(Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10)
Harvey testified that the Executive Action capability was intended
to include assassination. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 35) His cryptic handwritten
notes of the January 25/26 meetings, preserved at the CIA,
contain phrases which suggest a discussion of assassination: "last
resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness," "the magic
button," and "never mention word assassination". Harvey confirmed
this interpretation. (Harvey, Ex. 1,6/25/75) 2
The Inspector General's Report did not mention Harvey's notes, or
their dates. However, in describing Bissell's initial assignment of the
Executive Action project to Harvey, the Report referred to Harvey's
notes, now missing, and which quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey,
"the 'White House had twice urged me to create such a capability."
(I.G. Report, p. 37) Harvey also testified that this "urging" was men-
1 Harvey was asked whether his notations "25/1-Joes" and "26/1" Indicate that he
spoke to Joseph Scheider and the recruiting officer In 1961.
"Q: And Is It your judgment that that Is January 26, 1961 and Is about the subject of
Executive Action?
"HARVEY. Yes, It Is.
"Q: And It followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that you have recounted?
"HARVEY. • • • [W]ell, when I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got
to be 1962, but I am ·almost certain now that It Is not. If this is true, this might place
the tlrst discussion that I bad with Dick Bissell In early January and this Is difficult to
pinpoint because there were several such discussions In varying degrees of detail durln~
the period In the Spring, and very early in 1961 to the fall of 1961 period, but I did IInrl
out fairly early on that [the recruiting officer] had-or that Bissell had discussed the
~uestlon of assassination with [the recruiting officer] and this discussion. at the very least,
had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with [him]."
(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52)
Harvey had also testilled that, after receiving Bissell's Initial Instructions to establish
an Executive Action capability:
"The tlrst thing- I did • • • was discuss In theoretical terms with a few officers whom
I trusted quite Implicitly the whole subject of assassination, our possible assets, our
posture, going back, If you will, even to the fundamental questions of (a), Is assassination
a proper weapon of an American Intelligence service, and (b), even If you assume that
It Is. Is It within our capability within the framework of this government to do It etl'ec·
tlvely and properly, securely and discreetly." (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 38)
The Inspector General's Report connected [the recruiting officer] and Scheider to the
early stages of the Executive Action project as follows:
"Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with
[the recruiting officer] and with Joseph Scheider. Since [the recruiting officer] was already
cut In, Harvey used him In developlnl: the Executive Action Capability • • ., Harvey's
mention of him [Scheider] In this connection may explain a notation by [8 CIA doctor]
that Harvey Instructed [the doctor] to discuss techniques with Scheider without assoclat·
Inl: the discussion with the Castro operation." (I.G. Report. pp, 37-38)
It Is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turnover to Harvey
of the Rosselli contact In November. 1961 was discussed as part of ZR/RIFLE (see Section
(d), infra). Thus, their Initial discussion of Executive Action can. at the least, be dated
hefore November, 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" notations would have to refer to
JAnnarv, 1961.
• Harvev's notes also contained a phrase which suggests his concern that any U.S.
nssasslnatlon attempts mll:ht breed retaliation from other governments: "Dangers of RIS
(Russian Intellll:ence Service) counter-action and monitor If they are blamed," (Harvey,
Ex. 1.6/25/75; Bissell, Ex. I, 7/17/75)
184
tioned in his initial discussion of Executive Action with Bissell.
(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37) However, the testimony from Bissell and
from the "White House aides is in conflict with Harvey's testimony as
to whether such "urging" had in fact been given to Bissell.
