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Chapter 12
Action is the
antidote to despair.
-- JOAN BAEZ
I have been home
for nearly a week. I'm still living out of the suitcase I
took with me to Birmingham, and I'm trying to organize some of the
letters, cards, and other tributes people have sent to me since Pat's
death.
I look through a stack of cards and come across one from Pat's agent,
Frank Bauer. I sit looking at the card, reminded of a phone conversation
I had with Mr. Bauer shortly after Pat's death.
He told me he had
never met anyone even remotely like Pat, then he
went on to tell me how he was also the agent of Mike Martz, head coach
of the St. Louis Rams. In 2000, the Rams had just won the Super Bowl
after a remarkable 1999 season. Frank asked Pat to interview with the
Rams because they were interested in recruiting him. Pat didn't really
want to leave the Cardinals, but he agreed to meet with the Rams'
coaches, mostly as a favor to his agent. Mr. Bauer told me, "Mike Martz
loved Pat."
He told me the
team president, John Shaw, tried hard to get Pat to
make the move. He made an offer of $9.6 million for five years, with
$2.6 million up front. Mr. Bauer told me Pat said, "'No. Number one,
the Cardinals gave me a shot; Bob Ferguson [the general manager]
drafted me in the seventh round. I love Coach Mac; I love Phoenix, I've
played there, everybody knows me, I love the area; I don't want to
leave.'"
Pat was making $512,000 with the Cardinals. Mr. Bauer said to him,
"Pat, you're killing me!"
The story was
characteristically Pat. He was such a loyal person. He
always wanted to do right by the people who mattered to him. I remember
people trying to get him to rethink his position on accepting the
offer from the Rams, but he wouldn't budge. Not only did he feel he
owed it to his coaches and those who believed in him to stay, he also
liked the idea of being part of a team in transition. It wasn't
appealing or
challenging to him to be part of an already victorious team. He loved
being a Sun Devil in the years when the team was transformed from
mediocrity to a powerhouse. He hoped he could be part of the same
thing with the Cardinals.
I smile recalling
what a unique man Pat was, then become angry
thinking about the contradictions in the stories and documents with
regard to his death. I get on the computer and begin to look up all I
can
find on friendly fire deaths, and I enter Pat's name to see if
anyone with
knowledge of what happened to Pat has posted anything. After several
hours, I become very frustrated and angry. I type into the
computer,
"What happened to my son?" I'm so distraught; I expect an answer.
When none comes, I begin to cry.
School started two
weeks ago. Kevin calls as I'm leaving for work to
tell me Marie is having trouble getting Pat's autopsy from the Army. He
tells me he is going to talk to the casualty assistance liaison himself
and
see what he can do. He then tells me he has talked to the medic who got
to Pat's body first. The medic told him Pat was gone when he got to him. There was no attempt to save him. Hesitantly, he informs me the medic
said Pat's bulletproof Kevlar vest was riddled with green markings;
American ammunition is green-tipped. This further confirms that Pat
was hit by his own men. He told Kevin Pat's uniform and equipment had
been burned because they were a biohazard, and that one of the soldiers
who burned the vest mentioned the green tips. I can tell Kevin is
very
disturbed knowing Pat was hit so many times.
I try not to make
it worse for him by getting upset, but when I get off
the phone, I find myself feeling tremendous sadness and outrage. I think
to myself, "How could any of the soldiers not realize Pat was killed by
his
own men when his vest was full of U.S. rounds?" I leave for work,
but I
can't get the disturbing question out of my mind. I'm also angry that
the
Army hasn't provided Marie with Pat's autopsy report.
At lunchtime I
call Senator John McCain. I have made several calls
to him in the past few months about concerns we have. When he comes
on the line, I ask him if we are being unrealistic to expect Pat's
autopsy
after five months. He tells me we should have it by now and indicates he
will make sure it's sent to us. When I tell him I have many questions
about the 15-6 report, he tells me to formulate a list for the Army, and
he
will get it to the proper people.
When I get home, I
make dinner, grade a few papers, then sit at the
computer and try to find any information I can to help us determine
what happened to Pat. I look up smoke grenades. It has always baffled
me that Sergeant Greg Baker and his soldiers claim they never saw the
smoke when other soldiers indicate they did. I remember the smoke
quite well from seeing it used at Pat and Kevin's boot camp graduation.
It is thick and moves like liquid. I don't see how anyone could mistake
it
for flying dirt. I read that the average soldier can throw a grenade
about
thirty to thirty-five meters, and it ignites within three seconds. The
documents indicate that Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Bailey found the
grenade canister near the road just in front of where the vehicle would
have passed. This makes me wonder if Pat was far closer than we have
been told. I also discover that white smoke is produced for 105 to 150
seconds. Why didn't they see it?
The next day
school is busy and I'm somewhat distracted, but I keep
forming questions in my head to send to McCain. I'm also anxious about
the autopsy. I wonder if calling McCain is enough. Maybe I should call
the office of the secretary of the Army. Trying to contact people,
especially
with the time difference, is frustrating. I try to make my calls to
the East Coast in the morning before I go to work. It's often difficult
to
catch anyone during my break or lunchtime.
As soon as I get
home, I see an envelope from Fed Ex. The envelope
was sent from Rockville, Maryland; it's Pat's autopsy report. I sit at
my
kitchen table staring at the envelope that contains the coroner's
findings.
The cover letter tells me not to look at it alone, but I prefer to read
it by
myself. Slowly, I remove the cover letter and begin to read the
document.
The first time I read through, I process nothing. The second time
I'm struck by information that disturbs me. I go back and read the top
of
the first page.
Final Autopsy
Examination Report
Name: Tillman, Patrick D.
Autopsy No. xxxx-xxx
SSN: xxx-xx-xxxx
Date of Birth: 6 NOV 1976
Rank: CPL, US
Date of Death 22 APR 2004
Place of Death: Afghanistan
Date of Autopsy: 27 APR 2004 Place of Autopsy: Port Mortuary
Date of Report: 22 JUL 2004
I read where
it indicates Pat's autopsy was performed on April 27,
2004, then see where the date of the report is July 22, 2004. I wonder
why it took so long for the coroner to complete and sign the document.
The second page presents a description of the gunshot wounds. I don't
understand the information other than to recognize much of Pat's
head was gone. I move on to the next page. Pat was five foot eleven --
seventy-one inches tall -- but the autopsy states he was seventy-three
inches. I can't understand, considering the nature of his head wounds,
why he would measure taller.
The autopsy states
that Pat was wearing a gold wedding band, yet his
ring was platinum, having a dull, silver appearance. I'm also struck by
the
fact that no distinguishing features have been documented. Pat had a
scar under his right arm, the result of rotator cuff surgery; a torn
bicep
from a football injury; a broken little finger on his left hand; and
residual
scarring on his lungs from having had valley fever in college. None of
these features are mentioned. I then come to a section of the document
that says "Medical Interventions." It reads: "A 3-3/4 x 3-1/2 inch area
on the
left upper chest is consistent with an attempt at defibrillation."
"Defibrillation!"
I say out loud. Why would Pat be defibrillated? The
medic told Kevin that he made no attempt to save Pat on the scene. He
said Pat was clearly gone. Pat had been wrapped in a poncho and deemed
KIA, killed in action. He must have been dead nearly two hours before
he arrived at the field hospital. "Why would anyone defibrillate a body
with no head?"
I don't want to
alarm Marie, but I feel I must call her. I'm certain she
received the autopsy report as well, as I told McCain to have it sent to
both of us; however, I'm not certain she would have read it yet. When
Marie answers the phone, I attempt to make small talk, but she cuts me
off. She has read the report and feels as I do; something is wrong.
"That isn't Pat,"
she says.
The next morning
before I leave for work, I place a call to Commander
Craig Mallak, Armed Forces medical examiner at Rockville,
Maryland. Commander Mallak explains that he didn't perform Pat's
autopsy; a Dr. James Caruso did. He says Dr. Caruso is currently in
Iraq,
but he tells me he is quite familiar with Pat's case. I ask Dr.
Mallak why
Pat would measure two inches taller when he was missing so much of his
head. He tells me that the measurements aren't very exact. He says he
may have been measured with his toes pointed. The explanation sounds
ridiculous, but I just go on to the next concern. I tell him Pat's
wedding
band was platinum, yet the report says the ring was gold. Mallak tells
me
the ring was described from a photograph and that the lighting in the
room made the ring appear gold in the photograph.
"Why aren't
descriptions written down while looking at the body? It
makes no sense to describe details from a photograph."
"Yes, ma'am," he
says. "We can send you a cropped photo of your
son's hand if you like, or I can send you a photo of the ring itself
after it
was removed."
"Sir, my
daughter-in-law has Pat's ring. What concerns me is that we
might have the autopsy of the wrong man."
I ask him why none
of Pat's distinguishing features were documented.
I go over them with him carefully. He tells me the torn muscle
was not noted because they don't do internal examinations. He disregards
me when I explain that Pat's injury was plainly visible. Mallak
says there were no signs of active fungal infection of the lungs,
although
he admitted Pat's lungs were not looked at microscopically. Looking at
the pictures, he finds there is no indication of a rotator cuff scar or
a
broken finger. My frustration is mounting, and I feel as though I want
to cry.
"Why would Pat
have been defibrillated?" I ask. "He essentially had
no head, and he had been dead at least two hours before getting to the
field hospital."
"Ma'am," he says
self-righteously, "we normally don't fault someone
for trying to save someone's life."
I want to scream.
"I'm not faulting anyone, sir. I just wonder why
there was an attempt to save his life when he was so clearly gone."
The commander
explains that the shape of the abrasion on Pat's
chest was interpreted as a mark from a defibrillator. He says the
abrasion
could have been from prolonged CPR or other medical treatment. It is
as if he isn't hearing a word I'm saying. I can see I 'm getting
nowhere, and
I don't want to get so upset that I alienate him, but I ask him one more
question.
"Commander, why is
Pat's autopsy dated July 22, nearly three months
after the autopsy was performed?"
"Ma'am, Dr. Caruso
and I didn't believe the information we read on
the casualty report. Enemy rounds don't cause the type of wounds your
son had. Dr. Caruso refused to sign the autopsy report."
"Thank you,
Commander," I say, stunned, as I hang up the phone.
