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BOOTS ON THE GROUND BY DUSK: MY TRIBUTE TO PAT TILLMAN

Chapter 12

Action is the antidote to despair.
-- JOAN BAEZ

I have been home for nearly a week. I'm still living out of the suitcase I took with me to Birmingham, and I'm trying to organize some of the letters, cards, and other tributes people have sent to me since Pat's death. I look through a stack of cards and come across one from Pat's agent, Frank Bauer. I sit looking at the card, reminded of a phone conversation I had with Mr. Bauer shortly after Pat's death.

He told me he had never met anyone even remotely like Pat, then he went on to tell me how he was also the agent of Mike Martz, head coach of the St. Louis Rams. In 2000, the Rams had just won the Super Bowl after a remarkable 1999 season. Frank asked Pat to interview with the Rams because they were interested in recruiting him. Pat didn't really want to leave the Cardinals, but he agreed to meet with the Rams' coaches, mostly as a favor to his agent. Mr. Bauer told me, "Mike Martz loved Pat."

He told me the team president, John Shaw, tried hard to get Pat to make the move. He made an offer of $9.6 million for five years, with $2.6 million up front. Mr. Bauer told me Pat said, "'No. Number one, the Cardinals gave me a shot; Bob Ferguson [the general manager] drafted me in the seventh round. I love Coach Mac; I love Phoenix, I've played there, everybody knows me, I love the area; I don't want to leave.'" Pat was making $512,000 with the Cardinals. Mr. Bauer said to him, "Pat, you're killing me!"

The story was characteristically Pat. He was such a loyal person. He always wanted to do right by the people who mattered to him. I remember people trying to get him to rethink his position on accepting the offer from the Rams, but he wouldn't budge. Not only did he feel he owed it to his coaches and those who believed in him to stay, he also liked the idea of being part of a team in transition. It wasn't appealing or challenging to him to be part of an already victorious team. He loved being a Sun Devil in the years when the team was transformed from mediocrity to a powerhouse. He hoped he could be part of the same thing with the Cardinals.

I smile recalling what a unique man Pat was, then become angry thinking about the contradictions in the stories and documents with regard to his death. I get on the computer and begin to look up all I can find on friendly fire deaths, and I enter Pat's name to see if anyone with knowledge of what happened to Pat has posted anything. After several hours, I become very frustrated and angry. I type into the computer, "What happened to my son?" I'm so distraught; I expect an answer. When none comes, I begin to cry.

School started two weeks ago. Kevin calls as I'm leaving for work to tell me Marie is having trouble getting Pat's autopsy from the Army. He tells me he is going to talk to the casualty assistance liaison himself and see what he can do. He then tells me he has talked to the medic who got to Pat's body first. The medic told him Pat was gone when he got to him. There was no attempt to save him. Hesitantly, he informs me the medic said Pat's bulletproof Kevlar vest was riddled with green markings; American ammunition is green-tipped. This further confirms that Pat was hit by his own men. He told Kevin Pat's uniform and equipment had been burned because they were a biohazard, and that one of the soldiers who burned the vest mentioned the green tips. I can tell Kevin is very disturbed knowing Pat was hit so many times.

I try not to make it worse for him by getting upset, but when I get off the phone, I find myself feeling tremendous sadness and outrage. I think to myself, "How could any of the soldiers not realize Pat was killed by his own men when his vest was full of U.S. rounds?" I leave for work, but I can't get the disturbing question out of my mind. I'm also angry that the Army hasn't provided Marie with Pat's autopsy report.

At lunchtime I call Senator John McCain. I have made several calls to him in the past few months about concerns we have. When he comes on the line, I ask him if we are being unrealistic to expect Pat's autopsy after five months. He tells me we should have it by now and indicates he will make sure it's sent to us. When I tell him I have many questions about the 15-6 report, he tells me to formulate a list for the Army, and he will get it to the proper people.

When I get home, I make dinner, grade a few papers, then sit at the computer and try to find any information I can to help us determine what happened to Pat. I look up smoke grenades. It has always baffled me that Sergeant Greg Baker and his soldiers claim they never saw the smoke when other soldiers indicate they did. I remember the smoke quite well from seeing it used at Pat and Kevin's boot camp graduation. It is thick and moves like liquid. I don't see how anyone could mistake it for flying dirt. I read that the average soldier can throw a grenade about thirty to thirty-five meters, and it ignites within three seconds. The documents indicate that Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Bailey found the grenade canister near the road just in front of where the vehicle would have passed. This makes me wonder if Pat was far closer than we have been told. I also discover that white smoke is produced for 105 to 150 seconds. Why didn't they see it?

The next day school is busy and I'm somewhat distracted, but I keep forming questions in my head to send to McCain. I'm also anxious about the autopsy. I wonder if calling McCain is enough. Maybe I should call the office of the secretary of the Army. Trying to contact people, especially with the time difference, is frustrating. I try to make my calls to the East Coast in the morning before I go to work. It's often difficult to catch anyone during my break or lunchtime.

As soon as I get home, I see an envelope from Fed Ex. The envelope was sent from Rockville, Maryland; it's Pat's autopsy report. I sit at my kitchen table staring at the envelope that contains the coroner's findings. The cover letter tells me not to look at it alone, but I prefer to read it by myself. Slowly, I remove the cover letter and begin to read the document. The first time I read through, I process nothing. The second time I'm struck by information that disturbs me. I go back and read the top of the first page.

Final Autopsy Examination Report Name: Tillman, Patrick D. Autopsy No. xxxx-xxx SSN: xxx-xx-xxxx Date of Birth: 6 NOV 1976 Rank: CPL, US Date of Death 22 APR 2004 Place of Death: Afghanistan Date of Autopsy: 27 APR 2004 Place of Autopsy: Port Mortuary Date of Report: 22 JUL 2004

I read where it indicates Pat's autopsy was performed on April 27, 2004, then see where the date of the report is July 22, 2004. I wonder why it took so long for the coroner to complete and sign the document. The second page presents a description of the gunshot wounds. I don't understand the information other than to recognize much of Pat's head was gone. I move on to the next page. Pat was five foot eleven -- seventy-one inches tall -- but the autopsy states he was seventy-three inches. I can't understand, considering the nature of his head wounds, why he would measure taller.

The autopsy states that Pat was wearing a gold wedding band, yet his ring was platinum, having a dull, silver appearance. I'm also struck by the fact that no distinguishing features have been documented. Pat had a scar under his right arm, the result of rotator cuff surgery; a torn bicep from a football injury; a broken little finger on his left hand; and residual scarring on his lungs from having had valley fever in college. None of these features are mentioned. I then come to a section of the document that says "Medical Interventions." It reads: "A 3-3/4 x 3-1/2 inch area on the left upper chest is consistent with an attempt at defibrillation."

"Defibrillation!" I say out loud. Why would Pat be defibrillated? The medic told Kevin that he made no attempt to save Pat on the scene. He said Pat was clearly gone. Pat had been wrapped in a poncho and deemed KIA, killed in action. He must have been dead nearly two hours before he arrived at the field hospital. "Why would anyone defibrillate a body with no head?"

I don't want to alarm Marie, but I feel I must call her. I'm certain she received the autopsy report as well, as I told McCain to have it sent to both of us; however, I'm not certain she would have read it yet. When Marie answers the phone, I attempt to make small talk, but she cuts me off. She has read the report and feels as I do; something is wrong.

"That isn't Pat," she says.

The next morning before I leave for work, I place a call to Commander Craig Mallak, Armed Forces medical examiner at Rockville, Maryland. Commander Mallak explains that he didn't perform Pat's autopsy; a Dr. James Caruso did. He says Dr. Caruso is currently in Iraq, but he tells me he is quite familiar with Pat's case. I ask Dr. Mallak why Pat would measure two inches taller when he was missing so much of his head. He tells me that the measurements aren't very exact. He says he may have been measured with his toes pointed. The explanation sounds ridiculous, but I just go on to the next concern. I tell him Pat's wedding band was platinum, yet the report says the ring was gold. Mallak tells me the ring was described from a photograph and that the lighting in the room made the ring appear gold in the photograph.

"Why aren't descriptions written down while looking at the body? It makes no sense to describe details from a photograph."

"Yes, ma'am," he says. "We can send you a cropped photo of your son's hand if you like, or I can send you a photo of the ring itself after it was removed."

"Sir, my daughter-in-law has Pat's ring. What concerns me is that we might have the autopsy of the wrong man."

I ask him why none of Pat's distinguishing features were documented. I go over them with him carefully. He tells me the torn muscle was not noted because they don't do internal examinations. He disregards me when I explain that Pat's injury was plainly visible. Mallak says there were no signs of active fungal infection of the lungs, although he admitted Pat's lungs were not looked at microscopically. Looking at the pictures, he finds there is no indication of a rotator cuff scar or a broken finger. My frustration is mounting, and I feel as though I want to cry.

"Why would Pat have been defibrillated?" I ask. "He essentially had no head, and he had been dead at least two hours before getting to the field hospital."

"Ma'am," he says self-righteously, "we normally don't fault someone for trying to save someone's life."

I want to scream. "I'm not faulting anyone, sir. I just wonder why there was an attempt to save his life when he was so clearly gone."

The commander explains that the shape of the abrasion on Pat's chest was interpreted as a mark from a defibrillator. He says the abrasion could have been from prolonged CPR or other medical treatment. It is as if he isn't hearing a word I'm saying. I can see I 'm getting nowhere, and I don't want to get so upset that I alienate him, but I ask him one more question.

"Commander, why is Pat's autopsy dated July 22, nearly three months after the autopsy was performed?"

