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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

F. SCHNEIDER
1. SUMMARY
On September 4,1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality
in Chile s Presidential election.' Since no candidate had received .a majority
of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that a
joint session of its Congress decide between the first anq. second place
finishers. This constitutional requirement had, in the past, been proforma.
The Congress had always selected the candidate who received
the highest popular vote. The date set for the Congressional joint session
was October 24, 1970.
On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA
Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in. Chile would not be
acceptable to the United States. The CIA was instructed by President
Nixon to playa direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile
to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency. The Agency was to
take this action without coordination with the Departments of State
or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile.
While coup possibilities in general and other means of seeking to prevent
Allende's accession to power were explored by the 40 Committee
throughout this period, the 40 Committee was never informed of this
direct CIA role. In practice, the Agency was to report, both for informational
and approval purposes, to the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, or his deputy.
Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts
with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those
Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given ,assurances of
strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, both before
and after a coup.
One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators in
Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army, General Rene Schneider, who insisted the constitutional
process be followed. As a result of his strong constitutional stand, the
removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the
coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators. Unable to have General
Schneider retired or reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap
him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19, 1970,
by a group of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively
supporting. A second kidnap attempt was made the following day,
1 Dr. Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist Party In Chile, was a
candidate of the Popular Unity Coalition. The Coalition was made up of Communists. SocialIsts,
Social Democrats, Radicals, and dissident Christian Democrats. Allende was a self-proclaimed
:'frarxist and was making his fourth try for the presidency. His opponents were
Rodomiro Tomic Romero, candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and Jorj:e
Alessandrl Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party. Dr. Allende won 36.3%
of the popular vote; Alessandrl was second with 35.3% of the vote. Dr. Allende's marg\n
of Victory was 39,000 votes out of a total of 3 millIon votes cast in the election, The
incumbent President, Eduardo Frei Montalvo, a Christian Democrat, was ineligible for reelection.
Chilean law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves.
(225)
again unsuccessfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970,
machine guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group
that had failed on October 19. That same day General Schneider was
mortally wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The
attempted kidnap and the shooting were apparently conducted by conspirators
other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons
earlier in the day.
A Chilean military court found that high-ranking military officers,
both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and
to kidnap General Schneider. Several of the officers whom the CIA
had contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy were convicted
of conspiring to kidnap General Schneider. Those convicted of carrying
out the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of General Schneider
were associates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially
been thought by the CIA to be the best hope. However, later the CIA
discouraged General Viaux because the Agency felt other officers, such
as General Camilo Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved. General
Viaux was convicted by the military court and received a twenty-year
prison sentence for being the "intellectual author" of the Schneider
kidnap attempt. General Valenzuela was sentenced by the military
court to three years in exile for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent
Allende's assumption of office. The military court found that the two
Generals had been in contact throughout the coup plotting.
The principal facts leading up to the death of General Schneider
(all of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows:
1. By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible
way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende
from coming to power was to foment a coup d'etat.
2. All of the known coup plots developed within the Chilean military
entailed the removal of General Schneider by one means or
another.
3. United States officials continued to encourage and support Chilean
plans for a coup after it became known that the first step would
be to kidnap General Schneider.
4. Two unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made, one on October 19,
the other on October 20. Following these attempts, and with knowledge
of their failure, the CIA passed three submachine guns and ammunition
to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General
Schneider.
5. In a third kidnap attempt on October 2,2, apparently conducted
by Chileans other than those to whom weapons had been supplied,
General Schneider was shot and subsequently died. The guns used in
the abortive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability,
not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators. The Chilean military
court which investigated the Schneidel' killing determined that
Schneider had been murdered by handguns, although one machine gun
was at the scene of the killing.1
1 The Committee has not been able to determine whether or not the machine gun at the
Beene of the Schneider kllling was one of the three supplied by the CIA.
6. While there is no question that the CIA received a direct instruction
from the President on September 15th to attempt to foment a
coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about
whether the White House was kept iiifodned of, and authorized, the
coup efforts in Chile after October 15. On one side of the conflict is
the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig; on
the other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White
House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in
Chile on October 15, 1970. After that date, Kissinger testified-and
Haig agreed-that the White House neither knew of, nor specifically
approved, CIA coup activities in Chile. CIA officials, on the other
hand, have testified that their activities in Chile after October 15
were known to and thus authorized by the White House.l
This conflict in testimony, which the Committee has been unable
to resolve through its hearings or the documentary record, leaves unanswered
the most serious question of whether the CIA was acting
pursuant to higher authority (the CIA's view) or was pursuing coup
activities in Chile without sufficient communication (the Kissmger/
Haig view).
2. THE PRESIDENT'S INITIAL INSTRUCTION AND BACKGROUND
(a) SepternlJer15 White House meeting
On September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for
National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard
Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The
topic was Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that
meeting reflect both its tenor and the President's instructions:
One in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!
worth spending
not concerned risks involved
no involvement of Embassy
$10,000,000 available, more if necessary
full-time job--best men we have
game plan
make the economy scream
48 hours for plan of action.
In his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled
coming away from the meeting on September 15 with:
• • • [the] impression • • • that the President came down very hard that he
wanted something done, and he didn't much care how and that he was prepared
to make money available.· • • This was a pretty all-inclusive order. • • • If I
1 The basic Issue Is whether Or not the CIA informoo the White House of Its activities.
In context. Informing was tantamount to being authoriZed. No one who testified believed
that the CIA was required to seek step-by-step authorization for Its activities' rather the
burden was on the White House to object If a line of activity being pursued 'by the CIA
seemed unwise. Both Kissinger and Halg agreed that If the CIA had proposed a persuasive
plan to them, It almost certainly would have been approved. The CIA did not believe
It needed specific White House authorization to transfer weapons to the Chileans; In
fact, CIA Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas Karamesslnes testified that he did not formally
approve the transfer, but rather that In the context of the project It was clear that the
Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that It was clear to Karamesslnes'
subordinates that he would approve their decision to do so. He believed he probably was
Informed before the weapons actually were sent.
228
ever carried a marshall's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that
day.' (Helms, 7/15/75, pp. 6,10, 11)
However, none of the CIA officers believed that assassination was within
the guidelines Helms had been given.
Senator HART of Colorado.... did the kind of carte blanche mandate you
carried, the marshall's baton that you carried out in a knapsack to stop Allende
from assuming office include physicial elimination?
Mr. HELMS. 'VeIl, not in my mind, because when I became Director, I had
already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business
when I was Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and I think they
will tell you this.
The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting
at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he
related to his colleagues his understanding of the President's instructions:
2. The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an
Allende regime in Chile was unacceptable to the United States. The President
asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him.
The President authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. Further, the
Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments
of State or Defense. (Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 9/16/70)
Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with
President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms.2 Although
Dr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as precise
as those related by Director Helms, he did testify that:
• • • the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting was to urge Helms to
do whatever he could to prevent Allende from being seated. (Kissinger, 8/12/75,
p.13)
• • • * * * •
It is clear that President Nixon wanted him [Helms] to encourage the Chilean
military to cooperate or to take the initiative in preventing Allende from taking
office. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 12)
Operationally, the CIA set the President's instructions into motion
on September 21. On that day two cables were sent from CIA Headquarters
to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of
his new directive:
3. Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Parliamentary
legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective. (Cable
236, Hq. to Sta., 9/21/70) .
• • • • • * *
1 Director Helms also testified that the September 15th meeting with Preside'nt Nixon
may have been triggered by the presence of Augustin Edwards, the publisher of the
Santiago daily EZ Mercurio, in Washington. That morning, at the request of Donald Kendall,
President of Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast
with Kendall and Edwards. (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversation was the political
situation in Chile and the plight of EZ Mercurio and other anti-Allende forces. According
to Mr. Helms:
I recall that prior to this meeting [With the President] the editor of EZ Mercurio h'ad
come to Washington and I had been asked to go and talk to him at one of the hotels
here, this having been arranged through Don Kendall, the head of the Pepsi Cola Company.
• • • I have this impression that the President called this meeting where I have
my handwritten notes because of Edwards' presence in Washington and what he heard
from Kendall about What Edwards was saying about conditions in Chile and wh'at was
happening there. (Helms, 7/15/75, pp. 4--5)
%The documents, and the officials from whom the Committee has heard testimony, are in
substantial agreement about what President Nixon authorized on September 15, namely
CIA Involvement in promoting a military coup d'etat in Chile. There is not. however.
agreement about what was communicated between the CIA and the White House--and
hence what was authorized by the latter~in the week between October 15 and the shooting
of General Schneider on October 22. This matter wiII be discussed in Part V of this report.
