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BOOTS ON THE GROUND BY DUSK: MY TRIBUTE TO PAT TILLMAN |
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Chapter 13
Mr. Scheer and Ms. Zacchino appear taken aback by leafing through the five thick binders, more than two thousand pages of material, spread out on my dining room table. I explain that I have been reading and analyzing them for more than two months. The content of the binders is confusing and infuriating; there is so much material that each time I open one, I find information I missed on previous examinations. Just as in the previous 15-6 report, the pages are splotched with redactions, thick black lines where indelible marker has been used to conceal words, sentences, and entire paragraphs; reading them is painfully time-consuming and frustrating. The redacted information includes places, missions, equipment, and names -- essentially, most of the information that might allow my family and me to make sense of what happened to Pat. We were told the redactions of people's names are necessary to protect the privacy of individuals. Even my name is redacted in a section discussing the questions I had submitted to Senator McCain. Fortunately, through interviews with soldiers in Pat's platoon and information I gathered from other sources, I have been able to fill in some of the concealed information. As my guests seat themselves at the table, Ms. Zacchino tells me she knows some of the details of Pat's last mission; two months ago, she was a Pulitzer Prize juror and had read Steve Coll's Washington Post series; she said she was riveted by the stories and heartsick at the senselessness of Pat's death. I explain that Steve Coll had the daunting task of writing those articles after an investigation relying on an initial report that was about a hundred pages. For the next four and a half hours, I brief Mr. Scheer and Ms. Zacchino on what I have learned from studying the Jones report, starting at the beginning of the mission. The battalion deployed to Afghanistan on short notice as part of what the Army calls a "surge," a mission of short duration, intended in this case to disrupt the network of Jalaluddin Haqqani, commander of the Taliban forces and one of Osama bin Laden's most trusted associates in Afghanistan. The Rangers spent ten days patrolling the Pakistan border but found little evidence of Haqqani's fighters, so the chain of command, operating from the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in Salerno, decided to move A Company to a new "area of operations." The commanders pulled out all the forces except for Uthlaut's platoon, which they directed to clear one last village, Manah, five miles north of the Pakistan border. The platoon was stopped at an Afghan Militia Force checkpoint along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border on April 21, when Captain William Saunders and his executive officer, Captain Kirby Dennis, were called back to the TOC by Colonel Jeffrey Bailey to help plan the next operation. The aircraft coming to pick them up was going to bring a fuel pump to repair the disabled Humvee, and then the platoon would finish its mission. Saunders testified that he and other soldiers had been on the canyon road several times, and there had been no signs of the enemy in the area. The next day, Saunders had a meeting at another base with the Afghan Militia Force commander to discuss their next mission, and he returned to Salerno around noon. Dennis gave him an update on what was happening with Uthlaut's platoon and the disabled vehicle; it could not be repaired, so they had towed it as far as Magarah before they could not tow it farther. Dennis told Saunders about hiring the local jinga truck to haul it. I explain to Mr. Scheer and Ms. Zacchino that I do not know the identity of the TOC commander as the name is redacted, but in his testimony, he referred to the disabled vehicle as a "hangar queen" because of its poor condition. He also said he didn't want to have the jinga truck tow it all the way back to Salerno because "it's just embarrassing," yet this commander did not give orders to leave the vehicle behind or to destroy it. Saunders testified that it was important to get Manah cleared by the next day "so we would not get ourselves too far behind setting ourselves up for our next series of operations." All communications between the base and Uthlaut, who was seeking guidance about what to do with the vehicle, were by e-mail or satellite phone with Captain Dennis. A decision was made at the command center to end the delay and have Uthlaut split his platoon to get half his soldiers to Manah and the others to take the disabled vehicle to the wrecker on the highway. A sense of urgency was imposed on the platoon leader, requiring him to split his troops in order to accomplish both tasks quickly. Captain Saunders had to have known the potential for an ambush going through the canyon. Even though there had been no sign of the enemy when he was there, the fact that U.S. troops were stuck in Magarah for six hours certainly could allow time for the enemy