"Ma'am, Dr. Caruso and I didn't believe the information we read on the casualty report. Enemy rounds don't cause the type of wounds your son had. Dr. Caruso refused to sign the autopsy report."

"Thank you, Commander," I say, stunned, as I hang up the phone.

I have been researching information on fratricides and trying to get information on Pat's death since I returned home from Alabama. The information I just learned from Dr. Mallak makes me more fearful and suspicious that Pat may have been killed intentionally. I say very little about my suspicions to anyone other than my closest friends and family because I know people won't understand. I have tried getting information from the computer using Pat's name, but I always get ultra left-wing, often irrational sites with far-fetched conspiracy theories. I have no interest in reading them. I type in the words "military lies," and a list of sites comes up. I click on an article titled "Lies Upon Lies Upon Lies: US Military in Crisis," by Brian Cloughley, dated June 13, 2004, more than three months ago, right about the time we were being briefed at Fort Lewis. I scan the article and find it is quite interesting, but it doesn't have anything I'm looking for. Then, just when I'm ready to click off, I read:

Here is the official US Army citation concerning the award of posthumous and hysterically-publicized bravery decoration to an American soldier who was killed in Afghanistan on April 22.

Oh, my God! I can't believe what I'm reading.

"Through the firing [soldier X's] voice was heard issuing fire commands to take the fight to the enemy on the dominating high ground .... Only after his team engaged the well-armed enemy did it appear their fires diminished. As a result of his leadership and his team's efforts, the platoon trail section was able to maneuver through the ambush to positions of safety without a single casualty."

But here is what really happened, according to a reliable source, an Afghan, who was reported by CBS News on May 29 as saying that "two groups of soldiers had drifted some distance apart during the operation in the remote Spera district of Khost province. 'Suddenly the sound of a mine explosion was heard somewhere between the two groups and the Americans in one group started firing,' the official said, citing an account given to him by an Afghan fighter who was part of that group .... 'Nobody knew what it was ... or what was going on, or if enemy forces were firing. The situation was very confusing,' the official said. 'As the result of this firing, that American was killed and three Afghan soldiers were injured. It was a misunderstanding and afterwards they realized that it was a mine that had exploded and there were no enemy forces.'"

There was an ambush with enemy forces, I say to myself. The information I'm reading is shocking and frustrating. I had read an Associated Press account of Pat's death just after the fratricide information was released that said there was no enemy and no ambush. The article stated there was an explosion that caused confusion, and the two units of soldiers started firing on each other. However, that is not true. Kevin was involved in the ambush, and he and fellow soldiers saw enemy on the high ground, above the canyon walls. I think, "If that wasn't the enemy, who was it?" I'm perplexed by the article's reference to three injured Afghans. "Three Afghans weren't injured. Where is this information coming from?"

In other words, there was a monster stuff-up. And this sort of thing is far from unknown in battle: tragic disasters occur frequently. But what is astonishing and unforgivable is the deliberate, systematic, official, Bush-government-approved lying about what happened at the time.

It is evil and dishonorable that the account of the death of this young man was a Pentagon machine fabrication. The gallantry citation was a downright lie, forged for public relations' [sic] purposes because soldier X had a national image.

The article goes on to discuss how Lieutenant General Philip R. Kensinger lied to the media in the press conference about what happened to soldier X, whom I realize is Pat. When the members of the press tried to get answers, he refused to take questions. The author calls Kensinger "a moral coward." Since we have learned about the fratricide, I have wondered if Kensinger knew the true circumstances of Pat's death when he came to the memorial service. It upsets and angers me that he might have known the truth and let a false narrative be read. I have got to find out more about the author of this article.

I discover Brian Cloughley is a writer/journalist living in New Zealand. He enlisted in the British Army in 1958 and served in both the British and Australian armies. I read on from his Web site.

He was later commissioned, spent nine years as an artillery officer on regimental duty, mainly as a Forward Observer [1] and saw active service in Borneo with 42 Commando, Royal Marines; 1st Battalion Sarawak Rangers; and 4th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment.

He also served as an intelligence officer in Cyprus at the end of colonial rule, on attachment with the Jordan Desert Police Force, as Reconnaissance and Survey Officer in a nuclear missile regiment in Germany, and officer commanding the Australian Psychological Operations Unit in Vietnam ....

He has been involved in analysis of South Asian affairs since late 1970s. In 1985 he visited Pakistan at the invitation of President Zia, and travelled extensively in Balochistan. In 1996-1997 he was consultant to the OECD [2] on the relationship between defence expenditure and international aid in South Asia and had government-level discussions in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

When I finish reading his biography, I learn his e-mail information is provided, and I'm able to locate a phone number for him. It is clear Mr. Cloughley has had extensive experience with the military, and he continues to work in Pakistan and surrounding regions. He has very solid credentials. I need to know where he got his information about what happened to Pat. I quickly type an e-mail and send it to him.

Mr. Cloughley

I'm Pat Tillman's mother. I read your article, "Lies Upon Lies Upon Lies: U.S. military in Crisis." I would very much like to speak to you. The circumstances surrounding Pat's death are very suspicious. The army has not given us a straight story either ....

Thank you. Sincerely, Mary L. Tillman

After sending the e-mail, I also place a call to him. I have no idea what time it is in New Zealand; I just hope I'm not calling at three in the morning. The call goes directly to an answering machine, and I leave a message for him to contact me.

The following day Mr. Cloughley writes:

Dear Mrs. Tillman,

Thank you so much for writing to me. I offer my deepest sympathy on the loss of your son, I know you will always remember ... no matter the circumstances of his death ... that he was a fine person and behaved honorably.

I'm sorry but I can't add anything to the official statements and press reports about the cause of his death. If I knew anything at all, I would of course tell you at once. And if I do hear anything, you will be the first to know.

At the moment I am in Britain, attending a conference, then I travel to Pakistan for a week, then go home to New Zealand.

He continues by telling me he will be in touch when he returns home. He says in the meantime he will ask his "discreet" sources if they know anything about the manner in which Pat died.

Later that night, I call Mike and tell him about the article and the e-mail I received from Mr. Cloughley. Mike is very interested because he also thinks something suspicious surrounds Pat's death. He is also haunted by the autopsy report. It is a concern to both of us that local Afghans keep reporting to U.S. and foreign press that there was no enemy in the area when Pat was killed, yet there are witnesses who state enemy were firing on the unit. I wonder if it's possible the ambush was staged; I wonder if Pat was killed on purpose. Mike and I discuss the timing of Pat's death. April was the worst month for recorded casualties in the war; a tragically unsuccessful attempt had been made to capture Fallujah, one of the most peaceful areas of the country after the fall of Saddam; and the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal was being made public. Mike and I have believed for weeks that the military and the administration lied about the circumstances of Pat's death to rally patriotism and deflect public outrage over the breaking news from Iraq. Now we wonder if his death was deliberate.

Mike tells me he has read a book called Bush on the Couch, by Dr. Justin A. Frank. He tells me Dr. Frank is a psychiatrist who lives and works in Georgetown. He has done a lot of research on the president and has observed him from afar. The book states that Bush doesn't admire or respect the soldiers; on the contrary, he resents them. They are true warriors; Bush can only pretend. Mike brings the book to my house, and I read all night. In the morning before leaving for work, I call information and get Dr. Frank's number at George Washington University Medical School. I leave a message telling him my name and that my son was killed in Afghanistan in April. I let him know I want to speak to him and that I will be home by four p.m. Pacific time, then I leave my number. When I return home from work, I have a message from Dr. Frank. He tells me he knows who I am, and he will stay in his office until I return home to call him. Immediately, I dial the number, and he answers right away. I waste no time getting to the point.

"Hello, Dr. Frank. I'm Mary Tillman. I don't want to waste your time. I'm calling to ask you a question. Do you think it's possible that this administration orchestrated my son's death?"

"Sad to say, yes."

I'm positively stunned by his response. I thought he would gently tell me that he doesn't believe the administration is very honorable, but it would never do something so heinous as to have a soldier killed. "You believe they killed him?" I ask numbly.

"I think it's possible. Mrs. Tillman, I'm a psychiatrist. It would be unethical and irresponsible for me to tell a grieving mother to pursue such a thing if I didn't think it was possible."

Over the weekend the whole family goes to Arizona. The Cardinals are retiring Pat's number on Sunday, September 19. Mike and I fly to Arizona together, and we talk about what Dr. Frank told me. Mike encourages me to pursue answers. He has a very strong sense something is wrong. Mike and I share our suspicions with Richard, who also believes we need to get more information. Kevin and Marie are not in a frame of mind to discuss this topic. Kevin is especially apprehensive talking about this as anything but an accident.

While in Arizona, I check my home messages. There's one from Margaret Cloughley, Mr. Cloughley's wife. She received the phone message I had sent days before and wanted to let me know her husband was in Pakistan. I explain to her that he already responded to an e-mail I sent at the same time I left the phone message. She is very gracious and concerned. She says she feels terrible about what happened to Pat, and she supports us in our search for answers and hopes her husband can be of help when he returns.

On October 2, I receive a long e-mail from Mr. Cloughley.

Dear Mrs. Tillman,

I have now returned home to New Zealand. During my travels in the past month I talked with several people about your son.

There is no doubt his death was the result of what we former soldiers used to call a "patrol clash." I was close to one (but not directly involved) in Borneo many years ago, and experienced the shock that any soldier feels when things go terribly wrong and involve the death of men who are killed in error by their own comrades. But in [those] days (almost forty years ago) the natural reaction was to admit and to explain what went wrong. Things are different now.

The words "friendly fire" disgust me. It is a typical PR weasel phrase used to try to disguise the unpalatable fact that horrible accidents happen. And in this case the tragedy was made worse by lies told at the highest level to make it appear that your son died in circumstances that were later detected as being falsely described and notified.