B. (Track Two)-This is authority granted to CIA only, to work toward a
military solution to problem. As part of authority we were explicitly told that
40 Committee, State, Ambassador and Embassy were not to be told of this
Track Two nor involved in any matter. (Cable 240, Hq. to Sta., 9/21/70)
(b) B(U}kground: Tracks I and II
United States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile
did not begin with President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the
CIA.l For more than a year, Chile had been on the 40 Committee's
agenda. At an April 15, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the predecessor
of the 40 Committee) the question arose as to whether anything
should be done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential
electIOn in Chile. At that time, Director Helms pointed out that "an
election operation will not be effective unless an early enough start is
made." 2 On March 25, 1970, the 40 Committee approved a joint EmbassyICIA
proposal recommending that "spoiling" operationspropaganda
and other activities-be undertaken by the CIA in an
effort to prevent an election victory by Allende's Popular Unity (UP)
Coalition. A total of $135,000 was authorized by the 40 CommIttee for
this anti-Allende activity. On June 18, 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to
Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a two-phase proposal to the Department
of State and the CIA for review. The first phase involved an
increase in support to the anti-Allende campaign. The second was a
contingency plan to make "a $500,000 effort in Congress to persuade
certain shifts in voting on 24 October 1970." On June 27,1970, the 40
Committee increased funding for the anti-Allende "spoiling" operation
to $390,000. A decision on Ambassador Korry's second proposal
was deferred pending the results of the September 4 election.
The 40 Committee met twice between the time Allende received a
plurality of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon
issued his instruction to Director Helms on September 15.3 At both
these meetings the question of U.S. involvement in a military coup
1 Covert U.S. Government Involvement In large-scale political action programs In Chile
began with the 1964 Presidential election. As In 1970, this was, In part, In response to the
perceived threat of Salvador Allende. Over $3 million was spent by the CIA In the 1964
ell'ort. (Colby, 7/14/75, p. 5)
• This and other references to 40 Committee discussions and actions regarding Chile
are contained In a memorandum provided to the Committee by the CIA entitled "Policy
Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement In the September 1970 Chilean
Presidential Election," dated October 9, 1970. On August 25, 1975 we subpoenaed all
White House/National Security COUJ1cll documents and records reiatlng to the ell'ort
by the United States Government to prevent Salv'ador Allende from assuming office. On
September 4, the Committee received 46 documents from the White House relating to
Chile covering the period September 5 to October 14, 1970.
3 Following the september 4 election, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence circulated
an Intelligence community assessment of the Impact of an Allende government on U.S.
natlonal Interests. That assessment, dated September 7, 1970, stated:
Regarding threats to U.S. Interests, we conclude that:
1. The U.s. has no vital national Interests within Chile. There would, however.
be tangible economic losses.
2. The world mlUtary balance of power would not be significantly altered by an
Allende government.
3. An Allende victory would, however, create considerable political and psycholOgical
costs:
a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an Allende
government would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions that It would create In other
countries. We do not see, however, any likely threat to the peace of the region.
b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to the U.S.
and a dellnlte psychological advance for the Marxist Idea. (lntell1gence Memorandum!
"Situation Following the Chilean Presidential Election," CIA's Directorate of Intelligence,
(9/7/70)
against Allende was raised. Kissinger stressed the importance of these
meetings when he testified before the Committee:
I think the meeting of September 15th has to be seen in the context of two
previous meetings of the 40 Committee on Sept~mber 8th and September 14th
in which the 40 Committee was asked to look at the pros and cons and the problems
and prospects of a Chilean military coup to beBrganized with United States
assistance. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 5)
According to the summary of the 40 Committee meeting on September
8, the following was discussed: .
* * * all concerned realized that previous pl~ps for a Phase II would have to
be drastically redrawn. * * * The DCI made the point, however, that congressional
action against Allende was not likely to succeed and that once Allende was
in office the Chilean opposition to him would disintegrate and collapse rapidly.
While not advocating a specific course of action, the Director further observed
that a military golpe against Allende would have very little chance of success
unless undertaken soon. Both the Chairman and the Attorney General supported
this view. * * * At the close of the * * * meeting the Chairman directed the
Embassy to prepare a "cold"blooded assessment"· of:
(1) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved should a Chilean
military coup be organized now with U.S. assistance, and
(2) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved in organizing an
effective future Chilean opposition to Allende. (CIA MemorandumjPolicy Decision
Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean
Presidential Election, 10/9/70)
Ambassador Korry responded to the 40 Committee's request for a
"cold-blooded assessment" on September 12. He stated that "We [the
Embassy] believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat
not, move to prevent Allende's accession, barring unlikely sit.uation
of nat.ional chaos and widespread violence." The Ambassador went
on to say that "Our own military people [are] unanimous in rejecting
possibility of meaningful military intervention in political situation."
He concluded by stating: "What we are saying in this 'cold-blooded
assessment' is that opportunities for further Significant USG action
with the Chilean military are nonexistent.". (Memorandum/Ambassador's
Response to Request for Analysis of Military Option in Present
Chilean Situation, 9/12/70)
The CIA's response was in the same vein. Kissinger's assistant for
Latin American affairs on the NSC staff summarized the CIA's
"cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military Mtion UJ
impo88ible j the military is incapable and unwilling to seize power. We
have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memorandum
for Dr. Kissinger/Chile-40 Committee Meeting, Monday-September
14, 1970)
On Sept.ember 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports
and what action was to be taken:
Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared review of political and
military options in the Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy and
Station's "cold-blooded assessment." The Committee focused on the so-called
"Rube Goldberg" gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the Congress
on October 24th, resigning thereafter to leave Frei constitutionally free to run
in a second election for the presidency.
Ambassador Korry was asked to go directly to President Frei to see if he
would be willing to commit himself to this line of action. A contingency of
$250,000 was approved for "covert support of projects which Frei or his trusted
team deem important." It was further agreed that a propaganda campaign be
undertaken by the Agency to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover.'
'The $250,000 approved by the 40 Committee was never spent. The only proposal for
using it which arose--brlbing Chilean congressman to vote against Allende--was quickly
perceived to be unworkable.
231
(CIA Memo/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the
September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 10/9/70)
Following the September 14 Forty Committee meeting and President
Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government
efforts to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two
tracks.' Track I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40
Committee, including the $250,000 contingency fund to bribe Chilean
congressmen as well as propaganda and economic activities. These
activities were designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile
to prevent his assumption of power, either through political or military
means, Track II activities in Chile were undertaken in response to
President Nixon's September 15 order and were directed towards
actively promoting and encouraging the Chilean military to move
against Allende. In his testimony before the Committee, Kissinger
stressed the links between Tracks I and II :
• • • There was work by all of the agencies to try to prevent Allende from
being seated, and there was 'Work by all of the agencies on the so-called Track
I to encourage the military to move against Allende • • • the difference between
the September 15th meeting and what was being done in general within the
government was that President Nixon was encouraging a more direct role for
the CIA in actually organizing such a coup. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 13)
Tracks I and II did, in fact, move together in the month after September
15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry, who was formally
excluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup became broader
and broader. In the 40 Committee meeting on September 14, he and
other "'appropriate members of the Embassy Mission" were authorized
to intensity their contacts with Chilean military officers to assess their
willingness to support the "Frei gambit"-a voluntary turn-over of
power to the military by Frei, who would then have been eligible to
run for President in a new election. (Memorandum/Policy Decisions
Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970
Chilean Presidential Election, 10/9/70)
In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary
Charles Meyer on September 21, Ambassador Korry indioated that
in order to make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schneider
would have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary." 2
1 The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House officials
who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order to the CIA, The Committee
sent letters to various senior officIals inquiring if they were, in fact, not knowledgeable
of the Track II activities. Those letters were sent to Secretary of State William
Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, NSC Stall' Member for Latin America Vlron P.
Vaky, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelllgence and Research Ray S.
Cline, and the Deputy Chief of Mission In Santiago Harry W. Shlaudeman. The Committee
has received written responses from Messrs. Moorer, Johnson, Vaky, Shlaudeman and
Cline. All except Cline have Indicated that they had no knowledge of the Track II activity
at the time; Cline Indicated he heard of the activities in a general way, from his subordinate
who handled 40 Committee work and from former associates at the CIA. In
oral communications with Committee staff members, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have
Indicated they were unaware of Track II.
• In this same situation report, Ambassador Korry related a message th'at -he had sent
to President Frel through his Defense Minister indicating the economic pressures that
would be brought to bear on Chile should Allende assume office:
Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende.
Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the
Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a polley designed for a long time to come
to accelerate the h'ard features of a Communist society In Chile. Hence, for Frel to
believe that there will be much of an alternative to utter misery, such as seeing Chile
muddle through, would be strictly illusory.
The use of economic Instruments as levers on Frei and the Chilean military was a
persistent subject of White House/CIA discussions and of Instructions to the field.
Helms' notes from the September 15 meeting with the President Included the notation
"make the economy scream." Economic lever-age was the primary topic of a September 18
White House meeting Involving Kissinger, Helms and Karamesslnes.