to plan an attack. Saunders stated in his testimony that he thought the troops were going to split before entering the canyon, however in Uthlaut's communications with Captain Dennis, it's clear the two sections were going to take different routes before entering the deep and narrow pass. Not only did Uthlaut make the routes clear to the TOC, but the forward observer transmitted the route in his request for air support. When Serial Two entered the canyon, several soldiers remarked that it would be a "perfect place for an ambush": a narrow gorge with no easy escape. It was obvious to many of the Rangers that spending hours in Magarah, situated in the heart of an area known to be controlled by the Taliban, made them vulnerable. Numerous villagers overheard Rangers discuss the planned routes of the two serials, as well as negotiations with the jinga truck driver as to where the troops would be heading. One of the soldiers was obviously angry when he testified. He had been given a note written by the village doctor, who said he needed to talk to someone with the unit about "something bad" that was going to happen. The soldier told his superior, but that individual told the soldier to keep his mouth shut. In his testimony, the higher-ranking soldier said that troops get all kinds of warnings, and they can't follow up on all of them. There is confusion as to why the platoon set out during daylight. On an earlier deployment in Afghanistan in the fall of 2003, a member of A Company, Jay Blessing, had been killed by a roadside bomb while traveling in a daylight convoy near the Pakistan border. After that incident, the battalion commander, Colonel Bailey, had established a policy banning all daytime troop movement. It is suspicious to me that Colonel Bailey made a point of telling us on the visit to our house that Uthlaut misheard the order to get "boots on the ground by dawn" and instead heard "boots on the ground by dusk." In the report, it is well documented that the order was to get "boots on the ground by dark." It certainly seems that Bailey's explanation was an attempt to make Uthlaut appear at fault for daylight movement. Not only is there an attempt to fault Uthlaut for the fact the platoon set out for Manah before dark, there is also an attempt to portray the ambush as a far more intense engagement than it actually was in order to excuse the actions of a vehicle of overzealous soldiers. Although the attack began with a series of mortar or RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) rounds that came close to hitting the lead vehicles of Serial Two, within minutes the assault was over, most of the few attackers were in the process of fleeing, and only sporadic and extremely ineffective fire from small arms followed. Significantly, no vehicles or personnel had a single nick from the ambush, and there was no shrapnel damage. There is not one statement from any witness that more than three enemy "figures" ever were observed. Most of the confusion was not created by enemy fire but by the overwhelming and outsized reaction of the Rangers themselves, whose volume of fire was so great that it created the impression on those not directly engaged that it was a major firefight. I was surprised that Colonel Craig Nixon (who had not been there) also told General Jones that the intensity of the firefight was similar to the opening scenes of D-day in the film Saving Private Ryan. A comment that was absurd, as there was no carnage during the ambush; no one suffered so much as a scratch. It's hard to take any of Nixon's testimony seriously. The chain of command and the investigators seem to be concealing or minimizing the loss of discipline and fire control under the manufactured premise of an intense firefight. When the vehicle with Sergeant Baker and his men exited the canyon into the open area and began firing wildly onto the ridgeline, they were not taking fire from anywhere; Sergeant Baker testified that the AMF soldier was firing over his head, not at him, but Baker killed him anyway. Several of the soldiers remarked that they weren't taking fire or that they didn't know if they were taking fire. In their own words: "We were excited," "I wanted to stay in the firefight," "I wish I had taken a split second to identify my target." Their actions were not due to a fog of war, but a lust to fight. They were shooting so wildly they almost fired on the vehicle directly behind them. Sergeant Steven Walter, who was in charge of that vehicle and who saw the Americans on the ridge, testified about the behavior of Sergeant Baker and his men:
