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BOOTS ON THE GROUND BY DUSK: MY TRIBUTE TO PAT TILLMAN |
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Chapter 14
Kevin first met Captain Richard Scott before Pat's death while at the 2nd Battalion, 75th Regiment at Fort Lewis in Washington. Kevin left A Company after he learned Pat was killed in a fratricide situation. He no longer could work side by side with the soldiers who had killed his brother. The first time he remembers meeting Scott in an official capacity was when he was transferred from A Company to Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) to become part of a sniper section. Captain Scott was the Company Commander of HHC. Shortly after transferring to HHC, Kevin went to an army school called the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course (SOTIC) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He didn't recall spending significant time with Scott until he returned from SOTIC around late October or early November. At this point, our family had learned the secretary of the Army had appointed General Jones to further investigate Pat's death. Kevin went to Captain Scott on numerous occasions to vent his frustrations over the massive contradictions of information we had received and to get some advice as to how to address his dissatisfaction with General Jones when the time arrived for his testimony. As Kevin addressed some of the concerns about the disparities and conflicting information he received from the soldiers from his former platoon and from the most recent command briefing, Scott attempted to clarify some of the facts to dispel the confusion, contradictions, and inconsistencies regarding the investigation. After talking to Scott, Kevin was convinced that he felt the soldiers and officers involved in the investigation did not receive the appropriate level of punishment. It was at this point that Kevin realized that Scott was the initial 15-6 Investigating Officer assigned to ascertain the facts surrounding Pat's death. I find it hard to believe that LTC Bailey would place Kevin under Scott's command under the circumstances. As Kevin's Company Commander, Scott would have some obligation to his soldiers and their welfare. Kevin was shocked. He had no idea that Captain Scott had investigated Pat's death. He thought Major David Hodne had completed the investigation on which the 15-6 report was based. No one ever mentioned there had been an earlier investigation. Based on Scott's testimony, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Bailey appointed him to look into the circumstances of Pat's death less than twenty-four hours after it happened. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey had walked the area where Pat was killed, and based on what he observed, it was his belief that Pat's death had been caused by members of his own platoon. He felt it was necessary for Scott to begin his interviews right away. According to Scott's testimony, he had never done an investigation of this magnitude. His background was not in investigations; he was a Company Commander at the time of the incident. He told Kevin he is an Infantry Officer by profession and not a Criminal Investigator. He was not school-trained on forensics, investigating crime scenes, or collecting evidence. However, within hours of conducting interviews from key witnesses involved in the shooting, Scott quickly realized that Pat was most likely killed by friendly fire, rounds from his own platoon. Within eight to ten days Scott had completed his investigation without any assistance and informed his chain of command that he had concluded that Pat's death was the result of fratricide, and that there was potential for negligence on the part of soldiers on the ground and leaders at the TOC. After his report was sent to Regimental Headquarters, his superiors decided to conduct a second investigation at the regimental level, this time by a LTC and a JAG officer. Scott assumed it was because the findings and recommendations in his investigation revealed more serious implications. Scott let Kevin look over a copy of his report. After reading the report, paying close attention to the recommendations, he walked away from Scott's office furious. Several days after the discussion with Captain Scott, Kevin was called to give his testimony to General Jones. At that time, he informed General Jones that Captain Scott was the initial 15-6 Investigating Officer and recommended that General Jones call Captain Scott to testify. Kevin believed the facts were not "reflected accurately" in the regimental-level report. The report and the punishments seemed "diluted." Scott had concluded that there was potential for "gross negligence" and possible "criminal intent," and recommended the involvement of the Criminal Investigation Division. Captain Scott's report stated that soldiers in the lead vehicle were shooting at their own men who were located on the berm just east of a local village. Scott also stated that based on eyewitness testimony, the soldiers located on the berm were waving their hands and arms in an attempt to signal a cease fire. However, the soldiers in the lead vehicle continued to shoot at the village, which was occupied by local villagers. It was apparent that the soldiers in the lead vehicle were firing without being fired upon. Scott's report revealed that the radio telephone operator (RTO) and platoon leader were wounded as a result of rounds fired from the lead vehicle. The lead vehicle was commanded by Sergeant Baker: information Lieutenant Colonel Bailey had given us as fact when he came to our house a year ago, May 2004, yet the regimental report is vague and inconclusive. Kevin asked, "Why did [he] say that ... it's inconclusive? Referring to the regimental investigator, it just doesn't make sense ... why would [he] say that? Did ... he just not agree with [Scott's] findings, or ... did he have someone's foot on his head to water it down?" Before Kevin finished his interview with General Jones, he was adamant that the general call Captain Scott as a witness. We don't know if Jones was aware of the first investigation, or if he had intended to call Scott as a witness, but after Kevin's testimony, he had no choice. Mr. Scheer and Ms. Zacchino ask questions while trying to digest the information I have shared with them. Both tell me they want to do whatever they can to help my family get to the truth. After an hour or so, I walk them to their car and watch them back down the driveway as they solemnly wave good-bye. Back in the house, I sit down at the table, exhausted from going over the details in the documents sprawled out in front of me. I stare out the window, thinking about how difficult it must have been for Kevin, dealing with his loss and grief, to function as a soldier among men who might be either responsible for his brother's death, or suspect in covering it up. If Kevin had