The testimony regarding the relationship between "the White
House" and the Executive Action capability is summarized as follows:
H arvey.-Harvey testified that his missing notes which had been
destroyed had indicated that Bissell mentioned White House urgings
to develop an Executive Action capability. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37)
Harvey said that he "particularly remember[ed]" that Bissell said
that he received "more than one" urging from the "White House. (Harvey,
6/25/75, pp. 36-37; 7/11/75, p. 59) As he testified:
"On two occasions or on more than one occasion, and I particularly 'remember
the more than one because I recall at the time this was clear this was not just
a one-shot thing tossed out • • * the White House-I quote this much; this is
exact-had urged him (Bissell)-him in this case not ,personally, but the Agencyto
develop an Executive Action capability." (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 36-37)
But Harvey had no direct evidence that Bissell actually had any such
discussion with "the White House." No specific individual in the
White House was named to Harvey by Bissell. (Harvey, 6/25/75,
p. 31) Harvey said that it would han been "improper" for him to
have asked Bissell whom he had talked to and "grossly improper" for
Bissell to have volunteered that name. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37)
Bisscll.-Bissell specifically recalled assigning Harvey to investigate
the capability. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51) However, Bissell did not recall
"a specific conversation with anybody in the White House as the
origin" of his instruction to Harvey. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51)
During the course of several appearances before the Committee,
Bissell's testimony varied as to whether or not he had been urged by
the White House to develop an Executive Action capability.
In his initial appearances before the Committee on June 9 and 11,
1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White
House authorization had been given. In response to the "twice urged"
quotation of Harvey's notes in the Inspector General's Report, Bissell
said, "I have no reason to believe that Harvey's quote is wrong."
(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51) Bissell also said that as far as he knew, it
was true that he was asked by the 'Vhite House to create a general
stand-by assassination capahility. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 49, 51)
Based again on Harvey's missing notes ("'Vhite House urging"),
and his statement that he had no reason to challenge their accuracy,
Bissell initially gave his opinion that McGeorge Bundy and Walt
Rostow were the two people from whom such a request was most
likely to have come because they were "the two members of the White
House staff who were closest to CIA operations." (Bissell, 6/9/75,
pp.49-54)
At another point in his initial testimony, Bissell said that the creation
of the capability "may have been initiated within the Agency"
(Id., p. 81). Two days later he said: "There is little doubt in my mind
that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and possibly Bundy."
(Bissell, 6/11175, p. 46)
When Bissell appeared before the Committee on .July 17 and 22, his
testimony, given in light of information obtained since his earlier ap185
pearances, was that there was no 'White House urg-ing for the creation
of the Executive Action project, although tacit approval for the
"research" project was probably given by Bundy after it was
established.
First, Bissell was shown the Harvey notes which had been preserved
and which, without any mention of the 'White House, indicated
Harvey had received his assignment prior to January 25/26, 1961.
Those dates-just 5 days after the change in administration-made
Bissell conclude that it was "very unlikely that that assignment to
[Harvey] was taken as a result of 'White House urging or consultation."
(Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10) Bissell said that Bundy did not have
any influence at the Agency before the Presidential inauguration.
Bissell added that he did not remember meeting with anyone in the
new administration on matters prior to the inauguration. (Bissell,
7/22/75, p. 23)
Second, when he returned in July, Bissell also said he had been
convinced by telephone conversations with Rostow and Bundy after
his first appearances that since Rostow's duties in 1961 had nothing
to do with covert action, he had "never discussed" Executive Action
with Rostow. (Bissell. 7/17/75, p.10; 7/27/75, p. 22)
Bissell's final testimony about Bundy (given after his telephone
contact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy
about the capability after it had been created. (Bissell, 7/17/75, pp.
10-11; 7/22/75, pp. 21-22) But Bissell confirmed his original testimony
that he had not briefed Bundy on the actual assassination plots
against Castro already undertaken by the CIA. (Bissell, 6/11/75,
p. 47; 7/22/75, p. 31) Bissell was "quite certain" that he would not
have expected Bundy to mention the Executive Action capability to
the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35) He testified: .
Q. Would you think the development of a capability to kill foreign leaders
was a matter of sufficient importance to bring to the attention of the President?
BISSELL. In that context and at that time and given the limited scope of activities
within that project, I would not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35)
Bissell said that he and Bundy had discussed an untargeted "capability"
rather than the plan or approval for an assassination operation.