I have been
researching information on fratricides and trying to get
information on Pat's death since I returned home from Alabama. The
information I just learned from Dr. Mallak makes me more fearful and
suspicious that Pat may have been killed intentionally. I say very
little
about my suspicions to anyone other than my closest friends and family
because I know people won't understand. I have tried getting information
from the computer using Pat's name, but I always get ultra left-wing,
often irrational sites with far-fetched conspiracy theories. I have no
interest in reading them. I type in the words "military lies," and a
list of
sites comes up. I click on an article titled "Lies Upon Lies Upon Lies:
US
Military in Crisis," by Brian Cloughley, dated June 13, 2004, more than
three months ago, right about the time we were being briefed at Fort
Lewis. I scan the article and find it is quite interesting, but it
doesn't
have anything I'm looking for. Then, just when I'm ready to click off,
I read:
Here is the
official US Army citation concerning the award of
posthumous and hysterically-publicized bravery decoration to an
American soldier who was killed in Afghanistan on April 22.
Oh, my God! I
can't believe what I'm reading.
"Through the
firing [soldier X's] voice was heard issuing fire
commands to take the fight to the enemy on the dominating high
ground .... Only after his team engaged the well-armed enemy
did it appear their fires diminished. As a result of his leadership
and his team's efforts, the platoon trail section was able to
maneuver
through the ambush to positions of safety without a single
casualty."
But here is
what really happened, according to a reliable
source, an Afghan, who was reported by CBS News on May 29 as
saying that "two groups of soldiers had drifted some distance
apart during the operation in the remote Spera district of Khost
province. 'Suddenly the sound of a mine explosion was heard
somewhere between the two groups and the Americans in one
group started firing,' the official said, citing an account given to
him by an Afghan fighter who was part of that group .... 'Nobody
knew what it was ... or what was going on, or if enemy forces
were firing. The situation was very confusing,' the official said.
'As the result of this firing, that American was killed and three
Afghan soldiers were injured. It was a misunderstanding and
afterwards they realized that it was a mine that had exploded and
there were no enemy forces.'"
There was an
ambush with enemy forces, I say to myself. The information
I'm reading is shocking and frustrating. I had read an Associated Press
account of Pat's death just after the fratricide information was
released
that said there was no enemy and no ambush. The article stated there was
an explosion that caused confusion, and the two units of soldiers
started
firing on each other. However, that is not true. Kevin was involved in
the
ambush, and he and fellow soldiers saw enemy on the high ground, above
the canyon walls. I think, "If that wasn't the enemy, who was it?" I'm
perplexed
by the article's reference to three injured Afghans. "Three Afghans
weren't injured. Where is this information coming from?"
In other
words, there was a monster stuff-up. And this sort of
thing is far from unknown in battle: tragic disasters occur
frequently.
But what is astonishing and unforgivable is the deliberate,
systematic, official, Bush-government-approved lying about
what happened at the time.
It is evil and
dishonorable that the account of the death of this
young man was a Pentagon machine fabrication. The gallantry
citation was a downright lie, forged for public relations' [sic]
purposes
because soldier X had a national image.
The article goes
on to discuss how Lieutenant General Philip R.
Kensinger lied to the media in the press conference about what happened
to soldier X, whom I realize is Pat. When the members of the
press tried to get answers, he refused to take questions. The author
calls
Kensinger "a moral coward." Since we have learned about the fratricide,
I have wondered if Kensinger knew the true circumstances of Pat's death
when he came to the memorial service. It upsets and angers me that he
might have known the truth and let a false narrative be read. I have got
to find out more about the author of this article.
I discover Brian
Cloughley is a writer/journalist living in New Zealand.
He enlisted in the British Army in 1958 and served in both the
British and Australian armies. I read on from his Web site.
He was later
commissioned, spent nine years as an artillery
officer on regimental duty, mainly as a Forward Observer [1] and
saw active service in Borneo with 42 Commando, Royal
Marines; 1st Battalion Sarawak Rangers; and 4th Battalion of
the Royal Australian Regiment.
He also served
as an intelligence officer in Cyprus at the end
of colonial rule, on attachment with the Jordan Desert Police
Force, as Reconnaissance and Survey Officer in a nuclear missile
regiment in Germany, and officer commanding the Australian
Psychological Operations Unit in Vietnam ....
He has been
involved in analysis of South Asian affairs since
late 1970s. In 1985 he visited Pakistan at the invitation of
President
Zia, and travelled extensively in Balochistan. In 1996-1997
he was consultant to the OECD [2] on the relationship between
defence expenditure and international aid in South Asia and had
government-level discussions in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and
Sri Lanka.
When I finish
reading his biography, I learn his e-mail information is
provided, and I'm able to locate a phone number for him. It is clear Mr.
Cloughley has had extensive experience with the military, and he
continues
to work in Pakistan and surrounding regions. He has very solid
credentials. I need to know where he got his information about what
happened to Pat. I quickly type an e-mail and send it to him.
Mr. Cloughley
I'm Pat
Tillman's mother. I read your article, "Lies Upon Lies Upon Lies:
U.S. military in Crisis." I would very much like to speak to you.
The circumstances surrounding Pat's death are very suspicious. The
army has not given us a straight story either ....
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Mary L. Tillman
After sending the
e-mail, I also place a call to him. I have no idea
what time it is in New Zealand; I just hope I'm not calling at three in
the
morning. The call goes directly to an answering machine, and I leave a
message for him to contact me.
The following day
Mr. Cloughley writes:
Dear Mrs.
Tillman,
Thank you so
much for writing to me. I offer my deepest sympathy
on the loss of your son, I know you will always remember ...
no matter the circumstances of his death ... that he was a fine
person and behaved honorably.
I'm sorry but
I can't add anything to the official statements
and press reports about the cause of his death. If I knew anything
at all, I would of course tell you at once. And if I do hear
anything,
you will be the first to know.
At the moment
I am in Britain, attending a conference, then I
travel to Pakistan for a week, then go home to New Zealand.
He continues by
telling me he will be in touch when he returns home.
He says in the meantime he will ask his "discreet" sources if they know
anything about the manner in which Pat died.
Later that night,
I call Mike and tell him about the article and the
e-mail I received from Mr. Cloughley. Mike is very interested because
he also thinks something suspicious surrounds Pat's death. He is also
haunted by the autopsy report. It is a concern to both of us that local
Afghans keep reporting to U.S. and foreign press that there was no
enemy in the area when Pat was killed, yet there are witnesses who state
enemy were firing on the unit. I wonder if it's possible the ambush was
staged; I wonder if Pat was killed on purpose. Mike and I discuss the
timing of Pat's death. April was the worst month for recorded casualties
in the war; a tragically unsuccessful attempt had been made to capture
Fallujah, one of the most peaceful areas of the country after the fall
of
Saddam; and the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal was being made
public. Mike and I have believed for weeks that the military and the
administration lied about the circumstances of Pat's death to rally
patriotism
and deflect public outrage over the breaking news from Iraq. Now
we wonder if his death was deliberate.
Mike tells me he
has read a book called Bush on the Couch, by Dr.
Justin A. Frank. He tells me Dr. Frank is a psychiatrist who lives and
works in Georgetown. He has done a lot of research on the president and
has observed him from afar. The book states that Bush doesn't admire or
respect the soldiers; on the contrary, he resents them. They are true
warriors; Bush can only pretend. Mike brings the book to my house, and
I read all night. In the morning before leaving for work, I call
information
and get Dr. Frank's number at George Washington University
Medical School. I leave a message telling him my name and that my son
was killed in Afghanistan in April. I let him know I want to speak to
him
and that I will be home by four p.m. Pacific time, then I leave my
number.
When I return home from work, I have a message from Dr. Frank.
He tells me he knows who I am, and he will stay in his office until I
return home to call him. Immediately, I dial the number, and he answers
right away. I waste no time getting to the point.
"Hello, Dr.
Frank. I'm Mary Tillman. I don't want to waste your
time. I'm calling to ask you a question. Do you think it's possible that
this
administration orchestrated my son's death?"
"Sad to say,
yes."
I'm positively
stunned by his response. I thought he would gently tell
me that he doesn't believe the administration is very honorable, but it
would never do something so heinous as to have a soldier killed. "You
believe they killed him?" I ask numbly.
"I think it's
possible. Mrs. Tillman, I'm a psychiatrist. It would be
unethical and irresponsible for me to tell a grieving mother to pursue
such a thing if I didn't think it was possible."
Over the weekend
the whole family goes to Arizona. The Cardinals
are retiring Pat's number on Sunday, September 19. Mike and I fly to
Arizona together, and we talk about what Dr. Frank told me. Mike
encourages me to pursue answers. He has a very strong sense something
is wrong. Mike and I share our suspicions with Richard, who also
believes
we need to get more information. Kevin and Marie are not in a frame of
mind to discuss this topic. Kevin is especially apprehensive talking
about
this as anything but an accident.
While in Arizona,
I check my home messages. There's one from
Margaret Cloughley, Mr. Cloughley's wife. She received the phone message
I had sent days before and wanted to let me know her husband was
in Pakistan. I explain to her that he already responded to an e-mail I
sent
at the same time I left the phone message. She is very gracious and
concerned.
She says she feels terrible about what happened to Pat, and she
supports us in our search for answers and hopes her husband can be of
help when he returns.
On October 2, I
receive a long e-mail from Mr. Cloughley.
Dear Mrs.
Tillman,
I have now
returned home to New Zealand. During my travels
in the past month I talked with several people about your son.
There is no
doubt his death was the result of what we former
soldiers used to call a "patrol clash." I was close to one (but not
directly involved) in Borneo many years ago, and experienced the
shock that any soldier feels when things go terribly wrong and
involve the death of men who are killed in error by their own
comrades. But in [those] days (almost forty years ago) the natural
reaction was to admit and to explain what went wrong. Things
are different now.
The words
"friendly fire" disgust me. It is a typical PR weasel
phrase used to try to disguise the unpalatable fact that horrible
accidents happen. And in this case the tragedy was made worse
by lies told at the highest level to make it appear that your son
died in circumstances that were later detected as being falsely
described and notified.
... If you
wish the case to be given Maximum publicity, then
I suggest we approach a major newspaper. I happen to know the
managing editor of the Washington Post (Steve Coll: we were in
Pakistan together 10 years ago when he was a reporter and I was
the Australian defense attache) and would be prepared to ask him
to have the story covered in a tasteful fashion.
I send Mr.
Cloughley a summary of what we have been able to piece
together about Pat's death. Again, he encourages me to contact Steve
Coll. He tells me he tried e-mailing him but didn't receive a response.
I
indicate to him that I will try to get in touch with him as well.
During my lunch
break at school, I call the Washington Post and ask
for Steve Coll. After a few minutes of conversation, Mr. Coll confides
that his Pentagon reporter was very suspicious about the way Pat's death
was reported by the Army. He is interested in talking to me in person
and
viewing the 15-6 report. I tell him that, coincidentally, I will be in
D.C. to
meet a friend in several weeks. I let him know I can go to the paper to
talk
to him. After ending the conversation, I call Senator McCain. I tell him
I will be writing questions and e-mailing them to him. I also let
him know
there are anomalies in the autopsy report, but I want to speak to Dr.