... If you wish the case to be given Maximum publicity, then I suggest we approach a major newspaper. I happen to know the managing editor of the Washington Post (Steve Coll: we were in Pakistan together 10 years ago when he was a reporter and I was the Australian defense attache) and would be prepared to ask him to have the story covered in a tasteful fashion.

I send Mr. Cloughley a summary of what we have been able to piece together about Pat's death. Again, he encourages me to contact Steve Coll. He tells me he tried e-mailing him but didn't receive a response. I indicate to him that I will try to get in touch with him as well.

During my lunch break at school, I call the Washington Post and ask for Steve Coll. After a few minutes of conversation, Mr. Coll confides that his Pentagon reporter was very suspicious about the way Pat's death was reported by the Army. He is interested in talking to me in person and viewing the 15-6 report. I tell him that, coincidentally, I will be in D.C. to meet a friend in several weeks. I let him know I can go to the paper to talk to him. After ending the conversation, I call Senator McCain. I tell him I will be writing questions and e-mailing them to him. I also let him know there are anomalies in the autopsy report, but I want to speak to Dr. Caruso when he returns from Iraq before I do anything.

As soon as I get home from work, I sit down at my computer, overwhelmed with all the questions I have about Pat's death and its aftermath. I go to my room and grab Pat's brown T-shirt and wrap it around my neck. I sit back down at the computer, and the questions come rapidly and sequentially.

1. Why would a unit hold up for two days in a village in a hostile area to repair a Humvee, allowing the enemy to prepare for an ambush? Why does the vehicle have greater priority than the mission? Why bring a jinga truck through a dangerously narrow canyon where an ambush is likely to take place?

2. Why the insistence from Florida to bring the vehicle to Tit rather than abandon or destroy it? Why are orders coming from Florida period?

3. Why were the terms "dawn" and "dusk" used when orders were given to move out to Manah? Why was military time not used?

4. Why the hysterical reaction from Baker and his men? Aren't Rangers trained to assess a situation before shooting?

5. Aren't Rangers trained to go back and help sections of their troops when they're in trouble?

6. Weren't Baker and his men prepared to watch for the first serial, as Rangers come back to help their troops?

7. The driver of Baker's vehicle stated he recognized the Afghan as a friendly "within a split second" of coming out of the canyon. He also saw friendlies on the ridgeline and U.S. vehicles down the road. Why didn't the others see these things?

8. Why didn't the driver do more to stop the shooting?

9. Why didn't the driver physically yank Baker off the vehicle or do something to let him know he was allowing his men to shoot at friendlies?

10. There was a cessation of fire after the AMF was killed. What caused that cessation of fire? Bailey suggested at one point they were reloading. Don't they look around when they're reloading?

11. Baker and his men say they had tunnel vision. If so, they had to have seen what they were shooting. Why didn't they recognize them as friendlies? Baker and his men also state they saw nothing. Which is it? Why didn't they see the smoke?

12. Why did Baker and his men shoot CPL Tillman in the head three times and riddle his body with rounds?

13. Why did Baker and his men drive down the road shooting at buildings? Isn't that illegal?

14. Why were CPL Tillman's clothes burned?

15. Why were young soldiers under orders to keep quiet?

16. Why were men asked to share the blame?

17. Why did it take five weeks to tell the family CPL Tillman was killed by his own men? Why was the family not given a copy of the 15-6 investigation prior to the meeting rather than when we were walking out the door?

18. Why was there no attempt to take accurate measurements?

19. Why were there sketches of vehicles rather than photos of real vehicles?

20. Why wasn't a person situated near the rocks in the photos so scale could be determined? Why were there no tough follow-up questions posed to the soldiers?

21. Why was CPL Tillman's death so embellished by the military?

22. Why did LGEN Kensinger not take questions at the press conference regarding the fratricide?

23. Why didn't the military clear up the untrue and nebulous stories that were released after fratricide was determined to have caused CPL Tillman's death?

24. Why was CPL Tillman's death called an accident?

25. Why has it been stated there is no fault?

26. Why did the Army try to convince Marie to have a military funeral?

A week before leaving for Washington D.C., I read a column in the San Jose Mercury News about a woman named Dolores Kesterson, who lives in nearby Santa Clara. Her son Erik had been a Marine for eight years. In 2000, he earned the Navy and Marine Corps medal for heroism after pulling seven fellow Marines from a flaming helicopter after it crashed. Erik was living a civilian life when September 11th compelled him to re-enlist, this time in the Army. On November 15, 2003, Erik was killed when a chopper, flying in the wrong airspace, hit his Black Hawk helicopter. He was twenty-nine. Dolores was invited to Fort Lewis in June, along with other families of fallen soldiers, to meet with President Bush. The column indicates she was shocked by his behavior toward her. I call information and get her number. After several tries, I'm finally able to reach her, and we arrange to meet for coffee the next day.

Dolores is a strong, down-to-earth woman with a sharp sense of humor and a quick wit. Her large blue eyes reveal sadness as she takes out a copy of the letter she wrote to George Bush when she went to Fort Lewis. She describes how her purse was taken from her and searched.

She believes the letter was shown to the president before he met with her. She waited in a small cubicle until an aide announced, "The president will now see you." Dolores said [the president] "came marching in and got right in my face ... eyeball to eyeball, and said, 'I'm George Bush, president of the United States, and I understand you have something to say to me in private.'" She felt like he was attempting to intimidate her. She would not be threatened, however.

She made it clear to him that she believes the U.S. presence in Iraq is illegal. She shortly changed the subject to her son, telling the president that he was a young man with a zest for life and a wonderful sense of humor whose favorite saying was "Life is good."

The president looked at her blankly and said, "How do you know his life would have been good?"

Dolores was stunned by the insensitivity of his remark, and she shot back, "Life is life, good or bad, nobody wants to die." Dolores says, "Bush has no conscience about the death and destruction he has caused."

What Dolores has told me about her meeting with Bush is shameful, yet I'm not really shocked. The president does not appear to have any empathy. Anytime he tries to convey it, he comes across as insincere or callous. Dolores and I talk for about an hour, sharing stories about Pat and Erik. I let her know I will contact her when I return from Washington.

During my break the following day, I call Dr. Frank to let him know I will be going to D.C. and I'll be staying in Georgetown. I ask if he would be able to meet with me so I can show him the autopsy report. He says he would be happy to look at any documents I have.

Just days before I leave for my trip, I get a call from Dr. Caruso. He gives me the same information Dr. Mallak gave me. But he indicates that both he and Dr. Mallak were angry that Pat came back without his uniform or equipment. He tells me that all fallen soldiers are to be returned stateside with their uniforms. He mentions that the uniforms of wounded soldiers are usually destroyed. He, like Mallak, doesn't understand why I'm unwilling to accept the idea that someone tried to defibrillate Pat. He tells me I should have Marie request the field hospital report to find out what procedures were done there.

As soon as I get off the phone, I call Marie and Kevin and tell them what Dr. Caruso advised. Marie says she will call her casualty assistance liaison and make the request. I tell her I believe someone wants it to appear that there was an attempt at resuscitation because then there would be a reason to destroy the uniform. Uniforms of wounded soldiers can be destroyed. "I think they wanted it to appear Pat came in alive so they would have a reason to remove his uniform and destroy it. They needed to destroy the evidence of fratricide," I tell her.

I arrive in Georgetown on Sunday, October 17. I meet my friend Greg Martin for dinner, and we walk along M Street and talk about his trip to Canada. The next day we both meet Dr. Frank for lunch. I show him the 15-6 documents and the autopsy report. He agrees that many of the soldiers' statements are confounding and says he doesn't think the autopsy was very thorough. He believes I'm doing the right thing by requesting answers.

On Tuesday, Greg and I have lunch with Maura and Sheila Mandt before Maura and I leave to see Steve Coll at the Post. Maura is in the media business, and she suggested she come with me in the event I need some help. Once we arrive at the paper, we are taken to an area outside Steve Coll's office, where we wait for a few minutes. Mr. Coll comes out and introduces himself and his Pentagon correspondent, Josh White. We follow both of them through a maze of reporter cubicles to a meeting room where we sit around a large conference table.

I don't want to waste their time with small talk. I take out all the documents and place them on the table, then I draw a map of the canyon and label Magarah, Tit, and Manah. I outline the sequence of events and indicate movements on the map. I then outline all the anomalies and discuss my suspicions. I tell them what we find disturbing about the autopsy report. Steve is quite a quick study. It doesn't take him long to understand the situation. Josh White tells me he was present at both news conferences, the one that broke the news of Pat's death and the one that revealed his death was a fratricide. He says there was something suspicious about both of them. It was clear the Army was holding back.

I tell Steve and Josh that I would like them to do a story presenting Pat's true actions and the irregularities in the documents. I make it clear that I'm not convinced Pat's death was an accident and that my family feels the soldiers in the vehicle who killed Pat and the AMF soldier and wounded Uthlaut and Lane should have faced more serious consequences. We suspect they weren't dealt with more severely because a court-martial would implicate individuals of higher rank. I let them know that no one in our family wants to be quoted in the story. I explain that Pat's persona puts us in an awkward position, and we are not comfortable being in the public eye. Steve calls his secretary in to make photocopies of the documents.

Shortly after I get back to San Jose, I learn that Senator McCain gave my questions to the acting secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee. He asked the US Army Special Operations Command to address the conduct of the earlier investigation, the handling of evidence, and the delayed reporting of the true nature of Pat's death and report back to him. Lieutenant General Philip R. Kensinger assigned Brigadier General Gary Jones to conduct another 15-6 investigation into Pat's death.