232
(Situation Report, Korry to Meyer and Kissinger, 9/21/70) In testifying,
Kissinger felt the Korry report indicated "the degree to which
Track I and Track II were merging, that is to say, that individuals on
Track I were working on exactly the same problem as the CIA was
working on Track II." (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 21)
Ambassador Korry's activities in Chile between September 4 and
October 24 support Kissinger's view that the line separating Track I
and Track II often became blurred. For example, the Ambassador was
authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if
Allende were seated, the military could expect no further military
assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, in response to his
own recommendation, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean
military that all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance
pending the outcome of the Congressional election on October 24. On
October 7, Ambassador Korry received the following cable from
1Vashington, apparently authorized by the 40 Committee:
2. • • • you are now authorized to inform discreetly the Chilean military
through the channels available to you that if a successful effort is made to block
Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the cuts we have thus far been
forced to make in Chilean MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed
MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces. • • • If any steps the military should take
should result in civil disorder, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver
support and r.laterial that might be immediately required. (Cable 075517, Hq. to
Sta., 10/7/70)
The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by
instructions to Ambassador Korry dnring this period, was not that
Track II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective
in mind The difference between the two tracks was, simply, that
the CIA's direct contacts with the Chilean military, and its active
promotion and support for a coup without President Frei's involvement,
were to be known only to a small group of individuals in the
White House and the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track II matters
were to be reported directly to the White House "for reasons of security."
(Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 14) Thomas Karamessines, the CIA's
Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIA contact
with the White House on Track II matters, testified on his understanding
of why State. Defense, the 40 Committee and Ambassador Korry
were excluded from Track II:
That was not a decision that we made. But the best I can do is suggest that
there was concern about two things. Number one, that there might be seriou~
objections lodged, for example, by the State Department partiCUlarly if Track II
were to be laid out at a Forty Committee meeting. And the only other thing I
can contribute to that is that it was felt that the security of the activity would he
better protected if knowledge of it were limited. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 122)
(c) 01A view8 of diflieulty of project
On one point the testimony of the CIA officials who were involved
in Track II is unanimous: they all said they thought Track II was
unlikely to succeed. That view ran from the working- levels of the
Agency to the top. They 'all said they felt they were being asked to do
the impossible. that the risks and potential costs of the project were
too great. At the same time, they felt they had been given an explicit
Presidential order, and they tried to execute that order.
233
A few excerpts from the testimony follow:
Richard Helms, CIA Director-
...... my heart sank over this meeting, because" .... the possibility of bringing
off something like this seemed to me at that time to be just as remote as anything
could be. In practical terms, the Army was constitutionalist. .. .. .. And when
you look here at the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking you to
accomplish something, it seemed really almost inconceivable.......
What I came away from the meeting with the distinct impression that we were
being asked to do almost the impossible and trying to indicate this was going
to be pretty tough....... (Helms, 7/15/75, pp. 6-7)
Chief, Chile Task Force-
...... it [was] my feeling 'that the odds [were] unacceptable, it [was] something
that [was] not going to work, and we [were] going to be burned if we [got]
into it ...... what [were] the chances of pulling off a coup successfully, or in any
way stopping Allende from assuming the presidency? ...... we never even got to
two chances out of 20. (Chief, Chile Task Force, 7/31/75, p. 16)
...... I assure you that those people that I was in touch wIth at the Agency
just about universally said, my God, why are we given this assignment? (Chief,
Chile Task Force, 7/31/75, p. 53)
Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division-
There was just no question that we had to make this effort, no matter what the
odds were. And I think that most people felt that the odds were just pretty long.
(Deputy Chief/WH Division, 7/15/75, p. 20) .
Further, CIA officials believed their judgment of the project's
difficulty was known to the White House. Helms commented on the
September 15th meeting: "So realizing all of. these things, I'm relatively
certain that day that I pointed out this is going to be awfully
tough." (Helms, 7/15/75, p. 16) Karamessines recalled pointing' out to
the President that "the Chilean military seemed to be disorganized and
unwilling to do anything. And without their wantingw do something,
there did not seem to be much hope." (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 10)
3. CIA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF TRACK II
(a) Evolution of OIA strategy
The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent
Allende's 'assumption of power was given in the context of a broad
U.S. Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 in~
struction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a
military coup d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup jn
Chilean military circles, there was little indication that it would actually
take place without active U.S. encouragement and support.
There was much talk among Chilean officers about thepossi;bility of some kind
of coup ... but this was not the kind of talk that was being backed by, you
know, serious organizational planning. (Kal'amessines, 8/6/75, p. 32)
(i) The "Con8titutional Coup" Approaeh
Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende victory
continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its activities
on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end. On
September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago: ,
Purpose of exercise iSN prevent Allende assumption of power. Paramilitary
legerdemain has been diSC'llrded. Military solution is Qbjective. (Cable 236, Hq. to
Sta., 9/21/70)
The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting
a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency
decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a
successful military takeover.~· C~lemo, Helms to Kissinger, 11/18/70)
Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve
the Congress, and proclaim a new election. Thomas Karamessines, the
Deputy Director for Plans, testified: .
So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a sense another aspect of a quiet and
hopefully non-violent military coup. * * * This was abandoned when the military
were reluctant to push Frei publicly * * * and, number two, Frei was reluctant
to leave on his own in the absence of pressure from the military. * * * There
was left as the only chance of success a straight military coup. (Karamessines
8/6/75,p.6)
At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:
Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor Schneider will act. For that
reason any scenario in which either has to play an active role now appears utterly
unrealistic. Overtures to lower echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course
be made. This involves promoting Army split. (Cable 424, Sm. to Hg., 9/23/70)·
(ii) Military Solution
President Frei's failure even to attempt to dissuade his own party
convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende
ended all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (Memo,
Helms to Kissinger, 11/18/70, p. 16) Thus, by the beginning of October,
it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have
to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the
top leadership of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene
Schneider, constituted a stumbling block. (Cable 424, Sta. to Hq.,
9/23/70; Cable 439, Sta. to Hq., 9/30/70) The Agency's task was to
cause a coup in a highly unpromising situation and to overcome the
formidable obstacles represented by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong
constitutionalism, and the absence of organization and enthusiasm
among those officers who were interested in a coup.
A three-fold program was set into motion:
a. Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers;
b. Create a coup climate by propaganda,' disinformation, and terrorist activities
intended to provoke the left to give a pretext for a coup: (Cable 611, Hq. to
Sta., 10/7/70)
c. Inform those coup-minded officers that the U.S. Government would give them
fUll support in a coup short of direct U.S. military intervention. (Cable 762, Hq.
to Sta., 10/14/70)
1 A cable sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused on creating
an appropriate justification for a coup. The cable stated:
1. It still appears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification that it can oft'er to
make it acceptahle in Chlle or Latin America. It therefore would seem necessary to create
one to bolster what wlll probably be their claim to a coup to save ChlIe from communism
* * * You may wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to mllltary
for their use, These could include but are not llmited to: (A) Firm Intel. that Cubans
planned to reorganize all intel!lgence services along Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating
structure for pollee stat", * * * (B) Economic situation coUapsing. * * * (C) By quIck
r"cognition of CUba and Communist countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off materIal
assistance to Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barrlers. Would then
empty armories to Communist Peoples :'.Illitia with task to rUn campaign of terror based
on alJeged labor and economic sabotage. (Use some quot"s from AUende on this.)
2. Station has written some e:<:cellent prop guidances. UsIng themes at hand and whIch
best known to you Wp arc now asking you to prepare intel report based on some well
known facts and some fiction to justify coup, spilt opposition. and gain adherents for
mllitar)' group. With appropriate mllltary contact can determine how to "discover" Intel
r"port which could Hen be plant"d during raids planned by Carabineros.
3. We urge ~·ou to get this idea and some concrete suggestions to plotters as soon as yoU
can. 'Coup should have a justification to prosper. (Cable 882, Hg. to St.. 10/19/70)
(b) The Ohile ta8k force
Because of the highly sensitive nature of the operation. a special
task force was created in the CIA's 'Vestern Hemisphere Division to
manage it. The task force was placed under the daily direction of the
Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, and a group of the
Agency's most experienced and skilled operators were detailed to the
task force. One experienced CIA officer was summoned back to ,Vashington
from an overseas assignment to head the operation. With the
exception of the Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy and the
head of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware
of the task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had
responsibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications
channel to Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic
about Track II. (Memo, Helms to Kissinger, 11/18/70, p. 30) Most of
the significant operational decisions were made by the Chief of the
Chile Task Force, Broe and Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.
It should be noted that all those involved with the task force dec
scribed the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines
has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was
under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn
was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished."
(Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 7) The Deputy Chief of the Western Hem~
isphere Division testified that pressure was "as tough as I ever saw it
in my time there, extreme." (Deputy Chief/WH Division, 7/18/75;
p. 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we
did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just constant, constant, * * *
Just continual pressure. * * * It was coming from the White House."
(Broe, 8/4/75, p. 55)
(c) Use of the U.S. military attache and interagency relations
The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the
Chilean military to carry out its task. However, a U.S. military attache
in Santiago knew the Chilean military very well due to his
broad personal contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal
by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist the attaBhe
in collecting intelligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to
use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of
U.S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for
the Committee:
We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military
which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident
that our military representative in Chile had. • • • And we got the approval
of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of the attache in our effort to procure
intelligence. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 6)
To obtain the attache's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested
message for the Director of DIA to send to him in Santiago
through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director,
General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited
DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jamie M. Philpott to his office
236
on September 28, 1970.1 During that meeting, General Cushman requested
the assistanc~ of the attache, and General Philpott signed a
letter which authorized transmission of a message directing him:
• • • to work closely with the CIA chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in
contacting and advising the principal military figures who might playa decisive
role in any move which might, eventually, den;r the presidency to Allende.