Caruso when he returns from Iraq before I do anything.
As soon as I get
home from work, I sit down at my computer, overwhelmed
with all the questions I have about Pat's death and its aftermath.
I go to my room and grab Pat's brown T-shirt and wrap it around
my neck. I sit back down at the computer, and the questions come rapidly
and sequentially.
1. Why would a
unit hold up for two days in a village in a hostile area to
repair a Humvee, allowing the enemy to prepare for an ambush?
Why does the vehicle have greater priority than the mission? Why
bring a jinga truck through a dangerously narrow canyon where an
ambush is likely to take place?
2. Why the
insistence from Florida to bring the vehicle to Tit rather
than abandon or destroy it? Why are orders coming from Florida
period?
3. Why were
the terms "dawn" and "dusk" used when orders were given
to move out to Manah? Why was military time not used?
4. Why the
hysterical reaction from Baker and his men? Aren't Rangers
trained to assess a situation before shooting?
5. Aren't
Rangers trained to go back and help sections of their troops
when they're in trouble?
6. Weren't
Baker and his men prepared to watch for the first serial, as
Rangers come back to help their troops?
7. The driver
of Baker's vehicle stated he recognized the Afghan as a
friendly "within a split second" of coming out of the canyon. He
also
saw friendlies on the ridgeline and U.S. vehicles down the road. Why
didn't the others see these things?
8. Why didn't
the driver do more to stop the shooting?
9. Why didn't
the driver physically yank Baker off the vehicle or do
something to let him know he was allowing his men to shoot at
friendlies?
10. There was
a cessation of fire after the AMF was killed. What caused
that cessation of fire? Bailey suggested at one point they were
reloading.
Don't they look around when they're reloading?
11. Baker and
his men say they had tunnel vision. If so, they had to have
seen what they were shooting. Why didn't they recognize them as
friendlies? Baker and his men also state they saw nothing. Which is
it? Why didn't they see the smoke?
12. Why did
Baker and his men shoot CPL Tillman in the head three
times and riddle his body with rounds?
13. Why did
Baker and his men drive down the road shooting at buildings?
Isn't that illegal?
14. Why were
CPL Tillman's clothes burned?
15. Why were
young soldiers under orders to keep quiet?
16. Why were
men asked to share the blame?
17. Why did it
take five weeks to tell the family CPL Tillman was killed
by his own men? Why was the family not given a copy of the 15-6
investigation prior to the meeting rather than when we were walking
out the door?
18. Why was
there no attempt to take accurate measurements?
19. Why were
there sketches of vehicles rather than photos of real
vehicles?
20. Why wasn't
a person situated near the rocks in the photos so scale
could be determined? Why were there no tough follow-up questions
posed to the soldiers?
21. Why was
CPL Tillman's death so embellished by the military?
22. Why did
LGEN Kensinger not take questions at the press conference
regarding the fratricide?
23. Why didn't
the military clear up the untrue and nebulous stories that
were released after fratricide was determined to have caused CPL
Tillman's death?
24. Why was
CPL Tillman's death called an accident?
25. Why has it
been stated there is no fault?
26. Why did
the Army try to convince Marie to have a military
funeral?
A week before
leaving for Washington D.C., I read a column in the
San Jose Mercury News about a woman named Dolores Kesterson,
who lives in nearby Santa Clara. Her son Erik had been a Marine for
eight years. In 2000, he earned the Navy and Marine Corps medal for
heroism after pulling seven fellow Marines from a flaming helicopter
after it crashed. Erik was living a civilian life when September 11th
compelled him to re-enlist, this time in the Army. On November 15,
2003, Erik was killed when a chopper, flying in the wrong airspace, hit
his Black Hawk helicopter. He was twenty-nine. Dolores was invited to
Fort Lewis in June, along with other families of fallen soldiers, to
meet
with President Bush. The column indicates she was shocked by his
behavior toward her. I call information and get her number. After
several
tries, I'm finally able to reach her, and we arrange to meet for coffee
the next day.
Dolores is a
strong, down-to-earth woman with a sharp sense of
humor and a quick wit. Her large blue eyes reveal sadness as she
takes out
a copy of the letter she wrote to George Bush when she went to Fort
Lewis. She describes how her purse was taken from her and searched.
She believes
the letter was shown to the president before he met with
her. She waited in a small cubicle until an aide announced, "The
president
will now see you." Dolores said [the president] "came marching in
and got right in my face ... eyeball to eyeball, and said, 'I'm George
Bush, president of the United States, and I understand you have
something
to say to me in private.'" She felt like he was attempting to intimidate
her. She would not be threatened, however.
She made it
clear to him that she believes the U.S. presence in Iraq is illegal. She
shortly changed the subject to her son, telling the president that he
was a young man with a zest for life and a wonderful sense of humor
whose favorite saying was "Life is good."
The president
looked at her blankly and said, "How do you know his
life would have been good?"
Dolores was
stunned by the insensitivity of his remark, and she shot
back, "Life is life, good or bad, nobody wants to die." Dolores says,
"Bush
has no conscience about the death and destruction he has caused."
What Dolores has
told me about her meeting with Bush is shameful,
yet I'm not really shocked. The president does not appear to have any
empathy. Anytime he tries to convey it, he comes across as insincere
or callous. Dolores and I talk for about an hour, sharing stories about
Pat and Erik. I let her know I will contact her when I return from
Washington.
During my break
the following day, I call Dr. Frank to let him know
I will be going to D.C. and I'll be staying in Georgetown. I ask if he
would be able to meet with me so I can show him the autopsy report. He
says he would be happy to look at any documents I have.
Just days before I
leave for my trip, I get a call from Dr. Caruso. He
gives me the same information Dr. Mallak gave me. But he indicates that
both he and Dr. Mallak were angry that Pat came back without his uniform
or equipment. He tells me that all fallen soldiers are to be returned
stateside with their uniforms. He mentions that the uniforms of wounded
soldiers are usually destroyed. He, like Mallak, doesn't understand why
I'm unwilling to accept the idea that someone tried to defibrillate Pat.
He tells me I should have Marie request the field hospital report to
find
out what procedures were done there.
As soon as I get
off the phone, I call Marie and Kevin and tell them
what Dr. Caruso advised. Marie says she will call her casualty
assistance
liaison and make the request. I tell her I believe someone wants it to
appear that there was an attempt at resuscitation because then there
would be a reason to destroy the uniform. Uniforms of wounded soldiers
can be destroyed. "I think they wanted it to appear Pat came in alive so
they would have a reason to remove his uniform and destroy it. They
needed to destroy the evidence of fratricide," I tell her.
I arrive in
Georgetown on Sunday, October 17. I meet my friend
Greg Martin for dinner, and we walk along M Street and talk about his
trip to Canada. The next day we both meet Dr. Frank for lunch. I show
him the 15-6 documents and the autopsy report. He agrees that many of
the soldiers' statements are confounding and says he doesn't think the
autopsy was very thorough. He believes I'm doing the right thing by
requesting answers.
On Tuesday, Greg
and I have lunch with Maura and Sheila Mandt
before Maura and I leave to see Steve Coll at the Post. Maura is
in the
media business, and she suggested she come with me in the event I need
some help. Once we arrive at the paper, we are taken to an area outside
Steve Coll's office, where we wait for a few minutes. Mr. Coll comes out
and introduces himself and his Pentagon correspondent, Josh White.
We follow both of them through a maze of reporter cubicles to a meeting
room where we sit around a large conference table.
I don't want to
waste their time with small talk. I take out all the
documents and place them on the table, then I draw a map of the canyon
and label Magarah, Tit, and Manah. I outline the sequence of events and
indicate movements on the map. I then outline all the anomalies and
discuss my suspicions. I tell them what we find disturbing about the
autopsy report. Steve is quite a quick study. It doesn't take him long
to
understand the situation. Josh White tells me he was present at both
news conferences, the one that broke the news of Pat's death and the one
that revealed his death was a fratricide. He says there was something
suspicious about both of them. It was clear the Army was holding back.
I tell Steve and
Josh that I would like them to do a story presenting
Pat's true actions and the irregularities in the documents. I make
it
clear that I'm not convinced Pat's death was an accident and that my
family feels the soldiers in the vehicle who killed Pat and the AMF
soldier and wounded Uthlaut and Lane should have faced more serious
consequences. We suspect they weren't dealt with more severely
because a court-martial would implicate individuals of higher rank. I
let them know that no one in our family wants to be quoted in the
story. I explain that Pat's persona puts us in an awkward position, and
we are not comfortable being in the public eye. Steve calls his
secretary
in to make photocopies of the documents.
Shortly after I
get back to San Jose, I learn that Senator McCain
gave my questions to the acting secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee.
He asked the US Army Special Operations Command to address the
conduct of the earlier investigation, the handling of evidence, and the
delayed reporting of the true nature of Pat's death and report back to
him. Lieutenant General Philip R. Kensinger assigned Brigadier General
Gary Jones to conduct another 15-6 investigation into Pat's death.
I also learn
from Kevin that he met an officer who did a previous
investigation, which started within hours of Pat's death. The officer
Captain Richard Scott became Kevin's Company Commander when
Kevin asked for a reassignment when the unit came back from Afghanistan.
One day, Kevin spoke to Scott regarding his unhappiness with
the Army's handling of his brother's death. Scott attempted to help
Kevin by talking to him and trying to clarify some of the
inconsistencies
in the investigation. Scott seemed to allude that he had recommended
harsher punishment for some of the soldiers involved in the
shooting and he had similar concerns about the ambiguity of the orders
given. The regiment took over Scott's investigation and told him they
were handing it over to an officer of higher rank. Kevin says Captain
Scott was shocked to learn the soldiers were not more harshly punished.
Kevin and I discuss the fact that he will have to make sure Brigadier
General Jones knows about Captain Scott's investigation.
I stay in touch
with Steve Coll, keeping him updated with any information
we get. He wants to go to Afghanistan to visit the site where Pat
died and talk to local Afghans about what took place that day. I want to
travel to Afghanistan with him, but Kevin doesn't approve. He is adamant
that it's too dangerous for anyone to go over there. I don't want to
worry him, so I let Steve know I can't go.
The first week of
December, I receive a letter from a Los Angeles
Times reporter, David Zucchino, which is addressed to Pat's father
and
me. The letter indicates that he has been in Afghanistan and has spoken
to locals in and around Manah who say there was no enemy and no
ambush. Mr. Zucchino says he is informing us as a courtesy that he will
be writing the story within the week. I try to call Steve right away to
let
him know the reporter intends to write the story, but I can't reach him.