The soldiers in the vehicle said they did not "positively identify" their targets, but their neglect went far beyond that. The driver, Sergeant Kellett Sayre, said he saw friendlies on the ridgeline before Sergeant Baker shot the AMF, and several soldiers stated they saw waving hands. One soldier told General Jones it looked like the hands were trying to signal, "Hey, it's us." Even if you assume the soldiers believed the hands were those of an enemy soldier, to shoot at someone trying to surrender is a war crime. The vehicle then drove down the road as the occupants fired on structures occupied by women and children. Baker and his men clearly violated Rules of Engagement: "Deadly force may be used only when fired upon, hostile intent exists (if weapons are present, are they being aimed?), elements, mobs and or rioters threaten human life, sensitive equipment, and open free passage of relief supplies." The ROE at the time of the incident was "positive target ID is required prior to engagement." Soldiers also broke the Geneva Convention, which essentially says it is forbidden to shoot at structures possibly occupied by defenseless civilians, or to kill or wound an enemy (in this case a presumed enemy) who surrenders or who can no longer fight. After the ambush, Saunders testified that he left the TOC for the scene where Pat and the AMF were killed, and "we got the whole team down there" in the middle of the night in order to determine what happened. While explaining the actions of the AMF soldiers, he made a very unusual statement: "When they [the AMF soldiers] heard the trail serial make contact, my understanding was that all the AMF soldiers stayed with the vehicles minus one guy. And that one guy dismounted and moved with Corporal Tillman. When he positioned himself on the ridgeline, he was to be south of Corporal Tillman. So the first thing that the GMV [Baker's vehicle] saw when it [sic] looked up the hill was an AMF soldier in the prone with an AK-47 shooting across the road." I explain that I'm disturbed by the wording "was to be" when Saunders describes the position of the AMF. That phrasing is not often used in error. I tell Mr. Scheer and Ms. Zacchino that the remark implies that the position of the AMF soldier was planned. I explain that I have done some research and that it was highly unusual for AMF soldiers to get into fighting situations with U.S. troops in 2004; many of the soldiers testified to that. It disturbs me to speculate about the motives and actions of a man who is dead and who can't defend himself, especially when it appears he was trying to assist in the firefight, but that it was the AMF who drew the fire. I can't rule out anything under the circumstances. I also point out that Saunders states the AMF was in the prone position as a means of explaining why Baker couldn't identify his tiger-striped uniform. However, the AMF couldn't have been in a prone position facing downhill -- he was shot eight times in the chest. I explain that the most painful sections of the Jones report for me to read are those describing what happened to Pat and the graphic descriptions of his remains. I try to distance myself from my emotions and read the testimonies as if they are about someone else. But reading how First Sergeant Fuller found a section of Pat's brain and pieces of his skull is horrific: "As soon as the sun came up, I went to the place where Tillman died, and I took what was left of his head and put it in an ammo can, in a Ziploc bag; and I took it back to ... the CSH [combat support hospital] ... I wanted it to be with the body." I note that those remains never arrived in Rockville, Maryland, to be analyzed as evidence. Testimonies reveal that Pat's uniform, MOLLE, and RBA [1] were burned rather than sent with his body to the medical examiner's office. The uniform, in cases of suspected fratricide, is considered evidence and is to be returned with the soldier's body. Green-tipped U.S. rounds were identified on Pat's RBA within at least two hours -- grounds to deem Pat's death a potential fratricide. First Sergeant Fuller stated, "... there was no doubt in my mind that we shot him." Yet, the Cross Functional Team (CFT) commander who ordered the mission stated he knew the uniform and equipment were being destroyed but, "At the time, it didn't seem alarming to any of us because we didn't know it was a fratricide concern ... [And] at this point he'd already been zipped up and put on ice literally ... And there was no reason for any of us to haul around his uniform and that." This commander was crude and insensitive. I also believe he might be the man ultimately responsible for disregarding Uthlaut's vehement objections to splitting the troops. Captain Saunders's testimony in the 15-6 report states he told the Cross Functional Team commander of Uthlaut's objections to splitting the troops, but the commander ordered them split anyway. In the current report, Saunders states that he must have misunderstood the order the commander gave him and that he himself must take the blame for giving Uthlaut his final order. When General Jones asked the CFT commander, "Who made the decision that the platoon should be split?" He answered: "The platoon leader, sir," making it appear as though he had no idea Uthlaut had protested the order. He said that he, Saunders, and Dennis together developed the plan to get the vehicle picked up and the mission completed. He states that he told Saunders to get the Humvee and the wrecker linked up, get the Humvee dropped off, and have the platoon finish the clearing operations in Manah; splitting the platoon was not discussed. The commander