Do not, repeat not, advise the Amhassador or the Defense Attache of this
message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine
activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously,
I wish-and now authorize you-to aet in a concerted f;lshion with the CIA
chief.
This message is for your eyes only, and should not be discussed with any person
other than those CIA officers who will be knowledgeable. CIA will identify
them. (Cable 380, Hq. to Sta., 9/28/75)
For this and all subsequent messages intended for the attache,
the secret CIA communications channel was used.
Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that initially
the attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" intelligence
on Chilean military officers. 2 (Philpott, 8/5/75, p. 11;
Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the
attache, however, did in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup
attempt. According to the attache's testimony, he received day-to-day
instructions from the Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS
would show him messages, ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or
Philpott, directing him to take certain actions. The COS also transmitted
messages from the attache to these Generals.
General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II
and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor
did he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the attache.
General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything
connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman
on September 28. (Philpott~ 8/5/75~ p. 16)
U.S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October
1970 was the Chief of the Human Resourres Division, Director of Collection,
DIA, testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett
and Philpott on "a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities
who might be helpful in preventing the election of Allende as
President of Chile." (Roth, 8/14/75, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no
mention of Track II as such, the goal of this mission was identical to
that described in the message of September 28 bearing Philpott's
signature.
Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities
connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting
on October 21 regarding the prf;lparation of biographic material on
Chilean generals which focused on their willingness to participate in
a military coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative
attended. The chronology also shows that on Odoher 21. Roth
delivered a message to Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.3 A
1 General Bennett returned to the United States on the evenlnl: of October 10. 1970.
General Philpott was Actlne: Director In Rennett'. absence.
• In thIs connectIon It should b" noted that when QuestIoned about thIs letter. General
Philpott testified that pe recalled slgnlne: an authorl7,atlon such as that contaIned In the
flrst paragraph of Heatlonarters 380 hut that he dlrl not recall the authorizations anti
Instructions In paragraphs two and three.
S Roth beIleves that General Philpott dlrl"Cted hIm to tleliver thIs message and also
pressed hIm on several necaslons to seek a response from Broe to an earlier meSS"g'e to
the attache. (Roth. 10/7/75. p. 53)
message was sent to the attache that same day, ostensibly from
General Bennett, which authorized:
FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded.
This action does not repeat not imply change in our estimate of situation. On the
contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut
off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as we anticipate. Request
up date on situation. (Cable 446, Sta. to Hq., 10/21/70; Ref.: Cable 762, Hq. to
Sta., (Cable 934, Hq. to Sta., 10/21/70)
Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he
followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on
Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that
"any further action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibility
of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support
functions." (Roth, 8/14/75, p. 8) 1
Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described by
Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified:
I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is that I was informed
that there was concern at the highest U.S. Governmental level over the possible
t'lection of Allende, that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with
the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be helpful, and so forth.
I have nothing specific as to the nature of the instructions or the channels through
which they came.
Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a project that if
it had not been initiated by, at least had the attention of or concern of, the
highest level?
Colonel ROTH. That was my impression at the time.
Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department that the highest
level of government usually indicated the 'President of the United States?
Colonel ROTH. I would assume that.
The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify Generals
Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recjpient. Among
these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's
purported signature. (Undated message, 10/14/70) General
Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted
that it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott,
8/5/75, p. 22) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Cable
762, Hq. to Sta., 10/14/70) and October 21 (Cable,934, Hq. to Sta.,
10/21/70) conveying instructions from General Bep.nett to the attache.
General Bennett testified he did not authorize these messages :
It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military assistance area.
It goes beyond the responsibility which I had in terms that I would have to get
the authority or the approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert
aetion of this magnitude. This message would not have been signed by me.
(Bennett, 8/5/75, p. 21)
According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to
issue the directives contained in those messages. (Karamessines, 8/6/75,
p.84)
The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents
bearing on the issue of the attache's Track II instructions or responses.
A DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel O. Graham,
Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents for
the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, 8/5/75, p. 6) However,
1 Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe he Queried on two
or three occasions regarding a report from the attache and that Philpott instructed that
only he (PhUpott) would communicate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth. 8114/75.
p. 11) Roth .Iso testified that Philpott advised him that communications with the attache
would be by CIA channels. (Roth. 8/14/75. p. 41)
238
Roth testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared
on his activities arc missing from the files. (Hoth, 10/7/75. p. 68)
CIA officials maintain that thu'y acted faithfully in transmitting
m€'ssages to Generals Bunnett and/or Philpott and in never sending a
message without propel' authori;.:;ation. Mr. Karamessines was particularly
forceful in this regard:
* * * I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central Intelligence
Agency in which a message was received for an individual, an officer of the
government anywhere, in whatever department, which was not faithfUlly, directly,
promptly and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his duly
authorized representative. (Karamessines, 8/G/7;), p. 79)
We may have played tricks overseas, lmt it stopped at the water's edge, and
we didn't play tricks among ourselves 01' among our colleagues within the Agency
or in otl~er agencies. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 79)
'Ve could not remain in business for a day * * * if this had been the practice
of the Agency. It would have been no time at all before we would have been
found out, a single instance of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have
taken place would have put us out of business. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 80)
Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the attache's role or
that he authorized any messages to be sent to the attache. (Kissinger,
8/12/75,p.22)
The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the
statements of the senior CIA, DIA and 'White House officials. There
are four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals
Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated
their general instructions to the attache. This possibility would be contrary
to their sworn testimony. Seeond, General Bennett was not aware
of Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions
to the attache. This possibility is supported by Roth's
testimony but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his
duty to keep General Bennett mformed. Third, the CIA acted on its
own, and, after receiving initial authority from General Philpott, coopted
and ordered the attache without further informing any member
of the Department of Defense or the White House. This possibility
',"ould be contrary to the sworn testimony of the Chief of the Chile
Task Force. 'Villiam Broe, Thomas Karamessines, and William Colby.
Fourth. members of the White House staff authorized the CIA to convey
orders to the attache on the basis of high or highest government
authority. Further, that the 'Vhite House staff directed that the
attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be informed. This possibility
would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr. Kissinger and General
Alexander Haig.
(d) Agents 11'110 posed as third country nationals
In order to minimize the risks of making contact with dissident
Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to send four
agents to Chile posing as third country nationals to supplement the
attache's contacts with Chilean military officers. Headquarters felt this
was necessary because "vVe don't want. to miss a chance." (Cable 363,
Hq. to Sta.. 9/27/70) The agents were compartmented from each
other and reported separately on their contacts to an operative in
Santiago, who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony
of the Chief of Station, they received their instructions from
vVashington and not from the Station.
239
(e) Chief of Station
Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of
Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable
and the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean
officers. The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:
I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleagues and superiors that I did
not consider any kind of intervention in those constitutional processes desirable.
* * * And one of the reasons certainly for my last recall [to Washington] was
to be read the riot act-which was done in a very pleasant, -but very intelligible
manner. Specifically, I was told at that time that the Agency was not too
interested in continuously being told by me that certain proposals which had
been made could not be executed, or would be counterproductive. (Chief of
Station (Felix), 8/1/75, p. 10)
The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed.
The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report
should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on
action taken." (Cable 612, Hq. to Sta., 10/1/70) Very simply, Headquarters
wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency
itself.
Three examples of the Chief of Station's reporting bear out his
claim to have dissented:
Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceedingly narrow and available
options are quite limited and relatively simple. (Cable-424, Sta. to Hq., 9/23/10)
Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism. It is essential that we
not become victims of our own propaganda. (Cable 441, Sta. to Hq., 10/l/70)
Urge you do not convey impression that Station has sure-fire method of
halting, let alone triggering coup attempts. (Cable 477, Sta. to Hq., 10/1/10, p. 2)
4. CIA EFFORTS -TO PROMOTE A CO'O'P
(a) The ChileanCO'TtSpirat01'8
Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key
individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the
General who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before.1 Following
the "Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux
retained the support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as
well as being the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian
groups. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President
on Chile," 7/15/75) Another individual around which plotting centered
was General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago
Garrison, who was in league with several other Chilean officers. (CIA
Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 11/18/70) These officers;
with one possible exception, were in contact with Viaux as well.2 _
There was considerable communication among the various plotting
elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified :
* * * I might add here that it seemed that a good dozen or more Chilean senior
officers were privy to what was going on * * • they were aU talking to one another
1 This revolt was enJrlneered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of dramatizing the
mllltary's demand for higher pay. but was widely Interpreted as an abortive coup.
• The record of meetin~s between Vlaux and the active dntv military ofllcers is Incomplete.