The whole purpose of asking Steve to write the story is to get the story
of Pat's death right -- to get to the truth. If this reporter writes his
piece
without looking at documents or interviewing soldiers, he is going to
skew the facts even more.
I place a call to
Zucchino and tell him his story isn't that newsworthy.
I let him know that the Associated Press printed a story in June about
the fact there was no ambush. I explain that my son Kevin was there, and
there were people shooting at the serial from the top of the canyon. He
seems surprised when I tell him Kevin was part of the platoon. I can't
believe he has never heard Kevin was there. I tell him I really
don't think
it's a good idea for him to write a story without the benefit of soldier
statements. I suggest he will embarrass himself if the writes the
story.
During the
conversation, I give him information off the record, telling
him he can use it to track down other facts. By the end of the
conversation,
Zucchino tells me he won't write the story without looking into
the facts further. I find out he also called Patrick, who told him the
same
thing I did: that he needs to get more information before he writes a
piece.
That evening I get
a call from Steve and I tell him about the reporter.
Steve says he'll have to rush his story. He doesn't believe the reporter
will hold up his article. On December 5, part one of Steve's story on
Pat
comes out in the Washington Post. The piece is comprehensive,
powerful,
and distressing. It angers me on many levels that the Army lied about
Pat's death, but what upsets me most is that Pat was removed from the
context of his death and turned into a caricature. Steve did an amazing
job presenting the events of April 22 and establishing Pat's true and
honorable
actions that fateful day.
On Monday,
December 6, part two is published, and it is equally
compelling and poignant. However, David Zucchino's story is printed
that same morning in the LA Times. I'm absolutely furious -- not
only did
he write facts that were not carefully checked, he also quoted
information
I gave him off the record. Patrick called to tell me Zucchino quoted
him inappropriately as well. To be publicly quoted against your wishes
is
unsettling and a serious violation of journalistic ethics. I call Mr.
Zucchino
and tell him to never contact me again.
Barrage of Bullets
Drowned Out Cries of Comrades
Communication Breakdown, Split Platoon Among the Factors
Contributing to 'Friendly Fire'
By Steve Coll
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, December 5, 2004; Page A01
First in a
two-part series
It ended on a stony
ridge in fading light. Spec. Pat Tillman lay dying behind a
boulder. A young fellow U.S. Army Ranger stretched prone
beside him, praying quietly as tracer bullets poured in.
"Cease fire!
Friendlies!" Tillman cried out.
Smoke drifted from
a signal grenade Tillman had detonated minutes before in a
desperate bid to show his platoon members they were shooting
the wrong men. The firing had stopped. Tillman had stood up,
chattering in relief. Then the machine gun bursts erupted
again.
"I could hear the
pain in his voice," recalled the young Ranger days later to
Army investigators. Tillman kept calling out that he was a
friendly, and he shouted, "I am Pat [expletive] Tillman,
damn it!" His comrade recalled: "He said this over and over
again until he stopped."
Myths shaped Pat
Tillman's reputation, and mystery shrouded his death. A
long-haired, fierce-hitting defensive back with the Arizona
Cardinals of the National Football League, he turned away a
$3.6 million contract after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to
volunteer for the war on terrorism, ultimately giving his
life in combat in Taliban-infested southeastern Afghanistan.
Millions of stunned
Americans mourned his death last April 22 and embraced his
sacrifice as a rare example of courage and national service.
But the full story of how Tillman ended up on that Afghan
ridge and why he died at the hands of his own comrades has
never been told.
Dozens of witness
statements, e-mails, investigation findings, logbooks, maps
and photographs obtained by The Washington Post show that
Tillman died unnecessarily after botched communications, a
mistaken decision to split his platoon over the objections
of its leader, and negligent shooting by pumped-up young
Rangers -- some in their first firefight -- who failed to
identify their targets as they blasted their way out of a
frightening ambush.
The records show
Tillman fought bravely and honorably until his last breath.
They also show that his superiors exaggerated his actions
and invented details as they burnished his legend in public,
at the same time suppressing details that might tarnish
Tillman's commanders.
Army commanders
hurriedly awarded Tillman a posthumous Silver Star for valor
and released a nine-paragraph account of his heroism that
made no mention of fratricide. A month later the head of the
Army's Special Operations Command, Lt. Gen. Philip R.
Kensinger Jr., called a news conference to disclose in a
brief statement that Tillman "probably" died by "friendly
fire." Kensinger refused to answer questions.
Friends and family
describe Pat Tillman as an American original, a maverick who
burned with intensity. He was wild, exuberant, loyal,
compassionate and driven, they say. He bucked convention,
devoured books and debated conspiracy theories. He demanded
straight talk about uncomfortable truths.
After his death,
the Army that Tillman served did not do the same.
"I
play football. It just seems so unimportant compared to
everything that has taken place."
Pat Tillman's decision to trade the celebrity and luxury of
pro football for a grunt's life at the bottom of the Ranger
chain of command shocked many people, but not those who felt
they knew him best.
"There was so much
more to him than anyone will ever know," reflected Denver
Broncos quarterback Jake Plummer, a teammate at Arizona
State University and on the Cardinals, speaking at a
memorial service last May. Tillman was "fearless on the
field, reckless, tough," yet he was also "thought-provoking.
He liked to have deep conversations with a Guinness," and he
would walk away from those sessions saying, "I've got to
become more of a thinker."
In high school and
college, a mane of flaxen hair poured from beneath his
football helmet. His muscles rippled in a perfect taper from
the neck down. "Dude" was his favorite pronoun; for fun he
did handstands on the roof of the family house. He pedaled
shirtless on a bicycle to his first pro training camp.
"I play football.
It just seems so unimportant compared to everything that has
taken place," he told NFL Films after the Sept. 11 attacks.
His grandfather had been at Pearl Harbor. "A lot of my
family has gone and fought wars, and I really haven't done a
damn thing."
He was very close
to his younger brother Kevin, then playing minor league
baseball for the Cleveland Indians organization. They
finished each other's sentences, friends recounted. They
enlisted in the U.S. Army Rangers together in the spring of
2002. Less than a year later, they shipped out to Iraq.
In Pat Tillman's
first firefight during the initial months of the Iraq war,
he watched his lead gunner die within minutes, stepped into
his place and battled steadfastly, said Steve White, a U.S.
Navy SEAL on the same mission. "He was thirsty to be the
best," White said.
Yet Tillman
accepted his ordinary status in the military and rarely
talked about himself. One night he confided to White that he
had just turned down an NFL team's attempt to sign him to a
huge contract and free him from his Army service early.
"I'm going to
finish what I started," Tillman said, as White recalled at
the May memorial. The next morning Tillman returned to duty
and was ordered to cut "about an acre of grass by some
19-year-old kid."
The Tillman
brothers served together in the "Black Sheep," otherwise
known as 2nd Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger
Regiment. They were elite -- special operators transferred
from Iraq in the spring to conduct sweep and search missions
against the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants in eastern
Afghanistan. The Rangers worked with CIA paramilitaries,
Afghan allies and other special forces on grid-by-grid
patrols designed to flush out and entrap enemy guerrillas.
They moved in small, mobile, lethal units.
On April 13, 2004,
the Tillman brothers rolled out with their fellow Black
Sheep from a clandestine base near the Pakistan border to
begin anti-Taliban patrols with two other Ranger platoons. A
week later the other platoons returned to base. So did the
two senior commanding officers of A Company, records show.
They left behind the 2nd Platoon to carry on operations near
Khost, in Paktia province, a region of broken roads and
barren rock canyons frequented by Osama bin Laden and his
allies for many years before the Sept. 11 attacks.
Left in command of
the 2nd Platoon was then-Lt. David A. Uthlaut, a recent
graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where
he had been named the prestigious first captain of his
class. Now serving as a captain in Iraq, Uthlaut declined to
be interviewed for these articles, but his statements and
field communications are among the documents obtained by The
Post.
Uthlaut's
mission, as Army investigators later put it, was to kill or
capture any "anti-coalition members" that he and his men
could find.
"This
vehicle problem better not delay us any more."
The trouble began with a Humvee's broken fuel pump.
A helicopter flew into
Paktia with a spare on the night of April 21. But the next
morning, the Black Sheep's mechanic had no luck with his
repair.
Uthlaut ordered his
platoon to pull out. He commanded 34 men in nine vehicles,
including the busted Humvee. They towed the broken vehicle
with straps because they lacked a proper tow bar. After
several hours on rough dirt-rock roads, the Humvee's front
end buckled. It could move no farther. Uthlaut pulled his
men into a tiny village called Margarah to assess options.
It was just after
noon. They were in the heart of Taliban country, and they
were stuck.
Uthlaut messaged
his regiment's Tactical Operations Center far away at Bagram,
near Kabul. He asked for a helicopter to hoist the Humvee
back to base. No dice, came the reply: There would be no
transport chopper available for at least two or three days.
While Uthlaut tried
to develop other ideas, his commanders at the base squabbled
about the delay. According to investigative records, a
senior officer in the Rangers' operations center, whose name
is redacted from documents obtained by The Post, complained
pointedly to A Company's commander, Uthlaut's immediate
superior.
"This vehicle
problem better not delay us any more," the senior officer
said, as he later recalled in a sworn statement. The 2nd
Platoon was already 24 hours behind schedule, he said. It
was supposed to be conducting clearing operations in a
southeastern Afghan village called Manah.
"So
the only reason you want me to split up is so I can get
boots on the ground in sector before it gets dark?"
By 4 p.m. Uthlaut had a solution, he believed. He could hire
a local "jinga truck" driver to tow the Humvee out to a
nearby road where the Army could move down and pick it up.
In this scenario, Uthlaut told his commanders, he had a
choice. He could keep his platoon together until the Humvee
had been disposed of, then move to Manah. Or, he could
divide his platoon in half, with one "serial" handling the
vehicle while the other serial moved immediately to the
objective.
The A Company commander, under pressure from his superior to
get moving, ordered Uthlaut to split his platoon.
Uthlaut objected.
"I would recommend sending our whole platoon up to the
highway and then having us go together to the villages," he
wrote in an e-mail to the operations center at 5:03 p.m.
With sunset approaching, he wrote, even if he split the
platoon, the serial that went to Manah would not be able to
carry out search operations before dark. And under
procedures at the time, he was not supposed to conduct such
operations at night.
Uthlaut's
commander overruled him. Get half your platoon to Manah
right away, he ordered.
But why? Uthlaut
asked, as he recalled in a sworn statement. Do you want us
to change procedures and conduct sweep operations at night?