was asked: "Did you ever tell Saunders to have the element split?" Answer: "No. I did not." He claims he did not know the platoon had been split until a couple of days after the fratricide, at a platoon meeting called an AAR (after action review), and that he would have questioned that move. He claims he had no idea about the communications between Uthlaut and Captain Dennis. Yet, Captain Dennis and First Sergeant Fuller both stated that at the TOC they observed Saunders talking to the CFT commander to tell him Uthlaut's concerns. Captain Dennis, the executive officer communicating with Uthlaut, testified that the split was originally Uthlaut's idea, although he offered it only as an option -- and the least desirable one -- if he was forced to hand off the disabled vehicle to the wrecker and get to Manah at the same time. As we know, "once it was chosen. he argued against it," Dennis said, adding that there was a discussion between the CFT commander and Saunders, which Saunders initiated about whether to split. Dennis said he was not present at the discussion but relayed the ensuing decision to split to Uthlaut. Dennis said he had a "gut feeling" that Saunders did not agree with the decision, but it was maybe something that was ordered." Usually in those circumstances, he said, the commander would defer to the platoon leader on the ground, especially one so firmly opposed to an order. I tell Mr. Scheer and Ms. Zacchino that Lieutenant Uthlaut, First Captain of his class at West Point, is a bright, highly capable young man; it was arrogant to ignore his concerns. Dennis said he regretted that he didn't argue Uthlaut's point more vigorously in the TOC because he agreed the split was a bad idea. First Sergeant Fuller testified: "I remember Captain Saunders walking over to me saying, 'They don't want to split the platoon. They want to keep them together.' And I said, 'I don't think they should. I think they should keep them together.' And he says, 'I'm going to go talk to [the CFT commander] again.' Captain Saunders didn't think they should split. I didn't either. Saunders went to talk to [the CFT commander] about it." Colonel Bailey also indicated in his testimony that he believed the CFT commander gave the order to split the platoon, but that he may not have known exactly when the platoon left. The commander testified that after the AAR meeting, it was clear the soldiers believed he ordered the split. "So I grabbed Satch [Saunders] afterwards and said, 'What the hell is going on here? And he told me, 'I thought you told me do it.' And I said, 'Satch, we worked on this plan together, and that was never my' -- I mean, that was kind of the whole ... disconnect that happened ... " Saunders testified to General Jones that the decision "was ultimately my decision to split them into two sections. I had based that on having the discussion with the Battalion XO or the Battalion S3 at the time, who was the CFT commander .... He told me ... words to the effect 'Hey, we can't have one vehicle stopping entirely [inaudible].' I know he said that. My understanding after that was that he said to split the platoon. He may or may not have said that. That might have been the way I understood it ... I know he said we cannot have one Ranger platoon stopped for one vehicle ... I think he said we need to look to split the platoon or something to that effect. He did not direct me to split the platoon; that was ultimately my decision." Saunders then said that he thought it would be all right to split the troops because each unit had a big gun, the .50 caliber in Serial One and the MK-19 in Serial Two. The MK-19 was Kevin's weapon, which it turned out immediately had jammed and would not fire. Saunders said each section had satellite radio and could communicate with Salerno. But Uthlaut's warnings that there would be no communication in the canyon were realized and contributed to the fratricide. Uthlaut testified that the plan was for his platoon to bivouac outside Manah the night of April 22 and clear it the next day, so he did not understand why the entire platoon could not stay together, drop off the disabled vehicle, then set up camp together and clear Manah the next morning. Uthlaut was asked: "Who told you [that] you had to have boots on the ground before dark ... ?" He answered: "Sir, those were my questions to them. I said, 'So the only reason you want me to split my platoon is to have boots on the ground in the sector before dark?' ... and the response I got back was 'Yes.''' Uthlaut also did not see the need for urgency, especially with the safety of his men at risk. First Sergeant Fuller also thought the split unwise. He and others testified that there was no intelligence about the enemy or anything else to justify the urgency: "it's just a timeline, and we feel like we have to stick with it, and that's what drives this kind of stuff." I tell Mr. Scheer and Ms. Zacchino that my family and I are very grateful that the investigation was done. General Jones revealed crucial information, but his report raises more questions than it comes close to answering, and appropriate