I also learn from Kevin that he met an officer who did a previous investigation, which started within hours of Pat's death. The officer Captain Richard Scott became Kevin's Company Commander when Kevin asked for a reassignment when the unit came back from Afghanistan. One day, Kevin spoke to Scott regarding his unhappiness with the Army's handling of his brother's death. Scott attempted to help Kevin by talking to him and trying to clarify some of the inconsistencies in the investigation. Scott seemed to allude that he had recommended harsher punishment for some of the soldiers involved in the shooting and he had similar concerns about the ambiguity of the orders given. The regiment took over Scott's investigation and told him they were handing it over to an officer of higher rank. Kevin says Captain Scott was shocked to learn the soldiers were not more harshly punished. Kevin and I discuss the fact that he will have to make sure Brigadier General Jones knows about Captain Scott's investigation.

I stay in touch with Steve Coll, keeping him updated with any information we get. He wants to go to Afghanistan to visit the site where Pat died and talk to local Afghans about what took place that day. I want to travel to Afghanistan with him, but Kevin doesn't approve. He is adamant that it's too dangerous for anyone to go over there. I don't want to worry him, so I let Steve know I can't go.

The first week of December, I receive a letter from a Los Angeles Times reporter, David Zucchino, which is addressed to Pat's father and me. The letter indicates that he has been in Afghanistan and has spoken to locals in and around Manah who say there was no enemy and no ambush. Mr. Zucchino says he is informing us as a courtesy that he will be writing the story within the week. I try to call Steve right away to let him know the reporter intends to write the story, but I can't reach him. The whole purpose of asking Steve to write the story is to get the story of Pat's death right -- to get to the truth. If this reporter writes his piece without looking at documents or interviewing soldiers, he is going to skew the facts even more.

I place a call to Zucchino and tell him his story isn't that newsworthy. I let him know that the Associated Press printed a story in June about the fact there was no ambush. I explain that my son Kevin was there, and there were people shooting at the serial from the top of the canyon. He seems surprised when I tell him Kevin was part of the platoon. I can't believe he has never heard Kevin was there. I tell him I really don't think it's a good idea for him to write a story without the benefit of soldier statements. I suggest he will embarrass himself if the writes the story.

During the conversation, I give him information off the record, telling him he can use it to track down other facts. By the end of the conversation, Zucchino tells me he won't write the story without looking into the facts further. I find out he also called Patrick, who told him the same thing I did: that he needs to get more information before he writes a piece.

That evening I get a call from Steve and I tell him about the reporter. Steve says he'll have to rush his story. He doesn't believe the reporter will hold up his article. On December 5, part one of Steve's story on Pat comes out in the Washington Post. The piece is comprehensive, powerful, and distressing. It angers me on many levels that the Army lied about Pat's death, but what upsets me most is that Pat was removed from the context of his death and turned into a caricature. Steve did an amazing job presenting the events of April 22 and establishing Pat's true and honorable actions that fateful day.

On Monday, December 6, part two is published, and it is equally compelling and poignant. However, David Zucchino's story is printed that same morning in the LA Times. I'm absolutely furious -- not only did he write facts that were not carefully checked, he also quoted information I gave him off the record. Patrick called to tell me Zucchino quoted him inappropriately as well. To be publicly quoted against your wishes is unsettling and a serious violation of journalistic ethics. I call Mr. Zucchino and tell him to never contact me again.

Barrage of Bullets Drowned Out Cries of Comrades
Communication Breakdown, Split Platoon Among the Factors Contributing to 'Friendly Fire'

By Steve Coll
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, December 5, 2004; Page A01

First in a two-part series

It ended on a stony ridge in fading light. Spec. Pat Tillman lay dying behind a boulder. A young fellow U.S. Army Ranger stretched prone beside him, praying quietly as tracer bullets poured in.

"Cease fire! Friendlies!" Tillman cried out.

Smoke drifted from a signal grenade Tillman had detonated minutes before in a desperate bid to show his platoon members they were shooting the wrong men. The firing had stopped. Tillman had stood up, chattering in relief. Then the machine gun bursts erupted again.

"I could hear the pain in his voice," recalled the young Ranger days later to Army investigators. Tillman kept calling out that he was a friendly, and he shouted, "I am Pat [expletive] Tillman, damn it!" His comrade recalled: "He said this over and over again until he stopped."

Myths shaped Pat Tillman's reputation, and mystery shrouded his death. A long-haired, fierce-hitting defensive back with the Arizona Cardinals of the National Football League, he turned away a $3.6 million contract after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to volunteer for the war on terrorism, ultimately giving his life in combat in Taliban-infested southeastern Afghanistan.

Millions of stunned Americans mourned his death last April 22 and embraced his sacrifice as a rare example of courage and national service. But the full story of how Tillman ended up on that Afghan ridge and why he died at the hands of his own comrades has never been told.

Dozens of witness statements, e-mails, investigation findings, logbooks, maps and photographs obtained by The Washington Post show that Tillman died unnecessarily after botched communications, a mistaken decision to split his platoon over the objections of its leader, and negligent shooting by pumped-up young Rangers -- some in their first firefight -- who failed to identify their targets as they blasted their way out of a frightening ambush.

The records show Tillman fought bravely and honorably until his last breath. They also show that his superiors exaggerated his actions and invented details as they burnished his legend in public, at the same time suppressing details that might tarnish Tillman's commanders.

Army commanders hurriedly awarded Tillman a posthumous Silver Star for valor and released a nine-paragraph account of his heroism that made no mention of fratricide. A month later the head of the Army's Special Operations Command, Lt. Gen. Philip R. Kensinger Jr., called a news conference to disclose in a brief statement that Tillman "probably" died by "friendly fire." Kensinger refused to answer questions.

Friends and family describe Pat Tillman as an American original, a maverick who burned with intensity. He was wild, exuberant, loyal, compassionate and driven, they say. He bucked convention, devoured books and debated conspiracy theories. He demanded straight talk about uncomfortable truths.

After his death, the Army that Tillman served did not do the same.

"I play football. It just seems so unimportant compared to everything that has taken place."

Pat Tillman's decision to trade the celebrity and luxury of pro football for a grunt's life at the bottom of the Ranger chain of command shocked many people, but not those who felt they knew him best.

"There was so much more to him than anyone will ever know," reflected Denver Broncos quarterback Jake Plummer, a teammate at Arizona State University and on the Cardinals, speaking at a memorial service last May. Tillman was "fearless on the field, reckless, tough," yet he was also "thought-provoking. He liked to have deep conversations with a Guinness," and he would walk away from those sessions saying, "I've got to become more of a thinker."

In high school and college, a mane of flaxen hair poured from beneath his football helmet. His muscles rippled in a perfect taper from the neck down. "Dude" was his favorite pronoun; for fun he did handstands on the roof of the family house. He pedaled shirtless on a bicycle to his first pro training camp.

"I play football. It just seems so unimportant compared to everything that has taken place," he told NFL Films after the Sept. 11 attacks. His grandfather had been at Pearl Harbor. "A lot of my family has gone and fought wars, and I really haven't done a damn thing."

He was very close to his younger brother Kevin, then playing minor league baseball for the Cleveland Indians organization. They finished each other's sentences, friends recounted. They enlisted in the U.S. Army Rangers together in the spring of 2002. Less than a year later, they shipped out to Iraq.

In Pat Tillman's first firefight during the initial months of the Iraq war, he watched his lead gunner die within minutes, stepped into his place and battled steadfastly, said Steve White, a U.S. Navy SEAL on the same mission. "He was thirsty to be the best," White said.

Yet Tillman accepted his ordinary status in the military and rarely talked about himself. One night he confided to White that he had just turned down an NFL team's attempt to sign him to a huge contract and free him from his Army service early.

"I'm going to finish what I started," Tillman said, as White recalled at the May memorial. The next morning Tillman returned to duty and was ordered to cut "about an acre of grass by some 19-year-old kid."

The Tillman brothers served together in the "Black Sheep," otherwise known as 2nd Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. They were elite -- special operators transferred from Iraq in the spring to conduct sweep and search missions against the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants in eastern Afghanistan. The Rangers worked with CIA paramilitaries, Afghan allies and other special forces on grid-by-grid patrols designed to flush out and entrap enemy guerrillas. They moved in small, mobile, lethal units.

On April 13, 2004, the Tillman brothers rolled out with their fellow Black Sheep from a clandestine base near the Pakistan border to begin anti-Taliban patrols with two other Ranger platoons. A week later the other platoons returned to base. So did the two senior commanding officers of A Company, records show. They left behind the 2nd Platoon to carry on operations near Khost, in Paktia province, a region of broken roads and barren rock canyons frequented by Osama bin Laden and his allies for many years before the Sept. 11 attacks.

Left in command of the 2nd Platoon was then-Lt. David A. Uthlaut, a recent graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he had been named the prestigious first captain of his class. Now serving as a captain in Iraq, Uthlaut declined to be interviewed for these articles, but his statements and field communications are among the documents obtained by The Post.

Uthlaut's mission, as Army investigators later put it, was to kill or capture any "anti-coalition members" that he and his men could find.

"This vehicle problem better not delay us any more."

The trouble began with a Humvee's broken fuel pump.

A helicopter flew into Paktia with a spare on the night of April 21. But the next morning, the Black Sheep's mechanic had no luck with his repair.

Uthlaut ordered his platoon to pull out. He commanded 34 men in nine vehicles, including the busted Humvee. They towed the broken vehicle with straps because they lacked a proper tow bar. After several hours on rough dirt-rock roads, the Humvee's front end buckled. It could move no farther. Uthlaut pulled his men into a tiny village called Margarah to assess options.