never brought up his concerns about Pat's death to Captain Scott, we never would have known about the first investigation. I marvel at the courage it took for him to confront General Jones, to tell him of the existence of Captain Scott's report, and to then insist that the general get testimony from Scott himself. Without Scott's testimony, we would not know how egregious the circumstances were, and we wouldn't have the substantial evidence we need to get justice for Pat. I reach for the binder that holds Captain Scott's testimony and start reading through it for the fifth time. Captain Scott was summoned to testify on November 19, 2004, two days after Kevin gave his statement. He told General Jones he was verbally appointed by Lieutenant Colonel Bailey to investigate the facts of Pat within twenty-four hours of the shooting of his death. Bailey told him to begin right away. A formal order to investigate would come from the regimental commander, Colonel James C. Nixon, on April 29, 2004. Captain Scott was based in Salerno when he conducted his witness interviews with soldiers, who testified under oath while facts were still fresh in their minds. Scott interviewed each witness individually. He sketched on a whiteboard where each soldier was during the incident, where they said each vehicle was located, where each serial was, the location of the villages, where every eyewitness was when the mission started, and where they were when Pat was killed. After each interview, "I went back on the computer and started drawing up each individual's eyewitness [account] to the point where I could piece it all together," Scott testified. He noted that each Ranger provided his own perspective, and it was "really like piecing together a puzzle." Then he brought each witness back and they made sworn statements, which Scott entered into his computer. The point was for them to confirm what they said in relation to the other witnesses, "And they came back and all confirmed that, 'yes, that was indeed what happened based on my recollection,''' Scott said. He offered Jones copies of all of the sworn statements, which he said were still in his computer. Captain Scott told Jones that he submitted his written report, including his recommendations, about "eight to ten days" after he began the assignment; it was recorded as completed on May 4, 2004, and went up Scott's chain of command to the regimental command. There, Scott testified, "They decided then that this was a little bigger than what we expected. I did confirm, based on my investigation, the conclusion that it was fratricide, based on the interviews and evidence and based on the photographs that were given to me." Scott testified that after his report was submitted, the regimental JAG officer came to see him and suggested some changes in "military lingo" to make it easier for non-military people to read his report. The officer also suggested some "repackaging" and "formatting" changes, but nothing of major substance. Scott said, for example, in his original report, he did not have "exhibits" in parentheses, so the JAG officer recommended that format. Aside from these rather cosmetic changes, "the contents [were] still there. Nothing really was taken out," Scott said. Scott then presented Jones with two documents that then were marked "Exhibit 1" -- the rough draft of his report -- and "Exhibit 2" -- the final copy, whose only difference from the rough draft was an opening paragraph of background. It was Exhibit 2 that Scott said was submitted to regimental headquarters. "I saw this original in the three-ring binder when I came back from Afghanistan. And now apparently we can't find it," Scott stated. "And so this is the only one that's out there, unless you have a copy." Jones asked Scott: "This is the only copy left, correct?" Scott responded: "I have it on my thumb drive, sir. I brought you a copy." [2] Scott said his report's conclusion of fratricide was confirmed at regimental headquarters. A couple of days later, he was told that "You did a Battalion Level 15-6. Now we are going ahead and execute or initiate a Regimental 15-6." Scott said he determined that was being done because of the seriousness of the situation, that "based on my investigation ... it was indeed fratricide," and he thought that it "could involve some Rangers that could be charged for criminal intent." He then told Jones: "I did bring an enclosure that shows my recommendation. And that was also sent up [to the regimental headquarters] as well. Mostly administrative recommendations, but, again, [I] brought that for your review." The general then asked Scott if he had any physical evidence provided to him during his investigation. Scott replied that the morning after Pat's death, his MOLLE vest was shown to him. "It was in a brown trash bag. I got to see it. Got to take a look at it and it ... had bullet holes. It was torn because of the fragments of bullets and different size holes." Jones asked if Scott saw fragments with green tips, or green markings on the MOLLE vest. (American rounds have green tips.) Scott said he could not recall, but other soldiers might. Jones asked if there were any bullet fragments and if so, what happened to them. Scott said he thought there were some, but he could not recall what happened to them. Jones asked whether he was given a .50- caliber round, and Scott responded that it had been lodged in a boulder and that he couldn't recall what he did with it. Jones turned to the incident itself and asked if there was "anyone in particular" who told Scott he called for a cease fire. Scott answered: "Up on the ridgeline, there were numerous Rangers yelling 'cease fire,' trying to call on the radio ... [1] Staff Sergeant Weeks trying to call on the radio to tell him cease fire. [Private First Class Bryan] O'Neal yelling 'cease fire' as he -- as soon as he learned that it was our guys shooting at their position. Numerous other Rangers, I can't recall their names. They're in here [his computer]. Pretty much all of them started yelling "cease fire" and using hand and arm signals at certain points. Scott testified that the shooters were firing into the village and onto the ridgeline so indiscriminately and with such little restraint that they even came close to hitting soldiers in a vehicle behind them. And Scott had absolutely no doubt that they did hit the platoon leader and radio operator near the village. Jones asked Scott what his recommendations were, and Scott, seeming to grow a bit frustrated, said, "Again sir, a copy of my recommendations [was] submitted along with my report. But ... " He did not complete the sentence. Like his report, his recommendations also were obviously misplaced. The regimental personnel lost Scott's original report and then his recommendations also. That had to have been the list Kevin saw when he transferred into Captain Scott's company. Thankfully, Scott then produced a draft version of his recommendations.