consequences have not been meted out to soldiers or officers for negligent or possibly criminal actions. The first volume of the six volumes of the report begins with a briefing book, which contains a nearly incomprehensible explanation by General Jones about the confusion in the Tactical Operations Center over who ordered the split. It includes an explanation of how Saunders was offered immunity, and goes on for four pages, single-spaced. Jones says that he concluded that the CFT commander did not give the order to split and did not know about it prior to the after action review meeting. I read a portion of his statement: 1. "A critical piece of information to my original conclusion was Saunders' current belief in what [the Cross Functional team commander] told him on 22 April 2004 in the TOC. In his testimony in November 2004 and in his recent 23 February 2005 sworn statement, Saunders appeared to say that currently he is 'almost positive' that [CFT commander] told him to split the platoon. However, Saunders subsequently and repeatedly sought to clarify this portion of his statements, calling my legal adviser, [Lieutenant Colonel Michael] Hargis, several times. While Saunders was 'almost positive' on 22 April 2004 that [CFT commander] told him to split the platoon, he is positive now that [CFT commander] did not tell him to split the platoon. Saunders is also positive that he did not readdress the issue of splitting the platoon with [CFT commander] although he admits that he did tell [REDACTED] that he was going to do so. 2. "The clarification came after Saunders had been read his rights for false official statement and false swearing. This clarification came after [REDACTED] talked to [REDACTED] about his statement. [REDACTED] had been told that [REDACTED] had said he, Saunders, was 'almost positive' that [CFT commander] told him to split the platoon. [REDACTED] approaching a witness under these circumstances is not to be condoned. However, because Saunders corrected some language in his sworn statement, I believe that Saunders' recent clarifications are sincere and not the result of witness tampering by [CFT commander]." Jones also stated that even though Captain Dennis saw Saunders approach the CFT commander in the TOC with the intention of conveying Uthlaut's objections to the split, he found it "plausible" that Saunders never did bring it up because "he was unwilling to question his superior regarding the order ... "Jones concluded that, "The decision to split the platoon was, in my view, based upon a miscommunication of intent between Saunders and [CFT commander]." I don't know what to believe, but I do know from talking to various soldiers and from reading the documents that everyone present at the TOC knew Uthlaut was aggressively opposed to splitting the troops. I find it highly unlikely that the CFT commander was not aware of Uthlaut's position. My family and I remain perplexed as to why no one in the chain of command took Uthlaut's protest seriously. One of the most shameful and distasteful statements in all of the volumes comes from the officer placed in charge of the previous 15-6 investigation, whose name is redacted. In his testimony, he voiced criticism of our family, and Kevin in particular: "... nobody is satisfied with the answers in that family that they've been given. And it continuously, I mean it [is] just continuous through the last six months. I mean, personally, in my opinion, when this is done, sir, there is [sic] going to be more questions." Asked why he thought the family is not satisfied, this officer replied that he "found out" from a sergeant before Pat's "repatriation" ceremony, a ritual of sending a soldier's body home, that: "'[Kevin] Tillman doesn't want a chaplain involved in [Pat's] repatriation ceremony.' I'm like, 'Excuse me?' He goes, 'No, he doesn't want, they don't want a ... chaplain to preside over it.' And I'm like, 'Why is that?' He goes, 'Well, evidently he and his brother are atheists. That's the way they were raised.' I'm like, 'Well, you can tell Mr. Tillman that this ceremony ain't about him, it's about everybody in the Joint Task Force beading [sic] farewell to his brother, so there will be a chaplain and there will be prayers." He continued to tell Jones, "The underline [sic] ... discussion of the whole thing or the view is, those that are Christians can come to term [sic] with faith and the fact there is an afterlife, heaven, or whatnot. It is, I believe, it's being a Christian that it's easier to deal with that. Not being atheist, I'm not really sure what they believe or how they can get their head around death. So, in my personal opinion, sir, that is why I don't think they'll ever be satisfied. I mean, they were raised atheists, the father, I believe the mother is. I know Pat's wife, it's come out that she's -- they ... all are atheists. So I don't know if that's important but that's kind of the struggles that they're dealing with. And they do not want a chaplain even close to them, talking to them about Christianity and heaven or whatnot." Jones then called for a break in the testimony.