It was just after noon. They were in the heart of Taliban country, and they were stuck.

Uthlaut messaged his regiment's Tactical Operations Center far away at Bagram, near Kabul. He asked for a helicopter to hoist the Humvee back to base. No dice, came the reply: There would be no transport chopper available for at least two or three days.

While Uthlaut tried to develop other ideas, his commanders at the base squabbled about the delay. According to investigative records, a senior officer in the Rangers' operations center, whose name is redacted from documents obtained by The Post, complained pointedly to A Company's commander, Uthlaut's immediate superior.

"This vehicle problem better not delay us any more," the senior officer said, as he later recalled in a sworn statement. The 2nd Platoon was already 24 hours behind schedule, he said. It was supposed to be conducting clearing operations in a southeastern Afghan village called Manah.

"So the only reason you want me to split up is so I can get boots on the ground in sector before it gets dark?"

By 4 p.m. Uthlaut had a solution, he believed. He could hire a local "jinga truck" driver to tow the Humvee out to a nearby road where the Army could move down and pick it up. In this scenario, Uthlaut told his commanders, he had a choice. He could keep his platoon together until the Humvee had been disposed of, then move to Manah. Or, he could divide his platoon in half, with one "serial" handling the vehicle while the other serial moved immediately to the objective.

The A Company commander, under pressure from his superior to get moving, ordered Uthlaut to split his platoon.

Uthlaut objected. "I would recommend sending our whole platoon up to the highway and then having us go together to the villages," he wrote in an e-mail to the operations center at 5:03 p.m. With sunset approaching, he wrote, even if he split the platoon, the serial that went to Manah would not be able to carry out search operations before dark. And under procedures at the time, he was not supposed to conduct such operations at night.

Uthlaut's commander overruled him. Get half your platoon to Manah right away, he ordered.

But why? Uthlaut asked, as he recalled in a sworn statement. Do you want us to change procedures and conduct sweep operations at night?

No, said the A Company commander.

"So the only reason you want me to split up is so I can get boots on the ground in sector before it gets dark?" an incredulous Uthlaut asked, as he recalled.

Yes, said his commander.

Uthlaut tried "one last-ditch effort," pointing out that he had only one heavy .50-caliber machine gun for the entire platoon. Did that change anything? The commander said it did not.

"At that point I figured I had pushed the envelope far enough and accepted the mission," Uthlaut recalled in the statement.

He pulled his men together hastily and briefed them. Twenty-four hours after its detection, the broken Humvee part had brought them to a difficult spot: They had to divide into two groups quickly and get moving across a darkening, hostile landscape.

Serial 1, led by Uthlaut and including Pat Tillman, would move immediately to Manah.

Serial 2, with the local tow truck hauling the Humvee, would follow, but would soon branch off toward a highway to drop off the vehicle.

Sgt. Greg Baker, a young and slightly built Ranger nearing the end of his enlistment, commanded the heaviest-armed vehicle in Serial 2, just behind the jinga tow truck. Baker's men wielded the .50-caliber machine gun, plus an M-240B machine gun, an M-249 squad automatic weapon and three M-4 carbines. Baker's truck would do the heaviest shooting if there were any attack. Two of his gunners had never seen combat before.

Baker left the Rangers last spring; he declined to comment for these articles. A second gunner in his vehicle, Trevor Alders, also declined to discuss the incident.

Kevin Tillman was also assigned to Serial 2. He manned an MK19 gun in the trailing vehicle, well behind Baker.

They left Margarah village a little after 6 p.m. They had been in the same place for more than five hours, presenting an inviting target for Taliban guerrillas.

Pat Tillman's serial, with Uthlaut in command, soon turned into a steep and narrow canyon, passed through safely and approached Manah as planned.

Behind them, Serial 2 briefly started down a different road, then stopped. The Afghan tow truck driver said he could not navigate the pitted road. He suggested they turn around and follow the same route that Serial 1 had taken. After Serial 2 passed Manah, the group could circle around to the designated highway. Serial 2's leader, the platoon sergeant, agreed.

There was no radio communication between the two serials about this change in plans.

At 6:34 p.m. Serial 2, with about 17 Rangers in six vehicles, entered the narrow canyon that Serial 1 had just left.

"I noticed rocks falling . . . then I saw the second and third mortar round hit."

When he heard the first explosion, the platoon sergeant thought one of his vehicles had struck a land mine or a roadside bomb.

They had been in the canyon only a minute. In his machine gun-laden truck, Greg Baker also thought somebody had hit a mine. He and his men jumped out of their vehicle. Baker looked up at the sheer canyon walls. The canyon was five to 10 yards across at its narrowest. "I noticed rocks falling," he recalled in a statement, and "then I saw the second and third mortar rounds hit." He could hear, too, the rattle of enemy small-arms fire.

It was not a bomb -- it was an ambush. Baker and his comrades thought they could see their attackers moving high above them. They began to return fire.

They were trapped in the worst possible place: the kill zone of an ambush. The best way to beat a canyon ambush is to flee the kill zone as fast as possible. But Baker and his men had dismounted their vehicles. Worse, when they scrambled back and tried to move, they discovered that the lumbering Afghan tow truck in their serial was stalled, blocking their exit.

Baker "ran up and grabbed" the truck driver and his Afghan interpreter and "threw them in the truck and started to move," as he recalled. He fired up the canyon walls until he ran out of ammunition. Then he jumped from the tow truck, ran back to his vehicle and reloaded. When the tow truck stopped again, Baker shouted at his own driver to move around it.

Finally freed, Baker's heavily armed Humvee raced out of the ambush canyon, its machine guns pounding fire, its inexperienced shooters coursing with adrenaline.

"I remember not liking his position."

Ahead of them, parked outside a small village near Manah, David Uthlaut heard an explosion. From his position he "could not see the enemy or make an adequate assessment of the situation," so he ordered his men to move toward the firing.

Uthlaut designated Pat Tillman as one of three fire team leaders and ordered him to join other Rangers "to press the fight," as Uthlaut put it, against an uncertain adversary.

Uthlaut tried to raise Serial 2 on his radio. He wanted to find out where the Rangers were and to tell them where his serial had set up. But he could not get through -- the high canyon walls blocked radio signals.

Tillman and other Rangers moved up a rocky north-south ridge that faced the ambush canyon on a roughly perpendicular angle.

The light was dimming. "It was like twilight," one Ranger in the fight recalled. "You couldn't see colors, but you could see silhouettes." Another soldier felt the light was "still pretty good."

A sergeant with Tillman on the ridge recalled he "could actually see the enemy from the high northern ridge line. I could see their muzzle flashes." The presumed Taliban guerrillas were about half a mile away, he estimated.

Tillman approached the sergeant and said "that he saw the enemy on the southern ridge line," as the sergeant recalled. Tillman asked whether he could drop his heavy body armor. "No," the sergeant ordered.

"I didn't think about it at the time, but I think he wanted to assault the southern ridgeline," the sergeant recalled.

Instead, on the sergeant's instructions, Tillman moved down the slope with other Rangers and "into a position where he could engage the enemy," the sergeant recalled. With Tillman were a young Ranger and a bearded Afghan militia fighter who was part of the 2nd Platoon's traveling party.

A Ranger nearby watched Tillman take cover. "I remember not liking his position," he recalled. "I had just seen a red tracer come up over us . . . which immediately struck me as being a M240 tracer. . . . At that time the issue of friendly fire began turning over in my mind."

Tillman and his team fired toward the canyon to suppress the ambush. His brother Kevin was in the canyon.

Several of Serial 2's Rangers said later that as they shot their way out of the canyon, they had no idea where their comrades in Serial 1 might be.

"We have friendlies on top! . . . No one heard me."

"Contact right!" one gunner in Greg Baker's truck remembered hearing as they rolled from the ambush canyon.

As he fired, Baker "noticed muzzle flashes" coming from a ridge to the right of the village they were now approaching. Everyone in his vehicle poured fire at the flashes in a deafening roar.

"I saw a figure holding an AK-47, his muzzle was flashing, he wasn't wearing a helmet, and he was prone," Baker recalled in a statement. "I focused only on him. I got tunnel vision."

Baker was aiming at the bearded Afghan militia soldier in Pat Tillman's fire team. He died in a fusillade from Baker's Humvee.

A gunner in Baker's light truck later guessed they were "only about 100 meters" from their new targets on the ridge, but they were "driving pretty fast towards them."

Rangers are trained to shoot only after they have clearly identified specific targets as enemy forces. Gunners working together are supposed to follow orders from their vehicle's commander -- in this case, Baker. If there is no chance for orderly talk, the gunners are supposed to watch their commander's aim and shoot in the same direction.

As they pulled alongside the ridge, the gunners poured an undisciplined barrage of hundreds of rounds into the area where Tillman and other members of Serial 1 had taken up positions, Army investigators later concluded. The gunner of the M-2 .50-caliber machine gun in Baker's truck fired every round he had.

The shooters saw only "shapes," a Ranger-appointed investigator wrote, and all of them directed bursts of machine gun fire "without positively identifying the shapes."

Yet not everyone in Baker's convoy was confused. The driver of Baker's vehicle or the one behind him -- the records are not clear -- pulled free of the ambush canyon and quickly recognized the parked U.S. Army vehicles of Serial 1 ahead of him.

He looked to his right and saw a bearded Afghan firing an AK-47, "which confused me for a split second," but he then quickly saw the rest of Serial 1 on top of the ridge.

The driver shouted twice: "We have friendlies on top!" Then he screamed "No!" Then he yelled several more times to cease fire, he recalled. "No one heard me."

"We thought the battle was over, so we were relieved."