No, said the A
Company commander.
"So the only reason
you want me to split up is so I can get boots on the ground
in sector before it gets dark?" an incredulous Uthlaut
asked, as he recalled.
Yes, said his
commander.
Uthlaut tried "one
last-ditch effort," pointing out that he had only one heavy
.50-caliber machine gun for the entire platoon. Did that
change anything? The commander said it did not.
"At that point I
figured I had pushed the envelope far enough and accepted
the mission," Uthlaut recalled in the statement.
He pulled his men
together hastily and briefed them. Twenty-four hours after
its detection, the broken Humvee part had brought them to a
difficult spot: They had to divide into two groups quickly
and get moving across a darkening, hostile landscape.
Serial 1, led by
Uthlaut and including Pat Tillman, would move immediately to
Manah.
Serial 2, with the
local tow truck hauling the Humvee, would follow, but would
soon branch off toward a highway to drop off the vehicle.
Sgt. Greg Baker, a
young and slightly built Ranger nearing the end of his
enlistment, commanded the heaviest-armed vehicle in Serial
2, just behind the jinga tow truck. Baker's men wielded the
.50-caliber machine gun, plus an M-240B machine gun, an
M-249 squad automatic weapon and three M-4 carbines. Baker's
truck would do the heaviest shooting if there were any
attack. Two of his gunners had never seen combat before.
Baker left the
Rangers last spring; he declined to comment for these
articles. A second gunner in his vehicle, Trevor Alders,
also declined to discuss the incident.
Kevin Tillman was
also assigned to Serial 2. He manned an MK19 gun in the
trailing vehicle, well behind Baker.
They left Margarah
village a little after 6 p.m. They had been in the same
place for more than five hours, presenting an inviting
target for Taliban guerrillas.
Pat Tillman's
serial, with Uthlaut in command, soon turned into a steep
and narrow canyon, passed through safely and approached
Manah as planned.
Behind them, Serial
2 briefly started down a different road, then stopped. The
Afghan tow truck driver said he could not navigate the
pitted road. He suggested they turn around and follow the
same route that Serial 1 had taken. After Serial 2 passed
Manah, the group could circle around to the designated
highway. Serial 2's leader, the platoon sergeant, agreed.
There was no radio
communication between the two serials about this change in
plans.
At 6:34 p.m. Serial
2, with about 17 Rangers in six vehicles, entered the narrow
canyon that Serial 1 had just left.
"I
noticed rocks falling . . . then I saw the second and third
mortar round hit."
When he heard the
first explosion, the platoon sergeant thought one of his
vehicles had struck a land mine or a roadside bomb.
They had been in
the canyon only a minute. In his machine gun-laden truck,
Greg Baker also thought somebody had hit a mine. He and his
men jumped out of their vehicle. Baker looked up at the
sheer canyon walls. The canyon was five to 10 yards across
at its narrowest. "I noticed rocks falling," he recalled in
a statement, and "then I saw the second and third mortar
rounds hit." He could hear, too, the rattle of enemy
small-arms fire.
It was not a bomb
-- it was an ambush. Baker and his comrades thought they
could see their attackers moving high above them. They began
to return fire.
They were trapped
in the worst possible place: the kill zone of an ambush. The
best way to beat a canyon ambush is to flee the kill zone as
fast as possible. But Baker and his men had dismounted their
vehicles. Worse, when they scrambled back and tried to move,
they discovered that the lumbering Afghan tow truck in their
serial was stalled, blocking their exit.
Baker "ran up and
grabbed" the truck driver and his Afghan interpreter and
"threw them in the truck and started to move," as he
recalled. He fired up the canyon walls until he ran out of
ammunition. Then he jumped from the tow truck, ran back to
his vehicle and reloaded. When the tow truck stopped again,
Baker shouted at his own driver to move around it.
Finally freed,
Baker's heavily armed Humvee raced out of the ambush canyon,
its machine guns pounding fire, its inexperienced shooters
coursing with adrenaline.
"I
remember not liking his position."
Ahead of them,
parked outside a small village near Manah, David Uthlaut
heard an explosion. From his position he "could not see the
enemy or make an adequate assessment of the situation," so
he ordered his men to move toward the firing.
Uthlaut
designated Pat Tillman as one of three fire team leaders and
ordered him to join other Rangers "to press the fight," as
Uthlaut put it, against an uncertain adversary.
Uthlaut tried to
raise Serial 2 on his radio. He wanted to find out where the
Rangers were and to tell them where his serial had set up.
But he could not get through -- the high canyon walls
blocked radio signals.
Tillman and other
Rangers moved up a rocky north-south ridge that faced the
ambush canyon on a roughly perpendicular angle.
The light was
dimming. "It was like twilight," one Ranger in the fight
recalled. "You couldn't see colors, but you could see
silhouettes." Another soldier felt the light was "still
pretty good."
A sergeant with
Tillman on the ridge recalled he "could actually see the
enemy from the high northern ridge line. I could see their
muzzle flashes." The presumed Taliban guerrillas were about
half a mile away, he estimated.
Tillman approached
the sergeant and said "that he saw the enemy on the southern
ridge line," as the sergeant recalled. Tillman asked whether
he could drop his heavy body armor. "No," the sergeant
ordered.
"I didn't think
about it at the time, but I think he wanted to assault the
southern ridgeline," the sergeant recalled.
Instead, on the
sergeant's instructions, Tillman moved down the slope with
other Rangers and "into a position where he could engage the
enemy," the sergeant recalled. With Tillman were a young
Ranger and a bearded Afghan militia fighter who was part of
the 2nd Platoon's traveling party.
A Ranger nearby
watched Tillman take cover. "I remember not liking his
position," he recalled. "I had just seen a red tracer come
up over us . . . which immediately struck me as being a M240
tracer. . . . At that time the issue of friendly fire began
turning over in my mind."
Tillman and his
team fired toward the canyon to suppress the ambush. His
brother Kevin was in the canyon.
Several of Serial
2's Rangers said later that as they shot their way out of
the canyon, they had no idea where their comrades in Serial
1 might be.
"We
have friendlies on top! . . . No one heard me."
"Contact right!"
one gunner in Greg Baker's truck remembered hearing as they
rolled from the ambush canyon.
As he fired, Baker
"noticed muzzle flashes" coming from a ridge to the right of
the village they were now approaching. Everyone in his
vehicle poured fire at the flashes in a deafening roar.
"I saw a figure
holding an AK-47, his muzzle was flashing, he wasn't wearing
a helmet, and he was prone," Baker recalled in a statement.
"I focused only on him. I got tunnel vision."
Baker was aiming at
the bearded Afghan militia soldier in Pat Tillman's fire
team. He died in a fusillade from Baker's Humvee.
A gunner in Baker's
light truck later guessed they were "only about 100 meters"
from their new targets on the ridge, but they were "driving
pretty fast towards them."
Rangers are
trained to shoot only after they have clearly identified
specific targets as enemy forces. Gunners working together
are supposed to follow orders from their vehicle's commander
-- in this case, Baker. If there is no chance for orderly
talk, the gunners are supposed to watch their commander's
aim and shoot in the same direction.
As they pulled
alongside the ridge, the gunners poured an undisciplined
barrage of hundreds of rounds into the area where Tillman
and other members of Serial 1 had taken up positions, Army
investigators later concluded. The gunner of the M-2
.50-caliber machine gun in Baker's truck fired every round
he had.
The shooters saw
only "shapes," a Ranger-appointed investigator wrote, and
all of them directed bursts of machine gun fire "without
positively identifying the shapes."
Yet not everyone in
Baker's convoy was confused. The driver of Baker's vehicle
or the one behind him -- the records are not clear -- pulled
free of the ambush canyon and quickly recognized the parked
U.S. Army vehicles of Serial 1 ahead of him.
He looked to his
right and saw a bearded Afghan firing an AK-47, "which
confused me for a split second," but he then quickly saw the
rest of Serial 1 on top of the ridge.
The driver shouted
twice: "We have friendlies on top!" Then he screamed "No!"
Then he yelled several more times to cease fire, he
recalled. "No one heard me."
"We
thought the battle was over, so we were relieved."
Up on the ridge,
Tillman and Rangers around him began to wave their arms and
shout. But they only attracted more fire from Baker's
vehicle.
"I saw three to
four arms pop up," one of the gunners with Baker recalled.
"They did not look like the cease-fire hand-and-arm signal
because they were waving side to side." When he and the
other gunners spotted the waving arms, their "rate of fire
increased."
The young Ranger
nearest Tillman on the ridge, whose full name could not be
confirmed, saw a Humvee coming down the road. "They made
eye contact with us," then began firing, he remembered.
Baker's heavily armed vehicle "rolled into our sight and
started to unload on top of us. They would work in bursts."
Tillman and
nearly a dozen other Rangers on the ridge tried everything
they could: They shouted, they waved their arms, and they
screamed some more.
"Ranger! Ranger!
Cease fire!" one soldier on the ridge remembered shouting.
"But they couldn't
hear us," recalled the soldier nearest Tillman. Then Tillman
"came up with the idea to let a smoke grenade go." As its
thick smoke unfurled, "This stopped the friendly contact for
a few moments," the Ranger recalled.
"We thought the
battle was over, so we were relieved, getting up and
stretching out, and talking with one another."
Suddenly he saw the
attacking Humvee move into "a better position to fire on
us." He heard a new machine gun burst and hit the ground,
praying, as Pat Tillman fell.
"I
started screaming. . . . I was scared to death and didn't
know what to do."
A sergeant farther up
the ridge from Tillman fired a flare -- an even clearer
signal than Tillman's smoke grenade that these were friendly
forces.
By now Baker's
truck had pulled past the ridge and had come into plain
sight of Serial 1's U.S. vehicles. Baker said later that he
looked down the road, then back up to the ridge. He saw the
flare and identified Rangers even as he continued to shoot
at the Afghan he believed to be a Taliban fighter. Finally
he began to call for a cease-fire.
In the village
behind Tillman's ridge, Uthlaut and his radio operator had
been pinned down by the streams of fire pouring from Baker's
vehicle. Both were eventually hit by what they assumed was
machine gun fire.
The last of Serial
2's vehicles pulled up in the village. All the firing had
stopped.
The platoon
sergeant jumped out and began searching for Uthlaut, angry
that nobody seemed to know what was happening. He found the
lieutenant sitting near a wall of the village, dropped down
beside him and demanded to know what he was doing. "At that
point I spotted the blood around his mouth" and realized
there were casualties -- and that Uthlaut was one of them,
wounded but still conscious.