(Bissell, 7/17/75, .p. 11) Bissell said that although he does not have
a specific recollectiOn, he "might have" mentioned Castro, Lumumba,
and Trujillo in the course of a discussion of Executive Action "because
these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against
whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." (Bissell,
6/11/75, p. 51)
Bissell said his impression was that in addition to expressing no.
unfavorable reaction to the project, Bundy actually mig-ht have gIven
a more affirmative response. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28) Bissell testified
that he might have interpreted Bundy's reaction as approval (or
at least no objection) for the Executive Action concept. (Bissell,
7/22/75,p.30)
Q: * * * I think the testimony of this witness is going further in saying what
you received from [Bundy] was, in your view, tantamount to approval?
BISSELL: I, at least, interpreted it as you can call it approval, or you could
say no objection. He [Bundy] was briefed on something that was being done, as
I now believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His [Bundy's] comment is that
he made no objection to it. I suspect that his reaction was somewhat more favor186
able than that, but this is a matter that probably someone listening to the conversation
on which such a person could have had differing interpretations. (Bissell,
7/22/75,p.33)
All of the Bissell t€stimony on his Executive Action conversation
with Bundy was speculative reconstruction. From his first appearance
to his last, Bissell had no "clear recollection" of the events. (Bissell,
7/22/75, pp. 29, 36) But Bissell maintained that more "formal
and specific and explicit approval would have been required" before
any "actual overt steps in use of the capability." (Bissell, 7/22/7"5,
p. 31)
Bissell said that Harveis notation about 'White House urgings to
develop an Executive Action capability may have been a slightly confused
account of a Bissell/Harvey conversation subsequent to the initiation
of the project in which Bissell relayed Bundis reaction to Harvey.
(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 25) .
Bissell ultimately testified that the development of an Executive
Action capability was "undoubtedly," or "very much more likely"
initiated within the Agency. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 22, 27) He had
acknowledged on his first day of testimony that this would not have
been unusual:
It was the normal practice in the Agency and an important part of its
mission to create various kinds of capability long before there was any reason
to be certain whether those would be used or where or how or for what purpose.
The whole ongoing job of * * * a secret intelligence service of recruiting agents is
of that character * * *. So it would not be particularly surprising to me if the
decision to create * * * this capability had been taken without an outside request.
(Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 67-68)
Bundy.-McGeorge Bundy also t€stified to a conversation with
Bissell, during which the Executive Action capability was discussed.
Bundy's testimony comports with Bissell's on the fact that they discussed
an untargeted capability, rather than an assassination operation.
But Bundy said that the capability included "killing the individual."
(Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 5) 1 Bundy's impression was that the
CIA was "testing my reaction," not "seeking authority." (Bundy,
7/11/75, p. 15) Bundy said:
I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is only fair to add that I do not recall
that I offered any impediment either. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 10)
Bundy said that he did not take steps to halt the development
of the Executive Action capability or "pursue the matter at all"
(Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 19) because he was satisfied.
That this was not an operational activity, and would not become such without
two conditions: first, that there be a desire or a reque.st or a guidance that
there should be planning against some specific individual; and second, that
there should be a decision to move against the individual. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 7).
Bundy believed that neither of these conditions had been fulfilled.
(Bundy, 7/11175, p. 7)
Bundy recalled the conversation with Bissell as taking place "somet~
me in the early months of 1961." (Bundy. 7/11/75, p. 4) When questIoned
about the dates in Harvey's notes. Bundy rated the chance that
his conversation about Executive Action took place before January
1 Ree p. H;7. supra, for Bundy's testimony about having a vague recollection of hearin~
about poisons in relation possibly to use against a large group of people in Cuba. But he
did not connect this to the conversation about executive action.
187
25-when Harvey was already discussing the project at the CIA pursuant
to Bissell's directive-as "near zero" because the new Administration
had been in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied
with other problems, including the Berlin crisis and reorganizing the
Xational Security Staff. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 9)
Bundy testified that he did not brief the President on the Executive
Action project:
CHAmMAN. And you have testified that you did not take the matter to the
President?