Up on the ridge, Tillman and Rangers around him began to wave their arms and shout. But they only attracted more fire from Baker's vehicle.

"I saw three to four arms pop up," one of the gunners with Baker recalled. "They did not look like the cease-fire hand-and-arm signal because they were waving side to side." When he and the other gunners spotted the waving arms, their "rate of fire increased."

The young Ranger nearest Tillman on the ridge, whose full name could not be confirmed, saw a Humvee coming down the road. "They made eye contact with us," then began firing, he remembered. Baker's heavily armed vehicle "rolled into our sight and started to unload on top of us. They would work in bursts."

Tillman and nearly a dozen other Rangers on the ridge tried everything they could: They shouted, they waved their arms, and they screamed some more.

"Ranger! Ranger! Cease fire!" one soldier on the ridge remembered shouting.

"But they couldn't hear us," recalled the soldier nearest Tillman. Then Tillman "came up with the idea to let a smoke grenade go." As its thick smoke unfurled, "This stopped the friendly contact for a few moments," the Ranger recalled.

"We thought the battle was over, so we were relieved, getting up and stretching out, and talking with one another."

Suddenly he saw the attacking Humvee move into "a better position to fire on us." He heard a new machine gun burst and hit the ground, praying, as Pat Tillman fell.

"I started screaming. . . . I was scared to death and didn't know what to do."

A sergeant farther up the ridge from Tillman fired a flare -- an even clearer signal than Tillman's smoke grenade that these were friendly forces.

By now Baker's truck had pulled past the ridge and had come into plain sight of Serial 1's U.S. vehicles. Baker said later that he looked down the road, then back up to the ridge. He saw the flare and identified Rangers even as he continued to shoot at the Afghan he believed to be a Taliban fighter. Finally he began to call for a cease-fire.

In the village behind Tillman's ridge, Uthlaut and his radio operator had been pinned down by the streams of fire pouring from Baker's vehicle. Both were eventually hit by what they assumed was machine gun fire.

The last of Serial 2's vehicles pulled up in the village. All the firing had stopped.

The platoon sergeant jumped out and began searching for Uthlaut, angry that nobody seemed to know what was happening. He found the lieutenant sitting near a wall of the village, dropped down beside him and demanded to know what he was doing. "At that point I spotted the blood around his mouth" and realized there were casualties -- and that Uthlaut was one of them, wounded but still conscious.

On the ridge the young Ranger nearest Pat Tillman screamed, "Oh my [expletive] God!" again and again, as one of his comrades recalled. The Ranger beside Tillman had been lying flat as Tillman initially called out for a cease-fire, yelling out his name. Then Tillman went silent as the firing continued. Now the young Ranger saw a "river of blood" coming from Tillman's position. He got up, looked at Tillman, and saw that "his head was gone."

"I started screaming. . . . I was scared to death and didn't know what to do."

A sergeant on the ridge took charge. He called for a medic, ordered Rangers to stake out a perimeter picket in case Taliban guerrillas attacked again, and opened a radio channel to the 75th Ranger Regiment's operations center at Bagram.

Seventeen minutes after Serial 2 had entered the canyon, 2nd Platoon reported that its forces "were no longer in contact," as a Ranger-appointed investigator later put it. It was not clear then or later who the Afghan attackers spotted by half a dozen Rangers in both serials had been, how many guerrillas there were, or whether any were killed.

Nine minutes later, a regiment log shows, the platoon requested a medevac helicopter and reported two soldiers killed in action. One was the Afghan militia soldier. The other was Pat Tillman, age 27.

His brother Kevin arrived on the scene in Serial 2's trailing vehicle.

Kevin Tillman declined to be interviewed for these articles and was not asked by Ranger investigators to provide sworn statements. But according to other statements and sources familiar with the investigation, Kevin was initially asked to take up guard duty on the outskirts of the shooting scene.

He learned that his brother was dead only when a platoon mate mentioned it to him casually, according to these sources.

It would take almost five more weeks -- after a flag-draped coffin ceremony, a Silver Star award and a news release, and a public memorial attended by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Jake Plummer and newswoman Maria Shriver -- for the Rangers or the Army to acknowledge to Kevin Tillman, his family or the public that Pat Tillman had been killed by his own men.

Staff writer Josh White contributed to this report.

Tomorrow: The Army investigates

-- and protects its own.

Army Spun Tale Around Ill-Fated Mission

By Steve Coll
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, December 6, 2004; Page A01

Second in a two-part series.

Just days after Pat Tillman died from friendly fire on a desolate ridge in southeastern Afghanistan, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command released a brief account of his last moments.

The April 30, 2004, statement awarded Tillman a posthumous Silver Star for combat valor and described how a section of his Ranger platoon came under attack.

"He ordered his team to dismount and then maneuvered the Rangers up a hill near the enemy's location," the release said. "As they crested the hill, Tillman directed his team into firing positions and personally provided suppressive fire. . . . Tillman's voice was heard issuing commands to take the fight to the enemy forces."

It was a stirring tale and fitting eulogy for the Army's most famous volunteer in the war on terrorism, a charismatic former pro football star whose reticence, courage and handsome beret-draped face captured for many Americans the best aspects of the country's post-Sept. 11 character.

It was also a distorted and incomplete narrative, according to dozens of internal Army documents obtained by The Washington Post that describe Tillman's death by fratricide after a chain of botched communications, a misguided order to divide his platoon over the objection of its leader and undisciplined firing by fellow Rangers.

The Army's public release made no mention of friendly fire, even though at the time it was issued, investigators in Afghanistan had already taken at least 14 sworn statements from Tillman's platoon members that made clear the true causes of his death. The statements included a searing account from the Ranger nearest Tillman during the firefight, who quoted him as shouting "Cease fire! Friendlies!" with his last breaths.

Army records show Tillman fought bravely during his final battle. He followed orders, never wavered and at one stage proposed discarding his heavy body armor, apparently because he wanted to charge a distant ridge occupied by the enemy, an idea his immediate superior rejected, witness statements show.

But the Army's published account not only withheld all evidence of fratricide, but also exaggerated Tillman's role and stripped his actions of their context. Tillman was not one of the senior commanders on the scene -- he directed only himself, one other Ranger and an Afghan militiaman, under supervision from others. And witness statements in the Army's files at the time of the news release describe Tillman's voice ringing out on the battlefield mainly in a desperate effort, joined by other Rangers on his ridge, to warn comrades to stop shooting at their own men.

The Army's April 30 news release was just one episode in a broader Army effort to manage the uncomfortable facts of Pat Tillman's death, according to internal records and interviews.

During several weeks of memorials and commemorations that followed Tillman's death, commanders at his 75th Ranger Regiment and their superiors hid the truth about friendly fire from Tillman's brother Kevin, who had fought with Pat in the same platoon, but was not involved in the firing incident and did not know the cause of his brother's death. Commanders also withheld the facts from Tillman's widow, his parents, national politicians and the public, according to records and interviews with sources involved in the case.

On May 3, Ranger and Army officers joined hundreds of mourners at a public ceremony in San Jose, where Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Denver Broncos quarterback Jake Plummer and Maria Shriver took the podium to remember Tillman. The visiting officers gave no hint of the evidence investigators had collected in Afghanistan.

In a telephone interview, McCain said: "I think it would have been helpful to have at least their suspicions known" before he spoke publicly about Tillman's death. Even more, he said, "the family deserved some kind of heads-up that there would be questions."

McCain said yesterday that questions raised by Mary Tillman, Pat's mother, about how the Army handled the case led him to meet twice earlier this fall with Army officers and former acting Army secretary Les Brownlee to seek answers. About a month ago, McCain said, Brownlee told him that the Pentagon would reopen its investigation. McCain said that he was not certain about the scope of the new investigation but that he believed it is continuing. A Pentagon official confirmed that an investigation is underway, but Army spokesmen declined to comment further.

When she first learned that friendly fire had taken her son's life, "I was upset about it, but I thought, 'Well, accidents happen,' " Mary Tillman said in a telephone interview yesterday. "Then when I found out that it was because of huge negligence at places along the way -- you have time to process that and you really get annoyed."

Army Cites Probable Friendly Fire

As memorials and news releases shaped public perceptions in May, Army commanders privately pursued military justice investigations of several low-ranking Rangers who had fired on Tillman's position and officers who issued the ill-fated mission's orders, records show.

Army records show that Col. James C. Nixon, the 75th Ranger Regiment's commander, accepted his chief investigator's findings on the same day, May 8, that he was officially appointed to run the case. A spokesman for U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, which is legally responsible for the investigation, declined to respond to a question about the short time frame between the appointment and the findings.

The Army acknowledged only that friendly fire "probably" killed Tillman when Lt. Gen. Philip R. Kensinger Jr. made a terse announcement on May 29 at Fort Bragg, N.C. Kensinger declined to answer further questions and offered no details about the investigation, its conclusions or who might be held accountable.

Army spokesmen said last week that they followed standard policy in delaying and limiting disclosure of fratricide evidence. "All the services do not prematurely disclose any investigation findings until the investigation is complete," said Lt. Col. Hans Bush, chief of public affairs for the Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg. The Silver Star narrative released on April 30 came from information provided by Ranger commanders in the field, Bush said.

Kensinger's May 29 announcement that fratricide was probable came from an executive summary supplied by Central Command only the night before, he said. Because Kensinger was unfamiliar with the underlying evidence, he felt he could not answer questions, Bush said.

For its part, Central Command, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, handled the disclosures "in accordance with [Department of Defense] policies," Lt. Cmdr. Nick Balice, a command spokesman, said in an e-mail on Saturday responding to questions. Asked specifically why Central Command withheld any suggestion of fratricide when Army investigators by April 26 had collected at least 14 witness statements describing the incident, Balice wrote in an e-mail: "The specific details of this incident were not known until the completion of the investigation."