The record does show. however. that several met with 'Vlaux during the Track II
period. One hl!!:h rankln~ ofllcer may have been a member of Vlaux's Inner circle Qf
consnlrators. Although a distinction can be made between the Vlaux and Valenzuela groups.
as CIA witnesses did throu~hout their testimony before the Committee. the principal distinction
between the two was that the latter was led by active duty military ofllcers. The
two groups were In conta~t with each other. The record also Indicates thet they worked
together In at least two of the three Schneider kidnap attempts.
240
exchanging views and trying to see how best to mount the kind of coup that they
wanted to see take place. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 10.)
(b) Contacts prior to October 15
The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential ,vithin the
Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that antiAllende
currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros
(police), but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect
for the Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General
Schneider, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, who advocated strict
adherence to the Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force
Activities, 11/18/70), p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome
"the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military."
(Ibid, p. 2)
Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General
Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prats, were hostile to
the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to
the second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the
U.S. Government would support a coup both before and after it took
place.! (Cable 611, Hq. to Sta., 10/7/70) This effort began in earnest
on October 5 when the attache informed both an Army General
("Station's priority contact") and an Air Force General of the procoup
U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October
6.) 2 Three days later the Chief of Station told a high ranking Carabinero
official that "the U.S. Government favors a military solution
and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright military
intervention." (Task Force Log, 10/9/70) The official informed the
COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean Army high
command. (Task Force Log, 10/10/70)
On October 7, the attache approa~hedmembers of the War Academy
in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was
the attache's first contact with the Army officer to whom he would
ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22.3 At this meeting,
the Army officer told the attache that he and his colleagues were:
* * * Trying to exert forces on Frei to eliminate Gen. Schneider to either replace
him, send him out of the country. They had even studied plans to kidnap
him. Schneider is the main barrier to all plans for the military to take over the
government to prevent an Allende presidency. (Cable 483, Sta. to Hq., 10/8/70)
The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in re-
1 The military officers were told. for example, that should Allende be prevented from
taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostrarized, but rather can continue to
pount on us for "lAP support and malntenanee of our close relationship." (Cable 075.')17,
H~ to Sta., 10/7/70)
According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II. between October 5 and October 20.
the CIA Station and the attache--for the most part the latter-made 21 contacts with key
military and Carablnero officials. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 11/8/70)
3 In hIs testImony, the attache IndIcated that the Army officer was affiliated wIth an Army
general. (U.S. military attache. 8/41/75. p. 52) In a cable sent to Headquarters on October
18. In whIch tbe Army officer's reouest for three .uhmachine guns was made. the Station
IndIcated that the attache bellevt'd the officer. and his comDanlon. a Xavy officer were In
league with a Navy admIraL (Cable 562. Sta. to Hq.. 10/18/70) At another point In hIs tt'stlmony,
the attache stated. "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy officer and the Army
officer and the Air Force General over here." (The attacht'o 8/4/75. p. 107) The CommIttee
has been unable to determine the t'xact affilla tion of the A rmy officer. However. as prevl011sly
stated. both the Army general and the Navy admIral were affiliated with General Valenzuela
and the Navy admiral was in contact with General Vlaux.
241
sponse to the attache-Army officer meeting. Headquarters took note of
Schneider's resistance to coup plans and stated:
* * * This would make it more iIllportant than ever to remove him and to
bring this new state of events ... anything ,ve or Station can do to effect
rPIlloval of SchllPider: "We lmow tllis rhetorical question, but wish inspire
thought on both ends on this matter. (Cable 62H, II'!. to Sta., 10/8/70)
During the first week of intensi VI' efforts chances of success looked
bleak. The Chile Task Force Log cOlllmented :
* * * the highest levels of the armed forces unable to pull themselves together
to lJlock Allende. The Chilean military's tradition of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance
to tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's firm constitutional
stand, and most importantly, the lack of leadership within the government and
llJilitary are working against a military takeoH>r. (Task Force Log, 10/8/70)
The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid (Iy)
waning chances for success." (Cable 487, Sta. to Hq., 10/9/70) This
pessimism ,vas not dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station
has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination." (Cable
504, Sta. to Hq., 10/10/70) Three days later the Task Force agreed:
"We continue to focus our attention on General Viaux who now appears
to be the only military leader willing to block Allende." (Task
Force Log, 10/13/70)
If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were
bleak indeed. His own colleagues, including General Valenzuela, described
him as "a General without an army." (Cable 495, Sta. to Hq.,
10/9/70) Yet in the first two weeks of October he came to be regarded
as the best hope for carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.
Although the U.S. military attache was instructed not to involve
himself with Viaux because of the high risk involved (Cable 461, Sta.
to Hq., 10/5/70), he served initially as a contact to Viaux through a
military attache of another country. This attache reported on October 5
that Viaux wanted several hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch
it coup on October 9. (Cable 476, Sta. to Hq., 10/6/70) Headquarters
turned down the request, concluding that a "mini-coup at this juncture
would be counterproductive" and Viaux should postpone his plans,
"while encouraging him in a suitable manner to maintain his posture
so that he may join larger movement later if it materializes." (Cable
585, Hq. to Sta., 10/6/70)
The primary purpose of the CIA agents who posed as third country
nationals was to contact Viaux, and they very rapidly relieved the attache
of his indirect role in that task. Viaux reiterated his demand for
an air drop of weapons to one of these CIA agents, and again the response
'Yas the same: reject the demand for arms, but encourage him to
keep planning. In essence the Agency was buying time with Viaux:
"'YI' ,vish to encourage Viaux to expand and refine his coup planning.
Gain some influence 0"1'1' his actions." (Cable 689, Hq. to Sta., 10/10/
70) To achieve this latter purpose. Headquarters authorized passing
$20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000 in life insurance to Viaux
and his associates, as a demonstration of U.S. support. (Cable 729, Hq.
to Sta., 10/13/70)
On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over
Schneider by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement
in early hours which will freeze those military leaders who might
242
otherwise join Viaux (' (Cable 729, Hq. to Sta., 10/13/70.) The Station's
response later that same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap
(ienerals tlchneid('r and Prats \\'ithin the next 48 haUl'S in order to
precipitate a coup'" (Cable 5:H. Sta. to Ilth 10/1;~/70) This Viaux
kidnapping of Sclllleiller was reported by the Station "as part of a
coup that includell \'alenzuela." (Cable 529, Star to Hq., 10/13/70)
At about t~lis tillIP the Station began to receive encouragement from
its other contacts. On October 14. ten days before the Chilean Congress
was to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:
Xow we are beginning to see signs of increasing coup activity from other military
quarters, specifically, an Army General [deleted] and Admiral [deleted],
and the forces in Concepcion and Yaldivis * * * (Task Foree Log, 10/14/70)
(c) October 15 decision
To summarize, by October 15 General Viaux had advertised to his
contact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal
with the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once
with General Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.1
On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met jvith Henry Kissinger and
Alexander Haig at the 'White House to discuss the situation in Chile.
According to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines provided
a rundown on Viaux, a meeting between two other Chilean military
coup conspirators, and, in some detail, "the general situation in
Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." (Memorandum of Conversation/
Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 10/15/70) A decision was
made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least
temporarily:"
It was deeided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux
warning him against any precipitate action. In essenee the message should state:
"'VI' have reviewed your plans and based on your information and ours, we come
to the eonclusion that your plans for a eoup at this time cannot succeed. Failing,
they may reduce your capabilities in the future. Preserve your assets. We will
stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do
something. You will continue to have our support." (Memorandum of Conversation,
Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig, 10/15/70)
The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr.
Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure
on every Allende weak spot in sight-now, after the 24th of October,
after 5 Xoyember, and into the future unti! such time as new marching
orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would
comply." 2
1 The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable from
Santiago to Headquarters:
We discount Viaux's statenwnt that he had callpd off his coup attempt because
of the CIA agent's impending visit, Other rpporting indicated Vlaux probabl~' not able
or intending move this weekpnd. (Cable 499. Sta. to Hq., 10/10/70)
There Is also reason to belie\'(> that General Yalenzuela was Instrumental in persuading
Yiaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Foree Log:
Station reportp<\ that on 12 October General Valenzuela met with General Vlaux
aud lIttpmptNI to persuade him not to attempt a coup. (Chile Task Foree Log,
10/14/70)
2 Secretary Kissinger's re{'ollpctlon of the October 15 meeting Is not In accord with
that of :111'. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802) that was sent the following
day to the Station In Santiago. This matter will be discussed In Part V of this report.
243
The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White
House meeting to the Station in Santiago:
2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup.... \Ve
are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every
appropriate resource.
3. After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup
attempt carried out by him alone with the forces now at his disposal would fail.
Thus it would be counterproductive to our Track Two objectives. It was decided
that CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. (Cable
802, Hq. to Sta. 10/16/70)
The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage
him (Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces
"'ith other coup planners." (Cable 802, Hq. to Sta., 10/16/70) The
message concluded: "There is great and continuing interest in the activities
of Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune."