On the ridge the
young Ranger nearest Pat Tillman screamed, "Oh my
[expletive] God!" again and again, as one of his comrades
recalled. The Ranger beside Tillman had been lying flat as
Tillman initially called out for a cease-fire, yelling out
his name. Then Tillman went silent as the firing continued.
Now the young Ranger saw a "river of blood" coming from
Tillman's position. He got up, looked at Tillman, and saw
that "his head was gone."
"I started
screaming. . . . I was scared to death and didn't know what
to do."
A sergeant on the
ridge took charge. He called for a medic, ordered Rangers to
stake out a perimeter picket in case Taliban guerrillas
attacked again, and opened a radio channel to the 75th
Ranger Regiment's operations center at Bagram.
Seventeen minutes
after Serial 2 had entered the canyon, 2nd Platoon reported
that its forces "were no longer in contact," as a
Ranger-appointed investigator later put it. It was not
clear then or later who the Afghan attackers spotted by half
a dozen Rangers in both serials had been, how many
guerrillas there were, or whether any were killed.
Nine minutes later,
a regiment log shows, the platoon requested a medevac
helicopter and reported two soldiers killed in action. One
was the Afghan militia soldier. The other was Pat Tillman,
age 27.
His brother Kevin
arrived on the scene in Serial 2's trailing vehicle.
Kevin Tillman
declined to be interviewed for these articles and was not
asked by Ranger investigators to provide sworn statements.
But according to other statements and sources familiar with
the investigation, Kevin was initially asked to take up
guard duty on the outskirts of the shooting scene.
He learned that his
brother was dead only when a platoon mate mentioned it to
him casually, according to these sources.
It would take
almost five more weeks -- after a flag-draped coffin
ceremony, a Silver Star award and a news release, and a
public memorial attended by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Jake
Plummer and newswoman Maria Shriver -- for the Rangers or
the Army to acknowledge to Kevin Tillman, his family or the
public that Pat Tillman had been killed by his own men.
Staff
writer Josh White contributed to this report.
Tomorrow: The Army
investigates
-- and protects its
own.
Army Spun Tale
Around Ill-Fated Mission
By Steve Coll
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, December 6, 2004; Page A01
Second in
a two-part series.
Just days after Pat
Tillman died from friendly fire on a desolate ridge in
southeastern Afghanistan, the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command released a brief account of his last moments.
The April 30, 2004,
statement awarded Tillman a posthumous Silver Star for
combat valor and described how a section of his Ranger
platoon came under attack.
"He ordered his
team to dismount and then maneuvered the Rangers up a hill
near the enemy's location," the release said. "As they
crested the hill, Tillman directed his team into firing
positions and personally provided suppressive fire. . . .
Tillman's voice was heard issuing commands to take the fight
to the enemy forces."
It was a stirring
tale and fitting eulogy for the Army's most famous volunteer
in the war on terrorism, a charismatic former pro football
star whose reticence, courage and handsome beret-draped face
captured for many Americans the best aspects of the
country's post-Sept. 11 character.
It was also a
distorted and incomplete narrative, according to dozens of
internal Army documents obtained by The Washington Post that
describe Tillman's death by fratricide after a chain of
botched communications, a misguided order to divide his
platoon over the objection of its leader and undisciplined
firing by fellow Rangers.
The Army's
public release made no mention of friendly fire, even though
at the time it was issued, investigators in Afghanistan had
already taken at least 14 sworn statements from Tillman's
platoon members that made clear the true causes of his
death. The statements included a searing account from
the Ranger nearest Tillman during the firefight, who quoted
him as shouting "Cease fire! Friendlies!" with his last
breaths.
Army records show
Tillman fought bravely during his final battle. He followed
orders, never wavered and at one stage proposed discarding
his heavy body armor, apparently because he wanted to charge
a distant ridge occupied by the enemy, an idea his immediate
superior rejected, witness statements show.
But the Army's
published account not only withheld all evidence of
fratricide, but also exaggerated Tillman's role and stripped
his actions of their context. Tillman was not one of the
senior commanders on the scene -- he directed only himself,
one other Ranger and an Afghan militiaman, under supervision
from others. And witness statements in the Army's files
at the time of the news release describe Tillman's voice
ringing out on the battlefield mainly in a desperate effort,
joined by other Rangers on his ridge, to warn comrades to
stop shooting at their own men.
The Army's April 30
news release was just one episode in a broader Army effort
to manage the uncomfortable facts of Pat Tillman's death,
according to internal records and interviews.
During several
weeks of memorials and commemorations that followed
Tillman's death, commanders at his 75th Ranger Regiment and
their superiors hid the truth about friendly fire from
Tillman's brother Kevin, who had fought with Pat in the same
platoon, but was not involved in the firing incident and did
not know the cause of his brother's death. Commanders also
withheld the facts from Tillman's widow, his parents,
national politicians and the public, according to records
and interviews with sources involved in the case.
On May 3, Ranger
and Army officers joined hundreds of mourners at a public
ceremony in San Jose, where Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.),
Denver Broncos quarterback Jake Plummer and Maria Shriver
took the podium to remember Tillman. The visiting officers
gave no hint of the evidence investigators had collected in
Afghanistan.
In a telephone
interview, McCain said: "I think it would have been helpful
to have at least their suspicions known" before he spoke
publicly about Tillman's death. Even more, he said, "the
family deserved some kind of heads-up that there would be
questions."
McCain said
yesterday that questions raised by Mary Tillman, Pat's
mother, about how the Army handled the case led him to meet
twice earlier this fall with Army officers and former acting
Army secretary Les Brownlee to seek answers. About a month
ago, McCain said, Brownlee told him that the Pentagon would
reopen its investigation. McCain said that he was not
certain about the scope of the new investigation but that he
believed it is continuing. A Pentagon official confirmed
that an investigation is underway, but Army spokesmen
declined to comment further.
When she first
learned that friendly fire had taken her son's life, "I was
upset about it, but I thought, 'Well, accidents happen,' "
Mary Tillman said in a telephone interview yesterday. "Then
when I found out that it was because of huge negligence at
places along the way -- you have time to process that and
you really get annoyed."
Army
Cites Probable Friendly Fire
As memorials and
news releases shaped public perceptions in May, Army
commanders privately pursued military justice investigations
of several low-ranking Rangers who had fired on Tillman's
position and officers who issued the ill-fated mission's
orders, records show.
Army records show
that Col. James C. Nixon, the 75th Ranger Regiment's
commander, accepted his chief investigator's findings on the
same day, May 8, that he was officially appointed to run the
case. A spokesman for U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM,
which is legally responsible for the investigation, declined
to respond to a question about the short time frame between
the appointment and the findings.
The Army
acknowledged only that friendly fire "probably" killed
Tillman when Lt. Gen. Philip R. Kensinger Jr. made a terse
announcement on May 29 at Fort Bragg, N.C. Kensinger
declined to answer further questions and offered no details
about the investigation, its conclusions or who might be
held accountable.
Army spokesmen said
last week that they followed standard policy in delaying and
limiting disclosure of fratricide evidence. "All the
services do not prematurely disclose any investigation
findings until the investigation is complete," said Lt. Col.
Hans Bush, chief of public affairs for the Army Special
Operations Command at Fort Bragg. The Silver Star narrative
released on April 30 came from information provided by
Ranger commanders in the field, Bush said.
Kensinger's May 29
announcement that fratricide was probable came from an
executive summary supplied by Central Command only the night
before, he said. Because Kensinger was unfamiliar with the
underlying evidence, he felt he could not answer questions,
Bush said.
For its part,
Central Command, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in
Tampa, handled the disclosures "in accordance with
[Department of Defense] policies," Lt. Cmdr. Nick Balice, a
command spokesman, said in an e-mail on Saturday responding
to questions. Asked specifically why Central Command
withheld any suggestion of fratricide when Army
investigators by April 26 had collected at least 14 witness
statements describing the incident, Balice wrote in an
e-mail: "The specific details of this incident were not
known until the completion of the investigation."
Few
Guidelines for Cases
The U.S. military
has confronted a series of prominent friendly-fire cases in
recent years, in part because hair-trigger technology and
increasingly lethal remote-fire weapons can quickly turn
relatively small mistakes into deadly tragedies. Yet the
military's justice system has few consistent guidelines for
such cases, according to specialists in Army law.
Decision-making about how to mete out justice rests with
individual unit commanders who often work in secret, acting
as both investigators and judges. Their judgments can vary
widely from case to case.
"You can have
tremendously divergent outcomes at a very low level of
visibility," said Eugene R. Fidell, president of the
National Institute of Military Justice and a visiting
lecturer at Harvard Law School. "That does not necessarily
contribute to public confidence in the administration of
justice in the military. Other countries have been moving
away" from systems that put field commanders in charge of
their own fratricide investigations, he said.
In the Tillman
case, those factors were compounded by the victim's
extraordinary public profile. Also, Tillman's April 22
death was announced just days before the shocking disclosure
of photographs of abuse by U.S. soldiers working as guards
in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison. The photos ignited an
international furor and generated widespread questions about
discipline and accountability in the Army.
Commemorations
of Tillman's courage and sacrifice offered contrasting
images of honorable service, undisturbed by questions about
possible command or battlefield mistakes.
Whatever the cause,
McCain said, "you may have at least a subconscious desire
here to portray the situation in the best light, which may
not have been totally justified."
A
Disaster Unfolds
Working in private
last spring, the 75th Ranger Regiment moved quickly to
investigate and wrap up the case, Army records show.
Immediately after
the incident, platoon members generated after-action
statements, and investigators working in Afghanistan
gathered logs, documents and e-mails. The investigators
interviewed platoon members and senior officers to
reconstruct the chain of events. By early May, the evidence
made clear in precise detail how the disaster unfolded.
On patrol in
Taliban-infested sectors of Afghanistan's Paktia province,
Tillman's "Black Sheep" platoon, formally known as 2nd
Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment,
became bogged down because of a broken Humvee. Lt. David
Uthlaut, the platoon leader, recommended that his unit stay
together, deliver the truck to a nearby road, then complete
his mission. He was overruled by a superior officer
monitoring his operations from distant Bagram, near Kabul,
who ordered Uthlaut to split his platoon, with one section
taking care of the Humvee and the other proceeding to a
village, where the platoon was to search for enemy
guerrillas.
Steep terrain and
high canyon walls prevented the two platoon sections from
communicating with each other at crucial moments. When one
section unexpectedly changed its route and ran into an
apparent Taliban ambush while trapped in a deep canyon, the
other section from a nearby ridge began firing in support at
the ambushers. As the ambushed group broke free from the
canyon, machine guns blazing, one heavily armed vehicle
mistook an allied Afghan militiaman for the enemy and poured
hundreds of rounds at positions occupied by fellow Rangers,
killing Pat Tillman and the Afghan.