Few Guidelines for Cases

The U.S. military has confronted a series of prominent friendly-fire cases in recent years, in part because hair-trigger technology and increasingly lethal remote-fire weapons can quickly turn relatively small mistakes into deadly tragedies. Yet the military's justice system has few consistent guidelines for such cases, according to specialists in Army law. Decision-making about how to mete out justice rests with individual unit commanders who often work in secret, acting as both investigators and judges. Their judgments can vary widely from case to case.

"You can have tremendously divergent outcomes at a very low level of visibility," said Eugene R. Fidell, president of the National Institute of Military Justice and a visiting lecturer at Harvard Law School. "That does not necessarily contribute to public confidence in the administration of justice in the military. Other countries have been moving away" from systems that put field commanders in charge of their own fratricide investigations, he said.

In the Tillman case, those factors were compounded by the victim's extraordinary public profile. Also, Tillman's April 22 death was announced just days before the shocking disclosure of photographs of abuse by U.S. soldiers working as guards in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison. The photos ignited an international furor and generated widespread questions about discipline and accountability in the Army.

Commemorations of Tillman's courage and sacrifice offered contrasting images of honorable service, undisturbed by questions about possible command or battlefield mistakes.

Whatever the cause, McCain said, "you may have at least a subconscious desire here to portray the situation in the best light, which may not have been totally justified."

A Disaster Unfolds

Working in private last spring, the 75th Ranger Regiment moved quickly to investigate and wrap up the case, Army records show.

Immediately after the incident, platoon members generated after-action statements, and investigators working in Afghanistan gathered logs, documents and e-mails. The investigators interviewed platoon members and senior officers to reconstruct the chain of events. By early May, the evidence made clear in precise detail how the disaster unfolded.

On patrol in Taliban-infested sectors of Afghanistan's Paktia province, Tillman's "Black Sheep" platoon, formally known as 2nd Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, became bogged down because of a broken Humvee. Lt. David Uthlaut, the platoon leader, recommended that his unit stay together, deliver the truck to a nearby road, then complete his mission. He was overruled by a superior officer monitoring his operations from distant Bagram, near Kabul, who ordered Uthlaut to split his platoon, with one section taking care of the Humvee and the other proceeding to a village, where the platoon was to search for enemy guerrillas.

Steep terrain and high canyon walls prevented the two platoon sections from communicating with each other at crucial moments. When one section unexpectedly changed its route and ran into an apparent Taliban ambush while trapped in a deep canyon, the other section from a nearby ridge began firing in support at the ambushers. As the ambushed group broke free from the canyon, machine guns blazing, one heavily armed vehicle mistook an allied Afghan militiaman for the enemy and poured hundreds of rounds at positions occupied by fellow Rangers, killing Pat Tillman and the Afghan.

Investigators had to decide whether low-ranking Rangers who did the shooting had followed their training or had fired so recklessly that they should face military discipline or criminal charges. The investigators also had to decide whether more senior officers whose decisions contributed to the chain of confusion around the incident were liable.

Reporting formally to Col. Nixon in Bagram on May 8, the case's chief investigator offered nine specific conclusions, which Nixon endorsed, according to the records.

Among them:

• The decision by a Ranger commander to divide Tillman's 2nd Platoon into two groups, despite the objections of the platoon's leader, "created serious command and control issues" and "contributed to the eventual breakdown in internal Platoon communications." The Post could not confirm the name of the officer who issued this command.

• The A Company commander's order to the platoon leader to get "boots on the ground" at his mission objective created a "false sense of urgency" in the platoon, which, "whether intentional or not," led to "a hasty plan." That officer's name also could not be confirmed by The Post.

• Sgt. Greg Baker, the lead gunner in the Humvee that poured the heaviest fire on Ranger positions, "failed to maintain his situational awareness" at key moments of the battle and "failed" to direct the firing of the other gunners in his vehicle.

• The other gunners "failed to positively identify their respective targets and exercise good fire discipline. . . . Their collective failure to exercise fire discipline, by confirming the identity of their targets, resulted in the shootings of Corporal Tillman."

The chief investigator appeared to reserve his harshest judgments for the lower-ranking Rangers who did the shooting rather than the higher-ranking officers who oversaw the mission. While his judgments about the senior officers focused on process and communication problems, the chief investigator wrote about the failures in Baker's truck:

"While a great deal of discretion should be granted to a leader who is making difficult judgments in the heat of combat, the Command also has a responsibility to hold its leaders accountable when that judgment is so wanton or poor that it places the lives of other men at risk."

Gen. John P. Abizaid, CENTCOM's commander in chief, formally approved the investigation's conclusions on May 28 under an aide's signature and forwarded the report to Special Operations commanders "for evaluation and any action you deem appropriate to incorporate relevant lessons learned."

Deciding Accident or Crime

The field investigation's findings raised another question for Army commanders: Were the failures that resulted in Pat Tillman's death serious enough to warrant administrative or criminal charges?

In the military justice system, field officers such as Nixon, commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, can generally decide such matters on their own.

In the end, one member of Tillman's platoon received formal administrative charges, four others -- including one officer -- were discharged from the Rangers but not from the Army, and two additional officers were reprimanded, Lt. Col. Bush said. He declined to release their names, citing Privacy Act restrictions.

Baker left the Rangers on an honorable discharge when his enlistment ended last spring, while others who were in his truck remain in the Army, said sources involved in the case.

Military commanders have occasionally leveled charges of involuntary manslaughter in high-profile friendly-fire cases, such as one in 2002 when Maj. Harry Schmidt, an Illinois National Guard pilot, mistakenly bombed Canadian troops in Afghanistan. But in that case and others like it, military prosecutors have found it difficult to make murder charges stick against soldiers making rapid decisions in combat.

And because there is no uniform, openly published military case law about when friendly-fire cases cross the line from accident to crime, commanders are free to interpret that line for themselves.

The list of cases in recent years where manslaughter charges have been brought is "almost arbitrary and capricious," said Charles Gittins, a former Marine who is Schmidt's defense lawyer. Gittins said that senior military officers tend to focus on low-ranking personnel rather than commanders. In Schmidt's case, he said, "every single general and colonel with the exception of Harry's immediate commander has been promoted since the accident." Schmidt, on the other hand, was ultimately fined and banned from flying Air Force jets.

Short of manslaughter, the most common charge leveled in fratricide is dereliction of duty, or what the military code calls "culpable inefficiency" in the performance of duty, according to military law specialists. This violation is defined in the Pentagon's official Manual for Courts-Martial as "inefficiency for which there is no reasonable or just excuse."

In judging whether this standard applies to a case such as Tillman's death, prosecutors are supposed to decide whether the accused person exercised "that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances."

Even if a soldier or officer is found guilty under this code, the punishments are limited to demotions, fines and minor discipline such as extra duty.

Records in the Tillman case do not make clear if Army commanders considered more serious punishments than this against any Rangers or officers, or, if so, why they were apparently rejected.

Staff writer Josh White contributed to this report.

© 2004 The Washington Post Company

In March 2005, Brigadier General Jones briefs my family on the findings of his investigation. Kevin and Marie are briefed at Fort Lewis, and Patrick, Mike, and I are briefed at Moffett Field; however, Patrick is briefed at a different time.

My casualty assistance liaison picks up Mike and me at my house and takes us to the airfield. Brigadier General Jones greets us just inside the door. He is a tall, well-built man with a confident and friendly demeanor. He walks us down several halls to a meeting room. We are seated around a conference table with various military personnel, one of whom is a JAG officer -- a judge advocate general, a legal officer -- Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hargis. General Jones stands behind a podium and begins his presentation. He indicates right away that light conditions were very poor that evening. I politely interrupt him and tell him that Colonel Bailey told us he walked the site where Pat was killed approximately twenty-four hours after the incident, and he told us the light conditions were good. He told us he didn't understand how Baker and his men could not see the friendlies. Jones tells us that Bailey didn't walk the site at that time; he says Bailey was there in the morning hours.

"Are you saying Bailey lied to us about that?"

"No, ma'am," he says, then continues with his presentation.

He tells us that the farthest distance the Afghan was from Baker's vehicle was seventy-five meters. He indicates that Pat was around sixty-five meters away. However, based on soldiers' statements and looking at the photographs, Mike says the distance between Pat and Baker's vehicle would have been around 35 meters.

I question Jones about how the men in the vehicle could have not seen the Afghan, Pat, and the other friendlies at such close distances. I remind him that Bailey had originally told us Pat and the AMF soldier were nearly 150 to 200 meters away.

"I find it suspicious now that the distances are shrinking and the light conditions are deteriorating. How is it the driver, Sayre, was able to identify the AMF soldier and the friendlies?" Mike asks. "And why didn't he do more to stop the shooting?"

"There wasn't time for him to stop the shooting. They shot up that ridgeline in a matter of four seconds."

"What! Four seconds?" Mike and I yell at once.

"It took longer than four seconds for Pat to pull the pin and throw the smoke grenade," Mike says.

"You're telling us the men in that vehicle shot up the ridgeline in a matter of four seconds? From the time they left the canyon until they stopped past the village?" I ask.

"Yes, ma'am."

"Well, Colonel Bailey told us Baker was out of the vehicle when he shot the Afghan. He also told us there were several lulls in fire. In fact, O'Neal states in his testimony the vehicle stopped firing, then they got in a better position to shoot before they opened up again," I say in frustration.

"No one got out of the vehicle. That early information is incorrect, and O'Neal is the least reliable witness because he was so traumatized," Jones says.