The officer's comments are extremely offensive. The religious beliefs of Pat and our family have nothing to do with Pat's death. I can't help wondering if this man's prejudice had any influence over how he conducted his investigation, or how serious he was about finding the truth. Unfortunately, the same thought occurs when I read the comments of General Jones during the testimony of First Sergeant Fuller, who laments having to go through these investigations and answer questions. Fuller says, "The bottom line is: It was our fault. It was the individuals' fault on the ground, and we know that ... Can you say it was Baker? Partly. Can you say it was the PL [platoon leader]? Partly. Ours [in the TOC] for making him move? Yeah ... I know we want to find out what happened here, but I've to ask for some [inaudible] for some of my privates who have had to say this over and over. And when they come and see me, wanting to go see this counselor again because ... it's bothering them again ... I mean he [Baker] was the team leader, and they were his guys ... I just hate to see my guys do this over and over." Jones, in apparent sympathy, says, "I appreciate your candor there, Top ["Top" is an Army colloquialism commonly used when addressing those holding the rank of first sergeant]. We don't like doing these things any more than anyone else does. Bottom line is the secretary of the Army is [inaudible] the system ... and we're just following through on questions that [McCain] asked us to look at. We're just going to look at the facts, and we're only going to report the facts. That's all there is to it. I share your concern and having to readdress this with kids that just have been traumatized over stuff like this that don't need it .... " "Stuff like this" is how they regard the death of Pat in circumstances riddled with problematic questions, contradictions, and unmistakable instances of intentional deceit? Stuff like this? There are so many disturbing statements in the files that it is impossible to list them all. Saunders testified that the chain of command at the platoon meeting after Pat's death told the soldiers not to talk about the incident because "we didn't want guys calling home" to spread rumors. More likely it was to try to keep a lid on the information in order to withhold from us or the American public the truth of how Pat died. There are more questionable files feeding our suspicions that the military wanted to cover up the truth of his death. For example, there is an e-mail about a press release announcing Pat's Silver Star award that has in the subject line: "CPL Tillman SS game plan." Game plan? There was testimony from top officers that they knew within days after Pat died that he was shot by fellow soldiers, but no one told the family. One officer whose name is redacted talks about how, as the incident started to break in the news, the investigation came up and "It went to the 2-star [general] level and the 2-star took it right to the 4-star level. Basically we, you know, came to USASOC [2] when basically all, you know, everything opened up and now all of a sudden, okay, it's sort of like, 'Here is the steak dinner, but we're giving it to you on this, you know, garbage can cover.' You know, 'You got it. You work it.'''
Mr. Scheer and Ms. Zacchino seem stunned and disturbed by all this information. They both find the most compelling and damning document in the entire report to be the testimony of Captain Richard Scott, the officer who was assigned to investigate within hours of Pat's death. _______________ Notes: 1. Ranger Body Armor. 2. US Army Special Operations Command. |