Investigators had
to decide whether low-ranking Rangers who did the shooting
had followed their training or had fired so recklessly that
they should face military discipline or criminal charges.
The investigators also had to decide whether more senior
officers whose decisions contributed to the chain of
confusion around the incident were liable.
Reporting formally
to Col. Nixon in Bagram on May 8, the case's chief
investigator offered nine specific conclusions, which Nixon
endorsed, according to the records.
Among them:
• The decision by a
Ranger commander to divide Tillman's 2nd Platoon into two
groups, despite the objections of the platoon's leader,
"created serious command and control issues" and
"contributed to the eventual breakdown in internal Platoon
communications." The Post could not confirm the name of the
officer who issued this command.
• The A Company
commander's order to the platoon leader to get "boots on the
ground" at his mission objective created a "false sense of
urgency" in the platoon, which, "whether intentional or
not," led to "a hasty plan." That officer's name also could
not be confirmed by The Post.
• Sgt. Greg Baker,
the lead gunner in the Humvee that poured the heaviest fire
on Ranger positions, "failed to maintain his situational
awareness" at key moments of the battle and "failed" to
direct the firing of the other gunners in his vehicle.
• The other gunners
"failed to positively identify their respective targets and
exercise good fire discipline. . . . Their collective
failure to exercise fire discipline, by confirming the
identity of their targets, resulted in the shootings of
Corporal Tillman."
The chief
investigator appeared to reserve his harshest judgments for
the lower-ranking Rangers who did the shooting rather than
the higher-ranking officers who oversaw the mission. While
his judgments about the senior officers focused on process
and communication problems, the chief investigator wrote
about the failures in Baker's truck:
"While a great deal
of discretion should be granted to a leader who is making
difficult judgments in the heat of combat, the Command also
has a responsibility to hold its leaders accountable when
that judgment is so wanton or poor that it places the lives
of other men at risk."
Gen. John P.
Abizaid, CENTCOM's commander in chief, formally approved the
investigation's conclusions on May 28 under an aide's
signature and forwarded the report to Special Operations
commanders "for evaluation and any action you deem
appropriate to incorporate relevant lessons learned."
Deciding Accident or Crime
The field
investigation's findings raised another question for Army
commanders: Were the failures that resulted in Pat Tillman's
death serious enough to warrant administrative or criminal
charges?
In the military
justice system, field officers such as Nixon, commander of
the 75th Ranger Regiment, can generally decide such matters
on their own.
In the end, one
member of Tillman's platoon received formal administrative
charges, four others -- including one officer -- were
discharged from the Rangers but not from the Army, and two
additional officers were reprimanded, Lt. Col. Bush said. He
declined to release their names, citing Privacy Act
restrictions.
Baker left the
Rangers on an honorable discharge when his enlistment ended
last spring, while others who were in his truck remain in
the Army, said sources involved in the case.
Military commanders
have occasionally leveled charges of involuntary
manslaughter in high-profile friendly-fire cases, such as
one in 2002 when Maj. Harry Schmidt, an Illinois National
Guard pilot, mistakenly bombed Canadian troops in
Afghanistan. But in that case and others like it, military
prosecutors have found it difficult to make murder charges
stick against soldiers making rapid decisions in combat.
And because
there is no uniform, openly published military case law
about when friendly-fire cases cross the line from accident
to crime, commanders are free to interpret that line for
themselves.
The list of cases
in recent years where manslaughter charges have been brought
is "almost arbitrary and capricious," said Charles Gittins,
a former Marine who is Schmidt's defense lawyer. Gittins
said that senior military officers tend to focus on
low-ranking personnel rather than commanders. In Schmidt's
case, he said, "every single general and colonel with the
exception of Harry's immediate commander has been promoted
since the accident." Schmidt, on the other hand, was
ultimately fined and banned from flying Air Force jets.
Short of
manslaughter, the most common charge leveled in fratricide
is dereliction of duty, or what the military code calls
"culpable inefficiency" in the performance of duty,
according to military law specialists. This violation is
defined in the Pentagon's official Manual for Courts-Martial
as "inefficiency for which there is no reasonable or just
excuse."
In judging whether
this standard applies to a case such as Tillman's death,
prosecutors are supposed to decide whether the accused
person exercised "that degree of care which a reasonably
prudent person would have exercised under the same or
similar circumstances."
Even if a soldier
or officer is found guilty under this code, the punishments
are limited to demotions, fines and minor discipline such as
extra duty.
Records in the
Tillman case do not make clear if Army commanders considered
more serious punishments than this against any Rangers or
officers, or, if so, why they were apparently rejected.
Staff
writer Josh White contributed to this report.
© 2004 The
Washington Post Company
|
In March 2005,
Brigadier General Jones briefs my family on the
findings of his investigation. Kevin and Marie are briefed at Fort
Lewis,
and Patrick, Mike, and I are briefed at Moffett Field; however, Patrick
is
briefed at a different time.
My casualty
assistance liaison picks up Mike and me at my house
and takes us to the airfield. Brigadier General Jones greets us just
inside the door. He is a tall, well-built man with a confident and
friendly demeanor. He walks us down several halls to a meeting room.
We are seated around a conference table with various military personnel,
one of whom is a JAG officer -- a judge advocate general, a legal
officer -- Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hargis. General Jones stands
behind a podium and begins his presentation. He indicates right away
that light conditions were very poor that evening. I politely interrupt
him and tell him that Colonel Bailey told us he walked the site where
Pat was killed approximately twenty-four hours after the incident, and
he told us the light conditions were good. He told us he didn't
understand
how Baker and his men could not see the friendlies. Jones tells us
that Bailey didn't walk the site at that time; he says Bailey was there
in
the morning hours.
"Are you saying
Bailey lied to us about that?"
"No, ma'am," he
says, then continues with his presentation.
He tells us that
the farthest distance the Afghan was from Baker's
vehicle was seventy-five meters. He indicates that Pat was around
sixty-five
meters away. However, based on soldiers' statements and looking at
the photographs, Mike says the distance between Pat and Baker's vehicle
would have been around 35 meters.
I question Jones
about how the men in the vehicle could have not
seen the Afghan, Pat, and the other friendlies at such close distances.
I
remind him that Bailey had originally told us Pat and the AMF soldier
were nearly 150 to 200 meters away.
"I find it
suspicious now that the distances are shrinking and the light
conditions are deteriorating. How is it the driver, Sayre, was able to
identify the AMF soldier and the friendlies?" Mike asks. "And why
didn't he do more to stop the shooting?"
"There wasn't time
for him to stop the shooting. They shot up that
ridgeline in a matter of four seconds."
"What! Four
seconds?" Mike and I yell at once.
"It took longer
than four seconds for Pat to pull the pin and throw
the smoke grenade," Mike says.
"You're telling us
the men in that vehicle shot up the ridgeline in a
matter of four seconds? From the time they left the canyon until they
stopped past the village?" I ask.
"Yes, ma'am."
"Well, Colonel
Bailey told us Baker was out of the vehicle when he
shot the Afghan. He also told us there were several lulls in fire. In
fact,
O'Neal states in his testimony the vehicle stopped firing, then they got
in a better position to shoot before they opened up again," I say in
frustration.
"No one got out of
the vehicle. That early information is incorrect,
and O'Neal is the least reliable witness because he was so traumatized,"
Jones says.
"You won't believe
O'Neal, but you'll believe the guys who were
shooting at him!"
Jones stares at me
before moving on to his next point. He tells us that
the Army is very sorry for the fact we weren't told about the
circumstances
of Pat's death sooner, but there was misunderstanding about the
protocol. He says the Army is going to begin telling families right away
when fratricide is suspected.
I ask the general
if he knows why Pat's uniform, MOLLE [3],
and other equipment were burned, and he tells me his things were a
biohazard.
"Well, Pat's body
was a biohazard; why didn't they leave the uniform
on the body to go back to Dover? Commander Mallak, the medical
examiner, told me that all uniforms and equipment must be returned
with the body."
"That's a new
policy, ma'am. Not everyone is familiar with it."
"Pat's death was a
suspected fratricide," Mike says. "Shouldn't his
things have been preserved as evidence? Isn't that common sense?"
The meeting is
becoming frustrating, and I feel we are not getting
any answers. General Jones tells us we won't get a copy of the
thousand-plus-
page report for several weeks, but I'm given a binder with his summary.
Mike and I thank him and leave.
I sit up all night
reading and rereading Jones's summary. I also go
over the 15-6 again. At about seven a.m., I call my casualty assistance
liaison and ask her if I can meet with the general again today. She says
she will find out and call back. Fifteen minutes later, she calls back
and
tells me General Jones has agreed to see me again.
I walk into the
familiar room and sit down at the table. The same
personnel are seated there.
Jones greets me
and gets up to stand behind his podium.
"Could you please
not do that? Could you please just sit here at the
table and talk to me?"
The general looks
over at his JAG for a second, then sits down in a
chair across from me.
I tell him I have
gone through his summary binder, and I found a few
things I want to talk about. I tell him there is a protocol already in
place
about telling families about suspected fratricide. I tell him that there
is
also a protocol in the books about preserving the uniforms and equipment
of fallen soldiers, which has been in place since before the new
edict. I tell him I don't understand why so many soldiers and officers
were unaware of procedure.
General Jones
listens to me but doesn't respond. I tell him that in
looking at the statements in the 15-6 report, I'm sickened by the
remarks
of some of the soldiers in the vehicle. One of the soldiers is asked if
he
positively identified his target, and the soldier said, "No." He wanted
to
be in a firefight. I ask the general how he got away with saying
something
like that. The general agrees the remark is horrible, but he doesn't
indicate
anything will come of it.
I ask him if he
looked into the orders that were given from Salerno,
splitting the troops and moving in daylight. He tells me that even
though
splitting troops and moving in daylight is not policy, it had been done
before. Again, I feel I'm getting nowhere. I tell General Jones he will
be
hearing from me after I have a chance to go through the whole report. I
thank him and leave. Three weeks pass before we each finally get our
copies of the report. The report fills six binders, although the fifth
binder is classified and unavailable to us. Going through this report is
daunting. I welcome taking a break from it today to visit Pat. Today Pat
has been gone a year.
I drive to Santa
Cruz to the Crow's Nest, where Pat proposed to
Marie. Sitting on the deck, I stare out at the water. Five months ago,
on
Pat's birthday, we chartered a little Popeye-type boat and scattered
Pat's
glittering ashes just past the lighthouse. I tell Pat that he would have
loved the run that was held in his honor last weekend. Six thousand
people
showed up to participate in the first annual Pat's Run, organized by
the Pat Tillman Foundation. [4] It was a wonderful celebration of his
life
and his infectious spirit.
