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Title
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Contents
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Prologue
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I. Introduction and Summary
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II. Covert Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation
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III. Assassination Planning and the Plots
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A. Congo
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B. Cuba
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C. Institutionalizing Assassination: The "Executive Action"
Capability
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Question of White House
Initiation, Authorization, or Knowledge
- 3. The Question of
Authorization or Knowledge of the Executive Action Project by the DCI
- 4. The Question of Whether
Project ZR/Rifle was Connected
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D. Trujillo
- 1. Summary
- 2. Background
- 3. Initial Contact with
Dissidents and Request for Arms
- 4. Summer and Fall of 1960
- 5. January 12, 1961 Special
Group Approval of
- 6. January 20, 1961-April 17,
1961
- 7. April 17, 1961--May 31,
1961
- 8. May 30, 1961 and
Immediately Thereafter
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E. Diem
- 1. Summary
- 2. The Abortive Coup of August
1963
- 3. The November 1963 Coup
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F. Schneider
- 1. Summary
- 2. The President's Initial
Instruction and Background
- 3. CIA's Implementation of
Track II
- 4. CIA Efforts to Promote a
Coup
- 5. CIA/White House
Communication During Track II
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IV. Findings and Conclusions
- A. Findings Concerning the
Plots Themselves
- 1. Officials of the United
States Government Initiated Plots
- 2. No Foreign Leaders Were
Killed as a Result of Assassination Plots
- 3. American Officials
Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots
- 4. The Plots Occurred in a
Cold War Atmosphere
- 5. American Officials Had
Exaggerated Notions About Their Abilities
- 6. CIA Officials Made Use of
Known Underworld Figures in Assassination Efforts
- B. Conclusions Concerning the
Plots Themselves
- 1. The United States Should
Not Engage in Assassination
- 2. The United States Should
Not Make Use of Underworld Figures
- C. Findings and Conclusions
Relating to Authorization and Control
- 1. The Apparent Lack of
Accountability in the Command and Control System
- 2. Findings Relating to the
Level at Which the Plots Were Authorized
- 3. CIA Officials Involved in
the Assassination Operations Perceived
- 4. The Failure in
Communication Between Agency Officials in Charge
- 5. Practices Current at the
Time in Which the Assassination Plots Occurred
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V. Recommendations
- A. General Agreement That the
United States Must Not Engage in Assassination
- B. CIA Directives Banning
Assassination
- C. The Need for a Statute
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Epilogue
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Statement of Joinder
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Appendix A: A Bill to make
unlawful
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Appendix B: Chronology of Major
Events
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Separate Views of Senator Philip
A. Hart
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Additional Views of Senator Robert
Morgan
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Additional Views of Senator Howard
H. Baker, Jr.
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Additional Views of Senator Barry
Goldwater
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Supplemental Views of Senator
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
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Abbreviations of Citations
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