When he talks of "certain leaders" who were grossly negligent he is presumably referring to the Cross Functional Team commander and Captain William Saunders, the officers who were involved in the order to split the troops, despite Platoon Leader David Uthlaut's vehement but futile warnings that it would be dangerous to do so. There was also the CFT commander's insistence that there be "boots on the ground" in Manah by dark, as if there were some real urgency that made putting the troops in jeopardy worth the risk.
It is suspicious that a break is called now. Hargis is the JAG officer, the military's legal counsel in this investigation. He asked for a break just when Scott was implicating higher-ranking officers for negligence. The interview continued after the break.
I go back and reread what he had said just before the break: "I recommended that certain leaders be investigated if the investigation continued because I felt that there was some stuff negligent on their part ... because of what I thought was some gross negligence." Scott could not have been more clear, but then Hargis called for a break. Then, when Scott resumed interviewing, he appeared to have changed his testimony. I wonder if Jones or Hargis said something to him. Scott then said that "I don't know if it was legal" to interview officers of higher rank than he. A few minutes earlier, before the break, he had said he did not know if it was "appropriate to do that" because of their rank. Did Hargis tell him it was illegal to have interviewed higher-ranking officers? Hargis and Jones outrank Scott. Were they trying to keep him from implicating officers at the TOC? Scott then focused on the shooters, and started to get agitated: "I think Sergeant Baker demonstrated ... gross negligence with the actions he took. One, he recognized that ... the AMF soldier wasn't shooting in his direction but shot him and killed him anyways. And then I believe that he lost control of his vehicle, that he was responsible for number one, because he shot and killed that AMF soldier, and then two, again, the actions that everybody took within his vehicle." He then turned his attention to Private First Class Trevor Alders, the 249-gunner, quoting from his interview with Alders: " 'I was shooting where the rest of the GMV was shooting.' He's referring to Corporal Tillman's location ... 'As we were firing, I saw three or four arms pop up ... They did not look like cease-fire hand-and-arm signals because they were waving side-to-side.' So at this point they weren't receiving any fire at all ... No firing, no accurate firing, no effective firing, no firing at all except for what was coming out of the GMV [Baker's vehicle]." Scott testified that there were many attempts made to signal to the shooters that there were friendly forces on the ridgeline -- calling "cease fire," waving arms, Pat throwing a smoke grenade, and a sergeant on the ridgeline shooting a signal flare. Scott's testimony underscored the reality that Pat was killed in a senseless act by soldiers who were wildly and inexplicably out of control. Jones asked if Scott had anything more to add before ending his testimony, and the captain certainly did, though he initially stumbled through his words.