Throughout early
spring, media people have been calling everyone
in the family, offering to do stories or investigative pieces. For a
time
we were interested in 60 Minutes or Dateline doing an
investigative
piece, but ultimately both programs decide not to do anything because
no family member will consent to be interviewed on camera. We had a
family agreement that any story should be about Pat, not us. Josh
White comes to the house and examines the Jones report once the
documents arrive. He writes several solid pieces about his findings
in the Washington Post, which draw attention to the lies told in
Pat's
situation.
One day he
receives a phone call from the mother of a soldier killed
just weeks after Pat. She is searching for someone to help her find
answers. Josh calls me and asks if I will speak to her. He tells
me her
name is Peggy Buryj (pronounced "Booty"). I call her right away.
Peggy tells me her son Jesse was killed May 4, 2004. She and her husband
were first told Jesse was killed when a truck hit his vehicle. Three
months later, they learned he was shot. Days ago she finally received
Jesse's autopsy report, after nearly a year, and it revealed he was shot
in
the back. The Army is saying Polish allies killed him, but she doesn't
know what to believe. I tell Peggy I have no formula in trying to get
answers. Peggy is tough, smart, and resilient. I encourage her to keep
fighting.
Looking through my
incoming e-mail, I notice I received two messages
from my casualty assistance liaison. I see Marie got them as well.
One has an attachment of a psychological evaluation Pat had in December
2002. The other has the field hospital report attached. I had asked
Marie, as Pat's next of kin, to request both months ago. I remembered
that Pat had talked about having more psychological evaluations than
anyone he knew, and I wanted to see if I could learn why the evaluations
were given. I had wanted the field hospital report to help determine
why Pat had the strange abrasions on his chest. Since we know the
medic didn't attempt to defibrillate Pat, we think someone in the field
hospital did.
I first open the
two-page field hospital document. I feel trepidation
as I begin to scan the pages. The report is filled out in typical
doctor
scrawl. The first page is dated April 22, 2004. I scan the page.
There are
notes written across the first sheet.
Gun/shrapnel
to head
No BP [blood pressure] or pulse obtainable
Large calvarial defect: exposed grey matter
No cardiac tones
I notice the
second page looks as though it is dated April 25, 2004.
The page is hole punched over the day, but I can clearly see that the
last
number is a 5, and not a 2, suggesting the date of death as April 25,
2004.
The second page reads:
Surgery
Pt [patient] died of wounds no vs [vital signs] obtainable
[through] resuscitation
Disposition-mortuary services
The document makes
it look as though Pat died on the 25th. I turn
back to the first page and read what the doctor wrote:
1. CPR
performed
2. Trans to ICU for cont. CPR
What? If this were
Pat, why would the doctor write that he was given
CPR? Why would you transfer a man who had been dead for hours to
intensive care for continued CPR? What kind of surgery would you perform
on a man who had no brain and no skull, who was transported as a
KIA (killed in action)?
I then open the
psychological evaluation attachment, which is difficult
to read. The psychologist's handwriting is so small that I use a
magnifying
glass to try to make out what it says. There are only a few lines I
can read. One statement indicates that Pat is a "moderate risk." Others
say he "doesn't respect authority" and "Cockiness will get him in
trouble,
will square off with authority," "arrogant."
I'm outraged as I
read this assessment of Pat. I put the document
aside, and I start to feel sick. Why would a psychologist write such
things? Pat may have had some authority issues as a teenager, but not
the
man I knew before he died. I immediately am reminded of a
lovely letter
Pat's platoon leader, Lieutenant David Uthlaut, sent to Patrick and me
last Christmas. He described Pat as down-to-earth and someone who
was unusual in his consideration of others. He told a story about Pat's
relationship with younger Rangers, particularly Bryan O'Neal, the
soldier whose
life Pat saved.
"Whenever a new
soldier comes into the platoon," Uthlaut wrote,
"the more senior soldiers generally take to 'initiating' them in some
fashion,
and make them prove themselves worthy of being in the Rangers.
Pat saw his role very differently. When Private O'Neal came into the
platoon and got assigned to Pat's fire team, Pat did not force him to
prove himself; instead, he made it his primary mission to prepare this
young and inexperienced soldier for the upcoming deployment. Every
time I walked by the squad room, Pat was instructing; he was either
showing O'Neal battle drills with a whiteboard and marker, showing
him how to properly tie down his equipment, or giving him general
advice on how to survive. By showing that he was not only knowledgeable,
but that he also genuinely cared for the soldier under his charge,
Pat embodied the qualities of a true leader. He will forever have my
respect, not because he turned down NFL contracts to serve his country,
but because he was an exceptional soldier and a talented leader."
I was very touched
by Lieutenant Uthlaut's letter, and after I received
it, I called him, and we had a nice conversation. He's an honorable man,
and it is obvious he carries a sad and heavy burden because of what
happened.
I am sure he would be as dumbfounded as I am by the psychologist's
evaluation of Pat.
A few days later,
walking along Almaden Road, I watch the flags flutter
in the slight breeze. The neighborhood put the flags up for the first
anniversary of Pat's death. I cried when I drove down the driveway and
saw them once again flanking the road.
Today is Memorial
Day. I wonder if the flags will come down or if
they will be left until after the Fourth of July. As I walk up the
driveway,
three hens and a rooster scurry past me. Walking across my yard, I
notice
a paper has been left on the ledge of my Dutch door. It is a printout of
a column written by Robert Scheer titled A Cover-Up as Shameful as
Tillman's Death. My neighbor Annie must have left it for me. I sit
in a
lawn chair in the warm sun and read. Mr. Scheer, a nationally syndicated
columnist, clearly has been following Pat's story, and he very pointedly
blames the administration for covering up Pat's death. I'm impressed
with the courage it took to write the piece.
A Cover-Up as Shameful
as Tillman's Death
Robert Scheer
May 31, 2005
The Nation
Once again it has
taken grieving relatives to point out that the Bush
Administration will exploit even a heroic death for its
own partisan purposes.
As with the
widows of September 11 who demanded that our obfuscating
leaders investigate what went wrong on that terrible
day, or the wounded Army Pfc. Jessica Lynch, who
resisted efforts to make her into some kind of Rambo
figure, so relatives of late NFL star Pat Tillman are
demanding to know why their celebrated war hero son's
death in 2004 was exploited for public relations
purposes by the US military and the administration.
"They blew up
their poster boy," Tillman's father, Patrick, a San Jose
lawyer, told the Washington Post last week. He
joined his former wife to demand accountability for the
latest military cover-up to happen on Commander in Chief
Bush's watch. High-ranking Army officials, he said, told
"outright lies."
"After it
happened, all the people in positions of authority went
out of their way to script this," Tillman said. "They
purposely interfered with the investigation.... I think
they thought they could control it, and they realized
that their recruiting efforts were going to go to hell
in a handbasket if the truth about his death got out."
A devastating
series of investigations and Post stories has
shown that the Army's command structure was eager to
cover up the embarrassing truth: that Pat Tillman, who
turned down a $3.6-million contract with the Arizona
Cardinals to join the Army Rangers after 9/11, was
accidentally killed by his fellow Rangers while on
patrol in Afghanistan a year ago.
Last spring,
after months of increasingly damaging reports exposing
the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and cover-up, the
administration found some public relations relief in the
sad, patriotic tale of a man who spurned fame and
fortune to make "the ultimate sacrifice in the war on
terror," in the words of a White House spokesman at the
time. A nationally televised memorial service and a
Silver Star commendation cemented Tillman's place as the
nation's first war hero since the story of Lynch's
capture and phony details of her rescue were foisted on
the public in 2003.
Now, thanks to
the reporting of the Post and the fury of
Tillman's parents, we know that the military's top
commanders were covering up the truth to protect their
image, and that of the Bush Administration's costly and
deadly "nation-building" exercises in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
Although
"soldiers on the scene said they were immediately sure
Tillman was killed by a barrage of American bullets,"
according to the Post, and "a new Army report on
the death shows that top Army officials, including the
theater commander, Gen. John P. Abizaid, were told that
Tillman's death was fratricide days before the service,"
Army officials decided not to inform Tillman's family or
the public until weeks after the memorial. And even
then, they provided no details and answered no
questions, saying only that friendly fire "probably"
killed Tillman.
"The fact that
he was the ultimate team player and he watched his own
men kill him is absolutely heartbreaking and tragic,"
Tillman's mother, Mary, told the Post. "The fact
that they lied about it afterward is disgusting."
The soldiers
on the ground said they burned Tillman's bullet-riddled
uniform and body armor, the Post reported,
because they considered them a biohazard, and because,
as one said, "we knew at the time, based on taking the
pictures and walking around it, it was a fratricide....
so we weren't thinking about proof or anything."
So, given all
this, why has nobody high in the Army chain of command,
such as Abizaid, been held accountable for this
cover-up?
Did President
Bush know about it? If not, why not? After all, this was
the most prominent soldier to die since Bush took office
four years earlier, a prize recruit for his
controversial spate of foreign invasions.
In any case,
the White House has refrained from making any public
apologies for the cover-up. Indeed, Mary Tillman said
she was particularly offended that even after the facts
were known, Bush exploited her son's death with a
message played before an Arizona Cardinal game last fall
before the election.
"Maybe lying's
not a big deal anymore," Patrick Tillman said. "Pat's
dead, and this isn't going to bring him back. But these
guys should have been held up to scrutiny, right up the
chain of command, and no one has."
For the
Tillmans, as with Pfc. Lynch and the 9/11 widows, the
path to true patriotism means confronting your
government when it lies.
|
The next day I
place a call to Robert Scheer at USC, where he
teaches, to thank him for writing the column. He doesn't answer, so I
leave a message asking that he call me. When he returns my call, his
voice sounds uneasy. He tells me he was a bit afraid to call me. He
thought I might have been unhappy with the piece. I laugh that he would
take pot shots at the administration, but he was afraid of a phone call
from me. Before we ended the conversation, Mr. Scheer asks if he might
be able to come see the report. I tell him he can come anytime. He asks
if the upcoming Saturday is all right, and I say yes. He then asks
if he can
bring his wife, the deputy editor of the San Francisco Chronicle.
I tell him
that it would be fine.
Early afternoon on
Saturday, Robert Scheer and Narda Zacchino
drive up my driveway.
_______________
Notes:
1. Soldier
responsible for directing artillery fire and close air support onto
enemy positions.
2. Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development.
3. Modular
Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment.
4. The Pat Tillman
Foundation seeks to carry forward Pat's legacy by inspiring and
supporting young people striving to promote positive change in
themselves and the world around them.
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