BUNDY. As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 16)
Bundy explained that the division of responsibility for national
security affairs excluded Rostow from jurisdiction over covert operations,
making it unlikely that Rostow would have been briefed on a
project like ZR/RIFLE. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 11)
Rosto'W.-Rostow testified that he was "morally certain" that during
his entire tenure in government, he never heard a reference to executive
action or "such a capability for such an intention to act by the U.S."
(Rostow, 7/9/75, pp. 10, 13)1
3. TIlE QrEsTTOX OF AL:THORIZATIOX OR KXOWLEDGE OF THE EXECUTIVE
ACTION PROJECT BY THE DCI
Richard Bissell said he was "luite certain" that Allen Dulles had full
knowledge of the Executive Action project for two reasons: first, it
"would have come to the DCI's attention" when Harvey was transferred
between components of the Agency and assigned to work on
Cuban operations; 2 and second, Bissell "would imagine" it was mentioned
to Dulles at the initiation of the project. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35)
Bissell and Harvey briefed Richard Helms on Project ZR/RIFLE
when he became DDP. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 53; Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 63)
But Bissell did not recall briefing John McCone about the project when
McCone took over as DCI. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11) McCone testified
that he had no knowledge of such a project. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 43)
William Harvey said it was assumed that the project was within the
parameters permitted by the DCI. But Harvey testified that officially
advising the DCI of the existence or the project was "a bridge we did
not cross" and would not have crossed until "there was either specific
targeting or a specific operation or a specific recruitment." (Harvey,
6/25/75, p. 59)
4· THE Ql:ESTION OF WHETHER PROJECT ZR/RIFLE WAS CONNECTED TO ANY
ACTrAL ASSASSINATIOX PLOTS
The Committee has sought to determine whether the CIA development
of an Executive Action capability was related in any (Way to
the actual assassination efforts. One question raised by this inquiry
is whether the participants in the assassination operations might have
1 Goodpaster and Gray.-Andrew Goodpaster and Gordon Gray were the White House
officials with responsibility for national security affairs during the latter part of the Eisenhower
Administration. However. there was no evidence which raised the name of either
man In connection with the development of an Executive Action capability. Goodpaster and
Gray testified to having no knOWledge of It. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, P. 11; Gray, 7/9/75,
p. 56)
2 Haryey's transfer to Cuban operations was not completed until late In 1961.
188
perceived the Executive Action capability as In some way lending
legitimacy to the actual assassination efforts.
(a) Oom'ersation between Bissell and Bundy
In his early ,testimony. Bissell said he did not ha"e a recollection
of whether he discussed the names of Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo
with anyone in the 'Vhite House in the course of discussing the project
to develop an executive action capability. However, Bissell testified
that it WfiS "perfectly plausible that I would have used examples."
(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51) He continued:
In such a discussion of 'a capability, I might well have used the three names
that I just gave, because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in
history against whom such a capability might possibly h'ave been employed.
(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51)
Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that their discussion
on the development of the capability for assassination did not involve
any mention of actual assassination plans or attempts (see detailed
treatment at Section ('b), supra). There is no testimony to the contrary.
The account of this conversation raises a question as to whether
Bissell acted properly in 'withholding from Bundy the fact that 'assassination
efforts against Castro had already been mounted and were
moving forward. Bundy was responsible to a new President for national
security affairs and Bissell was his principal source of information
about covert operations at the CIA.
(b) Bissell's instruction to Harvey to take over responsibility for
unde7'1corld contact : November 1961
Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in November 1961, in
which Harvey was instructed to take over the contact with John Rosselli
as part of Project ZR/RIFLE. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19, 47;
Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 86; and 6/11/75, p. 19) Harvey's notes placed the
meeting on Novem'ber 15. 1961, (LG. Report, p. 39) , during the period
in which Harvey was freed from his duties on another Agency staff
and assumed direction of Task Force W which ran CIA activity
against the Castro regime.