"You won't believe O'Neal, but you'll believe the guys who were shooting at him!"

Jones stares at me before moving on to his next point. He tells us that the Army is very sorry for the fact we weren't told about the circumstances of Pat's death sooner, but there was misunderstanding about the protocol. He says the Army is going to begin telling families right away when fratricide is suspected.

I ask the general if he knows why Pat's uniform, MOLLE [3], and other equipment were burned, and he tells me his things were a biohazard.

"Well, Pat's body was a biohazard; why didn't they leave the uniform on the body to go back to Dover? Commander Mallak, the medical examiner, told me that all uniforms and equipment must be returned with the body."

"That's a new policy, ma'am. Not everyone is familiar with it."

"Pat's death was a suspected fratricide," Mike says. "Shouldn't his things have been preserved as evidence? Isn't that common sense?"

The meeting is becoming frustrating, and I feel we are not getting any answers. General Jones tells us we won't get a copy of the thousand-plus- page report for several weeks, but I'm given a binder with his summary. Mike and I thank him and leave.

I sit up all night reading and rereading Jones's summary. I also go over the 15-6 again. At about seven a.m., I call my casualty assistance liaison and ask her if I can meet with the general again today. She says she will find out and call back. Fifteen minutes later, she calls back and tells me General Jones has agreed to see me again.

I walk into the familiar room and sit down at the table. The same personnel are seated there.

Jones greets me and gets up to stand behind his podium.

"Could you please not do that? Could you please just sit here at the table and talk to me?"

The general looks over at his JAG for a second, then sits down in a chair across from me.

I tell him I have gone through his summary binder, and I found a few things I want to talk about. I tell him there is a protocol already in place about telling families about suspected fratricide. I tell him that there is also a protocol in the books about preserving the uniforms and equipment of fallen soldiers, which has been in place since before the new edict. I tell him I don't understand why so many soldiers and officers were unaware of procedure.

General Jones listens to me but doesn't respond. I tell him that in looking at the statements in the 15-6 report, I'm sickened by the remarks of some of the soldiers in the vehicle. One of the soldiers is asked if he positively identified his target, and the soldier said, "No." He wanted to be in a firefight. I ask the general how he got away with saying something like that. The general agrees the remark is horrible, but he doesn't indicate anything will come of it.

I ask him if he looked into the orders that were given from Salerno, splitting the troops and moving in daylight. He tells me that even though splitting troops and moving in daylight is not policy, it had been done before. Again, I feel I'm getting nowhere. I tell General Jones he will be hearing from me after I have a chance to go through the whole report. I thank him and leave. Three weeks pass before we each finally get our copies of the report. The report fills six binders, although the fifth binder is classified and unavailable to us. Going through this report is daunting. I welcome taking a break from it today to visit Pat. Today Pat has been gone a year.

I drive to Santa Cruz to the Crow's Nest, where Pat proposed to Marie. Sitting on the deck, I stare out at the water. Five months ago, on Pat's birthday, we chartered a little Popeye-type boat and scattered Pat's glittering ashes just past the lighthouse. I tell Pat that he would have loved the run that was held in his honor last weekend. Six thousand people showed up to participate in the first annual Pat's Run, organized by the Pat Tillman Foundation. [4] It was a wonderful celebration of his life and his infectious spirit.

Throughout early spring, media people have been calling everyone in the family, offering to do stories or investigative pieces. For a time we were interested in 60 Minutes or Dateline doing an investigative piece, but ultimately both programs decide not to do anything because no family member will consent to be interviewed on camera. We had a family agreement that any story should be about Pat, not us. Josh White comes to the house and examines the Jones report once the documents arrive. He writes several solid pieces about his findings in the Washington Post, which draw attention to the lies told in Pat's situation.

One day he receives a phone call from the mother of a soldier killed just weeks after Pat. She is searching for someone to help her find answers. Josh calls me and asks if I will speak to her. He tells me her name is Peggy Buryj (pronounced "Booty"). I call her right away. Peggy tells me her son Jesse was killed May 4, 2004. She and her husband were first told Jesse was killed when a truck hit his vehicle. Three months later, they learned he was shot. Days ago she finally received Jesse's autopsy report, after nearly a year, and it revealed he was shot in the back. The Army is saying Polish allies killed him, but she doesn't know what to believe. I tell Peggy I have no formula in trying to get answers. Peggy is tough, smart, and resilient. I encourage her to keep fighting.

Looking through my incoming e-mail, I notice I received two messages from my casualty assistance liaison. I see Marie got them as well. One has an attachment of a psychological evaluation Pat had in December 2002. The other has the field hospital report attached. I had asked Marie, as Pat's next of kin, to request both months ago. I remembered that Pat had talked about having more psychological evaluations than anyone he knew, and I wanted to see if I could learn why the evaluations were given. I had wanted the field hospital report to help determine why Pat had the strange abrasions on his chest. Since we know the medic didn't attempt to defibrillate Pat, we think someone in the field hospital did.

I first open the two-page field hospital document. I feel trepidation as I begin to scan the pages. The report is filled out in typical doctor scrawl. The first page is dated April 22, 2004. I scan the page. There are notes written across the first sheet.

Gun/shrapnel to head No BP [blood pressure] or pulse obtainable Large calvarial defect: exposed grey matter No cardiac tones

I notice the second page looks as though it is dated April 25, 2004. The page is hole punched over the day, but I can clearly see that the last number is a 5, and not a 2, suggesting the date of death as April 25, 2004. The second page reads:

Surgery Pt [patient] died of wounds no vs [vital signs] obtainable [through] resuscitation Disposition-mortuary services

The document makes it look as though Pat died on the 25th. I turn back to the first page and read what the doctor wrote:

1. CPR performed 2. Trans to ICU for cont. CPR

What? If this were Pat, why would the doctor write that he was given CPR? Why would you transfer a man who had been dead for hours to intensive care for continued CPR? What kind of surgery would you perform on a man who had no brain and no skull, who was transported as a KIA (killed in action)?

I then open the psychological evaluation attachment, which is difficult to read. The psychologist's handwriting is so small that I use a magnifying glass to try to make out what it says. There are only a few lines I can read. One statement indicates that Pat is a "moderate risk." Others say he "doesn't respect authority" and "Cockiness will get him in trouble, will square off with authority," "arrogant."

I'm outraged as I read this assessment of Pat. I put the document aside, and I start to feel sick. Why would a psychologist write such things? Pat may have had some authority issues as a teenager, but not the man I knew before he died. I immediately am reminded of a lovely letter Pat's platoon leader, Lieutenant David Uthlaut, sent to Patrick and me last Christmas. He described Pat as down-to-earth and someone who was unusual in his consideration of others. He told a story about Pat's relationship with younger Rangers, particularly Bryan O'Neal, the soldier whose life Pat saved.

"Whenever a new soldier comes into the platoon," Uthlaut wrote, "the more senior soldiers generally take to 'initiating' them in some fashion, and make them prove themselves worthy of being in the Rangers. Pat saw his role very differently. When Private O'Neal came into the platoon and got assigned to Pat's fire team, Pat did not force him to prove himself; instead, he made it his primary mission to prepare this young and inexperienced soldier for the upcoming deployment. Every time I walked by the squad room, Pat was instructing; he was either showing O'Neal battle drills with a whiteboard and marker, showing him how to properly tie down his equipment, or giving him general advice on how to survive. By showing that he was not only knowledgeable, but that he also genuinely cared for the soldier under his charge, Pat embodied the qualities of a true leader. He will forever have my respect, not because he turned down NFL contracts to serve his country, but because he was an exceptional soldier and a talented leader."

I was very touched by Lieutenant Uthlaut's letter, and after I received it, I called him, and we had a nice conversation. He's an honorable man, and it is obvious he carries a sad and heavy burden because of what happened. I am sure he would be as dumbfounded as I am by the psychologist's evaluation of Pat.

A few days later, walking along Almaden Road, I watch the flags flutter in the slight breeze. The neighborhood put the flags up for the first anniversary of Pat's death. I cried when I drove down the driveway and saw them once again flanking the road.

Today is Memorial Day. I wonder if the flags will come down or if they will be left until after the Fourth of July. As I walk up the driveway, three hens and a rooster scurry past me. Walking across my yard, I notice a paper has been left on the ledge of my Dutch door. It is a printout of a column written by Robert Scheer titled A Cover-Up as Shameful as Tillman's Death. My neighbor Annie must have left it for me. I sit in a lawn chair in the warm sun and read. Mr. Scheer, a nationally syndicated columnist, clearly has been following Pat's story, and he very pointedly blames the administration for covering up Pat's death. I'm impressed with the courage it took to write the piece.

A Cover-Up as Shameful as Tillman's Death

The next day I place a call to Robert Scheer at USC, where he teaches, to thank him for writing the column. He doesn't answer, so I leave a message asking that he call me. When he returns my call, his voice sounds uneasy. He tells me he was a bit afraid to call me. He thought I might have been unhappy with the piece. I laugh that he would take pot shots at the administration, but he was afraid of a phone call from me. Before we ended the conversation, Mr. Scheer asks if he might be able to come see the report. I tell him he can come anytime. He asks if the upcoming Saturday is all right, and I say yes. He then asks if he can bring his wife, the deputy editor of the San Francisco Chronicle. I tell him that it would be fine.

Early afternoon on Saturday, Robert Scheer and Narda Zacchino drive up my driveway.

_______________

Notes:

1. Soldier responsible for directing artillery fire and close air support onto enemy positions.

2. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

3. Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment.

4. The Pat Tillman Foundation seeks to carry forward Pat's legacy by inspiring and supporting young people striving to promote positive change in themselves and the world around them.

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