(Ibid)
(d) Ooup planning and attempts after October 15
The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to a Viaux associate
on October 17. The associate responded that it did not matter
because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. (Cable
533, Sta. to Hq., 10/17/70) At the final meeting of the CIA agent and
the Viaux associate on October 18, the Agency was informed that the
coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduction of General
Schneider is the first link in chain of events to come." (Cable 568, Sta.
to Hq., 10/19/70) An "emergency channel" of communication with
Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities,
11/18/70, p. 21)
As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked
brighter for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military
contacts.' A CIA overview statement on Track II stated:
Coup possibilities afforded by the active duty military group led by General
Valenzuela and Admiral [deleted] had always seemed more promising than the
capabilities of the Viaux group. These military officers had the ability and resources
to act providing they decided to move and organized themselves accordingly.
(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile,"
7/15/75, p. 5)
By mid-October the Chilean military officers appeared to be moving
in this direction.
On the evening of October 17, the U.S. military attache met with the
Chilean Army officer and the Navy officer. They requested 8 to 10 tear
gas grenades, three 45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition.
The Navy officer said he had three machine guns himself "but
can be identified by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore
unable to use them." (Cable 562, Sta. to H., 10/18/70) The attache
and the Chief of Station have testified that the officers wanted the
machine guns for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether
'Two coup plotters. both Chilean generals, made one last attempt to persuade General
Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15. The Station reported that the
meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco. Schneider refused to listen to their eloquent
presentation of Communist action in Chile • • • and [remained] adamant In maintaining
his non-involvement stance." (Cable 548, Sta. to Hq., 10/16/70)
61-985 0- 75 - 17
the arms were intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of
General Schneider. The fact that the weapons were provided the
Army officer and the Navy officer and that Viaux associates were convicted
of the Schneider killing suggests that the guns were not
involved.
The machine guns and ammunition were sent from Washington
by diplomatic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters
was puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort
provide them but find our credulity stretched by Navy officer
leading his troops with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these
guns ~ We will try send them whether you can provide explanation
or not." (Cable 854, Hq. to Sta., 10/18/70) The first installment was
delivered to the Army officer and the Navy officer late in the evening
of October 18 and consisted of the six tear gas grenades intended
originally for Viaux.1
That same day, General Valenzuela informed the attache that he
and three other high ranking military officers were prepared to
sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,
11/18/70) Their plan was to be~n with the kidnapping of General
Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military dinner
being given for Schneider,2 after which Schneider would be flown
to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, one of Valenzuela's
colleagues would head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With
respect to the kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reported:
General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation but not directly involved.
He has been sent to Vifia to stay with prominent physician. Will be seen in
public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation
not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week. Military
will not admit involvement in Schneider's abduction which is to be blamed on
leftists. (Cable 566, Sta. to Hq., 10/19/70)
The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General
Schneider left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car,
and his police guard failed to be withdrawn. The Army officer assured
the attache that another attempt would be made on October 20. (Cable
582, Sta. to Hq., 10/20/70) The attache was authorized to pay Valenzuela
$50,000 "which was the price agreed upon between the plotters
and the unidentified teamof abductors," but the attache insisted that
the kidnapping be completed before he paid the money. (Task Force
, 1 As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in Chile- focussed
on the active duty mllltary officers-Valenzuela, et aI.-rather than Viaux. An example of
this shift in focus was the decision to orovide the Army officer and the Navy officer the
tear gas ~renades originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the
purpose of this action:
Station plans give six tear ~as ~renades to the attache for delivery to Armed Forces officers
(deletion) instead of having CIA agents posing as third country nationals deliver them
to Viaux group. Our reasoning is that the attache dealing with active duty officers. Also
CIA agent leaving evening 18 October, and will not be replaced but the attache will stay
here. Henee Important that the attache credibility with Armed Forces officers be strengthened.
(Cable 562. Sta. to Hq.• 10/18/70.)
• The CIA agent who was In contact with Viaux at the tilDe the Valenzuela plan was given
to the attache apparently understood that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He
stated:
Q. Were you told any of the details of how the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?
Mr. SARNO. They indicoated It was goln~ to be at some sort of a banquet which the General
(Schneider) would be attending. (ISarno, 7/29/75, p.'37)
Log, 10/20/70) At the same time General Valenzuela assured the
attache that the military \vas now prepared to move. (Task Force
Log, 10/20/70) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also failed
and the Task Force concluded
Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty executing
even the first step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup succeeding or
even occurring before 24 October now appears remote. (Task Force Log,
10/22/70)
(e) The Shooting of Geneml Schneider
In the early morning hours of Oetober 22 (2 a.m.), the attache
delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army
officer in an isolated section of Santiago.1
At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General
Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the
findings of the Chilean :\:Iilitary Court which investigated the
Schneider killing, neither the Army officer nor the Navy officer were
there. Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted on
his way to work by the abductors and he was mortally wounded when
he drew his handgun in self-defense. The .Military Court determined
that hand guns had been used to kill General Schneider, although it
also found that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the
killing.2
The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said
"Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned
on way to work" (Cable 587, Sta. to Hq., 10/22/70) and "Assailants
used grease guns. (Cable 589, Sta. to Hq., 10/22/70) The submachine
guns had previously been described by the Station as "grease
guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station was that Schneider had
been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered several hours
parlier to the Army officer. Santiago then informed Headquarters
"Station has instructed the attache to hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela
requests" (Cable 592, Sta. to Hq., 10/22/70), thus indicating
that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by
Valenzuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled
Headquarters:
Station unaware if assassination was premeditated or whether it constituted
bungled abduction attempt. In any case, it important to bear in mind that move
1 Although the attaohe's testimony and the cable traffic do not clearly establlsh the identity
of the group to which thl' Army officer was affiliated (see pagl' 240 nf this report) two
CIA statements on Track II tie the weapons and therefore the Army officer, to the Valenzuela
gronp :
• • • The only assistance requested by Valenzuela to Sl't the plan [of October 19] Into
motion through Schneider's abduction was se\'eral submachine guns. ammunition, a few
tear "as grenades and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus $50,000 for expenses
(Which was to be passed upon demand), (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,
11/18/70, n. 22)
• • • Three sub-machinl' guns. together with six gas cannisters and masks, were
passed to the Vall'nzuela group at 2 a.m. on 22 October. The reason why they stlII wanted
the weapons was because there were two days remaining before the Congress decided the
Presidential election and the Valenzuela group maintained some hope they could still
carry out their plans. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from President on Chile,"
7/11'i/75. n. 7)
2 The )filitary Court determined that tho!'le who participated In the shooting of General
Rchnelder on October 22 were part of the Vlaux-led conspiracy. The Court also fonnd that
this same grollp had pRrtlcipated In the Octo3er 19 Rnd 20 kidnap attempts.
In June 1972 General Vlaux was convicted for complicity In the plot culminating In the
death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year prison sentence for being "author of
the crime of kidnapping which resulted In serious Injury to the victim," and a five-year
exile for conspiring to cause a military coup. General Valenzuela was also convicted on
the latter charge. He received a sentence of three years In exile.
against Schneider was conceived by and executed at behest of senior Armed
Forces officers. We know that General Valenzuela was involved. We also near
certain that Admiral [deleted], Army officer and Navy officer witting and
involved. We have reason for believing that General Viaux and numerous
associates fUlly clued in, but cannot prove or disprove that execution or attempt
against Schneider was entrusted to elements linked with Viaux. Important factor
to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not retired officers or extreme rightists,
set Schneider up for execution or abduction. * * * All we can say is that attempt
against Schneider is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity to prevent
Allende's election if they are willing to follow Valenzuela's scenario. (Cable 598,
Sta. to Hq., 10/22/70)
(f) Post October 132 events
The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declaration
of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed
Schneider as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General
Valenzuela as chief of Santiago province. These measures, and others
taken, caused the Chile Task Force to make the following initial
judgment:
With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional runoff, a coup climate
exists in Chile. * * * The attack on General Schneider has produced developments
which closely follow Valenzuela's plan. * * * Consequently the plotters'
positions have been enhanced. (Chile Task Force Log, 10/22/70)
On October 23, Director Helms revie~ed and discussed Track II :
It was agreed * * * that a maximum effort has been achieved, and that now
only the Chileans themselves can manage a successful coup. The Chileans have
been guided to a point where a military solution is at least open to them. (Task
Force Log, 10/24/70)
Although it was not immediately clear to CIA observers, the Station's
prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider (as a
result of an abduction attempt) would "rally the Army firmly behind
the flag of constitutionalism" was correct. (Cable 495, Sta. to Hq.,
10/9/75) On October 24 Dr. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean
Congress. General Schneider died the next day.
5. CIA/wHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATION DURING TRACK II
The testimony given to the Committee by Henry Kissinger and
General Haig conflicts with that given by CIA officials.
Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15, 1970, the White
House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in
Chile. Both testified that after that date they were neither informed
of, nor authorized, CIA Track II activities, including the kidnap plans
of General Schneider and the passage of weapons to the military
plotters.
By contrast, CIA officials testified that they operated before and
after October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White House.