According to Bissell and Harvey, their November meeting involved
only the planning and research of a capability rather than a targeted
operation against Castro. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 13; Harvey, 7/11/75, p.
60) But Bissell acknowledged that the purpose of the Rosselli contact
had been to assassinate Castro, and that "it is a fair inference that
there would have been no reason to maintain it [the contact] unless
there was some possibility of reactivating that operation." (Bissell,
6/11/75, p. 19) Bissell stated that because the assassination plot
against Castro involving the underworld figures
Had been stood down after the Bay of Pigs * * * and there was no authorization
to pursue it actively * * * the responsibility that was given to him [Harvey]
was that of taking over an inactive contact. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 14)
Bissell said that in effect he had asked Harvey to stand watch over
the contact in case any action should be required and further testified
189
that it was never required. However, as noted above, the Rosselli operation
was reactivated by Harvey in April 1962 after Bissell had left
the Agency.
The Inspector General's Report stated: "After Harvey took over
the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE." (LG. Report,
p. 40) Harvey recalled that during a discussion with Bissell of the
creation of an Executive Action capability, Bissell advised him of "a
then going operation" im-olving the names of Maheu and possibly
Rosselli and Giancana. "which was a part of the Agency's effort to
(levelop * * * a capability for executive action." Harvey said that at
the time of this discussion. the operation had been "in train" for
"approximately two years or perhaps 18 months." (Harvey, 7/11/75,
pp. 54, 55, 61)
Although his "net impression" was that both the "exploratory project"
and the "specific operation" were "fully authorized and approved."
Harve,y said he could not testify that "spe{'ific 'White House
authority for this given operation was implied or stated." (Harvey,
7/11/75, p. 54) Bissell does not recall telling anyone in the White
House that something had bee,n clone to bring a CIA officer together
with the criminal syndicate. (Bissell. 6/11/75. pp. 19-20) Harve,y did
not recall any mention of the Whitf' House or any authority higher
than the, DDP in his Xm-embf'r 1961 meeting with Bissell. (Harvey,
7/11/75,pp.60-(1)
Although Richard Helms was briefed and given administrative responsibility
(as DDP) for Project ZR/RTFLE three months later, he
did not recall that ZR/RTFLE was ever considered as part of the plot
to assassinate Castro. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55) Asked whether the actual
assassination efforts against Castro were relatf'd to ZR/RTFLE
(Executive Action), Helms testified: "In my mind those lines never
crossed." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52)
Bissell's testimony, however. leaves more ambiguity: "tIl(' contact
with the syndicate which had Castro as its target * * * folded into the,
ZR/RIFLE project * * * and they be,came one." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p.
47) When asked whether the Exocutive Action capability "* * * for
assassination" was "used against Castro." Bissell replied that it was
"in the later phase." (Bissell. 6/11/75. p. 47) The instruction from
Bissell to Harvey on Xovember 15. U16!. however. preceded by approximately
five months the reactivation of the CIA/underworld assassination
operation against Castro.
(c) Use of QJ/WIN in Africa
Q.T/WIX was a foreign citizen with a criminal background who had
been recruited by the CTA for certain sensitive programs prior to
Project ZR/RTFLE. As noted above. Q.T/WIN's function during
ZR/RIFLE was restricted to the "spottinn-" of potential assets for
"multi-purpose" covert use. The Lumumba section of this report
treats fully QJ/WIN's role.
Two factors may raise a question as to whether QJ/WIX was already
being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop an assassination
capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated. First, there is a
100
similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey, QJ/'VIN, the recruiting
officer, and Scheider were connected with the Lumumba matter and reappear
in connection with the subsequent development of ZR/RIFLE.
Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of an assassination
capability had already been discussed with the recruiting officer
and Scheider before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE. (Harvey,
6/25/75, p. 52; LG. Report, pp. 37-38)
Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm evidence connecting
QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate Lumumba. (see pp. 43 to 48),
supra)

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