Scott saw the shooters as careless, irresponsible soldiers who acted methodically, not out of control, in some sort of "fog of war" situation. They outrageously ignored many warnings that they were shooting at fellow soldiers. Scott felt that his investigation was accurate and was upset that his battalion commander, Colonel Jeffrey Bailey, apparently decided to go with the regimental officer's more lenient recommendations. Scott continued:
In the middle of crucial testimony, Scott is abruptly told to stop talking and step outside. When the interview resumed, General Jones asked Scott about his opinion that witnesses had changed their stories from the time he interviewed them under oath in Afghanistan and later under questioning in the subsequent investigation conducted by the regimental officer. Scott explained that one key difference had to do with the time that elapsed while the shooters were attacking the ridgeline. He testified that based on his interviews with the eyewitnesses, he determined that the lead vehicle with Sergeant Baker "methodically came through [the canyon] and fired on the ridgeline in what I considered three volleys of fire." The first was when they passed the jinga truck and they fired straight into the ridgeline. The second was when they fired on the Rangers on the hill, who at that point realized they were being fired upon by their fellow soldiers because they saw tracers from the weapons. The soldiers on the ridgeline were waving their arms and yelling "cease fire." Scott said it was at this point that Pat threw the smoke grenade, and the smoke started to build. The shooters, also at this same moment, stopped firing as their vehicle rounded a corner and their view became obstructed by a corral and a mud hut. When they stopped firing, Pat thought the smoke signal had worked because there was a lull in the fire. But soon the vehicle passed the hut, and Baker and his crew started firing again. The third and last volley, Scott testified, "would be onto the village itself." Scott charged that the witnesses later tried to establish that "it was so quick that it was just one volley. It was during that one volley that Pat Tillman was killed ... [T]hey were trying to say that it was under a minute to show that it was very quick ... And I think in my investigation it was a little longer than that, so it was more methodically planned out." The distinction was extremely important, as it helped drive Scott to the conclusion of gross negligence. He believed the shooters had enough time to assess the situation and " ... these guys in the truck actually saw hands waving, could identify hands waving, could see movement up there, could actually see that ... their weapons systems are not only firing up at the ridgeline but also firing on the backside of the ridgeline and also towards the village, which leads me to believe that these guys were similar in control." Scott said, "... I think what they were trying to show ... the battalion commander was that this was a very short distance, very quick. It was very difficult to control anything. And I disagree with that." He believed they were in control, that their actions were methodical and they had plenty of time to assess the situation.
Scott was very distressed that testimony given to him under oath was changed. "[They] refit ... the location of the AMF soldier, that he was in the prone position, when, in fact, he was standing up. I know that because that's what [Staff Sergeant Baker] told me, that he was standing up and [he] dropped him and actually saw him falling down after he shot him." I vividly recall Bailey's "unofficial" briefing at my house when he said the Afghan soldier was standing when Baker killed him, and then at the official briefing at Ft. Lewis, where Bailey insisted that the Afghan soldier was prone when he was shot. He excused his change of story by saying he was "mistaken" when he was at my house. Now here was Captain Scott not only accusing these soldiers of changing their testimony on that point, but he has the proof -- their original statements -- and he is handing them to the investigators, literally. Allowing or encouraging the witnesses to say the Afghan soldier was prone when shot, that the time that elapsed over the course of the barrage was much shorter, and that the distance between Pat and the shooters was greater than originally stated all seemed designed to paint a picture different from reality. It made it easier to excuse the shooters for not being able to identify their targets as friendly. It made it acceptable to let them off with lenient disciplines. Scott complained that there were witnesses who testified in the regimental probe who he did not interrogate because they were not even on the scene when it happened. "Yet they were in there talking about the distance and the time ... [it] led me to believe that these guys were coming in there just to stick up for Baker ... doing whatever they could to retain him in the Army." Scott regretted that a few days later, Baker told his commander that he was leaving the Army. "[T]hat really ... was one of those things that kind of upset me, too," Scott said. "We had an opportunity to punish him, and now he leaves the system .... " He seemed put on the defensive when JAG officer Hargis asked: "Captain Scott, were you present in the battalion commander's office when these NCOs -- as you say -- changed their story?" "As you say?" If the question was intended to unsettle Scott further, it worked. Scott said that the NCOs and his chain of command, including Captain William Saunders, were in the room when Colonel Bailey called him in, and it was clear he felt broadsided. Hargis then pressed Scott to identify which individuals in the room changed their testimony, and in what way. Scott said he could not recall specifically who said what -- that was seven months before -- but all six NCOs seemed to speak "with one voice."
Jones completed his interrogation by telling Scott not to talk about his testimony, adding, "I appreciate your candor." I close the binder and glance wearily over at Pat's picture on the bookshelf in the adjacent room. Pat was honest and incorruptible in life. He would be offended and outraged about the actions taken in the aftermath of his death. We owe it to Pat to find out who is behind these deceptions, and how high it goes. _______________ Notes: 1. Scott would later tell the Defense Department's Inspector General that he "deleted the files from the thumb drive after meeting with Brigadier General Jones." 2. All names in the document were redacted. I inserted the names I could determine in brackets. 3. Field grade officers are commissioned officers senior in rank to a company officer but junior to a general officer; a major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel. 4. Non-commissioned officer. 5. Company-grade officers are typically assigned to a company as a platoon leader or executive officer or as a commander; a second lieutenant, first lieutenant, or captain. |