The conflict pertains directly to the period after October 15, but it
bears on the degree of communication between the White House and
the CIA in the earlier period as well. For instance, Henry Kissinger
testified that he was informed of no coup plan which began with the
abduction of General Schneider. He was aware of General Viaux's
plan-which he and Karamessines decided on October 15 to try to
forestall-but did not know that it was to begin with Schneider's
abduction.
CIA officials, especially Thomas Karamessines, stated that there was
close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the
'White House. Karamessines testified that he met with Kissinger some
six to ten times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines,
8/6/75, p. 66); and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of
developments. (Ibid., p. 56) The Committee has records of two meetings
between Karamessines and Kissinger and of one telephone conversation
between Karamessines and Kissinger's deputy, General
Alexander Haig. Karamessines' daily calendar indicates that three
other meetings with General Haig took place-but does not establish
with certainty that the topic was Track II. The calendar also suggests
that Karamessines and Kissinger met on three other occasions and
so might have had the opportunity to discuss Track II.
Henry Kissinger's testimony before the Committee differs from
Karamessines in two respects: he believed Track II was "turned off"
on October 15/ and, after that date, he was informed neither of the
coup plans of the Chilean conspirators nor of the passage of weapons
to them. He said that Track II 'was:
In the nature of a probe and not in the nature of a plan, * * * no plan for a
coup was ever submitted to the White House. So my recollection of events, this
was a request by President Xixon for T,rack II which led to two or three meetings
which then on October 15th led to being turned off by the White House, after
which Track II was dead as far as my office was concerned, and we never
received another report on the subject. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 15)
In my mind Track II was finished on October 15th and I never received any
further CIA information after October 15th on the basis of any records that I
have been able to find. (Ibid., p. 59)
General Haig's testimony generally coincided with Kissinger's
recollection:
I left [the October 15th meeting] with the distinct impression that there was
nothing that could be done in this covert area that offered promise or hope for
success. I had the distinct impression that was Dr. Kissinger's conclusion,and
that in effect these things-and I wasn't even really familiar with what these
two groups were to do and how they were to do it, but they were to cease and
desist. (Haig, 8/15/75, pp. 2~27)
My recollection would be that we had no hope for a viable, covert plan of
action. That is the impression I got. (Ibid., p. 29)
The following pages present the Committee's record of communication
between the White House and the CIA from September 18 through
December 21, 1970:
(a) September
September 18
Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House.
As Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger
wanted a plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according
to CIA records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather
1 Secretary Kissing-er, in a written response to a Committee Question, stated that he
had not been able to find any "written instruction from the President to discontinue
efforts to organize a coup. The President did, however, convey this decision to me orally
in mid-October. 1970."
To date, the Committee has been unable to question former President Nixon on this
point.
(b) October
248
the conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised
in the Chilean situation." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP,
9/18/70) The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject
of concern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure
was viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei
gambit."
September 121
The 40 Committee met. The Committee has no confirmation that
Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' call.mdar
confirms that he attended; presumably KIssinger, the 40 Committee
chairman, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to
review his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting-and the
meetings of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chairedis
that the meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity
to meet privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all
these instances save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the
Committee has no evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/
Karamessines meeting actually took place. That the CIA prepared a
memorandum of conversation for the private meeting on the 22nd but
has been able to find none for other meetings may provide some support
for the argument that no other such private meetings occurred.
September 1212
Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind after a 40 Committee
meeting called to discuss Track T. The two men also discussed Track
II actions. According to the CIA record of the meeting, Kissinger told
Karamessines that "our handling of the problem during the earlier
meeting had been perfect and he added we were doing fine and keep
it up." (Karamessines Memorandum for the Record/Chile, 9/22/70)
October 5
A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a
report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals,
including Valenzuela, named in a cable of Ser>tember 30. (Cable
449, Hq. to Sta., 9/30/70) The October 5 cable mdicated that the
report was needed for a discussion with Kii'singer on Ootober 6.1
(Cable 556, Sta. to Hq., 10/5/70) Karamessines presumed such a
meeting had taken place, although he had no specific memory of it.
(Karamessines, 8/6/75, pp. 69-70) His calendar for Octobpr 6 indicates
that he attended a 40 Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines
calendar.) Kissinger chaired that meeting.
October 6
The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch
golpe evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Cable 472, Sta.
to Hq., 10/6/70) In response. CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective
coup one "with scant chance of success which will vitiate any
further more serious action." The Station was directed to try to "stop
1 In a written response to a Committee question, Kissinger stated that he was neYer
infonned that these contacts had been made.
249
ill-considered action at this time." (Cable 585, Hq. to Sta., 10/6/70)
Kissinger testified he had not. been informed of the Viaux plan,
supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum
of an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see
below) makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kissinger, 8/12/75,
p.24) Similarly, Kissinger did not remember having been informed
that the CIA had called off a coup it regarded as premature. He
stated:
My perception at that period was that if they had a coup they would come • • •
back to us before triggering it • • • at no time during the period did they, in
fact, tell us • • • th1lt they had a coup that might be ready to go. And, indeed,
they generally told us the opposite. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, pp. 25-26)
As Karamessines' calendar indicated, there was a 40 Committee
meeting on October 6. He attended this meeting, along with Richard
Helms and William Brae of the CIA. According to the minutes of
that meeting, CIA efforts to promote a military coup in Chile were
not discussed. However, in an exchange with Charles Meyer, who was
then the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Latin American
Affairs, Dr. Kissinger stressed the desire of "higher authority" (President
Nixon) to prevent Allende's assumptjon of office. According to
tho minutes:
Mr. Meyer pointed to the need to determine a post-Allende position such as
proposed in NSSM 97. It was agreed that an early NSC meeting was desirable
on that SUbject. Mr. Kissinger said this presumed total acceptance of a fait
accompli and higher authority had no intention of conceding before the 24th ;
on the contrary, he wanted no stone left unturned. (Memorandum for the
Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 10/6/70, 10/7/70)
October 8
Karamessines met for lunch with General Haig. (Karamessines
calendar.)
In his testimony, Haig recalled being aware that the CIA was in
touch with two different grouJ?s of military plott.ers. He believed there
must have been another meetmg in which the CIA informed him of
its on-going contacts.
It seems to me, although the records don't re1lect it, that there was a meeting
in September, a very brief one, in which I must have been told that there was
a speci1lc program going underway. That probably would have been by Henry
(Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines there. I am not sure. (Haig,
8/15/75,p.12)
October 10
Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with
General Haig. He indicat.ed that the Station had "made direct contact
with a number of the senior military officers, especially those who
had been reportedly very activist-minded and had received pessimistic
reactions from all." (Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Brae,
10/10/70)
Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on
the 10th. His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of
conversation.
I do know, and I know that from looking at the record this morning, that
Karamessines made a telephone call to me in which he gave a progress report.
I recall that, It was in effect a negative progress report, that they were just
not coming up with it. (Haig, 8/15/75, p. 12)
Haig indicated to the Committee that he would have passed along
the substance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general
his role at the time was one of a conduit to Kissmger:
I am quite confident that, given my own conception of my role at that time,
that I would have conveyed that information to Henry, • • •. (Haig, 8/15/75,
p. 13)
Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr. Kissinger, and talked to you,
what degree of latitude did you have concerning what you would pass on to
Dr. Kissinger?
General HAIG. At that time I would consider I had no degree of latitude, other
than to convey to him what had been given to me. (Id., p. 15)
October 14-
A cable to Santiago for the attache, ostensibly from General
Bennett, authorized the attache to select two Chilean general officers
and convey to them the following message: "High authority in Washington
has authorized you to offer material support short of armed
intervention to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may
undertake to prevent the election of Allende on October 24." (Cable
762" Hq. to Sta., 10/14/70) Karamessines testified that in this case
"high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President, for no
one else could have given the attache such broad authorization. Karamessines
presumed that the message had been drafted in, or at least
cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 91)
However, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October
14th cable. He found the sequence of events puzzling; having been told
on the 10th that little was happening, he would have expected in the
meeting on the 15th (see below) to have discussed the results of the
October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any
such discussion. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 53)
The 40 Committee met to discuss, among other topics, Chile. In addition
to the 40 Committee principals (Kissinger, John Mitchell, David
Packard, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Moorer), the meeting was attended
by Karamessines, William Broe and General Robert Cushman of the
CIA, Charles Meyer from State, and Ambassador Korry, who had returned
to Washington from Santiago for a short period of consultation.
According to the minutes of that meeting, Kissinger asked Karamessines
to give a rundown on the latest developments and present
situation in Chile. Karamessines pointed out that "a coup climate does
not presently exist." He noted that "the unpredictable General Viaux
is the only individual seemingly ready to attempt a coup and '" '" '"
his chances of mounting a successful one were slight." Ambassador
Korrv agreed with Karamessines' assessment iLnd stated that "as of
now it seemed almost certain that Allende would be voted into office
on October 24th." Kissinger then observed that "there presently appeared
to be little the U.S. can do to influence the Chilean situation
one way or another." Other participants at the meeting concurred.
(Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee,
10/14/70, 10/16/70)
October 15
Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to
discuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation,
251
Karamessines gll\-e a run-down on Viaux. a meeting between two other
Chilean military conspirators and "the general situation in Chile from
the coup-possibility Yie,ypoint." It was concluded that Vianx did not
han more than one chance in twenty-perhaps less-to launch a successful
coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negatiYe repercussions
from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:
5. It was decided by those present that the Ageney must get a message to Viaux
warning him ag-ainst any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state:
"We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come
to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing,
they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. 'Ve will
stay in touch. The time will come ,when you with all your other friends can do
something-. You will continue to have our support."
6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr.
Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserye Agency assets in Chile, working
clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations
against Allende in the future.
8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue
keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight-now, after the
24th of October, after I) November, and into the future until such time as new
marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would
comply. (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen.
Haig at the White House, 10/15/70)
Kissinger, in his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA
memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat
more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger,
8/12/75, p. 52) He belieyed the Agency had been told to "stand down
and preserve yonI' assets."
Kissinger belieyed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as
recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order
the CIA issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based
on the October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum
of the meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to
preserve the maximum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The
October 16th order indicated that Track II had been reviewed at
"high USG leyel" the preyious day, and stated:
2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It
would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts
in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. * * *
4. There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Valenzuela et al.
and we wish them optimum good 'fortune. (Cable 802, Hq. to Sta., 10/16/70)
Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off
the coup plans rather than giying a new order to do them." (Kissinger,
8/12/75, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.
The conclusions of that meeting were that we had better not do anything rather
than something that was not going to succeed. * * * My general feeling was, I
left that meeting with the impression that there was nothing authorized." (Haig,
8/15/75, p. 13)
October lO-October 22 (approwimate)
.Karamessi~es and one or two others went with Kissinger to speak
WIth the PreSIdent, after a larger meeting. Karamessines believed this
meeting took place bet,Yeen October 10 and 24, (Karamessines, 8/6/75,
p. ~9) According to Karamessines, the "President went out of his way
to Impress all of those there ,Yith his conyiction that it was absolutely
essential that the election of Mr. Allende to the presidency be thwart252
ed." lAs they were leaving the Oval Office, the President took Karamessines
aside to reiterate the message. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 8)
October 19
Station cabled Headquarters early in the morning, advising that
the tear gas had been passed and outlining the Valenzuela coup plan,
beginning ,vith the kidnap of Schneider. In testimony before the
Committee, Karamessines indicated he certainly would have reported
the Valenzuela plan to Kissinger "very promptly, if for no other reason
than that ,,-e didn't have all that much promising news to report
to the White House. * * * " (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 72)
In the afternoon of the 19th, Karamessines met with General Haig
at the White House. (Karamessines calendar.) By then, Karamessines
would have had in hand the cable outlining the Valenzuela plan, since
the cable had arrived that morning. Howenr, General Haig had no
recollection of the meeting with Karamessines on the 19th. Nor did he
believe he had been informed of the Valenzuela plan. "This is all very
new to me. I hadn't seen any of this, and I ,,-as not familiar with this
particular plan * * * or $50,000, or any of the characters that are
described in here." (Haig, 8/15/75, pp. 38-39)
Similarly, Kissinger testified that he had not been informed of the
Valenzuela plan. He said he ",vas informed of nothing after October
15th. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 65) He indicated that, according
to his daily calendar, he had no conversation with either Karamessines
or Helms between the 15th and the 19th. (Ibid., p. 53) He indicated
that he never knew that the CIA was in the process of passing
guns and tear gas to Chilean military conspirators. He said
"there was no further meeting on that subject. In anybody's record,
mine or theirs [the CIA's], none of the information from the 16th
on was familarto me." (Ibid., p. 62)
Kissinger further testified he did not know that the United States
was dealing with Chilean officers who plotted a coup which involved
the abduction of General Schneider:
Senator HART of Colorado. I am not sure that the record clearl.y shows your
answer to the direct question of whether you knew or did not know that we were
negotiating with military officers with regard to a plot that did involve the abduction
of General Schneider.
Secretary KISSINGER. I said I did not know. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 86)
Nor did General Haig believe he had been informed of any abduction
plans before the fact.
Q. Were you aware during that period of time of the plans to kidnap General
Schneider?
General HAm. I was aware after the fact. ...
Q. But you were never informed prior to his attempted abduction?
General HAIG. I don't believe I was at all.
1 If the meeting with the President occurred after October 15, that would lend credence
to the testimony of CIA officials that they were not directed to end their coup efforts in
the October 15th meeting. Unfortunately, the Committee has not had access to the daily
calendars of President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger, which might pinpoint the date of the
President's conversation with Karamesslnes.
October 120
A cable to the Station indicated that "while awaiting word on whatever
events may have occurred 19 October, please let us know. what you
can on interim basis. * * * Headquarters must respond durmg morning
20 October to queries from high levels/' (Cable 883, Hq. to Sta.,
10/20/70) Karamessines testified that the referen~es to "high leve~s"
in the cable of the 20th meant "\Vhite House offiCIals, probably KISsinger.
He felt quite certain that Kissinger ,,"ould have been briefed
in advance about Yalenzuela's plan for the 19th and so would have
been expected to ask "'hat happened on th~ ~norni~Ig of the 20th.
(Karamessines, 8/6/75. p. 73) In contrast, KIssmger mterpreted that
cable in precisely the opposite light. He fe~t it indicated that he had.
not been informed of the Yalenzuela plan m advance. When news of
the Schneider kidnap reached the "\Vhite House, Kissinger believed
he would have had "somebody pick up a telephone and say, 'What is
this all about r ,. (Kissinger. 8/12/75, p. (8)
October 22
Karamessines lllet with Haig at the 'White House. (Karamessines
calendar) General Haig remembered that word of the shooting of
Schneider came as " a great shock" to him, and he believed that
Karamessines had told him about it in their meeting on the 22nd. He
thought that Kissinger either was present at the meeting or that he,
Haig, had gone immediately in to Kissinger's office to relate what
Karamessines had told him. (Haig, 8/15/75, p. 36)
(c) December
December 2
A memorandum. dated December 2, 1970, from Helms to Kissinger
stated that Helms had given a recapitulation on Track II to Attorney
General. Mitchell, who would deliver it personally to Kissinger. A
handWrItten note on the memorandum read: "sent to Kissinger via
nqI [Helms]." (Memo, Helms to Kissinger, 12/12/70) The report,
wl11ch was dated Nm"ember 18, 1970, contamed a full account of CIA
activit.ies during Track II, including the several plans to kidnap
SchneIder and the passage of weapons to the Chilean conspirators.
(Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to
3 November 1970,10/18/70)
In his testimony to the Committee, Kissinger did not recall receiving
the report, although he doubted that he would have read such an
"after action" report in any case. He testified that he could not find
it in his files, in contr~~;t ~o his finding a CIA report on Track I, dated
November 19, 1970. KIssmger was puzzled by a number of aspects of
the memorandum and report: why there were two reports, why the
report of the 18th apparently was only called to his attention on the
2n? o~ December, and ,,-hy it was to be delivered through Mitchell.
(I,"Issmger. 8/12/75. pp. 71, 74)
(d) Did Track II end,'?
The Committee also received conflicting testimony about whether
',l'ra.ck II ever ended. formally or in fact. As noted above, Kissinger
mdIcated that Track II was supposed to have ended, as far as he was
254
concerned, on October 15. It was formally terminated, according to
Kissinger, by a new Presidential marching order issued prior to the
October 24 vote of the Chilean Congress. The Committee does not
have this new "marching order" in its possession. However, CIA
officials from whom the Committee took testimony believed that there
had been no such definitive end to Track II. It merely tapered off, to
be replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change of government in
Chile. Karamessines' testimony was most explicit:
Mr. KAll.AMESSINES. I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in
1970 had their impact in 1973. I do not have any question about that in my mind
either. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 26)
Q. Was Track II ever formally ended? Was there a specific order,ending it'!
Mr. KARAMESSINES. As far as I ,vas concerned, Track II was really never
ended. 'Vhat we were told to do in effect was, well, Allende is now President. So
Track II, which sought to prevent him from becoming President, was technically
out, it was done. But what we were told to do ,vas to continue our efforts. Stay
alert, and to do what we could to contribute to the eventnal achievement of the
objectives and 'Purposes of Track II. That being the ('ase, I don't think it is proper
to say that Track II was ended. (Ibid., pp. 128--129)
When informed of Karamessines' testimony that "rack II was never
ended, Kissinger testified:
The CHAIRMAN. Would you take issue with that, with the [Karamessines]
testimony?
Secretary KISSINGER. 'l'otally. * * * It is clear that * * * after October 15th
that there was no separate channel by the CIA to the White House and that all
actions with respect to Chile were taken in the 40 Committee framework. There
was no 40 Committee that authorized an approach to or contact with military
people, no plots which I am familiar with, and all the covert operations in Chile
after Allende's election by the Congress were directed towards maintaining the
democratic apposition for the 1976 election. And that was the exclusive thrust,
and if there was any further contact with military plotting, it was totally unauthorized
and this is the first that I have heard of it. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, pp.
75-77)

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